In May 2025, the U.S. government sanctioned a Chinese national for operating a cloud provider linked to the majority of virtual currency investment scam websites reported to the FBI. But a new report finds the accused continues to operate a slew of established accounts at American tech companies — including Facebook, Github, PayPal and Twitter/X.
On May 29, the U.S. Department of the Treasury announced economic sanctions against Funnull Technology Inc., a Philippines-based company alleged to provide infrastructure for hundreds of thousands of websites involved in virtual currency investment scams known as “pig butchering.” In January 2025, KrebsOnSecurity detailed how Funnull was designed as a content delivery network that catered to foreign cybercriminals seeking to route their traffic through U.S.-based cloud providers.
The Treasury also sanctioned Funnull’s alleged operator, a 40-year-old Chinese national named Liu “Steve” Lizhi. The government says Funnull directly facilitated financial schemes resulting in more than $200 million in financial losses by Americans, and that the company’s operations were linked to the majority of pig butchering scams reported to the FBI.
It is generally illegal for U.S. companies or individuals to transact with people sanctioned by the Treasury. However, as Mr. Lizhi’s case makes clear, just because someone is sanctioned doesn’t necessarily mean big tech companies are going to suspend their online accounts.
The government says Lizhi was born November 13, 1984, and used the nicknames “XXL4” and “Nice Lizhi.” Nevertheless, Steve Liu’s 17-year-old account on LinkedIn (in the name “Liulizhi”) had hundreds of followers (Lizhi’s LinkedIn profile helpfully confirms his birthday) until quite recently: The account was deleted this morning, just hours after KrebsOnSecurity sought comment from LinkedIn.
Mr. Lizhi’s LinkedIn account was suspended sometime in the last 24 hours, after KrebsOnSecurity sought comment from LinkedIn.
In an emailed response, a LinkedIn spokesperson said the company’s “Prohibited countries policy” states that LinkedIn “does not sell, license, support or otherwise make available its Premium accounts or other paid products and services to individuals and companies sanctioned by the U.S. government.” LinkedIn declined to say whether the profile in question was a premium or free account.
Mr. Lizhi also maintains a working PayPal account under the name Liu Lizhi and username “@nicelizhi,” another nickname listed in the Treasury sanctions. A 15-year-old Twitter/X account named “Lizhi” that links to Mr. Lizhi’s personal domain remains active, although it has few followers and hasn’t posted in years.
These accounts and many others were flagged by the security firm Silent Push, which has been tracking Funnull’s operations for the past year and calling out U.S. cloud providers like Amazon and Microsoft for failing to more quickly sever ties with the company.
Liu Lizhi’s PayPal account.
In a report released today, Silent Push found Lizhi still operates numerous Facebook accounts and groups, including a private Facebook account under the name Liu Lizhi. Another Facebook account clearly connected to Lizhi is a tourism page for Ganzhou, China called “EnjoyGanzhou” that was named in the Treasury Department sanctions.
“This guy is the technical administrator for the infrastructure that is hosting a majority of scams targeting people in the United States, and hundreds of millions have been lost based on the websites he’s been hosting,” said Zach Edwards, senior threat researcher at Silent Push. “It’s crazy that the vast majority of big tech companies haven’t done anything to cut ties with this guy.”
The FBI says it received nearly 150,000 complaints last year involving digital assets and $9.3 billion in losses — a 66 percent increase from the previous year. Investment scams were the top crypto-related crimes reported, with $5.8 billion in losses.
In a statement, a Meta spokesperson said the company continuously takes steps to meet its legal obligations, but that sanctions laws are complex and varied. They explained that sanctions are often targeted in nature and don’t always prohibit people from having a presence on its platform. Nevertheless, Meta confirmed it had removed the account, unpublished Pages, and removed Groups and events associated with the user for violating its policies.
Attempts to reach Mr. Lizhi via his primary email addresses at Hotmail and Gmail bounced as undeliverable. Likewise, his 14-year-old YouTube channel appears to have been taken down recently.
However, anyone interested in viewing or using Mr. Lizhi’s 146 computer code repositories will have no problem finding GitHub accounts for him, including one registered under the NiceLizhi and XXL4 nicknames mentioned in the Treasury sanctions.
One of multiple GitHub profiles used by Liu “Steve” Lizhi, who uses the nickname XXL4 (a moniker listed in the Treasury sanctions for Mr. Lizhi).
Mr. Lizhi also operates a GitHub page for an open source e-commerce platform called NexaMerchant, which advertises itself as a payment gateway working with numerous American financial institutions. Interestingly, this profile’s “followers” page shows several other accounts that appear to be Mr. Lizhi’s. All of the account’s followers are tagged as “suspended,” even though that suspended message does not display when one visits those individual profiles.
In response to questions, GitHub said it has a process in place to identify when users and customers are Specially Designated Nationals or other denied or blocked parties, but that it locks those accounts instead of removing them. According to its policy, GitHub takes care that users and customers aren’t impacted beyond what is required by law.
All of the follower accounts for the XXL4 GitHub account appear to be Mr. Lizhi’s, and have been suspended by GitHub, but their code is still accessible.
“This includes keeping public repositories, including those for open source projects, available and accessible to support personal communications involving developers in sanctioned regions,” the policy states. “This also means GitHub will advocate for developers in sanctioned regions to enjoy greater access to the platform and full access to the global open source community.”
Edwards said it’s great that GitHub has a process for handling sanctioned accounts, but that the process doesn’t seem to communicate risk in a transparent way, noting that the only indicator on the locked accounts is the message, “This repository has been archived by the owner. It is not read-only.”
“It’s an odd message that doesn’t communicate, ‘This is a sanctioned entity, don’t fork this code or use it in a production environment’,” Edwards said.
Mark Rasch is a former federal cybercrime prosecutor who now serves as counsel for the New York City based security consulting firm Unit 221B. Rasch said when Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctions a person or entity, it then becomes illegal for businesses or organizations to transact with the sanctioned party.
Rasch said financial institutions have very mature systems for severing accounts tied to people who become subject to OFAC sanctions, but that tech companies may be far less proactive — particularly with free accounts.
“Banks have established ways of checking [U.S. government sanctions lists] for sanctioned entities, but tech companies don’t necessarily do a good job with that, especially for services that you can just click and sign up for,” Rasch said. “It’s potentially a risk and liability for the tech companies involved, but only to the extent OFAC is willing to enforce it.”
Liu Lizhi operates numerous Facebook accounts and groups, including this one for an entity specified in the OFAC sanctions: The “Enjoy Ganzhou” tourism page for Ganzhou, China. Image: Silent Push.
In July 2024, Funnull purchased the domain polyfill[.]io, the longtime home of a legitimate open source project that allowed websites to ensure that devices using legacy browsers could still render content in newer formats. After the Polyfill domain changed hands, at least 384,000 websites were caught in a supply-chain attack that redirected visitors to malicious sites. According to the Treasury, Funnull used the code to redirect people to scam websites and online gambling sites, some of which were linked to Chinese criminal money laundering operations.
The U.S. government says Funnull provides domain names for websites on its purchased IP addresses, using domain generation algorithms (DGAs) — programs that generate large numbers of similar but unique names for websites — and that it sells web design templates to cybercriminals.
“These services not only make it easier for cybercriminals to impersonate trusted brands when creating scam websites, but also allow them to quickly change to different domain names and IP addresses when legitimate providers attempt to take the websites down,” reads a Treasury statement.
Meanwhile, Funnull appears to be morphing nearly all aspects of its business in the wake of the sanctions, Edwards said.
“Whereas before they might have used 60 DGA domains to hide and bounce their traffic, we’re seeing far more now,” he said. “They’re trying to make their infrastructure harder to track and more complicated, so for now they’re not going away but more just changing what they’re doing. And a lot more organizations should be holding their feet to the fire.”
Update, 2:48 PM ET: Added response from Meta, which confirmed it has closed the accounts and groups connected to Mr. Lizhi.
Update, July 7, 6:56 p.m. ET: In a written statement, PayPal said it continually works to combat and prevent the illicit use of its services.
“We devote significant resources globally to financial crime compliance, and we proactively refer cases to and assist law enforcement officials around the world in their efforts to identify, investigate and stop illegal activity,” the statement reads.
An employee at Elon Musk’s artificial intelligence company xAI leaked a private key on GitHub that for the past two months could have allowed anyone to query private xAI large language models (LLMs) which appear to have been custom made for working with internal data from Musk’s companies, including SpaceX, Tesla and Twitter/X, KrebsOnSecurity has learned.
Image: Shutterstock, @sdx15.
Philippe Caturegli, “chief hacking officer” at the security consultancy Seralys, was the first to publicize the leak of credentials for an x.ai application programming interface (API) exposed in the GitHub code repository of a technical staff member at xAI.
Caturegli’s post on LinkedIn caught the attention of researchers at GitGuardian, a company that specializes in detecting and remediating exposed secrets in public and proprietary environments. GitGuardian’s systems constantly scan GitHub and other code repositories for exposed API keys, and fire off automated alerts to affected users.
GitGuardian’s Eric Fourrier told KrebsOnSecurity the exposed API key had access to several unreleased models of Grok, the AI chatbot developed by xAI. In total, GitGuardian found the key had access to at least 60 fine-tuned and private LLMs.
“The credentials can be used to access the X.ai API with the identity of the user,” GitGuardian wrote in an email explaining their findings to xAI. “The associated account not only has access to public Grok models (grok-2-1212, etc) but also to what appears to be unreleased (grok-2.5V), development (research-grok-2p5v-1018), and private models (tweet-rejector, grok-spacex-2024-11-04).”
Fourrier found GitGuardian had alerted the xAI employee about the exposed API key nearly two months ago — on March 2. But as of April 30, when GitGuardian directly alerted xAI’s security team to the exposure, the key was still valid and usable. xAI told GitGuardian to report the matter through its bug bounty program at HackerOne, but just a few hours later the repository containing the API key was removed from GitHub.
“It looks like some of these internal LLMs were fine-tuned on SpaceX data, and some were fine-tuned with Tesla data,” Fourrier said. “I definitely don’t think a Grok model that’s fine-tuned on SpaceX data is intended to be exposed publicly.”
xAI did not respond to a request for comment. Nor did the 28-year-old xAI technical staff member whose key was exposed.
Carole Winqwist, chief marketing officer at GitGuardian, said giving potentially hostile users free access to private LLMs is a recipe for disaster.
“If you’re an attacker and you have direct access to the model and the back end interface for things like Grok, it’s definitely something you can use for further attacking,” she said. “An attacker could it use for prompt injection, to tweak the (LLM) model to serve their purposes, or try to implant code into the supply chain.”
The inadvertent exposure of internal LLMs for xAI comes as Musk’s so-called Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) has been feeding sensitive government records into artificial intelligence tools. In February, The Washington Post reported DOGE officials were feeding data from across the Education Department into AI tools to probe the agency’s programs and spending.
The Post said DOGE plans to replicate this process across many departments and agencies, accessing the back-end software at different parts of the government and then using AI technology to extract and sift through information about spending on employees and programs.
“Feeding sensitive data into AI software puts it into the possession of a system’s operator, increasing the chances it will be leaked or swept up in cyberattacks,” Post reporters wrote.
Wired reported in March that DOGE has deployed a proprietary chatbot called GSAi to 1,500 federal workers at the General Services Administration, part of an effort to automate tasks previously done by humans as DOGE continues its purge of the federal workforce.
A Reuters report last month said Trump administration officials told some U.S. government employees that DOGE is using AI to surveil at least one federal agency’s communications for hostility to President Trump and his agenda. Reuters wrote that the DOGE team has heavily deployed Musk’s Grok AI chatbot as part of their work slashing the federal government, although Reuters said it could not establish exactly how Grok was being used.
Caturegli said while there is no indication that federal government or user data could be accessed through the exposed x.ai API key, these private models are likely trained on proprietary data and may unintentionally expose details related to internal development efforts at xAI, Twitter, or SpaceX.
“The fact that this key was publicly exposed for two months and granted access to internal models is concerning,” Caturegli said. “This kind of long-lived credential exposure highlights weak key management and insufficient internal monitoring, raising questions about safeguards around developer access and broader operational security.”
On April 9, Twitter/X began automatically modifying links that mention “twitter.com” to read “x.com” instead. But over the past 48 hours, dozens of new domain names have been registered that demonstrate how this change could be used to craft convincing phishing links — such as fedetwitter[.]com, which until very recently rendered as fedex.com in tweets.
The message displayed when one visits goodrtwitter.com, which Twitter/X displayed as goodrx.com in tweets and messages.
A search at DomainTools.com shows at least 60 domain names have been registered over the past two days for domains ending in “twitter.com,” although research so far shows the majority of these domains have been registered “defensively” by private individuals to prevent the domains from being purchased by scammers.
Those include carfatwitter.com, which Twitter/X truncated to carfax.com when the domain appeared in user messages or tweets. Visiting this domain currently displays a message that begins, “Are you serious, X Corp?”
Update: It appears Twitter/X has corrected its mistake, and no longer truncates any domain ending in “twitter.com” to “x.com.”
Original story:
The same message is on other newly registered domains, including goodrtwitter.com (goodrx.com), neobutwitter.com (neobux.com), roblotwitter.com (roblox.com), square-enitwitter.com (square-enix.com) and yandetwitter.com (yandex.com). The message left on these domains indicates they were defensively registered by a user on Mastodon whose bio says they are a systems admin/engineer. That profile has not responded to requests for comment.
A number of these new domains including “twitter.com” appear to be registered defensively by Twitter/X users in Japan. The domain netflitwitter.com (netflix.com, to Twitter/X users) now displays a message saying it was “acquired to prevent its use for malicious purposes,” along with a Twitter/X username.
The domain mentioned at the beginning of this story — fedetwitter.com — redirects users to the blog of a Japanese technology enthusiast. A user with the handle “amplest0e” appears to have registered space-twitter.com, which Twitter/X users would see as the CEO’s “space-x.com.” The domain “ametwitter.com” already redirects to the real americanexpress.com.
Some of the domains registered recently and ending in “twitter.com” currently do not resolve and contain no useful contact information in their registration records. Those include firefotwitter[.]com (firefox.com), ngintwitter[.]com (nginx.com), and webetwitter[.]com (webex.com).
The domain setwitter.com, which Twitter/X until very recently rendered as “sex.com,” redirects to this blog post warning about the recent changes and their potential use for phishing.
Sean McNee, vice president of research and data at DomainTools, told KrebsOnSecurity it appears Twitter/X did not properly limit its redirection efforts.
“Bad actors could register domains as a way to divert traffic from legitimate sites or brands given the opportunity — many such brands in the top million domains end in x, such as webex, hbomax, xerox, xbox, and more,” McNee said. “It is also notable that several other globally popular brands, such as Rolex and Linux, were also on the list of registered domains.”
The apparent oversight by Twitter/X was cause for amusement and amazement from many former users who have migrated to other social media platforms since the new CEO took over. Matthew Garrett, a lecturer at U.C. Berkeley’s School of Information, summed up the Schadenfreude thusly:
“Twitter just doing a ‘redirect links in tweets that go to x.com to twitter.com instead but accidentally do so for all domains that end x.com like eg spacex.com going to spacetwitter.com’ is not absolutely the funniest thing I could imagine but it’s high up there.”
What does a hacker want with your social media account? Plenty.
Hackers hijack social media accounts for several reasons. They’ll dupe the victim’s friends and followers with scams. They’ll flood feeds with misinformation. And they’ll steal all kinds of personal information—not to mention photos and chats in DMs. In all, a stolen social media account could lead to fraud, blackmail, and other crimes.
Yet you have a strong line of defense that can prevent it from happening to you: multi-factor authentication (MFA).
MFA goes by other names, such as two-factor authentication and two-step verification. Yet they all boost your account security in much the same way. They add an extra step or steps to the login process. Extra evidence to prove that you are, in fact, you. It’s in addition to the usual username/password combination, thus the “multi-factor” in multi-factor authentication.
Examples of MFA include:
With MFA, a hacker needs more than just your username and password to weasel their way into your account. They need that extra piece of evidence required by the login process, which is something only you should have.
This stands as a good reminder that you should never give out the information you use in your security questions—and to never share your one-time security codes with anyone. In fact, scammers cobble up all kinds of phishing scams to steal that information.
Major social media platforms offer MFA, although they might call it by other names. As you’ll see, several platforms call it “two-factor authentication.”
Given the way that interfaces and menus can vary and get updated over time, your best bet for setting up MFA on your social media accounts is to go right to the source. Social media platforms provide the latest step-by-step instructions in their help pages. A simple search for “multi-factor authentication” and the name of your social media platform should readily turn up results.
For quick reference, you can find the appropriate help pages for some of the most popular platforms here:
Another important reminder is to check the URL of the site you’re on to ensure it’s legitimate. Scammers set up all kinds of phony login and account pages to steal your info. Phishing scams like those are a topic all on their own. A great way you can learn to spot them is by giving our Phishing Scam Protection Guide a quick read. It’s part of our McAfee Safety Series, which covers a broad range of topics, from romance scams and digital privacy to online credit protection and ransomware.
In many ways, your social media account is an extension of yourself. It reflects your friendships, interests, likes, and conversations. Only you should have access to that. Putting MFA in place can help keep it that way.
More broadly, enabling MFA across every account that offers it is a smart security move as well. It places a major barrier in the way of would-be hackers who, somehow, in some way, have ended up with your username and password.
On the topic, ensure your social media accounts have strong, unique passwords in place. The one-two punch of strong, unique passwords and MFA will make hacking your account tougher still. Wondering what a strong, unique password looks like? Here’s a hint: a password with eight characters is less secure than you might think. With a quick read, you can create strong, unique passwords that are tough to crack.
Lastly, consider using comprehensive online protection software if you aren’t already. In addition to securing your devices from hacks and attacks, it can help protect your privacy and identity across your travels online—both on social media and off.
The post How to Protect Your Social Media Passwords from Hacks and Attacks appeared first on McAfee Blog.
Authored by: Vallabh Chole and Yerko Grbic
On July 23rd, 2023, Elon Musk announced that the social networking site, Twitter was rebranding as “X”. The news propelled Twitter and X to gain headlines and become the top trending topics on popular social media platforms.
Scammers pounced on this opportunity and started renaming various hacked YouTube and other social media accounts to “twitter-x” and “twitter fund” to promote scam links with new X branding.
Figure 1. Twitter-X-themed YouTube Live Stream by scammer
Figure 2. Twitter X Crypto Scam
This type of scam has been active for some time and uses an innovative approach to lure victims. To make this scam more authentic, attackers target famous Influencers with sponsorship emails that contain password-stealing malware as email attachments. When password stealer malware is executed, the influencer’s session cookies (unique access tokens) are stolen and uploaded to attacker-controlled systems.
Figure 3. Malware Flow Chart
After the influencer’s account has been compromised, the scammer starts to rename channels, in this case to “Twitter CEO” and then the scammers start to live stream an Elon Musk video on YouTube. They post web links for new scam sites in chat, and target YouTube accounts with a large number of subscribers. On other social media platforms, such as Instagram and Twitter, they use compromised accounts to follow users and post screenshots with captions, such as “Thanks Mr.Elon”. If we look for these terms on Instagram, we observe thousands of similar posts. Compromised accounts are also used to post videos for software/game applications, which are malware masquerading as legitimate software or games. These videos demonstrate how to download and execute files, which are common password-stealing malware, and distributed through compromised social media accounts.
McAfee+ provides all-in-one online protection for your identity, privacy, and security. With McAfee+, you’ll feel safer online because you’ll have the tools, guidance, and support to take the steps to be safer online. McAfee protects against these types of scam sites with Web Advisor protection that detects malicious websites.
Figure 4. McAfee WebAdvisor detection
Below is a detection heatmap for scam URL’s targeting twitter-x and promoting crypto scams.
Figure 5. Scam URL Detection Heatmap
Figure 6. Password stealer Heatmap
Scam Site | Crypto Type | Wallet | |
twitter-x[.]org | ETH | 0xB1706fc3671115432eC9a997F802aC79CD7f378a | |
twitter-x[.]org | BTC | 1KtgaAjBETdcXiAdGsXJMePT4AEGWqtsug | |
twitter-x[.]org | USDT | 0xB1706fc3671115432eC9a997F802aC79CD7f378a | |
twitter-x[.]org | DOGE | DLCmD43eZ6hPxZVzc8C7eUL4w8TNrBMw9J |
The post Scammers Follow the Rebranding of Twitter to X, to Distribute Malware appeared first on McAfee Blog.