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Your digital life is being stitched together—one purchase, one search, one swipe at a time.
Data brokers collect and combine fragments of your personal information to build detailed profiles they can sell to advertisers, employers, and anyone willing to pay.
While you can request that these brokers delete your data, many make it almost impossible to do so.
A joint investigation by CalMatters and The Markup found that 35 data brokers had intentionally hidden their opt-out pages from search results, making it harder for people to remove their information.
The result: a patchwork version of you exists online—a Frankenstein of your data, stitched together without your consent.
Moreover, practically anyone can purchase this sensitive info. That ranges from advertisers to law enforcement and from employers to anyone on the street who wants to know a lot more about you.
Here’s what’s happening, and what you can do about it.
As part of the article, reporters analyzed 499 data broker sites registered in the state of California. Of them, 35 had search-blocking code. Additionally per the article, many opt out pages “required scrolling multiple screens, dismissing pop-ups for cookie permissions, and newsletter sign-ups and then finding a link that was a fraction the size of other text on the page.”[i]
Once the publications contacted the data brokers in question, multiple companies halted the practice, some responding that they were unaware their site had search-blocking code. Several others didn’t respond by the time the article was published and kept their practices in place.
There are several ways information brokers can get your info about you …
Sources available to the public: Some of your personal records are easily available to the public. Data brokers can collect public records like your voter registration records, birth certificate, criminal record, and even bankruptcy records. By rounding them up from multiple sources and gathering them in one place, it takes someone seconds to find out all these things about you, rather than spending hours poring over public records.
Search, browsing, and app usage: Through a combination of data collected from internet service providers (ISPs), websites, and apps, data brokers can get access to all kinds of activity. They can see what content you’re interested in, how much time you spend on certain sites, and even your daily travels thanks to location data. They also use web scraping tools (software that pulls info from the web), to gather yet more. All this data collecting makes up a multi-billion-dollar industry where personal data is gathered, analyzed, sold, and then sold again and again—all without a person’s knowledge.
Online agreements: As it is with smartphone apps, you’ll usually have to sign an agreement when signing up for a new online service. Many of these agreements have disclosures in the fine print that give the company the right to collect and distribute your personal info.
Purchase history: Data brokers want to know what products or services you’ve purchased, how you paid for them (credit card, debit card, or coupon), and when and where you purchased them. In some cases, they get this info from loyalty programs at places like supermarkets, drugstores, and other retailers. Kroger, one of the largest grocery chains, is a good example of how purchasing insights end up in the hands of others. According to Consumer Reports, the company draws 35% of its net income from selling customer data to other companies.
For starters, there aren’t any data privacy laws on the federal level. That, so far, has fallen to individual states to enact. As such, data privacy laws vary from state-to-state, with California having some of the earliest and strongest protections on record, via the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) and the California Privacy Rights Act (CPRA).
In all, 20 states currently have comprehensive privacy laws in place, with five others that have put narrower privacy protections in place, covering data brokers, internet service providers, and medical/biometric data.
States with Comprehensive Data Privacy Laws
| · California
· Virginia · Colorado · Connecticut · Utah · Iowa · Indiana · Tennessee · Texas |
· Florida
· Montana · Oregon · Delaware · New Hampshire · New Jersey · Kentucky · Nebraska · Rhode Island |
For specific laws in your state and how they can protect you, we suggest doing a search for “data privacy laws [your state]” for more info.
Even if your state has no or narrow data privacy laws in place, you still have several ways you can take back your privacy.
The first thing you can do is keep a lower profile online. That can limit the amount of personal info they can get their hands on:
The list of data brokers is long. Cleaning up your personal data online can quickly eat up your time, as it requires you to reach out to multiple data brokers and opt out.
Rather than removing yourself one-by-one from the host of data broker sites out there, you have a solution: our Personal Data Cleanup.
Personal Data Cleanup scans data broker and people search sites and shows you which ones are selling your personal info. It also provides guidance on how you can remove your data from those sites. And if you want to save time on manually removing that info, you have options. Our McAfee+ Advanced and Ultimate plans come with full-service Personal Data Cleanup, which sends requests to remove your data automatically.
If the thought of your personal info getting bought and sold in such a public way bothers you, our Personal Data Cleanup can put you back in charge of it.
The post Frankenstein Data: How Data Brokers Stitch Together—and Sell—Your Digital Self appeared first on McAfee Blog.
They’re not hiding in dark alleys—they’re hiding in plain sight. Airports, cafés, hotels, even libraries can harbor dangerous Vampire Wi-Fi networks.
These vampires pass themselves off as legitimate public Wi-Fi hotspots, using names that look innocent enough, such as “FREE_WIFI” and “AT&T_FREE_WIFI”. These can potentially be “evil twin networks,” they often mimic the name of the airport you’re in, or the place where you’re grabbing a quick coffee and some laptop time while you’re on the road. In fact, when you connect to a vampire or evil twin network, you’re connecting to a hacker.
These networks are relatively easy to set up. With just a few hundred dollars of gear, attackers can set up these digital bloodsuckers anywhere. The moment you log on, they begin feeding on your data, using tools called packet sniffers to capture and analyze every bit you send.
So say you’re on the road and log into one of these networks, a hacker on the network can see what you’re connecting to and what data you’re passing along. Your credit card number while you shop. Your password when you bank. That confidential contract you just sent to a client. And your email password when your app regularly checks for mail every few minutes or so.
What tools let hackers snoop? Network analyzers, or packet sniffers as many call them. A bad actor can gather up data with a packet sniffer, analyze it, and pluck out the sensitive bits of info that are of value. Before you know it, you’re a victim of identity theft.
Another common vampire Wi-Fi ploy is to set up a phony login screen that asks for a username and password, often for popular online services like Google and Apple. In this case, the hacker gets the keys to all the personal info, apps, files, and financial info connected to them.
Hackers typically take lengths to make these networks look legitimate, but they may give off signs:
Still, even with some of these flags, they can be tough to spot. And that’s a reason why our mobile security apps for iOS and Android analyze Wi-Fi networks before you connect to them—letting you know if a connection is Safe, Risky, or altogether Unsafe.
Your best bet when using any public Wi-Fi at all is to use a VPN.
A VPN is an app that you install on your device to help keep your data safe as you browse the internet. With your VPN on, your device makes a secure connection to a VPN server that routes internet traffic through an encrypted “tunnel.” This keeps your online activity private on any network, shielding it from prying eyes.
While you’re on a VPN, you can browse and bank with the confidence that your passwords, credentials, and financial info are secure. If a hacker attempts to intercept your web traffic, they’ll only see garbled content, thanks to your VPN’s encryption functionality.
With that, choosing a secure and trustworthy VPN provider is a must. A VPN like ours has both your security and privacy in mind. In a VPN, look for:
Not every VPN offers these features. Selecting one that does gives you the protection you want paired with the privacy you want. You’ll find them all in our VPN, which is also included as part of our McAfee+ plans.
Several other straightforward steps can keep you safer from vampire and evil twin Wi-Fi—and safer while using public Wi-Fi in general:
Vampire Wi-Fi networks aren’t going anywhere. Hackers will keep setting up these traps because they work. People see “free Wi-Fi” and click without thinking twice. But now you know better. You’ve got the tools to spot the red flags, the habits to stay protected, and most importantly, you understand why a quality VPN isn’t optional anymore—it’s essential.
McAfee+ gives you everything we’ve talked about: bank-level encryption, zero-logging policies, independent security audits, and that smart auto-connect feature that kicks in when you need it most. Plus, unlimited data across all your devices, because who has time to ration their security?
Your personal information is worth protecting. Your financial data, your work files, your private conversations, they’re all valuable to the wrong people. Don’t hand them over just because someone dangled “free Wi-Fi” in front of you.
Ready to stop gambling with your data? Get comprehensive protection with McAfee+ and never worry about vampire networks again.
The post Vampire Wifi: How Public Wi-Fi Traps Travelers in Cyber Attacks appeared first on McAfee Blog.
Remember that website where you bought a T-shirt in 2013? No?
Hackers do. And it’s one way they can steal your personal info.
Consider this website, and other forgotten sites like it, an example of a “Ghost Account,” a place where one of your long-unused logins lives on and puts your identity at risk.
Ghosts aside, old accounts like these are very real.
Think of all the times you’ve created a one-off account to make a single purchase, take an online quiz, or get more information about an event or a sale. For all the accounts you remember, there are plenty more you’ve probably completely forgotten about.
Even as estimates vary, it’s likely the average person has somewhere between 100 to 200 online accounts, where varying degrees of their personal and financial info are stored.
And all those accounts add up to plenty of exposure. Those companies still have your address, payment information, and other personal details in their system.
In a time where data breaches of varying sizes hack 3.5 million accounts on average each day, the odds of an old account of yours getting compromised are higher than you may realize. The more places your info resides, the more exposure to risk you have, namely data breaches, which can quickly lead to identity theft and fraud.
Compounding the problem is human nature. People tend to reuse passwords, or use highly similar passwords, all in an effort to maintain some degree of sanity across all the accounts they’re juggling. Hackers love that too. With one password in hand, they potentially get the keys to several other accounts, also with varying levels of personal and financial info, which (again) can lead to identity theft and fraud.
Our Online Account Cleanup can do the work for you, which you can find in all our McAfee+ plans.
It finds and deletes old accounts to reduce your risk of data exposure. In our McAfee+ Ultimate plans, you get full-service Online Account Cleanup, which sends the data deletion requests for you.
With each scan, you get an all-up view of accounts in your name. From there, it shows which are riskiest to keep, along with a look at what personal info is typically included in those accounts, which helps you decide what you’d like to keep and what you’d like to delete. Again, with McAfee+ Ultimate, you can request to delete accounts with a single click.
And because you add accounts and passwords from time to time, Online Account Cleanup gives you a monthly report. That way, you can keep tabs on your ever-evolving list of accounts and delete any you don’t want over time.
Yes, with all those accounts come passwords. While you’re cleaning up your old accounts, you can better protect the ones you keep with our Password Manager. It’s a simple and highly secure way you can create strong, unique passwords for each and every one of your accounts. That offers you yet one more line of defense against data breaches, because hackers know so many people reuse their passwords.
Lastly, it’s convenient. You only need to remember one password. Our password manager securely stores all your passwords, where one primary password grants access to them all.
Whether it’s for an old online gaming account, a streaming service you never use anymore, or a login for a doctor’s office you don’t visit anymore, delete it. The less personal and financial info you have sitting in a database somewhere is less info a hacker can steal and use to commit identity theft or fraud.
We all have our “ghosts” floating around online, and today you have an easy way to get rid of them for good.
The post Ghost Accounts: How Old, Forgotten Logins Put You at Risk for Identity Theft appeared first on McAfee Blog.
Aisuru, the botnet responsible for a series of record-smashing distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks this year, recently was overhauled to support a more low-key, lucrative and sustainable business: Renting hundreds of thousands of infected Internet of Things (IoT) devices to proxy services that help cybercriminals anonymize their traffic. Experts say a glut of proxies from Aisuru and other sources is fueling large-scale data harvesting efforts tied to various artificial intelligence (AI) projects, helping content scrapers evade detection by routing their traffic through residential connections that appear to be regular Internet users.
First identified in August 2024, Aisuru has spread to at least 700,000 IoT systems, such as poorly secured Internet routers and security cameras. Aisuru’s overlords have used their massive botnet to clobber targets with headline-grabbing DDoS attacks, flooding targeted hosts with blasts of junk requests from all infected systems simultaneously.
In June, Aisuru hit KrebsOnSecurity.com with a DDoS clocking at 6.3 terabits per second — the biggest attack that Google had ever mitigated at the time. In the weeks and months that followed, Aisuru’s operators demonstrated DDoS capabilities of nearly 30 terabits of data per second — well beyond the attack mitigation capabilities of most Internet destinations.
These digital sieges have been particularly disruptive this year for U.S.-based Internet service providers (ISPs), in part because Aisuru recently succeeded in taking over a large number of IoT devices in the United States. And when Aisuru launches attacks, the volume of outgoing traffic from infected systems on these ISPs is often so high that it can disrupt or degrade Internet service for adjacent (non-botted) customers of the ISPs.
“Multiple broadband access network operators have experienced significant operational impact due to outbound DDoS attacks in excess of 1.5Tb/sec launched from Aisuru botnet nodes residing on end-customer premises,” wrote Roland Dobbins, principal engineer at Netscout, in a recent executive summary on Aisuru. “Outbound/crossbound attack traffic exceeding 1Tb/sec from compromised customer premise equipment (CPE) devices has caused significant disruption to wireline and wireless broadband access networks. High-throughput attacks have caused chassis-based router line card failures.”
The incessant attacks from Aisuru have caught the attention of federal authorities in the United States and Europe (many of Aisuru’s victims are customers of ISPs and hosting providers based in Europe). Quite recently, some of the world’s largest ISPs have started informally sharing block lists identifying the rapidly shifting locations of the servers that the attackers use to control the activities of the botnet.
Experts say the Aisuru botmasters recently updated their malware so that compromised devices can more easily be rented to so-called “residential proxy” providers. These proxy services allow paying customers to route their Internet communications through someone else’s device, providing anonymity and the ability to appear as a regular Internet user in almost any major city worldwide.
From a website’s perspective, the IP traffic of a residential proxy network user appears to originate from the rented residential IP address, not from the proxy service customer. Proxy services can be used in a legitimate manner for several business purposes — such as price comparisons or sales intelligence. But they are massively abused for hiding cybercrime activity (think advertising fraud, credential stuffing) because they can make it difficult to trace malicious traffic to its original source.
And as we’ll see in a moment, this entire shadowy industry appears to be shifting its focus toward enabling aggressive content scraping activity that continuously feeds raw data into large language models (LLMs) built to support various AI projects.
Riley Kilmer is co-founder of spur.us, a service that tracks proxy networks. Kilmer said all of the top proxy services have grown substantially over the past six months.
“I just checked, and in the last 90 days we’ve seen 250 million unique residential proxy IPs,” Kilmer said. “That is insane. That is so high of a number, it’s unheard of. These proxies are absolutely everywhere now.”
Today, Spur says it is tracking an unprecedented spike in available proxies across all providers, including;
LUMINATI_PROXY 11,856,421
NETNUT_PROXY 10,982,458
ABCPROXY_PROXY 9,294,419
OXYLABS_PROXY 6,754,790
IPIDEA_PROXY 3,209,313
EARNFM_PROXY 2,659,913
NODEMAVEN_PROXY 2,627,851
INFATICA_PROXY 2,335,194
IPROYAL_PROXY 2,032,027
YILU_PROXY 1,549,155
Reached for comment about the apparent rapid growth in their proxy network, Oxylabs (#4 on Spur’s list) said while their proxy pool did grow recently, it did so at nowhere near the rate cited by Spur.
“We don’t systematically track other providers’ figures, and we’re not aware of any instances of 10× or 100× growth, especially when it comes to a few bigger companies that are legitimate businesses,” the company said in a written statement.
Bright Data was formerly known as Luminati Networks, the name that is currently at the top of Spur’s list of the biggest residential proxy networks. Bright Data likewise told KrebsOnSecurity that Spur’s current estimates of its proxy network are dramatically overstated and inaccurate.
“We did not actively initiate nor do we see any 10x or 100x expansion of our network, which leads me to believe that someone might be presenting these IPs as Bright Data’s in some way,” said Rony Shalit, Bright Data’s chief compliance and ethics officer. “In many cases in the past, due to us being the leading data collection proxy provider, IPs were falsely tagged as being part of our network, or while being used by other proxy providers for malicious activity.”
“Our network is only sourced from verified IP providers and a robust opt-in only residential peers, which we work hard and in complete transparency to obtain,” Shalit continued. “Every DC, ISP or SDK partner is reviewed and approved, and every residential peer must actively opt in to be part of our network.”
Even Spur acknowledges that Luminati and Oxylabs are unlike most other proxy services on their top proxy providers list, in that these providers actually adhere to “know-your-customer” policies, such as requiring video calls with all customers, and strictly blocking customers from reselling access.
Benjamin Brundage is founder of Synthient, a startup that helps companies detect proxy networks. Brundage said if there is increasing confusion around which proxy networks are the most worrisome, it’s because nearly all of these lesser-known proxy services have evolved into highly incestuous bandwidth resellers. What’s more, he said, some proxy providers do not appreciate being tracked and have been known to take aggressive steps to confuse systems that scan the Internet for residential proxy nodes.
Brundage said most proxy services today have created their own software development kit or SDK that other app developers can bundle with their code to earn revenue. These SDKs quietly modify the user’s device so that some portion of their bandwidth can be used to forward traffic from proxy service customers.
“Proxy providers have pools of constantly churning IP addresses,” he said. “These IP addresses are sourced through various means, such as bandwidth-sharing apps, botnets, Android SDKs, and more. These providers will often either directly approach resellers or offer a reseller program that allows users to resell bandwidth through their platform.”
Many SDK providers say they require full consent before allowing their software to be installed on end-user devices. Still, those opt-in agreements and consent checkboxes may be little more than a formality for cybercriminals like the Aisuru botmasters, who can earn a commission each time one of their infected devices is forced to install some SDK that enables one or more of these proxy services.
Depending on its structure, a single provider may operate hundreds of different proxy pools at a time — all maintained through other means, Brundage said.
“Often, you’ll see resellers maintaining their own proxy pool in addition to an upstream provider,” he said. “It allows them to market a proxy pool to high-value clients and offer an unlimited bandwidth plan for cheap reduce their own costs.”
Some proxy providers appear to be directly in league with botmasters. Brundage identified one proxy seller that was aggressively advertising cheap and plentiful bandwidth to content scraping companies. After scanning that provider’s pool of available proxies, Brundage said he found a one-to-one match with IP addresses he’d previously mapped to the Aisuru botnet.
Brundage says that by almost any measurement, the world’s largest residential proxy service is IPidea, a China-based proxy network. IPidea is #5 on Spur’s Top 10, and Brundage said its brands include ABCProxy (#3), Roxlabs, LunaProxy, PIA S5 Proxy, PyProxy, 922Proxy, 360Proxy, IP2World, and Cherry Proxy. Spur’s Kilmer said they also track Yilu Proxy (#10) as IPidea.
Brundage said all of these providers operate under a corporate umbrella known on the cybercrime forums as “HK Network.”
“The way it works is there’s this whole reseller ecosystem, where IPidea will be incredibly aggressive and approach all these proxy providers with the offer, ‘Hey, if you guys buy bandwidth from us, we’ll give you these amazing reseller prices,'” Brundage explained. “But they’re also very aggressive in recruiting resellers for their apps.”
A graphic depicting the relationship between proxy providers that Synthient found are white labeling IPidea proxies. Image: Synthient.com.
Those apps include a range of low-cost and “free” virtual private networking (VPN) services that indeed allow users to enjoy a free VPN, but which also turn the user’s device into a traffic relay that can be rented to cybercriminals, or else parceled out to countless other proxy networks.
“They have all this bandwidth to offload,” Brundage said of IPidea and its sister networks. “And they can do it through their own platforms, or they go get resellers to do it for them by advertising on sketchy hacker forums to reach more people.”
One of IPidea’s core brands is 922S5Proxy, which is a not-so-subtle nod to the 911S5Proxy service that was hugely popular between 2015 and 2022. In July 2022, KrebsOnSecurity published a deep dive into 911S5Proxy’s origins and apparent owners in China. Less than a week later, 911S5Proxy announced it was closing down after the company’s servers were massively hacked.
That 2022 story named Yunhe Wang from Beijing as the apparent owner and/or manager of the 911S5 proxy service. In May 2024, the U.S. Department of Justice arrested Mr Wang, alleging that his network was used to steal billions of dollars from financial institutions, credit card issuers, and federal lending programs. At the same time, the U.S. Treasury Department announced sanctions against Wang and two other Chinese nationals for operating 911S5Proxy.
The website for 922Proxy.
In recent months, multiple experts who track botnet and proxy activity have shared that a great deal of content scraping which ultimately benefits AI companies is now leveraging these proxy networks to further obfuscate their aggressive data-slurping activity. That’s because by routing it through residential IP addresses, content scraping firms can make their traffic far trickier to filter out.
“It’s really difficult to block, because there’s a risk of blocking real people,” Spur’s Kilmer said of the LLM scraping activity that is fed through individual residential IP addresses, which are often shared by multiple customers at once.
Kilmer says the AI industry has brought a veneer of legitimacy to residential proxy business, which has heretofore mostly been associated with sketchy affiliate money making programs, automated abuse, and unwanted Internet traffic.
“Web crawling and scraping has always been a thing, but AI made it like a commodity, data that had to be collected,” Kilmer said. “Everybody wanted to monetize their own data pots, and how they monetize that is different across the board.”
Kilmer said many LLM-related scrapers rely on residential proxies in cases where the content provider has restricted access to their platform in some way, such as forcing interaction through an app, or keeping all content behind a login page with multi-factor authentication.
“Where the cost of data is out of reach — there is some exclusivity or reason they can’t access the data — they’ll turn to residential proxies so they look like a real person accessing that data,” Kilmer said of the content scraping efforts.
Aggressive AI crawlers increasingly are overloading community-maintained infrastructure, causing what amounts to persistent DDoS attacks on vital public resources. A report earlier this year from LibreNews found some open-source projects now see as much as 97 percent of their traffic originating from AI company bots, dramatically increasing bandwidth costs, service instability, and burdening already stretched-thin maintainers.
Cloudflare is now experimenting with tools that will allow content creators to charge a fee to AI crawlers to scrape their websites. The company’s “pay-per-crawl” feature is currently in a private beta, and it lets publishers set their own prices that bots must pay before scraping content.
On October 22, the social media and news network Reddit sued Oxylabs (PDF) and several other proxy providers, alleging that their systems enabled the mass-scraping of Reddit user content even though Reddit had taken steps to block such activity.
“Recognizing that Reddit denies scrapers like them access to its site, Defendants scrape the data from Google’s search results instead,” the lawsuit alleges. “They do so by masking their identities, hiding their locations, and disguising their web scrapers as regular people (among other techniques) to circumvent or bypass the security restrictions meant to stop them.”
Denas Grybauskas, chief governance and strategy officer at Oxylabs, said the company was shocked and disappointed by the lawsuit.
“Reddit has made no attempt to speak with us directly or communicate any potential concerns,” Grybauskas said in a written statement. “Oxylabs has always been and will continue to be a pioneer and an industry leader in public data collection, and it will not hesitate to defend itself against these allegations. Oxylabs’ position is that no company should claim ownership of public data that does not belong to them. It is possible that it is just an attempt to sell the same public data at an inflated price.”
As big and powerful as Aisuru may be, it is hardly the only botnet that is contributing to the overall broad availability of residential proxies. For example, on June 5 the FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center warned that an IoT malware threat dubbed BADBOX 2.0 had compromised millions of smart-TV boxes, digital projectors, vehicle infotainment units, picture frames, and other IoT devices.
In July, Google filed a lawsuit in New York federal court against the Badbox botnet’s alleged perpetrators. Google said the Badbox 2.0 botnet “compromised more than 10 million uncertified devices running Android’s open-source software, which lacks Google’s security protections. Cybercriminals infected these devices with pre-installed malware and exploited them to conduct large-scale ad fraud and other digital crimes.”
Brundage said the Aisuru botmasters have their own SDK, and for some reason part of its code tells many newly-infected systems to query the domain name fuckbriankrebs[.]com. This may be little more than an elaborate “screw you” to this site’s author: One of the botnet’s alleged partners goes by the handle “Forky,” and was identified in June by KrebsOnSecurity as a young man from Sao Paulo, Brazil.
Brundage noted that only systems infected with Aisuru’s Android SDK will be forced to resolve the domain. Initially, there was some discussion about whether the domain might have some utility as a “kill switch” capable of disrupting the botnet’s operations, although Brundage and others interviewed for this story say that is unlikely.
A tiny sample of the traffic after a DNS server was enabled on the newly registered domain fuckbriankrebs dot com. Each unique IP address requested its own unique subdomain. Image: Seralys.
For one thing, they said, if the domain was somehow critical to the operation of the botnet, why was it still unregistered and actively for-sale? Why indeed, we asked. Happily, the domain name was deftly snatched up last week by Philippe Caturegli, “chief hacking officer” for the security intelligence company Seralys.
Caturegli enabled a passive DNS server on that domain and within a few hours received more than 700,000 requests for unique subdomains on fuckbriankrebs[.]com.
But even with that visibility into Aisuru, it is difficult to use this domain check-in feature to measure its true size, Brundage said. After all, he said, the systems that are phoning home to the domain are only a small portion of the overall botnet.
“The bots are hardcoded to just spam lookups on the subdomains,” he said. “So anytime an infection occurs or it runs in the background, it will do one of those DNS queries.”
Caturegli briefly configured all subdomains on fuckbriankrebs dot com to display this ASCII art image to visiting systems today.
The domain fuckbriankrebs[.]com has a storied history. On its initial launch in 2009, it was used to spread malicious software by the Cutwail spam botnet. In 2011, the domain was involved in a notable DDoS against this website from a botnet powered by Russkill (a.k.a. “Dirt Jumper”).
Domaintools.com finds that in 2015, fuckbriankrebs[.]com was registered to an email address attributed to David “Abdilo” Crees, a 27-year-old Australian man sentenced in May 2025 to time served for cybercrime convictions related to the Lizard Squad hacking group.
Update, Nov. 1, 2025, 10:25 a.m. ET: An earlier version of this story erroneously cited Spur’s proxy numbers from earlier this year; Spur said those numbers conflated residential proxies — which are rotating and attached to real end-user devices — with “ISP proxies” located at AT&T. ISP proxies, Spur said, involve tricking an ISP into routing a large number of IP addresses that are resold as far more static datacenter proxies.
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Cybercriminals are turning to TikTok to spread new scams that promise “free upgrades” or access to premium versions of popular apps.
According to Bleeping Computer, scammers are posting videos that look like tech tutorials, offering so-called activation hacks for software like Windows, Adobe Premiere, or Photoshop, and even fake “premium” services for Netflix and Spotify.
But instead of unlocking anything, these videos trick people into running hidden malware on their devices. Once that happens, attackers can steal passwords, cryptocurrency wallet details, or access to social media and bank accounts.
These “ClickFix” scams, as researchers call them, are spreading quickly because they rely on trust and curiosity. The videos look legitimate. Many use the same tone and layout as real how-to tech content, but behind the scenes, they’re designed to take control of your device and your data.
The scam works because it blends the look and feel of ordinary TikTok tutorials with social proof, think comments, hashtags, and even fake success stories, that make it seem credible.
Security researchers say the same technique has been spotted in similar scams spreading via fake CAPTCHA pages and cracked game downloads. The goal is always the same: convince users to “verify,” “activate,” or “fix” something, when in reality, they’re opening the door to attackers.
McAfee Labs has been tracking a related wave of attacks using fake CAPTCHA pages and cracked download sites to deliver info-stealing malware. In both campaigns, scammers prey on everyday habits such as downloading software, clicking “I’m not a robot,” or following quick tech fixes that seem safe.
Our researchers found that these scams spread through multiple channels, including phishing emails and fake support sites, all designed to look familiar. The end result is the same: stolen credentials, compromised devices, and exposed personal information.
These patterns mirror the rise of TikTok-based scams reported by Bleeping Computer. The methods may evolve, but the psychology is the same: social engineering that turns trust into a weapon.
Scammers are getting smarter about how they reach people. They’re blending into everyday content like short-form videos, social challenges, and viral tips. Then they’re using those moments of distraction to plant malware.
Tools like McAfee’s built-in Scam Detector, included in all core plans, are designed to spot this new kind of threat early. It automatically detects scams across text, email, and video, blocks dangerous links, and even identifies AI-manipulated content like deepfakes, helping stop harm before it happens.
As scammers adapt, your best defense is awareness and technology that adapts just as fast.
The post This New “Verification” Trick Fools You Into Installing Malware appeared first on McAfee Blog.
Tracking down bugs in software is a pain that all of us who write code must bear. When we're talking about outright errors in a web page, you typically have something to get you started (such as output in the console), but that wasn't the case here:
Sure! Reboots don't help :) Here are the two error screens which show up. pic.twitter.com/w2dmZcVyHk
— Peter Vogel (@PeterVogel) July 11, 2025
That's on a Chromebook, and it's the first user report we had about the issue back in early July. The initial problem this presented is that there are not a lot of people running around with devices we could test on. But there are enough people using them that we had multiple similar reports, so we were well beyond just giving people like Peter a bit of "works on my machine", and moving on. But the "SIGILL" error means that something pretty low-level has happened and, as you can see from the screen grab, you can't exactly just pop open the dev tools and peak at what's broken in the site when it can't even load in the first place.
However, after months of making no progress whilst the occasional Chromium user popped their head up and reported exactly the same problem, the answer finally emerged:
Reading MDN docs I don't find a directive 'report-sha256', so tried only removing that, and no crash.
— Mark : 1x Software Artisan (@virullius) October 24, 2025
Uh... shouldn't a browser just ignore a directive it doesn't recognise? (And incidentally, report-sha256 is documented in CSP level 3.) But the timing was awful coincidental with when we added that exact directive, only just before people started reporting problems:
Wow, good sleuthing! The timing of when this first began aligns with this commit from @stebets. I've just dropped it, does it look ok now? Also CC'ing @Scott_Helme - you seen this before mate? Bug was logged here: https://t.co/wiKpdmSxhU pic.twitter.com/m2nsDtAMjB
— Troy Hunt (@troyhunt) October 24, 2025
Getting to the title of this post, we almost worked this out ourselves, we just didn't look at data that was right in front of our eyes. Here it is:
This is Report URI's crash report graph, and until June, we'd had a good run! Crash reports are super cool because your customers' browsers automatically generate them, and with just a little tweaking of your response headers, you can easily turn your customers into automatic crash reporting bots! Report URI's value proposition (disclosure: I have a working relationship with them) is that it can receive those reports and create graphs like you see above. We just weren't watching the reports closely enough, hence the "almost" in the title.
I wanted to write this short post because sometimes, the answer is right in front of your eyes, and if we'd looked at what in hindsight is a really obvious place to check, we would have nailed this months ago. So, turn on crash reporting, and pay attention to it!
Financial regulators in Canada this week levied $176 million in fines against Cryptomus, a digital payments platform that supports dozens of Russian cryptocurrency exchanges and websites hawking cybercrime services. The penalties for violating Canada’s anti money-laundering laws come ten months after KrebsOnSecurity noted that Cryptomus’s Vancouver street address was home to dozens of foreign currency dealers, money transfer businesses, and cryptocurrency exchanges — none of which were physically located there.
On October 16, the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Center of Canada (FINTRAC) imposed a $176,960,190 penalty on Xeltox Enterprises Ltd., more commonly known as the cryptocurrency payments platform Cryptomus.
FINTRAC found that Cryptomus failed to submit suspicious transaction reports in cases where there were reasonable grounds to suspect that they were related to the laundering of proceeds connected to trafficking in child sexual abuse material, fraud, ransomware payments and sanctions evasion.
“Given that numerous violations in this case were connected to trafficking in child sexual abuse material, fraud, ransomware payments and sanctions evasion, FINTRAC was compelled to take this unprecedented enforcement action,” said Sarah Paquet, director and CEO at the regulatory agency.
In December 2024, KrebsOnSecurity covered research by blockchain analyst and investigator Richard Sanders, who’d spent several months signing up for various cybercrime services, and then tracking where their customer funds go from there. The 122 services targeted in Sanders’s research all used Cryptomus, and included some of the more prominent businesses advertising on the cybercrime forums, such as:
-abuse-friendly or “bulletproof” hosting providers like anonvm[.]wtf, and PQHosting;
-sites selling aged email, financial, or social media accounts, such as verif[.]work and kopeechka[.]store;
-anonymity or “proxy” providers like crazyrdp[.]com and rdp[.]monster;
-anonymous SMS services, including anonsim[.]net and smsboss[.]pro.
Flymoney, one of dozens of cryptocurrency exchanges apparently nested at Cryptomus. The image from this website has been machine translated from Russian.
Sanders found at least 56 cryptocurrency exchanges were using Cryptomus to process transactions, including financial entities with names like casher[.]su, grumbot[.]com, flymoney[.]biz, obama[.]ru and swop[.]is.
“These platforms were built for Russian speakers, and they each advertised the ability to anonymously swap one form of cryptocurrency for another,” the December 2024 story noted. “They also allowed the exchange of cryptocurrency for cash in accounts at some of Russia’s largest banks — nearly all of which are currently sanctioned by the United States and other western nations.”
Reached for comment on FINTRAC’s action, Sanders told KrebsOnSecurity he was surprised it took them so long.
“I have no idea why they don’t just sanction them or prosecute them,” Sanders said. “I’m not let down with the fine amount but it’s also just going to be the cost of doing business to them.”
The $173 million fine is a significant sum for FINTRAC, which imposed 23 such penalties last year totaling less than $26 million. But Sanders says FINTRAC still has much work to do in pursuing other shadowy money service businesses (MSBs) that are registered in Canada but are likely money laundering fronts for entities based in Russia and Iran.
In an investigation published in July 2024, CTV National News and the Investigative Journalism Foundation (IJF) documented dozens of cases across Canada where multiple MSBs are incorporated at the same address, often without the knowledge or consent of the location’s actual occupant.
Their inquiry found that the street address for Cryptomus parent Xeltox Enterprises was listed as the home of at least 76 foreign currency dealers, eight MSBs, and six cryptocurrency exchanges. At that address is a three-story building that used to be a bank and now houses a massage therapy clinic and a co-working space. But the news outlets found none of the MSBs or currency dealers were paying for services at that co-working space.
The reporters also found another collection of 97 MSBs clustered at an address for a commercial office suite in Ontario, even though there was no evidence any of these companies had ever arranged for any business services at that address.
Where is your data on the internet? I mean, outside the places you've consciously provided it, where has it now flowed to and is being used and abused in ways you've never expected? The truth is that once the bad guys have your data, it often replicates over and over again via numerous channels and platforms. If you're able to aggregate enough of it en masse, you end up with huge volumes of "threat intelligence data", to use the industry buzzword. And that's precisely what Ben from Synthient has done, and then sent it to Have I Been Pwned (HIBP).
Ben is in his final year of college in the US and is carving out a niche in threat intelligence. He's written up a deeper dive in The Stealer Log Ecosystem: Processing Millions of Credentials a Day, but the headline gives you a sense of the volumes. Have a read of that post and you'll see Ben is pulling data from various sources, including social media, forums, Tor and, of course, Telegram. He's managed to aggregate so much of it that by the time he sent it to us, it was rather sizeable:
That's 3.5 terrabytes of data, with the largest file alone being 2.6TB and, combined, they contain 23 billion rows. It's a vast corpus, and if we were attempting to compete with recent hyperbolic headlines about breach sizes, this would be one of the largest. But I'm not going to play the "mine is bigger than yours" game because it makes no sense once you start analysing the data. Part of what makes the data so large is that we're actually looking at both stealer logs and credential stuffing lists, so let's assess them separately, starting with those stealer logs.
Stealer logs are the product of infostealers, that is, malware running on infected machines and capturing credentials entered into websites on input. The output of those stealer logs is primarily three things:
Someone logging into Gmail, for example, ends up with their email address and password captured against gmail.com, hence the three parts. Due to the fact that stealer logs are so heavily recycled (they're posted over and over again to the sorts of channels Ben monitors), the first thing we always do is try to get a sense of how much is genuinely new:
This is the output of a little PowerShell script we use to guage where the email addresses in a new breach corpus have been seen before. Especially when there's a suspicion that data might have been repurposed from elsewhere, it's really useful to run them against the HIBP API and see what comes back. What the output above tells us is that after checking a sample of 94k of them, 92% had been previously seen, mostly in stealer log corpuses we'd loaded in the past. This is an empirical demonstration of what I wrote in the opening paragraph - "it often replicates over and over again" - and as you can see, most of what has been seen before was in the ALIEN TXTBASE stealer logs.
Back to the console output again, and having previously seen 92% of addresses also means we haven't seen 8% of the addresses. That's 8% of a considerable number, too: we found 183M unique email addresses across Ben's stealer log data, so we're talking about 14M+ addresses that have never surfaced in HIBP. (The final number once the entire data set was loaded into HIBP was 91% pre-existing, with 16.4M previously unseen addresses in any data breach, not just stealer logs.) But as with everything we load, the question has to be asked: Is it legit? Can you trust the shady criminals who publish this data not to fill it with junk? The only way to know for sure is to ask the legitimate owners of the data, so I reached out to a bunch of our subscribers and sought their support in verifying.
One of the respondants was already concerned there could be something wrong with his Gmail account and sure enough, he had one stealer log entry for "https://accounts.google.com/signin/challenge/pwd/1" with a, uh, "suboptimal" password:
Yes I can confirm that was an accurate password on my gmail account a few months ago
Another respondant who offered support had somewhat of a recognisable pattern in the sites he'd been visiting:
To his credit, he responded and confirmed that the list did indeed contain sites he'd visited, which also included online casinos, crypto websites and VPN services:
They all look like websites I have used and some still do use
As it turns out, he also had two other email addresses in the corpus of data, both with the same collection of passwords used on the first address he replied from. They also both aligned to services based on the same TLD as the other email address which suggested which country he's located in. (Incidentally, the online privacy offered by VPNs kinda falls apart when there's malware on your machine watching every site you visit and recording your credentials.)
Even without a response from a subscriber, it's still easy to get a sense of the legitimacy of the data in a privacy-preserving fashion (i.e. not logging in with their credentials!) just by testing enumeration vectors. For example, one subscriber had an account at ShopBack in the Philippines which offers what I'll refer to as "account enumeration as a service":
I simply added some character's in front of the email address and ShopBack happily confirmed that address didn't exist. However, remove the invalid characters and there's a very different response:
All of these little "tells" add up; another subscriber had a high prevalence of Greek websites they used, showing exactly the sort of pattern you'd expect to see for someone from that corner of the world. Another had various online survey sites they'd used, and like our "assandfurious" friend from earlier, a clear pattern emerged consistent with the apparent interests of the address's owner. Time and time again, the data checked out, so we loaded it. Those 183M email addresses are now searchable in HIBP, and the passwords are also searchable in Pwned Passwords, which has become rather popular:
Pwned Passwords just served 17.45 billion requests in 30 days 🤯 That's an *average* of 6,733 requests per second, but at our peak, we're hitting 42k per second in a 1-minute block. Crazy numbers! Made possible by @Cloudflare 😎 pic.twitter.com/Io6u1PiqJf
— Troy Hunt (@troyhunt) October 17, 2025
The website addresses are also now searchable, either in the stealer log section of your personal dashboard or by verified domain owners using the API. You'll find this data named "Synthient Stealer Log Threat Data" in HIBP, but stealer logs are only part of the Synthient story - the small part!
Ben's data also contained credential stuffing lists. Unlike stealer logs, which are the product of malware on the victim's machine, credential stuffing lists are typically aggregated from other places where email address and password pairs are obtained. For example, from data breaches where the passwords are either stored in plain text or protected with easily crackable hashing algorithms. Those lists are then used to access the other accounts of victims where they've reused their passwords.
Quick sidenote: Credential stuffing lists can be enormously damaging because they contain the keys to so many different services. Not only are they the gateway to so many takeovers of social media accounts, email addresses and other valuable personal resources, they're also responsible for many subsequent very serious data breaches. The 2017 Uber breach was attributed to previously breached employee credentials. Five years later, and the same approach provided the initial access to Uber again, after which MFA-bombing sealed the deal. Then there was the 23andMe breach in 2023, which was also traced back to credential stuffing. Similar but different was when Dunkin' Donuts had 20k customer details exposed in a show of how multifaceted this style of attack is: they were subsequently sued for not having sufficient controls to stop hackers from simply logging in with victims' legitimate credentials. It's wild; it's the attack that just keeps on giving.
Ever since loading Collection #1 in 2019, I have been extra cautious about dealing with credential stuffing lists. The 400+ comments on that blog post will give you just a little taste of how much attention that exercise garnered. Frankly, it was a significant contributor to the feeling that it was all getting a bit too much, leading to the decision that HIBP needed to find another home (which fortunately, never eventuated). The primary issue with credential stuffing lists is that we can't attribute a given row to a specific source website or data breach, and we don't offer a service to look up credential pairs. As you'll see from many of the comments on that post, I had angry people upset that, without knowing specifically which password was exposed in the list, the knowledge that they were in there was not actionable. I disagree, because by loading those passwords into Pwned Passwords, there are now three easy ways to check if you're using a vulnerable one:
My vested interest in 1Password aside, Watchtower is the easiest, fastest way to understand your potential exposure in this incident. And in case you're wondering why I have so many vulnerable and reused passwords, it's a combination of the test accounts I've saved over the years and the 4-digit PINs some services force you to use. Would you believe that every single 4-digit number ever has been pwned?! (If you're interested, the ABC has a fantastic infographic using a heatmap based on HIBP data that shows some very predictable patterns for 4-digit PINs.)
As of the time of publishing this blog post, only the stealer logs have been loaded, and as mentioned earlier, the data in HIBP has been called "Synthient Stealer Log Threat Data". We intend to load the credential stuffing data as a separate corpus next week and call it "Synthient Credential Stuffing Threat Data", assuming it's sufficiently new and the accuracy is confirmed with our subscribers! We're doing this in two parts simply because of the scale of the data and the fact that we want to break it into two discrete corpuses given the data originates via different means. I'll revise this blog post accordingly after we finish our analysis.
Something that is becoming more evident as we load more stealer logs is that treating them as a discrete "breach" is not an accurate representation of how these things work. The truth is that, unlike a single data breach such as Ashley Madison, Dropbox, or the many other hundreds already in HIBP, stealer logs are more of a firehose of data that's just constantly spewing personal info all over the place. That, combined with the duplication of previously seen data, means that we need a rethink on this model. The data itself is still on point, but I'd like to see HIBP better reflect that firehose analogy and provide a constant stream of new data. Until then, Synthient's Threat Data will still sit in HIBP and be searchable in all the usual ways.
Amazon Web Services (AWS), one of the world’s largest cloud providers, recently experienced a major outage that disrupted popular websites and apps across the globe—including Snapchat, Reddit, Fortnite, Ring, and Coinbase, according to reports from CNN and CNBC.
The disruption began out of Northern Virginia, where many of the internet’s most-used applications are hosted.
AWS said the problem originated within its EC2 internal network, impacting more than 70 of its own services, and was tied to DNS issues, the system that tells browsers how to find the right servers online.
A few hours after the initial reports of outages, AWS said the problem had been “fully mitigated,” though it took several more hours for all users to see their systems stabilized, according to CNBC.
There is no indication the outage was caused by a cyberattack, and Amazon continues to investigate the root cause.
When Amazon Web Services falters, the ripple effects reach far beyond businesses. Millions of consumers suddenly lose access to everyday apps and tools, including everything from banking and airline systems to gaming platforms and smart home devices.
“In the past, companies ran their own servers—if one failed, only that company’s customers felt it,” said Steve Grobman, McAfee’s Chief Technology Officer. “Today, much of the internet runs on shared backends like Amazon Web Services or Google Cloud. That interconnectedness makes the web faster and more efficient, but it also means one glitch can impact dozens of services at once.”
Grobman noted the issue was related to a capability called DNS within AWS, he described DNS as providing the directions on how systems find each other and even if those systems are operational, it can be detrimental.. It’s analogous to “tearing up a map or turning off your GPS before driving to the store.” The store might still be open and stocked, he explained, but if you can’t find your way there, it doesn’t matter.
“Even with rigorous safeguards in place, events like this remind us just how complex and intertwined our digital world has become,” Grobman added. “It highlights why resilience and layered protection matter more than ever.”
Events like this sow uncertainty for consumers. When apps fail to load, people may wonder: Is my account hacked? Is my data at risk? Is it just me?
Cybercriminals exploit that confusion. After past outages, McAfee researchers have seen phishing campaigns, fake refund emails, and malicious links promising “fixes” or “status updates” appear within hours.
Scammers often mimic legitimate service alerts—complete with logos and urgent wording—to trick users into entering passwords or payment information. Others push fake customer-support numbers or send direct messages claiming to “restore access.”
Here’s how to stay secure when the :
Using advanced artificial intelligence, McAfee’s Scam Detector automatically detects scams across text, email, and video, blocks dangerous links, and identifies deepfakes, stopping harm before it happens.
McAfee’s identity protection tools also monitor for signs that your personal information may have been exposed and guide you through steps to recover quickly.
Sign in to your McAfee account to scan for recent breaches linked to your email. You can also sign up for a free trial of McAfee antivirus to protect your devices.
The post AWS Outage Disrupts Major Apps Like Reddit and Snapchat—What Happened and How to Stay Safe appeared first on McAfee Blog.
Cybercriminals tricked employees at major global companies into handing over Salesforce access and used that access to steal millions of customer records.
Here’s the McAfee breakdown on what happened, what information was leaked, and what you need to know to keep your data and identity safe:
Hackers claim they’ve stolen customer data from multiple major companies, including household names like Adidas, Cisco, Disney, Google, IKEA, Pandora, Toyota, and Vietnam Airlines. Security Week has reported throughout 2025 on a wave of social-engineering attacks exploiting human – rather than platform – vulnerabilities.
According to The Wall Street Journal, the hacking group has already released millions of Qantas Airlines customer records and is threatening to expose information from other companies next.
The data reportedly includes names, email addresses, phone numbers, dates of birth, and loyalty program details. While it doesn’t appear that financial data was included, this kind of personal information can still be exploited in phishing and scam campaigns.
Salesforce has issued multiple advisories stressing that these attacks stem from credential theft and malicious connected apps – not from a breach of its infrastructure.
Unfortunately, incidents like this aren’t rare, and they’re not limited to any one platform or industry. Even the most sophisticated companies can fall victim when hackers rely on social engineering and manipulation to breach secure systems.
Hackers reportedly called various companies’ employees pretending to be IT support staff—a tactic known as “vishing”—and convinced them to share login credentials or connect fake third-party tools, essentially handing the criminals the keys to their accounts. Once inside, they accessed customer databases and stole the information stored there.
Think of it less like a burglar breaking a lock, and more like someone being tricked into opening the door.
So far, leaked data appears to include:
There’s no indication of credit card or banking data in the confirmed leaks, but that doesn’t mean you’re in the clear.
Even if your financial information isn’t exposed in a data breach, personal details like name and address can still be used for targeted scams and phishing. When that information is stolen and sold online, scammers use it to:
Even if your data isn’t part of this specific leak, these attacks highlight how often your information moves through third-party systems you don’t control.
1) Change your passwords—today.
Use strong, unique passwords for every account. McAfee’s password manager can help. Try our random password generator here.
2) Turn on two-factor authentication (2FA).
Even if a hacker has your password, they can’t get in without your code.
3) Monitor your financial and loyalty accounts.
Watch for strange charges, redemptions, or password reset emails you didn’t request.
4) Freeze your credit.
It’s free and prevents new accounts from being opened in your name. You can unfreeze it anytime. McAfee users can employ a “security freeze” for extra protection.
5) Be extra cautious with “breach” emails or calls.
Scammers often pretend to be from affected companies to “help you secure your account.” Don’t click links or give information over the phone. Go directly to the company’s website or app or your own IT team if a breach happens at your workplace.
6) Consider identity protection.
McAfee’s built-in identity monitoring can monitor your personal info across the dark web, send alerts if your data appears in a breach, and include up to $1 million in coverage for identity recovery expenses.
Your data could already be out there, but you don’t have to leave it there.
McAfee helps you take back control. Using advanced artificial intelligence, McAfee’s Scam Detector automatically detects scams across text, email, and video, blocks dangerous links, and identifies deepfakes, stopping harm before it happens.
And McAfee’s Personal Data Cleanup can help you check which data brokers have your private details and request to have it removed on your behalf.
Stay ahead of scammers. Check your exposure, clean up your data, and protect your identity, all with McAfee.
Learn more about McAfee and McAfee Scam Detector.
What to do if you’re caught up in a data breach
How to delete yourself from the internet
How to spot phishing emails and scams
The post Hackers Trick Staff Into Exposing Major Companies’ Salesforce Data–Find Out if You’re Safe appeared first on McAfee Blog.
Cybercriminals are abusing a widespread lack of authentication in the customer service platform Zendesk to flood targeted email inboxes with menacing messages that come from hundreds of Zendesk corporate customers simultaneously.
Zendesk is an automated help desk service designed to make it simple for people to contact companies for customer support issues. Earlier this week, KrebsOnSecurity started receiving thousands of ticket creation notification messages through Zendesk in rapid succession, each bearing the name of different Zendesk customers, such as CapCom, CompTIA, Discord, GMAC, NordVPN, The Washington Post, and Tinder.
The abusive missives sent via Zendesk’s platform can include any subject line chosen by the abusers. In my case, the messages variously warned about a supposed law enforcement investigation involving KrebsOnSecurity.com, or else contained personal insults.
Moreover, the automated messages that are sent out from this type of abuse all come from customer domain names — not from Zendesk. In the example below, replying to any of the junk customer support responses from The Washington Post’s Zendesk installation shows the reply-to address is help@washpost.com.
One of dozens of messages sent to me this week by The Washington Post.
Notified about the mass abuse of their platform, Zendesk said the emails were ticket creation notifications from customer accounts that configured their Zendesk instance to allow anyone to submit support requests — including anonymous users.
“These types of support tickets can be part of a customer’s workflow, where a prior verification is not required to allow them to engage and make use of the Support capabilities,” said Carolyn Camoens, communications director at Zendesk. “Although we recommend our customers to permit only verified users to submit tickets, some Zendesk customers prefer to use an anonymous environment to allow for tickets to be created due to various business reasons.”
Camoens said requests that can be submitted in an anonymous manner can also make use of an email address of the submitter’s choice.
“However, this method can also be used for spam requests to be created on behalf of third party email addresses,” Camoens said. “If an account has enabled the auto-responder trigger based on ticket creation, then this allows for the ticket notification email to be sent from our customer’s accounts to these third parties. The notification will also include the Subject added by the creator of these tickets.”
Zendesk claims it uses rate limits to prevent a high volume of requests from being created at once, but those limits did not stop Zendesk customers from flooding my inbox with thousands of messages in just a few hours.
“We recognize that our systems were leveraged against you in a distributed, many-against-one manner,” Camoens said. “We are actively investigating additional preventive measures. We are also advising customers experiencing this type of activity to follow our general security best practices and configure an authenticated ticket creation workflow.”
In all of the cases above, the messaging abuse would not have been possible if Zendesk customers validated support request email addresses prior to sending responses. Failing to do so may make it easier for Zendesk clients to handle customer support requests, but it also allows ne’er-do-wells to sully the sender’s brand in service of disruptive and malicious email floods.
Microsoft today released software updates to plug a whopping 172 security holes in its Windows operating systems, including at least two vulnerabilities that are already being actively exploited. October’s Patch Tuesday also marks the final month that Microsoft will ship security updates for Windows 10 systems. If you’re running a Windows 10 PC and you’re unable or unwilling to migrate to Windows 11, read on for other options.
The first zero-day bug addressed this month (CVE-2025-24990) involves a third-party modem driver called Agere Modem that’s been bundled with Windows for the past two decades. Microsoft responded to active attacks on this flaw by completely removing the vulnerable driver from Windows.
The other zero-day is CVE-2025-59230, an elevation of privilege vulnerability in Windows Remote Access Connection Manager (also known as RasMan), a service used to manage remote network connections through virtual private networks (VPNs) and dial-up networks.
“While RasMan is a frequent flyer on Patch Tuesday, appearing more than 20 times since January 2022, this is the first time we’ve seen it exploited in the wild as a zero day,” said Satnam Narang, senior staff research engineer at Tenable.
Narang notes that Microsoft Office users should also take note of CVE-2025-59227 and CVE-2025-59234, a pair of remote code execution bugs that take advantage of “Preview Pane,” meaning that the target doesn’t even need to open the file for exploitation to occur. To execute these flaws, an attacker would social engineer a target into previewing an email with a malicious Microsoft Office document.
Speaking of Office, Microsoft quietly announced this week that Microsoft Word will now automatically save documents to OneDrive, Microsoft’s cloud platform. Users who are uncomfortable saving all of their documents to Microsoft’s cloud can change this in Word’s settings; ZDNet has a useful how-to on disabling this feature.
Kev Breen, senior director of threat research at Immersive, called attention to CVE-2025-59287, a critical remote code execution bug in the Windows Server Update Service (WSUS) — the very same Windows service responsible for downloading security patches for Windows Server versions. Microsoft says there are no signs this weakness is being exploited yet. But with a threat score of 9.8 out of possible 10 and marked “exploitation more likely,” CVE-2025-59287 can be exploited without authentication and is an easy “patch now” candidate.
“Microsoft provides limited information, stating that an unauthenticated attacker with network access can send untrusted data to the WSUS server, resulting in deserialization and code execution,” Breen wrote. “As WSUS is a trusted Windows service that is designed to update privileged files across the file system, an attacker would have free rein over the operating system and could potentially bypass some EDR detections that ignore or exclude the WSUS service.”
For more on other fixes from Redmond today, check out the SANS Internet Storm Center monthly roundup, which indexes all of the updates by severity and urgency.
Windows 10 isn’t the only Microsoft OS that is reaching end-of-life today; Exchange Server 2016, Exchange Server 2019, Skype for Business 2016, Windows 11 IoT Enterprise Version 22H2, and Outlook 2016 are some of the other products that Microsoft is sunsetting today.
If you’re running any Windows 10 systems, you’ve probably already determined whether your PC meets the technical hardware specs recommended for the Windows 11 OS. If you’re reluctant or unable to migrate a Windows 10 system to Windows 11, there are alternatives to simply continuing to use Windows 10 without ongoing security updates.
One option is to pay for another year’s worth of security updates through Microsoft’s Extended Security Updates (ESU) program. The cost is just $30 if you don’t have a Microsoft account, and apparently free if you register the PC to a Microsoft account. This video breakdown from Ask Your Computer Guy does a good job of walking Windows 10 users through this process. Microsoft emphasizes that ESU enrollment does not provide other types of fixes, feature improvements or product enhancements. It also does not come with technical support.
If your Windows 10 system is associated with a Microsoft account and signed in when you visit Windows Update, you should see an option to enroll in extended updates. Image: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SZH7MlvOoPM
Windows 10 users also have the option of installing some flavor of Linux instead. Anyone seriously considering this option should check out the website endof10.org, which includes a plethora of tips and a DIY installation guide.
Linux Mint is a great option for Linux newbies. Like most modern Linux versions, Mint will run on anything with a 64-bit CPU that has at least 2GB of memory, although 4GB is recommended. In other words, it will run on almost any computer produced in the last decade.
Linux Mint also is likely to be the most intuitive interface for regular Windows users, and it is largely configurable without any fuss at the text-only command-line prompt. Mint and other flavors of Linux come with LibreOffice, which is an open source suite of tools that includes applications similar to Microsoft Office, and it can open, edit and save documents as Microsoft Office files.
If you’d prefer to give Linux a test drive before installing it on a Windows PC, you can always just download it to a removable USB drive. From there, reboot the computer (with the removable drive plugged in) and select the option at startup to run the operating system from the external USB drive. If you don’t see an option for that after restarting, try restarting again and hitting the F8 button, which should open a list of bootable drives. Here’s a fairly thorough tutorial that walks through exactly how to do all this.
And if this is your first time trying out Linux, relax and have fun: The nice thing about a “live” version of Linux (as it’s called when the operating system is run from a removable drive such as a CD or a USB stick) is that none of your changes persist after a reboot. Even if you somehow manage to break something, a restart will return the system back to its original state.
As ever, if you experience any difficulties during or after applying this month’s batch of patches, please leave a note about it in the comments below.
The world’s largest and most disruptive botnet is now drawing a majority of its firepower from compromised Internet-of-Things (IoT) devices hosted on U.S. Internet providers like AT&T, Comcast and Verizon, new evidence suggests. Experts say the heavy concentration of infected devices at U.S. providers is complicating efforts to limit collateral damage from the botnet’s attacks, which shattered previous records this week with a brief traffic flood that clocked in at nearly 30 trillion bits of data per second.
Since its debut more than a year ago, the Aisuru botnet has steadily outcompeted virtually all other IoT-based botnets in the wild, with recent attacks siphoning Internet bandwidth from an estimated 300,000 compromised hosts worldwide.
The hacked systems that get subsumed into the botnet are mostly consumer-grade routers, security cameras, digital video recorders and other devices operating with insecure and outdated firmware, and/or factory-default settings. Aisuru’s owners are continuously scanning the Internet for these vulnerable devices and enslaving them for use in distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks that can overwhelm targeted servers with crippling amounts of junk traffic.
As Aisuru’s size has mushroomed, so has its punch. In May 2025, KrebsOnSecurity was hit with a near-record 6.35 terabits per second (Tbps) attack from Aisuru, which was then the largest assault that Google’s DDoS protection service Project Shield had ever mitigated. Days later, Aisuru shattered that record with a data blast in excess of 11 Tbps.
By late September, Aisuru was publicly flexing DDoS capabilities topping 22 Tbps. Then on October 6, its operators heaved a whopping 29.6 terabits of junk data packets each second at a targeted host. Hardly anyone noticed because it appears to have been a brief test or demonstration of Aisuru’s capabilities: The traffic flood lasted less only a few seconds and was pointed at an Internet server that was specifically designed to measure large-scale DDoS attacks.
A measurement of an Oct. 6 DDoS believed to have been launched through multiple botnets operated by the owners of the Aisuru botnet. Image: DDoS Analyzer Community on Telegram.
Aisuru’s overlords aren’t just showing off. Their botnet is being blamed for a series of increasingly massive and disruptive attacks. Although recent assaults from Aisuru have targeted mostly ISPs that serve online gaming communities like Minecraft, those digital sieges often result in widespread collateral Internet disruption.
For the past several weeks, ISPs hosting some of the Internet’s top gaming destinations have been hit with a relentless volley of gargantuan attacks that experts say are well beyond the DDoS mitigation capabilities of most organizations connected to the Internet today.
Steven Ferguson is principal security engineer at Global Secure Layer (GSL), an ISP in Brisbane, Australia. GSL hosts TCPShield, which offers free or low-cost DDoS protection to more than 50,000 Minecraft servers worldwide. Ferguson told KrebsOnSecurity that on October 8, TCPShield was walloped with a blitz from Aisuru that flooded its network with more than 15 terabits of junk data per second.
Ferguson said that after the attack subsided, TCPShield was told by its upstream provider OVH that they were no longer welcome as a customer.
“This was causing serious congestion on their Miami external ports for several weeks, shown publicly via their weather map,” he said, explaining that TCPShield is now solely protected by GSL.
Traces from the recent spate of crippling Aisuru attacks on gaming servers can be still seen at the website blockgametracker.gg, which indexes the uptime and downtime of the top Minecraft hosts. In the following example from a series of data deluges on the evening of September 28, we can see an Aisuru botnet campaign briefly knocked TCPShield offline.
An Aisuru botnet attack on TCPShield (AS64199) on Sept. 28 can be seen in the giant downward spike in the middle of this uptime graphic. Image: grafana.blockgametracker.gg.
Paging through the same uptime graphs for other network operators listed shows almost all of them suffered brief but repeated outages around the same time. Here is the same uptime tracking for Minecraft servers on the network provider Cosmic (AS30456), and it shows multiple large dips that correspond to game server outages caused by Aisuru.
Multiple DDoS attacks from Aisuru can be seen against the Minecraft host Cosmic on Sept. 28. The sharp downward spikes correspond to brief but enormous attacks from Aisuru. Image: grafana.blockgametracker.gg.
Ferguson said he’s been tracking Aisuru for about three months, and recently he noticed the botnet’s composition shifted heavily toward infected systems at ISPs in the United States. Ferguson shared logs from an attack on October 8 that indexed traffic by the total volume sent through each network provider, and the logs showed that 11 of the top 20 traffic sources were U.S. based ISPs.
AT&T customers were by far the biggest U.S. contributors to that attack, followed by botted systems on Charter Communications, Comcast, T-Mobile and Verizon, Ferguson found. He said the volume of data packets per second coming from infected IoT hosts on these ISPs is often so high that it has started to affect the quality of service that ISPs are able to provide to adjacent (non-botted) customers.
“The impact extends beyond victim networks,” Ferguson said. “For instance we have seen 500 gigabits of traffic via Comcast’s network alone. This amount of egress leaving their network, especially being so US-East concentrated, will result in congestion towards other services or content trying to be reached while an attack is ongoing.”
Roland Dobbins is principal engineer at Netscout. Dobbins said Ferguson is spot on, noting that while most ISPs have effective mitigations in place to handle large incoming DDoS attacks, many are far less prepared to manage the inevitable service degradation caused by large numbers of their customers suddenly using some or all available bandwidth to attack others.
“The outbound and cross-bound DDoS attacks can be just as disruptive as the inbound stuff,” Dobbin said. “We’re now in a situation where ISPs are routinely seeing terabit-per-second plus outbound attacks from their networks that can cause operational problems.”
“The crying need for effective and universal outbound DDoS attack suppression is something that is really being highlighted by these recent attacks,” Dobbins continued. “A lot of network operators are learning that lesson now, and there’s going to be a period ahead where there’s some scrambling and potential disruption going on.”
KrebsOnSecurity sought comment from the ISPs named in Ferguson’s report. Charter Communications pointed to a recent blog post on protecting its network, stating that Charter actively monitors for both inbound and outbound attacks, and that it takes proactive action wherever possible.
“In addition to our own extensive network security, we also aim to reduce the risk of customer connected devices contributing to attacks through our Advanced WiFi solution that includes Security Shield, and we make Security Suite available to our Internet customers,” Charter wrote in an emailed response to questions. “With the ever-growing number of devices connecting to networks, we encourage customers to purchase trusted devices with secure development and manufacturing practices, use anti-virus and security tools on their connected devices, and regularly download security patches.”
A spokesperson for Comcast responded, “Currently our network is not experiencing impacts and we are able to handle the traffic.”
Aisuru is built on the bones of malicious code that was leaked in 2016 by the original creators of the Mirai IoT botnet. Like Aisuru, Mirai quickly outcompeted all other DDoS botnets in its heyday, and obliterated previous DDoS attack records with a 620 gigabit-per-second siege that sidelined this website for nearly four days in 2016.
The Mirai botmasters likewise used their crime machine to attack mostly Minecraft servers, but with the goal of forcing Minecraft server owners to purchase a DDoS protection service that they controlled. In addition, they rented out slices of the Mirai botnet to paying customers, some of whom used it to mask the sources of other types of cybercrime, such as click fraud.
A depiction of the outages caused by the Mirai botnet attacks against the internet infrastructure firm Dyn on October 21, 2016. Source: Downdetector.com.
Dobbins said Aisuru’s owners also appear to be renting out their botnet as a distributed proxy network that cybercriminal customers anywhere in the world can use to anonymize their malicious traffic and make it appear to be coming from regular residential users in the U.S.
“The people who operate this botnet are also selling (it as) residential proxies,” he said. “And that’s being used to reflect application layer attacks through the proxies on the bots as well.”
The Aisuru botnet harkens back to its predecessor Mirai in another intriguing way. One of its owners is using the Telegram handle “9gigsofram,” which corresponds to the nickname used by the co-owner of a Minecraft server protection service called Proxypipe that was heavily targeted in 2016 by the original Mirai botmasters.
Robert Coelho co-ran Proxypipe back then along with his business partner Erik “9gigsofram” Buckingham, and has spent the past nine years fine-tuning various DDoS mitigation companies that cater to Minecraft server operators and other gaming enthusiasts. Coelho said he has no idea why one of Aisuru’s botmasters chose Buckingham’s nickname, but added that it might say something about how long this person has been involved in the DDoS-for-hire industry.
“The Aisuru attacks on the gaming networks these past seven day have been absolutely huge, and you can see tons of providers going down multiple times a day,” Coelho said.
Coelho said the 15 Tbps attack this week against TCPShield was likely only a portion of the total attack volume hurled by Aisuru at the time, because much of it would have been shoved through networks that simply couldn’t process that volume of traffic all at once. Such outsized attacks, he said, are becoming increasingly difficult and expensive to mitigate.
“It’s definitely at the point now where you need to be spending at least a million dollars a month just to have the network capacity to be able to deal with these attacks,” he said.
Aisuru has long been rumored to use multiple zero-day vulnerabilities in IoT devices to aid its rapid growth over the past year. XLab, the Chinese security company that was the first to profile Aisuru’s rise in 2024, warned last month that one of the Aisuru botmasters had compromised the firmware distribution website for Totolink, a maker of low-cost routers and other networking gear.
“Multiple sources indicate the group allegedly compromised a router firmware update server in April and distributed malicious scripts to expand the botnet,” XLab wrote on September 15. “The node count is currently reported to be around 300,000.”
A malicious script implanted into a Totolink update server in April 2025. Image: XLab.
Aisuru’s operators received an unexpected boost to their crime machine in August when the U.S. Department Justice charged the alleged proprietor of Rapper Bot, a DDoS-for-hire botnet that competed directly with Aisuru for control over the global pool of vulnerable IoT systems.
Once Rapper Bot was dismantled, Aisuru’s curators moved quickly to commandeer vulnerable IoT devices that were suddenly set adrift by the government’s takedown, Dobbins said.
“Folks were arrested and Rapper Bot control servers were seized and that’s great, but unfortunately the botnet’s attack assets were then pieced out by the remaining botnets,” he said. “The problem is, even if those infected IoT devices are rebooted and cleaned up, they will still get re-compromised by something else generally within minutes of being plugged back in.”
A screenshot shared by XLabs showing the Aisuru botmasters recently celebrating a record-breaking 7.7 Tbps DDoS. The user at the top has adopted the name “Ethan J. Foltz” in a mocking tribute to the alleged Rapper Bot operator who was arrested and charged in August 2025.
XLab’s September blog post cited multiple unnamed sources saying Aisuru is operated by three cybercriminals: “Snow,” who’s responsible for botnet development; “Tom,” tasked with finding new vulnerabilities; and “Forky,” responsible for botnet sales.
KrebsOnSecurity interviewed Forky in our May 2025 story about the record 6.3 Tbps attack from Aisuru. That story identified Forky as a 21-year-old man from Sao Paulo, Brazil who has been extremely active in the DDoS-for-hire scene since at least 2022. The FBI has seized Forky’s DDoS-for-hire domains several times over the years.
Like the original Mirai botmasters, Forky also operates a DDoS mitigation service called Botshield. Forky declined to discuss the makeup of his ISP’s clientele, or to clarify whether Botshield was more of a hosting provider or a DDoS mitigation firm. However, Forky has posted on Telegram about Botshield successfully mitigating large DDoS attacks launched against other DDoS-for-hire services.
In our previous interview, Forky acknowledged being involved in the development and marketing of Aisuru, but denied participating in attacks launched by the botnet.
Reached for comment earlier this month, Forky continued to maintain his innocence, claiming that he also is still trying to figure out who the current Aisuru botnet operators are in real life (Forky said the same thing in our May interview).
But after a week of promising juicy details, Forky came up empty-handed once again. Suspecting that Forky was merely being coy, I asked him how someone so connected to the DDoS-for-hire world could still be mystified on this point, and suggested that his inability or unwillingness to blame anyone else for Aisuru would not exactly help his case.
At this, Forky verbally bristled at being pressed for more details, and abruptly terminated our interview.
“I’m not here to be threatened with ignorance because you are stressed,” Forky replied. “They’re blaming me for those new attacks. Pretty much the whole world (is) due to your blog.”
Article tags
by Harshil Patel and Prabudh Chakravorty
*EDITOR’S NOTE: Special thank you to the GitHub team for working with us on this research. All malicious GitHub repositories mentioned in the following research have been reported to GitHub and taken down.
Digital banking has made our lives easier, but it’s also handed cybercriminals a golden opportunity. Banking trojans are the invisible pickpockets of the digital age, silently stealing credentials while you browse your bank account or check your crypto wallet. Today, we’re breaking down a particularly nasty variant called Astaroth, and it’s doing something clever: abusing GitHub to stay resilient.
McAfee’s Threat Research team recently uncovered a new Astaroth campaign that’s taken infrastructure abuse to a new level. Instead of relying solely on traditional command-and-control (C2) servers that can be taken down, these attackers are leveraging GitHub repositories to host malware configurations. When law enforcement or security researchers shut down their C2 infrastructure, Astaroth simply pulls fresh configurations from GitHub and keeps running. Think of it like a criminal who keeps backup keys to your house hidden around the neighborhood. Even if you change your locks, they’ve got another way in.
Astaroth is capable of targeting many South American countries like Brazil, Mexico, Uruguay, Argentina, Paraguay, Chile, Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, Venezuela, and Panama. It can also target Portugal and Italy.
But in the recent campaign, it seems to be largely focused on Brazil.
Figure 1: Geographical Prevalence
Astaroth is a password-stealing malware family that targets South America. The malware leverages GitHub to host configuration files, treating the platform as resilient backup infrastructure when primary C2 servers become inaccessible. McAfee reported the findings to GitHub and worked with their security research team to remove the malicious repositories, temporarily disrupting operations.
Figure 2 : Infection chain
The attack starts with an e-mail to the victim which contains a link to a site that downloads a zip file. Emails with themes such as DocuSign and resumes are used to lure the victims into downloading a zip file.
Figure 3: Phishing Email
Figure 4: Phishing Email
Figure 5: Phishing Email
JavaScript Downloader
The downloaded zip file contains a LNK file, which has obfuscated javascript command run using mshta.exe.
This command simply fetches more javascript code from the following URL:
To impede analysis, all the links are geo-restricted, such that they can only be accessed from the targeted geography.
The downloaded javascript then downloads a set of files in ProgramData from a randomly selected server:
Figure 6: Downloaded Files
Here,
”Corsair.Yoga.06342.8476.366.log” is AutoIT compiled script, “Corsair.Yoga.06342.8476.366.exe” is AutoIT interpreter,
“stack.tmp” is an encrypted payload (Astaroth),
and “dump.log” is an encrypted malware configuration.
AutoIt script is executed by javascript, which builds and loads a shellcode in the memory of AutoIT process.
Figure 7: AutoIt script building shellcode
The shellcode has 3 entrypoints and $LOADOFFSET is the one using which it loads a DLL in memory.
To run the shellcode the script hooks Kernel32: LocalCompact, and makes it jump to the entrypoint.
Figure 8: Hooking LocalCompact API
Shellcode’s $LOADOFFSET starts by resolving a set of APIs that are used for loading a DLL in memory. The API addresses are stored in a jump table at the very beginning of the shellcode memory.
Figure 9: APIs resolved by shellcode
Here shellcode is made to load a DLL file(Delphi) and this DLL decrypts and injects the final payload into newly created RegSvc.exe process.
The payload, Astaroth malware is written in Delphi and uses various anti-analysis techniques and shuts down the system if it detects that it is being analyzed.
It checks for the following tools in the system:
Figure 10: List of analysis tools
It also makes sure that system locale is not related to the United States or English.
Every second it checks for program windows like browsers, if that window is in foreground and has a banking related site opened then it hooks keyboard events to get keystrokes.
Figure 11: Hooking keyboard events
Programs are targeted if they have a window class name containing chrome, ieframe, mozilla, xoff, xdesk, xtrava or sunawtframe.
Many banking-related sites are targeted, some of which are mentioned below:
caixa.gov.br
safra.com.br
Itau.com.br
bancooriginal.com.br
santandernet.com.br
btgpactual.com
We also observed some cryptocurrency-related sites being targeted:
etherscan.io
binance.com
bitcointrade.com.br
metamask.io
foxbit.com.br
localbitcoins.com
The stolen banking credentials and other information are sent to C2 server using a custom binary protocol.
Figure 12: C2 communication
Figure 13: C2 infrastructure
Malware config is stored in dump.log encrypted, following is the information stored in it:
Figure 14: Malware configuration
Every 2 hours the configuration is updated by fetching an image file from config update URLs and extracting the hidden configuration from the image.
hxxps://bit[.]ly/4gf4E7H —> hxxps://raw.githubusercontent[.]com//dridex2024//razeronline//refs/heads/main/razerlimpa[.]png
Image file keeps the configuration hidden by storing it in the following format:
We found more such GitHub repositories having image files with above pattern and reported them to GitHub, which they have taken down.
For persistence, Astaroth drops a LNK file in startup folder which runs the AutoIT script to launch the malware when the system starts.
McAfee has extensive coverage for Astaroth:
Trojan:Shortcut/SuspiciousLNK.OSRT
Trojan:Shortcut/Astaroth.OJS
Trojan:Script/Astaroth.DL
Trojan:Script/Astaroth.AI
Trojan:Script/AutoITLoader.LC!2
Trojan:Shortcut/Astaroth.STUP
| IOC | Hash / URL |
|
7418ffa31f8a51a04274fc8f610fa4d5aa5758746617020ee57493546ae35b70 7609973939b46fe13266eacd1f06b533f8991337d6334c15ab78e28fa3b320be 11f0d7e18f9a2913d2480b6a6955ebc92e40434ad11bed62d1ff81ddd3dda945 |
|
| ZIP URL | https://91.220.167.72.host.secureserver[.]net/peHg4yDUYgzNeAvm5.zip |
| LNK | 34207fbffcb38ed51cd469d082c0c518b696bac4eb61e5b191a141b5459669df |
| JS Downloader | 28515ea1ed7befb39f428f046ba034d92d44a075cc7a6f252d6faf681bdba39c |
| Download server |
clafenval.medicarium[.]help sprudiz.medicinatramp[.]click frecil.medicinatramp[.]beauty stroal.medicoassocidos[.]beauty strosonvaz.medicoassocidos[.]help gluminal188.trovaodoceara[.]sbs scrivinlinfer.medicinatramp[.]icu trisinsil.medicesterium[.]help brusar.trovaodoceara[.]autos gramgunvel.medicoassocidos[.]beauty blojannindor0.trovaodoceara[.]motorcycles |
| AutoIT compiled script | a235d2e44ea87e5764c66247e80a1c518c38a7395291ce7037f877a968c7b42b |
| Injector dll | db9d00f30e7df4d0cf10cee8c49ee59a6b2e518107fd6504475e99bbcf6cce34 |
| payload | 251cde68c30c7d303221207370c314362f4adccdd5db4533a67bedc2dc1e6195 |
| Startup LNK | 049849998f2d4dd1e629d46446699f15332daa54530a5dad5f35cc8904adea43 |
| C2 server |
1.tcp.sa.ngrok[.]io:20262 1.tcp.us-cal-1.ngrok[.]io:24521 5.tcp.ngrok[.]io:22934 7.tcp.ngrok[.]io:22426 9.tcp.ngrok[.]io:23955 9.tcp.ngrok[.]io:24080 |
| Config update URL |
https://bit[.]ly/49mKne9 https://bit[.]ly/4gf4E7H https://raw.githubusercontent[.]com/dridex2024/razeronline/refs/heads/main/razerlimpa.png |
| GitHub Repositories hosting config images |
https://github[.]com/dridex2024/razeronline
https://github[.]com/Config2023/01atk-83567z https://github[.]com/S20x/m25 https://github[.]com/Tami1010/base https://github[.]com/balancinho1/balaco https://github[.]com/fernandolopes201/675878fvfsv2231im2 https://github[.]com/polarbearfish/fishbom https://github[.]com/polarbearultra/amendointorrado https://github[.]com/projetonovo52/master https://github[.]com/vaicurintha/gol |
The post Astaroth: Banking Trojan Abusing GitHub for Resilience appeared first on McAfee Blog.
You see it all the time after a tragedy occurs somewhere, and people flock to offer their sympathies via the "thoughts and prayers" line. Sympathy is great, and we should all express that sentiment appropriately. The criticism, however, is that the line is often offered as a substitute for meaningful action. Responding to an incident with "thoughts and prayers" doesn't actually do anything, which brings us to court injunctions in the wake of a data breach.
Let's start with HWL Ebsworth, an Australian law firm that was the victim of a ransomware attack in 2023. They were granted an injunction, which means the following:
The final interlocutory injunction restrained hackers from the ALPHV, or “BlackCat”, hackers group from publishing the HWL data on the internet, sharing it with any person, or using the information for any reason other than for obtaining legal advice on the court’s orders.
To paraphrase, the injunction prohibits the Russian crime gang that hacked the law firm and attempted to extort them from publishing the data on the internet. Right... The threat actor was subsequently served with the injunction, to which, per the article, they responded in an entirely predictable fashion:
Fuck you fuckers
And then they dumped a huge trove of data. Clearly, criminals aren't going to pay any attention whatsoever to an injunction, but this legal construct has reach far beyond just the bad guys:
The injunction will also “assist in limiting the dissemination of the exfiltrated material by enabling HWLE to inform online platforms, who are at risk of publishing the material”, Justice Slattery said.
In other words, the data is also off limits to the good guys. Journalists, security firms and yes, Have I Been Pwned (HIBP) are all impacted by injunctions like this. To some extent, you can understand this when the data is as sensitive as what a law firm typically holds, and you need only use a little bit of imagination to picture how damaging it can be for data like this to fall into the wrong hands. But data in a breach of a company like Qantas is very different:
And now here’s mine. Still no indication of specifically which service was breached, but feels very much like loyalty program data (i.e. nothing to do with specific flights, password, passport or payment details). pic.twitter.com/r7KnlfM8TV
— Troy Hunt (@troyhunt) July 11, 2025
As well as my interest in running HIBP, I also appear to be a victim of their data breach, along with my wife and kids. And just to highlight how much skin I have in the game, I'm also a Qantas shareholder and a very loyal customer:
Sitting at the airport about to take my 301st (tracked) @Qantas flight. Nice banter with the staff: “you can lose my data, just don’t lose my bags” 😬 pic.twitter.com/ZGxc4I0aB1
— Troy Hunt (@troyhunt) July 2, 2025
As such, I was particularly interested when they applied for, and were granted, a court injunction of their own. Why? What possible upside does this provide? Because by now, it's pretty clear what's going to happen to the data:
This is from a Telegram channel run by the group that took the Qantas data, along with some other huge names:
🚨🚨🚨BREAKING - New data leak site by Scattered LAPSUS$ Hunters exposes Salesforce customers. Dozens of global companies involved in a large-scale extortion campaign.
— Hackmanac (@H4ckmanac) October 3, 2025
Scattered LAPSUS$ Hunters claims to have breached Salesforce, exfiltrating ~1B records.
They accuse Salesforce… pic.twitter.com/u2PAO7miyP
"Scattered LAPSUS$ Hunters" is threatening to dump all the data publicly in a couple of days' time unless a ransom is paid, which it won't be. The quote from the Telegram image is from a Qantas spokesperson, and clearly, the injunction is not going to stop the publishing of data. Much of my gripe with injunctions is the premise that they in some way protect customers (like me), when clearly, they don't. But hey, "thoughts and prayers", right?
Without wanting to give too much credit to criminals attempting to ransom my data (and everyone else's), they're right about the media outlets. An injunction would have had a meaningful impact on the Ashley Madison coverage a decade ago, where the press happily outed the presence of famous people in the breach. Clearly, the Qantas data is nowhere near as newsworthy, and I can't imagine a headline going much beyond the significant point balances of certain politicians. The data just isn't that interesting.
The injunction is only effective against people who meet the following criteria:
The first two points are obvious, and an asterix adorns the third as it's very heavily caveated. This from a chat with a lawyer friend thir morning who specialises in this space:
it would depend on which country and whether it has a reciprocal agreement with Australia eg like the UK and also who you are trying it enforce it against and then it’s up to the court in that country to determine - but as this is an injunction (so not eg for a debt against a specific person) it’s almost impossible - you can’t just register a foreign judgement somewhere against the world at large as far as I know.
So, if the injunction is so useless at providing meaningful protections to data breach victims, what's the point? Who does it protect? In researching this piece, the best explanation I could find was from law firm Clayton Utz:
Where that confidentiality is breached due to a hack, parties should generally do - and be seen to be doing - what they can to prevent or minimise the extent of harm. Even if injunctions might not impact hackers, for the reasons set out above, they can provide ancillary benefits in relation to the further dissemination of hacked information by legitimate individuals and organisations. Depending on the terms, it might also assist with recovery on relevant insurance policies and reduce the risk of securities class actions being brought.
That term - "be seen to be doing" - says it all. This is now just me speculating, but I can envisage lawyers for Qantas standing up in court when they're defending against the inevitable class actions they'll face (which I also have strong views on), saying "Your honour, we did everything we could, we even got an injunction!" In a previous conversation I had regarding another data breach that had successfully been granted an injunction, I was told by the lawyer involved that they wanted to assure customers that they'd done everything possible. That breach was subsequently circulated online via a popular clear web hacking site (not "the dark web"), but I assume this fact and the ineffectiveness of the injunction on that audience was left out of customer communications. I feel pretty comfortable arguing that the primary beneficiary of the injunction is the shareholder, rather than the customer. And I assume the lawyers charge for their time, right?
Where this leaves us with Qantas is that, on a personal note, as a law-abiding Australian who is aware of the injunction, I won't be able to view my data or that of my kids. I can always request it of Qantas, of course, but I won't be able to go and obtain it if and when it's spread all over the internet. The criminals will, of course, and that's a very uncomfortable feeling.
From an HIBP perspective, we obviously can't load that data. It's very likely that hundreds of thousands of our subscribers will be impacted, and we won't be able to let them know (which is part of the reason I've written this post - so I can direct them here when asked). Granted, Qantas has obviously sent out disclosure notices to impacted individuals, but I'd argue that the notice that comes from HIBP carries a different gravitas: it's one thing to be told "we've had a security incident", and quite another to learn that your data is now in circulation to the extent that it's been sent to us. Further, Qantas won't be notifying the owners of the domains that their customers' email addresses are on. Many people will be using their work email address for their Qantas account, and when you tie that together with the other exposed data attributes, that creates organisational risk. Companies want to know when corporate assets (including email addresses) are exposed in a data breach, and unfortunately, we won't be able to provide them with that information.
I understand that Qantas' decision to pursue the injunction is about something much broader than the email addresses potentially appearing in HIBP. I actually think much of the advice Qantas has given is good, for example, the resources they've provided on their page about the breach:
These are all fantastic, and each of them has many good external resources people worried about scams should refer to. For example, ScamWatch has this one:
And cyber.gov.au has a handy tip courtesy of our Australian Signals Directorate makes this suggestion:
Not to miss a beat, our friends at IDCARE also offer great advice:
And, of course, the OAIC has some fantastic guidance too:
The scam resources Qantas recommends all link through to a service that will never return the Qantas data breach. Did I mention "thoughts and prayers" already?
As threatened, the Qantas data was dumped publicly 2 days after writing this post. The data appeared on a clear web file sharing service linked to by both their .onion website and a clear web site that popped up on a new domain shortly after the data was publicised. Due to the injunction, I've not accessed the data myself but have had security folks in other parts of the world reach out and confirm my record and that of my family members is present. I've also seen public commentary from other researchers analysing the data, and have had multiple people contact me and offer to send it.
Clearly, the injunction has proven to be extremely limited in its ability to stop the spread of data. Further, as a Qantas customer, I've not heard anything from them in relation to my data having now been publicly released. None of this should surprise anybody, including Qantas.
As to questions in the comments about the legitimacy of the injunction and where it can be obtained, the advice I've obtained from the law firm we use is that it is absolutely legitimate and interested parties would need to contact Qantas if they want to see it (likely a redacted version). I'm not savvy with the mechanics of how courts issue these and why they're not more publicly accessible, but I suggest this story with quotes from Justice Kunc is worth a read. Frankly, it's all a bit nuts, but that's the environment we're operating in and the rules we need to adhere to.
A cybercriminal group that used voice phishing attacks to siphon more than a billion records from Salesforce customers earlier this year has launched a website that threatens to publish data stolen from dozens of Fortune 500 firms if they refuse to pay a ransom. The group also claimed responsibility for a recent breach involving Discord user data, and for stealing terabytes of sensitive files from thousands of customers of the enterprise software maker Red Hat.
The new extortion website tied to ShinyHunters (UNC6040), which threatens to publish stolen data unless Salesforce or individual victim companies agree to pay a ransom.
In May 2025, a prolific and amorphous English-speaking cybercrime group known as ShinyHunters launched a social engineering campaign that used voice phishing to trick targets into connecting a malicious app to their organization’s Salesforce portal.
The first real details about the incident came in early June, when the Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) warned that ShinyHunters — tracked by Google as UNC6040 — was extorting victims over their stolen Salesforce data, and that the group was poised to launch a data leak site to publicly shame victim companies into paying a ransom to keep their records private. A month later, Google acknowledged that one of its own corporate Salesforce instances was impacted in the voice phishing campaign.
Last week, a new victim shaming blog dubbed “Scattered LAPSUS$ Hunters” began publishing the names of companies that had customer Salesforce data stolen as a result of the May voice phishing campaign.
“Contact us to negotiate this ransom or all your customers data will be leaked,” the website stated in a message to Salesforce. “If we come to a resolution all individual extortions against your customers will be withdrawn from. Nobody else will have to pay us, if you pay, Salesforce, Inc.”
Below that message were more than three dozen entries for companies that allegedly had Salesforce data stolen, including Toyota, FedEx, Disney/Hulu, and UPS. The entries for each company specified the volume of stolen data available, as well as the date that the information was retrieved (the stated breach dates range between May and September 2025).
Image: Mandiant.
On October 5, the Scattered LAPSUS$ Hunters victim shaming and extortion blog announced that the group was responsible for a breach in September involving a GitLab server used by Red Hat that contained more than 28,000 Git code repositories, including more than 5,000 Customer Engagement Reports (CERs).
“Alot of folders have their client’s secrets such as artifactory access tokens, git tokens, azure, docker (redhat docker, azure containers, dockerhub), their client’s infrastructure details in the CERs like the audits that were done for them, and a whole LOT more, etc.,” the hackers claimed.
Their claims came several days after a previously unknown hacker group calling itself the Crimson Collective took credit for the Red Hat intrusion on Telegram.
Red Hat disclosed on October 2 that attackers had compromised a company GitLab server, and said it was in the process of notifying affected customers.
“The compromised GitLab instance housed consulting engagement data, which may include, for example, Red Hat’s project specifications, example code snippets, internal communications about consulting services, and limited forms of business contact information,” Red Hat wrote.
Separately, Discord has started emailing users affected by another breach claimed by ShinyHunters. Discord said an incident on September 20 at a “third-party customer service provider” impacted a “limited number of users” who communicated with Discord customer support or Trust & Safety teams. The information included Discord usernames, emails, IP address, the last four digits of any stored payment cards, and government ID images submitted during age verification appeals.
The Scattered Lapsus$ Hunters claim they will publish data stolen from Salesforce and its customers if ransom demands aren’t paid by October 10. The group also claims it will soon begin extorting hundreds more organizations that lost data in August after a cybercrime group stole vast amounts of authentication tokens from Salesloft, whose AI chatbot is used by many corporate websites to convert customer interaction into Salesforce leads.
In a communication sent to customers today, Salesforce emphasized that the theft of any third-party Salesloft data allegedly stolen by ShinyHunters did not originate from a vulnerability within the core Salesforce platform. The company also stressed that it has no plans to meet any extortion demands.
“Salesforce will not engage, negotiate with, or pay any extortion demand,” the message to customers read. “Our focus is, and remains, on defending our environment, conducting thorough forensic analysis, supporting our customers, and working with law enforcement and regulatory authorities.”
The GTIG tracked the group behind the Salesloft data thefts as UNC6395, and says the group has been observed harvesting the data for authentication tokens tied to a range of cloud services like Snowflake and Amazon’s AWS.
Google catalogs Scattered Lapsus$ Hunters by so many UNC names (throw in UNC6240 for good measure) because it is thought to be an amalgamation of three hacking groups — Scattered Spider, Lapsus$ and ShinyHunters. The members of these groups hail from many of the same chat channels on the Com, a mostly English-language cybercriminal community that operates across an ocean of Telegram and Discord servers.
The Scattered Lapsus$ Hunters darknet blog is currently offline. The outage appears to have coincided with the disappearance of the group’s new clearnet blog — breachforums[.]hn — which vanished after shifting its Domain Name Service (DNS) servers from DDoS-Guard to Cloudflare.
But before it died, the websites disclosed that hackers were exploiting a critical zero-day vulnerability in Oracle’s E-Business Suite software. Oracle has since confirmed that a security flaw tracked as CVE-2025-61882 allows attackers to perform unauthenticated remote code execution, and is urging customers to apply an emergency update to address the weakness.
Mandiant’s Charles Carmakal shared on LinkedIn that CVE-2025-61882 was initially exploited in August 2025 by the Clop ransomware gang to steal data from Oracle E-Business Suite servers. Bleeping Computer writes that news of the Oracle zero-day first surfaced on the Scattered Lapsus$ Hunters blog, which published a pair of scripts that were used to exploit vulnerable Oracle E-Business Suite instances.
On Monday evening, KrebsOnSecurity received a malware-laced message from a reader that threatened physical violence unless their unstated demands were met. The missive, titled “Shiny hunters,” contained the hashtag $LAPSU$$SCATEREDHUNTER, and urged me to visit a page on limewire[.]com to view their demands.
A screenshot of the phishing message linking to a malicious trojan disguised as a Windows screensaver file.
KrebsOnSecurity did not visit this link, but instead forwarded it to Mandiant, which confirmed that similar menacing missives were sent to employees at Mandiant and other security firms around the same time.
The link in the message fetches a malicious trojan disguised as a Windows screensaver file (Virustotal’s analysis on this malware is here). Simply viewing the booby-trapped screensaver on a Windows PC is enough to cause the bundled trojan to launch in the background.
Mandiant’s Austin Larsen said the trojan is a commercially available backdoor known as ASYNCRAT, a .NET-based backdoor that communicates using a custom binary protocol over TCP, and can execute shell commands and download plugins to extend its features.
A scan of the malicious screensaver file at Virustotal.com shows it is detected as bad by nearly a dozen security and antivirus tools.
“Downloaded plugins may be executed directly in memory or stored in the registry,” Larsen wrote in an analysis shared via email. “Capabilities added via plugins include screenshot capture, file transfer, keylogging, video capture, and cryptocurrency mining. ASYNCRAT also supports a plugin that targets credentials stored by Firefox and Chromium-based web browsers.”
Malware-laced targeted emails are not out of character for certain members of the Scattered Lapsus$ Hunters, who have previously harassed and threatened security researchers and even law enforcement officials who are investigating and warning about the extent of their attacks.
With so many big data breaches and ransom attacks now coming from cybercrime groups operating on the Com, law enforcement agencies on both sides of the pond are under increasing pressure to apprehend the criminal hackers involved. In late September, prosecutors in the U.K. charged two alleged Scattered Spider members aged 18 and 19 with extorting at least $115 million in ransom payments from companies victimized by data theft.
U.S. prosecutors heaped their own charges on the 19 year-old in that duo — U.K. resident Thalha Jubair — who is alleged to have been involved in data ransom attacks against Marks & Spencer and Harrods, the British food retailer Co-op Group, and the 2023 intrusions at MGM Resorts and Caesars Entertainment. Jubair also was allegedly a key member of LAPSUS$, a cybercrime group that broke into dozens of technology companies beginning in late 2021.
A Mastodon post by Kevin Beaumont, lamenting the prevalence of major companies paying millions to extortionist teen hackers, refers derisively to Thalha Jubair as a part of an APT threat known as “Advanced Persistent Teenagers.”
In August, convicted Scattered Spider member and 20-year-old Florida man Noah Michael Urban was sentenced to 10 years in federal prison and ordered to pay roughly $13 million in restitution to victims.
In April 2025, a 23-year-old Scottish man thought to be an early Scattered Spider member was extradited from Spain to the U.S., where he is facing charges of wire fraud, conspiracy and identity theft. U.S. prosecutors allege Tyler Robert Buchanan and co-conspirators hacked into dozens of companies in the United States and abroad, and that he personally controlled more than $26 million stolen from victims.
Update, Oct. 8, 8:59 a.m. ET: A previous version of this story incorrectly referred to the malware sent by the reader as a Windows screenshot file. Rather, it is a Windows screensaver file.
Latest research from McAfee Labs just announced and the numbers are staggering. If you think you’re immune to scams because you’re “too smart” or “too careful,” you might want to think again. Scammers have stepped up their game in 2025, and they’re coming for everyone.
Let’s start with the most shocking stat: job-related scams exploded by over 1,000% from May through late July 2025. Yes, you read that right. One thousand percent.
Think about that for a moment. In a world where finding decent work feels harder than ever, scammers are weaponizing our most basic need for employment. They’re not just sending random “work from home” nonsense anymore. These criminals are getting sophisticated, using terms like “resume,” “recruit,” “maternity,” and “paternity” to exploit our hopes around benefits and career opportunities.
Here’s the brutal reality: Nearly 1 in 3 Americans have received a job offer scam by text message. That means if you’re in a group of three people, at least one of you has been targeted. Even more disturbing? 45% of Americans have either experienced a job search scam personally or know someone who has. This isn’t some distant threat anymore, it’s hitting close to home.
Amazon Prime Day was a goldmine for scammers. Text scams in the shopping category jumped 250% from May to late July, with much of that spike happening right around Prime Day. Coincidence? Absolutely not.
Scammers know exactly when we’re most vulnerable. They know we’re hunting for deals, expecting delivery notifications, and clicking faster than we’re thinking. Amazon and Apple are the top brand names being impersonated because, let’s face it, we all interact with these companies constantly.
Shopping email scams climbed 60% during this same period, with Amazon holding the top spot, Target moving into second place, and Apple rounding out the top three. The fact that Target surged into the number two spot tells us something important: scammers are diversifying their approach and studying our shopping habits more carefully than we might be studying theirs.
Personal finance scams aren’t just growing, they’re surging nearly 150% from May to late July. Email scams in this category literally doubled between June and July. The top bait words? “Loan” and “money.” Because nothing says desperation like targeting people who are already financially stressed.
Credit cards topped the list of email scam keywords, which makes perfect sense. In an economy where everyone’s feeling pinched, the promise of easy credit or debt relief hits different. URL-based finance scams rose 10% in July alone, proving that scammers are hitting us from every digital angle.
Here’s what’s really clever (in a completely evil way): technology scams grew 40% in text messages and saw a staggering 160% increase in email scams across June and July. Apple dominated the scam landscape, but here’s the kicker: Nvidia drove much of the late-July growth.
Think about why that matters. Nvidia isn’t just any tech company; it’s the company behind the AI revolution everyone’s talking about. Scammers are literally using our fascination with AI and cutting-edge tech against us. They’re banking on our FOMO around technology trends.
Let’s step back and think critically about what’s really happening here. These aren’t random increases. Scammers are becoming more sophisticated, more targeted, and more successful because they’re exploiting fundamental human psychology:
Economic anxiety: With inflation concerns and job market uncertainty, financial scams hit when people are most vulnerable.
Technology overwhelm: As tech evolves rapidly, scammers exploit our confusion and excitement about new developments.
Social proof manipulation: Using trusted brand names like Apple, Amazon, and Target because we’ve been conditioned to trust these companies.
Timing exploitation: Hitting during Prime Day, benefit enrollment periods, and job hunting seasons when our guard is down.
But there’s another layer we need to call out, the long-term impact of falling for a fake job. When you’re unemployed, every lead matters. Chasing a fraudulent one doesn’t just waste time; it effectively pauses your real job search. Many people say job hunting is a full-time job in itself, so losing that time can feel like being pushed back to square one. That setback compounds stress and deepens the economic anxiety you were already feeling. It’s not just about losing money, it’s about losing momentum, confidence, and critical opportunities in a competitive market.
Advice like “just be careful” doesn’t cut it anymore. Scammers have leveled up, and their tactics are sophisticated enough to fool even the smartest of people. That’s why having the right tools and awareness matters more than ever. Staying informed isn’t about fear, it’s about empowerment. The more you know, the harder it is for scammers to win.
For job seekers: If someone contacts you about a job you didn’t apply for, especially mentioning benefits or asking for personal information upfront, pump the brakes. Real recruiters don’t typically lead with benefit details or ask for sensitive data in initial communications.
For online shoppers: Those delivery notifications and deal alerts you’re getting? Slow down before clicking. Go directly to the retailer’s official website or app instead of clicking links in texts or emails.
For anyone with financial concerns: If an offer sounds too good to be true (instant loans, credit repair miracles, investment opportunities), it probably is. When you’re stressed about money, that’s exactly when scammers strike hardest.
For tech enthusiasts: Being excited about new technology is great, but scammers are counting on that excitement to make you click faster than you think. Always verify tech-related communications through official channels.
The data is crystal clear: scams aren’t just increasing, they’re exploding across every category that matters to everyday people. Job hunting, shopping, managing money, staying current with technology. These criminals are systematically targeting the most essential aspects of modern life.
But here’s what the scammers don’t want you to know: awareness is your best defense. They rely on speed, emotion, and distraction. The moment you slow down, verify independently, and think critically, their whole game falls apart.
The 2025 scam landscape isn’t just more dangerous, it’s more personal. These aren’t random attempts anymore. They’re calculated attacks designed to hit you exactly when and where you’re most likely to let your guard down. To help job hunters and others, McAfee has launched Scam Detector, an all-in-one protection solution to help keep you safer across text, email and video. McAfee’s Scam Detector runs continuously in the background across all your devices, analyzing incoming emails, texts, and videos to detect potential scams in real-time. When it detects something suspicious, you get an instant alert that explains what raised the red flag and walks you through the specific tactics scammers use, so you can spot similar attempts on your own. For job seekers, Scam Detector can be an invaluable tool to help prevent fraudulent scams.
Stay sharp out there. Your financial security, career prospects, and digital safety depend on it.
The post Scam Alert: The Alarming Reality Behind 2025’s Explosion in Digital Fraud appeared first on McAfee Blog.
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