X-Recon - A Utility For Detecting Webpage Inputs And Conducting XSS Scans

A utility for identifying web page inputs and conducting XSS scanning.

Features:

• Subdomain Discovery:

• Retrieves relevant subdomains for the target website and consolidates them into a whitelist. These subdomains can be utilized during the scraping process.

• Site-wide Link Discovery:

• Collects all links throughout the website based on the provided whitelist and the specified max_depth.

• Form and Input Extraction:

• Identifies all forms and inputs found within the extracted links, generating a JSON output. This JSON output serves as a foundation for leveraging the XSS scanning capability of the tool.

• XSS Scanning:

• Once the start recon option returns a custom JSON containing the extracted entries, the X-Recon tool can initiate the XSS vulnerability testing process and furnish you with the desired results!

Note:

The scanning functionality is currently inactive on SPA (Single Page Application) web applications, and we have only tested it on websites developed with PHP, yielding remarkable results. In the future, we plan to incorporate these features into the tool.

Note:

This tool maintains an up-to-date list of file extensions that it skips during the exploration process. The default list includes common file types such as images, stylesheets, and scripts (".css",".js",".mp4",".zip","png",".svg",".jpeg",".webp",".jpg",".gif"). You can customize this list to better suit your needs by editing the setting.json file..

Installation

$ git clone https://github.com/joshkar/X-Recon
$ cd X-Recon
$ python3 -m pip install -r requirements.txt
$ python3 xr.py

Target For Test:

You can use this address in the Get URL section

  http://testphp.vulnweb.com

Invoke-SessionHunter - Retrieve And Display Information About Active User Sessions On Remote Computers (No Admin Privileges Required)

Retrieve and display information about active user sessions on remote computers. No admin privileges required.

The tool leverages the remote registry service to query the HKEY_USERS registry hive on the remote computers. It identifies and extracts Security Identifiers (SIDs) associated with active user sessions, and translates these into corresponding usernames, offering insights into who is currently logged in.

If the -CheckAdminAccess switch is provided, it will gather sessions by authenticating to targets where you have local admin access using Invoke-WMIRemoting (which most likely will retrieve more results)

It's important to note that the remote registry service needs to be running on the remote computer for the tool to work effectively. In my tests, if the service is stopped but its Startup type is configured to "Automatic" or "Manual", the service will start automatically on the target computer once queried (this is native behavior), and sessions information will be retrieved. If set to "Disabled" no session information can be retrieved from the target.

Usage:

iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Leo4j/Invoke-SessionHunter/main/Invoke-SessionHunter.ps1')

If run without parameters or switches it will retrieve active sessions for all computers in the current domain by querying the registry

Invoke-SessionHunter

Gather sessions by authenticating to targets where you have local admin access

Invoke-SessionHunter -CheckAsAdmin

You can optionally provide credentials in the following format

Invoke-SessionHunter -CheckAsAdmin -UserName "ferrari\Administrator" -Password "P@ssw0rd!"

You can also use the -FailSafe switch, which will direct the tool to proceed if the target remote registry becomes unresponsive.

This works in cobination with -Timeout | Default = 2, increase for slower networks.

Invoke-SessionHunter -FailSafe

Invoke-SessionHunter -FailSafe -Timeout 5

Use the -Match switch to show only targets where you have admin access and a privileged user is logged in

Invoke-SessionHunter -Match

All switches can be combined

Invoke-SessionHunter -CheckAsAdmin -UserName "ferrari\Administrator" -Password "P@ssw0rd!" -FailSafe -Timeout 5 -Match

Specify the target domain

Invoke-SessionHunter -Domain contoso.local

Specify a comma-separated list of targets or the full path to a file containing a list of targets - one per line

Invoke-SessionHunter -Targets "DC01,Workstation01.contoso.local"

Invoke-SessionHunter -Targets c:\Users\Public\Documents\targets.txt

Retrieve and display information about active user sessions on servers only

Invoke-SessionHunter -Servers

Retrieve and display information about active user sessions on workstations only

Invoke-SessionHunter -Workstations

Show active session for the specified user only

Invoke-SessionHunter -Hunt "Administrator"

Exclude localhost from the sessions retrieval

Invoke-SessionHunter -IncludeLocalHost

Return custom PSObjects instead of table-formatted results

Invoke-SessionHunter -RawResults

Do not run a port scan to enumerate for alive hosts before trying to retrieve sessions

Note: if a host is not reachable it will hang for a while

Invoke-SessionHunter -NoPortScan

Subhunter - A Fast Subdomain Takeover Tool

Subdomain takeover is a common vulnerability that allows an attacker to gain control over a subdomain of a target domain and redirect users intended for an organization's domain to a website that performs malicious activities, such as phishing campaigns, stealing user cookies, etc. It occurs when an attacker gains control over a subdomain of a target domain. Typically, this happens when the subdomain has a CNAME in the DNS, but no host is providing content for it. Subhunter takes a given list of Subdomains" title="Subdomains">subdomains and scans them to check this vulnerability.

Features:

• Auto update
• Uses random user agents
• Built in Go
• Uses a fork of fingerprint data from well known sources (can-i-take-over-xyz)

Installation:

Option 1:

Download from releases

Option 2:

Build from source:

$ git clone https://github.com/Nemesis0U/Subhunter.git
$ go build subhunter.go

Usage:

Options:

Usage of subhunter:
  -l string
        File including a list of hosts to scan
  -o string
        File to save results
  -t int
        Number of threads for scanning (default 50)
  -timeout int
        Timeout in seconds (default 20)

Demo (Added fake fingerprint for POC):

./Subhunter -l subdomains.txt -o test.txt

  ____            _       _                       _
 / ___|   _   _  | |__   | |__    _   _   _ __   | |_    ___   _ __
 \___ \  | | | | | '_ \  | '_ \  | | | | | '_ \  | __|  / _ \ | '__|
  ___) | | |_| | | |_) | | | | | | |_| | | | | | | |_  |  __/ | |
 |____/   \__,_| |_.__/  |_| |_|  \__,_| |_| |_|  \__|  \___| |_|


A fast subdomain takeover tool

Created by Nemesis

Loaded 88 fingerprints for current scan

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

[+] Nothing found at www.ubereats.com: Not Vulnerable
[+] Nothing found at testauth.ubereats.com: Not Vulnerable
[+] Nothing found at apple-maps-app-clip.ubereats.com: Not Vulnerable
[+] Nothing found at about.ubereats.com: Not Vulnerable
[+] Nothing found at beta.ubereats.com: Not Vulnerable
[+] Nothing found at ewp.ubereats.com: Not Vulnerable
[+] Nothi   ng found at edgetest.ubereats.com: Not Vulnerable
[+] Nothing found at guest.ubereats.com: Not Vulnerable
[+] Google Cloud: Possible takeover found at testauth.ubereats.com: Vulnerable
[+] Nothing found at info.ubereats.com: Not Vulnerable
[+] Nothing found at learn.ubereats.com: Not Vulnerable
[+] Nothing found at merchants.ubereats.com: Not Vulnerable
[+] Nothing found at guest-beta.ubereats.com: Not Vulnerable
[+] Nothing found at merchant-help.ubereats.com: Not Vulnerable
[+] Nothing found at merchants-beta.ubereats.com: Not Vulnerable
[+] Nothing found at merchants-staging.ubereats.com: Not Vulnerable
[+] Nothing found at messages.ubereats.com: Not Vulnerable
[+] Nothing found at order.ubereats.com: Not Vulnerable
[+] Nothing found at restaurants.ubereats.com: Not Vulnerable
[+] Nothing found at payments.ubereats.com: Not Vulnerable
[+] Nothing found at static.ubereats.com: Not Vulnerable

Subhunter exiting...
   Results written to test.txt

C2-Tracker - Live Feed Of C2 Servers, Tools, And Botnets

Free to use IOC feed for various tools/malware. It started out for just C2 tools but has morphed into tracking infostealers and botnets as well. It uses shodan.io/">Shodan searches to collect the IPs. The most recent collection is always stored in data; the IPs are broken down by tool and there is an all.txt.

The feed should update daily. Actively working on making the backend more reliable

Honorable Mentions

Many of the Shodan queries have been sourced from other CTI researchers:

• BushidoToken
• Michael Koczwara
• ViriBack
• Gi7W0rm
• @Glacius_

Huge shoutout to them!

Thanks to BertJanCyber for creating the KQL query for ingesting this feed

And finally, thanks to Y_nexro for creating C2Live in order to visualize the data

What do I track?

• C2's
  • Cobalt Strike
  • Metasploit Framework
  • Covenant
  • Mythic
  • Brute Ratel C4
  • Posh
  • Sliver
  • Deimos
  • PANDA
  • NimPlant C2
  • Havoc C2
  • Caldera
  • Empire
  • Ares
• Malware
  • AcidRain Stealer
  • Misha Stealer (AKA Grand Misha)
  • Patriot Stealer
  • RAXNET Bitcoin Stealer
  • Titan Stealer
  • Collector Stealer
  • Mystic Stealer
  • Gotham Stealer
  • Meduza Stealer
  • Quasar RAT
  • ShadowPad
  • AsyncRAT
  • DcRat
  • BitRAT
  • DarkComet Trojan
  • XtremeRAT Trojan
  • NanoCore RAT Trojan
  • Gh0st RAT Trojan
  • DarkTrack RAT Trojan
  • njRAT Trojan
  • Remcos Pro RAT Trojan
  • Poison Ivy Trojan
  • Orcus RAT Trojan
  • ZeroAccess Trojan
  • HOOKBOT Trojan
• Tools
  • XMRig Monero Cryptominer
  • GoPhish
• Botnets
  • 7777 Botnet

Running Locally

If you want to host a private version, put your Shodan API key in an environment variable called SHODAN_API_KEY

echo SHODAN_API_KEY=API_KEY >> ~/.bashrc
bash
python3 -m pip install -r requirements.txt
python3 tracker.py

Contributing

I encourage opening an issue/PR if you know of any additional Shodan searches for identifying adversary infrastructure. I will not set any hard guidelines around what can be submitted, just know, fidelity is paramount (high true/false positive ratio is the focus).

References

• Hunting C2 with Shodan by Michael Koczwara
• Hunting Cobalt Strike C2 with Shodan by Michael Koczwara
• https://twitter.com/MichalKoczwara/status/1591750513238118401?cxt=HHwWgsDUiZGqhJcsAAAA
• BushidoToken's OSINT-SearchOperators
• https://twitter.com/MichalKoczwara/status/1641119242618650653
• https://twitter.com/MichalKoczwara/status/1641676761283850241
• https://twitter.com/_montysecurity/status/1643164749599834112
• https://twitter.com/ViriBack/status/1713714868564394336
• https://gi7w0rm.medium.com/the-curious-case-of-the-7777-botnet-86e3464c3ffd
• https://twitter.com/Glacius_/status/1731699013873799209

Huntr-Com-Bug-Bounties-Collector - Keep Watching New Bug Bounty (Vulnerability) Postings

New bug bounty(vulnerabilities) collector

• Chrome with GUI (If you encounter trouble with script execution, check the status of VMs GPU features, if available.)
• Chrome WebDriver

# python3 main.py

*2024-02-20 16:14:47.836189*

1. Arbitrary File Reading due to Lack of Input Filepath Validation
- Feb 6th 2024 / High (CVE-2024-0964)
- gradio-app/gradio
- https://huntr.com/bounties/25e25501-5918-429c-8541-88832dfd3741/

2. View Barcode Image leads to Remote Code Execution
- Jan 31st 2024 / Critical (CVE: Not yet)
- dolibarr/dolibarr
- https://huntr.com/bounties/f0ffd01e-8054-4e43-96f7-a0d2e652ac7e/

(delimiter-based file database)

# vim feeds.db

1|2024-02-20 16:17:40.393240|7fe14fd58ca2582d66539b2fe178eeaed3524342|CVE-2024-0964|https://huntr.com/bounties/25e25501-5918-429c-8541-88832dfd3741/
2|2024-02-20 16:17:40.393987|c6b84ac808e7f229a4c8f9fbd073b4c0727e07e1|CVE: Not yet|https://huntr.com/bounties/f0ffd01e-8054-4e43-96f7-a0d2e652ac7e/
3|2024-02-20 16:17:40.394582|7fead9658843919219a3b30b8249700d968d0cc9|CVE: Not yet|https://huntr.com/bounties/d6cb06dc-5d10-4197-8f89-847c3203d953/
4|2024-02-20 16:17:40.395094|81fecdd74318ce7da9bc29e81198e62f3225bd44|CVE: Not yet|https://huntr.com/bounties/d875d1a2-7205-4b2b-93cf-439fa4c4f961/
5|2024-02-20 16:17:40.395613|111045c8f1a7926174243db403614d4a58dc72ed|CVE: Not yet|https://huntr.com/bounties/10e423cd-7051-43fd-b736-4e18650d0172/

• This code is designed to parse HTML elements from huntr.com, so it may not function correctly if the HTML page structure changes.
• In case of errors during parsing, exception handling has been included, so if it doesn't work as expected, please inspect the HTML source for any changes.
• If get in trouble In a typical cloud environment, scripts may not function properly within virtual machines (VMs).

BucketLoot - An Automated S3-compatible Bucket Inspector

To know more about our Attack Surface Management platform, check out NVADR.

D3m0n1z3dShell - Demonized Shell Is An Advanced Tool For Persistence In Linux

Demonized Shell is an Advanced Tool for persistence in linux.

Install

git clone https://github.com/MatheuZSecurity/D3m0n1z3dShell.git
cd D3m0n1z3dShell
chmod +x demonizedshell.sh
sudo ./demonizedshell.sh

One-Liner Install

Download D3m0n1z3dShell with all files:

curl -L https://github.com/MatheuZSecurity/D3m0n1z3dShell/archive/main.tar.gz | tar xz && cd D3m0n1z3dShell-main && sudo ./demonizedshell.sh

Load D3m0n1z3dShell statically (without the static-binaries directory):

sudo curl -s https://raw.githubusercontent.com/MatheuZSecurity/D3m0n1z3dShell/main/static/demonizedshell_static.sh -o /tmp/demonizedshell_static.sh && sudo bash /tmp/demonizedshell_static.sh

Demonized Features

• Auto Generate SSH keypair for all users
• APT Persistence
• Crontab Persistence
• Systemd User level
• Systemd Root Level
• Bashrc Persistence
• Privileged user & SUID bash
• LKM Rootkit Modified, Bypassing rkhunter & chkrootkit
• LKM Rootkit With file encoder. persistent icmp backdoor and others features.
• ICMP Backdoor
• LD_PRELOAD Setup PrivEsc
• Static Binaries For Process Monitoring, Dump credentials, Enumeration, Trolling and Others Binaries.

Pending Features

• LD_PRELOAD Rootkit
• Process Injection
• install for example: curl github.com/test/test/demonized.sh | bash
• Static D3m0n1z3dShell
• Intercept Syscall Write from a file
• ELF/Rootkit Anti-Reversing Technique
• PAM Backdoor
• rc.local Persistence
• init.d Persistence
• motd Persistence
• Persistence via php webshell and aspx webshell

And other types of features that will come in the future.

Contribution

If you want to contribute and help with the tool, please contact me on twitter: @MatheuzSecurity

Note

We are not responsible for any damage caused by this tool, use the tool intelligently and for educational purposes only.

Douglas-042 - Powershell Script To Help Speed ​​Up Threat Hunting Incident Response Processes

DOUGLAS-042 stands as an ingenious embodiment of a PowerShell script meticulously designed to expedite the triage process and facilitate the meticulous collection of crucial evidence derived from both forensic artifacts and the ephemeral landscape of volatile data. Its fundamental mission revolves around providing indispensable aid in the arduous task of pinpointing potential security breaches within Windows ecosystems. With an overarching focus on expediency, DOUGLAS-042 orchestrates the efficient prioritization and methodical aggregation of data, ensuring that no vital piece of information eludes scrutiny when investigating a possible compromise. As a testament to its organized approach, the amalgamated data finds its sanctuary within the confines of a meticulously named text file, bearing the nomenclature of the host system's very own hostname. This practice of meticulous data archival emerges not just as a systematic convention, but as a cornerstone that paves the way for seamless transitions into subsequent stages of the Forensic journey.

Content Queries

• General information
• Accountand group information
• Network
• Process Information
• OS Build and HOTFIXE
• Persistence
• HARDWARE Information
• Encryption information
• FIREWALL INFORMATION
• Services
• History
• SMB Queries
• Remoting queries
• REGISTRY Analysis
• LOG queries
• Instllation of Software
• User activity

Advanced Queries

• Prefetch file information
• DLL List
• WMI filters and consumers
• Named pipes

Usage

Using administrative privileges, just run the script from a PowerShell console, then the results will be saved in the directory as a txt file.

$ PS >./douglas.ps1

Advance usage

$ PS >./douglas.ps1 -a

Associated-Threat-Analyzer - Detects Malicious IPv4 Addresses And Domain Names Associated With Your Web Application Using Local Malicious Domain And IPv4 Lists

Associated-Threat-Analyzer detects malicious IPv4 addresses and domain names associated with your web application using local malicious domain and IPv4 lists.

Installation

From Git

git clone https://github.com/OsmanKandemir/associated-threat-analyzer.git
cd associated-threat-analyzer && pip3 install -r requirements.txt
python3 analyzer.py -d target-web.com

From Dockerfile

You can run this application on a container after build a Dockerfile.

Warning : If you want to run a Docker container, associated threat analyzer recommends to use your malicious IPs and domains lists, because maintainer may not be update a default malicious IP and domain lists on docker image.

docker build -t osmankandemir/threatanalyzer .
docker run osmankandemir/threatanalyzer -d target-web.com

From DockerHub

docker pull osmankandemir/threatanalyzer
docker run osmankandemir/threatanalyzer -d target-web.com

Usage

-d DOMAIN , --domain DOMAIN Input Target. --domain target-web1.com
-t DOMAINSFILE, --DomainsFile Malicious Domains List to Compare. -t SampleMaliciousDomains.txt
-i IPSFILE, --IPsFile Malicious IPs List to Compare. -i SampleMaliciousIPs.txt
-o JSON, --json JSON  JSON output. --json

DONE

• First-level depth scan your domain address.

TODO list

• Third-level or the more depth static files scanning for target web application.

Other linked github project. You can take a look.

Finds related domains and IPv4 addresses to do threat intelligence after Indicator-Intelligence v1.1.1 collects static files

https://github.com/OsmanKandemir/indicator-intelligence

Default Malicious IPs and Domains Sources

https://github.com/stamparm/blackbook

https://github.com/stamparm/ipsum

Development and Contribution

See; CONTRIBUTING.md

AD_Enumeration_Hunt - Collection Of PowerShell Scripts And Commands That Can Be Used For Active Directory (AD) Penetration Testing And Security Assessment

Description

Welcome to the AD Pentesting Toolkit! This repository contains a collection of PowerShell scripts and commands that can be used for Active Directory (AD) penetration testing and security assessment. The scripts cover various aspects of AD enumeration, user and group management, computer enumeration, network and security analysis, and more.

The toolkit is intended for use by penetration testers, red teamers, and security professionals who want to test and assess the security of Active Directory environments. Please ensure that you have proper authorization and permission before using these scripts in any production environment.

Everyone is looking at what you are looking at; But can everyone see what he can see? You are the only difference between them… By Mevlânâ Celâleddîn-i Rûmî

Features

• Enumerate and gather information about AD domains, users, groups, and computers.
• Check trust relationships between domains.
• List all objects inside a specific Organizational Unit (OU).
• Retrieve information about the currently logged-in user.
• Perform various operations related to local users and groups.
• Configure firewall rules and enable Remote Desktop (RDP).
• Connect to remote machines using RDP.
• Gather network and security information.
• Check Windows Defender status and exclusions configured via GPO.
• ...and more!

Usage

1. Clone the repository or download the scripts as needed.
2. Run the PowerShell script using the appropriate PowerShell environment.
3. Follow the on-screen prompts to provide domain, username, and password when required.
4. Enjoy exploring the AD Pentesting Toolkit and use the scripts responsibly!

Disclaimer

The AD Pentesting Toolkit is for educational and testing purposes only. The authors and contributors are not responsible for any misuse or damage caused by the use of these scripts. Always ensure that you have proper authorization and permission before performing any penetration testing or security assessment activities on any system or network.

License

This project is licensed under the MIT License. The Mewtwo ASCII art is the property of Alperen Ugurlu. All rights reserved.

Cyber Security Consultant

Alperen Ugurlu

HEDnsExtractor - Raw Html Extractor From Hurricane Electric Portal

HEDnsExtractor

Raw html extractor from Hurricane Electric portal

Features

• Automatically identify IPAddr ou Networks through command line parameter or stdin
• Extract networks based on IPAddr.
• Extract domains from networks.

Installation

go install -v github.com/HuntDownProject/hednsextractor/cmd/hednsextractor@latest

Usage

usage -h

nslookup hackerone.com | awk '/Address: / {print $2}' | hednsextractor -silent -only-networks

[INF] [104.16.99.52] 104.16.0.0/12
[INF] [104.16.99.52] 104.16.96.0/20

nslookup hackerone.com | awk '/Address: / {print $2}' | hednsextractor -silent -only-domains | tail -n 10

herllus.com
hezzy.store
hilariostore.com
hiperdrop.com
hippratas.online
hitsstory.com
hobbyshop.site
holyangelstore.com
holzfallerstore.fun
homedescontoo.com

cat $HOME/.config/hednsextractor/config.yaml 

# hednsextractor config file
# generated by https://github.com/projectdiscovery/goflags

# show only domains
#only-domains: false

# show only networks
#only-networks: false

# show virustotal score
#vt: false

# minimum virustotal score to show
#vt-score: 0

# ip address or network to query
#target: 

# show silent output
#silent: false

# show verbose output
#verbose: false

# virustotal api key
vt-api-key: Your API Key goes here

nslookup hackerone.com | awk '/Address: / {print $2}' | hednsextractor -only-domains -vt             

          _______  ______   _        _______  _______          _________ _______  _______  _______ _________ _______  _______ 
|\     /|(  ____ \(  __  \ ( (    /|(  ____ \(  ____ \|\     /|\__   __/(  ____ )(  ___  )(  ____ \\__   __/(  ___  )(  ____ )
| )   ( || (    \/| (  \  )|  \  ( || (    \/| (    \/( \   / )   ) (   | (    )|| (   ) || (    \/   ) (   | (   ) || (    )|
| (___) || (__    | |   ) ||   \ | || (_____ | (__     \ (_) /    | |   | (____)|| (___) || |         | |   | |   | || (____)|
|  ___  ||  __)   | |   | || (\ \) |(_____  )|  __)     ) _ (     | |   |     __)|  ___  || |         | |   | |   | ||     __)
| (   ) || (      | |   ) || | \   |      ) || (       / ( ) \    | |   | (\ (   | (   ) || |         | |   | |   | || (\ (   
| )   ( || (____/\| (__/  )| )  \  |/\____) || (____/\( /   \ )   | |   | ) \ \__| )   ( || (____/\   | |   | (___) || ) \ \__
|/     \|(_______/(______/ |/    )_)\_______)(_______/|/     \|      )_(   |/   \__/|/     \|(_______/   )_(   (_______)|/   \__/

[INF] Current hednsextractor version v1.0.0
[INF] [104.16.0.0/12] domain: ohst.ltd VT Score: 0
[INF] [104.16.0.0/12] domain: jxcraft.net VT Score: 0
[INF] [104.16.0.0/12] domain: teatimegm.com VT Score: 2
[INF] [104.16.0.0/12] domain: debugcheat.com VT Score: 0

SOC-Multitool - A Powerful And User-Friendly Browser Extension That Streamlines Investigations For Security Professionals

Introducing SOC Multi-tool, a free and open-source browser extension that makes investigations faster and more efficient. Now available on the Chrome Web Store and compatible with all Chromium-based browsers such as Microsoft Edge, Chrome, Brave, and Opera.
Now available on Chrome Web Store!

Streamline your investigations

SOC Multi-tool eliminates the need for constant copying and pasting during investigations. Simply highlight the text you want to investigate, right-click, and navigate to the type of data highlighted. The extension will then open new tabs with the results of your investigation.

Modern and feature-rich

The SOC Multi-tool is a modernized multi-tool built from the ground up, with a range of features and capabilities. Some of the key features include:

• IP Reputation Lookup using VirusTotal & AbuseIPDB
• IP Info Lookup using Tor relay checker & WHOIS
• Hash Reputation Lookup using VirusTotal
• Domain Reputation Lookup using VirusTotal & AbuseIPDB
• Domain Info Lookup using Alienvault
• Living off the land binaries Lookup using the LOLBas project
• Decoding of Base64 & HEX using CyberChef
• File Extension & Filename Lookup using fileinfo.com & File.net
• MAC Address manufacturer Lookup using maclookup.com
• Parsing of UserAgent using user-agents.net
• Microsoft Error code Lookup using Microsoft's DB
• Event ID Lookup (Windows, Sharepoint, SQL Server, Exchange, and Sysmon) using ultimatewindowssecurity.com
• Blockchain Address Lookup using blockchain.com
• CVE Info using cve.mitre.org

Easy to install

You can easily install the extension by downloading the release from the Chrome Web Store!
If you wish to make edits you can download from the releases page, extract the folder and make your changes.
To load your edited extension turn on developer mode in your browser's extensions settings, click "Load unpacked" and select the extracted folder!


SOC Multi-tool is a community-driven project and the developer encourages users to contribute and share better resources.

C2-Hunter - Extract C2 Traffic

C2-Hunter

• C2-Hunter is a program designed for malware analysts to extract Command and Control (C2) traffic from malwares in real-time. The program uses a unique approach by hooking into win32 connections APIs.

• With C2-Hunter, malware analysts can now intercept and analyze communication in real-time, gaining valuable insights into the inner workings of cyber threats. Its ability to track C2 elements of malware makes it an essential tool for any cyber security team.

Features

• Real-time extraction of C2 traffic
• Bypasses malware time delays to speed up the extraction process (SOON)

Requirements

• Windows Operating System
• Administrator Privileges

Wafaray - Enhance Your Malware Detection With WAF + YARA (WAFARAY)

WAFARAY is a LAB deployment based on Debian 11.3.0 (stable) x64 made and cooked between two main ingredients WAF + YARA to detect malicious files (e.g. webshells, virus, malware, binaries) typically through web functions (upload files).

Purpose

In essence, the main idea came to use WAF + YARA (YARA right-to-left = ARAY) to detect malicious files at the WAF level before WAF can forward them to the backend e.g. files uploaded through web functions see: https://owasp.org/www-community/vulnerabilities/Unrestricted_File_Upload

When a web page allows uploading files, most of the WAFs are not inspecting files before sending them to the backend. Implementing WAF + YARA could provide malware detection before WAF forwards the files to the backend.

Do malware detection through WAF?

Yes, one solution is to use ModSecurity + Clamav, most of the pages call ClamAV as a process and not as a daemon, in this case, analysing a file could take more than 50 seconds per file. See this resource: https://kifarunix.com/intercept-malicious-file-upload-with-modsecurity-and-clamav/

Do malware detection through WAF + YARA?

:-( A few clues here Black Hat Asia 2019 please continue reading and see below our quick LAB deployment.

WAFARAY: how does it work ?

Basically, It is a quick deployment (1) with pre-compiled and ready-to-use YARA rules via ModSecurity (WAF) using a custom rule; (2) this custom rule will perform an inspection and detection of the files that might contain malicious code, (3) typically web functions (upload files) if the file is suspicious will reject them receiving a 403 code Forbidden by ModSecurity.

Main Paths:

• Yara Compiled rules: /YaraRules/Compiled
• Yara Default rules: /YaraRules/rules
• Yara Scripts: /YaraRules/YaraScripts
• Apache vhosts: /etc/apache2/sites-enabled
• Temporal Files: /temporal
  

Approach

• Blueteamers: Rule enforcement, best alerting, malware detection on files uploaded through web functions.
• Redteamers/pentesters: GreyBox scope , upload and bypass with a malicious file, rule enforcement.
• Security Officers: Keep alerting, threat hunting.
• SOC: Best monitoring about malicious files.
• CERT: Malware Analysis, Determine new IOC.

Building Detection Lab

The Proof of Concept is based on Debian 11.3.0 (stable) x64 OS system, OWASP CRC v3.3.2 and Yara 4.0.5, you will find the automatic installation script here wafaray_install.sh and an optional manual installation guide can be found here: manual_instructions.txt also a PHP page has been created as a "mock" to observe the interaction and detection of malicious files using WAF + YARA.

Installation (recommended) with shell scripts

alex@waf-labs:~$ su root 
root@waf-labs:/home/alex#

# Remember to change YOUR_USER by your username (e.g waf)
root@waf-labs:/home/alex# sed -i 's/^\(# User privi.*\)/\1\nalex ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD:ALL/g' /etc/sudoers
root@waf-labs:/home/alex# exit
alex@waf-labs:~$ sudo sed -i 's/^\(deb cdrom.*\)/#\1/g' /etc/apt/sources.list
alex@waf-labs:~$ sudo sed -i 's/^# \(deb\-src http.*\)/ \1/g' /etc/apt/sources.list
alex@waf-labs:~$ sudo sed -i 's/^# \(deb http.*\)/ \1/g' /etc/apt/sources.list
alex@waf-labs:~$ echo -ne "\n\ndeb http://deb.debian.org/debian/ bullseye main\ndeb-src http://deb.debian.org/debian/ bullseye main\n" | sudo tee -a  /etc/apt/sources.list
alex@waf-labs:~$ sudo apt-get update
alex@waf-labs:~$ sudo apt-get install sudo -y
alex@waf-labs:~$ sudo apt-get install git vim dos2unix net-tools -y
alex@waf-labs:~$ git clone https://github.com/alt3kx/wafarayalex@waf-labs:~$ cd wafaray
alex@waf-labs:~$ dos2unix wafaray_install.sh
alex@waf-labs:~$ chmod +x wafaray_install.sh
alex@waf-labs:~$ sudo ./wafaray_install.sh >> log_install.log

# Test your LAB environment 
alex@waf-labs:~$ firefox localhost:8080/upload.php

Yara Rules

Once the Yara Rules were downloaded and compiled.

It is similar to when you deploy ModSecurity, you need to customize what kind of rule you need to apply. The following log is an example of when the Web Application Firewall + Yara detected a malicious file, in this case, eicar was detected.

Message: Access denied with code 403 (phase 2). File "/temporal/20220812-184146-YvbXKilOKdNkDfySME10ywAAAAA-file-Wx1hQA" rejected by 
the approver script "/YaraRules/YaraScripts/modsec_yara.py": 0 SUSPECTED [YaraSignature: eicar] 
[file "/etc/apache2/sites-enabled/test.conf"] [line "56"] [id "500002"] 
[msg "Suspected File Upload:eicar.com.txt -> /temporal/20220812-184146-YvbXKilOKdNkDfySME10ywAAAAA-file-Wx1hQA - URI: /upload.php"]

Testing WAFARAY... voilà...

Stop / Start ModSecurity

$ sudo service apache2 stop
$ sudo service apache2 start

Apache Logs

$ cd /var/log
$ sudo tail -f apache2/test_access.log apache2/test_audit.log apache2/test_error.log

Demos

Demo 1 - EICAR

A malicious file is uploaded, and the ModSecurity rules plus Yara denied uploading file to the backend if the file matched with at least one Yara Rule. (Example of Malware: https://secure.eicar.org/eicar.com.txt) NOT EXECUTE THE FILE.

Demo 2 - WebShell.php

For this demo, we disable the rule 933110 - PHP Inject Attack to validate Yara Rules. A malicious file is uploaded, and the ModSecurity rules plus Yara denied uploading file to the backend if the file matched with at least one Yara Rule. (Example of WebShell PHP: https://github.com/drag0s/php-webshell) NOT EXECUTE THE FILE.

Demo 3 - Malware Bazaar (RecordBreaker) Published: 2022-08-13

A malicious file is uploaded, and the ModSecurity rules plus Yara denied uploading file to the backend if the file matched with at least one Yara Rule. (Example of Malware Bazaar (RecordBreaker): https://bazaar.abuse.ch/sample/94ffc1624939c5eaa4ed32d19f82c369333b45afbbd9d053fa82fe8f05d91ac2/) NOT EXECUTE THE FILE.

YARA Rules sources

In case that you want to download more yara rules, you can see the following repositories:

• Yara Signatures Compiled - https://github.com/Yara-Rules/rules
• YARAHub - https://yaraify.abuse.ch/
• Awesome Yara Rules - https://github.com/InQuest/awesome-yara#rules
• Advanced Threat Research Yara Rules - https://github.com/advanced-threat-research/Yara-Rules
• Icewater - https://github.com/SupportIntelligence/Icewater
• Open Source Yara Rules - https://github.com/mikesxrs/Open-Source-YARA-rules
• Bartblaza Yara Rules - https://github.com/bartblaze/Yara-rules
• Cobalstrike - https://github.com/Te-k/cobaltstrike
• Yara Forensic - https://github.com/Xumeiquer/yara-forensics
• Loki - https://github.com/Neo23x0/Loki
• YarGen - https://github.com/Neo23x0/yarGen
• YarAnalyzer - https://github.com/Neo23x0/yarAnalyzer/
• Valhalla - https://www.nextron-systems.com/valhalla/, https://valhalla.nextron-systems.com/
• AlienVault - https://otx.alienvault.com/ (Create an account)

References

• https://portswigger.net/daily-swig/waf-reloaded-modsecurity-3-1-showcased-at-black-hat-asia
• https://yara.readthedocs.io/en/latest/gettingstarted.html
• https://yara.readthedocs.io/en/v3.4.0/yarapython.html
• https://virustotal.github.io/yara/
• https://www.tutorialspoint.com/perl/perl_introduction.htm
• https://malware.expert/scan-every-file-clam-antivirus-scanner-modsecurity/
• https://xael.org/pages/pyclamd-en.html
• https://docs.clamav.net/
• https://www.decalage.info/en/python/pyclamd
• https://opensource.apple.com/source/clamav/clamav-116.2/clamav.Conf/clamd.conf.auto.html
• https://c99.sh/hunting-0days-with-yara-rules/
• https://github.com/claroty/arya
• https://isc.sans.edu/diary/YARA%27s+Console+Module/28288

Roadmap until next release

• Malware Hash Database (MLDBM). The Database stores the MD5 or SHA1 that files were detected as suspicious.
• To be tested CRS Modsecurity v.3.3.3 new rules
• ModSecurity rules improvement to malware detection with Database.
• To be created blacklist and whitelist related to MD5 or SHA1.
• To be tested, run in background if the Yara analysis takes more than 3 seconds.
• To be tested, new payloads, example: Powershell Obfuscasted (WebShells)
• Remarks for live enviroments. (WAF AWS, WAF GCP, ...)

Authors

Alex Hernandez aka (@_alt3kx_)
Jesus Huerta aka @mindhack03d

Contributors

Israel Zeron Medina aka @spk085

TLDHunt - Domain Availability Checker

TLDHunt is a command-line tool designed to help users find available domain names for their online projects or businesses. By providing a keyword and a list of TLD (top-level domain) extensions, TLDHunt checks the availability of domain names that match the given criteria. This tool is particularly useful for those who want to quickly find a domain name that is not already taken, without having to perform a manual search on a domain registrar website.

For red teaming or phishing purposes, this tool can help you to find similar domains with different extensions from the original domain.

Dependencies

This tool is written in Bash and the only dependency required is whois. Therefore, make sure that you have installed whois on your system. In Debian, you can install whois using the following command:

sudo apt install whois -y

How It Works?

To detect whether a domain is registered or not, we search for the words "Name Server" in the output of the WHOIS command, as this is a signature of a registered domain. If you have a better signature or detection method, please feel free to submit a pull request.

Domain Extension List

You can use your custom tlds.txt list, but make sure that it is formatted like this:

.aero
.asia
.biz
.cat
.com
.coop
.info
.int
.jobs
.mobi

How to Use

➜  TLDHunt ./tldhunt.sh
 _____ _    ___  _  _          _   
|_   _| |  |   \| || |_  _ _ _| |_ 
  | | | |__| |) | __ | || | ' \  _|
  |_| |____|___/|_||_|\_,_|_||_\__|
        Domain Availability Checker

Keyword is required.
Usage: ./tldhunt.sh -k <keyword> [-e <tld> | -E <exts>] [-x]
Example: ./tldhunt.sh -k linuxsec -E tlds.txt

Example of TLDHunt usage:

./tldhunt.sh -k linuxsec -E tlds.txt

You can add -x flag to print only Not Registered domain. Example:

./tldhunt.sh -k linuxsec -E tlds.txt -x

Screenshot

debugHunter - Discover Hidden Debugging Parameters And Uncover Web Application Secrets

Discover hidden debugging parameters and uncover web application secrets with debugHunter. This Chrome extension scans websites for debugging parameters and notifies you when it finds a URL with modified responses. The extension utilizes a binary search algorithm to efficiently determine the parameter responsible for the change in the response.

Features

• Perform a binary search on a list of predefined query parameters.
• Compare responses with and without query parameters to identify changes.
• Track and display the number of modified URLs in the browser action badge.
• Allow the user to view and clear the list of modified URLs.

Installation

Option 1: Clone the repository

1. Download or clone this repository to your local machine.
2. Open Google Chrome, and go to chrome://extensions/.
3. Enable "Developer mode" in the top right corner if it's not already enabled.
4. Click the "Load unpacked" button on the top left corner.
5. Navigate to the directory where you downloaded or cloned the repository, and select the folder.
6. The debugHunter extension should now be installed and ready to use.

Option 2: Download the release (.zip)

1. Download the latest release .zip file from the "Releases" section of this repository.
2. Extract the contents of the .zip file to a folder on your local machine.
3. Open Google Chrome, and go to chrome://extensions/.
4. Enable "Developer mode" in the top right corner if it's not already enabled.
5. Click the "Load unpacked" button on the top left corner.
6. Navigate to the directory where you extracted the .zip file, and select the folder.
7. The debugHunter extension should now be installed and ready to use.

Usage

It is recommended to pin the extension to the toolbar to check if a new modified URL by debug parameter is found.

1. Navigate to any website.
2. Click on the debugHunter extension icon in the Chrome toolbar.
3. If the extension detects any URLs with modified responses due to debugging parameters, they will be listed in the popup.
4. Click on any URL in the list to open it in a new tab.
5. To clear the list, click on the trash can icon in the top right corner of the popup.

Contributing

We welcome contributions! Please feel free to submit pull requests or open issues to improve debugHunter.

ThreatHound - Tool That Help You On Your IR & Threat Hunting And CA

This tool will help you on your IR & Threat Hunting & CA. just drop your event log file and anlayze the results.

New Release Features:

• support windows (ThreatHound.exe)
• C for Linux based
• new vesion available in C also
• now you can save results in json file or print on screen it as you want by arg 'print' "'yes' to print the results on screen and 'no' to save the results on json file"
• you can give windows event logs folder or single evtx file or multiple evtx separated by comma by arg -p
• you can now give sigam ruels path by arg -s
• add multithreading to improve runing speed
• ThreatHound.exe is agent based you can push it and run it on multiple servers

• Example:

$ ThreatHound.exe -s ..\sigma_rules\ -p C:\Windows\System32\winevt\Logs\ -print no

• NOTE: give cmd full promission to read from "C:\Windows\System32\winevt\Logs"

• Linux Based:

• Windows Based

I’ve built the following:

• A dedicated backend to support Sigma rules for python
• A dedicated backend for parsing evtx for python
• A dedicated backend to match between evtx and the Sigma rules

Features of the tool:

• Automation for Threat hunting, Compromise Assessment, and Incident Response for the Windows Event Logs
• Downloading and updating the Sigma rules daily from the source
• More then 50 detection rules included
• support for more then 1500 detection rules for Sigma
• Support for new sigma rules dynamically and adding it to the detection rules
• Saving of all the outputs in JSON format
• Easily add any detection rules you prefer
• you can add new event log source type in mapping.py easily

To-do:

• Support for Sigma rules dedicated for DNS query
• Modifying the speed of algorithm dedicated for the detection and making it faster
• Adding JSON output that supports Splunk
• More features

installiton:

$ git clone https://github.com/MazX0p/ThreatHound.git
$ cd ThreatHound
$ pip install - r requirements.txt
$ pyhton3 ThreatHound.py

• Note: glob doesn't support get path of the directory if it has spaces on folder names, please ensure the path of the tool is without spaces (folders names)

Demo:

https://player.vimeo.com/video/784137549?h=6a0e7ea68a&badge=0&autopause=0&player_id=0&app_id=58479

Screenshots:

Misp-Extractor - Tool That Connects To A MISP Instance And Retrieves Attributes Of Specific Types (Such As IP Addresses, URLs, And Hashes)

This code connects to a given MISP (Malware Information Sharing Platform) server and parses a given number of events, writing the IP addresses, URLs, and MD5 hashes found in the events to three separate files.

Usage

To use this script, you will need to provide the URL of your MISP instance and a valid API key. You can then call the MISPConnector.run() method to retrieve the attributes and save them to files.

To use the code, run the following command:

python3 misp_connector.py --misp-url <MISP_URL> --misp-key <MISP_API_KEY> --limit <EVENT_LIMIT>

Supported attribute types

The MISPConnector class currently supports the following attribute types:

• ip-src
• ip-dst
• md5
• url
• domain

If an attribute of one of these types is found in an event, it will be added to the appropriate set (for example, IP addresses will be added to the network_set) and written to the corresponding file (network.txt, hash.txt, or url.txt).

Configuration

The code can be configured by passing arguments to the command-line script. The available arguments are:

• misp-url: The URL of the MISP server. This argument is required.
• misp-key: The API key for the MISP server. This argument is required.
• limit: The maximum number of events to parse. The default is 2000.

Limitations

This script has the following limitations:

• It only retrieves attributes of specific types (as listed above).
• It only writes the retrieved attributes to files, without any further processing or analysis.
• It only retrieves a maximum of 2000 events, as specified by the limit parameter in the misp.search() method.

License

This code is provided under the MIT License. See the LICENSE file for more details.

PowerHuntShares - Audit Script Designed In Inventory, Analyze, And Report Excessive Privileges Configured On Active Directory Domains

PowerHuntShares is design to automatically inventory, analyze, and report excessive privilege assigned to SMB shares on Active Directory domain joined computers.
It is intented to help IAM and other blue teams gain a better understand of their SMB Share attack surface and provides data insights to help naturally group related share to help stream line remediation efforts at scale.

It supports functionality to:

• Authenticate using the current user context, a credential, or clear text user/password.
• Discover accessible systems associated with an Active Directory domain automatically. It will also filter Active Directory computers based on available open ports.
• Target a single computer, list of computers, or discovered Active Directory computers (default).
• Collect SMB share ACL information from target computers using PowerShell.
• Analyze collected Share ACL data.
• Report summary reports and excessive privilege details in HTML and CSV file formats.

Excessive SMB share ACLs are a systemic problem and an attack surface that all organizations struggle with. The goal of this project is to provide a proof concept that will work towards building a better share collection and data insight engine that can help inform and priorititize remediation efforts.

Bonus Features:

• Generate directory listing dump for configurable depth
• Search for file types across discovered shares

I've also put together a short presentation outlining some of the common misconfigurations and strategies for prioritizing remediation here: https://www.slideshare.net/nullbind/into-the-abyss-evaluating-active-directory-smb-shares-on-scale-secure360-251762721

Vocabulary

PowerHuntShares will inventory SMB share ACLs configured with "excessive privileges" and highlight "high risk" ACLs. Below is how those are defined in this context.

Excessive Privileges
Excessive read and write share permissions have been defined as any network share ACL containing an explicit ACE (Access Control Entry) for the "Everyone", "Authenticated Users", "BUILTIN\Users", "Domain Users", or "Domain Computers" groups. All provide domain users access to the affected shares due to privilege inheritance issues. Note there is a parameter that allow operators to add their own target groups.
Below is some additional background:

• Everyone is a direct reference that applies to both unauthenticated and authenticated users. Typically only a null session is required to access those resources.
• BUILTIN\Users contains Authenticated Users
• Authenticated Users contains Domain Users on domain joined systems. That's why Domain Users can access a share when the share permissions have been assigned to "BUILTIN\Users".
• Domain Users is a direct reference
• Domain Users can also create up to 10 computer accounts by default that get placed in the Domain Computers group
• Domain Users that have local administrative access to a domain joined computer can also impersonate the computer account.

Please Note: Share permissions can be overruled by NTFS permissions. Also, be aware that testing excluded share names containing the following keywords:

print$, prnproc$, printer, netlogon,and sysvol

High Risk Shares
In the context of this report, high risk shares have been defined as shares that provide unauthorized remote access to a system or application. By default, that includes the shares

 wwwroot, inetpub, c$, and admin$   

Setup Commands

Below is a list of commands that can be used to load PowerHuntShares into your current PowerShell session. Please note that one of these will have to be run each time you run PowerShell is run. It is not persistent.

# Bypass execution policy restrictions
Set-ExecutionPolicy -Scope Process Bypass

# Import module that exists in the current directory
Import-Module .\PowerHuntShares.psm1

or

# Reduce SSL operating level to support connection to github
[System.Net.ServicePointManager]::ServerCertificateValidationCallback = {$true}
[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol =[Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12

# Download and load PowerHuntShares.psm1 into memory
IEX(New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadString("https://raw.githubusercontent.com/NetSPI/PowerHuntShares/main/PowerHuntShares.psm1")

Example Commands

Important Note: All commands should be run as an unprivileged domain user.

.EXAMPLE 1: Run from a domain computer. Performs Active Directory computer discovery by default.
PS C:\temp\test> Invoke-HuntSMBShares -Threads 100 -OutputDirectory c:\temp\test 

.EXAMPLE 2: Run from a domain computer with alternative domain credentials. Performs Active Directory computer discovery by default.
PS C:\temp\test> Invoke-HuntSMBShares -Threads 100 -OutputDirectory c:\temp\test -Credentials domain\user

.EXAMPLE 3: Run from a domain computer as current user. Target hosts in a file. One per line.
PS C:\temp\test> Invoke-HuntSMBShares -Threads 100 -OutputDirectory c:\temp\test  -HostList c:\temp\hosts.txt      

.EXAMPLE 4: Run from a non-domain computer with credential. Performs Active Directory computer discovery by default.
C:\temp\test> runas /netonly /user:domain\user PowerShell.exe
PS C:\temp\test> Import-Module Invoke-HuntSMBShares.ps1
PS C:\temp\test> Invoke-HuntSMBShares -Threads 100 -Run   SpaceTimeOut 10 -OutputDirectory c:\folder\ -DomainController 10.1.1.1 -Credential domain\user 

===============================================================
PowerHuntShares
===============================================================
 This function automates the following tasks:     

 o Determine current computer's domain
 o Enumerate domain computers        
 o Filter for computers that respond to ping reqeusts          
 o Filter for computers that have TCP 445 open and accessible  
 o Enumerate SMB shares 
 o Enumerate SMB share permissions   
 o Identify shares with potentially excessive privielges       
 o Identify shares that provide reads & write access           
 o Identify shares thare are high risk
 o Identify common share owners, names, & directory listings   
 o Generate creation, last written, & last accessed timelines
 o Generate html summary report and detailed csv files            

 Note: This can take hours to run in large environments.       
---------------------------------------------------------------
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
---------------------------------------------------------------
SHARE DISCOVERY      
---------------------------------------------------------------
[*][03/01/2021 09:35] Scan Start
[*][03/01/2021 09:35] Output Directory: c:\temp\smbshares\SmbShareHunt-03012021093504
[*][03/01/2021 09:35] Successful connection to domain controller: dc1.demo.local
[*][03/01/2021 09:35] Performing LDAP query for computers associated with the demo.local domain
[*][03/01/2021 09:35] - 245 computers found
[*][03/01/2021 09:35] Pinging 245 computers
[*][03/01/2021 09:35] - 55 computers responded to ping requests.
[*][03/01/2021 09:35] Checking if TCP Port 445 is open on 55 computers
[*][03/01/2021 09:36] - 49 computers have TCP port 445 open.
   [*][03/01/2021 09:36] Getting a list of SMB shares from 49 computers
[*][03/01/2021 09:36] - 217 SMB shares were found.
[*][03/01/2021 09:36] Getting share permissions from 217 SMB shares
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - 374 share permissions were enumerated.
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] Getting directory listings from 33 SMB shares
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - Targeting up to 3 nested directory levels
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - 563 files and folders were enumerated.
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] Identifying potentially excessive share permissions
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - 33 potentially excessive privileges were found across 12 systems..
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] Scan Complete
---------------------------------------------------------------
SHARE ANALYSIS      
---------------------------------------------------------------
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] Analysis Start
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - 14 shares can be read across 12 systems.
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - 1 shares can    be written to across 1 systems.
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - 46 shares are considered non-default across 32 systems.
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - 0 shares are considered high risk across 0 systems
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - Identified top 5 owners of excessive shares.
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - Identified top 5 share groups.
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - Identified top 5 share names.
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - Identified shares created in last 90 days.
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - Identified shares accessed in last 90 days.
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - Identified shares modified in last 90 days.
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] Analysis Complete
---------------------------------------------------------------
SHARE REPORT SUMMARY      
---------------------------------------------------------------
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] Domain: demo.local
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] Start time: 03/01/2021 09:35:04
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] End time: 03/01/2021 09:37:27
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] R   un time: 00:02:23.2759086
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] 
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] COMPUTER SUMMARY
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - 245 domain computers found.
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - 55 (22.45%) domain computers responded to ping.
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - 49 (20.00%) domain computers had TCP port 445 accessible.
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - 32 (13.06%) domain computers had shares that were non-default.
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - 12 (4.90%) domain computers had shares with potentially excessive privileges.
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - 12 (4.90%) domain computers had shares that allowed READ access.
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - 1 (0.41%) domain computers had shares that allowed WRITE access.
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - 0 (0.00%) domain computers had shares that are HIGH RISK.
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] 
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] SHARE SUMMARY
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - 217 shares were found. We expect a minimum of 98 shares
[*][03/01/2021 09:37]   because 49 systems had open ports a   nd there are typically two default shares.
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - 46 (21.20%) shares across 32 systems were non-default.
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - 14 (6.45%) shares across 12 systems are configured with 33 potentially excessive ACLs.
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - 14 (6.45%) shares across 12 systems allowed READ access.
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - 1 (0.46%) shares across 1 systems allowed WRITE access.
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - 0 (0.00%) shares across 0 systems are considered HIGH RISK.
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] 
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] SHARE ACL SUMMARY
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - 374 ACLs were found.
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - 374 (100.00%) ACLs were associated with non-default shares.
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - 33 (8.82%) ACLs were found to be potentially excessive.
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - 32 (8.56%) ACLs were found that allowed READ access.
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - 1 (0.27%) ACLs were found that allowed WRITE access.
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - 0 (0.00%) ACLs we   re found that are associated with HIGH RISK share names.
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] 
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - The 5 most common share names are:
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - 9 of 14 (64.29%) discovered shares are associated with the top 5 share names.
[*][03/01/2021 09:37]   - 4 backup
[*][03/01/2021 09:37]   - 2 ssms
[*][03/01/2021 09:37]   - 1 test2
[*][03/01/2021 09:37]   - 1 test1
[*][03/01/2021 09:37]   - 1 users
[*] -----------------------------------------------

HTML Report Examples

Credits

Author
Scott Sutherland (@_nullbind)

Open-Source Code Used
These individuals wrote open source code that was used as part of this project. A big thank you goes out them and their work!

License
BSD 3-Clause

Todos

Pending Fixes/Bugs

• Update code to avoid defender
• Fix file listing formating on data insight pages
• IPv6 addresses dont show up in subnets summary
• ACLs associated with Builtin\Users sometimes shows up as LocalSystem under undefined conditions, and as a result, doesnt show up in the Excessive Privileges export. - Thanks Sam!

Pending Features

• Add ability to specify additional groups to target
• Add directory listing to insights page.
• Add ability to grab system OS information for data insights.
• Add visualization: Visual squares with coloring mapped to share volume density by subnet or ip?.
• Add file type search. (half coded) + add to data insights. Don't forget things like *.aws, *.azure *.gcp directories that store cloud credentials.
• Add file content search.
• Add DontExcludePrintShares option
• Add auto targeting of groups that contain a large % of the user population; over 70% (make configurable). Add as option.
• Add configuration fid: netlogon and sysvol you may get access denied when using windows 10 unless the setting below is configured. Automat a check for this, and attempt to modify if privs are at correct level. gpedit.msc, go to Computer -> Administrative Templates -> Network -> Network Provider -> Hardened UNC Paths, enable the policy and click "Show" button. Enter your server name (* for all servers) into "Value name" and enter the folowing text "RequireMutualAuthentication=0,RequireIntegrity=0,RequirePrivacy=0" wihtout quotes into the "Value" field.
• Add an interesting shares based on names to data insights. example: sql, backup, password, etc.
• Add active sessions data to help identify potential owners/users of share.
• Pull spns and computer description/spn account descriptions to help identify owner/business unit.
• Create bloodhound import file / edge (highrisk share)
• Research to identify additional high risk share names based on common technology
• Add better support for IPv6
• Dynamic identification of spikes in high risk share creation/common groupings, need to better summarize supporting detail beyond just the timeline. For each of the data insights, add average number of shares created for insight grouping by year/month (for folder hash / name etc), and the increase the month/year it spikes. (attempt to provide some historical context); maybe even list the most common non default directories being used by each of those. Potentially adding "first seen date" as well.
• add showing share permissions (along with the already displayed NTFS permissions) and resultant access (most restrictive wins)

Pylirt - Python Linux Incident Response Toolkit

With this application, it is aimed to accelerate the incident response processes by collecting information in linux operating systems.

Features

Information is collected in the following contents.

/etc/passwd

cat /etc/group

cat /etc/sudoers

lastlog

cat /var/log/auth.log

uptime/proc/meminfo

ps aux

/etc/resolv.conf

/etc/hosts

iptables -L -v -n

find / -type f -size +512k -exec ls -lh {}/;

find / -mtime -1 -ls

ip a

netstat -nap

arp -a

echo $PATH

Installation

git clone https://github.com/anil-yelken/pylirt

cd pylirt

sudo pip3 install paramiko

Usage

The following information should be specified in the cred_list.txt file:

IP|Username|Password

sudo python3 plirt.py

Contact

https://twitter.com/anilyelken06

https://medium.com/@anilyelken

D4TA-HUNTER - GUI Osint Framework With Kali Linux

D4TA-HUNTER is a tool created in order to automate the collection of information about the employees of a company that is going to be audited for ethical hacking.

In addition, in this tool we can find in the "search company" section by inserting the domain of a company, emails of employees, subdomains and IP's of servers.

GET API KEY

Register on https://rapidapi.com/rohan-patra/api/breachdirectory

Install

git clone https://github.com/micro-joan/D4TA-HUNTER
cd D4TA-HUNTER/
chmod +x run.sh
./run.sh

After executing the application launcher you need to have all the components installed, the launcher will check one by one, and in the case of not having any component installed it will show you the statement that you must enter to install it:

Use

First you must have a free or paid api-key from BreachDirectory.org, if you don't have one and do a search D4TA-HUNTER provides you with a guide on how to get one.

Once you have the api-key you will be able to search for emails, with the advantage of showing you a list of all the password hashes ready for you to copy and paste into one of the online resources provided by D4TA-HUNTER to crack passwords 100 % free.

You can also insert a domain of a company and D4TA-HUNTER will search for employee emails, subdomains that may be of interest together with IP's of machines found:

Apis and tools

Sandbox_Scryer - Tool For Producing Threat Hunting And Intelligence Data From Public Sandbox Detonation Output

The Sandbox Scryer is an open-source tool for producing threat hunting and intelligence data from public sandbox detonation output The tool leverages the MITRE ATT&CK Framework to organize and prioritize findings, assisting in the assembly of IOCs, understanding attack movement and in threat hunting By allowing researchers to send thousands of samples to a sandbox for building a profile that can be used with the ATT&CK technique, the Sandbox Scryer delivers an unprecedented ability to solve use cases at scale The tool is intended for cybersecurity professionals who are interested in threat hunting and attack analysis leveraging sandbox output data. The Sandbox Scryer tool currently consumes output from the free and public Hybrid Analysis malware analysis service helping analysts expedite and scale threat hunting

Repository contents

[root] version.txt - Current tool version LICENSE - Defines license for source and other contents README.md - This file

[root\bin] \Linux - Pre-build binaries for running tool in Linux. Currently supports: Ubuntu x64 \MacOS - Pre-build binaries for running tool in MacOS. Currently supports: OSX 10.15 x64 \Windows - Pre-build binaries for running tool in Windows. Currently supports: Win10 x64

[root\presentation_video] Sandbox_Scryer__BlackHat_Presentation_and_demo.mp4 - Video walking through slide deck and showing demo of tool

[root\screenshots_and_videos] Various backing screenshots

[root\scripts] Parse_report_set.* - Windows PowerShell and DOS Command Window batch file scripts that invoke tool to parse each HA Sandbox report summary in test set Collate_Results.* - Windows PowerShell and DOS Command Window batch file scripts that invoke tool to collate data from parsing report summaries and generate a MITRE Navigator layer file

[root\slides] BlackHat_Arsenal_2022__Sandbox_Scryer__BH_template.pdf - PDF export of slides used to present the Sandbox Scryer at Black Hat 2022

[root\src] Sandbox_Scryer - Folder with source for Sandbox Scryer tool (in c#) and Visual Studio 2019 solution file

[root\test_data] (SHA256 filenames).json - Report summaries from submissions to Hybrid Analysis enterprise-attack__062322.json - MITRE CTI data TopAttackTechniques__High__060922.json - Top MITRE ATT&CK techniques generated with the MITRE calculator. Used to rank techniques for generating heat map in MITRE Navigator

[root\test_output] (SHA256)_report__summary_Error_Log.txt - Errors (if any) encountered while parsing report summary for SHA256 included in name (SHA256)_report__summary_Hits__Complete_List.png - Graphic showing tecniques noted while parsing report summary for SHA256 included in name (SHA256)_report__summary_MITRE_Attck_Hits.csv - For collation step, techniques and tactics with select metadata from parsing report summary for SHA256 included in name (SHA256)_report__summary_MITRE_Attck_Hits.txt - More human-readable form of .csv file. Includes ranking data of noted techniques

\collated_data collated_080122_MITRE_Attck_Heatmap.json - Layer file for import into MITRE Navigator

Operation

The Sandbox Scryer is intended to be invoked as a command-line tool, to facilitate scripting

Operation consists of two steps:

• Parsing, where a specified report summary is parsed to extract the output noted earlier
• Collation, where the data from the set of parsing results from the parsing step is collated to produce a Navigator layer file

Invocation examples:

• Parsing

• Collation

If the parameter "-h" is specified, the built-in help is displayed as shown here Sandbox_Scryer.exe -h

        Options:
           -h  Display command-line options
           -i  Input filepath
           -ita  Input filepath - MITRE report for top techniques
           -o  Output folder path
           -ft Type of file to submit
           -name Name to use with output
           -sb_name Identifier of sandbox to use  (default:  ha)
           -api_key API key to use with submission to sandbox
           -env_id Environment ID to use with submission to sandbox
           -inc_sub Include sub-techniques in graphical output  (default is to not include)
           -mitre_data Filepath for mitre cti data to parse (to populate att&ck techniques)
           -cmd  Command
                 Options:
                    parse  Process report file from prior sandbox submission
                           Uses -i, -ita, -   o, -name, -inc_sub, -sig_data   parameters
                    col    Collates report data from prior sandbox submissions
                           Uses -i (treated as folder path), -ita, -o, -name, -inc_sub, -mitre_data   parameters

Once the Navigator layer file is produced, it may be loaded into the Navigator for viewing via https://mitre-attack.github.io/attack-navigator/

Within the Navigator, techniques noted in the sandbox report summaries are highlighted and shown with increased heat based on a combined scoring of the technique ranking and the count of hits on the technique in the sandbox report summaries. Howevering of techniques will show select metadata.

Whids - Open Source EDR For Windows

What

EDR with artifact collection driven by detection. The detection engine is built on top of a previous project Gene specially designed to match Windows events against user defined rules.

What do you mean by "artifact collection driven by detection" ?

It means that an alert can directly trigger some artifact collection (file, registry, process memory). This way you are sure you collected the artifacts as soon as you could (near real time).

All this work has been done on my free time in the hope it would help other people, I hope you will enjoy it. Unless I get some funding to further develop this project, I will continue doing so. I will make all I can to fix issues in time and provide updates. Feel free to open issues to improve that project and keep it alive.

Why

• Provide an Open Source EDR to the community
• Make transparency on the detection rules to make analysts understand why a rule triggered
• Offer powerful detection primitives though a flexible rule engine
• Optimize Incident Response processes by drastically reducing the time between detection and artifact collection

How

NB: the EDR agent can be ran standalone (without being connected to an EDR manager)

Strengths

• Open Source
• Relies on Sysmon for all the heavy lifting (kernel component)
• Very powerful but also customizable detection engine
• Built by an Incident Responder for all Incident Responders to make their job easier
• Low footprint (no process injection)
• Can co-exist with any antivirus product (advised to run it along with MS Defender)
• Designed for high throughput. It can easily enrich and analyze 4M events a day per endpoint without performance impact. Good luck to achieve that with a SIEM.
• Easily integrable with other tools (Splunk, ELK, MISP ...)
• Integrated with ATT&CK framework

Weaknesses

• Only works on Windows
• Detection limited to what is available in Windows event logs channels ETW providers/sessions (already a lot in there)
• No process instrumentation (it is also a strength as it depends on the point of view)
• No GUI yet (will develop one if requested by the community)
• No support for ETW (available in beta)
• Tell me if you notice others ...

Installation

Requirements

1. Install Sysmon
2. Configure Sysmon
   • You can find optimized Sysmon configurations here
   • Logging any ProcessCreate and ProcessTerminate is mandatory
3. Take note of the path to your Sysmon binary because you will need it later on

NB: event filtering can be done at 100% with Gene rules so do not bother creating a complicated Sysmon configuration.

Pre-Installation Recommendations

In order to get the most of WHIDS you might want to improve your logging policy.

• Enable Powershell Module Logging
• Audit Service Creation: gpedit.msc -> Computer Configuration\Windows Settings\Security Settings\Advanced Audit Policy Configuration\System Audit Policies\System\Audit Security System Extension -> Enable
• Enable File System Audit. Sysmon only provides FileCreate events when new files are created, so if you want/need to log other kind of accesses (Read, Write, ...) you need to enable FS Auditing.
  1. gpedit.msc -> Computer Configuration\Windows Settings\Security Settings\Advanced Audit Policy Configuration\System Audit Policies\Object Access\Audit File System -> Enable
  2. Right Click Any Folder -> Properties -> Security -> Advanced -> Auditing -> Add
     1. Select a principal (put here the name of the user/group you want the audit for). Put group Everyone if you want to log access from any user.
     2. Apply this to is used to select the scope of this audit policy starting from the folder you have selected
     3. Basic permissions select the kinds of accesses you want the logs to be generated for
     4. Validate
  3. File System auditing logs will appear in the Security log channel
• If you want an antivirus to run on your endpoints, keep Microsoft Defender, first because it is a good AV but also because it logs alerts in a dedicated log channel Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender/Operational monitored by the EDR.

EDR Endpoint agent (Whids.exe)

This section covers the installation of the agent on the endpoint.

1. Download and extract the latest WHIDS release https://github.com/0xrawsec/whids/releases
2. Run manage.bat as administrator
3. Launch installation by selecting the appropriate option
4. Verify that files have been created at the installation directory
5. Edit configuration file by selecting the appropriate option in manage.bat or using your preferred text editor
6. Skip this if running with a connection to a manager, because rules will be updated automatically. If there is nothing in the rules directory the tool will be useless, so make sure there are some gene rules in there. Some rules are packaged with WHIDS and you will be prompted to choose if you want to install those or not. If you want the last up to date rules, you can get those here (take the compiled ones)
7. Start the services from appropriate option in manage.bat or just reboot (preferred option otherwise some enrichment fields will be incomplete leading to false alerts)
8. If you configured a manager do not forget to run it in order to receive alerts and dumps

NB: At installation time the Sysmon service will be made dependent of WHIDS service so that we are sure the EDR runs before Sysmon starts generating some events.

EDR Manager

The EDR manager can be installed on several platforms, pre-built binaries are provided for Windows, Linux and Darwin.

1. Create TLS certificate if needed for HTTPS connections
2. Create a configuration file (there is a command line argument to generate a basic config)
3. Run the binary

Configuration Examples

Please visit doc/configuration.md

Further Documentation

• Endpoint Manager REST API documentation
• How to write rules
• Getting EDR detection rules
• Overview of events enrichment

Known Issues

• Does not work properly when ran from a network share mapped as a network drive (this case prevent whids to identify itself and thus generate some noise). Example: if \\vbox\test is mounted as Z: drive, running Z:\whids.exe won't work while running \\vbox\test\whids.exe actually would.

Roadmap until next release

• find a new name to the project because we all agree it sucks
• better sysmon integration (config, deployment, update)
• endpoint configuration from manager
• tooling management (update, install), like OSQuery
• code refactoring and optimization
• implement a performance monitor
• get rid of any on-disk configuration
• implement IOC management capabilities
• ETW support
• automatic documentation (OpenAPI) and testing of manager's API
• provide endpoint system information in manager
• implement actionable rules
• provide canary file management
• builtin commands to be executed by endpoints
• provide Incident Response reports about endpoints
• overall manager API improvement
• provide event streams so that a client can receive events in realtime
• standardize HTTP headers
• provide a python library to interact with EDR manager (https://github.com/0xrawsec/pywhids)

Changelog

v1.7

• New Administrative HTTP API with following features:
  • Manage endpoints (list, create, delete)
  • Get basic statistics about the manager
  • Execute commands on endpoints and get results
    • Can drop files prior to execution, to execute binaries/scripts not present on endpoint. Dropped files are deleted after command was ran.
    • Can retrieve files (post command execution), to retrieve results of the command
  • Collect files from endpoints for forensic purposes
  • Contain / Uncontain endpoints by restricting any network traffic except communication to the manager.
  • Query endpoints logs
  • Query endpoints alerts
  • Pivot on a timestamp and retrieve logs/alerts around that time pivot
  • Access endpoint report
    • Scoring (relative to each environment) allowing to sort endpoints and spot the ones behaving differently from the others.
    • Alerts / TTPs observed on a given time frame
  • Manage rules (list, create, update, save, delete)
• Integration with Sysmon v12 and v13
  • Integrate ClipboardData events
    • Put the content of the clipboard data inside the event to allow creating rule on the content of the clipboard
  • Integrate ProcessTampering events
    • Enrich event with a diffing score between .text section on disk and in memory
• Implemented certificate pinning on client to enhance security of the communication channel between endpoints and management server
• Log filtering capabilities, allowing one to collect contextual events. Log filtering is achieved by creating Gene filtering rules (c.f. Gene Documentation).
• Configuration files in TOML format for better readability
• Better protection of the installation directory

Related Work

• Sysmon Based EDR written in PowerShell: https://github.com/ion-storm/sysmon-edr
• Comodo Open Source EDR with user and kernel components: https://github.com/ComodoSecurity/openedr
• Sysmon X: https://github.com/marcosd4h/sysmonx

Sponsors

Github:https://github.com/tines Website:https://www.tines.com/ Twitter:@tines_io

Matano - The Open-Source Security Lake Platform For AWS

Matano is an open source security lake platform for AWS. It lets you ingest petabytes of security and log data from various sources, store and query them in an open Apache Iceberg data lake, and create Python detections as code for realtime alerting. Matano is fully serverless and designed specifically for AWS and focuses on enabling high scale, low cost, and zero-ops. Matano deploys fully into your AWS account.

Features

Collect data from all your sources

Matano lets you collect log data from sources using S3 or SQS based ingestion.

Ingest, transform, normalize log data

Matano normalizes and transforms your data using Vector Remap Language (VRL). Matano works with the Elastic Common Schema (ECS) by default and you can define your own schema.

Store data in S3 object storage

Log data is always stored in S3 object storage, for cost effective, long term, durable storage.

Apache Iceberg Data lake

All data is ingested into an Apache Iceberg based data lake, allowing you to perform ACID transactions, time travel, and more on all your log data. Apache Iceberg is an open table format, so you always own your own data, with no vendor lock-in.

Serverless

Matano is a fully serverless platform, designed for zero-ops and unlimited elastic horizontal scaling.

Detections as code

Write Python detections to implement realtime alerting on your log data.

Installing

View the complete installation instructions.

You can install the matano CLI to deploy Matano into your AWS account, and manage your Matano deployment.

Requirements

• Docker

Installation

Matano provides a nightly release with the latest prebuilt files to install the Matano CLI on GitHub. You can download and execute these files to install Matano.

For example, to install the Matano CLI for Linux, run:

curl -OL https://github.com/matanolabs/matano/releases/download/nightly/matano-linux-x64.sh
chmod +x matano-linux-x64.sh
sudo ./matano-linux-x64.sh

Getting started

Read the complete docs on getting started.

Deployment

To get started with Matano, run the matano init command. Make sure you have AWS credentials in your environment (or in an AWS CLI profile).

The interactive CLI wizard will walk you through getting started by generating an initial Matano directory for you, initializing your AWS account, and deploying Matano into your AWS account.

Initial deployment takes a few minutes.

Documentation

View our complete documentation.

License

• Apache-2.0 License