“Vishing” occurs when criminals cold-call victims and attempt to persuade them to divulge personal information over the phone. These scammers are generally after credit card numbers and personal identifying information, which can then be used to commit financial theft. Vishing can occur both on your landline phone or via your cell phone.
The term is a combination of “voice,” and “phishing,” which is the use of spoofed emails to trick targets into clicking malicious links. Rather than email, vishing generally relies on automated phone calls that instruct targets to provide account numbers. Techniques scammers use to get your phone numbers include:
Once vishers have phone numbers, they employ various strategies to deceive their targets and obtain valuable personal information:
To protect yourself from vishing scams, you should:
Staying vigilant and informed is your best defense against vishing scams. By verifying caller identities, being skeptical of unsolicited requests for personal information, and using call-blocking tools, you can significantly reduce your risk of falling victim to these deceptive practices. Additionally, investing in identity theft protection services can provide an extra layer of security. These services monitor your personal information for suspicious activity and offer assistance in recovering from identity theft, giving you peace of mind in an increasingly digital world. Remember, proactive measures and awareness are key to safeguarding your personal information against vishing threats.
The post How to Protect Yourself from Vishing appeared first on McAfee Blog.
On March 8, 2024, KrebsOnSecurity published a deep dive on the consumer data broker Radaris, showing how the original owners are two men in Massachusetts who operated multiple Russian language dating services and affiliate programs, in addition to a dizzying array of people-search websites. The subjects of that piece are threatening to sue KrebsOnSecurity for defamation unless the story is retracted. Meanwhile, their attorney has admitted that the person Radaris named as the CEO from its inception is a fabricated identity.
Radaris is just one cog in a sprawling network of people-search properties online that sell highly detailed background reports on U.S. consumers and businesses. Those reports typically include the subject’s current and previous addresses, partial Social Security numbers, any known licenses, email addresses and phone numbers, as well as the same information for any of their immediate relatives.
Radaris has a less-than-stellar reputation when it comes to responding to consumers seeking to have their reports removed from its various people-search services. That poor reputation, combined with indications that the true founders of Radaris have gone to extraordinary lengths to conceal their stewardship of the company, was what prompted KrebsOnSecurity to investigate the origins of Radaris in the first place.
On April 18, KrebsOnSecurity received a certified letter (PDF) from Valentin “Val” Gurvits, an attorney with the Boston Law Group, stating that KrebsOnSecurity would face a withering defamation lawsuit unless the Radaris story was immediately retracted and an apology issued to the two brothers named in the story as co-founders.
That March story worked backwards from the email address used to register radaris.com, and charted an impressive array of data broker companies created over the past 15 years by Massachusetts residents Dmitry and Igor Lubarsky (also sometimes spelled Lybarsky or Lubarski). Dmitry goes by “Dan,” and Igor uses the name “Gary.”
Those businesses included numerous websites marketed to Russian-speaking people who are new to the United States, such as russianamerica.com, newyork.ru, russiancleveland.com, russianla.com, russianmiami.com, etc. Other domains connected to the Lubarskys included Russian-language dating and adult websites, as well as affiliate programs for their international calling card businesses.
A mind map of various entities apparently tied to Radaris and the company’s co-founders. Click to enlarge.
The story on Radaris noted that the Lubarsky brothers registered most of their businesses using a made-up name — “Gary Norden,” sometimes called Gary Nord or Gary Nard.
Mr. Gurvits’ letter stated emphatically that my reporting was lazy, mean-spirited, and obviously intended to smear the reputation of his clients. By way of example, Mr. Gurvits said the Lubarskys were actually Ukrainian, and that the story painted his clients in a negative light by insinuating that they were somehow associated with Radaris and with vaguely nefarious elements in Russia.
But more to the point, Mr. Gurvits said, neither of his clients were Gary Norden, and neither had ever held any leadership positions at Radaris, nor were they financial beneficiaries of the company in any way.
“Neither of my clients is a founder of Radaris, and neither of my clients is the CEOs of Radaris,” Gurvits wrote. “Additionally, presently and going back at least the past 10 years, neither of my clients are (or were) officers or employees of Radaris. Indeed, neither of them even owns (or ever owned) any equity in Radaris. In intentional disregard of these facts, the Article implies that my clients are personally responsible for Radaris’ actions. Therefore, you intentionally caused all negative allegations in the Article made with respect to Radaris to be imputed against my clients personally.”
Dan Lubarsky’s Facebook page, just prior to the March 8 story about Radaris, said he was from Moscow.
We took Mr. Gurvits’ word on the ethnicity of his clients, and adjusted the story to remove a single mention that they were Russian. We did so even though Dan Lubarsky’s own Facebook page said (until recently) that he was from Moscow, Russia.
KrebsOnSecurity asked Mr. Gurvits to explain precisely which other details in the story were incorrect, and replied that we would be happy to update the story with a correction if they could demonstrate any errors of fact or omission.
We also requested specifics about several aspects of the story, such as the identity of the current Radaris CEO — listed on the Radaris website as “Victor K.” Mr. Gurvits replied that Radaris is and always has been based in Ukraine, and that the company’s true founder “Eugene L” is based there.
While Radaris has claimed to have offices in Massachusetts, Cyprus and Latvia, its website has never mentioned Ukraine. Mr. Gurvits has not responded to requests for more information about the identities of “Eugene L” or “Victor K.”
Gurvits said he had no intention of doing anyone’s reporting for them, and that the Lubarskys were going to sue KrebsOnSecurity for defamation unless the story was retracted in full. KrebsOnSecurity replied that journalists often face challenges to things that they report, but it is more than rare for one who makes a challenge to take umbrage at being asked for supporting information.
On June 13, Mr. Gurvits sent another letter (PDF) that continued to claim KrebsOnSecurity was defaming his clients, only this time Gurvits said his clients would be satisfied if KrebsOnSecurity just removed their names from the story.
“Ultimately, my clients don’t care what you say about any of the websites or corporate entities in your Article, as long as you completely remove my clients’ names from the Article and cooperate with my clients to have copies of the Article where my clients’ names appear removed from the Internet,” Mr. Gurvits wrote.
The June 13 letter explained that the name Gary Norden was a pseudonym invented by the Radaris marketing division, but that neither of the Lubarsky brothers were Norden.
This was a startling admission, given that Radaris has quoted the fictitious Gary Norden in press releases published and paid for by Radaris, and in news media stories where the company is explicitly seeking money from investors. In other words, Radaris has been misrepresenting itself to investors from the beginning. Here’s a press release from Radaris that was published on PR Newswire in April 2011:
A press release published by Radaris in 2011 names the CEO of Radaris as Gary Norden, which was a fake name made up by Radaris’ marketing department.
In April 2014, the Boston Business Journal published a story (PDF) about Radaris that extolled the company’s rapid growth and considerable customer base. The story noted that, “to date, the company has raised less than $1 million from Cyprus-based investment company Difive.”
“We live in a world where information becomes much more broad and much more available every single day,” the Boston Business Journal quoted Radaris’ fake CEO Gary Norden, who by then had somehow been demoted from CEO to vice president of business development.
A Boston Business Journal story from April 2014 quotes the fictitious Radaris CEO Gary Norden.
“We decided there needs to be a service that allows for ease of monitoring of information about people,” the fake CEO said. The story went on to say Radaris was seeking to raise between $5 million and $7 million from investors in the ensuing months.
In his most recent demand letter, Mr. Gurvits helpfully included resumes for both of the Lubarsky brothers.
Dmitry Lubarsky’s resume states he is the owner of Difive.com, a startup incubator for IT companies. Recall that Difive is the same company mentioned by the fake Radaris CEO in the 2014 Boston Business Journal story, which said Difive was the company’s initial and sole investor.
Difive’s website in 2016 said it had offices in Boston, New York, San Francisco, Riga (Latvia) and Moscow (nothing in Ukraine). Meanwhile, DomainTools.com reports difive.com was originally registered in 2007 to the fictitious Gary Norden from Massachusetts.
Archived copies of the Difive website from 2017 include a “Portfolio” page indexing all of the companies in which Difive has invested. That list, available here, includes virtually every “Gary Norden” domain name mentioned in my original report, plus a few that escaped notice earlier.
Dan Lubarsky’s resume says he was CEO of a people search company called HumanBook. The Wayback machine at archive.org shows the Humanbook domain (humanbook.com) came online around April 2008, when the company was still in “beta” mode.
By August 2008, however, humanbook.com had changed the name advertised on its homepage to Radaris Beta. Eventually, Humanbook simply redirected to radaris.com.
Astute readers may notice that the domain radaris.com is not among the companies listed as Difive investments. However, passive domain name system (DNS) records from DomainTools show that between October 2023 and March 2024 radaris.com was hosted alongside all of the other Gary Norden domains at the Internet address range 38.111.228.x.
That address range simultaneously hosted every domain mentioned in this story and in the original March 2024 report as connected to email addresses used by Gary Norden, including radaris.com, radaris.ru, radaris.de, difive.com, privet.ru, blog.ru, comfi.com, phoneowner.com, russianamerica.com, eprofit.com, rehold.com, homeflock.com, humanbook.com and dozens more. A spreadsheet of those historical DNS entries for radaris.com is available here (.csv).
Image: DomainTools.com
The breach tracking service Constella Intelligence finds just two email addresses ending in difive.com have been exposed in data breaches over the years: dan@difive.com, and gn@difive.com. Presumably, “gn” stands for Gary Norden.
A search on the email address gn@difive.com via the breach tracking service osint.industries reveals this address was used to create an account at Airbnb under the name Gary, with the last four digits of the account’s phone number ending in “0001.”
Constella Intelligence finds gn@difive.com was associated with the Massachusetts number 617-794-0001, which was used to register accounts for “Igor Lybarsky” from Wellesley or Sherborn, Ma. at multiple online businesses, including audiusa.com and the designer eyewear store luxottica.com.
The phone number 617-794-0001 also appears for a “Gary Nard” user at russianamerica.com. Igor Lubarsky’s resume says he was the manager of russianamerica.com.
DomainTools finds 617-794-0001 is connected to registration records for three domains, including paytone.com, a domain that Dan Lubarsky’s resume says he managed. DomainTools also found that number on the registration records for trustoria.com, another major consumer data broker that has an atrocious reputation, according to the Better Business Bureau.
Dan Lubarsky’s resume says he was responsible for several international telecommunications services, including the website comfi.com. DomainTools says the phone number connected to that domain — 617-952-4234 — was also used on the registration records for humanbook.net/biz/info/mobi/us, as well as for radaris.me, radaris.in, and radaris.tel.
Two other key domains are connected to that phone number. The first is barsky.com, which is the website for Barsky Estate Realty Trust (PDF), a real estate holding company controlled by the Lubarskys. Naturally, DomainTools finds barsky.com also was registered to a Gary Norden from Massachusetts. But the organization listed in the barsky.com registration records is Comfi Inc., a VOIP communications firm that Dan Lubarsky’s resume says he managed.
The other domain of note is unipointtechnologies.com. Dan Lubarsky’s resume says he was the CEO of Wellesley Hills, Mass-based Unipoint Technology Inc. In 2012, Unipoint was fined $179,000 by the U.S. Federal Communications Commission, which said the company had failed to apply for a license to provide international telecommunications services.
A pandemic assistance loan granted in 2020 to Igor Lybarsky of Sherborn, Ma. shows he received the money to an entity called Norden Consulting.
Notice the name on the recipient of this government loan for Igor Lybarsky from Sherborn, Ma: Norden Consulting.
The 2011 Radaris press release quoting their fake CEO Gary Norden said the company had four patents pending from a team of computer science PhDs. According to the resume shared by Mr. Gurvits, Dan Lubarsky has a PhD in computer science.
The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) says Dan Lubarsky/Lubarski has at least nine technology patents to his name. The fake CEO press release from Radaris mentioning its four patents was published in April 2011. By that time, the PTO says Dan Lubarsky had applied for exactly four patents, including, “System and Method for a Web-Based People Directory.” The first of those patents, published in 2009, is tied to Humanbook.com, the company Dan Lubarsky founded that later changed its name to Radaris.
If the Lubarskys were never involved in Radaris, how do they or their attorney know the inside information that Gary Norden is a fiction of Radaris’ marketing department? KrebsOnSecurity has learned that Mr. Gurvits is the same attorney responding on behalf of Radaris in a lawsuit against the data broker filed earlier this year by Atlas Data Privacy.
Mr. Gurvits also stepped forward as Radaris’ attorney in a class action lawsuit the company lost in 2017 because it never contested the claim in court. When the plaintiffs told the judge they couldn’t collect on the $7.5 million default judgment, the judge ordered the domain registry Verisign to transfer the radaris.com domain name to the plaintiffs.
Mr. Gurvits appealed the verdict, arguing that the lawsuit hadn’t named the actual owners of the Radaris domain name — a Cyprus company called Bitseller Expert Limited — and thus taking the domain away would be a violation of their due process rights.
The judge ruled in Radaris’ favor — halting the domain transfer — and told the plaintiffs they could refile their complaint. Soon after, the operator of Radaris changed from Bitseller to Andtop Company, an entity formed (PDF) in the Marshall Islands in Oct. 2020. Andtop also operates the aforementioned people-search service Trustoria.
Mr. Gurvits’ most-publicized defamation case was a client named Aleksej Gubarev, a Russian technology executive whose name appeared in the Steele Dossier. That document included a collection of salacious, unverified information gathered by the former British intelligence officer Christopher Steele during the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign at the direction of former president Donald Trump’s political rivals.
Gubarev, the head of the IT services company XBT Holding and the Florida web hosting firm Webzilla, sued BuzzFeed for publishing the Steele dossier. One of the items in the dossier alleged that XBT/Webzilla and affiliated companies played a key role in the hack of Democratic Party computers in the spring of 2016. The memo alleged Gubarev had been coerced into providing services to Russia’s main domestic security agency, known as the FSB.
In December 2018, a federal judge in Miami ruled in favor of BuzzFeed, saying the publication was protected by the fair report privilege, which gives news organizations latitude in reporting on official government proceedings.
Radaris was originally operated by Bitseller Expert Limited. Who owns Bitseller Expert Limited? A report (PDF) obtained from the Cyprus business registry shows this company lists its director as Pavel Kaydash from Moscow. Mr. Kaydash could not be reached for comment.
A 22-year-old man from the United Kingdom arrested this week in Spain is allegedly the ringleader of Scattered Spider, a cybercrime group suspected of hacking into Twilio, LastPass, DoorDash, Mailchimp, and nearly 130 other organizations over the past two years.
The Spanish daily Murcia Today reports the suspect was wanted by the FBI and arrested in Palma de Mallorca as he tried to board a flight to Italy.
A still frame from a video released by the Spanish national police shows Tylerb in custody at the airport.
“He stands accused of hacking into corporate accounts and stealing critical information, which allegedly enabled the group to access multi-million-dollar funds,” Murcia Today wrote. “According to Palma police, at one point he controlled Bitcoins worth $27 million.”
The cybercrime-focused Twitter/X account vx-underground said the U.K. man arrested was a SIM-swapper who went by the alias “Tyler.” In a SIM-swapping attack, crooks transfer the target’s phone number to a device they control and intercept any text messages or phone calls sent to the victim — including one-time passcodes for authentication, or password reset links sent via SMS.
“He is a known SIM-swapper and is allegedly involved with the infamous Scattered Spider group,” vx-underground wrote on June 15, referring to a prolific gang implicated in costly data ransom attacks at MGM and Caesars casinos in Las Vegas last year.
Sources familiar with the investigation told KrebsOnSecurity the accused is a 22-year-old from Dundee, Scotland named Tyler Buchanan, also allegedly known as “tylerb” on Telegram chat channels centered around SIM-swapping.
In January 2024, U.S. authorities arrested another alleged Scattered Spider member — 19-year-old Noah Michael Urban of Palm Coast, Fla. — and charged him with stealing at least $800,000 from five victims between August 2022 and March 2023. Urban allegedly went by the nicknames “Sosa” and “King Bob,” and is believed to be part of the same crew that hacked Twilio and a slew of other companies in 2022.
Investigators say Scattered Spider members are part of a more diffuse cybercriminal community online known as “The Com,” wherein hackers from different cliques boast loudly about high-profile cyber thefts that almost invariably begin with social engineering — tricking people over the phone, email or SMS into giving away credentials that allow remote access to corporate internal networks.
One of the more popular SIM-swapping channels on Telegram maintains a frequently updated leaderboard of the most accomplished SIM-swappers, indexed by their supposed conquests in stealing cryptocurrency. That leaderboard currently lists Sosa as #24 (out of 100), and Tylerb at #65.
In August 2022, KrebsOnSecurity wrote about peering inside the data harvested in a months-long cybercrime campaign by Scattered Spider involving countless SMS-based phishing attacks against employees at major corporations. The security firm Group-IB called the gang by a different name — 0ktapus, a nod to how the criminal group phished employees for credentials.
The missives asked users to click a link and log in at a phishing page that mimicked their employer’s Okta authentication page. Those who submitted credentials were then prompted to provide the one-time password needed for multi-factor authentication.
These phishing attacks used newly-registered domains that often included the name of the targeted company, and sent text messages urging employees to click on links to these domains to view information about a pending change in their work schedule. The phishing sites also featured a hidden Telegram instant message bot to forward any submitted credentials in real-time, allowing the attackers to use the phished username, password and one-time code to log in as that employee at the real employer website.
One of Scattered Spider’s first big victims in its 2022 SMS phishing spree was Twilio, a company that provides services for making and receiving text messages and phone calls. The group then pivoted, using their access to Twilio to attack at least 163 of its customers.
A Scattered Spider phishing lure sent to Twilio employees.
Among those was the encrypted messaging app Signal, which said the breach could have let attackers re-register the phone number on another device for about 1,900 users.
Also in August 2022, several employees at email delivery firm Mailchimp provided their remote access credentials to this phishing group. According to Mailchimp, the attackers used their access to Mailchimp employee accounts to steal data from 214 customers involved in cryptocurrency and finance.
On August 25, 2022, the password manager service LastPass disclosed a breach in which attackers stole some source code and proprietary LastPass technical information, and weeks later LastPass said an investigation revealed no customer data or password vaults were accessed.
However, on November 30, 2022 LastPass disclosed a far more serious breach that the company said leveraged data stolen in the August breach. LastPass said criminal hackers had stolen encrypted copies of some password vaults, as well as other personal information.
In February 2023, LastPass disclosed that the intrusion involved a highly complex, targeted attack against an engineer who was one of only four LastPass employees with access to the corporate vault. In that incident, the attackers exploited a security vulnerability in a Plex media server that the employee was running on his home network, and succeeded in installing malicious software that stole passwords and other authentication credentials. The vulnerability exploited by the intruders was patched back in 2020, but the employee never updated his Plex software.
Plex announced its own data breach one day before LastPass disclosed its initial August intrusion. On August 24, 2022, Plex’s security team urged users to reset their passwords, saying an intruder had accessed customer emails, usernames and encrypted passwords.
Sosa and Tylerb were both subjected to physical attacks from rival SIM-swapping gangs. These communities have been known to settle scores by turning to so-called “violence-as-a-service” offerings on cybercrime channels, wherein people can be hired to perform a variety geographically-specific “in real life” jobs, such as bricking windows, slashing car tires, or even home invasions.
In 2022, a video surfaced on a popular cybercrime channel purporting to show attackers hurling a brick through a window at an address that matches the spacious and upscale home of Urban’s parents in Sanford, Fl.
January’s story on Sosa noted that a junior member of his crew named “Foreshadow” was kidnapped, beaten and held for ransom in September 2022. Foreshadow’s captors held guns to his bloodied head while forcing him to record a video message pleading with his crew to fork over a $200,000 ransom in exchange for his life (Foreshadow escaped further harm in that incident).
According to several SIM-swapping channels on Telegram where Tylerb was known to frequent, rival SIM-swappers hired thugs to invade his home in February 2023. Those accounts state that the intruders assaulted Tylerb’s mother in the home invasion, and that they threatened to burn him with a blowtorch if he didn’t give up the keys to his cryptocurrency wallets. Tylerb was reputed to have fled the United Kingdom after that assault.
KrebsOnSecurity sought comment from Mr. Buchanan, and will update this story in the event he responds.
My mother recently turned 80, so of course a large celebration was in order. With 100 plus guests, entertainment, and catering to organise, the best way for me to keep everyone updated (and share tasks) was to use Google Docs. Gee, it worked well. My updates could immediately be seen by everyone, the family could access it from all the devices, and it was free to use! No wonder Google has a monopoly on drive and document sharing.
But here’s the thing – hackers know just how much both individuals and businesses have embraced Google products. So, it makes complete sense that they use reputable companies such as Google to devise phishing emails that are designed to extract our personal information. In fact, the Google Docs phishing scam was widely regarded as one of the most successful personal data extraction scams to date. They know that billions of people worldwide use Google so an invitation to click a link and view a document does not seem like an unreasonable email to receive. But it caused so much grief for so many people.
Emails designed to trick you into sharing your personal information are a scammer’s bread and butter. This is essentially what phishing is. It is by far the most successful tool they use to get their hands on your personal data and access your email.
‘But why do they want my email logins?’ – I hear you ask. Well, email accounts are what every scammer dreams of – they are a treasure trove of personally identifiable material that they can either steal or exploit. They could also use your email to launch a wide range of malicious activities from spamming and spoofing to spear phishing. Complicated terms, I know but in essence these are different types of phishing strategies. So, you can see why they are keen!!
But successful phishing emails usually share a few criteria which is important to know. Firstly, the email looks like it has been sent from a legitimate company e.g. Microsoft, Amex, or Google. Secondly, the email has a strong ‘call to action’ e.g. ‘your password has been changed, if this is not the case, please click here’. And thirdly, the email does not seem too out of place or random from the potential victim’s perspective.
Despite the fact that scammers are savvy tricksters, there are steps you can take to maximise the chances your email remains locked away from their prying eyes. Here’s what I suggest:
Never respond to an unexpected email or website that asks you for personal information or your login details no matter how professional it looks. If you have any doubts, always contact the company directly to verify.
Make sure you have super-duper internet security software that includes all the bells and whistles. Not only does internet security software McAfee+ include protection for daily browsing but it also has a password manager, a VPN, and a social privacy manager that will lock down your privacy settings on your social media accounts. A complete no-brainer!
Avoid using public Wi-Fi to log into your email from public places. It takes very little effort for a hacker to position themselves between you and the connection point. So, it’s entirely possible for them to be in receipt of all your private information and logins which clearly you don’t want. If you really need to use it, invest in a Virtual Private Network (VPN) which will ensure everything you share via Wi-Fi will be encrypted. Your McAfee+ subscription includes a VPN.
Public computers should also be avoided even just to ‘check your email’. Not only is there a greater chance of spyware on untrusted computers but some of them sport key-logging programs which can both monitor and record the keys you strike on the keyboard – a great way of finding out your password!
Ensuring each of your online accounts has its own unique, strong, and complex password is one of the best ways of keeping hackers out of your life. I always suggest at least 10-12 characters with a combination of upper and lower case letters, symbols, and numbers. A crazy nonsensical sentence is a great option here but better still is a password manager that will remember and generate passwords that no human could! A password manager is also part of your McAfee+ online security pack.
Even if you have taken all the necessary steps to protect your email from hackers, there is the chance that your email logins may be leaked in a data breach. A data breach happens when a company’s data is accessed by scammers and customers’ personal information is stolen. You may remember the Optus, Medibank and Latitude hacks of 2022/23?
If you have had your personal information stolen, please be assured that there are steps you can take to remedy this. The key is to act fast. Check out my recent blog post here for everything you need to know.
So, next time you’re organising a big gathering don’t hesitate to use Google Docs to plan or Microsoft Teams to host your planning meetings. While the thought of being hacked might make you want to withdraw, please don’t. Instead, cultivate a questioning mindset in both yourself and your kids, and always have a healthy amount of suspicion when going about your online life. You’ve got this!!
Till next time,
Stay safe!
Alex
The post How To Prevent Your Emails From Being Hacked appeared first on McAfee Blog.
I think I could count on my hand the people I know who have NOT had their email hacked. Maybe they found a four-leaf clover when they were kids!
Email hacking is one of the very unfortunate downsides of living in our connected, digital world. And it usually occurs as a result of a data breach – a situation that even the savviest tech experts find themselves in.
In simple terms, a data breach happens when personal information is accessed, disclosed without permission, or lost. Companies, organisations, and government departments of any size can be affected. Data stolen can include customer login details (email addresses and passwords), credit card numbers, identifying IDs of customers e.g. driver’s license numbers and/or passport numbers, confidential customer information, company strategy, or even matters of national security.
Data breaches have made headlines, particularly over the last few years. When the Optus and Medibank data breaches hit the news in 2022 affecting almost 10 million Aussies a piece, we were all shaken. But then when Aussie finance company Latitude, was affected in 2023 with a whopping 14 million people from both Australia and New Zealand affected, it almost felt inevitable that by now, most of us would have been impacted.
But these were the data breaches that grabbed our attention. The reality is that data breaches have been happening for years. In fact, the largest data breach in Australian history actually happened in May 2019 to the online design site Canva which affected 137 million users globally including many Aussies.
So, in short – it can happen to anyone, and the chances are you may have already been affected.
The sole objective of a hacker is to get their hands on your data. And any information that you share in your email account can be very valuable to them. But why do they want your data, you ask? It’s simple really – so they can cash in! Some will keep the juicy stuff for themselves – passwords or logins to government departments or large companies they may want to ’target’ with the aim of extracting valuable data and/or funds. But the more sophisticated ones will sell your details including name, telephone, email address, and credit card details, and cash in on the Dark Web. They often do this in batches. Some experts believe they can get as much as AU$250 for a full set of details including credit cards. So, you can see why they’d be interested in you!
The other reason why hackers will be interested in your email address and password is that many of us re-use these login details across our other online accounts too. So, once they’ve got their hands on your email credentials then they may be able to access your online banking and investment accounts – the possibilities are endless if you are using the same login credentials everywhere. So, you can see why I harp on about using a unique password for every online account!
There is a plethora of statistics on just how big this issue is – all of them concerning.
According to the Australian Institute of Criminology, there were over 16,000 reports of identity theft in 2022.
The Department of Home Affairs and Stay Smart Australia reports that cybercrime costs Australian businesses $29 billion a year with the average business spending around $275,000 to remedy a data breach
And although there has been a slight reduction in Aussies falling for phishing scams in recent years (down from 2.7% in 2020/1 to 2.5% in 2022/3), more Australians are falling victim to card fraud scams with a total of $2.2 billion lost in 2023.
But regardless of which statistic you choose to focus on, we have a big issue on our hands!
If you find yourself a victim of email hacking there are a few very important steps you need to take and the key is to take them FAST!!
This is the very first thing you must do to ensure the hacker can’t get back into your account. It is essential that your new password is complex and totally unrelated to previous passwords. Always use at least 8-10 characters with a variety of upper and lower case and throw in some symbols and numbers. I really like the idea of a crazy, nonsensical sentence – easier to remember and harder to crack! But, better still, get yourself a password manager that will create a password that no human would be capable of creating.
If you find the hacker has locked you out of your account by changing your password, you will need to reset the password by clicking on the ‘Forgot My Password’ link.
This is time-consuming but essential. Ensure you change any other accounts that use the same username and password as your compromised email. Hackers love the fact that many people still use the same logins for multiple accounts, so it is guaranteed they will try your info in other email applications and sites such as PayPal, Amazon, Netflix – you name it!
Once the dust has settled, please review your password strategy for all your online accounts. A best practice is to ensure every online account has its own unique and complex password.
A big part of the hacker’s strategy is to ‘get their claws’ into your address book with the aim of hooking others as well. Send a message to all your email contacts as soon as possible so they know to avoid opening any emails (most likely loaded with malware) that have come from you.
Yes, multi-factor authentication (or 2-factor authentication) adds another step to your login but it also adds another layer of protection. Enabling this will mean that in addition to your password, you will need a special one-time use code to log in. This can be sent to your mobile phone or alternatively, it may be generated via an authenticator app. So worthwhile!
It is not uncommon for hackers to modify your email settings so that a copy of every email you receive is automatically forwarded to them. Not only can they monitor your logins for other sites, but they’ll keep a watchful eye over any particularly juicy personal information. So, check your mail forwarding settings to ensure no unexpected email addresses have been added.
Don’t forget to check your email signature to ensure nothing spammy has been added. Also, ensure your ‘reply to’ email address is actually yours! Hackers have been known to create an email address here that looks similar to yours – when someone replies, it goes straight to their account, not yours!
This is essential also. If you find anything, please ensure it is addressed, and then change your email password again. And if you don’t have it – please invest. Comprehensive security software will provide you with a digital shield for your online life. McAfee+ lets you protect all your devices – including your smartphone – from viruses and malware. It also contains a password manager to help you remember and generate unique passwords for all your accounts.
If you have been hacked several times and your email provider isn’t mitigating the amount of spam you are receiving, then consider starting afresh but don’t delete your email address. Many experts warn against deleting email accounts as most email providers will recycle your old email address. This could mean a hacker could spam every site they can find with a ‘forgot my password’ request and try to impersonate you – identity theft!
Your email is an important part of your online identity so being vigilant and addressing any fallout from hacking is essential for your digital reputation. And even though it may feel that ‘getting hacked’ is inevitable, you can definitely reduce your risk by installing some good quality security software on all your devices. Comprehensive security software such as McAfee+ will alert you when visiting risky websites, warn you when a download looks ‘dodgy’, and will block annoying and dangerous emails with anti-spam technology.
It makes sense really – if you don’t receive the ‘dodgy’ phishing email – you can’t click on it! Smart!
And finally, don’t forget that hackers love social media – particularly those of us who overshare on it. So, before you post details of your adorable new kitten, remember it may just provide the perfect clue for a hacker trying to guess your email password!
Till next time
Alex
The post What to Do If Your Email Is Hacked appeared first on McAfee Blog.
An open-source, prototype implementation of property graphs for JavaScript based on the esprima parser, and the EsTree SpiderMonkey Spec. JAW can be used for analyzing the client-side of web applications and JavaScript-based programs.
This project is licensed under GNU AFFERO GENERAL PUBLIC LICENSE V3.0
. See here for more information.
JAW has a Github pages website available at https://soheilkhodayari.github.io/JAW/.
Release Notes:
JAW-V2
branch.JAW-V1
branch.The architecture of the JAW is shown below.
JAW can be used in two distinct ways:
Arbitrary JavaScript Analysis: Utilize JAW for modeling and analyzing any JavaScript program by specifying the program's file system path
.
Web Application Analysis: Analyze a web application by providing a single seed URL.
Use the collected web resources to create a Hybrid Program Graph (HPG), which will be imported into a Neo4j database.
Optionally, supply the HPG construction module with a mapping of semantic types to custom JavaScript language tokens, facilitating the categorization of JavaScript functions based on their purpose (e.g., HTTP request functions).
Query the constructed Neo4j
graph database for various analyses. JAW offers utility traversals for data flow analysis, control flow analysis, reachability analysis, and pattern matching. These traversals can be used to develop custom security analyses.
JAW also includes built-in traversals for detecting client-side CSRF, DOM Clobbering and request hijacking vulnerabilities.
The outputs will be stored in the same folder as that of input.
The installation script relies on the following prerequisites: - Latest version of npm package manager
(node js) - Any stable version of python 3.x
- Python pip
package manager
Afterwards, install the necessary dependencies via:
$ ./install.sh
For detailed
installation instructions, please see here.
You can run an instance of the pipeline in a background screen via:
$ python3 -m run_pipeline --conf=config.yaml
The CLI provides the following options:
$ python3 -m run_pipeline -h
usage: run_pipeline.py [-h] [--conf FILE] [--site SITE] [--list LIST] [--from FROM] [--to TO]
This script runs the tool pipeline.
optional arguments:
-h, --help show this help message and exit
--conf FILE, -C FILE pipeline configuration file. (default: config.yaml)
--site SITE, -S SITE website to test; overrides config file (default: None)
--list LIST, -L LIST site list to test; overrides config file (default: None)
--from FROM, -F FROM the first entry to consider when a site list is provided; overrides config file (default: -1)
--to TO, -T TO the last entry to consider when a site list is provided; overrides config file (default: -1)
Input Config: JAW expects a .yaml
config file as input. See config.yaml for an example.
Hint. The config file specifies different passes (e.g., crawling, static analysis, etc) which can be enabled or disabled for each vulnerability class. This allows running the tool building blocks individually, or in a different order (e.g., crawl all webapps first, then conduct security analysis).
For running a quick example demonstrating how to build a property graph and run Cypher queries over it, do:
$ python3 -m analyses.example.example_analysis --input=$(pwd)/data/test_program/test.js
This module collects the data (i.e., JavaScript code and state values of web pages) needed for testing. If you want to test a specific JavaScipt file that you already have on your file system, you can skip this step.
JAW has crawlers based on Selenium (JAW-v1), Puppeteer (JAW-v2, v3) and Playwright (JAW-v3). For most up-to-date features, it is recommended to use the Puppeteer- or Playwright-based versions.
This web crawler employs foxhound, an instrumented version of Firefox, to perform dynamic taint tracking as it navigates through webpages. To start the crawler, do:
$ cd crawler
$ node crawler-taint.js --seedurl=https://google.com --maxurls=100 --headless=true --foxhoundpath=<optional-foxhound-executable-path>
The foxhoundpath
is by default set to the following directory: crawler/foxhound/firefox
which contains a binary named firefox
.
Note: you need a build of foxhound to use this version. An ubuntu build is included in the JAW-v3 release.
To start the crawler, do:
$ cd crawler
$ node crawler.js --seedurl=https://google.com --maxurls=100 --browser=chrome --headless=true
See here for more information.
To start the crawler, do:
$ cd crawler/hpg_crawler
$ vim docker-compose.yaml # set the websites you want to crawl here and save
$ docker-compose build
$ docker-compose up -d
Please refer to the documentation of the hpg_crawler
here for more information.
To generate an HPG for a given (set of) JavaScript file(s), do:
$ node engine/cli.js --lang=js --graphid=graph1 --input=/in/file1.js --input=/in/file2.js --output=$(pwd)/data/out/ --mode=csv
optional arguments:
--lang: language of the input program
--graphid: an identifier for the generated HPG
--input: path of the input program(s)
--output: path of the output HPG, must be i
--mode: determines the output format (csv or graphML)
To import an HPG inside a neo4j graph database (docker instance), do:
$ python3 -m hpg_neo4j.hpg_import --rpath=<path-to-the-folder-of-the-csv-files> --id=<xyz> --nodes=<nodes.csv> --edges=<rels.csv>
$ python3 -m hpg_neo4j.hpg_import -h
usage: hpg_import.py [-h] [--rpath P] [--id I] [--nodes N] [--edges E]
This script imports a CSV of a property graph into a neo4j docker database.
optional arguments:
-h, --help show this help message and exit
--rpath P relative path to the folder containing the graph CSV files inside the `data` directory
--id I an identifier for the graph or docker container
--nodes N the name of the nodes csv file (default: nodes.csv)
--edges E the name of the relations csv file (default: rels.csv)
In order to create a hybrid property graph for the output of the hpg_crawler
and import it inside a local neo4j instance, you can also do:
$ python3 -m engine.api <path> --js=<program.js> --import=<bool> --hybrid=<bool> --reqs=<requests.out> --evts=<events.out> --cookies=<cookies.pkl> --html=<html_snapshot.html>
Specification of Parameters:
<path>
: absolute path to the folder containing the program files for analysis (must be under the engine/outputs
folder).--js=<program.js>
: name of the JavaScript program for analysis (default: js_program.js
).--import=<bool>
: whether the constructed property graph should be imported to an active neo4j database (default: true).--hybrid=bool
: whether the hybrid mode is enabled (default: false
). This implies that the tester wants to enrich the property graph by inputing files for any of the HTML snapshot, fired events, HTTP requests and cookies, as collected by the JAW crawler.--reqs=<requests.out>
: for hybrid mode only, name of the file containing the sequence of obsevered network requests, pass the string false
to exclude (default: request_logs_short.out
).--evts=<events.out>
: for hybrid mode only, name of the file containing the sequence of fired events, pass the string false
to exclude (default: events.out
).--cookies=<cookies.pkl>
: for hybrid mode only, name of the file containing the cookies, pass the string false
to exclude (default: cookies.pkl
).--html=<html_snapshot.html>
: for hybrid mode only, name of the file containing the DOM tree snapshot, pass the string false
to exclude (default: html_rendered.html
).For more information, you can use the help CLI provided with the graph construction API:
$ python3 -m engine.api -h
The constructed HPG can then be queried using Cypher or the NeoModel ORM.
You should place and run your queries in analyses/<ANALYSIS_NAME>
.
You can use the NeoModel ORM to query the HPG. To write a query:
example_query_orm.py
in the analyses/example
folder.$ python3 -m analyses.example.example_query_orm
For more information, please see here.
You can use Cypher to write custom queries. For this:
example_query_cypher.py
in the analyses/example
folder.$ python3 -m analyses.example.example_query_cypher
For more information, please see here.
This section describes how to configure and use JAW for vulnerability detection, and how to interpret the output. JAW contains, among others, self-contained queries for detecting client-side CSRF and DOM Clobbering
Step 1. enable the analysis component for the vulnerability class in the input config.yaml file:
request_hijacking:
enabled: true
# [...]
#
domclobbering:
enabled: false
# [...]
cs_csrf:
enabled: false
# [...]
Step 2. Run an instance of the pipeline with:
$ python3 -m run_pipeline --conf=config.yaml
Hint. You can run multiple instances of the pipeline under different screen
s:
$ screen -dmS s1 bash -c 'python3 -m run_pipeline --conf=conf1.yaml; exec sh'
$ screen -dmS s2 bash -c 'python3 -m run_pipeline --conf=conf2.yaml; exec sh'
$ # [...]
To generate parallel configuration files automatically, you may use the generate_config.py
script.
The outputs will be stored in a file called sink.flows.out
in the same folder as that of the input. For Client-side CSRF, for example, for each HTTP request detected, JAW outputs an entry marking the set of semantic types (a.k.a, semantic tags or labels) associated with the elements constructing the request (i.e., the program slices). For example, an HTTP request marked with the semantic type ['WIN.LOC']
is forgeable through the window.location
injection point. However, a request marked with ['NON-REACH']
is not forgeable.
An example output entry is shown below:
[*] Tags: ['WIN.LOC']
[*] NodeId: {'TopExpression': '86', 'CallExpression': '87', 'Argument': '94'}
[*] Location: 29
[*] Function: ajax
[*] Template: ajaxloc + "/bearer1234/"
[*] Top Expression: $.ajax({ xhrFields: { withCredentials: "true" }, url: ajaxloc + "/bearer1234/" })
1:['WIN.LOC'] variable=ajaxloc
0 (loc:6)- var ajaxloc = window.location.href
This entry shows that on line 29, there is a $.ajax
call expression, and this call expression triggers an ajax
request with the url template value of ajaxloc + "/bearer1234/
, where the parameter ajaxloc
is a program slice reading its value at line 6 from window.location.href
, thus forgeable through ['WIN.LOC']
.
In order to streamline the testing process for JAW and ensure that your setup is accurate, we provide a simple node.js
web application which you can test JAW with.
First, install the dependencies via:
$ cd tests/test-webapp
$ npm install
Then, run the application in a new screen:
$ screen -dmS jawwebapp bash -c 'PORT=6789 npm run devstart; exec sh'
For more information, visit our wiki page here. Below is a table of contents for quick access.
Pull requests are always welcomed. This project is intended to be a safe, welcoming space, and contributors are expected to adhere to the contributor code of conduct.
If you use the JAW for academic research, we encourage you to cite the following paper:
@inproceedings{JAW,
title = {JAW: Studying Client-side CSRF with Hybrid Property Graphs and Declarative Traversals},
author= {Soheil Khodayari and Giancarlo Pellegrino},
booktitle = {30th {USENIX} Security Symposium ({USENIX} Security 21)},
year = {2021},
address = {Vancouver, B.C.},
publisher = {{USENIX} Association},
}
JAW has come a long way and we want to give our contributors a well-deserved shoutout here!
@tmbrbr, @c01gide, @jndre, and Sepehr Mirzaei.
The original 403fuzzer.py :)
Fuzz 401/403ing endpoints for bypasses
This tool performs various checks via headers, path normalization, verbs, etc. to attempt to bypass ACL's or URL validation.
It will output the response codes and length for each request, in a nicely organized, color coded way so things are reaable.
I implemented a "Smart Filter" that lets you mute responses that look the same after a certain number of times.
You can now feed it raw HTTP requests that you save to a file from Burp.
usage: bypassfuzzer.py -h
Simply paste the request into a file and run the script!
- It will parse and use cookies
& headers
from the request. - Easiest way to authenticate for your requests
python3 bypassfuzzer.py -r request.txt
Specify a URL
python3 bypassfuzzer.py -u http://example.com/test1/test2/test3/forbidden.html
Specify cookies to use in requests:
some examples:
--cookies "cookie1=blah"
-c "cookie1=blah; cookie2=blah"
Specify a method/verb and body data to send
bypassfuzzer.py -u https://example.com/forbidden -m POST -d "param1=blah¶m2=blah2"
bypassfuzzer.py -u https://example.com/forbidden -m PUT -d "param1=blah¶m2=blah2"
Specify custom headers to use with every request Maybe you need to add some kind of auth header like Authorization: bearer <token>
Specify -H "header: value"
for each additional header you'd like to add:
bypassfuzzer.py -u https://example.com/forbidden -H "Some-Header: blah" -H "Authorization: Bearer 1234567"
Based on response code and length. If it sees a response 8 times or more it will automatically mute it.
Repeats are changeable in the code until I add an option to specify it in flag
NOTE: Can't be used simultaneously with -hc
or -hl
(yet)
# toggle smart filter on
bypassfuzzer.py -u https://example.com/forbidden --smart
Useful if you wanna proxy through Burp
bypassfuzzer.py -u https://example.com/forbidden --proxy http://127.0.0.1:8080
# skip sending headers payloads
bypassfuzzer.py -u https://example.com/forbidden -sh
bypassfuzzer.py -u https://example.com/forbidden --skip-headers
# Skip sending path normailization payloads
bypassfuzzer.py -u https://example.com/forbidden -su
bypassfuzzer.py -u https://example.com/forbidden --skip-urls
Provide comma delimited lists without spaces. Examples:
# Hide response codes
bypassfuzzer.py -u https://example.com/forbidden -hc 403,404,400
# Hide response lengths of 638
bypassfuzzer.py -u https://example.com/forbidden -hl 638
Virtual private networking (VPN) companies market their services as a way to prevent anyone from snooping on your Internet usage. But new research suggests this is a dangerous assumption when connecting to a VPN via an untrusted network, because attackers on the same network could force a target’s traffic off of the protection provided by their VPN without triggering any alerts to the user.
Image: Shutterstock.
When a device initially tries to connect to a network, it broadcasts a message to the entire local network stating that it is requesting an Internet address. Normally, the only system on the network that notices this request and replies is the router responsible for managing the network to which the user is trying to connect.
The machine on a network responsible for fielding these requests is called a Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) server, which will issue time-based leases for IP addresses. The DHCP server also takes care of setting a specific local address — known as an Internet gateway — that all connecting systems will use as a primary route to the Web.
VPNs work by creating a virtual network interface that serves as an encrypted tunnel for communications. But researchers at Leviathan Security say they’ve discovered it’s possible to abuse an obscure feature built into the DHCP standard so that other users on the local network are forced to connect to a rogue DHCP server.
“Our technique is to run a DHCP server on the same network as a targeted VPN user and to also set our DHCP configuration to use itself as a gateway,” Leviathan researchers Lizzie Moratti and Dani Cronce wrote. “When the traffic hits our gateway, we use traffic forwarding rules on the DHCP server to pass traffic through to a legitimate gateway while we snoop on it.”
The feature being abused here is known as DHCP option 121, and it allows a DHCP server to set a route on the VPN user’s system that is more specific than those used by most VPNs. Abusing this option, Leviathan found, effectively gives an attacker on the local network the ability to set up routing rules that have a higher priority than the routes for the virtual network interface that the target’s VPN creates.
“Pushing a route also means that the network traffic will be sent over the same interface as the DHCP server instead of the virtual network interface,” the Leviathan researchers said. “This is intended functionality that isn’t clearly stated in the RFC [standard]. Therefore, for the routes we push, it is never encrypted by the VPN’s virtual interface but instead transmitted by the network interface that is talking to the DHCP server. As an attacker, we can select which IP addresses go over the tunnel and which addresses go over the network interface talking to our DHCP server.”
Leviathan found they could force VPNs on the local network that already had a connection to arbitrarily request a new one. In this well-documented tactic, known as a DHCP starvation attack, an attacker floods the DHCP server with requests that consume all available IP addresses that can be allocated. Once the network’s legitimate DHCP server is completely tied up, the attacker can then have their rogue DHCP server respond to all pending requests.
“This technique can also be used against an already established VPN connection once the VPN user’s host needs to renew a lease from our DHCP server,” the researchers wrote. “We can artificially create that scenario by setting a short lease time in the DHCP lease, so the user updates their routing table more frequently. In addition, the VPN control channel is still intact because it already uses the physical interface for its communication. In our testing, the VPN always continued to report as connected, and the kill switch was never engaged to drop our VPN connection.”
The researchers say their methods could be used by an attacker who compromises a DHCP server or wireless access point, or by a rogue network administrator who owns the infrastructure themselves and maliciously configures it. Alternatively, an attacker could set up an “evil twin” wireless hotspot that mimics the signal broadcast by a legitimate provider.
Bill Woodcock is executive director at Packet Clearing House, a nonprofit based in San Francisco. Woodcock said Option 121 has been included in the DHCP standard since 2002, which means the attack described by Leviathan has technically been possible for the last 22 years.
“They’re realizing now that this can be used to circumvent a VPN in a way that’s really problematic, and they’re right,” Woodcock said.
Woodcock said anyone who might be a target of spear phishing attacks should be very concerned about using VPNs on an untrusted network.
“Anyone who is in a position of authority or maybe even someone who is just a high net worth individual, those are all very reasonable targets of this attack,” he said. “If I were trying to do an attack against someone at a relatively high security company and I knew where they typically get their coffee or sandwich at twice a week, this is a very effective tool in that toolbox. I’d be a little surprised if it wasn’t already being exploited in that way, because again this isn’t rocket science. It’s just thinking a little outside the box.”
Successfully executing this attack on a network likely would not allow an attacker to see all of a target’s traffic or browsing activity. That’s because for the vast majority of the websites visited by the target, the content is encrypted (the site’s address begins with https://). However, an attacker would still be able to see the metadata — such as the source and destination addresses — of any traffic flowing by.
KrebsOnSecurity shared Leviathan’s research with John Kristoff, founder of dataplane.org and a PhD candidate in computer science at the University of Illinois Chicago. Kristoff said practically all user-edge network gear, including WiFi deployments, support some form of rogue DHCP server detection and mitigation, but that it’s unclear how widely deployed those protections are in real-world environments.
“However, and I think this is a key point to emphasize, an untrusted network is an untrusted network, which is why you’re usually employing the VPN in the first place,” Kristoff said. “If [the] local network is inherently hostile and has no qualms about operating a rogue DHCP server, then this is a sneaky technique that could be used to de-cloak some traffic – and if done carefully, I’m sure a user might never notice.”
According to Leviathan, there are several ways to minimize the threat from rogue DHCP servers on an unsecured network. One is using a device powered by the Android operating system, which apparently ignores DHCP option 121.
Relying on a temporary wireless hotspot controlled by a cellular device you own also effectively blocks this attack.
“They create a password-locked LAN with automatic network address translation,” the researchers wrote of cellular hot-spots. “Because this network is completely controlled by the cellular device and requires a password, an attacker should not have local network access.”
Leviathan’s Moratti said another mitigation is to run your VPN from inside of a virtual machine (VM) — like Parallels, VMware or VirtualBox. VPNs run inside of a VM are not vulnerable to this attack, Moratti said, provided they are not run in “bridged mode,” which causes the VM to replicate another node on the network.
In addition, a technology called “deep packet inspection” can be used to deny all in- and outbound traffic from the physical interface except for the DHCP and the VPN server. However, Leviathan says this approach opens up a potential “side channel” attack that could be used to determine the destination of traffic.
“This could be theoretically done by performing traffic analysis on the volume a target user sends when the attacker’s routes are installed compared to the baseline,” they wrote. “In addition, this selective denial-of-service is unique as it could be used to censor specific resources that an attacker doesn’t want a target user to connect to even while they are using the VPN.”
Moratti said Leviathan’s research shows that many VPN providers are currently making promises to their customers that their technology can’t keep.
“VPNs weren’t designed to keep you more secure on your local network, but to keep your traffic more secure on the Internet,” Moratti said. “When you start making assurances that your product protects people from seeing your traffic, there’s an assurance or promise that can’t be met.”
A copy of Leviathan’s research, along with code intended to allow others to duplicate their findings in a lab environment, is available here.
Automate the process of analyzing web server logs with the Python Web Log Analyzer. This powerful tool is designed to enhance security by identifying and detecting various types of cyber attacks within your server logs. Stay ahead of potential threats with features that include:
Attack Detection: Identify and flag potential Cross-Site Scripting (XSS), Local File Inclusion (LFI), Remote File Inclusion (RFI), and other common web application attacks.
Rate Limit Monitoring: Detect suspicious patterns in multiple requests made in a short time frame, helping to identify brute-force attacks or automated scanning tools.
Automated Scanner Detection: Keep your web applications secure by identifying requests associated with known automated scanning tools or vulnerability scanners.
User-Agent Analysis: Analyze and identify potentially malicious User-Agent strings, allowing you to spot unusual or suspicious behavior.
This project is actively developed, and future features may include:
The tool only requires Python 3 at the moment.
After cloning the repository to your local machine, you can initiate the application by executing the command python3 WLA-cli.py. simple usage example : python3 WLA-cli.py -l LogSampls/access.log -t
use -h or --help for more detailed usage examples : python3 WLA-cli.py -h
linkdin:(https://www.linkedin.com/in/oudjani-seyyid-taqy-eddine-b964a5228)
The head of counterintelligence for a division of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) was sentenced last week to nine years in a penal colony for accepting a USD $1.7 million bribe to ignore the activities of a prolific Russian cybercrime group that hacked thousands of e-commerce websites. The protection scheme was exposed in 2022 when Russian authorities arrested six members of the group, which sold millions of stolen payment cards at flashy online shops like Trump’s Dumps.
A now-defunct carding shop that sold stolen credit cards and invoked 45’s likeness and name.
As reported by The Record, a Russian court last week sentenced former FSB officer Grigory Tsaregorodtsev for taking a $1.7 million bribe from a cybercriminal group that was seeking a “roof,” a well-placed, corrupt law enforcement official who could be counted on to both disregard their illegal hacking activities and run interference with authorities in the event of their arrest.
Tsaregorodtsev was head of the counterintelligence department for a division of the FSB based in Perm, Russia. In February 2022, Russian authorities arrested six men in the Perm region accused of selling stolen payment card data. They also seized multiple carding shops run by the gang, including Ferum Shop, Sky-Fraud, and Trump’s Dumps, a popular fraud store that invoked the 45th president’s likeness and promised to “make credit card fraud great again.”
All of the domains seized in that raid were registered by an IT consulting company in Perm called Get-net LLC, which was owned in part by Artem Zaitsev — one of the six men arrested. Zaitsev reportedly was a well-known programmer whose company supplied services and leasing to the local FSB field office.
The message for Trump’s Dumps users left behind by Russian authorities that seized the domain in 2022.
Russian news sites report that Internal Affairs officials with the FSB grew suspicious when Tsaregorodtsev became a little too interested in the case following the hacking group’s arrests. The former FSB agent had reportedly assured the hackers he could have their case transferred and that they would soon be free.
But when that promised freedom didn’t materialize, four the of the defendants pulled the walls down on the scheme and brought down their own roof. The FSB arrested Tsaregorodtsev, and seized $154,000 in cash, 100 gold bars, real estate and expensive cars.
At Tsaregorodtsev’s trial, his lawyers argued that their client wasn’t guilty of bribery per se, but that he did admit to fraud because he was ultimately unable to fully perform the services for which he’d been hired.
The Russian news outlet Kommersant reports that all four of those who cooperated were released with probation or correctional labor. Zaitsev received a sentence of 3.5 years in prison, and defendant Alexander Kovalev got four years.
In 2017, KrebsOnSecurity profiled Trump’s Dumps, and found the contact address listed on the site was tied to an email address used to register more than a dozen domains that were made to look like legitimate Javascript calls many e-commerce sites routinely make to process transactions — such as “js-link[dot]su,” “js-stat[dot]su,” and “js-mod[dot]su.”
Searching on those malicious domains revealed a 2016 report from RiskIQ, which shows the domains featured prominently in a series of hacking campaigns against e-commerce websites. According to RiskIQ, the attacks targeted online stores running outdated and unpatched versions of shopping cart software from Magento, Powerfront and OpenCart.
Those shopping cart flaws allowed the crooks to install “web skimmers,” malicious Javascript used to steal credit card details and other information from payment forms on the checkout pages of vulnerable e-commerce sites. The stolen customer payment card details were then sold on sites like Trump’s Dumps and Sky-Fraud.
It’s that time of year again – tax season! Whether you’ve already filed in the hopes of an early refund or have yet to start the process, one thing is for sure: cybercriminals will certainly use tax season as a means to get victims to give up their personal and financial information. This time of year is advantageous for malicious actors since the IRS and tax preparers are some of the few people who actually need your personal data. As a result, consumers are targeted with various scams impersonating trusted sources like the IRS or DIY tax software companies. Fortunately, every year the IRS outlines the most prevalent tax scams, such as voice phishing, email phishing, and fake tax software scams. Let’s explore the details of these threats.
So, how do cybercriminals use voice phishing to impersonate the IRS? Voice phishing, a form of criminal phone fraud, uses social engineering tactics to gain access to victims’ personal and financial information. For tax scams, criminals will make unsolicited calls posing as the IRS and leave voicemails requesting an immediate callback. The crooks will then demand that the victim pay a phony tax bill in the form of a wire transfer, prepaid debit card or gift card. In one case outlined by Forbes, victims received emails in their inbox that allegedly contained voicemails from the IRS. The emails didn’t actually contain any voicemails but instead directed victims to a suspicious SharePoint URL. Last year, a number of SharePoint phishing scams occurred as an attempt to steal Office 365 credentials, so it’s not surprising that cybercriminals are using this technique to access taxpayers’ personal data now as well.
In addition to voice phishing schemes, malicious actors are also using email to try and get consumers to give up their personal and financial information. This year alone, almost 400 IRS phishing URLs have been reported. In a typical email phishing scheme, scammers try to obtain personal tax information like usernames and passwords by using spoofed email addresses and stolen logos. In many cases, the emails contain suspicious hyperlinks that redirect users to a fake site or PDF attachments that may download malware or viruses. If a victim clicks on these malicious links or attachments, they can seriously endanger their tax data by giving identity thieves the opportunity to steal their refund. What’s more, cybercriminals are also using subject lines like “IRS Important Notice” and “IRS Taxpayer Notice” and demanding payment or threatening to seize the victim’s tax refund.
Cybercriminals are even going so far as to impersonate trusted brands like TurboTax for their scams. In this case, DIY tax preparers who search for TurboTax software on Google are shown ads for pirated versions of TurboTax. The victims will pay a fee for the software via PayPal, only to have their computer infected with malware after downloading the software. You may be wondering, how do victims happen upon this malicious software through a simple Google search? Unfortunately, scammers have been paying to have their spoofed sites show up in search results, increasing the chances that an innocent taxpayer will fall victim to their scheme.
Money is a prime motivator for many consumers, and malicious actors are fully prepared to exploit this. Many people are concerned about how much they might owe or are predicting how much they’ll get back on their tax refund, and scammers play to both of these emotions. So, as hundreds of taxpayers are waiting for a potential tax return, it’s important that they navigate tax season wisely. Check out the following tips to avoid being spoofed by cybercriminals and identity thieves:
File before cybercriminals do it for you. The easiest defense you can take against tax season schemes is to get your hands on your W-2 and file as soon as possible. The more prompt you are to file, the less likely your data will be raked in by a cybercriminal.
Keep an eye on your credit and your identity. Keeping tabs on your credit report and knowing if your personal information has been compromised in some way can help prevent tax fraud. Together, they can let you know if someone has stolen your identity or if you have personal info on the dark web that could lead to identity theft.
Watch out for spoofed websites. Scammers have extremely sophisticated tools that help disguise phony web addresses for DIY tax software, such as stolen company logos and site designs. To avoid falling for this, go directly to the source. Type the address of a website directly into the address bar of your browser instead of following a link from an email or internet search. If you receive any suspicious links in your email, investigating the domain is usually a good way to tell if the source is legitimate or not.
Protect yourself from scam messages. Scammers also send links to scam sites via texts, social media messages, and email. McAfee Scam Protection can help you spot if the message you got is a fake. It uses AI technology that automatically detects links to scam URLs. If you accidentally click, don’t worry, it can block risky sites if you do.
Clean up your personal info online. Crooks and scammers have to find you before they can contact you. After all, they need to get your phone number or email from somewhere. Sometimes, that’s from “people finder” and online data brokers that gather and sell personal info to any buyer. Including crooks. McAfee Personal Data Cleanup can remove your personal info from the data broker sites scammers use to contact their victims.
Consider an identity theft protection solution. If for some reason your personal data does become compromised, be sure to use an identity theft solution such as McAfee Identity Theft Protection, which allows users to take a proactive approach to protect their identities with personal and financial monitoring and recovery tools to help keep their identities personal and secured.
The post How to Steer Clear of Tax Season Scams appeared first on McAfee Blog.
This is the companion code for the paper: 'Fuzzing Embedded Systems using Debugger Interfaces'. A preprint of the paper can be found here https://publications.cispa.saarland/3950/. The code allows the users to reproduce and extend the results reported in the paper. Please cite the above paper when reporting, reproducing or extending the results.
.
├── benchmark # Scripts to build Google's fuzzer test suite and run experiments
├── dependencies # Contains a Makefile to install dependencies for GDBFuzz
├── evaluation # Raw exeriment data, presented in the paper
├── example_firmware # Embedded example applications, used for the evaluation
├── example_programs # Contains a compiled example program and configs to test GDBFuzz
├── src # Contains the implementation of GDBFuzz
├── Dockerfile # For creating a Docker image with all GDBFuzz dependencies installed
├── LICENSE # License
├── Makefile # Makefile for creating the docker image or install GDBFuzz locally
└── README.md # This README file
The idea of GDBFuzz is to leverage hardware breakpoints from microcontrollers as feedback for coverage-guided fuzzing. Therefore, GDB is used as a generic interface to enable broad applicability. For binary analysis of the firmware, Ghidra is used. The code contains a benchmark setup for evaluating the method. Additionally, example firmware files are included.
GDBFuzz enables coverage-guided fuzzing for embedded systems, but - for evaluation purposes - can also fuzz arbitrary user applications. For fuzzing on microcontrollers we recommend a local installation of GDBFuzz to be able to send fuzz data to the device under test flawlessly.
GDBFuzz has been tested on Ubuntu 20.04 LTS and Raspberry Pie OS 32-bit. Prerequisites are java and python3. First, create a new virtual environment and install all dependencies.
virtualenv .venv
source .venv/bin/activate
make
chmod a+x ./src/GDBFuzz/main.py
GDBFuzz reads settings from a config file with the following keys.
[SUT]
# Path to the binary file of the SUT.
# This can, for example, be an .elf file or a .bin file.
binary_file_path = <path>
# Address of the root node of the CFG.
# Breakpoints are placed at nodes of this CFG.
# e.g. 'LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput' or 'main'
entrypoint = <entrypoint>
# Number of inputs that must be executed without a breakpoint hit until
# breakpoints are rotated.
until_rotate_breakpoints = <number>
# Maximum number of breakpoints that can be placed at any given time.
max_breakpoints = <number>
# Blacklist functions that shall be ignored.
# ignore_functions is a space separated list of function names e.g. 'malloc free'.
ignore_functions = <space separated list>
# One of {Hardware, QEMU, SUTRunsOnHost}
# Hardware: An external component starts a gdb server and GDBFuzz can connect to this gdb server.
# QEMU: GDBFuzz starts QEMU. QEMU emulates binary_file_path and starts gdbserver.
# SUTRunsOnHost: GDBFuzz start the target program within GDB.
target_mode = <mode>
# Set this to False if you want to start ghidra, analyze the SUT,
# and start the ghidra bridge server manually.
start_ghidra = True
# Space separated list of addresses where software breakpoints (for error
# handling code) are set. Execution of those is considered a crash.
# Example: software_breakpoint_addresses = 0x123 0x432
software_breakpoint_addresses =
# Whether all triggered software breakpoints are considered as crash
consider_sw_breakpoint_as_error = False
[SUTConnection]
# The class 'SUT_connection_class' in file 'SUT_connection_path' implements
# how inputs are sent to the SUT.
# Inputs can, for example, be sent over Wi-Fi, Serial, Bluetooth, ...
# This class must inherit from ./connections/SUTConnection.py.
# See ./connections/SUTConnection.py for more information.
SUT_connection_file = FIFOConnection.py
[GDB]
path_to_gdb = gdb-multiarch
#Written in address:port
gdb_server_address = localhost:4242
[Fuzzer]
# In Bytes
maximum_input_length = 100000
# In seconds
single_run_timeout = 20
# In seconds
total_runtime = 3600
# Optional
# Path to a directory where each file contains one seed. If you don't want to
# use seeds, leave the value empty.
seeds_directory =
[BreakpointStrategy]
# Strategies to choose basic blocks are located in
# 'src/GDBFuzz/breakpoint_strategies/'
# For the paper we use the following strategies
# 'RandomBasicBlockStrategy.py' - Randomly choosing unreached basic blocks
# 'RandomBasicBlockNoDomStrategy.py' - Like previous, but doesn't use dominance relations to derive transitively reached nodes.
# 'RandomBasicBlockNoCorpusStrategy.py' - Like first, but prevents growing the input corpus and therefore behaves like blackbox fuzzing with coverage measurement.
# 'BlackboxStrategy.py', - Doesn't set any breakpoints
breakpoint_strategy_file = RandomBasicBlockStrategy.py
[Dependencies]
path_to_qemu = dependencies/qemu/build/x86_64-linux-user/qemu-x86_64
path_to_ghidra = dependencies/ghidra
[LogsAndVisualizations]
# One of {DEBUG, INFO, WARNING, ERROR, CRITICAL}
loglevel = INFO
# Path to a directory where output files (e.g. graphs, logfiles) are stored.
output_directory = ./output
# If set to True, an MQTT client sends UI elements (e.g. graphs)
enable_UI = False
An example config file is located in ./example_programs/
together with an example program that was compiled using our fuzzing harness in benchmark/benchSUTs/GDBFuzz_wrapper/common/
. Start fuzzing for one hour with the following command.
chmod a+x ./example_programs/json-2017-02-12
./src/GDBFuzz/main.py --config ./example_programs/fuzz_json.cfg
We first see output from Ghidra analyzing the binary executable and susequently messages when breakpoints are relocated or hit.
Depending on the specified output_directory
in the config file, there should now be a folder trial-0
with the following structure
.
├── corpus # A folder that contains the input corpus.
├── crashes # A folder that contains crashing inputs - if any.
├── cfg # The control flow graph as adjacency list.
├── fuzzer_stats # Statistics of the fuzzing campaign.
├── plot_data # Table showing at which relative time in the fuzzing campaign which basic block was reached.
├── reverse_cfg # The reverse control flow graph.
By setting start_ghidra = False
in the config file, GDBFuzz connects to a Ghidra instance running in GUI mode. Therefore, the ghidra_bridge plugin needs to be started manually from the script manager. During fuzzing, reached program blocks are highlighted in green.
For fuzzing on Linux user applications, GDBFuzz leverages the standard LLVMFuzzOneInput
entrypoint that is used by almost all fuzzers like AFL, AFL++, libFuzzer,.... In benchmark/benchSUTs/GDBFuzz_wrapper/common
There is a wrapper that can be used to compile any compliant fuzz harness into a standalone program that fetches input via a named pipe at /tmp/fromGDBFuzz
. This allows to simulate an embedded device that consumes data via a well defined input interface and therefore run GDBFuzz on any application. For convenience we created a script in benchmark/benchSUTs
that compiles all programs from our evaluation with our wrapper as explained later.
NOTE: GDBFuzz is not intended to fuzz Linux user applications. Use AFL++ or other fuzzers therefore. The wrapper just exists for evaluation purposes to enable running benchmarks and comparisons on a scale!
The general effectiveness of our approach is shown in a large scale benchmark deployed as docker containers.
make dockerimage
To run the above experiment in the docker container (for one hour as specified in the config file), map the example_programs
and output
folder as volumes and start GDBFuzz as follows.
chmod a+x ./example_programs/json-2017-02-12
docker run -it --env CONFIG_FILE=/example_programs/fuzz_json_docker_qemu.cfg -v $(pwd)/example_programs:/example_programs -v $(pwd)/output:/output gdbfuzz:1.0
An output folder should appear in the current working directory with the structure explained above.
Our evaluation is split in two parts. 1. GDBFuzz on its intended setup, directly on the hardware. 2. GDBFuzz in an emulated environment to allow independend analysis and comparisons of the results.
GDBFuzz can work with any GDB server and therefore most debug probes for microcontrollers.
Regarding RQ1 from the paper, we execute GDBFuzz on different microcontrollers with different firmwares located in example_firmware
. For each experiment we run GDBFuzz with the RandomBasicBlock
and with the RandomBasicBlockNoCorpus
strategy. The latter behaves like fuzzing without feedback, but we can still measure the achieved coverage. For answering RQ1, we compare the achieved coverage of the RandomBasicBlock
and the RandomBasicBlockNoCorpus
strategy. Respective config files are in the corresponding subfolders and we now explain how to setup fuzzing on the four development boards.
GDBFuzz requires access to a GDB Server. In this case the B-L4S5I-IOT01A and its on-board debugger are used. This on-board debugger sets up a GDB server via the 'st-util' program, and enables access to this GDB server via localhost:4242.
sudo apt-get install stlink-tools gdb-multiarch
Build and flash a firmware for the STM32 B-L4S5I-IOT01A, for example the arduinojson project.
Prerequisite: Install platformio (pio)
cd ./example_firmware/stm32_disco_arduinojson/
pio run --target upload
For your info: platformio stored an .elf file of the SUT here: ./example_firmware/stm32_disco_arduinojson/.pio/build/disco_l4s5i_iot01a/firmware.elf
This .elf file is also later used in the user configuration for Ghidra.
Start a new terminal, and run the following to start the a GDB Server:
st-util
Run GDBFuzz with a user configuration for arduinojson. We can send data over the usb port to the microcontroller. The microcontroller forwards this data via serial to the SUT'. In our case /dev/ttyACM0
is the USB device to the microcontroller board. If your system assigned another device to the microcontroller board, change /dev/ttyACM0
in the config file to your device.
./src/GDBFuzz/main.py --config ./example_firmware/stm32_disco_arduinojson/fuzz_serial_json.cfg
Fuzzer statistics and logs are in the ./output/... directory.
Install pyocd
:
pip install --upgrade pip 'mbed-ls>=1.7.1' 'pyocd>=0.16'
Make sure that 'KitProg v3' is on the device and put Board into 'Arm DAPLink' Mode by pressing the appropriate button. Start the GDB server:
pyocd gdbserver --persist
Flash a firmware and start fuzzing e.g. with
gdb-multiarch
target remote :3333
load ./example_firmware/CY8CKIT_json/mtb-example-psoc6-uart-transmit-receive.elf
monitor reset
./src/GDBFuzz/main.py --config ./example_firmware/CY8CKIT_json/fuzz_serial_json.cfg
Build and flash a firmware for the ESP32, for instance the arduinojson example with platformio.
cd ./example_firmware/esp32_arduinojson/
pio run --target upload
Add following line to the openocd config file for the J-Link debugger: jlink.cfg
adapter speed 10000
Start a new terminal, and run the following to start the GDB Server:
get_idf
openocd -f interface/jlink.cfg -f target/esp32.cfg -c "telnet_port 7777" -c "gdb_port 8888"
Run GDBFuzz with a user configuration for arduinojson. We can send data over the usb port to the microcontroller. The microcontroller forwards this data via serial to the SUT'. In our case /dev/ttyUSB0
is the USB device to the microcontroller board. If your system assigned another device to the microcontroller board, change /dev/ttyUSB0
in the config file to your device.
./src/GDBFuzz/main.py --config ./example_firmware/esp32_arduinojson/fuzz_serial.cfg
Fuzzer statistics and logs are in the ./output/... directory.
Install TI MSP430 GCC from https://www.ti.com/tool/MSP430-GCC-OPENSOURCE
Start GDB Server
./gdb_agent_console libmsp430.so
or (more stable). Build mspdebug from https://github.com/dlbeer/mspdebug/ and use:
until mspdebug --fet-skip-close --force-reset tilib "opt gdb_loop True" gdb ; do sleep 1 ; done
Ghidra fails to analyze binaries for the TI MSP430 controller out of the box. To fix that, we import the file in the Ghidra GUI, choose MSP430X as architecture and skip the auto analysis. Next, we open the 'Symbol Table', sort them by name and delete all symbols with names like $C$L*
. Now the auto analysis can be executed. After analysis, start the ghidra bridge from the Ghidra GUI manually and then start GDBFuzz.
./src/GDBFuzz/main.py --config ./example_firmware/msp430_arduinojson/fuzz_serial.cfg
To access USB devices as non-root user with pyusb
we add appropriate rules to udev. Paste following lines to /etc/udev/rules.d/50-myusb.rules
:
SUBSYSTEM=="usb", ATTRS{idVendor}=="1234", ATTRS{idProduct}=="5678" GROUP="usbusers", MODE="666"
Reload udev:
sudo udevadm control --reload
sudo udevadm trigger
In RQ2 from the paper, we compare GDBFuzz against the emulation based approach Fuzzware. First we execute GDBFuzz and Fuzzware as described previously on the shipped firmware files. For each GDBFuzz experiment, we create a file with valid basic blocks from the control flow graph files as follows:
cut -d " " -f1 ./cfg > valid_bbs.txt
Now we can replay coverage against fuzzware result fuzzware genstats --valid-bb-file valid_bbs.txt
When crashing or hanging inputs are found, the are stored in the crashes
folder. During evaluation, we found the following three bugs:
GDBFuzz can also run on a Raspberry Pi host with slight modifications:
In file ./dependencies/ghidra/support/launch.sh:125
The JAVA_HOME
variable must be hardcoded therefore e.g. to JAVA_HOME="/usr/lib/jvm/default-java"
To fuzz software on other boards, GDBFuzz requires
src/GDBFuzz/connections
) that triggers execution of the code at the entry point e.g. serial connectionAll these properties need to be specified in the config file.
For RQ's 4 - 8 we run a large scale benchmark. First, build the Docker image as described previously and compile applications from Google's Fuzzer Test Suite with our fuzzing harness in benchmark/benchSUTs/GDBFuzz_wrapper/common
.
cd ./benchmark/benchSUTs
chmod a+x setup_benchmark_SUTs.py
make dockerbenchmarkimage
Next adopt the benchmark settings in benchmark/scripts/benchmark.py
and benchmark/scripts/benchmark_aflpp.py
to your demands (especially number_of_cores
, trials
, and seconds_per_trial
) and start the benchmark with:
cd ./benchmark/scripts
./benchmark.py $(pwd)/../benchSUTs/SUTs/ SUTs.json
./benchmark_aflpp.py $(pwd)/../benchSUTs/SUTs/ SUTs.json
A folder appears in ./benchmark/scripts
that contains plot files (coverage over time), fuzzer statistic files, and control flow graph files for each experiment as in evaluation/fuzzer_test_suite_qemu_runs
.
GDBFuzz has an optional feature where it plots the control flow graph of covered nodes. This is disabled by default. You can enable it by following the instructions of this section and setting 'enable_UI' to 'True' in the user configuration.
On the host:
Install
sudo apt-get install graphviz
Install a recent version of node, for example Option 2 from here. Use Option 2 and not option 1. This should install both node and npm. For reference, our version numbers are (but newer versions should work too):
➜ node --version
v16.9.1
➜ npm --version
7.21.1
Install web UI dependencies:
cd ./src/webui
npm install
Install mosquitto MQTT broker, e.g. see here
Update the mosquitto broker config: Replace the file /etc/mosquitto/conf.d/mosquitto.conf with the following content:
listener 1883
allow_anonymous true
listener 9001
protocol websockets
Restart the mosquitto broker:
sudo service mosquitto restart
Check that the mosquitto broker is running:
sudo service mosquitto status
The output should include the text 'Active: active (running)'
Start the web UI:
cd ./src/webui
npm start
Your web browser should open automatically on 'http://localhost:3000/'.
Start GDBFuzz and use a user config file where enable_UI is set to True. You can use the Docker container and arduinojson SUT from above. But make sure to set 'enable_UI' to 'True'.
The nodes covered in 'blue' are covered. White nodes are not covered. We only show uncovered nodes if their parent is covered (drawing the complete control flow graph takes too much time if the control flow graph is large).
A cybercrook who has been setting up websites that mimic the self-destructing message service privnote.com accidentally exposed the breadth of their operations recently when they threatened to sue a software company. The disclosure revealed a profitable network of phishing sites that behave and look like the real Privnote, except that any messages containing cryptocurrency addresses will be automatically altered to include a different payment address controlled by the scammers.
The real Privnote, at privnote.com.
Launched in 2008, privnote.com employs technology that encrypts each message so that even Privnote itself cannot read its contents. And it doesn’t send or receive messages. Creating a message merely generates a link. When that link is clicked or visited, the service warns that the message will be gone forever after it is read.
Privnote’s ease-of-use and popularity among cryptocurrency enthusiasts has made it a perennial target of phishers, who erect Privnote clones that function more or less as advertised but also quietly inject their own cryptocurrency payment addresses when a note is created that contains crypto wallets.
Last month, a new user on GitHub named fory66399 lodged a complaint on the “issues” page for MetaMask, a software cryptocurrency wallet used to interact with the Ethereum blockchain. Fory66399 insisted that their website — privnote[.]co — was being wrongly flagged by MetaMask’s “eth-phishing-detect” list as malicious.
“We filed a lawsuit with a lawyer for dishonestly adding a site to the block list, damaging reputation, as well as ignoring the moderation department and ignoring answers!” fory66399 threatened. “Provide evidence or I will demand compensation!”
MetaMask’s lead product manager Taylor Monahan replied by posting several screenshots of privnote[.]co showing the site did indeed swap out any cryptocurrency addresses.
After being told where they could send a copy of their lawsuit, Fory66399 appeared to become flustered, and proceeded to mention a number of other interesting domain names:
You sent me screenshots from some other site! It’s red!!!!
The tornote.io website has a different color altogether
The privatenote,io website also has a different color! What’s wrong?????
A search at DomainTools.com for privatenote[.]io shows it has been registered to two names over as many years, including Andrey Sokol from Moscow and Alexandr Ermakov from Kiev. There is no indication these are the real names of the phishers, but the names are useful in pointing to other sites targeting Privnote since 2020.
DomainTools says other domains registered to Alexandr Ermakov include pirvnota[.]com, privatemessage[.]net, privatenote[.]io, and tornote[.]io.
A screenshot of the phishing domain privatemessage dot net.
The registration records for pirvnota[.]com at one point were updated from Andrey Sokol to “BPW” as the registrant organization, and “Tambov district” in the registrant state/province field. Searching DomainTools for domains that include both of these terms reveals pirwnote[.]com.
Other Privnote phishing domains that also phoned home to the same Internet address as pirwnote[.]com include privnode[.]com, privnate[.]com, and prevnóte[.]com. Pirwnote[.]com is currently selling security cameras made by the Chinese manufacturer Hikvision, via an Internet address based in Hong Kong.
It appears someone has gone to great lengths to make tornote[.]io seem like a legitimate website. For example, this account at Medium has authored more than a dozen blog posts in the past year singing the praises of Tornote as a secure, self-destructing messaging service. However, testing shows tornote[.]io will also replace any cryptocurrency addresses in messages with their own payment address.
These malicious note sites attract visitors by gaming search engine results to make the phishing domains appear prominently in search results for “privnote.” A search in Google for “privnote” currently returns tornote[.]io as the fifth result. Like other phishing sites tied to this network, Tornote will use the same cryptocurrency addresses for roughly 5 days, and then rotate in new payment addresses.
Tornote changed the cryptocurrency address entered into a test note to this address controlled by the phishers.
Throughout 2023, Tornote was hosted with the Russian provider DDoS-Guard, at the Internet address 186.2.163[.]216. A review of the passive DNS records tied to this address shows that apart from subdomains dedicated to tornote[.]io, the main other domain at this address was hkleaks[.]ml.
In August 2019, a slew of websites and social media channels dubbed “HKLEAKS” began doxing the identities and personal information of pro-democracy activists in Hong Kong. According to a report (PDF) from Citizen Lab, hkleaks[.]ml was the second domain that appeared as the perpetrators began to expand the list of those doxed.
HKleaks, as indexed by The Wayback Machine.
DomainTools shows there are more than 1,000 other domains whose registration records include the organization name “BPW” and “Tambov District” as the location. Virtually all of those domains were registered through one of two registrars — Hong Kong-based Nicenic and Singapore-based WebCC — and almost all appear to be phishing or pill-spam related.
Among those is rustraitor[.]info, a website erected after Russia invaded Ukraine in early 2022 that doxed Russians perceived to have helped the Ukrainian cause.
An archive.org copy of Rustraitor.
In keeping with the overall theme, these phishing domains appear focused on stealing usernames and passwords to some of the cybercrime underground’s busiest shops, including Brian’s Club. What do all the phished sites have in common? They all accept payment via virtual currencies.
It appears MetaMask’s Monahan made the correct decision in forcing these phishers to tip their hand: Among the websites at that DDoS-Guard address are multiple MetaMask phishing domains, including metarrnask[.]com, meternask[.]com, and rnetamask[.]com.
How profitable are these private note phishing sites? Reviewing the four malicious cryptocurrency payment addresses that the attackers swapped into notes passed through privnote[.]co (as pictured in Monahan’s screenshot above) shows that between March 15 and March 19, 2024, those address raked in and transferred out nearly $18,000 in cryptocurrencies. And that’s just one of their phishing websites.
Roughly nine years ago, KrebsOnSecurity profiled a Pakistan-based cybercrime group called “The Manipulaters,” a sprawling web hosting network of phishing and spam delivery platforms. In January 2024, The Manipulaters pleaded with this author to unpublish previous stories about their work, claiming the group had turned over a new leaf and gone legitimate. But new research suggests that while they have improved the quality of their products and services, these nitwits still fail spectacularly at hiding their illegal activities.
In May 2015, KrebsOnSecurity published a brief writeup about the brazen Manipulaters team, noting that they openly operated hundreds of web sites selling tools designed to trick people into giving up usernames and passwords, or deploying malicious software on their PCs.
Manipulaters advertisement for “Office 365 Private Page with Antibot” phishing kit sold on the domain heartsender,com. “Antibot” refers to functionality that attempts to evade automated detection techniques, keeping a phish deployed as long as possible. Image: DomainTools.
The core brand of The Manipulaters has long been a shared cybercriminal identity named “Saim Raza,” who for the past decade has peddled a popular spamming and phishing service variously called “Fudtools,” “Fudpage,” “Fudsender,” “FudCo,” etc. The term “FUD” in those names stands for “Fully Un-Detectable,” and it refers to cybercrime resources that will evade detection by security tools like antivirus software or anti-spam appliances.
A September 2021 story here checked in on The Manipulaters, and found that Saim Raza and company were prospering under their FudCo brands, which they secretly managed from a front company called We Code Solutions.
That piece worked backwards from all of the known Saim Raza email addresses to identify Facebook profiles for multiple We Code Solutions employees, many of whom could be seen celebrating company anniversaries gathered around a giant cake with the words “FudCo” painted in icing.
Since that story ran, KrebsOnSecurity has heard from this Saim Raza identity on two occasions. The first was in the weeks following the Sept. 2021 piece, when one of Saim Raza’s known email addresses — bluebtcus@gmail.com — pleaded to have the story taken down.
“Hello, we already leave that fud etc before year,” the Saim Raza identity wrote. “Why you post us? Why you destroy our lifes? We never harm anyone. Please remove it.”
Not wishing to be manipulated by a phishing gang, KrebsOnSecurity ignored those entreaties. But on Jan. 14, 2024, KrebsOnSecurity heard from the same bluebtcus@gmail.com address, apropos of nothing.
“Please remove this article,” Sam Raza wrote, linking to the 2021 profile. “Please already my police register case on me. I already leave everything.”
Asked to elaborate on the police investigation, Saim Raza said they were freshly released from jail.
“I was there many days,” the reply explained. “Now back after bail. Now I want to start my new work.”
Exactly what that “new work” might entail, Saim Raza wouldn’t say. But a new report from researchers at DomainTools.com finds that several computers associated with The Manipulaters have been massively hacked by malicious data- and password-snarfing malware for quite some time.
DomainTools says the malware infections on Manipulaters PCs exposed “vast swaths of account-related data along with an outline of the group’s membership, operations, and position in the broader underground economy.”
“Curiously, the large subset of identified Manipulaters customers appear to be compromised by the same stealer malware,” DomainTools wrote. “All observed customer malware infections began after the initial compromise of Manipulaters PCs, which raises a number of questions regarding the origin of those infections.”
A number of questions, indeed. The core Manipulaters product these days is a spam delivery service called HeartSender, whose homepage openly advertises phishing kits targeting users of various Internet companies, including Microsoft 365, Yahoo, AOL, Intuit, iCloud and ID.me, to name a few.
A screenshot of the homepage of HeartSender 4 displays an IP address tied to fudtoolshop@gmail.com. Image: DomainTools.
HeartSender customers can interact with the subscription service via the website, but the product appears to be far more effective and user-friendly if one downloads HeartSender as a Windows executable program. Whether that HeartSender program was somehow compromised and used to infect the service’s customers is unknown.
However, DomainTools also found the hosted version of HeartSender service leaks an extraordinary amount of user information that probably is not intended to be publicly accessible. Apparently, the HeartSender web interface has several webpages that are accessible to unauthenticated users, exposing customer credentials along with support requests to HeartSender developers.
“Ironically, the Manipulaters may create more short-term risk to their own customers than law enforcement,” DomainTools wrote. “The data table “User Feedbacks” (sic) exposes what appear to be customer authentication tokens, user identifiers, and even a customer support request that exposes root-level SMTP credentials–all visible by an unauthenticated user on a Manipulaters-controlled domain. Given the risk for abuse, this domain will not be published.”
This is hardly the first time The Manipulaters have shot themselves in the foot. In 2019, The Manipulaters failed to renew their core domain name — manipulaters[.]com — the same one tied to so many of the company’s past and current business operations. That domain was quickly scooped up by Scylla Intel, a cyber intelligence firm that focuses on connecting cybercriminals to their real-life identities.
Currently, The Manipulaters seem focused on building out and supporting HeartSender, which specializes in spam and email-to-SMS spamming services.
“The Manipulaters’ newfound interest in email-to-SMS spam could be in response to the massive increase in smishing activity impersonating the USPS,” DomainTools wrote. “Proofs posted on HeartSender’s Telegram channel contain numerous references to postal service impersonation, including proving delivery of USPS-themed phishing lures and the sale of a USPS phishing kit.”
Reached via email, the Saim Raza identity declined to respond to questions about the DomainTools findings.
“First [of] all we never work on virus or compromised computer etc,” Raza replied. “If you want to write like that fake go ahead. Second I leave country already. If someone bind anything with exe file and spread on internet its not my fault.”
Asked why they left Pakistan, Saim Raza said the authorities there just wanted to shake them down.
“After your article our police put FIR on my [identity],” Saim Raza explained. “FIR” in this case stands for “First Information Report,” which is the initial complaint in the criminal justice system of Pakistan.
“They only get money from me nothing else,” Saim Raza continued. “Now some officers ask for money again again. Brother, there is no good law in Pakistan just they need money.”
Saim Raza has a history of being slippery with the truth, so who knows whether The Manipulaters and/or its leaders have in fact fled Pakistan (it may be more of an extended vacation abroad). With any luck, these guys will soon venture into a more Western-friendly, “good law” nation and receive a warm welcome by the local authorities.
VolWeb is a digital forensic memory analysis platform that leverages the power of the Volatility 3 framework. It is dedicated to aiding in investigations and incident responses.
The goal of VolWeb is to enhance the efficiency of memory collection and forensic analysis by providing a centralized, visual, and enhanced web application for incident responders and digital forensics investigators. Once an investigator obtains a memory image from a Linux or Windows system, the evidence can be uploaded to VolWeb, which triggers automatic processing and extraction of artifacts using the power of the Volatility 3 framework.
By utilizing cloud-native storage technologies, VolWeb also enables incident responders to directly upload memory images into the VolWeb platform from various locations using dedicated scripts interfaced with the platform and maintained by the community. Another goal is to allow users to compile technical information, such as Indicators, which can later be imported into modern CTI platforms like OpenCTI, thereby connecting your incident response and CTI teams after your investigation.
The project documentation is available on the Wiki. There, you will be able to deploy the tool in your investigation environment or lab.
[!IMPORTANT] Take time to read the documentation in order to avoid common miss-configuration issues.
VolWeb exposes a REST API to allow analysts to interact with the platform. There is a dedicated repository proposing some scripts maintained by the community: https://github.com/forensicxlab/VolWeb-Scripts Check the wiki of the project to learn more about the possible API calls.
If you have encountered a bug, or wish to propose a feature, please feel free to open an issue. To enable us to quickly address them, follow the guide in the "Contributing" section of the Wiki associated with the project.
Contact me at k1nd0ne@mail.com for any questions regarding this tool.
Check out the roadmap: https://github.com/k1nd0ne/VolWeb/projects/1
Thread hijacking attacks. They happen when someone you know has their email account compromised, and you are suddenly dropped into an existing conversation between the sender and someone else. These missives draw on the recipient’s natural curiosity about being copied on a private discussion, which is modified to include a malicious link or attachment. Here’s the story of a thread hijacking attack in which a journalist was copied on a phishing email from the unwilling subject of a recent scoop.
In Sept. 2023, the Pennsylvania news outlet LancasterOnline.com published a story about Adam Kidan, a wealthy businessman with a criminal past who is a major donor to Republican causes and candidates, including Rep. Lloyd Smucker (R-Pa).
The LancasterOnline story about Adam Kidan.
Several months after that piece ran, the story’s author Brett Sholtis received two emails from Kidan, both of which contained attachments. One of the messages appeared to be a lengthy conversation between Kidan and a colleague, with the subject line, “Re: Successfully sent data.” The second missive was a more brief email from Kidan with the subject, “Acknowledge New Work Order,” and a message that read simply, “Please find the attached.”
Sholtis said he clicked the attachment in one of the messages, which then launched a web page that looked exactly like a Microsoft Office 365 login page. An analysis of the webpage reveals it would check any submitted credentials at the real Microsoft website, and return an error if the user entered bogus account information. A successful login would record the submitted credentials and forward the victim to the real Microsoft website.
But Sholtis said he didn’t enter his Outlook username and password. Instead, he forwarded the messages to LancasterOneline’s IT team, which quickly flagged them as phishing attempts.
LancasterOnline Executive Editor Tom Murse said the two phishing messages from Mr. Kidan raised eyebrows in the newsroom because Kidan had threatened to sue the news outlet multiple times over Sholtis’s story.
“We were just perplexed,” Murse said. “It seemed to be a phishing attempt but we were confused why it would come from a prominent businessman we’ve written about. Our initial response was confusion, but we didn’t know what else to do with it other than to send it to the FBI.”
The phishing lure attached to the thread hijacking email from Mr. Kidan.
In 2006, Kidan was sentenced to 70 months in federal prison after pleading guilty to defrauding lenders along with Jack Abramoff, the disgraced lobbyist whose corruption became a symbol of the excesses of Washington influence peddling. He was paroled in 2009, and in 2014 moved his family to a home in Lancaster County, Pa.
The FBI hasn’t responded to LancasterOnline’s tip. Messages sent by KrebsOnSecurity to Kidan’s emails addresses were returned as blocked. Messages left with Mr. Kidan’s company, Empire Workforce Solutions, went unreturned.
No doubt the FBI saw the messages from Kidan for what they likely were: The result of Mr. Kidan having his Microsoft Outlook account compromised and used to send malicious email to people in his contacts list.
Thread hijacking attacks are hardly new, but that is mainly true because many Internet users still don’t know how to identify them. The email security firm Proofpoint says it has tracked north of 90 million malicious messages in the last five years that leverage this attack method.
One key reason thread hijacking is so successful is that these attacks generally do not include the tell that exposes most phishing scams: A fabricated sense of urgency. A majority of phishing threats warn of negative consequences should you fail to act quickly — such as an account suspension or an unauthorized high-dollar charge going through.
In contrast, thread hijacking campaigns tend to patiently prey on the natural curiosity of the recipient.
Ryan Kalember, chief strategy officer at Proofpoint, said probably the most ubiquitous examples of thread hijacking are “CEO fraud” or “business email compromise” scams, wherein employees are tricked by an email from a senior executive into wiring millions of dollars to fraudsters overseas.
But Kalember said these low-tech attacks can nevertheless be quite effective because they tend to catch people off-guard.
“It works because you feel like you’re suddenly included in an important conversation,” Kalember said. “It just registers a lot differently when people start reading, because you think you’re observing a private conversation between two different people.”
Some thread hijacking attacks actually involve multiple threat actors who are actively conversing while copying — but not addressing — the recipient.
“We call these multi-persona phishing scams, and they’re often paired with thread hijacking,” Kalember said. “It’s basically a way to build a little more affinity than just copying people on an email. And the longer the conversation goes on, the higher their success rate seems to be because some people start replying to the thread [and participating] psycho-socially.”
The best advice to sidestep phishing scams is to avoid clicking on links or attachments that arrive unbidden in emails, text messages and other mediums. If you’re unsure whether the message is legitimate, take a deep breath and visit the site or service in question manually — ideally, using a browser bookmark so as to avoid potential typosquatting sites.
The nonprofit organization that supports the Firefox web browser said today it is winding down its new partnership with Onerep, an identity protection service recently bundled with Firefox that offers to remove users from hundreds of people-search sites. The move comes just days after a report by KrebsOnSecurity forced Onerep’s CEO to admit that he has founded dozens of people-search networks over the years.
Mozilla only began bundling Onerep in Firefox last month, when it announced the reputation service would be offered on a subscription basis as part of Mozilla Monitor Plus. Launched in 2018 under the name Firefox Monitor, Mozilla Monitor also checks data from the website Have I Been Pwned? to let users know when their email addresses or password are leaked in data breaches.
On March 14, KrebsOnSecurity published a story showing that Onerep’s Belarusian CEO and founder Dimitiri Shelest launched dozens of people-search services since 2010, including a still-active data broker called Nuwber that sells background reports on people. Onerep and Shelest did not respond to requests for comment on that story.
But on March 21, Shelest released a lengthy statement wherein he admitted to maintaining an ownership stake in Nuwber, a consumer data broker he founded in 2015 — around the same time he launched Onerep.
Shelest maintained that Nuwber has “zero cross-over or information-sharing with Onerep,” and said any other old domains that may be found and associated with his name are no longer being operated by him.
“I get it,” Shelest wrote. “My affiliation with a people search business may look odd from the outside. In truth, if I hadn’t taken that initial path with a deep dive into how people search sites work, Onerep wouldn’t have the best tech and team in the space. Still, I now appreciate that we did not make this more clear in the past and I’m aiming to do better in the future.” The full statement is available here (PDF).
Onerep CEO and founder Dimitri Shelest.
In a statement released today, a spokesperson for Mozilla said it was moving away from Onerep as a service provider in its Monitor Plus product.
“Though customer data was never at risk, the outside financial interests and activities of Onerep’s CEO do not align with our values,” Mozilla wrote. “We’re working now to solidify a transition plan that will provide customers with a seamless experience and will continue to put their interests first.”
KrebsOnSecurity also reported that Shelest’s email address was used circa 2010 by an affiliate of Spamit, a Russian-language organization that paid people to aggressively promote websites hawking male enhancement drugs and generic pharmaceuticals. As noted in the March 14 story, this connection was confirmed by research from multiple graduate students at my alma mater George Mason University.
Shelest denied ever being associated with Spamit. “Between 2010 and 2014, we put up some web pages and optimize them — a widely used SEO practice — and then ran AdSense banners on them,” Shelest said, presumably referring to the dozens of people-search domains KrebsOnSecurity found were connected to his email addresses (dmitrcox@gmail.com and dmitrcox2@gmail.com). “As we progressed and learned more, we saw that a lot of the inquiries coming in were for people.”
Shelest also acknowledged that Onerep pays to run ads on “on a handful of data broker sites in very specific circumstances.”
“Our ad is served once someone has manually completed an opt-out form on their own,” Shelest wrote. “The goal is to let them know that if they were exposed on that site, there may be others, and bring awareness to there being a more automated opt-out option, such as Onerep.”
Reached via Twitter/X, HaveIBeenPwned founder Troy Hunt said he knew Mozilla was considering a partnership with Onerep, but that he was previously unaware of the Onerep CEO’s many conflicts of interest.
“I knew Mozilla had this in the works and we’d casually discussed it when talking about Firefox monitor,” Hunt told KrebsOnSecurity. “The point I made to them was the same as I’ve made to various companies wanting to put data broker removal ads on HIBP: removing your data from legally operating services has minimal impact, and you can’t remove it from the outright illegal ones who are doing the genuine damage.”
Playing both sides — creating and spreading the same digital disease that your medicine is designed to treat — may be highly unethical and wrong. But in the United States it’s not against the law. Nor is collecting and selling data on Americans. Privacy experts say the problem is that data brokers, people-search services like Nuwber and Onerep, and online reputation management firms exist because virtually all U.S. states exempt so-called “public” or “government” records from consumer privacy laws.
Those include voting registries, property filings, marriage certificates, motor vehicle records, criminal records, court documents, death records, professional licenses, and bankruptcy filings. Data brokers also can enrich consumer records with additional information, by adding social media data and known associates.
The March 14 story on Onerep was the second in a series of three investigative reports published here this month that examined the data broker and people-search industries, and highlighted the need for more congressional oversight — if not regulation — on consumer data protection and privacy.
On March 8, KrebsOnSecurity published A Close Up Look at the Consumer Data Broker Radaris, which showed that the co-founders of Radaris operate multiple Russian-language dating services and affiliate programs. It also appears many of their businesses have ties to a California marketing firm that works with a Russian state-run media conglomerate currently sanctioned by the U.S. government.
On March 20, KrebsOnSecurity published The Not-So-True People-Search Network from China, which revealed an elaborate web of phony people-search companies and executives designed to conceal the location of people-search affiliates in China who are earning money promoting U.S. based data brokers that sell personal information on Americans.
Feel free to make suggestions
Find devices in a particular city. city:"Bangalore"
Find devices in a particular country. country:"IN"
Find devices by giving geographical coordinates. geo:"56.913055,118.250862"
country:us
country:ru country:de city:chicago
Find devices matching the hostname. server: "gws" hostname:"google"
hostname:example.com -hostname:subdomain.example.com
hostname:example.com,example.org
Find devices based on an IP address or /x CIDR. net:210.214.0.0/16
org:microsoft
org:"United States Department"
asn:ASxxxx
Find devices based on operating system. os:"windows 7"
Find devices based on open ports. proftpd port:21
Find devices before or after between a given time. apache after:22/02/2009 before:14/3/2010
Self signed certificates ssl.cert.issuer.cn:example.com ssl.cert.subject.cn:example.com
Expired certificates ssl.cert.expired:true
ssl.cert.subject.cn:example.com
device:firewall
device:router
device:wap
device:webcam
device:media
device:"broadband router"
device:pbx
device:printer
device:switch
device:storage
device:specialized
device:phone
device:"voip"
device:"voip phone"
device:"voip adaptor"
device:"load balancer"
device:"print server"
device:terminal
device:remote
device:telecom
device:power
device:proxy
device:pda
device:bridge
os:"windows 7"
os:"windows server 2012"
os:"linux 3.x"
product:apache
product:nginx
product:android
product:chromecast
cpe:apple
cpe:microsoft
cpe:nginx
cpe:cisco
server: nginx
server: apache
server: microsoft
server: cisco-ios
dc:14:de:8e:d7:c1:15:43:23:82:25:81:d2:59:e8:c0
http.html:/dana-na
http.title:"Index of /" http.html:".pem"
onion-location
"product:MySQL"
mysql port:"3306"
"product:MongoDB"
mongodb port:27017
"MongoDB Server Information { "metrics":"
"Set-Cookie: mongo-express=" "200 OK"
"MongoDB Server Information" port:27017 -authentication
kibana content-legth:217
port:9200 json
port:"9200" all:elastic
port:"9200" all:"elastic indices"
"product:Memcached"
"product:CouchDB"
port:"5984"+Server: "CouchDB/2.1.0"
"port:5432 PostgreSQL"
"port:8087 Riak"
"product:Redis"
"product:Cassandra"
"Server: Prismview Player"
"in-tank inventory" port:10001
No auth required to access CLI terminal. "privileged command" GET
P372 "ANPR enabled"
mikrotik streetlight
"voter system serial" country:US
May allow for ATM Access availability NCR Port:"161"
"Cisco IOS" "ADVIPSERVICESK9_LI-M"
"[2J[H Encartele Confidential"
http.title:"Tesla PowerPack System" http.component:"d3" -ga3ca4f2
"Server: gSOAP/2.8" "Content-Length: 583"
Shodan made a pretty sweet Ship Tracker that maps ship locations in real time, too!
"Cobham SATCOM" OR ("Sailor" "VSAT")
title:"Slocum Fleet Mission Control"
"Server: CarelDataServer" "200 Document follows"
http.title:"Nordex Control" "Windows 2000 5.0 x86" "Jetty/3.1 (JSP 1.1; Servlet 2.2; java 1.6.0_14)"
"[1m[35mWelcome on console"
Secured by default, thankfully, but these 1,700+ machines still have no business being on the internet.
"DICOM Server Response" port:104
"Server: EIG Embedded Web Server" "200 Document follows"
"Siemens, SIMATIC" port:161
"Server: Microsoft-WinCE" "Content-Length: 12581"
"HID VertX" port:4070
"log off" "select the appropriate"
Helps to find the charging status of tesla powerpack. http.title:"Tesla PowerPack System" http.component:"d3" -ga3ca4f2
title:"xzeres wind"
"html:"PIPS Technology ALPR Processors""
"port:502"
"port:1911,4911 product:Niagara"
"port:18245,18246 product:"general electric""
"port:5006,5007 product:mitsubishi"
"port:2455 operating system"
"port:102"
"port:47808"
"port:5094 hart-ip"
"port:9600 response code"
"port:2404 asdu address"
"port:20000 source address"
"port:44818"
"port:1962 PLC"
"port:789 product:"Red Lion Controls"
"port:20547 PLC"
"authentication disabled" port:5900,5901
"authentication disabled" "RFB 003.008"
99.99% are secured by a secondary Windows login screen.
"\x03\x00\x00\x0b\x06\xd0\x00\x00\x124\x00"
product:"cobalt strike team server"
product:"Cobalt Strike Beacon"
ssl.cert.serial:146473198
- default certificate serial number ssl.jarm:07d14d16d21d21d07c42d41d00041d24a458a375eef0c576d23a7bab9a9fb1
ssl:foren.zik
http.html_hash:-1957161625
product:"Brute Ratel C4"
ssl:"Covenant" http.component:"Blazor"
ssl:"MetasploitSelfSignedCA"
Routers which got compromised hacked-router-help-sos
product:"Redis key-value store"
Find Citrix Gateway. title:"citrix gateway"
Command-line access inside Kubernetes pods and Docker containers, and real-time visualization/monitoring of the entire infrastructure.
title:"Weave Scope" http.favicon.hash:567176827
"X-Jenkins" "Set-Cookie: JSESSIONID" http.title:"Dashboard"
Jenkins Unrestricted Dashboard x-jenkins 200
"Docker Containers:" port:2375
"Docker-Distribution-Api-Version: registry" "200 OK" -gitlab
"dnsmasq-pi-hole" "Recursion: enabled"
"port: 53" Recursion: Enabled
"root@" port:23 -login -password -name -Session
NO password required for telnet access. port:23 console gateway
"polycom command shell"
nport -keyin port:23
A tangential result of Google's sloppy fractured update approach. 🙄 More information here.
"Android Debug Bridge" "Device" port:5555
Lantronix password port:30718 -secured
"Citrix Applications:" port:1604
Vulnerable (kind of "by design," but especially when exposed).
"smart install client active"
PBX "gateway console" -password port:23
http.title:"- Polycom" "Server: lighttpd"
"Polycom Command Shell" -failed port:23
"Polycom Command Shell" -failed port:23
Example: Polycom Video Conferencing
"Server: Bomgar" "200 OK"
"Intel(R) Active Management Technology" port:623,664,16992,16993,16994,16995
"Active Management Technology"
HP-ILO-4 !"HP-ILO-4/2.53" !"HP-ILO-4/2.54" !"HP-ILO-4/2.55" !"HP-ILO-4/2.60" !"HP-ILO-4/2.61" !"HP-ILO-4/2.62" !"HP-iLO-4/2.70" port:1900
"Press Enter for Setup Mode port:9999"
Helps to find the cleartext wifi passwords in Shodan. html:"def_wirelesspassword"
The wp-config.php if accessed can give out the database credentials. http.html:"* The wp-config.php creation script uses this file"
"x-owa-version" "IE=EmulateIE7" "Server: Microsoft-IIS/7.0"
"x-owa-version" "IE=EmulateIE7" http.favicon.hash:442749392
"X-AspNet-Version" http.title:"Outlook" -"x-owa-version"
"X-MS-Server-Fqdn"
Produces ~500,000 results...narrow down by adding "Documents" or "Videos", etc.
"Authentication: disabled" port:445
"Authentication: disabled" NETLOGON SYSVOL -unix port:445
"Authentication: disabled" "Shared this folder to access QuickBooks files OverNetwork" -unix port:445
"220" "230 Login successful." port:21
"Set-Cookie: iomega=" -"manage/login.html" -http.title:"Log In"
Redirecting sencha port:9000
"Server: Logitech Media Server" "200 OK"
Example: Logitech Media Servers
"X-Plex-Protocol" "200 OK" port:32400
"CherryPy/5.1.0" "/home"
"IPC$ all storage devices"
title:camera
webcam has_screenshot:true
"d-Link Internet Camera, 200 OK"
"Hipcam RealServer/V1.0"
"Server: yawcam" "Mime-Type: text/html"
("webcam 7" OR "webcamXP") http.component:"mootools" -401
"Server: IP Webcam Server" "200 OK"
html:"DVR_H264 ActiveX"
With username:admin and password: :P NETSurveillance uc-httpd
Server: uc-httpd 1.0.0
"Serial Number:" "Built:" "Server: HP HTTP"
ssl:"Xerox Generic Root"
"SERVER: EPSON_Linux UPnP" "200 OK"
"Server: EPSON-HTTP" "200 OK"
"Server: KS_HTTP" "200 OK"
"Server: CANON HTTP Server"
"Server: AV_Receiver" "HTTP/1.1 406"
Apple TVs, HomePods, etc.
"\x08_airplay" port:5353
"Chromecast:" port:8008
"Model: PYNG-HUB"
"Server: calibre" http.status:200 http.title:calibre
title:"OctoPrint" -title:"Login" http.favicon.hash:1307375944
"ETH - Total speed"
Substitute .pem with any extension or a filename like phpinfo.php.
http.title:"Index of /" http.html:".pem"
Exposed wp-config.php files containing database credentials.
http.html:"* The wp-config.php creation script uses this file"
"Minecraft Server" "protocol 340" port:25565
net:175.45.176.0/22,210.52.109.0/24,77.94.35.0/24
The data privacy company Onerep.com bills itself as a Virginia-based service for helping people remove their personal information from almost 200 people-search websites. However, an investigation into the history of onerep.com finds this company is operating out of Belarus and Cyprus, and that its founder has launched dozens of people-search services over the years.
Onerep’s “Protect” service starts at $8.33 per month for individuals and $15/mo for families, and promises to remove your personal information from nearly 200 people-search sites. Onerep also markets its service to companies seeking to offer their employees the ability to have their data continuously removed from people-search sites.
A testimonial on onerep.com.
Customer case studies published on onerep.com state that it struck a deal to offer the service to employees of Permanente Medicine, which represents the doctors within the health insurance giant Kaiser Permanente. Onerep also says it has made inroads among police departments in the United States.
But a review of Onerep’s domain registration records and that of its founder reveal a different side to this company. Onerep.com says its founder and CEO is Dimitri Shelest from Minsk, Belarus, as does Shelest’s profile on LinkedIn. Historic registration records indexed by DomainTools.com say Mr. Shelest was a registrant of onerep.com who used the email address dmitrcox2@gmail.com.
A search in the data breach tracking service Constella Intelligence for the name Dimitri Shelest brings up the email address dimitri.shelest@onerep.com. Constella also finds that Dimitri Shelest from Belarus used the email address d.sh@nuwber.com, and the Belarus phone number +375-292-702786.
Nuwber.com is a people search service whose employees all appear to be from Belarus, and it is one of dozens of people-search companies that Onerep claims to target with its data-removal service. Onerep.com’s website disavows any relationship to Nuwber.com, stating quite clearly, “Please note that OneRep is not associated with Nuwber.com.”
However, there is an abundance of evidence suggesting Mr. Shelest is in fact the founder of Nuwber. Constella found that Minsk telephone number (375-292-702786) has been used multiple times in connection with the email address dmitrcox@gmail.com. Recall that Onerep.com’s domain registration records in 2018 list the email address dmitrcox2@gmail.com.
It appears Mr. Shelest sought to reinvent his online identity in 2015 by adding a “2” to his email address. The Belarus phone number tied to Nuwber.com shows up in the domain records for comversus.com, and DomainTools says this domain is tied to both dmitrcox@gmail.com and dmitrcox2@gmail.com. Other domains that mention both email addresses in their WHOIS records include careon.me, docvsdoc.com, dotcomsvdot.com, namevname.com, okanyway.com and tapanyapp.com.
Onerep.com CEO and founder Dimitri Shelest, as pictured on the “about” page of onerep.com.
A search in DomainTools for the email address dmitrcox@gmail.com shows it is associated with the registration of at least 179 domain names, including dozens of mostly now-defunct people-search companies targeting citizens of Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Israel, Italy, Japan, Latvia and Mexico, among others.
Those include nuwber.fr, a site registered in 2016 which was identical to the homepage of Nuwber.com at the time. DomainTools shows the same email and Belarus phone number are in historic registration records for nuwber.at, nuwber.ch, and nuwber.dk (all domains linked here are to their cached copies at archive.org, where available).
Update, March 21, 11:15 a.m. ET: Mr. Shelest has provided a lengthy response to the findings in this story. In summary, Shelest acknowledged maintaining an ownership stake in Nuwber, but said there was “zero cross-over or information-sharing with OneRep.” Mr. Shelest said any other old domains that may be found and associated with his name are no longer being operated by him.
“I get it,” Shelest wrote. “My affiliation with a people search business may look odd from the outside. In truth, if I hadn’t taken that initial path with a deep dive into how people search sites work, Onerep wouldn’t have the best tech and team in the space. Still, I now appreciate that we did not make this more clear in the past and I’m aiming to do better in the future.” The full statement is available here (PDF).
Original story:
Historic WHOIS records for onerep.com show it was registered for many years to a resident of Sioux Falls, SD for a completely unrelated site. But around Sept. 2015 the domain switched from the registrar GoDaddy.com to eNom, and the registration records were hidden behind privacy protection services. DomainTools indicates around this time onerep.com started using domain name servers from DNS provider constellix.com. Likewise, Nuwber.com first appeared in late 2015, was also registered through eNom, and also started using constellix.com for DNS at nearly the same time.
Listed on LinkedIn as a former product manager at OneRep.com between 2015 and 2018 is Dimitri Bukuyazau, who says their hometown is Warsaw, Poland. While this LinkedIn profile (linkedin.com/in/dzmitrybukuyazau) does not mention Nuwber, a search on this name in Google turns up a 2017 blog post from privacyduck.com, which laid out a number of reasons to support a conclusion that OneRep and Nuwber.com were the same company.
“Any people search profiles containing your Personally Identifiable Information that were on Nuwber.com were also mirrored identically on OneRep.com, down to the relatives’ names and address histories,” Privacyduck.com wrote. The post continued:
“Both sites offered the same immediate opt-out process. Both sites had the same generic contact and support structure. They were – and remain – the same company (even PissedConsumer.com advocates this fact: https://nuwber.pissedconsumer.com/nuwber-and-onerep-20160707878520.html).”
“Things changed in early 2016 when OneRep.com began offering privacy removal services right alongside their own open displays of your personal information. At this point when you found yourself on Nuwber.com OR OneRep.com, you would be provided with the option of opting-out your data on their site for free – but also be highly encouraged to pay them to remove it from a slew of other sites (and part of that payment was removing you from their own site, Nuwber.com, as a benefit of their service).”
Reached via LinkedIn, Mr. Bukuyazau declined to answer questions, such as whether he ever worked at Nuwber.com. However, Constella Intelligence finds two interesting email addresses for employees at nuwber.com: d.bu@nuwber.com, and d.bu+figure-eight.com@nuwber.com, which was registered under the name “Dzmitry.”
PrivacyDuck’s claims about how onerep.com appeared and behaved in the early days are not readily verifiable because the domain onerep.com has been completely excluded from the Wayback Machine at archive.org. The Wayback Machine will honor such requests if they come directly from the owner of the domain in question.
Still, Mr. Shelest’s name, phone number and email also appear in the domain registration records for a truly dizzying number of country-specific people-search services, including pplcrwlr.in, pplcrwlr.fr, pplcrwlr.dk, pplcrwlr.jp, peeepl.br.com, peeepl.in, peeepl.it and peeepl.co.uk.
The same details appear in the WHOIS registration records for the now-defunct people-search sites waatpp.de, waatp1.fr, azersab.com, and ahavoila.com, a people-search service for French citizens.
A search on the email address dmitrcox@gmail.com suggests Mr. Shelest was previously involved in rather aggressive email marketing campaigns. In 2010, an anonymous source leaked to KrebsOnSecurity the financial and organizational records of Spamit, which at the time was easily the largest Russian-language pharmacy spam affiliate program in the world.
Spamit paid spammers a hefty commission every time someone bought male enhancement drugs from any of their spam-advertised websites. Mr. Shelest’s email address stood out because immediately after the Spamit database was leaked, KrebsOnSecurity searched all of the Spamit affiliate email addresses to determine if any of them corresponded to social media accounts at Facebook.com (at the time, Facebook allowed users to search profiles by email address).
That mapping, which was done mainly by generous graduate students at my alma mater George Mason University, revealed that dmitrcox@gmail.com was used by a Spamit affiliate, albeit not a very profitable one. That same Facebook profile for Mr. Shelest is still active, and it says he is married and living in Minsk [Update, Mar. 16: Mr. Shelest’s Facebook account is no longer active].
Scrolling down Mr. Shelest’s Facebook page to posts made more than ten years ago show him liking the Facebook profile pages for a large number of other people-search sites, including findita.com, findmedo.com, folkscan.com, huntize.com, ifindy.com, jupery.com, look2man.com, lookerun.com, manyp.com, peepull.com, perserch.com, persuer.com, pervent.com, piplenter.com, piplfind.com, piplscan.com, popopke.com, pplsorce.com, qimeo.com, scoutu2.com, search64.com, searchay.com, seekmi.com, selfabc.com, socsee.com, srching.com, toolooks.com, upearch.com, webmeek.com, and many country-code variations of viadin.ca (e.g. viadin.hk, viadin.com and viadin.de).
Domaintools.com finds that all of the domains mentioned in the last paragraph were registered to the email address dmitrcox@gmail.com.
Mr. Shelest has not responded to multiple requests for comment. KrebsOnSecurity also sought comment from onerep.com, which likewise has not responded to inquiries about its founder’s many apparent conflicts of interest. In any event, these practices would seem to contradict the goal Onerep has stated on its site: “We believe that no one should compromise personal online security and get a profit from it.”
Max Anderson is chief growth officer at 360 Privacy, a legitimate privacy company that works to keep its clients’ data off of more than 400 data broker and people-search sites. Anderson said it is concerning to see a direct link between between a data removal service and data broker websites.
“I would consider it unethical to run a company that sells people’s information, and then charge those same people to have their information removed,” Anderson said.
Last week, KrebsOnSecurity published an analysis of the people-search data broker giant Radaris, whose consumer profiles are deep enough to rival those of far more guarded data broker resources available to U.S. police departments and other law enforcement personnel.
That story revealed that the co-founders of Radaris are two native Russian brothers who operate multiple Russian-language dating services and affiliate programs. It also appears many of the Radaris founders’ businesses have ties to a California marketing firm that works with a Russian state-run media conglomerate currently sanctioned by the U.S. government.
KrebsOnSecurity will continue investigating the history of various consumer data brokers and people-search providers. If any readers have inside knowledge of this industry or key players within it, please consider reaching out to krebsonsecurity at gmail.com.
Update, March 15, 11:35 a.m. ET: Many readers have pointed out something that was somehow overlooked amid all this research: The Mozilla Foundation, the company that runs the Firefox Web browser, has launched a data removal service called Mozilla Monitor that bundles OneRep. That notice says Mozilla Monitor is offered as a free or paid subscription service.
“The free data breach notification service is a partnership with Have I Been Pwned (“HIBP”),” the Mozilla Foundation explains. “The automated data deletion service is a partnership with OneRep to remove personal information published on publicly available online directories and other aggregators of information about individuals (“Data Broker Sites”).”
In a statement shared with KrebsOnSecurity.com, Mozilla said they did assess OneRep’s data removal service to confirm it acts according to privacy principles advocated at Mozilla.
“We were aware of the past affiliations with the entities named in the article and were assured they had ended prior to our work together,” the statement reads. “We’re now looking into this further. We will always put the privacy and security of our customers first and will provide updates as needed.”
A list of Google Dorks for Bug Bounty, Web Application Security, and Pentesting
site:example.com -www -shop -share -ir -mfa
site:example.com ext:php inurl:?
site:openbugbounty.org inurl:reports intext:"example.com"
site:"example[.]com" ext:log | ext:txt | ext:conf | ext:cnf | ext:ini | ext:env | ext:sh | ext:bak | ext:backup | ext:swp | ext:old | ext:~ | ext:git | ext:svn | ext:htpasswd | ext:htaccess
inurl:q= | inurl:s= | inurl:search= | inurl:query= | inurl:keyword= | inurl:lang= inurl:& site:example.com
inurl:url= | inurl:return= | inurl:next= | inurl:redirect= | inurl:redir= | inurl:ret= | inurl:r2= | inurl:page= inurl:& inurl:http site:example.com
inurl:id= | inurl:pid= | inurl:category= | inurl:cat= | inurl:action= | inurl:sid= | inurl:dir= inurl:& site:example.com
inurl:http | inurl:url= | inurl:path= | inurl:dest= | inurl:html= | inurl:data= | inurl:domain= | inurl:page= inurl:& site:example.com
inurl:include | inurl:dir | inurl:detail= | inurl:file= | inurl:folder= | inurl:inc= | inurl:locate= | inurl:doc= | inurl:conf= inurl:& site:example.com
inurl:cmd | inurl:exec= | inurl:query= | inurl:code= | inurl:do= | inurl:run= | inurl:read= | inurl:ping= inurl:& site:example.com
inurl:config | inurl:env | inurl:setting | inurl:backup | inurl:admin | inurl:php site:example[.]com
inurl:email= | inurl:phone= | inurl:password= | inurl:secret= inurl:& site:example[.]com
inurl:apidocs | inurl:api-docs | inurl:swagger | inurl:api-explorer site:"example[.]com"
site:pastebin.com "example.com"
site:jsfiddle.net "example.com"
site:codebeautify.org "example.com"
site:codepen.io "example.com"
site:s3.amazonaws.com "example.com"
site:blob.core.windows.net "example.com"
site:googleapis.com "example.com"
site:drive.google.com "example.com"
site:dev.azure.com "example[.]com"
site:onedrive.live.com "example[.]com"
site:digitaloceanspaces.com "example[.]com"
site:sharepoint.com "example[.]com"
site:s3-external-1.amazonaws.com "example[.]com"
site:s3.dualstack.us-east-1.amazonaws.com "example[.]com"
site:dropbox.com/s "example[.]com"
site:box.com/s "example[.]com"
site:docs.google.com inurl:"/d/" "example[.]com"
site:jfrog.io "example[.]com"
site:firebaseio.com "example[.]com"
site:example.com "choose file"
"submit vulnerability report" | "powered by bugcrowd" | "powered by hackerone"
site:*/security.txt "bounty"
site:*/server-status apache
inurl:/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php
intext:"Powered by" & intext:Drupal & inurl:user
site:*/joomla/login
Medium articles for more dorks:
https://thegrayarea.tech/5-google-dorks-every-hacker-needs-to-know-fed21022a906
https://infosecwriteups.com/uncover-hidden-gems-in-the-cloud-with-google-dorks-8621e56a329d
https://infosecwriteups.com/10-google-dorks-for-sensitive-data-9454b09edc12
Top Parameters:
https://github.com/lutfumertceylan/top25-parameter
Proviesec dorks:
https://github.com/Proviesec/google-dorks