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CrimsonEDR is an open-source project engineered to identify specific malware patterns, offering a tool for honing skills in circumventing Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR). By leveraging diverse detection methods, it empowers users to deepen their understanding of security evasion tactics.
| Detection | Description |
|---|---|
| Direct Syscall | Detects the usage of direct system calls, often employed by malware to bypass traditional API hooks. |
| NTDLL Unhooking | Identifies attempts to unhook functions within the NTDLL library, a common evasion technique. |
| AMSI Patch | Detects modifications to the Anti-Malware Scan Interface (AMSI) through byte-level analysis. |
| ETW Patch | Detects byte-level alterations to Event Tracing for Windows (ETW), commonly manipulated by malware to evade detection. |
| PE Stomping | Identifies instances of PE (Portable Executable) stomping. |
| Reflective PE Loading | Detects the reflective loading of PE files, a technique employed by malware to avoid static analysis. |
| Unbacked Thread Origin | Identifies threads originating from unbacked memory regions, often indicative of malicious activity. |
| Unbacked Thread Start Address | Detects threads with start addresses pointing to unbacked memory, a potential sign of code injection. |
| API hooking | Places a hook on the NtWriteVirtualMemory function to monitor memory modifications. |
| Custom Pattern Search | Allows users to search for specific patterns provided in a JSON file, facilitating the identification of known malware signatures. |
To get started with CrimsonEDR, follow these steps:
FreshRSS 
bash sudo apt-get install gcc-mingw-w64-x86-64
bash git clone https://github.com/Helixo32/CrimsonEDR
bash cd CrimsonEDR; chmod +x compile.sh; ./compile.sh
Windows Defender and other antivirus programs may flag the DLL as malicious due to its content containing bytes used to verify if the AMSI has been patched. Please ensure to whitelist the DLL or disable your antivirus temporarily when using CrimsonEDR to avoid any interruptions.
To use CrimsonEDR, follow these steps:
ioc.json file is placed in the current directory from which the executable being monitored is launched. For example, if you launch your executable to monitor from C:\Users\admin\, the DLL will look for ioc.json in C:\Users\admin\ioc.json. Currently, ioc.json contains patterns related to msfvenom. You can easily add your own in the following format:{
"IOC": [
["0x03", "0x4c", "0x24", "0x08", "0x45", "0x39", "0xd1", "0x75"],
["0xf1", "0x4c", "0x03", "0x4c", "0x24", "0x08", "0x45", "0x39"],
["0x58", "0x44", "0x8b", "0x40", "0x24", "0x49", "0x01", "0xd0"],
["0x66", "0x41", "0x8b", "0x0c", "0x48", "0x44", "0x8b", "0x40"],
["0x8b", "0x0c", "0x48", "0x44", "0x8b", "0x40", "0x1c", "0x49"],
["0x01", "0xc1", "0x38", "0xe0", "0x75", "0xf1", "0x4c", "0x03"],
["0x24", "0x49", "0x01", "0xd0", "0x66", "0x41", "0x8b", "0x0c"],
["0xe8", "0xcc", "0x00", "0x00", "0x00", "0x41", "0x51", "0x41"]
]
}
Execute CrimsonEDRPanel.exe with the following arguments:
-d <path_to_dll>: Specifies the path to the CrimsonEDR.dll file.
-p <process_id>: Specifies the Process ID (PID) of the target process where you want to inject the DLL.
For example:
.\CrimsonEDRPanel.exe -d C:\Temp\CrimsonEDR.dll -p 1234
Here are some useful resources that helped in the development of this project:
For questions, feedback, or support, please reach out to me via:
DllNotificationInection is a POC of a new “threadless” process injection technique that works by utilizing the concept of DLL Notification Callbacks in local and remote processes.
An accompanying blog post with more details is available here:
https://shorsec.io/blog/dll-notification-injection/
DllNotificationInection works by creating a new LDR_DLL_NOTIFICATION_ENTRY in the remote process. It inserts it manually into the remote LdrpDllNotificationList by patching of the List.Flink of the list head and the List.Blink of the first entry (now second) of the list.
Our new LDR_DLL_NOTIFICATION_ENTRY will point to a custom trampoline shellcode (built with @C5pider's ShellcodeTemplate project) that will restore our changes and execute a malicious shellcode in a new thread using TpWorkCallback.
After manually registering our new entry in the remote process we just need to wait for the remote process to trigger our DLL Notification Callback by loading or unloading some DLL. This obviously doesn't happen in every process regularly so prior work finding suitable candidates for this injection technique is needed. From my brief searching, it seems that RuntimeBroker.exe and explorer.exe are suitable candidates for this, although I encourage you to find others as well.
This is a POC. In order for this to be OPSEC safe and evade AV/EDR products, some modifications are needed. For example, I used RWX when allocating memory for the shellcodes - don't be lazy (like me) and change those. One also might want to replace OpenProcess, ReadProcessMemory and WriteProcessMemory with some lower level APIs and use Indirect Syscalls or (shameless plug) HWSyscalls. Maybe encrypt the shellcodes or even go the extra mile and modify the trampoline shellcode to suit your needs, or at least change the default hash values in @C5pider's ShellcodeTemplate project which was utilized to create the trampoline shellcode.
MemTracer is a tool that offers live memory analysis capabilities, allowing digital forensic practitioners to discover and investigate stealthy attack traces hidden in memory. The MemTracer is implemented in Python language, aiming to detect reflectively loaded native .NET framework Dynamic-Link Library (DLL). This is achieved by looking for the following abnormal memory region’s characteristics:
The tool starts by scanning the running processes, and by analyzing the allocated memory regions characteristics to detect reflective DLL loading symptoms. Suspicious memory regions which are identified as DLL modules are dumped for further analysis and investigation.
Furthermore, the tool features the following options:
python.exe memScanner.py [-h] [-r] [-m MODULE]
-h, --help show this help message and exit
-r, --reflectiveScan Looking for reflective DLL loading
-m MODULE, --module MODULE Looking for spcefic loaded DLL
The script needs administrator privileges in order incepect all processes.
While DLL sideloading can be used for legitimate purposes, such as loading necessary libraries for a program to function, it can also be used for malicious purposes. Attackers can use DLL sideloading to execute arbitrary code on a target system, often by exploiting vulnerabilities in legitimate applications that are used to load DLLs.
To automate the DLL sideloading process and make it more effective, Chimera was created a tool that include evasion methodologies to bypass EDR/AV products. These tool can automatically encrypt a shellcode via XOR with a random key and create template Images that can be imported into Visual Studio to create a malicious DLL.
Also Dynamic Syscalls from SysWhispers2 is used and a modified assembly version to evade the pattern that the EDR search for, Random nop sleds are added and also registers are moved. Furthermore Early Bird Injection is also used to inject the shellcode in another process which the user can specify with Sandbox Evasion mechanisms like HardDisk check & if the process is being debugged. Finally Timing attack is placed in the loader which using waitable timers to delay the execution of the shellcode.
This tool has been tested and shown to be effective at bypassing EDR/AV products and executing arbitrary code on a target system.
Chimera is written in python3 and there is no need to install any extra dependencies.
Chimera currently supports two DLL options either Microsoft teams or Microsoft OneDrive.
Someone can create userenv.dll which is a missing DLL from Microsoft Teams and insert it to the specific folder to
%USERPROFILE%/Appdata/local/Microsoft/Teams/current
For Microsoft OneDrive the script uses version DLL which is common because its missing from the binary example onedriveupdater.exe
python3 ./chimera.py met.bin chimera_automation notepad.exe teams
python3 ./chimera.py met.bin chimera_automation notepad.exe onedrive
Once the compilation process is complete, a DLL will be generated, which should include either "version.dll" for OneDrive or "userenv.dll" for Microsoft Teams. Next, it is necessary to rename the original DLLs.
For instance, the original "userenv.dll" should be renamed as "tmpB0F7.dll," while the original "version.dll" should be renamed as "tmp44BC.dll." Additionally, you have the option to modify the name of the proxy DLL as desired by altering the source code of the DLL exports instead of using the default script names.
Step 1: Creating a New Visual Studio Project with DLL Template
Step 2: Importing Images into the Visual Studio Project
Step 3: Build Customization
Step 4: Enable MASM
Step 5:
Step 1: Change optimization
Step 2: Remove Debug Information's
To the maximum extent permitted by applicable law, myself(George Sotiriadis) and/or affiliates who have submitted content to my repo, shall not be liable for any indirect, incidental, special, consequential or punitive damages, or any loss of profits or revenue, whether incurred directly or indirectly, or any loss of data, use, goodwill, or other intangible losses, resulting from (i) your access to this resource and/or inability to access this resource; (ii) any conduct or content of any third party referenced by this resource, including without limitation, any defamatory, offensive or illegal conduct or other users or third parties; (iii) any content obtained from this resource
https://evasions.checkpoint.com/
https://github.com/Flangvik/SharpDllProxy
https://github.com/jthuraisamy/SysWhispers2
https://github.com/Mr-Un1k0d3r
This tool allows you to list protected processes, get the protection level of a specific process, or set an arbitrary protection level. For more information, you can read this blog post: Debugging Protected Processes.
You can get a copy of the MSI driver RTCore64.sys here: PPLKiller/driver.
Disclaimer: it goes without saying that you should never install this driver on your host machine. Use a VM!
sc.exe create RTCore64 type= kernel start= auto binPath= C:\PATH\TO\RTCore64.sys DisplayName= "Micro - Star MSI Afterburner"
net start RTCore64List protected processes.
PPLcontrol.exe listGet the protection level of a specific process.
PPLcontrol.exe get 1234Set an arbitrary protection level.
PPLcontrol.exe set 1234 PPL WinTcbProtect a non-protected process with an arbitrary protection level. This will also automatically adjust the signature levels accordingly.
PPLcontrol.exe protect 1234 PPL WinTcbUnprotect a protected process. This will set the protection level to 0 (i.e. None) and the EXE/DLL signature levels to 0 (i.e. Unchecked).
PPLcontrol.exe unprotect 1234net stop RTCore64
sc.exe delete RTCore64WinDbg just needs to open the target process, so you can use PPLcontrol to set an arbitrary protection level on your windbg.exe process.
windbg.exe process.C:\Temp>tasklist | findstr /i windbg
windbg.exe 1232 Console 1 24,840 K
C:\Temp>PPLcontrol.exe protect 1232 PPL WinTcb
[+] The Protection 'PPL-WinTcb' was set on the process with PID 1232, previous protection was: 'None-None'.
[+] The Signature level 'WindowsTcb' and the Section signature level 'Windows' were set on the process with PID 1232.In addition to opening the target process, API monitor injects a DLL into it. Therefore, setting an arbitrary protection level on your apimonitor.exe process won't suffice. Since the injected DLL is not properly signed for this purpose, the Section signature flag of the target process will likely prevent it from being loaded. However, you can temporarily disable the protection on the target process, start monitoring it, and restore the protection right after.
Failed to load module in target process - Error: 577, Windows cannot verify the digital signature for this file. A recent hardware or software change might have installed a file that is signed incorrectly or damaged, or that might be malicious software from an unknown source.C:\Temp>tasklist | findstr /i target
target.exe 1337 Services 1 14,160 K
C:\Temp>PPLcontrol.exe get 1337
[+] The process with PID 1337 is a PPL with the Signer type 'WinTcb' (6).
C:\Temp>PPLcontrol.exe unprotect 1337
[+] The process with PID 1337 is no longer a PP(L).
C:\Temp>PPLcontrol.exe protect 1337 PPL WinTcb
[+] The Protection 'PPL-WinTcb' was set on the process with PID 1337, previous protection was: 'None-None'.
[+] The Signature level 'WindowsTcb' and the Section signature level 'Windows' were set on the process with PID 1337.Release/x64 (x86 is not supported and will probably never be).
