Authorities in the United States and United Kingdom today levied financial sanctions against seven men accused of operating “Trickbot,” a cybercrime-as-a-service platform based in Russia that has enabled countless ransomware attacks and bank account takeovers since its debut in 2016. The U.S. Department of the Treasury says the Trickbot group is associated with Russian intelligence services, and that this alliance led to the targeting of many U.S. companies and government entities.
Initially a stealthy trojan horse program delivered via email and used to steal passwords, Trickbot evolved into “a highly modular malware suite that provides the Trickbot Group with the ability to conduct a variety of illegal cyber activities, including ransomware attacks,” the Treasury Department said.
A spam email from 2020 containing a Trickbot-infected attachment. Image: Microsoft.
“During the height of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, Trickbot targeted hospitals and healthcare centers, launching a wave of ransomware attacks against hospitals across the United States,” the sanctions notice continued. “In one of these attacks, the Trickbot Group deployed ransomware against three Minnesota medical facilities, disrupting their computer networks and telephones, and causing a diversion of ambulances. Members of the Trickbot Group publicly gloated over the ease of targeting the medical facilities and the speed with which the ransoms were paid to the group.”
Only one of the men sanctioned today is known to have been criminally charged in connection with hacking activity. According to the Treasury Department, the alleged senior leader of the Trickbot group is 34-year-old Russian national Vitaly “Bentley” Kovalev.
A New Jersey grand jury indicted Kovalev in 2012 after an investigation by the U.S. Secret Service determined that he ran a massive “money mule” scheme, which used phony job offers to trick people into laundering money stolen from hacked small to mid-sized businesses in the United States. The 2012 indictment against Kovalev relates to cybercrimes he allegedly perpetrated prior to the creation of Trickbot.
In 2015, Kovalev reportedly began filming a movie in Russia about cybercrime called “Botnet.” According to a 2016 story from Forbes.ru, Botnet’s opening scene was to depict the plight of Christina Svechinskaya, a Russian student arrested by FBI agents in September 2010.
Christina Svechinskaya, a money mule hired by Bentley who was arrested by the FBI in 2010.
Svechinskaya was one of Bentley’s money mules, most of whom were young Russian students on temporary travel visas in the United States. She was among 37 alleged mules charged with aiding an international cybercrime operation — basically, setting up phony corporate bank accounts for the sole purpose of laundering stolen funds.
Although she possessed no real hacking skills, Svechinskaya’s mugshot and social media photos went viral online and she was quickly dubbed “the world’s sexiest computer hacker” by the tabloids.
Kovalev’s Botnet film project was disrupted after Russian authorities raided the film production company’s offices as part of a cybercrime investigation. In February 2016, Reuters reported that the raid was connected to a crackdown on “Dyre,” a sophisticated trojan that U.S. federal investigators say was the precursor to the Trickbot malware. The Forbes.ru article cited sources close to the investigation who said the film studio was operating as a money-laundering front for the cybercrooks behind Dyre.
But shifting political winds in Russia would soon bring high treason charges against three of the Russian cybercrime investigators tied to the investigation into the film studio. In a major shakeup in 2017, the Kremlin levied treason charges against Sergey Mikhaylov, then deputy chief of Russia’s top anti-cybercrime unit.
Also charged with treason was Ruslan Stoyanov, then a senior employee at Russian security firm Kaspersky Lab [the Forbes.ru report from 2016 said investigators from Mikhaylov’s unit and Kaspersky Lab were present at the film company raid].
Russian media outlets have speculated that the men were accused of treason for helping American cybercrime investigators pursue top Russian hackers. However, the charges against both men were classified and have never been officially revealed. After their brief, closed trial, both men were convicted of treason. Mikhaylov was given a 22 year prison sentence; Stoyanov was sentenced to 14 years in prison.
In September 2021, the Kremlin issued treason charges against Ilya Sachkov, formerly head of the cybersecurity firm Group-IB. According to Reuters, Sachkov and his company were hired by the film studio “to advise the Botnet director and writers on the finer points of cybercrime.” Sachkov remains imprisoned in Russia pending his treason trial.
Trickbot was heavily used by Conti and Ryuk, two of Russia’s most ruthless and successful ransomware groups. Blockchain analysis firm Chainalysis estimates that in 2021 alone, Conti extorted more than USD $100 million from its hacking victims; Chainalysis estimates Ryuk extorted more than USD $150 million from its ransomware victims.
The U.S. cybersecurity firm CrowdStrike has long tracked the activities of Trickbot, Ryuk and Conti under the same moniker — “Wizard Spider” — which CrowdStrike describes as “a Russia-nexus cybercriminal group behind the core development and distribution of a sophisticated arsenal of criminal tools, that allow them to run multiple different types of operations.”
“CrowdStrike Intelligence has observed WIZARD SPIDER targeting multiple countries and industries such as academia, energy, financial services, government, and more,” said Adam Meyers, head of intelligence at CrowdStrike.
This is not the U.S. government’s first swipe at the Trickbot group. In early October 2020, KrebsOnSecurity broke the news that someone had launched a series of coordinated attacks designed to disrupt the Trickbot botnet. A week later, The Washington Post ran a story saying the attack on Trickbot was the work of U.S. Cyber Command, a branch of the Department of Defense headed by the director of the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA).
Days after Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, a Ukrainian researcher leaked several years of internal chat logs from the Conti ransomware gang. Those candid conversations offer a fascinating view into the challenges of running a sprawling criminal enterprise with more than 100 salaried employees. They also showed that Conti enjoyed protection from prosecution by Russian authorities, as long as the hacker group took care not to target Russian organizations.
In addition, the leaked Conti chats confirmed there was considerable overlap in the operation and leadership of Conti, Trickbot and Ryuk.
Michael DeBolt, chief intelligence officer at cybersecurity firm Intel 471, said the leaked Conti chats showed Bentley oversaw a team of coders tasked with ensuring that the Trickbot and Conti malware remained undetected by the different antivirus and security software vendors.
In the years prior to the emergence of Trickbot in 2016, Bentley worked closely on the Gameover ZeuS trojan, a peer-to-peer malware threat that infected between 500,000 and a million computers with an automated ransomware strain called Cryptolocker, DeBolt said.
The FBI has a standing $3 million bounty offered for the capture of Evgeny “Slavik” Bogachev, the alleged author of the Zeus trojan. And there are indications that Bentley worked directly with Bogachev. DeBolt pointed to an October 2014 discussion on the exclusive Russian hacking forum Mazafaka that included a complaint by a Russian hosting firm against a forum user by the name “Ferrari” who had failed to pay a $30,000 hosting bill.
In that discussion thread, it emerged that the hosting company thought it was filing a complaint against Slavik. But the Mazafaka member who vouched for Ferrari’s membership on the forum said they knew Ferrari as Bentley the mule handler, and at some point Slavik and Bentley must have been sharing the Ferrari user account.
“It is likely that Slavik (aka. Bogachev) and Bentley (aka. Kovalev) shared the same ‘Ferrari’ handle on the Mazafaka forum circa 2014, which suggests the two had a working relationship at that time, and supports the recent US and UK Government announcements regarding Kovalev’s past involvement in cybercrime predating Dyre or the Trickbot Group,” DeBolt said.
CrowdStrike’s Meyers said while Wizard Spider operations have significantly reduced following the demise of Conti in June 2022, today’s sanctions will likely cause temporary disruptions for the cybercriminal group while they look for ways to circumvent the financial restrictions — which make it illegal to transact with or hold the assets of sanctioned persons or entities.
“Often, when cybercriminal groups are disrupted, they will go dark for a time only to rebrand under a new name,” Meyers said.
The prosecution of Kovalev is being handled by the U.S. Attorney’s Office in New Jersey. A copy of the now-unsealed 2012 indictment of Kovalev is here (PDF).
Written by James Schmidt
Editor’s Note: We often speak of online scams in our blogs, ones that cost victims hundreds if not thousands of dollars. This account puts a face on one of those scams—along with the personal, financial, and emotional pain that they can leave in their wake. This is the story of “Meredith,” whose aunt “Leslie” fell victim to an emerging form on online elder fraud. Our thanks to James for bringing it forward and to “Meredith’s” family for sharing it, all so others can prevent such scams from happening to them.
“Embarrassing. Simply embarrassing.” She shook her head. “It’s too raw. I can’t talk about it right now. I need time.”
Her aunt had been scammed. To the tune of $100,000 dollars. My colleague—we both work in the security industry—felt a peculiar sense of loss.
“I work in this industry. I thought I’d done everything right. I’ve passed on enough warnings to my family and friends to ensure they’d avoid the fate of the scammed. Simply because I’m in this industry does not imply my circle is always aware of all the threats to them, even if I do my best to teach them.”
“My mental state, recently, borders on shame; this feeling, you know? How could someone working in my industry have something like this happen to a family member?”
I told her many people working in other industries cannot control what happens to people in their families even if people in that industry had knowledge that could have helped them or otherwise avoided a problem altogether.
“I know, but this simply should never have happened! My aunt is one of the smartest, most conscientious people I know, and she fell for this. It’s crazy and I can’t wrap my head around it.”
My colleague, let’s call her Meredith (not her real name as she’s a bit ashamed to know this happened to a family member), told me the beginnings.
Let’s call her aunt Leslie.
Her story unfolds, the overall picture a pastiche of millions of people in the United States today. Her aunt is retired, bored, lonely, and isolated. She feels adrift without something to occupy her time; she was looking for companionship, connections, someone (anyone) to talk to. Her feelings intensified during the pandemic. She morphed into perfect prey for scammers of what is now known as the “Pig Butchering Scam.”
The term “Pig Butchering” has a visceral and raw feel to it, which falls right in line with how brutal this scam can be. It’s a long con game, where the scammer befriends the victim and encourages them to make small investments through the scammer, which get bigger and bigger over time. The scammer builds trust early with what appear to be small investment wins. None of it is legit. The money goes right into the scammer’s pocket, even as the scammer shows the victim phony financial statements and dashboards to show off the bogus returns. Confidence grows. The scammer wrings even larger sums out of the victim. And then disappears.
It was a targeted attack that started innocuously enough with a “fake wrong number”. An SMS arrives. A text conversation starts. The scammer then apologizes but tells Leslie someone gave them the number to initiate the text.
The scammer then uses emotional and psychological techniques to keep Leslie hooked. “How are you, are you having a nice day?” Leslie, being bored and interested, engages willingly.
The scammer asks to talk directly, not via text: and a phone conversation ensues. The scammer proceeds to describe—in very soothing detail—what they are doing, helping people, like Leslie, invest their “hard-earned money” into something that will make them more money, to help them out in retirement.
Of course, it is too good to be true.
“The craziest part of all of this is my aunt refuses—to this day—to believe she’s been scammed!”
She still thinks this scammer is a “friend” even though the entire family is up in arms over this, all of whom beg her aunt to “open her eyes.”
“My aunt still thinks she’d going to see that money again, or even make some money, which is crazy. The scammers are so good at emotional intelligence; really leveraging heartstrings and psychological makeup of the forlorn in society. My aunt finally agreed to stop sending more money to the scammers, but only after the entire family threatened to cut her off from the rest of the family. It took a lot to get her to stop trusting the scammers.”
Meredith feels this is doubly sad as the aunt in question is not someone they’d ever imagine would in this predicament. She was always the upright one, always the diligent and hardworking and the best with money. She is smart and savvy and we could never imagine her to be taken by these people and taken so easily. It boggles the mind.”
She did start to change in the last few years. And the pandemic created a weird situation. Retirement, loneliness from loss of a partner, and the added burden of the pandemic created a perfect storm for her to open herself up to someone willingly, simply for the sake of connection.
“No one deserves this. It has rocked my family to the core. It is not only about the money, but we’ve found family bonds stretched. She believes these random people, these scammers, more than she believes her own family. Have we been neglectful of our aunt? Does she no longer put her faith in people she knows, rather gives money to complete strangers?”
Being a security professional does not provide magical protection. We are more aware of scams and scammers, and how they work, and what to look for, and we try to do all we can to keep our family aware of scams out there in the big wide world, but we are human. We fall short.
Diligence is action. Awareness is action. Education is action.
We need to be better, all of us, at socializing risky things. We need to consistently educate our family and friends to protect themselves, not only via security software (which everyone should have as default) but by providing tips and tricks and warnings for things we all need to be on the lookout. This is not a one-time thing. The cliché holds true: “If you see something say something.” Repetition helps.
In today’s world, the need for protecting people’s security, identity, and privacy is critical to keeping them safe. Scammers long stopped focusing on attacking only your computer. Now focus more than ever on YOU: your identity, your privacy, your trust. If they get you there, they soon get your money.
As for contributing factors to scammers success with their victims, such as loneliness, isolation, and boredom, they all have remedies. Make connections with your loved ones, especially those easily tagged as vulnerable, those you feel might be at risk. Reach out. It may be hard sometimes due to distance and other factors but make it a point to connect. There is a reason these scammers are succeeding. They are stepping into roles of companions to people who are desperate for connection.
Most people are greatly saddened at seeing other people being “taken.” Let’s work together to help stop the scammers.
Look out for each other, and get your people protected!
Editor’s Closing Note:
If you or someone you know suspects elder fraud, the following resources can help:
For further reading on scams and scam prevention, check out the guides in our McAfee Safety Series, which provide in-depth advice on protecting your identity and privacy—and your family from scams. They’re ready to download and share.
The post A Scam in the Family—How a Close Relative Lost $100,000 to an Elder Scam appeared first on McAfee Blog.
It’s been like this from the start—wherever people shop, do business, or simply gather together, you’ll find thieves in the mix, ready to take advantage. And that’s truer today when it comes to life online as cybercriminals use the internet to steal financial or personal data for their personal gain—otherwise known as identity theft.
This is a criminal act and can affect your credit score in a negative way and cost money to fix. It can also affect employment opportunities since some employers conduct a credit check on top of drug testing and a criminal history check. Identity theft victims may even experience an impact to their mental health as they work to resolve their case.
This could include private details like your birth date, bank account information, Social Security number, home address, and more. With data like this, an individual can adopt your identity (or even create a fake identity using pieces of your personal profile) and apply for loans, credit cards, debit cards, and more.
You don’t have to be kept in the dark, though. The good news is that being able to recognize the signs of identity theft means you can act quickly to intervene and minimize any effects in case it happens to you. You can also protect yourself by using preventive measures and engaging in smart online behavior.
Steps to take if you think your identity has been stolen
There are several signs that your identity has been stolen, from a change in your credit score to receiving unfamiliar bills and debt collectors calling about unfamiliar new accounts. It may be an unusual charge on one of your cards, however small. Or you may use a credit monitoring service like ours and receive an alert of suspicious activity. However it comes to your attention, you can act fast to minimize what happens.
File a police report
Start by contacting law enforcement to file a report. Your local police department can issue a formal report, which you may need to get your bank or other financial institution to reverse fraudulent charges. An official report assures the bank that you have been affected by identity fraud and it’s not a scam.
Before going to the police, gather all the relevant information about what happened. This could include the dates and times of fraudulent activity and any account numbers affected. Bringing copies of your bank statements can be useful. Also, make note of any suspicious activity that could be related. For example, was your debit card recently lost or your email hacked? The police will want to know.
Notify the company where the fraud occurred
You should also notify any businesses linked to your identity theft case. Depending on the type of identity theft, this could include banks, credit card companies, medical offices, health insurers, e-commerce stores, and more. Similarly, a fraudster may assume your identity to gain access to health care services, such as medical checkups, prescription drugs, or pricey medical devices. For instance, if someone uses your health insurance to get prescription drugs from a pharmacy, make sure to alert the pharmacy and your insurer.
File a report with the Federal Trade Commission
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is a government body that protects consumer interests. You can report identity theft via their portal, IdentityTheft.gov. They’ll then use the details you provide to create a free recovery plan you can use to address the effects of identity theft, like contacting the major credit bureaus or alerting the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) fraud department. You can report your case online or by calling 1-877-438-4338.
Outside of the U.S., our knowledge base article on identity theft offers suggestions for the specific steps you can take in specific countries, along with helpful links for local authorities that you can turn to for reporting and assistance.
Ask credit reporting agencies to issue a fraud alert
A common consequence of identity theft is a dip in the victim’s credit score. For example, a cybercriminal may take out new lines of credit in the victim’s name, accrue credit card debt, and then not pay the balance. For this reason, contacting the credit monitoring bureaus is one of the most important steps to take in identity theft cases.
There are three main agencies in the U.S.: TransUnion, Equifax, and Experian. You can get a free credit report from each agency every 12 months via AnnualCreditReport.com. Check the report and note all fraudulent activity or false information and flag it with the relevant bureau’s fraud department. You should also initiate a fraud alert with each agency.
A fraud alert requires any creditors to verify your identity before opening a new line of credit. This adds an extra layer of security. An initial fraud alert lasts for 90 days. Once this expires, you can prolong your protection via an extended fraud alert, which will remain valid for seven years. You can notify one of the big three bureaus to set it up. They are then required to notify the other two bureaus.
A credit freeze is another smart move, which you can do through each of the three major credit bureaus. You can either call them or start the process online. This prevents people from accessing your credit report. Lenders, creditors, retailers, landlords, and others may want to see your credit as proof of financial stability. For example, if someone tries to open a phone contract under your name, the retailer may check the credit report. If there is a credit freeze in place, they won’t be able to view it and won’t issue the contract. If you need to allow someone access to your credit report, you can temporarily lift the freeze. And depending on your plan, you can issue a credit freeze or an even more comprehensive security freeze right from the McAfee app.
Change passwords for your accounts
Identity theft is often linked with leaked or hacked passwords. Even if you aren’t sure whether your passwords have been compromised, it’s best to play it safe. Change passwords to any affected accounts. Make sure to use strong, unique passwords for each of your accounts with a mix of numbers, letters, and symbols. A password manager included with comprehensive online protection software can do the work for you by creating and securely storing them for you. Further, if there’s a chance to activate two-factor authentication on your accounts go ahead and use it as it makes accessing accounts with a stolen password more difficult.
Is it possible to prevent identity theft?
Putting thorough protections in place can greatly reduce your risk of identity theft. As mentioned above, our McAfee+ plans offer a broad set of features that can help protect your identity. You monitor your credit, monitor your identity, and even help you restore your credit with identity theft & restoration services that cover up to $1 million in losses due to identity theft and connect you with recovery pros who can help you clean up your credit.
Additionally, you can grab a copy of our free Identity Protection Guide that covers the topic in detail—it’s part of our McAfee Safety Series, dedicated to ways you can protect yourself for a safer, more enjoyable life online.
If identity theft happens to you …
Realizing that you’ve become a victim carries plenty of emotion with it, which is understandable—the thief has stolen a part of you to get at your money, information, or even reputation. Once that initial rush of anger and surprise has passed, it’s time to get clinical and get busy. Right away.
Think like a detective who is building—and closing—a case. That’s exactly what you’re doing. Follow the steps, document each one, and build up your case file as you need. Staying cool, organized, and ready with an answer for any questions you’ll face in the process of restoring your identity will help you see things through.
The post What Should You Do if Your Identity Has Been Stolen? appeared first on McAfee Blog.
Written by James Schmidt
Editor’s Note: We often speak of online scams in our blogs, ones that cost victims hundreds if not thousands of dollars. This account puts a face on one of those scams—along with the personal, financial, and emotional pain that they can leave in their wake. This is the story of “Meredith,” whose aunt “Leslie” fell victim to an emerging form on online elder fraud. Our thanks to James for bringing it forward and to “Meredith’s” family for sharing it, all so others can prevent such scams from happening to them.
“Embarrassing. Simply embarrassing.” She shook her head. “It’s too raw. I can’t talk about it right now. I need time.”
Her aunt had been scammed. To the tune of $100,000 dollars. My colleague—we both work in the security industry—felt a peculiar sense of loss.
“I work in this industry. I thought I’d done everything right. I’ve passed on enough warnings to my family and friends to ensure they’d avoid the fate of the scammed. Simply because I’m in this industry does not imply my circle is always aware of all the threats to them, even if I do my best to teach them.”
“My mental state, recently, borders on shame; this feeling, you know? How could someone working in my industry have something like this happen to a family member?”
I told her many people working in other industries cannot control what happens to people in their families even if people in that industry had knowledge that could have helped them or otherwise avoided a problem altogether.
“I know, but this simply should never have happened! My aunt is one of the smartest, most conscientious people I know, and she fell for this. It’s crazy and I can’t wrap my head around it.”
My colleague, let’s call her Meredith (not her real name as she’s a bit ashamed to know this happened to a family member), told me the beginnings.
Let’s call her aunt Leslie.
Her story unfolds, the overall picture a pastiche of millions of people in the United States today. Her aunt is retired, bored, lonely, and isolated. She feels adrift without something to occupy her time; she was looking for companionship, connections, someone (anyone) to talk to. Her feelings intensified during the pandemic. She morphed into perfect prey for scammers of what is now known as the “Pig Butchering Scam.”
The term “Pig Butchering” has a visceral and raw feel to it, which falls right in line with how brutal this scam can be. It’s a long con game, where the scammer befriends the victim and encourages them to make small investments through the scammer, which get bigger and bigger over time. The scammer builds trust early with what appear to be small investment wins. None of it is legit. The money goes right into the scammer’s pocket, even as the scammer shows the victim phony financial statements and dashboards to show off the bogus returns. Confidence grows. The scammer wrings even larger sums out of the victim. And then disappears.
It was a targeted attack that started innocuously enough with a “fake wrong number”. An SMS arrives. A text conversation starts. The scammer then apologizes but tells Leslie someone gave them the number to initiate the text.
The scammer then uses emotional and psychological techniques to keep Leslie hooked. “How are you, are you having a nice day?” Leslie, being bored and interested, engages willingly.
The scammer asks to talk directly, not via text: and a phone conversation ensues. The scammer proceeds to describe—in very soothing detail—what they are doing, helping people, like Leslie, invest their “hard-earned money” into something that will make them more money, to help them out in retirement.
Of course, it is too good to be true.
“The craziest part of all of this is my aunt refuses—to this day—to believe she’s been scammed!”
She still thinks this scammer is a “friend” even though the entire family is up in arms over this, all of whom beg her aunt to “open her eyes.”
“My aunt still thinks she’d going to see that money again, or even make some money, which is crazy. The scammers are so good at emotional intelligence; really leveraging heartstrings and psychological makeup of the forlorn in society. My aunt finally agreed to stop sending more money to the scammers, but only after the entire family threatened to cut her off from the rest of the family. It took a lot to get her to stop trusting the scammers.”
Meredith feels this is doubly sad as the aunt in question is not someone they’d ever imagine would in this predicament. She was always the upright one, always the diligent and hardworking and the best with money. She is smart and savvy and we could never imagine her to be taken by these people and taken so easily. It boggles the mind.”
She did start to change in the last few years. And the pandemic created a weird situation. Retirement, loneliness from loss of a partner, and the added burden of the pandemic created a perfect storm for her to open herself up to someone willingly, simply for the sake of connection.
“No one deserves this. It has rocked my family to the core. It is not only about the money, but we’ve found family bonds stretched. She believes these random people, these scammers, more than she believes her own family. Have we been neglectful of our aunt? Does she no longer put her faith in people she knows, rather gives money to complete strangers?”
Being a security professional does not provide magical protection. We are more aware of scams and scammers, and how they work, and what to look for, and we try to do all we can to keep our family aware of scams out there in the big wide world, but we are human. We fall short.
Diligence is action. Awareness is action. Education is action.
We need to be better, all of us, at socializing risky things. We need to consistently educate our family and friends to protect themselves, not only via security software (which everyone should have as default) but by providing tips and tricks and warnings for things we all need to be on the lookout. This is not a one-time thing. The cliché holds true: “If you see something say something.” Repetition helps.
In today’s world, the need for protecting people’s security, identity, and privacy is critical to keeping them safe. Scammers long stopped focusing on attacking only your computer. Now focus more than ever on YOU: your identity, your privacy, your trust. If they get you there, they soon get your money.
As for contributing factors to scammers success with their victims, such as loneliness, isolation, and boredom, they all have remedies. Make connections with your loved ones, especially those easily tagged as vulnerable, those you feel might be at risk. Reach out. It may be hard sometimes due to distance and other factors but make it a point to connect. There is a reason these scammers are succeeding. They are stepping into roles of companions to people who are desperate for connection.
Most people are greatly saddened at seeing other people being “taken.” Let’s work together to help stop the scammers.
Look out for each other, and get your people protected!
Editor’s Closing Note:
If you or someone you know suspects elder fraud, the following resources can help:
For further reading on scams and scam prevention, check out the guides in our McAfee Safety Series, which provide in-depth advice on protecting your identity and privacy—and your family from scams. They’re ready to download and share.
The post A Scam in the Family—How a Close Relative Lost $100,000 to an Elder Scam appeared first on McAfee Blog.
Lateral movement analyzer (LATMA) collects authentication logs from the domain and searches for potential lateral movement attacks and suspicious activity. The tool visualizes the findings with diagrams depicting the lateral movement patterns. This tool contains two modules, one that collects the logs and one that analyzes them. You can execute each of the modules separately, the event log collector should be executed in a Windows machine in an active directory domain environment with python 3.8 or above. The analyzer can be executed in a linux machine and a Windows machine.
The Event Log Collector module scans domain controllers for successful NTLM authentication logs and endpoints for successful Kerberos authentication logs. It requires LDAP/S port 389 and 636 and RPC port 135 access to the domain controller and clients. In addition it requires domain admin privileges or a user in the Event log Reader group or one with equivalent permissions. This is required to pull event logs from all endpoints and domain controllers.
The collector gathers NTLM logs from event 8004 on the domain controllers and Kerberos logs from event 4648 on the clients. It generates as an output a csv comma delimited format file with all the available authentication traffic. The output contains the fields source host, destination, username, auth type, SPN and timestamps in the format %Y/%m/%d %H:%M. The collector requires credential of a valid user with event viewer privileges across the environment and queries the specific logs for each protocol.
Verify Kerberos and NTLM protocols are audited across the environment using group policy:
The Analyzer receives as input a spreadsheet with authentication data formatted as specified in Collector's output structure. It searches for suspicious activity with the lateral movement analyzer algorithm and also detects additional IoCs of lateral movement. The authentication source and destination should be formalized with netbios name and not ip addresses.
LATMA gets a batch of authentication requests and sends an alert when it finds suspicious lateral movement attacks. We define the following:
Authentication Graph: A directed graph that contains information about authentication traffic in the environment. The nodes of the graphs are computers, and the edges are authentications between the computers. The graph edges have the attributes: protocol type, date of authentication and the account that sent the request. The graph nodes contain information about the computer it represents, detailed below.
Lateral movement graph: A sub-graph of the authentication graph that represents the attacker’s movement. The lateral movement graph is not always a path in the sub-graph, in some attacks the attacker goes in many different directions.
Alert: A sub-graph the algorithm suspects are part of the lateral movement graph.
LATMA performs several actions during its execution:
Information gathering: LATMA monitors normal behavior of the users and machines and characterizes them. The learning is used later to decide which authentication requests deviate from a normal behavior and might be involved in a lateral movement attack. For a learning period of three weeks LATMA does not throw any alerts and only learns the environment. The learning continues after those three weeks.
Authentication graph building: After the learning period every relevant authentication is added to the authentication graph. It is critical to filter only for relevant authentication, otherwise the number of edges the graph holds might be too big. We filter on the following protocol types: NTLM and Kerberos with the services “rpc”, “rpcss” and “termsrv.”
Adding an authentication to the graph might trigger a process of alerting. In general, a new edge can create a new alert, join an existing alert or merge two alerts.
Every authentication request monitored by LATMA is used for learning and stored in a dedicated data structure. First, we identify sinks and hubs. We define sinks as machines accessed by many (at least 50) different accounts, such as a company portal or exchange server. We define hubs as machines many different accounts (at least 20) authenticate from, such as proxies and VPNs. Authentications to sinks or from hubs are considered benign and are therefore removed from the authentication graph.
In addition to basic classification, LATMA matches between accounts and machines they frequently authenticate from. If an account authenticates from a machine at least three different days in a three weeks’ period, it means that this account matches the machine and any authentication of this account from the machine is considered benign and removed from the authentication graph.
The lateral movement IoCs are:
White cane - User accounts authenticating from a single machine to multiple ones in a relatively short time.
Bridge - User account X authenticating from machine A to machine B and following that, from machine B to machine C. This IoC potentially indicates an attacker performing actual advance from its initial foothold (A) to destination machine that better serves the attack’s objectives.
Switched Bridge - User account X authenticating from machine A to machine B, followed by user account Y authenticating from machine B to machine C. This IoC potentially indicates an attacker that discovers and compromises an additional account along its path and uses the new account to advance forward (a common example is account X being a standard domain user and account Y being a admin user)
Weight Shift - White cane (see above) from machine A to machines {B1,…, Bn}, followed by another White cane from machine Bx to machines {C1,…,Cn}. This IoC potentially indicates an attacker that has determined that machine B would better serve the attack’s purposes from now on uses machine B as the source for additional searches.
Blast - User account X authenticating from machine A to multiple machines in a very short timeframe. A common example is an attacker that plants \ executes ransomware on a mass number of machines simultaneously
Output:
The analyzer outputs several different files
usage
The Collector
Required arguments:
The Analyzer
Required arguments:
Optional arguments: 2. -output_file The location the csv with the all the IOCs is going to be saved to 3. -progression_output_file The location the csv with the the IOCs of the lateral movements is going to be save to 4. -sink_threshold number of accounts from which a machine is considered sink, default is 50 5. -hub_threshold number of accounts from which a machine is considered hub, default is 20 6. -learning_period learning period in days, default is 7 days 7. -show_all_iocs Show IoC that are not connected to any other IoCs 8. -show_gant If true, output the events in a gant format
Binary Usage Open command prompt and navigate to the binary folder. Run executables with the specified above arguments.
In the example files you have several samples of real environments (some contain lateral movement attacks and some don't) which you can give as input for the analyzer.
Usage example
As the majority of the global Covid fog finally started lifting in 2022, other events – and their associated risks – started to fill the headspace of C-level execs the world over. In my role, I regularly engage with CISOs in all kinds of sectors, representatives at industry bodies, and experts at analyst houses. This gives me an invaluable macroview not only of how the last 12 months have affected organizations and what CISOs are thinking about, but also how the upcoming year is shaping up.
Using this information, last year I wrote a blog summing up the nine top of mind issues I believed will most impact CISOs as we headed into 2022. Many of them still ring true now and will continue to do so, but some new concerns have risen up the agenda. Here are the topics that I think will be top of mind in 2023, and what CISOs can do to prepare.
One aspect that has come to the fore this year is the CISO’s position as ‘guardian of customers’ private data’ in the event of a breach, and their responsibilities over the level of disclosure they later provide. And here, we are not only talking about the legal duty to inform regulators, but the implicit moral duty to inform third parties, customers, etc. From my conversations this year, this whole area is getting CISOs thinking about their own personal liability more.
As a result of this, next year we could see CISOs tightening up the disclosure decision making process, focusing on quicker and greater clarity on breach impact, and even looking to include personal liability cover in cyber insurance contracts. CISOs will also likely be pushing more tabletop exercises with the executive leadership team to ask and answer questions around what is showed, to whom, and by whom.
Cyber insurance has become a newsworthy topic over the last 24 months, mainly due to the hardening of the market, as insurance products have become less profitable for underwriters and insurers’ costs have risen. But the topic will continue to be in focus as we move into 2023, with insurers demanding greater attribution – aka the science of identifying the perpetrator of a cybercrime by comparing the evidence gathered from an attack with evidence gathered from earlier attacks that have been attributed to known perpetrators to find similarities.
The need for greater attribution stems from the news that some insurers are announcing that they are not covering nation state attacks, including major marketplace for insurance and reinsurance, Lloyd’s – a topic I covered with colleague and co-author Martin Lee, in this blog earlier in the year.
Greater preparation and crystal-clear clarity of the extent to which attribution has taken place when negotiating contracts will be an essential element for CISOs going forward. For more practical advice on this topic, I also wrote a blog on some of the challenges and opportunities within the cyber liability insurance market back in June which you can read here.
Being a CISO has never been more complex. With more sophisticated attacks, scarcity of resources, the challenges of communicating effectively with the board, and more demanding regulatory drivers like the recently approved NIS2 in the EU, which includes a requirement to flag incidents that cause a significant financial implication or operational disruption to the service or to others within 24 hours.
With so much to consider, it is vital that CISOs have a clear understanding of the core elements of what they protect. Questions like ‘where is the data?’, ‘who is accessing it?’, ‘what applications is the organization using?’, ‘where and what is in the cloud?’ will continue to be asked, with an overarching need to make management of the security function more flexible and simpler for the user. This visibility will also inevitably help ease quicker decision making and less of an operational overhead when it comes to regulatory compliance, so the benefits of asking these questions are clear.
According to Forrester, the term Zero Trust was born in 2009. Since then, it has been used liberally by different cybersecurity vendors – with various degrees of accuracy. Zero Trust implementations, while being the most secure approach a firm can take, are long journeys that take multiple years for major enterprises to carry out, so it is vital that they start as they mean to go on. But it is clear from the interactions we have had that many CISOs still don’t know where to start, as we touched on in point #3.
However, that can be easier said than done in many cases, as the principles within Zero trust fundamentally turn traditional security methods on their head, from protecting from the outside in (guarding your company’s parameter from external threats) to protecting from in the inside out (guarding individual assets from all threats, both internal and external). This is particularly challenging for large enterprises with a multitude of different silos, stakeholders and business divisions to consider.
The key to success on a zero-trust journey is to set up the right governance mode with the relevant stakeholders and communicate all changes. It is also worth taking the opportunity to update their solutions via a tech refresh which has a multitude of benefits, as explained in our most recent Security Outcomes Study (volume 2).
For more on where to start check out our eBook which explores the five phases to achieving zero trust, and if you have already embarked on the journey, read our recently published Guide to Zero Trust Maturity to help you find quick wins along the way.
As with last year, ransomware continues to be the main tactical issue and concern facing CISOs. More specifically, the uncertainty around when and how an attack could be launched against the organization is a constant threat.
Increased regulation on the payment of ransomware and declaring payments is predicted, on top of the Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act of 2022 (CIRCIA), the Ransom Disclosure Act, but that doesn’t help alleviate ransomware worries, especially as this will again put the CISO in the firing line.
CISOs will continue to keep a focus on the core basics to prevent or limit the impact of an attack, and again have a closer look at how any ransomware payment may or may not be paid and who will authorize payment. For more on how executives can prepare for ransomware attacks, read this blog from Cisco Talos.
Traditionally CISOs have talked about the importance of improving security awareness which has resulted in the growth of those test phishing emails we all know and love so much. Joking aside, there is increased discussion now about the limited impact of this approach, including this in depth study from the computer science department of ETH Zurich.
The study, which was the largest both in terms of scale and length at time of publishing, revealed that ‘embedded training during simulated phishing exercises, as commonly deployed in the industry today, does not make employees more resilient to phishing, but instead it can have unexpected side effects that can make employees even more susceptible to phishing’.
For the most effective security awareness, culture is key. This means that everyone should see themselves as part of the security team, like the approach that has been taken when approaching the issue of safety in many high-risk industries. In 2023, CISOs will now be keen to bring about a change to a security culture by making security inclusive, looking to create security champions within the business unit, and finding new methods to communicate the security message.
Last year, we talked about preparing for the ‘great resignation’ and how to prevent staff leaving as WFH became a norm rather than an exception. In the past year, the conversations I have had have altered to focus on how to ensure recruitment and retention of key staff within the business by ensuring they work in an environment that supports their role.
Overly restrictive security practices, burdensome security with too many friction points, and limitations around what resources and tools can be used may deter the best talent from joining – or indeed staying – with an organization. And CISOs don’t need that extra worry of being the reason behind that kind of ‘brain drain’. So, security will need to focus on supporting the introduction of flexibility and the ease of user experience, such as passwordless or risk-based authentication.
Just when we thought it was safe to go back into the organization with MFA protecting us, along came methods of attack that rely on push-based authentication vulnerabilities including:
There has been a lot written about this kind of technique and how it works (including guidance from Duo) due to some recent high-profile cases. So, in the forthcoming year CISOs will look to update their solutions and introduce new ways to authenticate, along with increased communications to users on the topic.
This issue was highlighted again this year driven by regulations in different sectors such as the UK Telecoms (Security) Act which went live in the UK in November 2022 and the new EU regulation on digital operational resilience for financial services firms (DORA), which the European Parliament voted to adopt, also in November 2022. Both prompt greater focus on compliance, more reporting and understanding the dependency and interaction organizations have with the supply chain and other third parties.
CISOs will focus on obtaining reassurance from third parties as to their posture and will receive a lot of requests from others about where their organization stands, so it is crucial more robust insight into third parties is gained, documented, and communicated.
When writing this blog, and comparing it to last year’s, the 2023 top nine topics fit into three categories. Some themes make a reappearance, seem to repeat themselves such as the need to improve security’s interaction with users and the need to keep up to date with digital change. Others appear as almost incremental changes to current capabilities such as an adjusted approach to MFA to cope with push fatigue. But, perhaps one of the most striking differences to previous years is the new focus on the role of the CISO in the firing line and the personal impact that may have. We will of course continue to monitor all changes over the year and lend our viewpoint to give guidance. We wish you a secure and prosperous new year!
We’d love to hear what you think. Ask a Question, Comment Below, and Stay Connected with Cisco Secure on social!
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Ransomware. Even the name sounds scary.
When you get down to it, ransomware is one of the nastiest attacks a hacker can wage. They target some of our most important and precious things—our files, our photos, and the information stored on our devices. Think about suddenly losing access to all of them and being forced to pay a ransom to get access back. Worse yet, paying the ransom is no guarantee the hacker will return them.
That’s what a ransomware attack does. Broadly speaking, it’s a type of malware that infects a network or a device and then typically encrypts the files, data, and apps stored on it, digitally scrambling them so the proper owners can’t access them. Only a digital key can unlock them—one that the hacker holds.
Nasty for sure, yet you can take several steps that can greatly reduce the risk of it happening to you. Our recently published Ransomware Security Guide breaks them down for you, and in this blog we’ll look at a few reasons why ransomware protection is so vital.
The short answer is pretty bad—to the tune of billions of dollars stolen from victims each year. Ransomware targets people and their families just as explained above. Yet it also targets large organizations, governments, and even companies that run critical stretches of energy infrastructure and the food supply chain. Accordingly, the ransom amounts for these victims climb into millions of dollars.
A few recent cases of large-scale ransomware attacks include:
Who’s behind such attacks? Given the scope and scale of them, it’s often organized hacking groups. Put simply, these are big heists. It demands expertise to pull them off, not to mention further expertise to transfer large sums of cryptocurrency in ways that cover the hackers’ tracks.
As for ransomware attacks on people and their families, the individual dollar amounts of an attack are far lower, typically in the hundreds of dollars. Again, the culprits behind them may be large hacking groups that cast a wider net for individual victims, where hundreds of successful attacks at hundreds of dollars each quickly add up. One example: a hacker group that posed as a government agency and as a major retailer, which mailed out thousands of USB drives infected with malware.
Other ransomware hackers who target people and families are far less sophisticated. Small-time hackers and hacking groups can find the tools they need to conduct such attacks by shopping on the dark web, where ransomware is available for sale or for lease as a service (Ransomware as a Service, or RaaS). In effect, near-amateur hackers can grab a ready-to-deploy attack right off the shelf.
Taken together, hackers will level a ransomware attack at practically anyone or any organization—making it everyone’s concern.
Hackers have several ways of getting ransomware onto one of your devices. Like any other type of malware, it can infect your device via a phishing link or a bogus attachment. It can also end up there by downloading apps from questionable app stores, with a stolen or hacked password, or through an outdated device or network router with poor security measures in place. And as mentioned above, infected storage devices provide another avenue.
Social engineering attacks enter the mix as well, where the hacker poses as someone the victim knows and gets the victim to either download malware or provide the hacker access to an otherwise password-protected device, app, or network.
And yes, ransomware can end up on smartphones as well.
While not a prevalent as other types of malware attacks, smartphone ransomware can encrypt files, photos, and the like on a smartphone, just as it can on computers and networks. Yet other forms of mobile ransomware don’t have to encrypt data to make the phone unusable. The “Lockerpin” ransomware that has struck some Android devices in the past would change the PIN number that locked the phone. Other forms of mobile ransomware paste a window over the phone’s apps, making them unusable without decrypting the ransomware.
Part of avoiding ransomware involves reducing human error—keeping a watchful eye open for those spammy links, malicious downloads, bogus emails, and basically keeping your apps and devices up to date so that they have the latest security measures in place. The remainder relies on a good dose of prevention.
Our Ransomware Security Guide provides a checklist for both.
It gets into the details of what ransomware looks like and how it works, followed by the straightforward things you can do to prevent it, along with the steps to take if the unfortunate ends up happening to you or someone you know.
Ransomware is one of the nastiest attacks going because it targets our files, photos, and information, things we don’t know where we’d be without. Yet it’s good to know you can indeed lower your risk with a few relatively simple steps. Once you have them in place, chances are a good feeling will come over you, the one that comes with knowing you’ve protected what’s precious and important to you.
The post Your Guide to Ransomware—and Preventing It Too appeared first on McAfee Blog.
Shennina is an automated host exploitation framework. The mission of the project is to fully automate the scanning, vulnerability scanning/analysis, and exploitation using Artificial Intelligence. Shennina is integrated with Metasploit and Nmap for performing the attacks, as well as being integrated with an in-house Command-and-Control Server for exfiltrating data from compromised machines automatically.
This was developed by Mazin Ahmed and Khalid Farah within the HITB CyberWeek 2019 AI challenge. The project is developed based on the concept of DeepExploit by Isao Takaesu.
Shennina scans a set of input targets for available network services, uses its AI engine to identify recommended exploits for the attacks, and then attempts to test and attack the targets. If the attack succeeds, Shennina proceeds with the post-exploitation phase.
The AI engine is initially trained against live targets to learn reliable exploits against remote services.
Shennina also supports a "Heuristics" mode for identfying recommended exploits.
The documentation can be found in the Docs directory within the project.
The problem should be solved by a hash tree without using "AI", however, the HITB Cyber Week AI Challenge required the project to find ways to solve it through AI.
This project is a security experiment.
This project is made for educational and ethical testing purposes only. Usage of Shennina for attacking targets without prior mutual consent is illegal. It is the end user's responsibility to obey all applicable local, state and federal laws. Developers assume no liability and are not responsible for any misuse or damage caused by this program.
Ransomware groups are constantly devising new methods for infecting victims and convincing them to pay up, but a couple of strategies tested recently seem especially devious. The first centers on targeting healthcare organizations that offer consultations over the Internet and sending them booby-trapped medical records for the “patient.” The other involves carefully editing email inboxes of public company executives to make it appear that some were involved in insider trading.
Alex Holden is founder of Hold Security, a Milwaukee-based cybersecurity firm. Holden’s team gained visibility into discussions among members of two different ransom groups: CLOP (a.k.a. “Cl0p” a.k.a. “TA505“), and a newer ransom group known as Venus.
Last month, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) warned that Venus ransomware attacks were targeting a number of U.S. healthcare organizations. First spotted in mid-August 2022, Venus is known for hacking into victims’ publicly-exposed Remote Desktop services to encrypt Windows devices.
Holden said the internal discussions among the Venus group members indicate this gang has no problem gaining access to victim organizations.
“The Venus group has problems getting paid,” Holden said. “They are targeting a lot of U.S. companies, but nobody wants to pay them.”
Which might explain why their latest scheme centers on trying to frame executives at public companies for insider trading charges. Venus indicated it recently had success with a method that involves carefully editing one or more email inbox files at a victim firm — to insert messages discussing plans to trade large volumes of the company’s stock based on non-public information.
“We imitate correspondence of the [CEO] with a certain insider who shares financial reports of his companies through which your victim allegedly trades in the stock market, which naturally is a criminal offense and — according to US federal laws [includes the possibility of up to] 20 years in prison,” one Venus member wrote to an underling.
“You need to create this file and inject into the machine(s) like this so that metadata would say that they were created on his computer,” they continued. “One of my clients did it, I don’t know how. In addition to pst, you need to decompose several files into different places, so that metadata says the files are native from a certain date and time rather than created yesterday on an unknown machine.”
Holden said it’s not easy to plant emails into an inbox, but it can be done with Microsoft Outlook .pst files, which the attackers may also have access to if they’d already compromised a victim network.
“It’s not going to be forensically solid, but that’s not what they care about,” he said. “It still has the potential to be a huge scandal — at least for a while — when a victim is being threatened with the publication or release of these records.”
The Venus ransom group’s extortion note. Image: Tripwire.com
Holden said the CLOP ransomware gang has a different problem of late: Not enough victims. The intercepted CLOP communication seen by KrebsOnSecurity shows the group bragged about twice having success infiltrating new victims in the healthcare industry by sending them infected files disguised as ultrasound images or other medical documents for a patient seeking a remote consultation.
The CLOP members said one tried-and-true method of infecting healthcare providers involved gathering healthcare insurance and payment data to use in submitting requests for a remote consultation on a patient who has cirrhosis of the liver.
“Basically, they’re counting on doctors or nurses reviewing the patient’s chart and scans just before the appointment,” Holden said. “They initially discussed going in with cardiovascular issues, but decided cirrhosis or fibrosis of the liver would be more likely to be diagnosable remotely from existing test results and scans.”
While CLOP as a money making collective is a fairly young organization, security experts say CLOP members hail from a group of Threat Actors (TA) known as “TA505,” which MITRE’s ATT&CK database says is a financially motivated cybercrime group that has been active since at least 2014. “This group is known for frequently changing malware and driving global trends in criminal malware distribution,” MITRE assessed.
In April, 2021, KrebsOnSecurity detailed how CLOP helped pioneer another innovation aimed at pushing more victims into paying an extortion demand: Emailing the ransomware victim’s customers and partners directly and warning that their data would be leaked to the dark web unless they can convince the victim firm to pay up.
Security firm Tripwire points out that the HHS advisory on Venus says multiple threat actor groups are likely distributing the Venus ransomware. Tripwire’s tips for all organizations on avoiding ransomware attacks include:
While the above tips are important and useful, one critical area of ransomware preparedness overlooked by too many organizations is the need to develop — and then periodically rehearse — a plan for how everyone in the organization should respond in the event of a ransomware or data ransom incident. Drilling this breach response plan is key because it helps expose weaknesses in those plans that could be exploited by the intruders.
As noted in last year’s story Don’t Wanna Pay Ransom Gangs? Test Your Backups, experts say the biggest reason ransomware targets and/or their insurance providers still pay when they already have reliable backups of their systems and data is that nobody at the victim organization bothered to test in advance how long this data restoration process might take.
“Suddenly the victim notices they have a couple of petabytes of data to restore over the Internet, and they realize that even with their fast connections it’s going to take three months to download all these backup files,” said Fabian Wosar, chief technology officer at Emsisoft. “A lot of IT teams never actually make even a back-of-the-napkin calculation of how long it would take them to restore from a data rate perspective.”
Authored by Dennis Pang
What is antivirus? That’s a good question. What does it really protect? That’s an even better question.
Over the years, I’ve come to recognize that different people define antivirus differently. Some see it as way to keep hackers from crashing their computers. Others see it as a comprehensive set of protections. Neither definition is entirely on the money.
With this blog, I hope to give everyone a clear definition of what antivirus does well, along with what it doesn’t do at all. The fact is that antivirus is just one form of online protection. There are other forms of protection as well, and understanding antivirus’ role in your overall mix of online protection is an important part of staying safer online.
Antivirus software protects your devices against malware and viruses through a combination of prevention, detection, and removal.
For years, people have installed antivirus software on their computers. Today, it can also protect your smartphones and tablets as well. In fact, we recommend installing it on those devices as well because they’re connected, just like a computer—and any device that connects to the internet is a potential target for malware and viruses.
In short, if it’s connected, it must get protected.
One important distinction about antivirus is its name, a name that first came into use decades ago when viruses first appeared on the scene. (More on that in a bit.) However, antivirus protects you from more than viruses. It protects against malware too.
Malware is an umbrella term that covers all types of malicious software regardless of its design, intent, or how its delivered. Viruses are a subset of malicious software that infects devices and then replicates itself so that it can infect yet more devices.
So while we popularly refer to protection software as antivirus, it protects against far more than just viruses. It protects against malware overall.
Now here’s where some confusion may come in. Some antivirus apps are standalone. They offer malware protection and that’s it. Other antivirus apps are part of comprehensive online protection software, which can include several additional far-reaching features that can protect your privacy and your identity.
The reason why antivirus gets paired up with other apps for your privacy and identity is because antivirus alone doesn’t offer these kinds of protections. Yet when paired with things like a password manager, credit monitoring, identity theft coverage, and a VPN, to name a few, you can protect your devices—along with your privacy and identity. All the things you need to stay safer online.
In short, antivirus doesn’t cut it alone.
With that, let’s take a closer look at what malware and viruses really are—how they evolved, and what they look like today, along with how antivirus protects you against them.
Viruses have a long history. And depending on how you define what a virus is, the first one arguably took root in 1971—more than 50 years ago.
It was known as Creeper, and rather than being malicious in nature, it was designed to show how a self-replicating program could identify other connected devices on a network, transfer itself to them, and find yet more devices to repeat the process. Later, the same programmer who created a follow-on version of Creeper developed Reaper, a program that could remove the Creeper program. In a way, Reaper could be considered the first piece of antivirus software.
From there, it wasn’t until the 1980’s that malware started affecting the broader population, a time when computers became more commonplace in businesses and people’s homes.
At first, malware typically spread by infected floppy disks, much like the “Brain” virus in 1986. While recognized today as the first large-scale computer virus, its authors say they never intended it to work that way. Rather they say they created Brain as an anti-piracy measure to protect their proprietary software from theft. However, Brain got loose. It went beyond their software and affected computers worldwide. Although not malicious or destructive in nature, Brain most certainly put the industry, businesses, and consumers on notice.
Computer viruses became a thing.
Another piece of malware that got passed along via floppy disks was the “PC Cyborg” attack that targeted the medical research community in and around 1989. There the malware would lie in wait until the user rebooted their computer for the 90th time. And on that 90th boot, the user was presented with a digital ransom note like the one here:
Along with that note, PC Cyborg encrypted the computer’s files, which would only get unencrypted if the victim paid a fee—making PC Cyborg the first widely recognized form of ransomware.
Shortly thereafter, the internet started connecting computers, which opened millions of doors for hackers as people went online. Among the most noteworthy was 1999’s “Melissa” virus, which spread by way of infected email attachments and overloaded hundreds of corporate and governmental email servers worldwide.
It was quickly followed in 2000 by what’s considered the among the most damaging malware to date—ILOVEYOU, which also spread by way of an attachment, this one posing as a love letter. Specifically, it was a self-replicating worm that installed itself on the victim’s computer where it destroyed some information and stole other information, then spread to other computers. One estimate puts the global cost of ILOVEYOU at $10 billion and further speculated that it infected 10% of the world’s internet-connected computers at the time.
With the advent of the internet, malware quickly established itself as a sad fact of connected life. Today, McAfee registers an average of 1.1 million new malicious programs and potentially unwanted apps (PUA) each day, which contributes to the millions and millions of malicious programs already in existence.
Apart from the sheer volume of malware out there today, another thing that distinguishes today’s malware from early malware attacks—they’re created largely for profit.
We can think of it this way:
Today’s malware is far more than an annoyance or headache. It can lead to follow-on attacks that target your finances, your identity, your privacy, or a mix of all three.
So with a million or so new threats coming online each day, and millions more out there already, how does antivirus protect you from malware? It blocks, detects, and removes malware. And it does so in a couple of ways:
However, as mentioned earlier, antivirus provides only one aspect of online protection today. While it protects your devices and the data that’s on them, your privacy and identity can come under attack as well. So while antivirus alone can protect you from malware, it can’t prevent other forms of online crime like identity theft, phishing attacks designed to steal personal information, or attacks on your accounts, to name a few of the many other types of threats out there.
Yet comprehensive online protection can.
Comprehensive online protection software like ours offers antivirus, along with specific services and features that protect your privacy and identity online as well. It gives you dozens of other features like identity theft coverage & restoration, personal data cleanup, security freezes, and an online protection score that shows you just how safe you are, along with suggestions that can make you safer still.
So while protecting your devices with antivirus is a great start, it’s only one part of staying safer online. Including privacy and identity protection rounds out your protection overall.
The post What is Antivirus and What Does It Really Protect? appeared first on McAfee Blog.
Peter is an IT manager for a technology manufacturer that got hit with a Russian ransomware strain called “Zeppelin” in May 2020. He’d been on the job less than six months, and because of the way his predecessor architected things, the company’s data backups also were encrypted by Zeppelin. After two weeks of stalling their extortionists, Peter’s bosses were ready to capitulate and pay the ransom demand. Then came the unlikely call from an FBI agent. “Don’t pay,” the agent said. “We’ve found someone who can crack the encryption.”
Peter, who spoke candidly about the attack on condition of anonymity, said the FBI told him to contact a cybersecurity consulting firm in New Jersey called Unit 221B, and specifically its founder — Lance James. Zeppelin sprang onto the crimeware scene in December 2019, but it wasn’t long before James discovered multiple vulnerabilities in the malware’s encryption routines that allowed him to brute-force the decryption keys in a matter of hours, using nearly 100 cloud computer servers.
In an interview with KrebsOnSecurity, James said Unit 221B was wary of advertising its ability to crack Zeppelin ransomware keys because it didn’t want to tip its hand to Zeppelin’s creators, who were likely to modify their file encryption approach if they detected it was somehow being bypassed.
This is not an idle concern. There are multiple examples of ransomware groups doing just that after security researchers crowed about finding vulnerabilities in their ransomware code.
“The minute you announce you’ve got a decryptor for some ransomware, they change up the code,” James said.
But he said the Zeppelin group appears to have stopped spreading their ransomware code gradually over the past year, possibly because Unit 221B’s referrals from the FBI let them quietly help nearly two dozen victim organizations recover without paying their extortionists.
In a blog post published today to coincide with a Black Hat talk on their discoveries, James and co-author Joel Lathrop said they were motivated to crack Zeppelin after the ransomware gang started attacking nonprofit and charity organizations.
“What motivated us the most during the leadup to our action was the targeting of homeless shelters, nonprofits and charity organizations,” the two wrote. “These senseless acts of targeting those who are unable to respond are the motivation for this research, analysis, tools, and blog post. A general Unit 221B rule of thumb around our offices is: Don’t [REDACTED] with the homeless or sick! It will simply trigger our ADHD and we will get into that hyper-focus mode that is good if you’re a good guy, but not so great if you are an ***hole.”
The researchers said their break came when they understood that while Zeppelin used three different types of encryption keys to encrypt files, they could undo the whole scheme by factoring or computing just one of them: An ephemeral RSA-512 public key that is randomly generated on each machine it infects.
“If we can recover the RSA-512 Public Key from the registry, we can crack it and get the 256-bit AES Key that encrypts the files!” they wrote. “The challenge was that they delete the [public key] once the files are fully encrypted. Memory analysis gave us about a 5-minute window after files were encrypted to retrieve this public key.”
Unit 221B ultimately built a “Live CD” version of Linux that victims could run on infected systems to extract that RSA-512 key. From there, they would load the keys into a cluster of 800 CPUs donated by hosting giant Digital Ocean that would then start cracking them. The company also used that same donated infrastructure to help victims decrypt their data using the recovered keys.
A typical Zeppelin ransomware note.
Jon is another grateful Zeppelin ransomware victim who was aided by Unit 221B’s decryption efforts. Like Peter, Jon asked that his last name and that of his employer be omitted from the story, but he’s in charge of IT for a mid-sized managed service provider that got hit with Zeppelin in July 2020.
The attackers that savaged Jon’s company managed to phish credentials and a multi-factor authentication token for some tools the company used to support customers, and in short order they’d seized control over the servers and backups for a healthcare provider customer.
Jon said his company was reluctant to pay a ransom in part because it wasn’t clear from the hackers’ demands whether the ransom amount they demanded would provide a key to unlock all systems, and that it would do so safely.
“They want you to unlock your data with their software, but you can’t trust that,” Jon said. “You want to use your own software or someone else who’s trusted to do it.”
In August 2022, the FBI and the Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) issued a joint warning on Zeppelin, saying the FBI had “observed instances where Zeppelin actors executed their malware multiple times within a victim’s network, resulting in the creation of different IDs or file extensions, for each instance of an attack; this results in the victim needing several unique decryption keys.”
The advisory says Zeppelin has attacked “a range of businesses and critical infrastructure organizations, including defense contractors, educational institutions, manufacturers, technology companies, and especially organizations in the healthcare and medical industries. Zeppelin actors have been known to request ransom payments in Bitcoin, with initial amounts ranging from several thousand dollars to over a million dollars.”
The FBI and CISA say the Zeppelin actors gain access to victim networks by exploiting weak Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) credentials, exploiting SonicWall firewall vulnerabilities, and phishing campaigns. Prior to deploying Zeppelin ransomware, actors spend one to two weeks mapping or enumerating the victim network to identify data enclaves, including cloud storage and network backups, the alert notes.
Jon said he felt so lucky after connecting with James and hearing about their decryption work, that he toyed with the idea of buying a lottery ticket that day.
“This just doesn’t usually happen,” Jon said. “It’s 100 percent like winning the lottery.”
By the time Jon’s company got around to decrypting their data, they were forced by regulators to prove that no patient data had been exfiltrated from their systems. All told, it took his employer two months to fully recover from the attack.
“I definitely feel like I was ill-prepared for this attack,” Jon said. “One of the things I’ve learned from this is the importance of forming your core team and having those people who know what their roles and responsibilities are ahead of time. Also, trying to vet new vendors you’ve never met before and build trust relationships with them is very difficult to do when you have customers down hard now and they’re waiting on you to help them get back up.”
A more technical writeup on Unit 221B’s discoveries (cheekily titled “0XDEAD ZEPPELIN”) is available here.