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The quantum computing era is coming, and it will change everything about how the world connects online. While quantum computing will yield tremendous benefits, it will also create new risks, so itβs essential that we prepare our critical internet infrastructure for whatβs to come. Thatβs why weβre so pleased to share our latest efforts in this area, including technology that weβre making available as an open source implementation to help internet operators worldwide prepare.
In recent years, the research team here at Verisign has been focused on a future where quantum computing is a reality, and where the general best practices and guidelines of traditional cryptography are re-imagined. As part of that work, weβve made three further contributions to help the DNS community prepare for these changes:
First, a brief refresher on what MTL mode is and what it accomplishes:
MTL mode is a technique developed by Verisign researchers that can reduce the operational impact of a signature scheme when authenticating an evolving series of messages. Rather than signing messages individually, MTL mode signs structures called Merkle tree ladders that are derived from the messages to be authenticated. Individual messages are authenticated relative to a ladder using a Merkle tree authentication path, while ladders are authenticated relative to a public key of an underlying signature scheme using a digital signature. The size and computational cost of the underlying digital signatures can therefore be spread across multiple messages.
The reduction in operational impact achieved by MTL mode can be particularly beneficial when the mode is applied to a signature scheme that has a large signature size or computational cost in specific use cases, such as when post-quantum signature schemes are applied to DNSSEC.
Recently, Verisign Fellow Duane Wessels described how Verisignβs DNSSEC algorithm update β from RSA/SHA-256 (Algorithm 8) to ECDSA Curve P-256 with SHA-256 (Algorithm 13) β increases the security strength of DNSSEC signatures and reduces their size impact. The present update is a logical next step in the evolution of DNSSEC resiliency. In the future, it is possible that DNSSEC may utilize a post-quantum signature scheme. Among the new post-quantum signature schemes currently being standardized, though, there is a shortcoming; if we were to directly apply these schemes to DNSSEC, it would significantly increase the size of the signatures1. With our work on MTL mode, the researchers at Verisign have provided a way to achieve the security benefit of a post-quantum algorithm rollover in a way that mitigates the size impact.
Put simply, this means that in a quantum environment, the MTL mode of operation developed by Verisign will enable internet infrastructure operators to use the longer signatures they will need to protect communications from quantum attacks, while still supporting the speed and space efficiency weβve come to expect.
For more background information on MTL mode and how it works, see my July 2023 blog post, the MTL mode I-D, or the research paper, βMerkle Tree Ladder Mode: Reducing the Size Impact of NIST PQC Signature Algorithms in Practice.β
In my July 2023 blog post titled βNext Steps in Preparing for Post-Quantum DNSSEC,β I described two recent contributions by Verisign to help the DNS community prepare for a post-quantum world: the MTL mode I-D and a public, royalty-free license to certain intellectual property related to that I-D. These activities set the stage for the latest contributions Iβm announcing in this post today.
Verisign is grateful for the DNS communityβs interest in this area, and we are pleased to serve as stewards of the internet when it comes to developing new technology that can help the internet grow and thrive. Our work on MTL mode is one of the longer-term efforts supporting our mission to enhance the security, stability, and resiliency of the global DNS. Weβre encouraged by the progress that has been achieved, and we look forward to further collaborations as we prepare for a post-quantum future.
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The post Verisign Provides Open Source Implementation of Merkle Tree Ladder Mode appeared first on Verisign Blog.
RansomwareSim is a simulated ransomware application developed for educational and training purposes. It is designed to demonstrate how ransomware encrypts files on a system and communicates with a command-and-control server. This tool is strictly for educational use and should not be used for malicious purposes.
Important: This tool should only be used in controlled environments where all participants have given consent. Do not use this tool on any system without explicit permission. For more, read SECURE
Clone the repository:
FreshRSS 
git clone https://github.com/HalilDeniz/RansomwareSim.gitNavigate to the project directory:
cd RansomwareSimInstall the required dependencies:
pip install -r requirements.txtcontrolpanel.py.controlpanel.py.RansomwareSim and the Decoder.RansomwareSim.main function in encoder.py to specify the target directory and other parameters.encoder.py to start the encryption process.decoder.py after the files have been encrypted.RansomwareSim is developed for educational purposes only. The creators of RansomwareSim are not responsible for any misuse of this tool. This tool should not be used in any unauthorized or illegal manner. Always ensure ethical and legal use of this tool.
Contributions, suggestions, and feedback are welcome. Please create an issue or pull request for any contributions.
For any inquiries or further information, you can reach me through the following channels:
Welcome to CryptChat - where conversations remain truly private. Built on the robust Python ecosystem, our application ensures that every word you send is wrapped in layers of encryption. Whether you're discussing sensitive business details or sharing personal stories, CryptChat provides the sanctuary you need in the digital age. Dive in, and experience the next level of secure messaging!
Clone the repository:
git clone https://github.com/HalilDeniz/CryptoChat.gitNavigate to the project directory:
cd CryptoChatInstall the required dependencies:
pip install -r requirements.txt$ python3 server.py --help
usage: server.py [-h] [--host HOST] [--port PORT]
Start the chat server.
options:
-h, --help show this help message and exit
--host HOST The IP address to bind the server to.
--port PORT The port number to bind the server to.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
$ python3 client.py --help
usage: client.py [-h] [--host HOST] [--port PORT]
Connect to the chat server.
options:
-h, --help show this help message and exit
--host HOST The server's IP address.
--port PORT The port number of the server.$ python3 serverE.py --help
usage: serverE.py [-h] [--host HOST] [--port PORT] [--key KEY]
Start the chat server.
options:
-h, --help show this help message and exit
--host HOST The IP address to bind the server to. (Default=0.0.0.0)
--port PORT The port number to bind the server to. (Default=12345)
--key KEY The secret key for encryption. (Default=mysecretpassword)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
$ python3 clientE.py --help
usage: clientE.py [-h] [--host HOST] [--port PORT] [--key KEY]
Connect to the chat server.
options:
-h, --help show this help message and exit
--host HOST The IP address to bind the server to. (Default=127.0.0.1)
--port PORT The port number to bind the server to. (Default=12345)
--key KEY The secret key for encr yption. (Default=mysecretpassword)--help: show this help message and exit--host: The IP address to bind the server.--port: The port number to bind the server.--key : The secret key for encryptionContributions are welcome! If you find any issues or have suggestions for improvements, feel free to open an issue or submit a pull request.
If you have any questions, comments, or suggestions about CryptChat, please feel free to contact me:
Caracal is a static analyzer tool over the SIERRA representation for Starknet smart contracts.
Precompiled binaries are available on our releases page. If you are using Cairo compiler 1.x.x uses the binary v0.1.x otherwise if you are using the Cairo compiler 2.x.x uses v0.2.x.
You need the Rust compiler and Cargo. Building from git:
cargo install --git https://github.com/crytic/caracal --profile release --forceBuilding from a local copy:
git clone https://github.com/crytic/caracal
cd caracal
cargo install --path . --profile release --forceList detectors:
caracal detectorsList printers:
caracal printersTo use with a standalone cairo file you need to pass the path to the corelib library either with the --corelib cli option or by setting the CORELIB_PATH environment variable. Run detectors:
caracal detect path/file/to/analyze --corelib path/to/corelib/srcRun printers:
caracal print path/file/to/analyze --printer printer_to_use --corelib path/to/corelib/srcIf you have a project that uses Scarb you need to add the following in Scarb.toml:
[[target.starknet-contract]]
sierra = true
[cairo]
sierra-replace-ids = trueThen pass the path to the directory where Scarb.toml resides. Run detectors:
caracal detect path/to/dirRun printers:
caracal print path/to/dir --printer printer_to_use| Num | Detector | What it Detects | Impact | Confidence | Cairo |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | controlled-library-call | Library calls with a user controlled class hash | High | Medium | 1 & 2 |
| 2 | unchecked-l1-handler-from | Detect L1 handlers without from address check | High | Medium | 1 & 2 |
| 3 | felt252-overflow | Detect user controlled operations with felt252 type, which is not overflow safe | High | Medium | 1 & 2 |
| 4 | reentrancy | Detect when a storage variable is read before an external call and written after | Medium | Medium | 1 & 2 |
| 5 | read-only-reentrancy | Detect when a view function read a storage variable written after an external call | Medium | Medium | 1 & 2 |
| 6 | unused-events | Events defined but not emitted | Medium | Medium | 1 & 2 |
| 7 | unused-return | Unused return values | Medium | Medium | 1 & 2 |
| 8 | unenforced-view | Function has view decorator but modifies state | Medium | Medium | 1 |
| 9 | unused-arguments | Unused arguments | Low | Medium | 1 & 2 |
| 10 | reentrancy-benign | Detect when a storage variable is written after an external call but not read before | Low | Medium | 1 & 2 |
| 11 | reentrancy-events | Detect when an event is emitted after an external call leading to out-of-order events | Low | Medium | 1 & 2 |
| 12 | dead-code | Private functions never used | Low | Medium | 1 & 2 |
The Cairo column represent the compiler version(s) for which the detector is valid.
cfg: Export the CFG of each function to a .dot filecallgraph: Export function call graph to a .dot fileCheck the wiki on the following topics:
