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WebCopilot is an automation tool designed to enumerate subdomains of the target and detect bugs using different open-source tools.
The script first enumerate all the subdomains of the given target domain using assetfinder, sublister, subfinder, amass, findomain, hackertarget, riddler and crt then do active subdomain enumeration using gobuster from SecLists wordlist then filters out all the live subdomains using dnsx then it extract titles of the subdomains using httpx & scans for subdomain takeover using subjack. Then it uses gauplus & waybackurls to crawl all the endpoints of the given subdomains then it use gf patterns to filters out xss, lfi, ssrf, sqli, open redirect & rce parameters from that given subdomains, and then it scans for vulnerabilities on the sub domains using different open-source tools (like kxss, dalfox, openredirex, nuclei, etc). Then it'll print out the result of the scan and save all the output in a specified directory.
FreshRSS 
g!2m0:~ webcopilot -h
βββββββββββββββββ
ββββββββββββββββββ
ββββββββββββββββββββββ
ββββββββββββ¬βββββββββββ
βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ
ββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ
βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ¦βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ
ββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ βββββββββββββββββββββ
βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ¦βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ
βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ ββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ
[β] @h4r5h1t.hrs | G!2m0
Usage:
webcopilot -d <target>
webcopilot -d <target> -s
webcopilot [-d target] [-o output destination] [-t threads] [-b blind server URL] [-x exclude domains]
Flags:
-d Add your target [Requried]
-o To save outputs in folder [Default: domain.com]
-t Number of threads [Default: 100]
-b Add your server for BXSS [Default: False]
-x Exclude out of scope domains [Default: False]
-s Run only Subdomain Enumeration [Default: False]
-h Show this help message
Example: webcopilot -d domain.com -o domain -t 333 -x exclude.txt -b testServer.xss
Use https://xsshunter.com/ or https://interact.projectdiscovery.io/ to get your serverWebCopilot requires git to install successfully. Run the following command as a root to install webcopilot
git clone https://github.com/h4r5h1t/webcopilot && cd webcopilot/ && chmod +x webcopilot install.sh && mv webcopilot /usr/bin/ && ./install.shSubFinder β’ Sublist3r β’ Findomain β’ gf β’ OpenRedireX β’ dnsx β’ sqlmap β’ gobuster β’ assetfinder β’ httpx β’ kxss β’ qsreplace β’ Nuclei β’ dalfox β’ anew β’ jq β’ aquatone β’ urldedupe β’ Amass β’ gauplus β’ waybackurls β’ crlfuzz
To run the tool on a target, just use the following command.
g!2m0:~ webcopilot -d bugcrowd.comThe -o command can be used to specify an output dir.
g!2m0:~ webcopilot -d bugcrowd.com -o bugcrowdThe -s command can be used for only subdomain enumerations (Active + Passive and also get title & screenshots).
g!2m0:~ webcopilot -d bugcrowd.com -o bugcrowd -s The -t command can be used to add thrads to your scan for faster result.
g!2m0:~ webcopilot -d bugcrowd.com -o bugcrowd -t 333 The -b command can be used for blind xss (OOB), you can get your server from xsshunter or interact
g!2m0:~ webcopilot -d bugcrowd.com -o bugcrowd -t 333 -b testServer.xssThe -x command can be used to exclude out of scope domains.
g!2m0:~ echo out.bugcrowd.com > excludeDomain.txt
g!2m0:~ webcopilot -d bugcrowd.com -o bugcrowd -t 333 -x excludeDomain.txt -b testServer.xssDefault options looks like this:
g!2m0:~ webcopilot -d bugcrowd.com - bugcrowd βββββββββββββββββ
ββββββββββββββββββ
ββββββββββββββββββββββ
ββββββββββββ¬βββββββββββ
βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ
ββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ
βββββββββββββββ βββββββββββββ¦βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ
βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ ββββββ
βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ¦βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ
ββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ
[β] @h4r5h1t.hrs | G!2m0
[β] Warning: Use with caution. You are responsible for your own actions.
[β] Developers assume no liability and are not responsible for any misuse or damage cause by this tool.
Target: bugcrowd.com
Output: /home/gizmo/targets/bugcrowd
Threads: 100
Server: False
Exclude: False
Mode: Running all Enumeration
Time: 30-08-2021 15:10:00
[!] Please wait while scanning...
[β] Subdoamin Scanning is in progress: Scanning subdomains of bugcrowd.com
[β] Subdoamin Scanned - [assetfinderβ] Subdomain Found: 34
[β] Subdoamin Scanned - [sublist3rβ] Subdomain Found: 29
[β] Subdoamin Scanned - [subfinderβ] Subdomain Found: 54
[β] Subdoamin Scanned - [amassβ] Subdomain Found: 43
[β] Subdoamin Scanned - [findomainβ] Subdomain Found: 27
[β] Active Subdoamin Scanning is in progress:
[!] Please be patient. This may take a while...
[β] Active Subdoamin Scanned - [gobusterβ] Subdomain Found: 11
[β] Active Subdoamin Scanned - [amassβ] Subdomain Found: 0
[β] Subdomain Scanning: Filtering out of scope subdomains
[β] Subdomain Scanning: Filtering Alive subdomains
[β] Subdomain Scanning: Getting titles of valid subdomains
[β] Visual inspection of Subdoamins is completed. Check: /subdomains/aquatone/
[β] Scanning Completed for Subdomains of bugcrowd.com Total: 43 | Alive: 30
[β] Endpoints Scanning Completed for Subdomains of bugcrowd.com Total: 11032
[β] Vulnerabilities Scanning is in progress: Getting all vulnerabilities of bugcrowd.com
[β] Vulnerabilities Scanned - [XSSβ] Found: 0
[β] Vulnerabilities Scanned - [SQLiβ] Found: 0
[β] Vulnerabilities Scanned - [LFIβ] Found: 0
[β] Vulnerabilities Scanned - [CRLFβ] Found: 0
[β] Vulnerabilities Scanned - [SSRFβ] Found: 0
[β] Vulnerabilities Scanned - [Sensitive Dataβ] Found: 0
[β] Vulnerabilities Scanned - [Open redirectβ] Found: 0
[β] Vulnerabilities Scanned - [Subdomain Takeoverβ] Found: 0
[β] Vulnerabilities Scanned - [Nuclieβ] Found: 0
[β] Vulnerabilities Scanning Completed for Subdomains of bugcrowd.com Check: /vulnerabilities/
βββββ βββ βββ ββββ βββ βββββ
βββββ βββ βββ ββββ βββ βββββ
βββββ βββ βββ ββββ βββ βββββ
[+] Subdomains of bugcrowd.com
[+] Subdomains Found: 0
[+] Subdomains Alive: 0
[+] Endpoints: 11032
[+] XSS: 0
[+] SQLi: 0
[+] Open Redirect: 0
[+] SSRF: 0
[+] CRLF: 0
[+] LFI: 0
[+] Sensitive Data: 0
[+] Subdomain Takeover: 0
[+] Nuclei: 0WebCopilot is inspired from Garud & Pinaak by ROX4R.
@aboul3la @tomnomnom @lc @hahwul @projectdiscovery @maurosoria @shelld3v @devanshbatham @michenriksen @defparam @projectdiscovery @bp0lr @ameenmaali @sqlmapproject @dwisiswant0 @OWASP @OJ @Findomain @danielmiessler @1ndianl33t @ROX4R
| Warning: Developers assume no liability and are not responsible for any misuse or damage cause by this tool. So, please se with caution because you are responsible for your own actions. |
In 2020, the United States brought charges against four men accused of building a bulletproof hosting empire that once dominated the Russian cybercrime industry and supported multiple organized cybercrime groups. All four pleaded guilty to conspiracy and racketeering charges. But there is a fascinating and untold backstory behind the two Russian men involved, who co-ran the worldβs top spam forum and worked closely with Russiaβs most dangerous cybercriminals.
From January 2005 to April 2013, there were two primary administrators of the cybercrime forum Spamdot (a.k.a Spamit), an invite-only community for Russian-speaking people in the businesses of sending spam and building botnets of infected computers to relay said spam. The Spamdot admins went by the nicknames Icamis (a.k.a. Ika), and Salomon (a.k.a. Sal).
Spamdot forum administrator βIkaβ a.k.a. βIcamisβ responds to a message from βTarelka,β the botmaster behind the Rustock botnet. Dmsell said: βIβm actually very glad that I switched to legal spam mailing,β prompting Tarelka and Ika to scoff.
As detailed in my 2014 book, Spam Nation, Spamdot was home to crooks controlling some of the worldβs nastiest botnets, global malware contagions that went by exotic names like Rustock, Cutwail, Mega-D, Festi, Waledac, and Grum.
Icamis and Sal were in daily communications with these botmasters, via the Spamdot forum and private messages. Collectively in control over millions of spam-spewing zombies, those botmasters also continuously harvested passwords and other data from infected machines.
As weβll see in a moment, Salomon is now behind bars, in part because he helped to rob dozens of small businesses in the United States using some of those same harvested passwords. He is currently housed in a federal prison in Michigan, serving the final stretch of a 60-month sentence.
But the identity and whereabouts of Icamis have remained a mystery to this author until recently. For years, security experts β and indeed, many top cybercriminals in the Spamit affiliate program β have expressed the belief that Sal and Icamis were likely the same person using two different identities. And there were many good reasons to support this conclusion.
For example, in 2010 Spamdot and its spam affiliate program Spamit were hacked, and its user database shows Sal and Icamis often accessed the forum from the same Internet address β usually from Cherepovets, an industrial town situated approximately 230 miles north of Moscow. Also, it was common for Icamis to reply when Spamdot members communicated a request or complaint to Sal, and vice versa.
Image: maps.google.com
Still, other clues suggested Icamis and Sal were two separate individuals. For starters, they frequently changed the status on their instant messenger clients at different times. Also, they each privately discussed with others having attended different universities.
KrebsOnSecurity began researching Icamisβs real-life identity in 2012, but failed to revisit any of that research until recently. In December 2023, KrebsOnSecurity published new details about the identity of βRescator,β a Russian cybercriminal who is thought to be closely connected to the 2013 data breach at Target.
That story mentioned Rescatorβs real-life identity was exposed by Icamis in April 2013, as part of a lengthy farewell letter Ika wrote to Spamdot members wherein Ika said he was closing the forum and quitting the cybercrime business entirely.
To no oneβs shock, Icamis didnβt quit the business: He simply became more quiet and circumspect about his work, which increasingly was focused on helping crime groups siphon funds from U.S. bank accounts. But the Rescator story was a reminder that 10 years worth of research on who Ika/Icamis is in real life had been completely set aside. This post is an attempt to remedy that omission.
The farewell post from Ika (aka Icamis), the administrator of both the BlackSEO forum and Pustota, the successor forum to Spamit/Spamdot.
Icamis and Sal offered a comprehensive package of goods and services that any aspiring or accomplished spammer would need on a day-to-day basis: Virtually unlimited bulletproof domain registration and hosting services, as well as services that helped botmasters evade spam block lists generated by anti-spam groups like Spamhaus.org. Hereβs snippet of Icamisβs ad on Spamdot from Aug. 2008, wherein he addresses forum members with the salutation, βHello Gentlemen Scammers.β
We are glad to present you our services!
Many are already aware (and are our clients), but publicity is never superfluous.Domains.
β all major gtlds (com, net, org, info, biz)
β many interesting and uninteresting cctlds
β options for any topic
β processing of any quantities
β guarantees
β exceptionally low prices for domains for white and gray schemes (including any SEO and affiliate spam )
β control panel with balances and auto-registration
β all services under the Ikamis brand, proven over the years;)Servers.
β long-term partnerships with several [data centers] in several parts of the world for any topic
β your own data center (no longer in Russia ;)) for gray and white topics
β any configuration and any hardware
β your own IP networks (PI, not PA) and full legal support
β realtime backups to neutral sites
β guarantees and full responsibility for the services provided
β non-standard equipment on request
β our own admins to resolve any technical issues (services are free for clients)
β hosting (shared and vps) is also possibleNon-standard and related services.
β ssl certificates signed by geotrust and thawte
β old domains (any year, any quantity)
β beautiful domains (keyword, short, etc.)
β domains with indicators (any, for SEO, etc.)
β making unstable gtld domains stable
β interception and hijacking of custom domains (expensive)
β full domain posting via web.archive.org with restoration of native content (preliminary applications)
β any updates to our panels to suit your needs upon request (our own coders)All orders for the βDomainsβ sections and βServersβ are carried out during the day (depending on our workload).
For non-standard and related services, a preliminary application is required 30 days in advance (except for ssl certificates β within 24 hours).
Icamis and Sal frequently claimed that their service kept SpamhausΒ and other anti-spam groups several steps behind their operations. But itβs clear that those anti-spam operations had a real and painful impact on spam revenues, and Salomon was obsessed with striking back at anti-spam groups, particularly Spamhaus.
In 2007, Salomon collected more than $3,000 from botmasters affiliated with competing spam affiliate programs that wanted to see Spamhaus suffer, and the money was used to fund a week-long distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack against Spamhaus and its online infrastructure. But rather than divert their spam botnets from their normal activity and thereby decrease sales, the botmasters voted to create a new DDoS botnet by purchasing installations of DDoS malware on thousands of already-hacked PCs (at a rate of $25 per 1,000 installs).
As an affiliate of Spamdot, Salomon used the email address ad1@safe-mail.net, and the password 19871987gr. The breach tracking service Constella Intelligence found the password 19871987grΒ was used by the email address grichishkin@gmail.com. Multiple accounts are registered to that email address under the name Alexander Valerievich Grichishkin, from Cherepovets.
In 2020, Grichishkin was arrested outside of Russia on a warrant for providing bulletproof hosting services to cybercriminal gangs. The U.S. government said Grichishkin and three others set up the infrastructure used by cybercriminals between 2009 to 2015 to distribute malware and attack financial institutions and victims throughout the United States.
Those clients included crooks using malware like Zeus, SpyEye, Citadel and the Blackhole exploit kit to build botnets and steal banking credentials.
βThe Organization and its members helped their clients to access computers without authorization, steal financial information (including banking credentials), and initiate unauthorized wire transfers from victimsβ financial accounts,β the governmentβs complaint stated.
Grichishkin pleaded guilty to conspiracy charges and was sentenced to four years in prison. He is 36 years old, has a wife and kids in Thailand, and is slated for release on February 8, 2024.
The identity of Icamis came into view when KrebsOnSecurity began focusing on clues that might connect Icamis to Cherepovets (Ikaβs apparent hometown based on the Internet addresses he regularly used to access Spamdot).
Historic domain ownership records from DomainTools.com reveal that many of the email addresses and domains connected to Icamis invoke the name βAndrew Artz,β including icamis[.]ws, icamis[.]ru, and icamis[.]biz. IcamisΒ promoted his services in 2003 β such as bulk-domains[.]info β using the email address icamis@4host.info. From one of his ads in 2005:
Domains For Projects Advertised By Spam
I can register bulletproof domains for sites and projects advertised by spam(of course they must be legal). I can not provide DNS for u, only domains. The price will be:
65$ for domain[if u will buy less than 5 domains]
50$ for domain[more than 5 domains]
45$ for domain[more than 10 domains]
These prices are for domains in the .net & .com zones.
If u want to order domains write me to: icamis@4host.info
In 2009, an βAndrew Artzβ registered at the hosting service FirstVDS.com using the email address icamis@4host.info, with a notation saying the company name attached to the account was βWMPay.β Likewise, the bulletproof domain service icamis[.]ws was registered to an Andrew Artz.
The domain wmpay.ru is registered to the phonetically similar name βAndrew Hertz,β at andrew@wmpay.ru. A search on βicamis.ruβ in Google brings up a 2003 post by him on a discussion forum designed by and for students of Amtek, a secondary school in Cherepovets (Icamis was commenting from an Internet address in Cherepovets).
The website amtek-foreva-narod.ru is still online, and it links to several yearbooks for Amtek graduates. It states that the yearbook for the Amtek class of 2004 is hosted at 41.wmpay[.]com.
The yearbook photos for the Amtek class of 2004 are not indexed in the Wayback Machine at archive.org, but the names and nicknames of 16 students remain. However, it appears that the entry for one student β the Wmpay[.]com site administrator β was removed at some point.
In 2004, the administrator of the Amtek discussion forum β a 2003 graduate who used the handle βGrandβ β observed that there were three people named Andrey who graduated from Amtek in 2004, but one of them was conspicuously absent from the yearbook at wmpay[.]ru: Andrey Skvortsov.
To bring this full circle, Icamis was Andrey Skvortsov, the other Russian man charged alongside Grichiskin (the two others who pleaded guilty to conspiracy charges were from Estonia and Lithuania). All of the defendants in that case pleaded guilty to conspiracy to engage in a Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organization (RICO).
[Authorβs note: No doubt government prosecutors had their own reasons for omitting the nicknames of the defendants in their press releases, but that information sure would have saved me a lot of time and effort].
Skvortsov was sentenced to time served, and presumably deported. His current whereabouts are unknown and he was not reachable for comment via his known contact addresses.
The government says Ika and Salβs bulletproof hosting empire provided extensive support for a highly damaging cybercrime group known as the JabberZeus Crew, which worked closely with the author of the Zeus Trojan β Evgeniy Mikhailovich Bogachev β to develop a then-advanced strain of the Zeus malware that was designed to defeat one-time codes for authentication. Bogachev is a top Russian cybercriminal with a standing $3 million bounty on his head from the FBI.
The JabberZeus Crew stole money by constantly recruiting money mules, people in the United States and in Europe who could be enticed or tricked into forwarding money stolen from cybercrime victims. Interestingly, Icamisβs various email addresses are connected to websites for a vast network of phony technology companies that claimed they needed people with bank accounts to help pay their overseas employees.
Icamis used the email address tech@safe-mail.net on Spamdot, and this email address is tied to the registration records for multiple phony technology companies that were set up to recruit money mules.
One such site β sun-technology[.]net β advertised itself as a Hong Kong-based electronics firm that was looking for βhonest, responsible and motivated people in UK, USA, AU and NZ to be Sales Representatives in your particular region and receive payments from our clients. Agent commission is 5 percent of total amount received to the personal bank account. You may use your existing bank account or open a new one for these purposes.β
In January 2010, KrebsOnSecurity broke the news that the JabberZeus crew had just used money mules to steal $500,000 from tiny Duanesburg Central School District in upstate New York. As part of his sentence, Skvortsov was ordered to pay $497,200 in restitution to the Duanesburg Central School District.
The JabberZeus Crew operated mainly out of the eastern Ukraine city of Donetsk, which was always pro-Russia and is now occupied by Russian forces. But when Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, the alleged leader of the notorious cybercrime gang β Vyacheslav Igoravich Andreev (a.ka. Penchukov) β fled his mandatory military service orders and was arrested in Geneva, Switzerland. He is currently in federal custody awaiting trial, and is slated to be arraigned in U.S. federal court tomorrow (Jan. 9, 2024). A copy of the indictment against Andreev is here (PDF).
Andreev, aka βTank,β seen here performing as a DJ in Ukraine in an undated photo from social media.
Legba is a multiprotocol credentials bruteforcer / password sprayer and enumerator built with Rust and the Tokio asynchronous runtime in order to achieve better performances and stability while consuming less resources than similar tools (see the benchmark below).
For the building instructions, usage and the complete list of options check the project Wiki.
AMQP (ActiveMQ, RabbitMQ, Qpid, JORAM and Solace), Cassandra/ScyllaDB, DNS subdomain enumeration, FTP, HTTP (basic authentication, NTLMv1, NTLMv2, multipart form, custom requests with CSRF support, files/folders enumeration, virtual host enumeration), IMAP, Kerberos pre-authentication and user enumeration, LDAP, MongoDB, MQTT, Microsoft SQL, MySQL, Oracle, PostgreSQL, POP3, RDP, Redis, SSH / SFTP, SMTP, STOMP (ActiveMQ, RabbitMQ, HornetQ and OpenMQ), TCP port scanning, Telnet, VNC.
Here's a benchmark of legba versus thc-hydra running some common plugins, both targeting the same test servers on localhost. The benchmark has been executed on a macOS laptop with an M1 Max CPU, using a wordlist of 1000 passwords with the correct one being on the last line. Legba was compiled in release mode, Hydra compiled and installed via brew formula.
Far from being an exhaustive benchmark (some legba features are simply not supported by hydra, such as CSRF token grabbing), this table still gives a clear idea of how using an asynchronous runtime can drastically improve performances.
| Test Name | Hydra Tasks | Hydra Time | Legba Tasks | Legba Time |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| HTTP basic auth | 16 | 7.100s | 10 | 1.560s (ο 4.5x faster) |
| HTTP POST login (wordpress) | 16 | 14.854s | 10 | 5.045s (ο 2.9x faster) |
| SSH | 16 | 7m29.85s * | 10 | 8.150s (ο 55.1x faster) |
| MySQL | 4 ** | 9.819s | 4 ** | 2.542s (ο 3.8x faster) |
| Microsoft SQL | 16 | 7.609s | 10 | 4.789s (ο 1.5x faster) |
* While this result would suggest a default delay between connection attempts used by Hydra. I've tried to study the source code to find such delay but to my knowledge there's none. For some reason it's simply very slow.
** For MySQL hydra automatically reduces the amount of tasks to 4, therefore legba's concurrency level has been adjusted to 4 as well.
Legba is released under the GPL 3 license. To see the licenses of the project dependencies, install cargo license with cargo install cargo-license and then run cargo license.
On Dec. 18, 2013, KrebsOnSecurity broke the news that U.S. retail giant Target was battling a wide-ranging computer intrusion that compromised more than 40 million customer payment cards over the previous month. The malware used in the Target breach included the text string βRescator,β which also was the handle chosen by the cybercriminal who was selling all of the cards stolen from Target customers. Ten years later, KrebsOnSecurity has uncovered new clues about the real-life identity of Rescator.
Rescator, advertising a new batch of cards stolen in a 2014 breach at P.F. Changβs.
Shortly after breaking the Target story, KrebsOnSecurity reported that Rescator appeared to be a hacker from Ukraine. Efforts to confirm my reporting with that individual ended when they declined to answer questions, and after I declined to accept a bribe of $10,000 not to run my story.
That reporting was based on clues from an early Russian cybercrime forum in which a hacker named Rescator β using the same profile image that Rescator was known to use on other forums β claimed to have originally been known as βHelkern,β the nickname chosen by the administrator of a cybercrime forum called Darklife.
KrebsOnSecurity began revisiting the research into Rescatorβs real-life identity in 2018, after the U.S. Department of Justice unsealed an indictment that named a different Ukrainian man as Helkern.
It may be helpful to first recap why Rescator is thought to be so closely tied to the Target breach. For starters, the text string βRescatorβ was found in some of the malware used in the Target breach. Investigators would later determine that a variant of the malware used in the Target breach was used in 2014 to steal 56 million payment cards from Home Depot customers. And once again, cards stolen in the Home Depot breach were sold exclusively at Rescatorβs shops.
On Nov. 25, 2013, two days before Target said the breach officially began, Rescator could be seen in instant messages hiring another forum member to verify 400,000 payment cards that Rescator claimed were freshly stolen.
By the first week of December 2013, Rescatorβs online store β rescator[.]la β was selling more than six million payment card records stolen from Target customers. Prior to the Target breach, Rescator had mostly sold much smaller batches of stolen card and identity data, and the website allowed cybercriminals to automate the sending of fraudulent wire transfers to money mules based in Lviv, Ukraine.
Finally, there is some honor among thieves, and in the marketplace for stolen payment card data it is considered poor form to advertise a batch of cards as βyoursβ if you are merely reselling cards sold to you by a third-party card vendor or thief. When serious stolen payment card shop vendors wish to communicate that a batch of cards is uniquely their handiwork or that of their immediate crew, they refer to it as βour base.β And Rescator was quite clear in his advertisements that these millions of cards were obtained firsthand.
The new clues about Rescatorβs identity came into focus when I revisited the reporting around an April 2013 story here that identified the author of the OSX Flashback Trojan, an early Mac malware strain that quickly spread to more than 650,000 Mac computers worldwide in 2012.
That story about the Flashback author was possible because a source had obtained a Web browser authentication cookie for a founding member of a Russian cybercrime forum called BlackSEO. Anyone in possession of that cookie could then browse the invite-only BlackSEO forum and read the userβs private messages without having to log in.
BlackSEO.com VIP member βMavookβ tells forum admin Ika in a private message that he is the Flashback author.
The legitimate owner of that BlackSEO user cookie went by the nickname Ika, and IkaβsΒ private messages on the forum showed he was close friends with the Flashback author. At the time, Ika also was the administrator of Pustota[.]pw β a closely-guarded Russian forum that counted among its members some of the worldβs most successful and established spammers and malware writers.
For many years, Ika held a key position at one of Russiaβs largest Internet service providers, and his (mostly glowing) reputation as a reliable provider of web hosting to the Russian cybercrime community gave him an encyclopedic knowledge about nearly every major player in that scene at the time.
The story on the Flashback author featured redacted screenshots that were taken from Ikaβs BlackSEO account (see image above). The day after that story ran, Ika posted a farewell address to his mates, expressing shock and bewilderment over the apparent compromise of his BlackSEO account.
In a lengthy post on April 4, 2013 titled βI DONβT UNDERSTAND ANYTHING,β Ika told Pustota forum members he was so spooked by recent events that he was closing the forum and quitting the cybercrime business entirely. Ika recounted how the Flashback story had come the same week that rival cybercriminals tried to βdoxβ him (their dox named the wrong individual, but included some of Ikaβs more guarded identities).
βItβs no secret that karma farted in my direction,β Ika said at the beginning of his post. Unbeknownst to Ika at the time, his Pustota forum also had been completely hacked that week, and a copy of its database shared with this author.
A Google translated version of the farewell post from Ika, the administrator of Pustota, a Russian language cybercrime forum focused on botnets and spam. Click to enlarge.
Ika said the two individuals who tried to dox him did so on an even more guarded Russian language forum β DirectConnection[.]ws, perhaps the most exclusive Russian cybercrime community ever created. New applicants of this forum had to pay a non-refundable deposit, and receive vouches by three established cybercriminals already on the forum. Even if one managed to steal (or guess) a userβs DirectConnection password, the login page could not be reached unless the visitor also possessed a special browser certificate that the forum administrator gave only to approved members.
In no uncertain terms, Ika declared that Rescator went by the nickname MikeMike on DirectConnection:
βI did not want to bring any of this to real life. Especially since I knew the patron of the clowns β specifically Pavel Vrublevsky. Yes, I do state with confidence that the man with the nickname Rescator a.k.a. MikeMike with his partner Pipol have been Pavel Vrublevskyβs puppets for a long time.β
Pavel Vrublevsky is a convicted cybercriminal who became famous as the CEO of the Russian e-payments company ChronoPay, which specialized in facilitating online payments for a variety of βhigh-riskβ businesses, including gambling, pirated Mp3 files, rogue antivirus software and βmale enhancementβ pills.
As detailed in my 2014 book Spam Nation, Vrublevsky not-so-secretly ran a pharmacy affiliate spam program called Rx-Promotion, which paid spammers and virus writers to blast out tens of billions of junk emails advertising generic Viagra and controlled pharmaceuticals like pain relief medications. Much of my reporting on Vrublevskyβs cybercrime empire came from several years worth of internal ChronoPay emails and documents that were leaked online in 2010 and 2011.
Pavel Vrublevskyβs former Facebook profile photo.
In 2014, KrebsOnSecurity learned from a trusted source close to the Target breach investigation that the user MikeMike on DirectConnection β the same account that Ika said belonged to Rescator β used the email address βzaxvatmira@gmail.com.β
At the time, KrebsOnSecurity could not connect that email address to anything or anyone. However, a recent search on zaxvatmira@gmail.com at the breach tracking service Constella Intelligence returns just one result: An account created in November 2010 at the site searchengines[.]ru under the handleΒ βr-fac1.β
A search on βr-fac1β at cyber intelligence firm Intel 471 revealed that this userβs introductory post on searchengines[.]ru advertised musictransferonline[.]com, an affiliate program that paid people to drive traffic to sites that sold pirated music files for pennies apiece.
According to leaked ChronoPay emails from 2010, this domain was registered and paid for by ChronoPay. Those missives also show that in August 2010 Vrublevsky authorized a payment of ~$1,200 for a multi-user license of an Intranet service called MegaPlan.
ChronoPay used the MegaPlan service to help manage the sprawling projects that Vrublevsky referred to internally as their βblackβ payment processing operations, including pirated pills, porn, Mp3s, and fake antivirus products. ChronoPay employees used their MegaPlan accounts to track payment disputes, order volumes, and advertising partnerships for these high-risk programs.
Borrowing a page from the Quentin Tarantino movie Reservoir Dogs, the employees adopted nicknames like βMr. Kink,β βMr. Heppner,β and βMs. Nati.β However, in a classic failure of operational security, many of these employees had their MegaPlan account messages automatically forwarded to their real ChronoPay email accounts.
A screen shot of the org chart from ChronoPayβs MegaPlan Intranet system.
When ChronoPayβs internal emails were leaked in 2010, the username and password for its MegaPlan subscription were still working and valid. An internal user directory for that subscription included the personal (non-ChronoPay) email address tied to each employee Megaplan nickname. That directory listing said the email address zaxvatmira@gmail.com was assigned to the head of the Media/Mp3 division for ChronoPay, pictured at the top left of the organizational chart above as βBabushka Vani and Koli.β
[Authorβs note: I initially overlooked the presence of the email address zaxvatmira@gmail.com in my notes because it did not show up in text searches of my saved emails, files or messages. I rediscovered it recently when a text search for zaxvatmira@gmail.com on my Mac found the address in a screenshot of the ChronoPay MegaPlan interface.]
The nickname two rungs down from βBabushkaβ in the ChronoPay org chart is βLev Tolstoy,β which the MegaPlan service showed was picked by someone who used the email address v.zhabukin@freefrog-co-ru.
ChronoPayβs emails show that this Freefrog email address belongs to a Vasily Borisovich Zhabykin from Moscow. The Russian business tracking website rusprofile[.]ru reports that Zhabykin is or was the supervisor or owner of three Russian organizations, including one called JSC Hot Spot.
[Authorβs note: The word βbabushkaβ means βgrandmaβ in Russian, and it could be that this nickname is a nod to the ChronoPay CEOβs wife, Vera. The leaked ChronoPay emails show that Vera Vrublevsky managed a group of hackers working with their media division, and was at least nominally in charge of MP3 projects for ChronoPay. Indeed, in messages exposed by the leaked ChronoPay email cache, Zhabykin stated that he was βdirectly subordinateβ to Mrs. Vrublevsky].
JSC Hot Spot is interesting because its co-founder is another ChronoPay employee: 37-year-old Mikhail βMikeβ Shefel. A Facebook profile for Mr. Shefel says he is or was vice president of payment systems at ChronoPay. However, the last update on that profile is from 2018, when Shefel appears to have legally changed his last name.
Archive.org shows that Hot Spotβs website β myhotspot[.]ru β sold a variety of consulting services, including IT security assessments, code and system audits, and email marketing. The earliest recorded archive of the Hot Spot website listed three clients on its homepage, including ChronoPay and Freefrog.
ChronoPay internal emails show that Freefrog was one of its investment projects that facilitated the sale of pirated Mp3 files. Rusprofile[.]ru reports that Freefrogβs official company name β JSC Freefrog β is incorporated by a thinly-documented entity based in the Seychelles called Impex Consulting Ltd., and it is unclear who its true owners are.
However, a search at DomainTools.com on the phone number listed on the homepage of myhotspot[.]ru (74957809554) reveals that number is associated with eight domain names.
Six of those domains are some variation of FreeFrog. Another domain registered to that phone number is bothunter[.]me, which included a copyright credit to βHot Spot 2011.β At the annual Russian Internet Week IT convention in Moscow in 2012, Mr. Shefel gave a short presentation about bothunter, which he described as a service he designed to identify inauthentic (bot) accounts on Russian social media networks.
Interestingly, one of r-fac1βs first posts to Searchengines[.]ru a year earlier saw this user requesting help from other members who had access to large numbers of hacked social media accounts. R-fac1 told forum members that he was only looking to use those accounts to post harmless links and comments to the followers of the hacked profiles, and his post suggested he was testing something.
βGood afternoon,β r-fac1 wrote on Dec. 20, 2010. βIβm looking for people with their own not-recently-registered accounts on forums, (except for search) Social networks, Twitter, blogs, their websites. Tasks, depending on your accounts, post text and a link, sometimes just a link. Most often the topic is chatter, relaxation, discussion. Posting my links in your profiles, on your walls. A separate offer for people with a large set of contacts in instant messengers to try to use viral marketing.β
Neither Mr. Shefel nor Mr. Zhabykin responded to requests for comment.
Mr. Zhabykin soon moved on to bigger ventures, co-founding a cryptocurrency exchange based in Moscowβs financial center called Suex. In September 2021, Suex earned the distinction of becoming the first crypto firm to be sanctioned by the U.S. Department of the Treasury, which effectively blocked Suex from the global financial system. The Treasury alleged Suex helped to process millions in criminal transactions, including the proceeds of numerous ransomware attacks.
βI donβt understand how I got mixed up in this,β Zhabykin told The New York Times in 2021. Zhabykin said Suex, which is registered in the Czech Republic, was mostly a failure and had conducted only a half dozen or so transactions since 2019.
The Russian business tracking service Rusprofile says Zhabykin also is the owner of a company based in the United Kingdom called RideWithLocal; the companyβs website says it specializes in arranging excursions for extreme sports, including snowboarding, skiing, surfing and parasailing. Images from the RideWithLocal Facebook page show helicopters dropping snowboarders and skiers atop some fairly steep mountains.
A screenshot from the Facebook page of RideWithLocal.
Constella Intelligence found a cached copy of a now-deleted LinkedIn profile for Mr. Zhabykin, who described himself as a βsporttech/fintech specialist and mentor.β
βI create products and services worldwide, focusing on innovation and global challenges,β his LinkedIn profile said. βIβve started my career in 2002 and since then I worked in Moscow, different regions of Russia, including Siberia and in Finland, Brazil, United Kingdom, Sri Lanka. Over the last 15 years I contributed to many amazing products in the following industries: sports, ecology, sport tech, fin tech, electronic payments, big data, telecommunications, pulp and paper industry, wood processing and travel. My specialities are Product development, Mentorship, Strategy and Business development.β
Rusprofile reports that Mikhail Borisovich Shefel is associated with at least eight current or now-defunct companies in Russia, including Dengi IM (Money IM), Internet Capital, Internet Lawyer, Internet 2, Zao Hot Spot, and (my personal favorite) an entity incorporated in 2021 called βAll the Money in the World.β
Constella Intelligence found several official documents for Mr. Shefel that came from hacked Russian phone, automobile and residence records. They indicate Mr. Shefel is the registrant of a black Porsche Cayenne (Plate:X537SR197) and a Mercedes (Plate:P003PX90). Those vehicle records show Mr. Shefel was born on May 28, 1986.
Rusprofile reveals that at some point near the end of 2018, Shefel changed his last name to Lenin. DomainTools reports that in 2018, Mr. Shefelβs company Internet 2 LLC registered the domain name Lenin[.]me. This now-defunct service sold physical USSR-era Ruble notes that bear the image of Vladimir Lenin, the founding father of the Soviet Union.
Meanwhile, Pavel Vrublevsky remains imprisoned in Russia, awaiting trial on fraud charges levied against the payment company CEO in March 2022. Authorities allege Vrublevsky operated several fraudulent SMS-based payment schemes. They also accused Vrublevsky of facilitating money laundering for Hydra, the largest Russian darknet market. Hydra trafficked in illegal drugs and financial services, including cryptocurrency tumbling for money laundering, exchange services between cryptocurrency and Russian rubles, and the sale of falsified documents and hacking services.
In 2013, Vrublevsky was sentenced to 2.5 years in a Russian penal colony for convincing one of his top spammers and botmasters to launch a distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack against a ChronoPay competitor that shut down the ticketing system for the state-owned Aeroflot airline.
Following his release, Vrublevsky began working on a new digital payments platform based in Hong Kong called HPay Ltd (a.k.a. Hong Kong Processing Corporation). HPay appears to have had a great number of clients that were running schemes which bamboozled people with fake lotteries and prize contests.
KrebsOnSecurity sought comment on this research from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the U.S. Secret Service, both of which have been involved in the Target breach investigation over the years. The FBI declined to comment. The Secret Service declined to confirm or dispute any of the findings, but said it is still interested in hearing from anyone who might have more information.
βThe U.S. Secret Service does not comment on any open investigation and wonβt confirm or deny the accuracy in any reporting related to a criminal manner,β the agency said in a written statement. βHowever, If you have any information relating to the subjects referenced in this article, please contact the U.S. Secret Service at mostwanted@usss.dhs.gov. The Secret Service pays a reward for information leading to the arrest of cybercriminals.β
APIDetector is a powerful and efficient tool designed for testing exposed Swagger endpoints in various subdomains with unique smart capabilities to detect false-positives. It's particularly useful for security professionals and developers who are engaged in API testing and vulnerability scanning.
Before running APIDetector, ensure you have Python 3.x and pip installed on your system. You can download Python here.
Clone the APIDetector repository to your local machine using:
git clone https://github.com/brinhosa/apidetector.git
cd apidetector
pip install requests Run APIDetector using the command line. Here are some usage examples:
Common usage, scan with 30 threads a list of subdomains using a Chrome user-agent and save the results in a file:
python apidetector.py -i list_of_company_subdomains.txt -o results_file.txt -t 30 -ua "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/90.0.4430.212 Safari/537.36"To scan a single domain:
python apidetector.py -d example.comTo scan multiple domains from a file:
python apidetector.py -i input_file.txtTo specify an output file:
python apidetector.py -i input_file.txt -o output_file.txtTo use a specific number of threads:
python apidetector.py -i input_file.txt -t 20To scan with both HTTP and HTTPS protocols:
python apidetector.py -m -d example.comTo run the script in quiet mode (suppress verbose output):
python apidetector.py -q -d example.comTo run the script with a custom user-agent:
python apidetector.py -d example.com -ua "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/90.0.4430.212 Safari/537.36"-d, --domain: Single domain to test.-i, --input: Input file containing subdomains to test.-o, --output: Output file to write valid URLs to.-t, --threads: Number of threads to use for scanning (default is 10).-m, --mixed-mode: Test both HTTP and HTTPS protocols.-q, --quiet: Disable verbose output (default mode is verbose).-ua, --user-agent: Custom User-Agent string for requests.Exposing Swagger or OpenAPI documentation endpoints can present various risks, primarily related to information disclosure. Here's an ordered list based on potential risk levels, with similar endpoints grouped together APIDetector scans:
'/swagger-ui.html', '/swagger-ui/', '/swagger-ui/index.html', '/api/swagger-ui.html', '/documentation/swagger-ui.html', '/swagger/index.html', '/api/docs', '/docs', '/api/swagger-ui', '/documentation/swagger-ui'
'/openapi.json', '/swagger.json', '/api/swagger.json', '/swagger.yaml', '/swagger.yml', '/api/swagger.yaml', '/api/swagger.yml', '/api.json', '/api.yaml', '/api.yml', '/documentation/swagger.json', '/documentation/swagger.yaml', '/documentation/swagger.yml'
'/v2/api-docs', '/v3/api-docs', '/api/v2/swagger.json', '/api/v3/swagger.json', '/api/v1/documentation', '/api/v2/documentation', '/api/v3/documentation', '/api/v1/api-docs', '/api/v2/api-docs', '/api/v3/api-docs', '/swagger/v2/api-docs', '/swagger/v3/api-docs', '/swagger-ui.html/v2/api-docs', '/swagger-ui.html/v3/api-docs', '/api/swagger/v2/api-docs', '/api/swagger/v3/api-docs'
'/swagger-resources', '/swagger-resources/configuration/ui', '/swagger-resources/configuration/security', '/api/swagger-resources', '/api.html'
Contributions to APIDetector are welcome! Feel free to fork the repository, make changes, and submit pull requests.
The use of APIDetector should be limited to testing and educational purposes only. The developers of APIDetector assume no liability and are not responsible for any misuse or damage caused by this tool. It is the end user's responsibility to obey all applicable local, state, and federal laws. Developers assume no responsibility for unauthorized or illegal use of this tool. Before using APIDetector, ensure you have permission to test the network or systems you intend to scan.
This project is licensed under the MIT License.
CloakQuest3r is a powerful Python tool meticulously crafted to uncover the true IP address of websites safeguarded by Cloudflare, a widely adopted web security and performance enhancement service. Its core mission is to accurately discern the actual IP address of web servers that are concealed behind Cloudflare's protective shield. Subdomain scanning is employed as a key technique in this pursuit. This tool is an invaluable resource for penetration testers, security professionals, and web administrators seeking to perform comprehensive security assessments and identify vulnerabilities that may be obscured by Cloudflare's security measures.
Key Features:
Real IP Detection: CloakQuest3r excels in the art of discovering the real IP address of web servers employing Cloudflare's services. This crucial information is paramount for conducting comprehensive penetration tests and ensuring the security of web assets.
Subdomain Scanning: Subdomain scanning is harnessed as a fundamental component in the process of finding the real IP address. It aids in the identification of the actual server responsible for hosting the website and its associated subdomains.
Threaded Scanning: To enhance efficiency and expedite the real IP detection process, CloakQuest3r utilizes threading. This feature enables scanning of a substantial list of subdomains without significantly extending the execution time.
Detailed Reporting: The tool provides comprehensive output, including the total number of subdomains scanned, the total number of subdomains found, and the time taken for the scan. Any real IP addresses unveiled during the process are also presented, facilitating in-depth analysis and penetration testing.
With CloakQuest3r, you can confidently evaluate website security, unveil hidden vulnerabilities, and secure your web assets by disclosing the true IP address concealed behind Cloudflare's protective layers.
- Still in the development phase, sometimes it can't detect the real Ip.
- CloakQuest3r combines multiple indicators to uncover real IP addresses behind Cloudflare. While subdomain scanning is a part of the process, we do not assume that all subdomains' A records point to the target host. The tool is designed to provide valuable insights but may not work in every scenario. We welcome any specific suggestions for improvement.
1. False Negatives: CloakReveal3r may not always accurately identify the real IP address behind Cloudflare, particularly for websites with complex network configurations or strict security measures.
2. Dynamic Environments: Websites' infrastructure and configurations can change over time. The tool may not capture these changes, potentially leading to outdated information.
3. Subdomain Variation: While the tool scans subdomains, it doesn't guarantee that all subdomains' A records will point to the pri mary host. Some subdomains may also be protected by Cloudflare.
How to Use:
Run CloudScan with a single command-line argument: the target domain you want to analyze.
git clone https://github.com/spyboy-productions/CloakQuest3r.git
cd CloakQuest3r
pip3 install -r requirements.txt
python cloakquest3r.py example.com
The tool will check if the website is using Cloudflare. If not, it will inform you that subdomain scanning is unnecessary.
If Cloudflare is detected, CloudScan will scan for subdomains and identify their real IP addresses.
You will receive detailed output, including the number of subdomains scanned, the total number of subdomains found, and the time taken for the scan.
Any real IP addresses found will be displayed, allowing you to conduct further analysis and penetration testing.
CloudScan simplifies the process of assessing website security by providing a clear, organized, and informative report. Use it to enhance your security assessments, identify potential vulnerabilities, and secure your web assets.
Run it online on replit.com : https://replit.com/@spyb0y/CloakQuest3r
Porch Pirate started as a tool to quickly uncover Postman secrets, and has slowly begun to evolve into a multi-purpose reconaissance / OSINT framework for Postman. While existing tools are great proof of concepts, they only attempt to identify very specific keywords as "secrets", and in very limited locations, with no consideration to recon beyond secrets. We realized we required capabilities that were "secret-agnostic", and had enough flexibility to capture false-positives that still provided offensive value.
Porch Pirate enumerates and presents sensitive results (global secrets, unique headers, endpoints, query parameters, authorization, etc), from publicly accessible Postman entities, such as:
python3 -m pip install porch-pirateThe Porch Pirate client can be used to nearly fully conduct reviews on public Postman entities in a quick and simple fashion. There are intended workflows and particular keywords to be used that can typically maximize results. These methodologies can be located on our blog: Plundering Postman with Porch Pirate.
Porch Pirate supports the following arguments to be performed on collections, workspaces, or users.
--globals--collections--requests--urls--dump--raw--curlporch-pirate -s "coca-cola.com"By default, Porch Pirate will display globals from all active and inactive environments if they are defined in the workspace. Provide a -w argument with the workspace ID (found by performing a simple search, or automatic search dump) to extract the workspace's globals, along with other information.
porch-pirate -w abd6bded-ac31-4dd5-87d6-aa4a399071b8When an interesting result has been found with a simple search, we can provide the workspace ID to the -w argument with the --dump command to begin extracting information from the workspace and its collections.
porch-pirate -w abd6bded-ac31-4dd5-87d6-aa4a399071b8 --dumpPorch Pirate can be supplied a simple search term, following the --globals argument. Porch Pirate will dump all relevant workspaces tied to the results discovered in the simple search, but only if there are globals defined. This is particularly useful for quickly identifying potentially interesting workspaces to dig into further.
porch-pirate -s "shopify" --globalsPorch Pirate can be supplied a simple search term, following the --dump argument. Porch Pirate will dump all relevant workspaces and collections tied to the results discovered in the simple search. This is particularly useful for quickly sifting through potentially interesting results.
porch-pirate -s "coca-cola.com" --dumpA particularly useful way to use Porch Pirate is to extract all URLs from a workspace and export them to another tool for fuzzing.
porch-pirate -w abd6bded-ac31-4dd5-87d6-aa4a399071b8 --urlsPorch Pirate will recursively extract all URLs from workspaces and their collections related to a simple search term.
porch-pirate -s "coca-cola.com" --urlsporch-pirate -w abd6bded-ac31-4dd5-87d6-aa4a399071b8 --collectionsporch-pirate -w abd6bded-ac31-4dd5-87d6-aa4a399071b8 --requestsporch-pirate -w abd6bded-ac31-4dd5-87d6-aa4a399071b8 --rawporch-pirate -w WORKSPACE_IDporch-pirate -c COLLECTION_IDporch-pirate -r REQUEST_IDporch-pirate -u USERNAME/TEAMNAMEPorch Pirate can build curl requests when provided with a request ID for easier testing.
porch-pirate -r 11055256-b1529390-18d2-4dce-812f-ee4d33bffd38 --curlporch-pirate -s coca-cola.com --proxy 127.0.0.1:8080p = porchpirate()
print(p.search('coca-cola.com'))p = porchpirate()
print(p.collections('4127fdda-08be-4f34-af0e-a8bdc06efaba'))p = porchpirate()
collections = json.loads(p.collections('4127fdda-08be-4f34-af0e-a8bdc06efaba'))
for collection in collections['data']:
requests = collection['requests']
for r in requests:
request_data = p.request(r['id'])
print(request_data)p = porchpirate()
print(p.workspace_globals('4127fdda-08be-4f34-af0e-a8bdc06efaba'))Other library usage examples can be located in the examples directory, which contains the following examples:
dump_workspace.pyformat_search_results.pyformat_workspace_collections.pyformat_workspace_globals.pyget_collection.pyget_collections.pyget_profile.pyget_request.pyget_statistics.pyget_team.pyget_user.pyget_workspace.pyrecursive_globals_from_search.pyrequest_to_curl.pysearch.pysearch_by_page.pyworkspace_collections.py
