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A cybercrook who has been setting up websites that mimic the self-destructing message service privnote.com accidentally exposed the breadth of their operations recently when they threatened to sue a software company. The disclosure revealed a profitable network of phishing sites that behave and look like the real Privnote, except that any messages containing cryptocurrency addresses will be automatically altered to include a different payment address controlled by the scammers.
The real Privnote, at privnote.com.
Launched in 2008, privnote.com employs technology that encrypts each message so that even Privnote itself cannot read its contents. And it doesnβt send or receive messages. Creating a message merely generates a link. When that link is clicked or visited, the service warns that the message will be gone forever after it is read.
Privnoteβs ease-of-use and popularity among cryptocurrency enthusiasts has made it a perennial target of phishers, who erect Privnote clones that function more or less as advertised but also quietly inject their own cryptocurrency payment addresses when a note is created that contains crypto wallets.
Last month, a new user on GitHub named fory66399 lodged a complaint on the βissuesβ page for MetaMask, a software cryptocurrency wallet used to interact with the Ethereum blockchain. Fory66399 insisted that their website β privnote[.]co β was being wrongly flagged by MetaMaskβs βeth-phishing-detectβ list as malicious.
βWe filed a lawsuit with a lawyer for dishonestly adding a site to the block list, damaging reputation, as well as ignoring the moderation department and ignoring answers!β fory66399 threatened. βProvide evidence or I will demand compensation!β
MetaMaskβs lead product manager Taylor Monahan replied by posting several screenshots of privnote[.]co showing the site did indeed swap out any cryptocurrency addresses.
After being told where they could send a copy of their lawsuit, Fory66399 appeared to become flustered, and proceeded to mention a number of other interesting domain names:
You sent me screenshots from some other site! Itβs red!!!!
The tornote.io website has a different color altogether
The privatenote,io website also has a different color! Whatβs wrong?????
A search at DomainTools.com for privatenote[.]io shows it has been registered to two names over as many years, including Andrey Sokol from Moscow and Alexandr Ermakov from Kiev. There is no indication these are the real names of the phishers, but the names are useful in pointing to other sites targeting Privnote since 2020.
DomainTools says other domains registered to Alexandr Ermakov include pirvnota[.]com, privatemessage[.]net, privatenote[.]io, and tornote[.]io.
A screenshot of the phishing domain privatemessage dot net.
The registration records for pirvnota[.]com at one point were updated from Andrey Sokol to βBPWβ as the registrant organization, and βTambov districtβ in the registrant state/province field. Searching DomainTools for domains that include both of these terms reveals pirwnote[.]com.
Other Privnote phishing domains that also phoned home to the same Internet address as pirwnote[.]com include privnode[.]com, privnate[.]com, and prevnΓ³te[.]com. Pirwnote[.]com is currently selling security cameras made by the Chinese manufacturer Hikvision, via an Internet address based in Hong Kong.
It appears someone has gone to great lengths to make tornote[.]io seem like a legitimate website. For example, this account at Medium has authored more than a dozen blog posts in the past year singing the praises of Tornote as a secure, self-destructing messaging service. However, testing shows tornote[.]io will also replace any cryptocurrency addresses in messages with their own payment address.
These malicious note sites attract visitors by gaming search engine results to make the phishing domains appear prominently in search results for βprivnote.β A search in Google for βprivnoteβ currently returns tornote[.]io as the fifth result. Like other phishing sites tied to this network, Tornote will use the same cryptocurrency addresses for roughly 5 days, and then rotate in new payment addresses.
Tornote changed the cryptocurrency address entered into a test note to this address controlled by the phishers.
Throughout 2023, Tornote was hosted with the Russian provider DDoS-Guard, at the Internet address 186.2.163[.]216. A review of the passive DNS records tied to this address shows that apart from subdomains dedicated to tornote[.]io, the main other domain at this address was hkleaks[.]ml.
In August 2019, a slew of websites and social media channels dubbed βHKLEAKSβ began doxing the identities and personal information of pro-democracy activists in Hong Kong. According to a report (PDF) from Citizen Lab, hkleaks[.]ml was the second domain that appeared as the perpetrators began to expand the list of those doxed.
HKleaks, as indexed by The Wayback Machine.
DomainTools shows there are more than 1,000 other domains whose registration records include the organization name βBPWβ and βTambov Districtβ as the location. Virtually all of those domains were registered through one of two registrars β Hong Kong-based Nicenic and Singapore-based WebCC β and almost all appear to be phishing or pill-spam related.
Among those is rustraitor[.]info, a website erected after Russia invaded Ukraine in early 2022 that doxed Russians perceived to have helped the Ukrainian cause.
An archive.org copy of Rustraitor.
In keeping with the overall theme, these phishing domains appear focused on stealing usernames and passwords to some of the cybercrime undergroundβs busiest shops, including Brianβs Club. What do all the phished sites have in common? They all accept payment via virtual currencies.
It appears MetaMaskβs Monahan made the correct decision in forcing these phishers to tip their hand: Among the websites at that DDoS-Guard address are multiple MetaMask phishing domains, including metarrnask[.]com, meternask[.]com, and rnetamask[.]com.
How profitable are these private note phishing sites? Reviewing the four malicious cryptocurrency payment addresses that the attackers swapped into notes passed through privnote[.]co (as pictured in Monahanβs screenshot above) shows that between March 15 and March 19, 2024, those address raked in and transferred out nearly $18,000 in cryptocurrencies. And thatβs just one of their phishing websites.
LeakSearch is a simple tool to search and parse plain text passwords using ProxyNova COMB (Combination Of Many Breaches) over the Internet. You can define a custom proxy and you can also use your own password file, to search using different keywords: such as user, domain or password.
In addition, you can define how many results you want to display on the terminal and export them as JSON or TXT files. Due to the simplicity of the code, it is very easy to add new sources, so more providers will be added in the future.
It is recommended to clone the complete repository or download the zip file. You can do this by running the following command:
FreshRSS 
git clone https://github.com/JoelGMSec/LeakSearch
_ _ ____ _
| | ___ __ _| | __/ ___| ___ __ _ _ __ ___| |__
| | / _ \/ _` | |/ /\___ \ / _ \/ _` | '__/ __| '_ \
| |__| __/ (_| | < ___) | __/ (_| | | | (__| | | |
|_____\___|\__,_|_|\_\|____/ \___|\__,_|_| \___|_| |_|
------------------- by @JoelGMSec -------------------
usage: LeakSearch.py [-h] [-d DATABASE] [-k KEYWORD] [-n NUMBER] [-o OUTPUT] [-p PROXY]
options:
-h, --help show this help message and exit
-d DATABASE, --database DATABASE
Database used for the search (ProxyNova or LocalDataBase)
-k KEYWORD, --keyword KEYWORD
Keyword (user/domain/pass) to search for leaks in the DB
-n NUMBER, --number NUMBER
Number of results to show (default is 20)
-o OUTPUT, --output OUTPUT
Save the results as json or txt into a file
-p PROXY, --proxy PROXY
Set HTTP/S proxy (like http://localhost:8080)
https://darkbyte.net/buscando-y-filtrando-contrasenas-con-leaksearch
This project is licensed under the GNU 3.0 license - see the LICENSE file for more details.
This tool has been created and designed from scratch by Joel GΓ‘mez Molina (@JoelGMSec).
This software does not offer any kind of guarantee. Its use is exclusive for educational environments and / or security audits with the corresponding consent of the client. I am not responsible for its misuse or for any possible damage caused by it.
For more information, you can find me on Twitter as @JoelGMSec and on my blog darkbyte.net.
Β
This is a tool designed for Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) purposes, which helps to gather information about employees of a company.
The tool starts by searching through LinkedIn to obtain a list of employees of the company. Then, it looks for their social network profiles to find their personal email addresses. Finally, it uses those email addresses to search through a custom COMB database to retrieve leaked passwords. You an easily add yours and connect to through the tool.
To use this tool, you'll need to have Python 3.10 installed on your machine. Clone this repository to your local machine and install the required dependencies using pip in the cli folder:
cd cli
pip install -r requirements.txt
We know that there is a problem when installing the tool due to the psycopg2 binary. If you run into this problem, you can solve it running:
cd cli
python3 -m pip install psycopg2-binary`
To use the tool, simply run the following command:
python3 cli/emploleaks.py
If everything went well during the installation, you will be able to start using EmploLeaks:
___________ .__ .__ __
\_ _____/ _____ ______ | | ____ | | ____ _____ | | __ ______
| __)_ / \____ \| | / _ \| | _/ __ \__ \ | |/ / / ___/
| \ Y Y \ |_> > |_( <_> ) |_\ ___/ / __ \| < \___ \
/_______ /__|_| / __/|____/\____/|____/\___ >____ /__|_ \/____ >
\/ \/|__| \/ \/ \/ \/
OSINT tool Γ°ΕΈβ’Β΅ to chain multiple apis
emploleaks>
Right now, the tool supports two functionalities:
First, you must set the plugin to use, which in this case is linkedin. After, you should set your authentication tokens and the run the impersonate process:
emploleaks> use --plugin linkedin
emploleaks(linkedin)> setopt JSESSIONID
JSESSIONID:
[+] Updating value successfull
emploleaks(linkedin)> setopt li-at
li-at:
[+] Updating value successfull
emploleaks(linkedin)> show options
Module options:
Name Current Setting Required Description
---------- ----------------------------------- ---------- -----------------------------------
hide yes no hide the JSESSIONID field
JSESSIONID ************************** no active cookie session in browser #1
li-at AQEDAQ74B0YEUS-_AAABilIFFBsAAAGKdhG no active cookie session in browser #1
YG00AxGP34jz1bRrgAcxkXm9RPNeYIAXz3M
cycrQm5FB6lJ-Tezn8GGAsnl_GRpEANRdPI
lWTRJJGF9vbv5yZHKOeze_WCHoOpe4ylvET
kyCyfN58SNNH
emploleaks(linkedin)> run i mpersonate
[+] Using cookies from the browser
Setting for first time JSESSIONID
Setting for first time li_at
li_at and JSESSIONID are the authentication cookies of your LinkedIn session on the browser. You can use the Web Developer Tools to get it, just sign-in normally at LinkedIn and press right click and Inspect, those cookies will be in the Storage tab.
Now that the module is configured, you can run it and start gathering information from the company:
We created a custom workflow, where with the information retrieved by Linkedin, we try to match employees' personal emails to potential leaked passwords. In this case, you can connect to a database (in our case we have a custom indexed COMB database) using the connect command, as it is shown below:
emploleaks(linkedin)> connect --user myuser --passwd mypass123 --dbname mydbname --host 1.2.3.4
[+] Connecting to the Leak Database...
[*] version: PostgreSQL 12.15
Once it's connected, you can run the workflow. With all the users gathered, the tool will try to search in the database if a leaked credential is affecting someone:
An imortant aspect of this project is the use of the indexed COMB database, to build your version you need to download the torrent first. Be careful, because the files and the indexed version downloaded requires, at least, 400 GB of disk space available.
Once the torrent has been completelly downloaded you will get a file folder as following:
Γ’βΕΓ’ββ¬Γ’ββ¬ count_total.sh
Γ’βΕΓ’ββ¬Γ’ββ¬ data
Γ’ββ Γ’βΕΓ’ββ¬Γ’ββ¬ 0
Γ’ββ Γ’βΕΓ’ββ¬Γ’ββ¬ 1
Γ’ββ Γ’ββ Γ’βΕΓ’ββ¬Γ’ββ¬ 0
Γ’ββ Γ’ββ Γ’βΕΓ’ββ¬Γ’ββ¬ 1
Γ’ββ Γ’ββ Γ’βΕΓ’ββ¬Γ’ββ¬ 2
Γ’ββ Γ’ββ Γ’βΕΓ’ββ¬Γ’ββ¬ 3
Γ’ββ Γ’ββ Γ’βΕΓ’ββ¬Γ’ββ¬ 4
Γ’ββ Γ’ββ Γ’βΕΓ’ββ¬Γ’&β¬ 5
Γ’ββ Γ’ββ Γ’βΕΓ’ββ¬Γ’ββ¬ 6
Γ’ββ Γ’ββ Γ’βΕΓ’ββ¬Γ’ββ¬ 7
Γ’ββ Γ’ββ Γ’βΕΓ’ββ¬Γ’ββ¬ 8
Γ’ββ Γ’ββ Γ’βΕΓ’ββ¬Γ’ββ¬ 9
Γ’ββ Γ’ββ Γ’βΕΓ’ββ¬Γ’ββ¬ a
Γ’ββ Γ’ββ Γ’βΕΓ’ββ¬Γ’ββ¬ b
Γ’ββ Γ’ββ Γ’βΕΓ’ββ¬Γ’ββ¬ c
Γ’ββ Γ’ββ Γ’βΕΓ’ββ¬Γ’ββ¬ d
Γ’ββ Γ’ββ Γ’βΕΓ’ββ¬Γ’ββ¬ e
Γ’ββ Γ’ββ Γ’βΕΓ’ββ¬Γ’ββ¬ f
Γ’ββ Γ’ββ Γ’βΕΓ’ββ¬Γ’ββ¬ g
Γ’ββ Γ’ββ Γ’βΕΓ’ββ¬Γ’ββ¬ h
Γ’ββ Γ’ββ Γ’βΕΓ’ββ¬Γ’ββ¬ i
Γ’ββ Γ’ββ Γ’βΕΓ’ββ¬Γ’ββ¬ j
Γ’ββ Γ’ββ Γ’βΕΓ’ββ¬Γ’ββ¬ k
Γ’ββ Γ’ββ Γ’βΕΓ’ββ¬Γ’ββ¬ l
Γ’ββ Γ’ββ Γ’βΕΓ’ββ¬Γ’ββ¬ m
Γ’ββ Γ’ββ Γ’βΕΓ’ β¬Γ’ββ¬ n
Γ’ββ Γ’ββ Γ’βΕΓ’ββ¬Γ’ββ¬ o
Γ’ββ Γ’ββ Γ’βΕΓ’ββ¬Γ’ββ¬ p
Γ’ββ Γ’ββ Γ’βΕΓ’ββ¬Γ’ββ¬ q
Γ’ββ Γ’ββ Γ’βΕΓ’ββ¬Γ’ββ¬ r
Γ’ββ Γ’ββ Γ’βΕΓ’ββ¬Γ’ββ¬ s
Γ’ββ Γ’ββ Γ’βΕΓ’ββ¬Γ’ββ¬ symbols
Γ’ββ Γ’ββ Γ’βΕΓ’ββ¬Γ’ββ¬ t
At this point, you could import all those files with the command create_db:
We are integrating other public sites and applications that may offer about a leaked credential. We may not be able to see the plaintext password, but it will give an insight if the user has any compromised credential:
Also, we will be focusing on gathering even more information from public sources of every employee. Do you have any idea in mind? Don't hesitate to reach us:
Or you con DM at @pastacls or @gaaabifranco on Twitter.
