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KrebsOnSecurity last week was hit by a near record distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack that clocked in at more than 6.3 terabits of data per second (a terabit is one trillion bits of data). The brief attack appears to have been a test run for a massive new Internet of Things (IoT) botnet capable of launching crippling digital assaults that few web destinations can withstand. Read on for more about the botnet, the attack, and the apparent creator of this global menace.
For reference, the 6.3 Tbps attack last week was ten times the size of the assault launched against this site in 2016 by the Mirai IoT botnet, which held KrebsOnSecurity offline for nearly four days. The 2016 assault was so large that Akamai – which was providing pro-bono DDoS protection for KrebsOnSecurity at the time — asked me to leave their service because the attack was causing problems for their paying customers.
Since the Mirai attack, KrebsOnSecurity.com has been behind the protection of Project Shield, a free DDoS defense service that Google provides to websites offering news, human rights, and election-related content. Google Security Engineer Damian Menscher told KrebsOnSecurity the May 12 attack was the largest Google has ever handled. In terms of sheer size, it is second only to a very similar attack that Cloudflare mitigated and wrote about in April.
After comparing notes with Cloudflare, Menscher said the botnet that launched both attacks bears the fingerprints of Aisuru, a digital siege machine that first surfaced less than a year ago. Menscher said the attack on KrebsOnSecurity lasted less than a minute, hurling large UDP data packets at random ports at a rate of approximately 585 million data packets per second.
“It was the type of attack normally designed to overwhelm network links,” Menscher said, referring to the throughput connections between and among various Internet service providers (ISPs). “For most companies, this size of attack would kill them.”
A graph depicting the 6.5 Tbps attack mitigated by Cloudflare in April 2025. Image: Cloudflare.
The Aisuru botnet comprises a globally-dispersed collection of hacked IoT devices, including routers, digital video recorders and other systems that are commandeered via default passwords or software vulnerabilities. As documented by researchers at QiAnXin XLab, the botnet was first identified in an August 2024 attack on a large gaming platform.
Aisuru reportedly went quiet after that exposure, only to reappear in November with even more firepower and software exploits. In a January 2025 report, XLab found the new and improved Aisuru (a.k.a. “Airashi“) had incorporated a previously unknown zero-day vulnerability in Cambium Networks cnPilot routers.
The people behind the Aisuru botnet have been peddling access to their DDoS machine in public Telegram chat channels that are closely monitored by multiple security firms. In August 2024, the botnet was rented out in subscription tiers ranging from $150 per day to $600 per week, offering attacks of up to two terabits per second.
“You may not attack any measurement walls, healthcare facilities, schools or government sites,” read a notice posted on Telegram by the Aisuru botnet owners in August 2024.
Interested parties were told to contact the Telegram handle “@yfork” to purchase a subscription. The account @yfork previously used the nickname “Forky,” an identity that has been posting to public DDoS-focused Telegram channels since 2021.
According to the FBI, Forky’s DDoS-for-hire domains have been seized in multiple law enforcement operations over the years. Last year, Forky said on Telegram he was selling the domain stresser[.]best, which saw its servers seized by the FBI in 2022 as part of an ongoing international law enforcement effort aimed at diminishing the supply of and demand for DDoS-for-hire services.
“The operator of this service, who calls himself ‘Forky,’ operates a Telegram channel to advertise features and communicate with current and prospective DDoS customers,” reads an FBI seizure warrant (PDF) issued for stresser[.]best. The FBI warrant stated that on the same day the seizures were announced, Forky posted a link to a story on this blog that detailed the domain seizure operation, adding the comment, “We are buying our new domains right now.”
A screenshot from the FBI’s seizure warrant for Forky’s DDoS-for-hire domains shows Forky announcing the resurrection of their service at new domains.
Approximately ten hours later, Forky posted again, including a screenshot of the stresser[.]best user dashboard, instructing customers to use their saved passwords for the old website on the new one.
A review of Forky’s posts to public Telegram channels — as indexed by the cyber intelligence firms Unit 221B and Flashpoint — reveals a 21-year-old individual who claims to reside in Brazil [full disclosure: Flashpoint is currently an advertiser on this blog].
Since late 2022, Forky’s posts have frequently promoted a DDoS mitigation company and ISP that he operates called botshield[.]io. The Botshield website is connected to a business entity registered in the United Kingdom called Botshield LTD, which lists a 21-year-old woman from Sao Paulo, Brazil as the director. Internet routing records indicate Botshield (AS213613) currently controls several hundred Internet addresses that were allocated to the company earlier this year.
Domaintools.com reports that botshield[.]io was registered in July 2022 to a Kaike Southier Leite in Sao Paulo. A LinkedIn profile by the same name says this individual is a network specialist from Brazil who works in “the planning and implementation of robust network infrastructures, with a focus on security, DDoS mitigation, colocation and cloud server services.”
Image: Jaclyn Vernace / Shutterstock.com.
In his posts to public Telegram chat channels, Forky has hardly attempted to conceal his whereabouts or identity. In countless chat conversations indexed by Unit 221B, Forky could be seen talking about everyday life in Brazil, often remarking on the extremely low or high prices in Brazil for a range of goods, from computer and networking gear to narcotics and food.
Reached via Telegram, Forky claimed he was “not involved in this type of illegal actions for years now,” and that the project had been taken over by other unspecified developers. Forky initially told KrebsOnSecurity he had been out of the botnet scene for years, only to concede this wasn’t true when presented with public posts on Telegram from late last year that clearly showed otherwise.
Forky denied being involved in the attack on KrebsOnSecurity, but acknowledged that he helped to develop and market the Aisuru botnet. Forky claims he is now merely a staff member for the Aisuru botnet team, and that he stopped running the botnet roughly two months ago after starting a family. Forky also said the woman named as director of Botshield is related to him.
Forky offered equivocal, evasive responses to a number of questions about the Aisuru botnet and his business endeavors. But on one point he was crystal clear:
“I have zero fear about you, the FBI, or Interpol,” Forky said, asserting that he is now almost entirely focused on their hosting business — Botshield.
Forky declined to discuss the makeup of his ISP’s clientele, or to clarify whether Botshield was more of a hosting provider or a DDoS mitigation firm. However, Forky has posted on Telegram about Botshield successfully mitigating large DDoS attacks launched against other DDoS-for-hire services.
DomainTools finds the same Sao Paulo street address in the registration records for botshield[.]io was used to register several other domains, including cant-mitigate[.]us. The email address in the WHOIS records for that domain is forkcontato@gmail.com, which DomainTools says was used to register the domain for the now-defunct DDoS-for-hire service stresser[.]us, one of the domains seized in the FBI’s 2023 crackdown.
On May 8, 2023, the U.S. Department of Justice announced the seizure of stresser[.]us, along with a dozen other domains offering DDoS services. The DOJ said ten of the 13 domains were reincarnations of services that were seized during a prior sweep in December, which targeted 48 top stresser services (also known as “booters”).
Forky claimed he could find out who attacked my site with Aisuru. But when pressed a day later on the question, Forky said he’d come up empty-handed.
“I tried to ask around, all the big guys are not retarded enough to attack you,” Forky explained in an interview on Telegram. “I didn’t have anything to do with it. But you are welcome to write the story and try to put the blame on me.”
The 6.3 Tbps attack last week caused no visible disruption to this site, in part because it was so brief — lasting approximately 45 seconds. DDoS attacks of such magnitude and brevity typically are produced when botnet operators wish to test or demonstrate their firepower for the benefit of potential buyers. Indeed, Google’s Menscher said it is likely that both the May 12 attack and the slightly larger 6.5 Tbps attack against Cloudflare last month were simply tests of the same botnet’s capabilities.
In many ways, the threat posed by the Aisuru/Airashi botnet is reminiscent of Mirai, an innovative IoT malware strain that emerged in the summer of 2016 and successfully out-competed virtually all other IoT malware strains in existence at the time.
As first revealed by KrebsOnSecurity in January 2017, the Mirai authors were two U.S. men who co-ran a DDoS mitigation service — even as they were selling far more lucrative DDoS-for-hire services using the most powerful botnet on the planet.
Less than a week after the Mirai botnet was used in a days-long DDoS against KrebsOnSecurity, the Mirai authors published the source code to their botnet so that they would not be the only ones in possession of it in the event of their arrest by federal investigators.
Ironically, the leaking of the Mirai source is precisely what led to the eventual unmasking and arrest of the Mirai authors, who went on to serve probation sentences that required them to consult with FBI investigators on DDoS investigations. But that leak also rapidly led to the creation of dozens of Mirai botnet clones, many of which were harnessed to fuel their own powerful DDoS-for-hire services.
Menscher told KrebsOnSecurity that as counterintuitive as it may sound, the Internet as a whole would probably be better off if the source code for Aisuru became public knowledge. After all, he said, the people behind Aisuru are in constant competition with other IoT botnet operators who are all striving to commandeer a finite number of vulnerable IoT devices globally.
Such a development would almost certainly cause a proliferation of Aisuru botnet clones, he said, but at least then the overall firepower from each individual botnet would be greatly diminished — or at least within range of the mitigation capabilities of most DDoS protection providers.
Barring a source code leak, Menscher said, it would be nice if someone published the full list of software exploits being used by the Aisuru operators to grow their botnet so quickly.
“Part of the reason Mirai was so dangerous was that it effectively took out competing botnets,” he said. “This attack somehow managed to compromise all these boxes that nobody else knows about. Ideally, we’d want to see that fragmented out, so that no [individual botnet operator] controls too much.”
This GitHub repository provides a range of search queries, known as "dorks," for Shodan, a powerful tool used to search for Internet-connected devices. The dorks are designed to help security researchers discover potential vulnerabilities and configuration issues in various types of devices such as webcams, routers, and servers. This resource is helpful for those interested in exploring network security and conducting vulnerability scanning, including both beginners and experienced information security professionals. By leveraging this repository, users can improve the security of their own networks and protect against potential attacks.
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http.html:"ESP Easy Mega"
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http.html:"Jamf Pro Setup"
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http.html:"moodle"
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http.html:"phpmyfaq"
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http.html:"soplanning"
http.html:"SOUND4"
http.html:"study any topic, anytime"
http.html:"sucuri firewall"
http.html:"symfony Profiler"
http.html:"Symfony Profiler"
http.html:"sympa"
http.html:"teampass"
http.html:"Telerik Report Server"
http.html:"Thruk"
http.html:"thruk" || http.title:"thruk monitoring webinterface"
http.html:"TIBCO BusinessConnect"
http.html:"tiki wiki"
http.html:"TLR-2005KSH"
http.html:"totemomail" inurl:responsiveui
http.html:"Umbraco"
http.html:"vaultwarden"
http.html:"Vertex Tax Installer"
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http.html:"VMware Horizon"
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http.html:"Wavlink"
http.html:"WebADM"
http.html:"Webasyst Installer"
http.html:"WebCenter"
http.html:"Web Image Monitor"
http.html:"Webp"
http.html:"webshell4"
http.html:"Welcome to MapProxy"
http.html:"Welcome to Oracle Fusion Middleware"
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http.html:/wp-content/plugins/custom-facebook-feed/
http.html:/wp-content/plugins/custom-search-plugin/
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http.html:"/wp-content/plugins/gift-voucher/"
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http.html:"/wp-content/plugins/hostel/"
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http.html:"wp-content/plugins/hurrakify"
http.html:/wp-content/plugins/learnpress
http.html:/wp-content/plugins/login-as-customer-or-user
http.html:wp-content/plugins/media-library-assistant
http.html:/wp-content/plugins/motopress-hotel-booking
http.html:/wp-content/plugins/mstore-api/
http.html:/wp-content/plugins/newsletter/
http.html:/wp-content/plugins/nex-forms-express-wp-form-builder/
http.html:"/wp-content/plugins/ninja-forms/"
http.html:/wp-content/plugins/ninja-forms/
http.html:/wp-content/plugins/pagination/
http.html:/wp-content/plugins/paid-memberships-pro/
http.html:/wp-content/plugins/pdf-generator-for-wp
http.html:/wp-content/plugins/pdf-print/
http.html:/wp-content/plugins/photoblocks-grid-gallery/
http.html:/wp-content/plugins/photo-gallery
http.html:/wp-content/plugins/polls-widget/
http.html:/wp-content/plugins/popup-builder/
http.html:/wp-content/plugins/popup-by-supsystic
http.html:/wp-content/plugins/popup-maker/
http.html:/wp-content/plugins/post-smtp
http.html:/wp-content/plugins/prismatic
http.html:/wp-content/plugins/promobar/
http.html:/wp-content/plugins/qt-kentharadio
http.html:/wp-content/plugins/quick-event-manager
http.html:"/wp-content/plugins/radio-player"
http.html:/wp-content/plugins/rating-bws/
http.html:/wp-content/plugins/realty/
http.html:/wp-content/plugins/registrations-for-the-events-calendar/
http.html:/wp-content/plugins/searchwp-live-ajax-search/
http.html:/wp-content/plugins/sender/
http.html:/wp-content/plugins/sfwd-lms
http.html:/wp-content/plugins/shortpixel-adaptive-images/
http.html:/wp-content/plugins/show-all-comments-in-one-page
http.html:/wp-content/plugins/site-offline/
http.html:/wp-content/plugins/social-buttons-pack/
http.html:/wp-content/plugins/social-login-bws/
http.html:/wp-content/plugins/stock-ticker/
http.html:/wp-content/plugins/subscriber/
http.html:/wp-content/plugins/super-socializer/
http.html:/wp-content/plugins/tutor/
http.html:/wp-content/plugins/twitter-plugin/
http.html:/wp-content/plugins/ubigeo-peru/
http.html:/wp-content/plugins/ultimate-member
http.html:/wp-content/plugins/updater/
"http.html:/wp-content/plugins/user-meta/"
http.html:/wp-content/plugins/user-role/
http.html:/wp-content/plugins/video-list-manager/
http.html:/wp-content/plugins/visitors-online/
http.html:/wp-content/plugins/wc-multivendor-marketplace
http.html:/wp-content/plugins/woocommerce-payments
http.html:/wp-content/plugins/wordpress-toolbar/
"http.html:/wp-content/plugins/wp-fastest-cache/"
http.html:"/wp-content/plugins/wp-file-upload/"
http.html:/wp-content/plugins/wp-helper-lite
http.html:/wp-content/plugins/wp-simple-firewall
http.html:/wp-content/plugins/wp-statistics/
http.html:/wp-content/plugins/wp-user/
http.html:/wp-content/plugins/zendesk-help-center/
http.html:/wp-content/themes/newspaper
http.html:/wp-content/themes/noo-jobmonster
http.html:"wp-stats-manager"
http.html:"Wuzhicms"
http.html:"/xibosignage/xibo-cms"
http.html:"yeswiki"
http.html:"Z-BlogPHP"
http.html:"zm - login"
http.html:"ZTE Corporation"
http.html:"心上无垢，林间有风"
http.securitytxt:contact http.status:200
http.title:"1Password SCIM Bridge Login"
http.title:"3CX Phone System Management Console"
http.title:"Accueil WAMPSERVER"
http.title:"Acrolinx Dashboard"
http.title:"Actifio Resource Center"
http.title:"Adapt authoring tool"
http.title:"Admin | Employee's Payroll Management System"
http.title:adminer
http.title:"AdmiralCloud"
http.title:"Adobe Media Server"
http.title:"Advanced eMail Solution DEEPMail"
http.title:"Advanced Setup - Security - Admin User Name & Password"
http.title:"Aerohive NetConfig UI"
http.title:"Aethra Telecommunications Operating System"
http.title:"AirCube Dashboard"
http.title:"AirNotifier"
http.title:"Alamos GmbH | FE2"
http.title:"Alertmanager"
http.title:"Alfresco Content App"
http.title:"AlienVault USM"
http.title:"altenergy power control software"
http.title:"AlternC Desktop"
http.title:"Amazon Cognito Developer Authentication Sample"
http.title:"Amazon ECS Sample App"
http.title:"Ampache -- Debug Page"
http.title:"Android Debug Database"
http.title:"Apache2 Debian Default Page:"
http.title:"Apache2 Ubuntu Default Page"
http.title:"apache apisix dashboard"
http.title:"Apache CloudStack"
http.title:"Apache+Default","Apache+HTTP+Server+Test","Apache2+It+works"
http.title:"Apache HTTP Server Test Page powered by CentOS"
http.title:"apache streampipes"
http.title:"apex it help desk"
http.title:"appsmith"
http.title:"Aptus Login"
http.title:"Aqua Enterprise" || http.title:"Aqua Cloud Native Security Platform"
http.title:"ArcGIS"
http.title:"Argo CD"
http.title:"avantfax - login"
http.title:"aviatrix cloud controller"
http.title:"AVideo"
http.title:"Axel"
http.title:"Axigen WebAdmin"
http.title:"Axigen WebMail"
http.title:"Axway API Manager Login"
http.title:"Axyom Network Manager"
http.title:"Azkaban Web Client"
http.title:"Bagisto Installer"
http.title:"Bamboo"
http.title:"BigBlueButton"
http.title:"BigFix"
http.title:"big-ip®-+redirect" +"server"
http.title:"BioTime"
http.title:"Black Duck"
http.title:"Blue Iris Login"
http.title:"BMC Remedy Single Sign-On domain data entry"
http.title:"BMC Software"
http.title:"browserless debugger"
http.title:"Caton Network Manager System"
http.title:"Celebrus"
http.title:"Centreon"
http.title:"change detection"
http.title:"Charger Management Console"
http.title:"Check_MK"
http.title:"Cisco Secure CN"
http.title:"Cisco ServiceGrid"
http.title:"Cisco Systems Login"
http.title:"Cisco Telepresence"
http.title:"citrix gateway"
http.title:"ClarityVista"
http.title:"CleanWeb"
http.title:"Cloudphysician RADAR"
http.title:"Cluster Overview - Trino"
http.title:"C-more -- the best HMI presented by AutomationDirect"
http.title:"cobbler web interface"
http.title:"Codeigniter Application Installer"
http.title:"code-server login"
http.title:"Codian MCU - Home page"
http.title:"CompleteView Web Client"
http.title:"Conductor UI", http.title:"Workflow UI"
http.title:"Connection - SphinxOnline"
http.title:"Content Central Login"
http.title:"copyparty"
http.title:"Coverity"
http.title:"craftercms"
http.title:"Create a pipeline - Go" html:"GoCD Version"
http.title:"Creatio"
http.title:"Database Error"
http.title:"datagerry"
http.title:"DataHub"
http.title:"datataker"
http.title:"Davantis"
http.title:"Decision Center | Business Console"
http.title:"Dericam"
http.title:"Dgraph Ratel Dashboard"
http.title:"docassemble"
http.title:"Docuware"
http.title:"Dolibarr"
http.title:"dolphinscheduler"
http.title:"DolphinScheduler"
http.title:"Domibus"
http.title:"dotcms"
http.title:"Dozzle"
http.title:"Easyvista"
http.title:"Ekoenergetyka-Polska Sp. z o.o - CCU3 Software Update for Embedded Systems"
http.title:"Elastic" || http.favicon.hash:1328449667
http.title:"Elasticsearch-sql client"
http.title:"emby"
http.title:"emerge"
http.title:"Emerson Network Power IntelliSlot Web Card"
http.title:"EMQX Dashboard"
http.title:"Endpoint Protector"
http.title:"EnvisionGateway"
http.title:"erxes"
http.title:"EWM Manager"
http.title:"Extreme NetConfig UI"
http.title:"Falcosidekick"
http.title:"FastCGI"
http.title:"Flex VNF Web-UI"
http.title:"flightpath"
http.title:"flowchart maker"
http.title:"Forcepoint Appliance"
http.title:"fortimail"
http.title:"FORTINET LOGIN"
http.title:"fortiweb - "
http.title:"fuel cms"
http.title:"GeoWebServer"
http.title:"gitbook"
http.title:"Gitea"
http.title:"GitHub Debug"
http.title:"GitLab"
http.title:"git repository browser"
http.title:"GlassFish Server - Server Running"
http.title:"Glowroot"
http.title:"glpi"
http.title:"Gophish - Login"
http.title:"Grandstream Device Configuration"
http.title:"Graphite Browser"
http.title:"Graylog Web Interface"
http.title:"Gryphon"
http.title:"GXD5 Pacs Connexion utilisateur"
http.title:"H5S CONSOLE"
http.title:"Hacked By"
http.title:"Haivision Gateway"
http.title:"Haivision Media Platform"
http.title:"hd-network real-time monitoring system v2.0"
http.title:"Heatmiser Wifi Thermostat"
http.title:"HiveQueue"
http.title:"Home Assistant"
http.title:"Home Page - My ASP.NET Application"
http.title:"HP BladeSystem"
http.title:"HP Color LaserJet"
http.title:"Hp Officejet pro"
http.title:"HP Virtual Connect Manager"
http.title:"httpbin.org"
http.title:"HTTP Server Test Page powered by CentOS-WebPanel.com"
http.title:"HUAWEI Home Gateway HG658d"
http.title:"Hubble UI"
http.title:"hybris"
http.title:"HYPERPLANNING"
http.title:"IBM-HTTP-Server"
http.title:"IBM iNotes Login"
http.title:"IBM Security Access Manager"
http.title:"Icecast Streaming Media Server"
http.title:"IdentityServer v3"
http.title:"IIS7"
http.title:"IIS Windows Server"
http.title:"ImpressPages installation wizard"
http.title:"Infoblox"
http.title:"Installation - Gogs"
http.title:"Installer - Easyscripts"
http.title:"Intelbras"
http.title:"Intelligent WAPPLES"
http.title:"IoT vDME Simulator"
"http.title:\"ispconfig\""
http.title:"iXBus"
http.title:"J2EE"
http.title:"Jaeger UI"
http.title:"jeedom"
http.title:"Jellyfin"
"http.title:\"JFrog\""
http.title:"Jitsi Meet"
http.title:'JumpServer'
http.title:"Juniper Web Device Manager"
http.title:"JupyterHub"
http.title:"Kafka Center"
http.title:"Kafka Cruise Control UI"
http.title:"kavita"
http.title:"Kerio Connect Client"
http.title:"kibana"
http.title:"kkFileView"
http.title:"Kopano WebApp"
http.title:"Kraken dashboard"
http.title:"Kube Metrics Server"
http.title:"Kubernetes Operational View"
http.title:"kubernetes web view"
http.title:"lansweeper - login"
http.title:"LDAP Account Manager"
http.title:"Leostream"
http.title:"Linksys Smart WI-FI"
http.title:"LinShare"
http.title:"LISTSERV Maestro"
http.title:"LockSelf"
http.title:"login | control webpanel"
http.title:"Log in - easyJOB"
http.title:"Login - Residential Gateway"
http.title:"login - splunk"
http.title:"Login - Splunk"
http.title:"login" "x-oracle-dms-ecid" 200
http.title:"Logitech Harmony Pro Installer"
http.title:"Lomnido Login"
http.title:"Loxone Intercom Video"
http.title:"Lucee"
http.title:"Maestro - LuCI"
http.title:"MAG Dashboard Login"
http.title:"MailWatch Login Page"
http.title:"manageengine desktop central 10"
http.title:"ManageEngine Password"
http.title:"manageengine servicedesk plus"
http.title:"mcloud-installer-web"
http.title:"Meduza Stealer"
http.title:"MetaView Explorer"
http.title:MeTube
http.title:"Microsoft Azure App Service - Welcome"
http.title:"Microsoft Internet Information Services 8"
http.title:"mikrotik routeros > administration"
"http.title:\"mlflow\""
http.title:"mlflow"
http.title:"MobiProxy"
http.title:"MongoDB Ops Manager"
http.title:"mongo express"
http.title:"MSPControl - Sign In"
http.title:"My Datacenter - Login"
http.title:"Mystic Stealer"
http.title:"nagios"
http.title:"nagios xi"
http.title:"N-central Login"
http.title:"nconf"
http.title:"Netris Dashboard"
http.title:"NETSurveillance WEB"
http.title:"NetSUS Server Login"
http.title:"Nextcloud"
http.title:"nginx admin manager"
http.title:"Nginx Proxy Manager"
http.title:"ngrok"
http.title:"Normhost Backup server manager"
http.title:"noVNC"
http.title:"NS-ASG"
http.title:"ntopng - Traffic Dashboard"
http.title:"officescan"
http.title:"okta"
http.title:"Olivetti CRF"
http.title:"olympic banking system"
http.title:"OneinStack"
http.title:"Opcache Control Panel"
http.title:"Open Game Panel"
http.title:"openHAB"
http.title:"OpenObserve"
http.title:"opensis"
http.title:"openSIS"
http.title:"openvpn connect"
http.title:"Operations Automation Default Page"
http.title:"Opinio"
http.title:"opmanager plus"
http.title:"opnsense"
http.title:"opsview"
http.title:"Oracle Application Server Containers"
http.title:"oracle business intelligence sign in"
http.title:"Oracle Containers for J2EE"
http.title:"Oracle Database as a Service"
"http.title:\"Oracle PeopleSoft Sign-in\""
http.title:"Oracle(R) Integrated Lights Out Manager"
http.title:"OrangeHRM Web Installation Wizard"
http.title:"OSNEXUS QuantaStor Manager"
http.title:"otobo"
http.title:"OurMGMT3"
http.title:outlook exchange
http.title:"OVPN Config Download"
http.title:"PAHTool"
http.title:"pandora fms"
http.title:"Passbolt | Open source password manager for teams"
http.title:"Payara Server - Server Running"
http.title:"PendingInstallVZW - Web Page Configuration"
http.title:"Pexip Connect for Web"
http.title:"pfsense - login"
http.title:"PgHero"
http.title:"PGP Global Directory"
http.title:"phoronix-test-suite"
http.title:PhotoPrism
http.title:"PHP Mailer"
http.title:phpMyAdmin
http.title:"PHP warning" || "Fatal error"
http.title:"Plastic SCM"
http.title:"Please Login | Nozomi Networks Console"
http.title:"PMM Installation Wizard"
http.title:"posthog"
http.title:"PowerCom Network Manager"
http.title:"Powered By Jetty"
http.title:"Powered by lighttpd"
http.title:"PowerJob"
http.title:"prime infrastructure"
http.title:"PRONOTE"
http.title:"Puppetboard"
http.title:"Ranger - Sign In"
http.title:"rconfig"
http.title:"rConfig"
http.title:"RD Web Access"
http.title:"Remkon Device Manager"
http.title:"Reolink"
http.title:"rocket.chat"
http.title:"Rocket.Chat"
http.title:"RouterOS router configuration page"
http.title:"roxy file manager"
http.title:"R-SeeNet"
http.title:"seagate nas - seagate"
http.title:SearXNG
http.title:"Secure Login Service"
http.title:"securenvoy"
http.title:"securepoint utm"
http.title:"SeedDMS"
http.title:"Selenium Grid"
http.title:"Self Enrollment"
http.title:"SequoiaDB"
http.title:"Server Backup Manager SE"
http.title:"Service"
http.title:"SevOne NMS - Network Manager"
http.title:"S-Filer"
http.title:"SGP"
http.title:"SHOUTcast Server"
http.title:"sidekiq"
http.title:"Sign In - Hyperic"
http.title:"Sign in to Netsparker Enterprise"
"http.title:\"SimpleSAMLphp installation page\""
http.title:"sitecore"
http.title:"Skeepers"
http.title:"SMS Gateway | Installation"
http.title:"smtp2go"
http.title:"Snapdrop"
http.title:"SoftEther VPN Server"
http.title:"SOGo"
http.title:"Sonatype Nexus Repository"
http.title:"Splunk"
http.title:"Splunk SOAR"
http.title:"SQL Buddy"
http.title:"SteVe - Steckdosenverwaltung"
http.title:"storybook"
http.title:"strapi"
http.title:"Supermicro BMC Login"
"http.title:\"swagger\""
http.title:"Symantec Encryption Server"
http.title:"Synapse Mobility Login"
http.title:"t24 sign in"
http.title:"Tactical RMM - Login"
http.title:"Tenda 11N Wireless Router Login Screen"
http.title:"Test Page for the Apache HTTP Server on Red Hat Enterprise Linux"
http.title:"Test Page for the HTTP Server on Fedora"
http.title:"Test Page for the Nginx HTTP Server on Amazon Linux"
http.title:"Test Page for the SSL/TLS-aware Apache Installation on Web Site"
http.title:"The install worked successfully! Congratulations!"
http.title:"thinfinity virtualui"
http.title:"TileServer GL - Server for vector and raster maps with GL styles"
"http.title:\"tixeo\""
http.title:"totolink"
http.title:"traefik"
http.title:"transact sign in","t24 sign in"
http.title:"Transmission Web Interface"
http.title:triconsole.com - php calendar date picker
http.title:"TurnKey OpenVPN"
http.title:"Twenty"
http.title:"TYPO3 Exception"
http.title:"UI for Apache Kafka"
http.title:"UiPath Orchestrator"
http.title:"UniFi Network"
http.title:"UniGUI"
http.title:"Verizon Router"
http.title:"VERSA DIRECTOR Login"
http.title:"vertigis"
http.title:"ViewPoint System Status"
http.title:"vRealize Operations Tenant App"
http.title:"Wallix Access Manager"
http.title:"Warning [refreshed every 30 sec.]"
http.title:"Watershed LRS"
http.title:"webcamXP 5"
http.title:"webmin"
http.title:"Web Server's Default Page"
http.title:"WebSphere Liberty"
http.title:"Webtools"
http.title:"Web Transfer Client"
http.title:"web viewer for samsung dvr"
http.title:"Welcome to Citrix Hypervisor"
http.title:"Welcome to CodeIgniter"
http.title:"Welcome to nginx!"
http.title:"welcome to ntop"
http.title:"Welcome to OpenResty!"
http.title:"Welcome To RunCloud"
http.title:"Welcome to Service Assistant"
http.title:"Welcome to Sitecore"
http.title:"Welcome to Symfony"
http.title:"Welcome to tengine"
http.title:"Welcome to VMware Site Recovery Manager"
http.title:"Welcome to your Strapi app"
http.title:"Wi-Fi APP Login"
http.title:"Wiren Board Web UI"
http.title:"WoodWing Studio Server"
http.title:"XAMPP"
http.title:"XDS-AMR - status"
http.title:"XenForo"
http.title:"XNAT"
http.title:"YApi"
http.title:zblog
http.title:"zentao"
http.title:"zeroshell"
http.title:"Zope QuickStart"
http.title:"zywall"
http.title:"ZyWall"
http.title:"小米路由器"
http.title:"高清智能录播系统"
icon_hash="915499123"
"If you find a bug in this Lighttpd package, or in Lighttpd itself"
imap
"Kerio Control"
Laravel-Framework
ldap
"Lorex"
"loytec"
"Max-Forwards:"
Microsoft FTP Service
mongodb server information
"Ms-Author-Via: DAV"
MSMQ
"nimplant C2 server"
"OfficeWeb365"
ollama
"Ollama is running"
OpenSSL
"Open X Server:"
Path=/gespage
pentaho
"pfBlockerNG"
php.ini
"PHPnow works"
".phpunit.result.cache"
pop3 port:110
port:10001
"port:110"
port:"111"
port:11300 "cmd-peek"
port:1433
port:22
port:2375 product:"docker"
port:23 telnet
"port:3306"
port:3310 product:"ClamAV"
port:3310 product:"ClamAV" version:"0.99.2"
"port:445"
port:445
port:523
'port:541 xab'
port:5432
port:5432 product:"PostgreSQL"
"port:69"
port:"79" action
port:"873"
port:873
product:"ActiveMQ OpenWire transport"
product:"Apache ActiveMQ"
product:'Ares RAT C2'
product:"Axigen"
product:"besu"
product:"BGP"
product:"bitvise"
"product:\"Check Point Firewall\""
product:"Cisco fingerd"
product:"cloudflare-nginx"
product:"CouchDB"
"product:cups"
product:"CUPS (IPP)"
product:'DarkComet Trojan'
product:'DarkTrack RAT Trojan'
product:"Dropbear sshd"
product:"Erigon"
product:"Erlang Port Mapper Daemon"
product:"etcd"
"product:\"Exim smtpd\""
product:"Fortinet FortiWiFi"
product:"Geth"
product:"GitLab Self-Managed"
product:"GNU Inetutils FTPd"
product:"HttpFileServer httpd"
product:"IBM DB2 Database Server"
product:"jenkins"
product:"Kafka"
product:"kubernetes"
product:"Kubernetes" version:"1.21.5-eks-bc4871b"
product:"Linksys E2000 WAP http config"
product:"MikroTik router ftpd"
product:"MikroTik RouterOS API Service"
product:"Minecraft"
product:"MS .NET Remoting httpd"
product:"mysql"
product:"MySQL"
product:"Nethermind"
product:"Niagara Fox"
product:"nPerf"
product:OpenEthereum
product:"OpenResty"
product:"OpenSSH"
product:"Oracle TNS Listener"
product:"Oracle Weblogic"
product:'Orcus RAT Trojan'
"product:\"PostgreSQL\""
"product:\"ProFTPD\""
product:"ProFTPD"
product:"RabbitMQ"
product:"rhinosoft serv-u httpd"
product:"Riak"
product:"Sliver C2"
product:"TeamSpeak 3 ServerQuery"
product:"tomcat"
product:"VMware Authentication Daemon"
product:"vsftpd"
product:"Xlight ftpd"
product:'XtremeRAT Trojan'
'"python/3.10 aiohttp/3.8.3" && bad status'
"r470t"
realm="karaf"
"RTM WEB"
"RT-N16"
RTSP/1.0
secmail
"SEH HTTP Server"
"Server: Boa/"
"Server: Burp Collaborator"
'Server: Cleo'
'Server: Cleo'
"Server: EC2ws"
'server: "ecstatic"'
'Server: Flowmon'
"Server: gabia"
"Server: GeoHttpServer"
'Server: Goliath'
'Server: httpd/2.0 port:8080'
'Server: mikrotik httpproxy'
'Server: Mongoose'
"Server: tinyproxy"
"Server: Trellix"
"Set-Cookie: MFPSESSIONID="
'set-cookie: nsbase_session'
sickbeard
smtp
SSH-2.0-AWS_SFTP_1.1
"SSH-2.0-MOVEit"
SSH-2.0-ROSSSH
ssl:"AsyncRAT Server"
ssl.cert.issuer.cn:"QNAP NAS",title:"QNAP Turbo NAS"
ssl.cert.serial:146473198
ssl.cert.subject.cn:"Onimai Academies CA"
ssl.cert.subject.cn:"Quasar Server CA"
ssl:"Covenant" http.component:"Blazor"
ssl.jarm:07d14d16d21d21d07c42d41d00041d24a458a375eef0c576d23a7bab9a9fb1+port:443
ssl:"Kubernetes Ingress Controller Fake Certificate"
ssl:"MetasploitSelfSignedCA"
ssl:"Mythic"
ssl:Mythic port:7443
ssl:"ou=fortianalyzer"
ssl:"ou=fortiauthenticator"
ssl:"ou=fortiddos"
ssl:"ou=fortigate"
ssl:"ou=fortimanager"
ssl:"P18055077"
'ssl:postalCode=3540 ssl.jarm:3fd21b20d00000021c43d21b21b43de0a012c76cf078b8d06f4620c2286f5e'
ssl.version:sslv2 ssl.version:sslv3 ssl.version:tlsv1 ssl.version:tlsv1.1
"Statamic"
".styleci.yml"
The requested resource
"TIBCO Spotfire Server"
title:"3ware"
title:"Acunetix"
title:"AddOnFinancePortal"
title:"Administration login" html:"poste<span"
title:"AdminLogin - MPFTVC"
title:"Advanced System Management"
title:"AeroCMS"
title:"AiCloud"
title:"Airflow - DAGs"
title:"Akuiteo"
title:"Alma Installation"
title:"Ambassador Edge Stack"
title:"AmpGuard wifi setup"
title:"Anaqua User Sign On""
title:"AnythingLLM"
title:"Apache APISIX Dashboard"
title:"Apache Apollo"
title:"Apache Drill"
title:"Apache Druid"
title:"Apache Miracle Linux Web Server"
title:"Apache Ozone"
title:"Apache Pinot"
title:"Apache Shiro Quickstart"
title:"apache streampipes"
title:"Apache Tomcat"
title:"APC | Log On"
title:"Appliance Management Console Login"
title:"Appliance Setup Wizard"
title:"Audiobookshelf"
title:"Automatisch"
title:"AutoSet"
title:"AWS X-Ray Sample Application"
title:"Axigen"
title:"Backpack Admin"
title:"Bamboo setup wizard"
title:"BigAnt"
title:"Biostar"
title:"Blackbox Exporter"
title:"BRAVIA Signage"
title:"BrightSign"
title:"Build Dashboard - Atlassian Bamboo"
title:"Businesso Installer"
title:"c3325"
title:"cAdvisor"
title:"Camaleon CMS"
title:"CAREL Pl@ntVisor"
"title:\"CData - API Server\""
"title:\"CData Arc\""
"title:\"CData Connect\""
"title:\"CData Sync\""
title:"Chamilo has not been installed"
title:"Change Detection"
title:"Choose your deployment type - Confluence"
title:"Cisco Unified"
title:"Cisco vManage"
title:"Cisco WebEx"
title:"Claris FileMaker WebDirect"
title:"CloudCenter Installer"
title:"CloudCenter Suite"
title:"Cloud Services Appliance"
title:"Codis • Dashboard"
title:"Collectd Exporter"
title:"Coming Soon"
title:"COMPALEX"
title:"Concourse"
title:"Configure ntop"
title:"Congratulations | Cloud Run"
title="ConnectWise Control Remote Support Software"
title:"copyparty"
title:"Cryptobox"
title:"CudaTel"
title:"cvsweb"
title:"CyberChef"
title:"Dashboard - Ace Admin"
title:"Dashboard - Bootstrap Admin Template"
title:"Dashboard - Confluence"
title:"Dashboard - ESPHome"
title:"Datadog"
title:"dataiku"
title:"Debug Config"
title:"Debugger"
"title=\"Decision Center | Business Console\""
title:"dedecms" || http.html:"power by dedecms"
title:"Default Parallels Plesk Panel Page"
title:"Dell Remote Management Controller"
title:"Deluge"
title:"Devika AI"
title:"Dialogic XMS Admin Console"
title:"Discourse Setup"
title:"Discuz!"
title:"D-LINK"
title:"Dockge"
title:"Docmosis Tornado"
title:"DokuWiki"
title:"Dolibarr install or upgrade"
title:"DPLUS Dashboard"
title:"DQS Superadmin"
title:"Dradis Professional Edition"
title:"DuomiCMS"
title:"Dynamics Container Host"
title:"EC2 Instance Information"
title:"Eclipse BIRT Home"
title:"Elastic HD Dashboard"
title:"Elemiz Network Manager"
title:"elfinder"
title:"Enablix"
title:"Encompass CM1 Home Page"
title:"Enterprise-Class Redis for Developers"
title:"Envoy Admin"
title:"EOS HTTP Browser"
title:"Error" html:"CodeIgniter"
title:"Eureka"
title:"Event Debug Server"
title:"EVlink Local Controller"
title:"Express Status"
title:"FASTPANEL HOSTING CONTROL"
title:"ffserver Status"
title:"FileGator"
title:"Flahscookie Superadmin"
title:"Flask + Redis Queue + Docker"
title:"Flexnet"
title:"Flex VNF Web-UI"
title:"FlureeDB Admin Console"
title:"FootPrints Service Core Login"
title:"For the Love of Music - Installation"
title:"FOSSBilling"
title:"Freshrss"
title:"Froxlor"
title:"Froxlor Server Management Panel"
title:"FusionAuth Setup Wizard"
title:"Gargoyle Router Management Utility"
title:"GEE Server"
title:"Geowebserver"
title:"Gira HomeServer 4"
title:"Gitblit"
title:"GitHub Enterprise"
title:"GitLab"
title:"GitList"
title:"GL.iNet Admin Panel"
title:"Global Traffic Statistics"
title:"Glowroot"
title:"Gopher Server"
title:"Gradio"
title:"Grafana"
title:"GraphQL Playground"
title:"Gravitino"
title:"Grav Register Admin User"
title:"Graylog Web Interface"
title:"Group-IB Managed XDR"
title:"H2O Flow"
title:"haproxy exporter"
title:"Health Checks UI"
title:"Hetzner Cloud"
title:"HFS /"
title:"Homebridge"
title:"Home - Mongo Express"
title:"Home Page - Select or create a notebook"
title:"Honeywell XL Web Controller"
title:"hookbot"
title:"hoteldruid"
title:"h-sphere"
title:"HUAWEI"
title:"Hue Personal"
title:"hue personal wireless lighting"
title:"Hue - Welcome to Hue"
title:"HugeGraph"
title:"Hybris"
title:"HyperTest"
title:"Icecast Streaming Media Server"
title:"icewarp"
title:"IDEMIA"
title:"i-MSCP - Multi Server Control Panel"
title:"Initial server configuration"
'title:"Installation - Gitea: Git with a cup of tea"'
title:"Installation Moodle"
title:"Install Binom"
title:"Install concrete"
title:"Installing TYPO3 CMS"
title:"Install · Nagios Log Server"
title:"Install Umbraco"
title:"ISPConfig" http.favicon.hash:483383992
title:"issabel"
title:"ITRS"
title:"Jackett"
title:"Jamf Pro"
title:"JC-e converter webinterface"
title:"Jeecg-Boot"
title:"Jeedom"
title:"JIRA - JIRA setup"
title:"Jitsi Meet"
title:"Joomla Web Installer"
title:"JSON Server"
title:"JSPWiki"
title:"Juniper Web Device Manager"
title:"jupyter notebook"
title:"Kafka-Manager"
title:"keycloak"
title:"Kiali"
title:"Kiwi TCMS - Login" http.favicon.hash:-1909533337
title:"KnowledgeTree Installer"
title:"Koel"
title:kubecost
title:Kube-state-metrics
title:"Lantronix"
title:"LDAP Account Manager"
title:"LibrePhotos"
title:"LibreSpeed"
title:"Libvirt"
title:"Lidarr"
title:"Liferay"
title:"Lightdash"
title:"LinkTap Gateway"
title:"Locust"
title:logger html:"htmlWebpackPlugin.options.title"
title:"Login - Authelia"
title:"Log in - Bitbucket"
title:"Login | Control WebPanel"
title:"Login | GYRA Master Admin"
title:"login" product:"Avtech"
title:"login" product:"Avtech AVN801 network camera"
title:"Log in | Telerik Report Server"
title:"Login to ICC PRO system"
title:"Login to TLR-2005KSH"
title:"LVM Exporter"
title:"MachForm Admin Panel"
title:"macOS Server"
title:"Magnolia Installation"
title:"Maltrail"
title:"MAMP"
title:"ManageEngine"
title:"ManageEngine Desktop Central"
title:"MantisBT"
title:"Matomo"
title:"Mautic"
title:"Metabase"
title:"Microsoft Azure Web App - Error 404"
title:"MinIO Console"
title:"mirth connect administrator"
title:"Mobotix"
title:"MobSF"
title:"Moleculer Microservices Project"
title:"MongoDB exporter"
'title:"Monstra :: Install"'
title:"Moodle"
title:"MySQLd exporter"
title:"myStrom"
title:"Nacos"
title:"Nagios XI"
title:"Named Process Exporter"
title:"NeoDash"
title:"Netdisco"
title:"Netman"
title:"netman 204"
title:"NetMizer"
"title:NextChat,\"ChatGPT Next Web\""
title:"NginX Auto Installer"
title="nginxwebui"
title:"Nifi"
"title:\"NiFi\""
title:"NiFi"
title:"NI Web-based Configuration & Monitoring"
title:"NodeBB Web Installer"
title:"NoEscape - Login"
title:"Notion – One workspace. Every team."
title:"NP Data Cache"
title:"NPort Web Console"
title:"nsqadmin"
title:"Nuxeo Platform"
title:"O2 Easy Setup"
title=="O2OA"
title:"OCS Inventory"
title:"Odoo"
title:"Okta"
title:"OLT Web Management Interface"
title:"OneDev"
title:"OpenCart"
title:"opencats"
title:"OpenEMR Setup Tool"
title:"OpenMage Installation Wizard"
title:"OpenMediaVault"
title:"OpenNMS Web Console"
title:"openproject"
title:"OpenShift"
title:"OpenShift Assisted Installer"
title:"openSIS"
title:"OpenWRT"
title:"Oracle Application Server"
title:"Oracle Forms"
title:"Oracle Opera" && html:"/OperaLogin/Welcome.do"
title:"Oracle PeopleSoft Sign-in"
title:"Orangescrum Setup Wizard"
title:"osticket"
title:"osTicket"
title:"Ovirt-Engine"
title:"owncloud"
title:"OXID eShop installation"
title:"Pa11y Dashboard"
title:"Pagekit Installer"
title:"PairDrop"
title:"Papercut"
'title:"Payara Micro #badassfish - Error report"'
title:"PCDN Cache Node Dataset"
title:"pCOWeb"
title:"Pega"
title:"perfSONAR"
title:" Permissions | Installer"
title:"Persis"
title:"PgHero"
title:"Pgwatch2"
title:"phpLDAPadmin"
title:"phpMemcachedAdmin"
title:"phpmyadmin"
title:"Pi-hole"
title:"Piwik › Installation"
title:"Plenti"
title:"Portainer"
title:"Postgres exporter"
title:"Powered by phpwind"
title:"Powered By vBulletin"
title:"PQube 3"
title:"PrestaShop Installation Assistant"
title:"Prison Management System"
title:"Pritunl"
title:"PrivateBin"
title:"PrivX"
title:"ProcessWire 3.x Installer"
title:"Pulsar Admin"
'title:"PuppetDB: Dashboard"'
title:"QlikView - AccessPoint"
title:"QuestDB · Console"
title:"RabbitMQ Exporter"
title:"Raspberry Shake Config"
title:"Ray Dashboard"
title:"rConfig"
title:"ReCrystallize"
title:"RedisInsight"
title:"Redpanda Console"
title:"Registration and Login System"
title:"Rekognition Image Validation Debug UI"
title:"reNgine"
title:"Reolink"
title:"Repetier-Server"
title:"ResourceSpace"
title:"Retool"
title:"RocketMQ"
title:"Room Alert"
title:"RStudio Sign In"
title:"ruckus"
"title:\"Rule Execution Server\""
title:"Rule Execution Server"
title:"Rundeck"
title:"Runtime Error"
title:"Rustici Content Controller"
title:"SaltStack Config"
title:"Sato"
title:"Scribble Diffusion"
title:"ScriptCase"
title:"SecurEnvoy"
title:SecuritySpy
title:"SelfCheck System Manager"
title:"SentinelOne - Management Console"
title:"Seq"
title:"SERVER MONITOR - Install"
title:"ServerStatus"
title:"servicenow"
title:"- setup" html:"Modem setup"
title:"Setup - mosparo"
title:"Setup wizard for webtrees"
title:"Setup Wizard" html:"/ruckus"
title:"Setup Wizard" html:"untangle"
title:"Setup Wizard" http.favicon.hash:-1851491385
title:"Setup Wizard" http.favicon.hash:2055322029
title:"ShareFile Storage Server"
title:"shenyu"
title:"Shopify App — Installation"
title:"shopware AG"
title:"ShopXO企业级B2C电商系统提供商"
title:"Sign In - Airflow"
title:"sitecore"
title:"Sitecore"
title:"Slurm HPC Dashboard"
title:"SmartPing Dashboard"
title:"SMF Installer"
title:"SmokePing Latency Page for Network Latency Grapher"
title:"Snoop Servlet"
title:"SoftEther VPN Server"
title:"Solr"
title:"Sonarqube"
title:"SonicWall Network Security"
title:"Speedtest Tracker"
title:"Splash"
title:"SqWebMail"
title:"Stremio-Jackett"
title:"Struts2 Showcase"
title:"Sugar Setup Wizard"
title:"SuiteCRM"
title:"SumoWebTools Installer"
title:"Superadmin UI - 4myhealth"
title:"SuperWebMailer"
title:"Symantec Endpoint Protection Manager"
title:"Synapse is running"
title:"SyncThru Web Service"
title:"System Properties"
title:"T24 Sign in"
title:"tailon"
title:"TamronOS IPTV系统"
title:"Tasmota"
title:"Tautulli - Welcome"
title:"TeamForge :"
title:"Tekton"
title:"TemboSocial Administration"
title:"Tenda Web Master"
title:"Teradek Cube Administrative Console"
title:"TestRail Installation Wizard"
title:"Thanos | Highly available Prometheus setup"
title:"ThinkPHP"
title:"THIS WEBSITE HAS BEEN SEIZED"
title:"Tigase XMPP Server"
title:"Tiki Wiki CMS"
title:"Tiny File Manager"
title:"Tiny Tiny RSS - Installer"
title:"TitanNit Web Control"
title:"tooljet"
title:"ToolJet - Dashboard"
title:"topaccess"
title:"Tornado - Login"
title:"Trassir Webview"
title:"Turbo Website Reviewer"
title:"TurnKey LAMP"
title:"ueditor"
title:"UniFi Wizard"
title:"uniGUI"
title:"Uptime Kuma"
title:"User Control Panel"
title:"USG FLEX"
title:"Utility Services Administration"
title:"UVDesk Helpdesk Community Edition - Installation Wizard"
title:"V2924"
title:"V2X Control"
"title:\"vBulletin\""
title:"veeam backup enterprise manager"
title:"Veeam Backup for GCP"
title:"Veeam Backup for Microsoft Azure"
title:"Veriz0wn"
title:"VideoXpert"
title:"Vitogate 300"
title:"VIVOTEK Web Console"
title:"vManage"
title:"VMware Appliance Management"
title:"VMware Aria Operations"
title:"VMware Carbon Black EDR"
title:"Vmware Cloud"
title:"VMware Cloud Director Availability"
title:"VMWARE FTP SERVER"
title:"VMware HCX"
title:"Vmware Horizon"
title:"VMware Site Recovery Manager"
title:"VMware VCenter"
title:"Vodafone Vox UI"
title:"vRealize Operations Manager"
title:"WAMPSERVER Homepage"
"title:\"Wazuh\""
title:"WebCalendar Setup Wizard"
title:"WebcomCo"
title:"Web Configurator"
title:"Web Configurator" html:"ACTi"
title:"Web File Manager"
title:"WebIQ"
title:"Webmin"
title:"Webmodule"
title:"WebPageTest"
title:"Webroot - Login"
title:"Webuzo Installer"
title:"Welcome to Azure Container Instances!"
title:"Welcome to C-Lodop"
title:"Welcome to Movable Type"
title:"Welcome to SmarterStats!"
title:"Welcome to your SWAG instance"
title:"WhatsUp Gold" http.favicon.hash:-2107233094
title:"WIFISKY-7层流控路由器"
title:"Wiki.js Setup"
title:"WorldServer"
title:"WoW-CMS | Installation"
title:"XenMobile"
"title:\"XenMobile - Console\""
title:"XEROX WORKCENTRE"
title:"xfinity"
title:"xnat"
title:"X-UI Login"
title:"Yellowfin Information Collaboration"
title:"Yii Debugger"
title:"Yopass"
title:"Your Own URL Shortener"
title:"YzmCMS"
title:"Zebra"
title:"Zend Server Test Page"
title:"Zenphoto install"
title:"Zeppelin"
title:"Zitadel"
title:"ZoneMinder"
title:"ZWave To MQTT"
title:"контроллер"
title:"孚盟云 "
title:"通达OA"
"Versa-Analytics-Server"
"wasabis3"
"/wd/hub"
"/websm/"
"Wing FTP Server"
"WL-500G"
"WL-520GU"
"workerman"
"WSO2 Carbon Server"
"www-authenticate:"
'www-authenticate: negotiate'
X-Amz-Server-Side-Encryption
"X-AspNetMvc-Version"
"X-AspNet-Version"
"X-ClickHouse-Summary"
"X-Influxdb-"
"X-Jenkins"
"X-Mod-Pagespeed:"
"X-Powered-By: Chamilo"
"X-Powered-By: Express"
"X-Powered-By: PHP"
"X-Recruiting:"
"X-TYPO3-Parsetime: 0ms"
Find devices in a particular city. city:"Bangalore"
Find devices in a particular country. country:"IN"
Find devices by giving geographical coordinates. geo:"56.913055,118.250862"
country:us country:ru country:de city:chicago
Find devices matching the hostname. server: "gws" hostname:"google" hostname:example.com -hostname:subdomain.example.com hostname:example.com,example.org
Find devices based on an IP address or /x CIDR. net:210.214.0.0/16
org:microsoft org:"United States Department"
asn:ASxxxx
Find devices based on operating system. os:"windows 7"
Find devices based on open ports. proftpd port:21
Find devices before or after between a given time. apache after:22/02/2009 before:14/3/2010
Self signed certificates ssl.cert.issuer.cn:example.com ssl.cert.subject.cn:example.com
Expired certificates ssl.cert.expired:true
ssl.cert.subject.cn:example.com
device:firewall device:router device:wap device:webcam device:media device:"broadband router" device:pbx device:printer device:switch device:storage device:specialized device:phone device:"voip" device:"voip phone" device:"voip adaptor" device:"load balancer" device:"print server" device:terminal device:remote device:telecom device:power device:proxy device:pda device:bridge
os:"windows 7" os:"windows server 2012" os:"linux 3.x"
product:apache product:nginx product:android product:chromecast
cpe:apple cpe:microsoft cpe:nginx cpe:cisco
server: nginx server: apache server: microsoft server: cisco-ios
dc:14:de:8e:d7:c1:15:43:23:82:25:81:d2:59:e8:c0
http.html:/dana-na
http.title:"Index of /" http.html:".pem"
onion-location
"product:MySQL" mysql port:"3306"
"product:MongoDB" mongodb port:27017
"MongoDB Server Information { "metrics":" "Set-Cookie: mongo-express=" "200 OK" "MongoDB Server Information" port:27017 -authentication
kibana content-legth:217
port:9200 json port:"9200" all:elastic port:"9200" all:"elastic indices"
"product:Memcached"
"product:CouchDB" port:"5984"+Server: "CouchDB/2.1.0"
"port:5432 PostgreSQL"
"port:8087 Riak"
"product:Redis"
"product:Cassandra"
"Server: Prismview Player"
"in-tank inventory" port:10001
No auth required to access CLI terminal. "privileged command" GET
P372 "ANPR enabled"
mikrotik streetlight
"voter system serial" country:US
May allow for ATM Access availability NCR Port:"161"
"Cisco IOS" "ADVIPSERVICESK9_LI-M"
"[2J[H Encartele Confidential"
http.title:"Tesla PowerPack System" http.component:"d3" -ga3ca4f2
"Server: gSOAP/2.8" "Content-Length: 583"
Shodan made a pretty sweet Ship Tracker that maps ship locations in real time, too!
"Cobham SATCOM" OR ("Sailor" "VSAT")
title:"Slocum Fleet Mission Control"
"Server: CarelDataServer" "200 Document follows"
http.title:"Nordex Control" "Windows 2000 5.0 x86" "Jetty/3.1 (JSP 1.1; Servlet 2.2; java 1.6.0_14)"
"[1m[35mWelcome on console"
Secured by default, thankfully, but these 1,700+ machines still have no business being on the internet.
"DICOM Server Response" port:104
"Server: EIG Embedded Web Server" "200 Document follows"
"Siemens, SIMATIC" port:161
"Server: Microsoft-WinCE" "Content-Length: 12581"
"HID VertX" port:4070
"log off" "select the appropriate"
Helps to find the charging status of tesla powerpack. http.title:"Tesla PowerPack System" http.component:"d3" -ga3ca4f2
title:"xzeres wind"
"html:"PIPS Technology ALPR Processors""
"port:502"
"port:1911,4911 product:Niagara"
"port:18245,18246 product:"general electric""
"port:5006,5007 product:mitsubishi"
"port:2455 operating system"
"port:102"
"port:47808"
"port:5094 hart-ip"
"port:9600 response code"
"port:2404 asdu address"
"port:20000 source address"
"port:44818"
"port:1962 PLC"
"port:789 product:"Red Lion Controls"
"port:20547 PLC"
"authentication disabled" port:5900,5901 "authentication disabled" "RFB 003.008"
99.99% are secured by a secondary Windows login screen.
"\x03\x00\x00\x0b\x06\xd0\x00\x00\x124\x00"
product:"cobalt strike team server" product:"Cobalt Strike Beacon" ssl.cert.serial:146473198 - default certificate serial number ssl.jarm:07d14d16d21d21d07c42d41d00041d24a458a375eef0c576d23a7bab9a9fb1 ssl:foren.zik
http.html_hash:-1957161625 product:"Brute Ratel C4"
ssl:"Covenant" http.component:"Blazor"
ssl:"MetasploitSelfSignedCA"
Routers which got compromised hacked-router-help-sos
product:"Redis key-value store"
Find Citrix Gateway. title:"citrix gateway"
Command-line access inside Kubernetes pods and Docker containers, and real-time visualization/monitoring of the entire infrastructure.
title:"Weave Scope" http.favicon.hash:567176827
"X-Jenkins" "Set-Cookie: JSESSIONID" http.title:"Dashboard"
Jenkins Unrestricted Dashboard x-jenkins 200
"Docker Containers:" port:2375
"Docker-Distribution-Api-Version: registry" "200 OK" -gitlab
"dnsmasq-pi-hole" "Recursion: enabled"
"port: 53" Recursion: Enabled
"root@" port:23 -login -password -name -Session
NO password required for telnet access. port:23 console gateway
"polycom command shell"
nport -keyin port:23
A tangential result of Google's sloppy fractured update approach. 🙄 More information here.
"Android Debug Bridge" "Device" port:5555
Lantronix password port:30718 -secured
"Citrix Applications:" port:1604
Vulnerable (kind of "by design," but especially when exposed).
"smart install client active"
PBX "gateway console" -password port:23
http.title:"- Polycom" "Server: lighttpd" "Polycom Command Shell" -failed port:23
"Polycom Command Shell" -failed port:23
Example: Polycom Video Conferencing
"Server: Bomgar" "200 OK"
"Intel(R) Active Management Technology" port:623,664,16992,16993,16994,16995 "Active Management Technology"
HP-ILO-4 !"HP-ILO-4/2.53" !"HP-ILO-4/2.54" !"HP-ILO-4/2.55" !"HP-ILO-4/2.60" !"HP-ILO-4/2.61" !"HP-ILO-4/2.62" !"HP-iLO-4/2.70" port:1900
"Press Enter for Setup Mode port:9999"
Helps to find the cleartext wifi passwords in Shodan. html:"def_wirelesspassword"
The wp-config.php if accessed can give out the database credentials. http.html:"* The wp-config.php creation script uses this file"
"x-owa-version" "IE=EmulateIE7" "Server: Microsoft-IIS/7.0"
"x-owa-version" "IE=EmulateIE7" http.favicon.hash:442749392
"X-AspNet-Version" http.title:"Outlook" -"x-owa-version"
"X-MS-Server-Fqdn"
Produces ~500,000 results...narrow down by adding "Documents" or "Videos", etc.
"Authentication: disabled" port:445
"Authentication: disabled" NETLOGON SYSVOL -unix port:445
"Authentication: disabled" "Shared this folder to access QuickBooks files OverNetwork" -unix port:445
"220" "230 Login successful." port:21
"Set-Cookie: iomega=" -"manage/login.html" -http.title:"Log In"
Redirecting sencha port:9000
"Server: Logitech Media Server" "200 OK"
Example: Logitech Media Servers
"X-Plex-Protocol" "200 OK" port:32400
"CherryPy/5.1.0" "/home"
"IPC$ all storage devices"
title:camera
webcam has_screenshot:true
"d-Link Internet Camera, 200 OK"
"Hipcam RealServer/V1.0"
"Server: yawcam" "Mime-Type: text/html"
("webcam 7" OR "webcamXP") http.component:"mootools" -401
"Server: IP Webcam Server" "200 OK"
html:"DVR_H264 ActiveX"
With username:admin and password: :P NETSurveillance uc-httpd Server: uc-httpd 1.0.0
"Serial Number:" "Built:" "Server: HP HTTP"
ssl:"Xerox Generic Root"
"SERVER: EPSON_Linux UPnP" "200 OK"
"Server: EPSON-HTTP" "200 OK"
"Server: KS_HTTP" "200 OK"
"Server: CANON HTTP Server"
"Server: AV_Receiver" "HTTP/1.1 406"
Apple TVs, HomePods, etc.
"\x08_airplay" port:5353
"Chromecast:" port:8008
"Model: PYNG-HUB"
"Server: calibre" http.status:200 http.title:calibre
title:"OctoPrint" -title:"Login" http.favicon.hash:1307375944
"ETH - Total speed"
Substitute .pem with any extension or a filename like phpinfo.php.
http.title:"Index of /" http.html:".pem"
Exposed wp-config.php files containing database credentials.
http.html:"* The wp-config.php creation script uses this file"
"Minecraft Server" "protocol 340" port:25565
net:175.45.176.0/22,210.52.109.0/24,77.94.35.0/24
The payment card giant MasterCard just fixed a glaring error in its domain name server settings that could have allowed anyone to intercept or divert Internet traffic for the company by registering an unused domain name. The misconfiguration persisted for nearly five years until a security researcher spent $300 to register the domain and prevent it from being grabbed by cybercriminals.
A DNS lookup on the domain az.mastercard.com on Jan. 14, 2025 shows the mistyped domain name a22-65.akam.ne.
From June 30, 2020 until January 14, 2025, one of the core Internet servers that MasterCard uses to direct traffic for portions of the mastercard.com network was misnamed. MasterCard.com relies on five shared Domain Name System (DNS) servers at the Internet infrastructure provider Akamai [DNS acts as a kind of Internet phone book, by translating website names to numeric Internet addresses that are easier for computers to manage].
All of the Akamai DNS server names that MasterCard uses are supposed to end in “akam.net” but one of them was misconfigured to rely on the domain “akam.ne.”
This tiny but potentially critical typo was discovered recently by Philippe Caturegli, founder of the security consultancy Seralys. Caturegli said he guessed that nobody had yet registered the domain akam.ne, which is under the purview of the top-level domain authority for the West Africa nation of Niger.
Caturegli said it took $300 and nearly three months of waiting to secure the domain with the registry in Niger. After enabling a DNS server on akam.ne, he noticed hundreds of thousands of DNS requests hitting his server each day from locations around the globe. Apparently, MasterCard wasn’t the only organization that had fat-fingered a DNS entry to include “akam.ne,” but they were by far the largest.
Had he enabled an email server on his new domain akam.ne, Caturegli likely would have received wayward emails directed toward mastercard.com or other affected domains. If he’d abused his access, he probably could have obtained website encryption certificates (SSL/TLS certs) that were authorized to accept and relay web traffic for affected websites. He may even have been able to passively receive Microsoft Windows authentication credentials from employee computers at affected companies.
But the researcher said he didn’t attempt to do any of that. Instead, he alerted MasterCard that the domain was theirs if they wanted it, copying this author on his notifications. A few hours later, MasterCard acknowledged the mistake, but said there was never any real threat to the security of its operations.
“We have looked into the matter and there was not a risk to our systems,” a MasterCard spokesperson wrote. “This typo has now been corrected.”
Meanwhile, Caturegli received a request submitted through Bugcrowd, a program that offers financial rewards and recognition to security researchers who find flaws and work privately with the affected vendor to fix them. The message suggested his public disclosure of the MasterCard DNS error via a post on LinkedIn (after he’d secured the akam.ne domain) was not aligned with ethical security practices, and passed on a request from MasterCard to have the post removed.
MasterCard’s request to Caturegli, a.k.a. “Titon” on infosec.exchange.
Caturegli said while he does have an account on Bugcrowd, he has never submitted anything through the Bugcrowd program, and that he reported this issue directly to MasterCard.
“I did not disclose this issue through Bugcrowd,” Caturegli wrote in reply. “Before making any public disclosure, I ensured that the affected domain was registered to prevent exploitation, mitigating any risk to MasterCard or its customers. This action, which we took at our own expense, demonstrates our commitment to ethical security practices and responsible disclosure.”
Most organizations have at least two authoritative domain name servers, but some handle so many DNS requests that they need to spread the load over additional DNS server domains. In MasterCard’s case, that number is five, so it stands to reason that if an attacker managed to seize control over just one of those domains they would only be able to see about one-fifth of the overall DNS requests coming in.
But Caturegli said the reality is that many Internet users are relying at least to some degree on public traffic forwarders or DNS resolvers like Cloudflare and Google.
“So all we need is for one of these resolvers to query our name server and cache the result,” Caturegli said. By setting their DNS server records with a long TTL or “Time To Live” — a setting that can adjust the lifespan of data packets on a network — an attacker’s poisoned instructions for the target domain can be propagated by large cloud providers.
“With a long TTL, we may reroute a LOT more than just 1/5 of the traffic,” he said.
The researcher said he’d hoped that the credit card giant might thank him, or at least offer to cover the cost of buying the domain.
“We obviously disagree with this assessment,” Caturegli wrote in a follow-up post on LinkedIn regarding MasterCard’s public statement. “But we’ll let you judge— here are some of the DNS lookups we recorded before reporting the issue.”
Caturegli posted this screenshot of MasterCard domains that were potentially at risk from the misconfigured domain.
As the screenshot above shows, the misconfigured DNS server Caturegli found involved the MasterCard subdomain az.mastercard.com. It is not clear exactly how this subdomain is used by MasterCard, however their naming conventions suggest the domains correspond to production servers at Microsoft’s Azure cloud service. Caturegli said the domains all resolve to Internet addresses at Microsoft.
“Don’t be like Mastercard,” Caturegli concluded in his LinkedIn post. “Don’t dismiss risk, and don’t let your marketing team handle security disclosures.”
One final note: The domain akam.ne has been registered previously — in December 2016 by someone using the email address um-i-delo@yandex.ru. The Russian search giant Yandex reports this user account belongs to an “Ivan I.” from Moscow. Passive DNS records from DomainTools.com show that between 2016 and 2018 the domain was connected to an Internet server in Germany, and that the domain was left to expire in 2018.
This is interesting given a comment on Caturegli’s LinkedIn post from an ex-Cloudflare employee who linked to a report he co-authored on a similar typo domain apparently registered in 2017 for organizations that may have mistyped their AWS DNS server as “awsdns-06.ne” instead of “awsdns-06.net.” DomainTools reports that this typo domain also was registered to a Yandex user (playlotto@yandex.ru), and was hosted at the same German ISP — Team Internet (AS61969).
A financial firm registered in Canada has emerged as the payment processor for dozens of Russian cryptocurrency exchanges and websites hawking cybercrime services aimed at Russian-speaking customers, new research finds. Meanwhile, an investigation into the Vancouver street address used by this company shows it is home to dozens of foreign currency dealers, money transfer businesses, and cryptocurrency exchanges — none of which are physically located there.
Richard Sanders is a blockchain analyst and investigator who advises the law enforcement and intelligence community. Sanders spent most of 2023 in Ukraine, traveling with Ukrainian soldiers while mapping the shifting landscape of Russian crypto exchanges that are laundering money for narcotics networks operating in the region.
More recently, Sanders has focused on identifying how dozens of popular cybercrime services are getting paid by their customers, and how they are converting cryptocurrency revenues into cash. For the past several months, he’s been signing up for various cybercrime services, and then tracking where their customer funds go from there.
The 122 services targeted in Sanders’ research include some of the more prominent businesses advertising on the cybercrime forums today, such as:
-abuse-friendly or “bulletproof” hosting providers like anonvm[.]wtf, and PQHosting;
-sites selling aged email, financial, or social media accounts, such as verif[.]work and kopeechka[.]store;
-anonymity or “proxy” providers like crazyrdp[.]com and rdp[.]monster;
-anonymous SMS services, including anonsim[.]net and smsboss[.]pro.
The site Verif dot work, which processes payments through Cryptomus, sells financial accounts, including debit and credit cards.
Sanders said he first encountered some of these services while investigating Kremlin-funded disinformation efforts in Ukraine, as they are all useful in assembling large-scale, anonymous social media campaigns.
According to Sanders, all 122 of the services he tested are processing transactions through a company called Cryptomus, which says it is a cryptocurrency payments platform based in Vancouver, British Columbia. Cryptomus’ website says its parent firm — Xeltox Enterprises Ltd. (formerly certa-pay[.]com) — is registered as a money service business (MSB) with the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC).
Sanders said the payment data he gathered also shows that at least 56 cryptocurrency exchanges are currently using Cryptomus to process transactions, including financial entities with names like casher[.]su, grumbot[.]com, flymoney[.]biz, obama[.]ru and swop[.]is.
These platforms are built for Russian speakers, and they each advertise the ability to anonymously swap one form of cryptocurrency for another. They also allow the exchange of cryptocurrency for cash in accounts at some of Russia’s largest banks — nearly all of which are currently sanctioned by the United States and other western nations.
A machine-translated version of Flymoney, one of dozens of cryptocurrency exchanges apparently nested at Cryptomus.
An analysis of their technology infrastructure shows that all of these exchanges use Russian email providers, and most are directly hosted in Russia or by Russia-backed ISPs with infrastructure in Europe (e.g. Selectel, Netwarm UK, Beget, Timeweb and DDoS-Guard). The analysis also showed nearly all 56 exchanges used services from Cloudflare, a global content delivery network based in San Francisco.
“Purportedly, the purpose of these platforms is for companies to accept cryptocurrency payments in exchange for goods or services,” Sanders told KrebsOnSecurity. “Unfortunately, it is next to impossible to find any goods for sale with websites using Cryptomus, and the services appear to fall into one or two different categories: Facilitating transactions with sanctioned Russian banks, and platforms providing the infrastructure and means for cyber attacks.”
Cryptomus did not respond to multiple requests for comment.
The Cryptomus website and its FINTRAC listing say the company’s registered address is Suite 170, 422 Richards St. in Vancouver, BC. This address was the subject of an investigation published in July by CTV National News and the Investigative Journalism Foundation (IJF), which documented dozens of cases across Canada where multiple MSBs are incorporated at the same address, often without the knowledge or consent of the location’s actual occupant.
This building at 422 Richards St. in downtown Vancouver is the registered address for 90 money services businesses, including 10 that have had their registrations revoked. Image: theijf.org/msb-cluster-investigation.
Their inquiry found 422 Richards St. was listed as the registered address for at least 76 foreign currency dealers, eight MSBs, and six cryptocurrency exchanges. At that address is a three-story building that used to be a bank and now houses a massage therapy clinic and a co-working space. But they found none of the MSBs or currency dealers were paying for services at that co-working space.
The reporters found another collection of 97 MSBs clustered at an address for a commercial office suite in Ontario, even though there was no evidence these companies had ever arranged for any business services at that address.
Peter German, a former deputy commissioner for the Royal Canadian Mounted Police who authored two reports on money laundering in British Columbia, told the publications it goes against the spirit of Canada’s registration requirements for such businesses, which are considered high-risk for money laundering and terrorist financing.
“If you’re able to have 70 in one building, that’s just an abuse of the whole system,” German said.
Ten MSBs registered to 422 Richard St. had their registrations revoked. One company at 422 Richards St. whose registration was revoked this year had a director with a listed address in Russia, the publications reported. “Others appear to be directed by people who are also directors of companies in Cyprus and other high-risk jurisdictions for money laundering,” they wrote.
A review of FINTRAC’s registry (.CSV) shows many of the MSBs at 422 Richards St. are international money transfer or remittance services to countries like Malaysia, India and Nigeria. Some act as currency exchanges, while others appear to sell merchant accounts and online payment services. Still, KrebsOnSecurity could find no obvious connections between the 56 Russian cryptocurrency exchanges identified by Sanders and the dozens of payment companies that FINTRAC says share an address with the Cryptomus parent firm Xeltox Enterprises.
In August 2023, Binance and some of the largest cryptocurrency exchanges responded to sanctions against Russia by cutting off many Russian banks and restricting Russian customers to transactions in Rubles only. Sanders said prior to that change, most of the exchanges currently served by Cryptomus were handling customer funds with their own self-custodial cryptocurrency wallets.
By September 2023, Sanders said he found the exchanges he was tracking had all nested themselves like Matryoshka dolls at Cryptomus, which adds a layer of obfuscation to all transactions by generating a new cryptocurrency wallet for each order.
“They all simply moved to Cryptomus,” he said. “Cryptomus generates new wallets for each order, rendering ongoing attribution to require transactions with high fees each time.”
“Exchanges like Binance and OKX removing Sberbank and other sanctioned banks and offboarding Russian users did not remove the ability of Russians to transact in and out of cryptocurrency easily,” he continued. “In fact, it’s become easier, because the instant-swap exchanges do not even have Know Your Customer rules. The U.S. sanctions resulted in the majority of Russian instant exchanges switching from their self-custodial wallets to platforms, especially Cryptomus.”
Russian President Vladimir Putin in August signed a new law legalizing cryptocurrency mining and allowing the use of cryptocurrency for international payments. The Russian government’s embrace of cryptocurrency was a remarkable pivot: Bloomberg notes that as recently as January 2022, just weeks before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the central bank proposed a blanket ban on the use and creation of cryptocurrencies.
In a report on Russia’s cryptocurrency ambitions published in September, blockchain analysis firm Chainalysis said Russia’s move to integrate crypto into its financial system may improve its ability to bypass the U.S.-led financial system and to engage in non-dollar denominated trade.
“Although it can be hard to quantify the true impact of certain sanctions actions, the fact that Russian officials have singled out the effect of sanctions on Moscow’s ability to process cross-border trade suggests that the impact felt is great enough to incite urgency to legitimize and invest in alternative payment channels it once decried,” Chainalysis assessed.
Asked about its view of activity on Cryptomus, Chainanlysis said Cryptomus has been used by criminals of all stripes for laundering money and/or the purchase of goods and services.
“We see threat actors engaged in ransomware, narcotics, darknet markets, fraud, cybercrime, sanctioned entities and jurisdictions, and hacktivism making deposits to Cryptomus for purchases but also laundering the services using Cryptomos payment API,” the company said in a statement.
It is unclear if Cryptomus and/or Xeltox Enterprises have any presence in Canada at all. A search in the United Kingdom’s Companies House registry for Xeltox’s former name — Certa Payments Ltd. — shows an entity by that name incorporated at a mail drop in London in December 2023.
The sole shareholder and director of that company is listed as a 25-year-old Ukrainian woman in the Czech Republic named Vira Krychka. Ms. Krychka was recently appointed the director of several other new U.K. firms, including an entity created in February 2024 called Globopay UAB Ltd, and another called WS Management and Advisory Corporation Ltd. Ms. Krychka did not respond to a request for comment.
WS Management and Advisory Corporation bills itself as the regulatory body that exclusively oversees licenses of cryptocurrencies in the jurisdiction of Western Sahara, a disputed territory in northwest Africa. Its website says the company assists applicants with bank setup and formation, online gaming licenses, and the creation and licensing of foreign exchange brokers. One of Certa Payments’ former websites — certa[.]website — also shared a server with 12 other domains, including rasd-state[.]ws, a website for the Central Reserve Authority of the Western Sahara.
The website crasadr dot com, the official website of the Central Reserve Authority of Western Sahara.
This business registry from the Czech Republic indicates Ms. Krychka works as a director at an advertising and marketing firm called Icon Tech SRO, which was previously named Blaven Technologies (Blaven’s website says it is an online payment service provider).
In August 2024, Icon Tech changed its name again to Mezhundarondnaya IBU SRO, which describes itself as an “experienced company in IT consulting” that is based in Armenia. The same registry says Ms. Krychka is somehow also a director at a Turkish investment venture. So much business acumen at such a young age!
For now, Canada remains an attractive location for cryptocurrency businesses to set up shop, at least on paper. The IJF and CTV News found that as of February 2024, there were just over 3,000 actively registered MSBs in Canada, 1,247 of which were located at the same building as at least one other MSB.
“That analysis does not include the roughly 2,700 MSBs whose registrations have lapsed, been revoked or otherwise stopped,” they observed. “If they are included, then a staggering 2,061 out of 5,705 total MSBs share a building with at least one other MSB.”
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Two-step verification, two-factor authentication, multi-factor authentication…whatever your social media platform calls it, it’s an excellent way to protect your accounts.
There’s a good chance you’re already using multi-factor verification with your other accounts — for your bank, your finances, your credit card, and any number of things. The way it requires an extra one-time code in addition to your login and password makes life far tougher for hackers.
It’s increasingly common to see nowadays, where all manner of online services only allow access to your accounts after you’ve provided a one-time passcode sent to your email or smartphone. That’s where two-step verification comes in. You get sent a code as part of your usual login process (usually a six-digit number), and then you enter that along with your username and password.
Some online services also offer the option to use an authenticator app, which sends the code to a secure app rather than via email or your smartphone. Authenticator apps work much in the same way, yet they offer three unique features:
Google, Microsoft, and others offer authenticator apps if you want to go that route. You can get a good list of options by checking out the “editor’s picks” at your app store or in trusted tech publications.
Whichever form of authentication you use, always keep that secure code to yourself. It’s yours and yours alone. Anyone who asks for that code, say someone masquerading as a customer service rep, is trying to scam you. With that code, and your username/password combo, they can get into your account.
Passwords and two-step verification work hand-in-hand to keep you safer. Yet not any old password will do. You’ll want a strong, unique password. Here’s how that breaks down:
Now, with strong passwords in place, you can get to setting up multi-factor verification on your social media accounts.
When you set up two-factor authentication on Facebook, you’ll be asked to choose one of three security methods:
And here’s a link to the company’s full walkthrough: https://www.facebook.com/help/148233965247823
When you set up two-factor authentication on Instagram, you’ll be asked to choose one of three security methods: an authentication app, text message, or WhatsApp.
And here’s a link to the company’s full walkthrough: https://help.instagram.com/566810106808145
And here’s a link to the company’s full walkthrough: https://faq.whatsapp.com/1920866721452534
And here’s a link to the company’s full walkthrough: https://support.google.com/accounts/answer/185839?hl=en&co=GENIE.Platform%3DDesktop
1. TapProfileat the bottom of the screen.
2. Tap the Menu button at the top.
3. Tap Settings and Privacy, then Security.
4. Tap 2-step verification and choose at least two verification methods: SMS (text), email, and authenticator app.
5. Tap Turn on to confirm.
And here’s a link to the company’s full walkthrough: https://support.tiktok.com/en/account-and-privacy/personalized-ads-and-data/how-your-phone-number-is-used-on-tiktok
The post How to Protect Your Social Media Passwords with Multi-factor Verification appeared first on McAfee Blog.
I've spent more than a decade now writing about how to make Have I Been Pwned (HIBP) fast. Really fast. Fast to the extent that sometimes, it was even too fast:
The response from each search was coming back so quickly that the user wasn’t sure if it was legitimately checking subsequent addresses they entered or if there was a glitch.
Over the years, the service has evolved to use emerging new techniques to not just make things fast, but make them scale more under load, increase availability and sometimes, even drive down cost. For example, 8 years ago now I started rolling the most important services to Azure Functions, "serverless" code that was no longer bound by logical machines and would just scale out to whatever volume of requests was thrown at it. And just last year, I turned on Cloudflare cache reserve to ensure that all cachable objects remained cached, even under conditions where they previously would have been evicted.
And now, the pièce de résistance, the coolest performance thing we've done to date (and it is now "we", thank you Stefán): just caching the whole lot at Cloudflare. Everything. Every search you do... almost. Let me explain, firstly by way of some background:
When you hit any of the services on HIBP, the first place the traffic goes from your browser is to one of Cloudflare's 330 "edge nodes":
As I sit here writing this on the Gold Coast on Australia's most eastern seaboard, any request I make to HIBP hits that edge node on the far right of the Aussie continent which is just up the road in Brisbane. The capital city of our great state of Queensland is just a short jet ski away, about 80km as the crow flies. Before now, every single time I searched HIBP from home, my request bytes would travel up the wire to Brisbane and then take a giant 12,000km trip to Seattle where the Azure Function in the West US Azure data would query the database before sending the response 12,000km back west to Cloudflare's edge node, then the final 80km down to my Surfers Paradise home. But what if it didn't have to be that way? What if that data was already sitting on the Cloudflare edge node in Brisbane? And the one in Paris, and the one in well, I'm not even sure where all those blue dots are, but what if it was everywhere? Several awesome things would happen:
In short, pushing data and processing "closer to the edge" benefits both our customers and ourselves. But how do you do that for 5 billion unique email addresses? (Note: As of today, HIBP reports over 14 billion breached accounts, the number of unique email addresses is lower as on average, each breached address has appeared in multiple breaches.) To answer this question, let's recap on how the data is queried:
Let's delve into that last point further because it's the secret sauce to how this whole caching model works. In order to provide subscribers of this service with complete anonymity over the email addresses being searched for, the only data passed to the API is the first six characters of the SHA-1 hash of the full email address. If this sounds odd, read the blog post linked to in that last bullet point for full details. The important thing for now, though, is that it means there are a total of 16^6 different possible requests that can be made to the API, which is just over 16 million. Further, we can transform the first two use cases above into k-anonymity searches on the server side as it simply involved hashing the email address and taking those first six characters.
In summary, this means we can boil the entire searchable database of email addresses down to the following:
That's a large albeit finite list, and that's what we're now caching. So, here's what a search via email address looks like:
K-anonymity searches obviously go straight to step four, skipping the first few steps as we already know the hash prefix. All of this happens in a Cloudflare worker, so it's "code on the edge" creating hashes, checking cache then retrieving from the origin where necessary. That code also takes care of handling parameters that transform queries, for example, filtering by domain or truncating the response. It's a beautiful, simple model that's all self-contained within a worker and a very simple origin API. But there's a catch - what happens when the data changes?
There are two events that can change cached data, one is simple and one is major:
The second point is kind of frustrating as we've built up this beautiful collection of data all sitting close to the consumer where it's super fast to query, and then we nuke it all and go from scratch. The problem is it's either that or we selectively purge what could be many millions of individual hash prefixes, which you can't do:
For Zones on Enterprise plan, you may purge up to 500 URLs in one API call.
And:
Cache-Tag, host, and prefix purging each have a rate limit of 30,000 purge API calls in every 24 hour period.
We're giving all this further thought, but it's a non-trivial problem and a full cache flush is both easy and (near) instantaneous.
Enough words, let's get to some pictures! Here's a typical week of queries to the enterprise k-anonymity API:
This is a very predictable pattern, largely due to one particular subscriber regularly querying their entire customer base each day. (Sidenote: most of our enterprise level subscribers use callbacks such that we push updates to them via webhook when a new breach impacts their customers.) That's the total volume of inbound requests, but the really interesting bit is the requests that hit the origin (blue) versus those served directly by Cloudflare (orange):
Let's take the lowest blue data point towards the end of the graph as an example:
At that time, 96% of requests were served from Cloudflare's edge. Awesome! But look at it only a little bit later:
That's when I flushed cache for the Finsure breach, and 100% of traffic started being directed to the origin. (We're still seeing 14.24k hits via Cloudflare as, inevitably, some requests in that 1-hour block were to the same hash range and were served from cache.) It then took a whole 20 hours for the cache to repopulate to the extent that the hit:miss ratio returned to about 50:50:
Look back towards the start of the graph and you can see the same pattern from when I loaded the DemandScience breach. This all does pretty funky things to our origin API:
That last sudden increase is more than a 30x traffic increase in an instant! If we hadn't been careful about how we managed the origin infrastructure, we would have built a literal DDoS machine. Stefán will write later about how we manage the underlying database to ensure this doesn't happen, but even still, whilst we're dealing with the cyclical support patterns seen in that first graph above, I know that the best time to load a breach is later in the Aussie afternoon when the traffic is a third of what it is first thing in the morning. This helps smooth out the rate of requests to the origin such that by the time the traffic is ramping up, more of the content can be returned directly from Cloudflare. You can see that in the graphs above; that big peaky block towards the end of the last graph is pretty steady, even though the inbound traffic the first graph over the same period of time increases quite significantly. It's like we're trying to race the increasing inbound traffic by building ourselves up a bugger in cache.
Here's another angle to this whole thing: now more than ever, loading a data breach costs us money. For example, by the end of the graphs above, we were cruising along at a 50% cache hit ratio, which meant we were only paying for half as many of the Azure Function executions, egress bandwidth, and underlying SQL database as we would have been otherwise. Flushing cache and suddenly sending all the traffic to the origin doubles our cost. Waiting until we're back at 90% cache it ratio literally increases those costs 10x when we flush. If I were to be completely financially ruthless about it, I would need to either load fewer breaches or bulk them together such that a cache flush is only ejecting a small amount of data anyway, but clearly, that's not what I've been doing 😄
There's just one remaining fly in the ointment...
Of those three methods of querying email addresses, the first is a no-brainer: searches from the front page of the website hit a Cloudflare Worker where it validates the Turnstile token and returns a result. Easy. However, the second two models (the public and enterprise APIs) have the added burden of validating the API key against Azure API Management (APIM), and the only place that exists is in the West US origin service. What this means for those endpoints is that before we can return search results from a location that may be just a short jet ski ride away, we need to go all the way to the other side of the world to validate the key and ensure the request is within the rate limit. We do this in the lightest possible way with barely any data transiting the request to check the key, plus we do it in async with pulling the data back from the origin service if it isn't already in cache. In other words, we're as efficient as humanly possible, but we still cop a massive latency burden.
Doing API management at the origin is super frustrating, but there are really only two alternatives. The first is to distribute our APIM instance to other Azure data centres, and the problem with that is we need a Premium instance of the product. We presently run on a Basic instance, which means we're talking about a 19x increase in price just to unlock that ability. But that's just to go Premium; we then need at least one more instance somewhere else for this to make sense, which means we're talking about a 28x increase. And every region we add amplifies that even further. It's a financial non-starter.
The second option is for Cloudflare to build an API management product. This is the killer piece of this puzzle, as it would put all the checks and balances within the one edge node. It's a suggestion I've put forward on many occasions now, and who knows, maybe it's already in the works, but it's a suggestion I make out of a love of what the company does and a desire to go all-in on having them control the flow of our traffic. I did get a suggestion this week about rolling what is effectively a "poor man's API management" within workers, and it's a really cool suggestion, but it gets hard when people change plans or when we want to apply quotas to APIs rather than rate limits. So c'mon Cloudflare, let's make this happen!
Finally, just one more stat on how powerful serving content directly from the edge is: I shared this stat last month for Pwned Passwords which serves well over 99% of requests from Cloudflare's cache reserve:
There it is - we’ve now passed 10,000,000,000 requests to Pwned Password in 30 days 😮 This is made possible with @Cloudflare’s support, massively edge caching the data to make it super fast and highly available for everyone. pic.twitter.com/kw3C9gsHmB
— Troy Hunt (@troyhunt) October 5, 2024
That's about 3,900 requests per second, on average, non-stop for 30 days. It's obviously way more than that at peak; just a quick glance through the last month and it looks like about 17k requests per second in a one-minute period a few weeks ago:
But it doesn't matter how high it is, because I never even think about it. I set up the worker, I turned on cache reserve, and that's it 😎
I hope you've enjoyed this post, Stefán and I will be doing a live stream on this topic at 06:00 AEST Friday morning for this week's regular video update, and it'll be available for replay immediately after. It's also embedded here for convenience:
Most accomplished cybercriminals go out of their way to separate their real names from their hacker handles. But among certain old-school Russian hackers it is not uncommon to find major players who have done little to prevent people from figuring out who they are in real life. A case study in this phenomenon is “x999xx,” the nickname chosen by a venerated Russian hacker who specializes in providing the initial network access to various ransomware groups.
x999xx is a well-known “access broker” who frequently sells access to hacked corporate networks — usually in the form of remote access credentials — as well as compromised databases containing large amounts of personal and financial data.
In an analysis published in February 2019, cyber intelligence firm Flashpoint called x999xx one of the most senior and prolific members of the top-tier Russian-language cybercrime forum Exploit, where x999xx could be seen frequently advertising the sale of stolen databases and network credentials.
In August 2023, x999xx sold access to a company that develops software for the real estate industry. In July 2023, x999xx advertised the sale of Social Security numbers, names, and birthdays for the citizenry of an entire U.S. state (unnamed in the auction).
A month earlier, x999xx posted a sales thread for 80 databases taken from Australia’s largest retail company. “You may use this data to demand a ransom or do something different with it,” x999xx wrote on Exploit. “Unfortunately, the flaw was patched fast. [+] no one has used the data yet [+] the data hasn’t been used to send spam [+] the data is waiting for its time.”
In October 2022, x999xx sold administrative access to a U.S. healthcare provider.
The oldest account by the name x999xx appeared in 2009 on the Russian language cybercrime forum Verified, under the email address maxnm@ozersk.com. Ozersk is a city in the Chelyabinsk region of west-central Russia.
According to the breach tracking service Constella Intelligence, the address maxnm@ozersk.com was used more than a decade ago to create an account at Vktontakte (the Russian answer to Facebook) under the name Maxim Kirtsov from Ozersk. Mr. Kirtsov’s profile — “maxnm” — says his birthday is September 5, 1991.
Personal photos Maxnm shared on Vktontakte in 2016. The caption has been machine translated from Russian.
The user x999xx registered on the Russian language cybercrime community Zloy in 2014 using the email address maxnmalias-1@yahoo.com. Constella says this email address was used in 2022 at the Russian shipping service cdek.ru by a Maksim Georgievich Kirtsov from Ozersk.
Additional searches on these contact details reveal that prior to 2009, x999xx favored the handle Maxnm on Russian cybercrime forums. Cyber intelligence company Intel 471 finds the user Maxnm registered on Zloy in 2006 from an Internet address in Chelyabinsk, using the email address kirtsov@telecom.ozersk.ru.
That same email address was used to create Maxnm accounts on several other crime forums, including Spamdot and Exploit in 2005 (also from Chelyabinsk), and Damagelab in 2006.
A search in Constella for the Russian version of Kirtsov’s full name — Кирцов Максим Георгиевич — brings up multiple accounts registered to maksya@icloud.com.
A review of the digital footprint for maksya@icloud.com at osint.industries reveals this address was used a decade ago to register a still-active account at imageshack.com under the name x999xx. That account features numerous screenshots of financial statements from various banks, chat logs with other hackers, and even hacked websites.
x999xx’s Imageshack account includes screenshots of bank account balances from dozens of financial institutions, as well as chat logs with other hackers and pictures of homegrown weed.
Some of the photos in that Imageshack account also appear on Kirtsov’s Vkontakte page, including images of vehicles he owns, as well as pictures of potted marijuana plants. Kirtsov’s Vkontakte profile says that in 2012 he was a faculty member of the Ozersk Technological Institute National Research Nuclear University.
The Vkontakte page lists Kirtsov’s occupation as a website called ozersk[.]today, which on the surface appears to be a blog about life in Ozersk. However, in 2019 the security firm Recorded Future published a blog post which found this domain was being used to host a malicious Cobalt Strike server.
Cobalt Strike is a commercial network penetration testing and reconnaissance tool that is sold only to vetted partners. But stolen or ill-gotten Cobalt Strike licenses are frequently abused by cybercriminal gangs to help lay the groundwork for the installation of ransomware on a victim network.
In August 2023, x999xx posted a message on Exploit saying he was interested in buying a licensed version of Cobalt Strike. A month earlier, x999xx filed a complaint on Exploit against another forum member named Cobaltforce, an apparent onetime partner whose sudden and prolonged disappearance from the community left x999xx and others in the lurch. Cobaltforce recruited people experienced in using Cobalt Strike for ransomware operations, and offered to monetize access to hacked networks for a share of the profits.
DomainTools.com finds ozersk[.]today was registered to the email address dashin2008@yahoo.com, which also was used to register roughly two dozen other domains, including x999xx[.]biz. Virtually all of those domains were registered to Maxim Kirtsov from Ozersk. Below is a mind map used to track the identities mentioned in this story.
A visual depiction of the data points connecting x999xx to Max Kirtsov.
x999xx is a prolific member of the Russian webmaster forum “Gofuckbiz,” with more than 2,000 posts over nearly a decade, according to Intel 471. In one post from 2016, x999xx asked whether anyone knew where he could buy a heat lamp that simulates sunlight, explaining that one his pet rabbits had recently perished for lack of adequate light and heat. Mr. Kirtsov’s Vkontakte page includes several pictures of caged rabbits from 2015 and earlier.
Reached via email, Mr. Kirtsov acknowledged that he is x999xx. Kirtsov said he and his team are also regular readers of KrebsOnSecurity.
“We’re glad to hear and read you,” Kirtsov replied.
Asked whether he was concerned about the legal and moral implications of his work, Kirtsov downplayed his role in ransomware intrusions, saying he was more focused on harvesting data.
“I consider myself as committed to ethical practices as you are,” Kirtsov wrote. “I have also embarked on research and am currently mentoring students. You may have noticed my activities on a forum, which I assume you know of through information gathered from public sources, possibly using the new tool you reviewed.”
“Regarding my posts about selling access, I must honestly admit, upon reviewing my own actions, I recall such mentions but believe they were never actualized,” he continued. “Many use the forum for self-serving purposes, which explains why listings of targets for sale have dwindled — they simply ceased being viable.”
Kirtsov asserted that he is not interested in harming healthcare institutions, just in stealing their data.
“As for health-related matters, I was once acquainted with affluent webmasters who would pay up to $50 for every 1000 health-themed emails,” Kirtsov said. “Therefore, I had no interest in the more sensitive data from medical institutions like X-rays, insurance numbers, or even names; I focused solely on emails. I am proficient in SQL, hence my ease with handling data like IDs and emails. And i never doing spam or something like this.”
On the Russian crime forums, x999xx said he never targets anything or anyone in Russia, and that he has little to fear from domestic law enforcement agencies provided he remains focused on foreign adversaries.
x999xx’s lackadaisical approach to personal security mirrors that of Wazawaka, another top Russian access broker who sold access to countless organizations and even operated his own ransomware affiliate programs.
“Don’t shit where you live, travel local, and don’t go abroad,” Wazawaka said of his own personal mantra. “Mother Russia will help you. Love your country, and you will always get away with everything.”
In January 2022, KrebsOnSecurity followed clues left behind by Wazawaka to identify him as 32-year-old Mikhail Matveev from Khakassia, Russia. In May 2023, the U.S. Department of Justice indicted Matveev as a key figure in several ransomware groups that collectively extorted hundreds of millions of dollars from victim organizations. The U.S. State Department is offering a $10 million reward for information leading to the capture and/or prosecution of Matveev.
Perhaps in recognition that many top ransomware criminals are largely untouchable so long as they remain in Russia, western law enforcement agencies have begun focusing more on getting inside the heads of those individuals. These so-called “psyops” are aimed at infiltrating ransomware-as-a-service operations, disrupting major cybercrime services, and decreasing trust within cybercriminal communities.
When authorities in the U.S. and U.K. announced in February 2024 that they’d infiltrated and seized the infrastructure used by the infamous LockBit ransomware gang, they borrowed the existing design of LockBit’s victim shaming website to link instead to press releases about the takedown, and included a countdown timer that was eventually replaced with the personal details of LockBit’s alleged leader.
In May 2024, law enforcement agencies in the United States and Europe announced Operation Endgame, a coordinated action against some of the most popular cybercrime platforms for delivering ransomware and data-stealing malware. The Operation Endgame website also included a countdown timer, which served to tease the release of several animated videos that mimic the same sort of flashy, short advertisements that established cybercriminals often produce to promote their services online.
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A tool to find a company (target) infrastructure, files, and apps on the top cloud providers (Amazon, Google, Microsoft, DigitalOcean, Alibaba, Vultr, Linode). The outcome is useful for bug bounty hunters, red teamers, and penetration testers alike.
The complete writeup is available. here
we are always thinking of something we can automate to make black-box security testing easier. We discussed this idea of creating a multiple platform cloud brute-force hunter.mainly to find open buckets, apps, and databases hosted on the clouds and possibly app behind proxy servers.
Here is the list issues on previous approaches we tried to fix:
Microsoft: - Storage - Apps
Amazon: - Storage - Apps
Google: - Storage - Apps
DigitalOcean: - storage
Vultr: - Storage
Linode: - Storage
Alibaba: - Storage
1.0.0
Just download the latest release for your operation system and follow the usage.
To make the best use of this tool, you have to understand how to configure it correctly. When you open your downloaded version, there is a config folder, and there is a config.YAML file in there.
It looks like this
providers: ["amazon","alibaba","amazon","microsoft","digitalocean","linode","vultr","google"] # supported providers
environments: [ "test", "dev", "prod", "stage" , "staging" , "bak" ] # used for mutations
proxytype: "http" # socks5 / http
ipinfo: "" # IPINFO.io API KEY
For IPINFO API, you can register and get a free key at IPINFO, the environments used to generate URLs, such as test-keyword.target.region and test.keyword.target.region, etc.
We provided some wordlist out of the box, but it's better to customize and minimize your wordlists (based on your recon) before executing the tool.
After setting up your API key, you are ready to use CloudBrute.
██████╗██╗ ██████╗ ██╗ ██╗██████╗ ██████╗ ██████╗ ██╗ ██╗████████╗███████╗
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╚██████╗███████╗╚██████╔╝╚██████╔╝██████╔╝██████╔╝██║ ██║╚██████╔╝ ██║ ███████╗
╚═════╝╚══════╝ ╚═════╝ ╚═════╝ ╚═════╝ ╚═════╝ ╚═╝ ╚═╝ ╚═════╝ ╚═╝ ╚══════╝
V 1.0.7
usage: CloudBrute [-h|--help] -d|--domain "<value>" -k|--keyword "<value>"
-w|--wordlist "<value>" [-c|--cloud "<value>"] [-t|--threads
<integer>] [-T|--timeout <integer>] [-p|--proxy "<value>"]
[-a|--randomagent "<value>"] [-D|--debug] [-q|--quite]
[-m|--mode "<value>"] [-o|--output "<value>"]
[-C|--configFolder "<value>"]
Awesome Cloud Enumerator
Arguments:
-h --help Print help information
-d --domain domain
-k --keyword keyword used to generator urls
-w --wordlist path to wordlist
-c --cloud force a search, check config.yaml providers list
-t --threads number of threads. Default: 80
-T --timeout timeout per request in seconds. Default: 10
-p --proxy use proxy list
-a --randomagent user agent randomization
-D --debug show debug logs. Default: false
-q --quite suppress all output. Default: false
-m --mode storage or app. Default: storage
-o --output Output file. Default: out.txt
-C --configFolder Config path. Default: config
for example
CloudBrute -d target.com -k target -m storage -t 80 -T 10 -w "./data/storage_small.txt"
please note -k keyword used to generate URLs, so if you want the full domain to be part of mutation, you have used it for both domain (-d) and keyword (-k) arguments
If a cloud provider not detected or want force searching on a specific provider, you can use -c option.
CloudBrute -d target.com -k keyword -m storage -t 80 -T 10 -w -c amazon -o target_output.txt
Read the usage.
Make sure you read the usage correctly, and if you think you found a bug open an issue.
It's because you use public proxies, use private and higher quality proxies. You can use ProxyFor to verify the good proxies with your chosen provider.
change -T (timeout) option to get best results for your run.
Inspired by every single repo listed here .
The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) today said they arrested the alleged operator of 911 S5, a ten-year-old online anonymity service that was powered by what the director of the FBI called “likely the world’s largest botnet ever.” The arrest coincided with the seizure of the 911 S5 website and supporting infrastructure, which the government says turned computers running various “free VPN” products into Internet traffic relays that facilitated billions of dollars in online fraud and cybercrime.
The Cloud Router homepage, which was seized by the FBI this past weekend. Cloud Router was previously called 911 S5.
On May 24, authorities in Singapore arrested the alleged creator and operator of 911 S5, a 35-year-old Chinese national named YunHe Wang. In a statement on his arrest today, the DOJ said 911 S5 enabled cybercriminals to bypass financial fraud detection systems and steal billions of dollars from financial institutions, credit card issuers, and federal lending programs.
For example, the government estimates that 560,000 fraudulent unemployment insurance claims originated from compromised Internet addresses, resulting in a confirmed fraudulent loss exceeding $5.9 billion.
“Additionally, in evaluating suspected fraud loss to the Economic Injury Disaster Loan (EIDL) program, the United States estimates that more than 47,000 EIDL applications originated from IP addresses compromised by 911 S5,” the DOJ wrote. “Millions of dollars more were similarly identified by financial institutions in the United States as loss originating from IP addresses compromised by 911 S5.”
From 2015 to July 2022, 911 S5 sold access to hundreds of thousands of Microsoft Windows computers daily, as “proxies” that allowed customers to route their Internet traffic through PCs in virtually any country or city around the globe — but predominantly in the United States.
911 S5 built its proxy network mainly by offering “free” virtual private networking (VPN) services. 911’s VPN performed largely as advertised for the user — allowing them to surf the web anonymously — but it also quietly turned the user’s computer into a traffic relay for paying 911 S5 customers.
911 S5’s reliability and extremely low prices quickly made it one of the most popular services among denizens of the cybercrime underground, and the service became almost shorthand for connecting to that “last mile” of cybercrime. Namely, the ability to route one’s malicious traffic through a computer that is geographically close to the consumer whose stolen credit card is about to be used, or whose bank account is about to be emptied.
The prices page for 911 S5, circa July 2022. $28 would let users cycle through 150 proxies on this popular service.
KrebsOnSecurity first identified Mr. Wang as the proprietor of the popular service in a deep dive on 911 S5 published in July 2022. That story showed that 911 S5 had a history of paying people to install its software by secretly bundling it with other software — including fake security updates for common programs like Flash Player, and “cracked” or pirated commercial software distributed on file-sharing networks.
Ten days later, 911 S5 closed up shop, claiming it had been hacked. But experts soon tracked the reemergence of the proxy network by another name: Cloud Router.
The announcement of Wang’s arrest came less than 24 hours after the U.S. Department of the Treasury sanctioned Wang and two associates, as well as several companies the men allegedly used to launder the nearly $100 million in proceeds from 911 S5 and Cloud Router customers.
Cloud Router’s homepage now features a notice saying the domain has been seized by the U.S. government. In addition, the DOJ says it worked with authorities in Singapore, Thailand and Germany to search residences tied to the defendant, and seized approximately $30 million in assets.
The Cloud Router homepage now features a seizure notice from the FBI in multiple languages.
Those assets included a 2022 Ferrari F8 Spider S-A, a BMW i8, a BMW X7 M50d, a Rolls Royce, more than a dozen domestic and international bank accounts, over two dozen cryptocurrency wallets, several luxury wristwatches, and 21 residential or investment properties.
The government says Wang is charged with conspiracy to commit computer fraud, substantive computer fraud, conspiracy to commit wire fraud, and conspiracy to commit money laundering. If convicted on all counts, he faces a maximum penalty of 65 years in prison.
Brett Leatherman, deputy assistant director of the FBI’s Cyber Division, said the DOJ is working with the Singaporean government on extraditing Wang to face charges in the United States.
Leatherman encouraged Internet users to visit a new FBI webpage that can help people determine whether their computers may be part of the 911 S5 botnet, which the government says spanned more than 19 million individual computers in at least 190 countries.
Leatherman said 911 S5 and Cloud Router used several “free VPN” brands to lure consumers into installing the proxy service, including MaskVPN, DewVPN, PaladinVPN, Proxygate, Shield VPN, and ShineVPN.
“American citizens who didn’t know that their IP space was being utilized to attack US businesses or defraud the U.S. government, they were unaware,” Leatherman said. “But these kind of operations breed that awareness.”
Last week, the United States joined the U.K. and Australia in sanctioning and charging a Russian man named Dmitry Yuryevich Khoroshev as the leader of the infamous LockBit ransomware group. LockBit’s leader “LockBitSupp” claims the feds named the wrong guy, saying the charges don’t explain how they connected him to Khoroshev. This post examines the activities of Khoroshev’s many alter egos on the cybercrime forums, and tracks the career of a gifted malware author who has written and sold malicious code for the past 14 years.
Dmitry Yuryevich Khoroshev. Image: treasury.gov.
On May 7, the U.S. Department of Justice indicted Khoroshev on 26 criminal counts, including extortion, wire fraud, and conspiracy. The government alleges Khoroshev created, sold and used the LockBit ransomware strain to personally extort more than $100 million from hundreds of victim organizations, and that LockBit as a group extorted roughly half a billion dollars over four years.
Federal investigators say Khoroshev ran LockBit as a “ransomware-as-a-service” operation, wherein he kept 20 percent of any ransom amount paid by a victim organization infected with his code, with the remaining 80 percent of the payment going to LockBit affiliates responsible for spreading the malware.
Financial sanctions levied against Khoroshev by the U.S. Department of the Treasury listed his known email and street address (in Voronezh, in southwest Russia), passport number, and even his tax ID number (hello, Russian tax authorities). The Treasury filing says Khoroshev used the emails sitedev5@yandex.ru, and khoroshev1@icloud.com.
According to DomainTools.com, the address sitedev5@yandex.ru was used to register at least six domains, including a Russian business registered in Khoroshev’s name called tkaner.com, which is a blog about clothing and fabrics.
A search at the breach-tracking service Constella Intelligence on the phone number in Tkaner’s registration records — 7.9521020220 — brings up multiple official Russian government documents listing the number’s owner as Dmitri Yurievich Khoroshev.
Another domain registered to that phone number was stairwell[.]ru, which at one point advertised the sale of wooden staircases. Constella finds that the email addresses webmaster@stairwell.ru and admin@stairwell.ru used the password 225948.
DomainTools reports that stairwell.ru for several years included the registrant’s name as “Dmitrij Ju Horoshev,” and the email address pin@darktower.su. According to Constella, this email address was used in 2010 to register an account for a Dmitry Yurievich Khoroshev from Voronezh, Russia at the hosting provider firstvds.ru.
Image: Shutterstock.
Cyber intelligence firm Intel 471 finds that pin@darktower.ru was used by a Russian-speaking member called Pin on the English-language cybercrime forum Opensc. Pin was active on Opensc around March 2012, and authored 13 posts that mostly concerned data encryption issues, or how to fix bugs in code.
Other posts concerned custom code Pin claimed to have written that would bypass memory protections on Windows XP and Windows 7 systems, and inject malware into memory space normally allocated to trusted applications on a Windows machine.
Pin also was active at that same time on the Russian-language security forum Antichat, where they told fellow forum members to contact them at the ICQ instant messenger number 669316.
A search on the ICQ number 669316 at Intel 471 shows that in April 2011, a user by the name NeroWolfe joined the Russian cybercrime forum Zloy using the email address d.horoshev@gmail.com, and from an Internet address in Voronezh, RU.
Constella finds the same password tied to webmaster@stairwell.ru (225948) was used by the email address 3k@xakep.ru, which Intel 471 says was registered to more than a dozen NeroWolfe accounts across just as many Russian cybercrime forums between 2011 and 2015.
NeroWolfe’s introductory post to the forum Verified in Oct. 2011 said he was a system administrator and C++ coder.
“Installing SpyEYE, ZeuS, any DDoS and spam admin panels,” NeroWolfe wrote. This user said they specialize in developing malware, creating computer worms, and crafting new ways to hijack Web browsers.
“I can provide my portfolio on request,” NeroWolfe wrote. “P.S. I don’t modify someone else’s code or work with someone else’s frameworks.”
In April 2013, NeroWolfe wrote in a private message to another Verified forum user that he was selling a malware “loader” program that could bypass all of the security protections on Windows XP and Windows 7.
“The access to the network is slightly restricted,” NeroWolfe said of the loader, which he was selling for $5,000. “You won’t manage to bind a port. However, it’s quite possible to send data. The code is written in C.”
In an October 2013 discussion on the cybercrime forum Exploit, NeroWolfe weighed in on the karmic ramifications of ransomware. At the time, ransomware-as-a-service didn’t exist yet, and many members of Exploit were still making good money from “lockers,” relatively crude programs that locked the user out of their system until they agreed to make a small payment (usually a few hundred dollars via prepaid Green Dot cards).
Lockers, which presaged the coming ransomware scourge, were generally viewed by the Russian-speaking cybercrime forums as harmless moneymaking opportunities, because they usually didn’t seek to harm the host computer or endanger files on the system. Also, there were still plenty of locker programs that aspiring cybercriminals could either buy or rent to make a steady income.
NeroWolfe reminded forum denizens that they were just as vulnerable to ransomware attacks as their would-be victims, and that what goes around comes around.
“Guys, do you have a conscience?,” NeroWolfe wrote. “Okay, lockers, network gopstop aka business in Russian. The last thing was always squeezed out of the suckers. But encoders, no one is protected from them, including the local audience.”
If Khoroshev was ever worried that someone outside of Russia might be able to connect his early hacker handles to his real life persona, that’s not clear from reviewing his history online. In fact, the same email address tied to so many of NeroWolfe’s accounts on the forums — 3k@xakep.ru — was used in 2011 to create an account for a Dmitry Yurevich Khoroshev on the Russian social media network Vkontakte.
NeroWolfe seems to have abandoned all of his forum accounts sometime in 2016. In November 2016, an exploit[.]ru member filed an official complaint against NeroWolfe, saying NeroWolfe had been paid $2,000 to produce custom code but never finished the project and vanished.
It’s unclear what happened to NeroWolfe or to Khoroshev during this time. Maybe he got arrested, or some close associates did. Perhaps he just decided it was time to lay low and hit the reset on his operational security efforts, given his past failures in this regard. It’s also possible NeroWolfe landed a real job somewhere for a few years, fathered a child, and/or had to put his cybercrime career on hold.
Or perhaps Khoroshev saw the coming ransomware industry for the endless pot of gold that it was about to become, and then dedicated himself to working on custom ransomware code. That’s what the government believes.
The indictment against Khoroshev says he used the hacker nickname Putinkrab, and Intel 471 says this corresponds to a username that was first registered across three major Russian cybercrime forums in early 2019.
KrebsOnSecurity could find no obvious connections between Putinkrab and any of Khoroshev’s older identities. However, if Putinkrab was Khoroshev, he would have learned from his past mistakes and started fresh with a new identity (which he did). But also, it is likely the government hasn’t shared all of the intelligence it has collected against him (more on that in a bit).
Putinkrab’s first posts on the Russian cybercrime forums XSS, Exploit and UFOLabs saw this user selling ransomware source code written in C.
A machine-translated ad for ransomware source code from Putinkrab on the Russian language cybercrime forum UFOlabs in 2019. Image: Ke-la.com.
In April 2019, Putkinkrab offered an affiliate program that would run on top of his custom-made ransomware code.
“I want to work for a share of the ransoms: 20/80,” Putinkrab wrote on Exploit. “20 percent is my percentage for the work, you get 80% of the ransoms. The percentage can be reduced up to 10/90 if the volumes are good. But now, temporarily, until the service is fully automated, we are working using a different algorithm.”
Throughout the summer of 2019, Putinkrab posted multiple updates to Exploit about new features being added to his ransomware strain, as well as novel evasion techniques to avoid detection by security tools. He also told forum members he was looking for investors for a new ransomware project based on his code.
In response to an Exploit member who complained that the security industry was making it harder to profit from ransomware, Putinkrab said that was because so many cybercriminals were relying on crappy ransomware code.
“The vast majority of top antiviruses have acquired behavioral analysis, which blocks 95% of crypto-lockers at their root,” Putinkrab wrote. “Cryptolockers made a lot of noise in the press, but lazy system administrators don’t make backups after that. The vast majority of cryptolockers are written by people who have little understanding of cryptography. Therefore, decryptors appear on the Internet, and with them the hope that files can be decrypted without paying a ransom. They just sit and wait. Contact with the owner of the key is lost over time.”
Putinkrab said he had every confidence his ransomware code was a game-changer, and a huge money machine.
“The game is just gaining momentum,” Putinkrab wrote. “Weak players lose and are eliminated.”
The rest of his response was structured like a poem:
“In this world, the strongest survive.
Our life is just a struggle.
The winner will be the smartest,
Who has his head on his shoulders.”
Putinkrab’s final post came on August 23, 2019. The Justice Department says the LockBit ransomware affiliate program was officially launched five months later. From there on out, the government says, Khoroshev adopted the persona of LockBitSupp. In his introductory post on Exploit, LockBit’s mastermind said the ransomware strain had been in development since September 2019.
The original LockBit malware was written in C (a language that NeroWolfe excelled at). Here’s the original description of LockBit, from its maker:
“The software is written in C and Assembler; encryption is performed through the I/O Completion Port; there is a port scanning local networks and an option to find all DFS, SMB, WebDAV network shares, an admin panel in Tor, automatic test decryption; a decryption tool is provided; there is a chat with Push notifications, a Jabber bot that forwards correspondence and an option to terminate services/processes in line which prevent the ransomware from opening files at a certain moment. The ransomware sets file permissions and removes blocking attributes, deletes shadow copies, clears logs and mounts hidden partitions; there is an option to drag-and-drop files/folders and a console/hidden mode. The ransomware encrypts files in parts in various places: the larger the file size, the more parts there are. The algorithms used are AES + RSA.
You are the one who determines the ransom amount after communicating with the victim. The ransom paid in any currency that suits you will be transferred to your wallets. The Jabber bot serves as an admin panel and is used for banning, providing decryption tools, chatting – Jabber is used for absolutely everything.”
Does the above timeline prove that NeroWolfe/Khoroshev is LockBitSupp? No. However, it does indicate Khoroshev was for many years deeply invested in countless schemes involving botnets, stolen data, and malware he wrote that others used to great effect. NeroWolfe’s many private messages from fellow forum members confirm this.
NeroWolfe’s specialty was creating custom code that employed novel stealth and evasion techniques, and he was always quick to volunteer his services on the forums whenever anyone was looking help on a malware project that called for a strong C or C++ programmer.
Someone with those qualifications — as well as demonstrated mastery of data encryption and decryption techniques — would have been in great demand by the ransomware-as-a-service industry that took off at around the same time NeroWolfe vanished from the forums.
Someone like that who is near or at the top of their game vis-a-vis their peers does not simply walk away from that level of influence, community status, and potential income stream unless forced to do so by circumstances beyond their immediate control.
It’s important to note that Putinkrab didn’t just materialize out of thin air in 2019 — suddenly endowed with knowledge about how to write advanced, stealthy ransomware strains. That knowledge clearly came from someone who’d already had years of experience building and deploying ransomware strains against real-life victim organizations.
Thus, whoever Putinkrab was before they adopted that moniker, it’s a safe bet they were involved in the development and use of earlier, highly successful ransomware strains. One strong possible candidate is Cerber ransomware, the most popular and effective affiliate program operating between early 2016 and mid-2017. Cerber thrived because it emerged as an early mover in the market for ransomware-as-a-service offerings.
In February 2024, the FBI seized LockBit’s cybercrime infrastructure on the dark web, following an apparently lengthy infiltration of the group’s operations. The United States has already indicted and sanctioned at least five other alleged LockBit ringleaders or affiliates, so presumably the feds have been able to draw additional resources from those investigations.
Also, it seems likely that the three national intelligence agencies involved in bringing these charges are not showing all of their cards. For example, the Treasury documents on Khoroshev mention a single cryptocurrency address, and yet experts interviewed for this story say there are no obvious clues connecting this address to Khoroshev or Putinkrab.
But given that LockBitSupp has been actively involved in Lockbit ransomware attacks against organizations for four years now, the government almost certainly has an extensive list of the LockBit leader’s various cryptocurrency addresses — and probably even his bank accounts in Russia. And no doubt the money trail from some of those transactions was traceable to its ultimate beneficiary (or close enough).
Not long after Khoroshev was charged as the leader of LockBit, a number of open-source intelligence accounts on Telegram began extending the information released by the Treasury Department. Within hours, these sleuths had unearthed more than a dozen credit card accounts used by Khoroshev over the past decade, as well as his various bank account numbers in Russia.
The point is, this post is based on data that’s available to and verifiable by KrebsOnSecurity. Woodward & Bernstein’s source in the Watergate investigation — Deep Throat — famously told the two reporters to “follow the money.” This is always excellent advice. But these days, that can be a lot easier said than done — especially with people who a) do not wish to be found, and b) don’t exactly file annual reports.
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