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New CherryLoader Malware Mimics CherryTree to Deploy PrivEsc Exploits

A new Go-based malware loader called CherryLoader has been discovered by threat hunters in the wild to deliver additional payloads onto compromised hosts for follow-on exploitation. Arctic Wolf Labs, which discovered the new attack tool in two recent intrusions, said the loader's icon and name masquerades as the legitimate CherryTree note-taking application to dupe potential victims

VX-API - Collection Of Various Malicious Functionality To Aid In Malware Development

By: Zion3R

ย 


The VX-API is a collection of malicious functionality to aid in malware development. It is recommended you clone and/or download this entire repo then open the Visual Studio solution file to easily explore functionality and concepts.

Some functions may be dependent on other functions present within the solution file. Using the solution file provided here will make it easier to identify which other functionality and/or header data is required.

You're free to use this in any manner you please. You do not need to use this entire solution for your malware proof-of-concepts or Red Team engagements. Strip, copy, paste, delete, or edit this projects contents as much as you'd like.


List of features

Anti-debug

Function Name Original Author
AdfCloseHandleOnInvalidAddress Checkpoint Research
AdfIsCreateProcessDebugEventCodeSet Checkpoint Research
AdfOpenProcessOnCsrss Checkpoint Research
CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent2 ReactOS
IsDebuggerPresentEx smelly__vx
IsIntelHardwareBreakpointPresent Checkpoint Research

Cryptography Related

Function Name Original Author
HashStringDjb2 Dan Bernstein
HashStringFowlerNollVoVariant1a Glenn Fowler, Landon Curt Noll, and Kiem-Phong Vo
HashStringJenkinsOneAtATime32Bit Bob Jenkins
HashStringLoseLose Brian Kernighan and Dennis Ritchie
HashStringRotr32 T. Oshiba (1972)
HashStringSdbm Ozan Yigit
HashStringSuperFastHash Paul Hsieh
HashStringUnknownGenericHash1A Unknown
HashStringSipHash RistBS
HashStringMurmur RistBS
CreateMd5HashFromFilePath Microsoft
CreatePseudoRandomInteger Apple (c) 1999
CreatePseudoRandomString smelly__vx
HashFileByMsiFileHashTable smelly__vx
CreatePseudoRandomIntegerFromNtdll smelly__vx
LzMaximumCompressBuffer smelly__vx
LzMaximumDecompressBuffer smelly__vx
LzStandardCompressBuffer smelly__vx
LzStandardDecompressBuffer smelly__vx
XpressHuffMaximumCompressBuffer smelly__vx
XpressHuffMaximumDecompressBuffer smelly__vx
XpressHuffStandardCompressBuffer smelly__vx
XpressHuffStandardDecompressBuffer smelly__vx
XpressMaximumCompressBuffer smelly__vx
XpressMaximumDecompressBuffer smelly__vx
XpressStandardCompressBuffer smelly__vx
XpressStandardDecompressBuffer smelly__vx
ExtractFilesFromCabIntoTarget smelly__vx

Error Handling

Function Name Original Author
GetLastErrorFromTeb smelly__vx
GetLastNtStatusFromTeb smelly__vx
RtlNtStatusToDosErrorViaImport ReactOS
GetLastErrorFromTeb smelly__vx
SetLastErrorInTeb smelly__vx
SetLastNtStatusInTeb smelly__vx
Win32FromHResult Raymond Chen

Evasion

Function Name Original Author
AmsiBypassViaPatternScan ZeroMemoryEx
DelayedExecutionExecuteOnDisplayOff am0nsec and smelly__vx
HookEngineRestoreHeapFree rad9800
MasqueradePebAsExplorer smelly__vx
RemoveDllFromPeb rad9800
RemoveRegisterDllNotification Rad98, Peter Winter-Smith
SleepObfuscationViaVirtualProtect 5pider
RtlSetBaseUnicodeCommandLine TheWover

Fingerprinting

Function Name Original Author
GetCurrentLocaleFromTeb 3xp0rt
GetNumberOfLinkedDlls smelly__vx
GetOsBuildNumberFromPeb smelly__vx
GetOsMajorVersionFromPeb smelly__vx
GetOsMinorVersionFromPeb smelly__vx
GetOsPlatformIdFromPeb smelly__vx
IsNvidiaGraphicsCardPresent smelly__vx
IsProcessRunning smelly__vx
IsProcessRunningAsAdmin Vimal Shekar
GetPidFromNtQuerySystemInformation smelly__vx
GetPidFromWindowsTerminalService modexp
GetPidFromWmiComInterface aalimian and modexp
GetPidFromEnumProcesses smelly__vx
GetPidFromPidBruteForcing modexp
GetPidFromNtQueryFileInformation modexp, Lloyd Davies, Jonas Lyk
GetPidFromPidBruteForcingExW smelly__vx, LLoyd Davies, Jonas Lyk, modexp

Helper Functions

Function Name Original Author
CreateLocalAppDataObjectPath smelly__vx
CreateWindowsObjectPath smelly__vx
GetCurrentDirectoryFromUserProcessParameters smelly__vx
GetCurrentProcessIdFromTeb ReactOS
GetCurrentUserSid Giovanni Dicanio
GetCurrentWindowTextFromUserProcessParameter smelly__vx
GetFileSizeFromPath smelly__vx
GetProcessHeapFromTeb smelly__vx
GetProcessPathFromLoaderLoadModule smelly__vx
GetProcessPathFromUserProcessParameters smelly__vx
GetSystemWindowsDirectory Geoff Chappell
IsPathValid smelly__vx
RecursiveFindFile Luke
SetProcessPrivilegeToken Microsoft
IsDllLoaded smelly__vx
TryLoadDllMultiMethod smelly__vx
CreateThreadAndWaitForCompletion smelly__vx
GetProcessBinaryNameFromHwndW smelly__vx
GetByteArrayFromFile smelly__vx
Ex_GetHandleOnDeviceHttpCommunication x86matthew
IsRegistryKeyValid smelly__vx
FastcallExecuteBinaryShellExecuteEx smelly__vx
GetCurrentProcessIdFromOffset RistBS
GetPeBaseAddress smelly__vx
LdrLoadGetProcedureAddress c5pider
IsPeSection smelly__vx
AddSectionToPeFile smelly__vx
WriteDataToPeSection smelly__vx
GetPeSectionSizeInByte smelly__vx
ReadDataFromPeSection smelly__vx
GetCurrentProcessNoForward ReactOS
GetCurrentThreadNoForward ReactOS

Library Loading

Function Name Original Author
GetKUserSharedData Geoff Chappell
GetModuleHandleEx2 smelly__vx
GetPeb 29a
GetPebFromTeb ReactOS
GetProcAddress 29a Volume 2, c5pider
GetProcAddressDjb2 smelly__vx
GetProcAddressFowlerNollVoVariant1a smelly__vx
GetProcAddressJenkinsOneAtATime32Bit smelly__vx
GetProcAddressLoseLose smelly__vx
GetProcAddressRotr32 smelly__vx
GetProcAddressSdbm smelly__vx
GetProcAddressSuperFastHash smelly__vx
GetProcAddressUnknownGenericHash1 smelly__vx
GetProcAddressSipHash RistBS
GetProcAddressMurmur RistBS
GetRtlUserProcessParameters ReactOS
GetTeb ReactOS
RtlLoadPeHeaders smelly__vx
ProxyWorkItemLoadLibrary Rad98, Peter Winter-Smith
ProxyRegisterWaitLoadLibrary Rad98, Peter Winter-Smith

Lsass Dumping

Function Name Original Author
MpfGetLsaPidFromServiceManager modexp
MpfGetLsaPidFromRegistry modexp
MpfGetLsaPidFromNamedPipe modexp

Network Connectivity

Function Name Original Author
UrlDownloadToFileSynchronous Hans Passant
ConvertIPv4IpAddressStructureToString smelly__vx
ConvertIPv4StringToUnsignedLong smelly__vx
SendIcmpEchoMessageToIPv4Host smelly__vx
ConvertIPv4IpAddressUnsignedLongToString smelly__vx
DnsGetDomainNameIPv4AddressAsString smelly__vx
DnsGetDomainNameIPv4AddressUnsignedLong smelly__vx
GetDomainNameFromUnsignedLongIPV4Address smelly__vx
GetDomainNameFromIPV4AddressAsString smelly__vx

Other

Function Name Original Author
OleGetClipboardData Microsoft
MpfComVssDeleteShadowVolumeBackups am0nsec
MpfComModifyShortcutTarget Unknown
MpfComMonitorChromeSessionOnce smelly__vx
MpfExtractMaliciousPayloadFromZipFileNoPassword Codu

Process Creation

Function Name Original Author
CreateProcessFromIHxHelpPaneServer James Forshaw
CreateProcessFromIHxInteractiveUser James Forshaw
CreateProcessFromIShellDispatchInvoke Mohamed Fakroud
CreateProcessFromShellExecuteInExplorerProcess Microsoft
CreateProcessViaNtCreateUserProcess CaptMeelo
CreateProcessWithCfGuard smelly__vx and Adam Chester
CreateProcessByWindowsRHotKey smelly__vx
CreateProcessByWindowsRHotKeyEx smelly__vx
CreateProcessFromINFSectionInstallStringNoCab smelly__vx
CreateProcessFromINFSetupCommand smelly__vx
CreateProcessFromINFSectionInstallStringNoCab2 smelly__vx
CreateProcessFromIeFrameOpenUrl smelly__vx
CreateProcessFromPcwUtil smelly__vx
CreateProcessFromShdocVwOpenUrl smelly__vx
CreateProcessFromShell32ShellExecRun smelly__vx
MpfExecute64bitPeBinaryInMemoryFromByteArrayNoReloc aaaddress1
CreateProcessFromWmiWin32_ProcessW CIA
CreateProcessFromZipfldrRouteCall smelly__vx
CreateProcessFromUrlFileProtocolHandler smelly__vx
CreateProcessFromUrlOpenUrl smelly__vx
CreateProcessFromMsHTMLW smelly__vx

Process Injection

Function Name Original Author
MpfPiControlInjection SafeBreach Labs
MpfPiQueueUserAPCViaAtomBomb SafeBreach Labs
MpfPiWriteProcessMemoryCreateRemoteThread SafeBreach Labs
MpfProcessInjectionViaProcessReflection Deep Instinct

Proxied Functions

Function Name Original Author
IeCreateFile smelly__vx
CopyFileViaSetupCopyFile smelly__vx
CreateFileFromDsCopyFromSharedFile Jonas Lyk
DeleteDirectoryAndSubDataViaDelNode smelly__vx
DeleteFileWithCreateFileFlag smelly__vx
IsProcessRunningAsAdmin2 smelly__vx
IeCreateDirectory smelly__vx
IeDeleteFile smelly__vx
IeFindFirstFile smelly__vx
IEGetFileAttributesEx smelly__vx
IeMoveFileEx smelly__vx
IeRemoveDirectory smelly__vx

Shellcode Execution

Function Name Original Author
MpfSceViaImmEnumInputContext alfarom256, aahmad097
MpfSceViaCertFindChainInStore alfarom256, aahmad097
MpfSceViaEnumPropsExW alfarom256, aahmad097
MpfSceViaCreateThreadpoolWait alfarom256, aahmad097
MpfSceViaCryptEnumOIDInfo alfarom256, aahmad097
MpfSceViaDSA_EnumCallback alfarom256, aahmad097
MpfSceViaCreateTimerQueueTimer alfarom256, aahmad097
MpfSceViaEvtSubscribe alfarom256, aahmad097
MpfSceViaFlsAlloc alfarom256, aahmad097
MpfSceViaInitOnceExecuteOnce alfarom256, aahmad097
MpfSceViaEnumChildWindows alfarom256, aahmad097, wra7h
MpfSceViaCDefFolderMenu_Create2 alfarom256, aahmad097, wra7h
MpfSceViaCertEnumSystemStore alfarom256, aahmad097, wra7h
MpfSceViaCertEnumSystemStoreLocation alfarom256, aahmad097, wra7h
MpfSceViaEnumDateFormatsW alfarom256, aahmad097, wra7h
MpfSceViaEnumDesktopWindows alfarom256, aahmad097, wra7h
MpfSceViaEnumDesktopsW alfarom256, aahmad097, wra7h
MpfSceViaEnumDirTreeW alfarom256, aahmad097, wra7h
MpfSceViaEnumDisplayMonitors alfarom256, aahmad097, wra7h
MpfSceViaEnumFontFamiliesExW alfarom256, aahmad097, wra7h
MpfSceViaEnumFontsW alfarom256, aahmad097, wra7h
MpfSceViaEnumLanguageGroupLocalesW alfarom256, aahmad097, wra7h
MpfSceViaEnumObjects alfarom256, aahmad097, wra7h
MpfSceViaEnumResourceTypesExW alfarom256, aahmad097, wra7h
MpfSceViaEnumSystemCodePagesW alfarom256, aahmad097, wra7h
MpfSceViaEnumSystemGeoID alfarom256, aahmad097, wra7h
MpfSceViaEnumSystemLanguageGroupsW alfarom256, aahmad097, wra7h
MpfSceViaEnumSystemLocalesEx alfarom256, aahmad097, wra7h
MpfSceViaEnumThreadWindows alfarom256, aahmad097, wra7h
MpfSceViaEnumTimeFormatsEx alfarom256, aahmad097, wra7h
MpfSceViaEnumUILanguagesW alfarom256, aahmad097, wra7h
MpfSceViaEnumWindowStationsW alfarom256, aahmad097, wra7h
MpfSceViaEnumWindows alfarom256, aahmad097, wra7h
MpfSceViaEnumerateLoadedModules64 alfarom256, aahmad097, wra7h
MpfSceViaK32EnumPageFilesW alfarom256, aahmad097, wra7h
MpfSceViaEnumPwrSchemes alfarom256, aahmad097, wra7h
MpfSceViaMessageBoxIndirectW alfarom256, aahmad097, wra7h
MpfSceViaChooseColorW alfarom256, aahmad097, wra7h
MpfSceViaClusWorkerCreate alfarom256, aahmad097, wra7h
MpfSceViaSymEnumProcesses alfarom256, aahmad097, wra7h
MpfSceViaImageGetDigestStream alfarom256, aahmad097, wra7h
MpfSceViaVerifierEnumerateResource alfarom256, aahmad097, wra7h
MpfSceViaSymEnumSourceFiles alfarom256, aahmad097, wra7h

String Manipulation

Function Name Original Author
ByteArrayToCharArray smelly__vx
CharArrayToByteArray smelly__vx
ShlwapiCharStringToWCharString smelly__vx
ShlwapiWCharStringToCharString smelly__vx
CharStringToWCharString smelly__vx
WCharStringToCharString smelly__vx
RtlInitEmptyUnicodeString ReactOS
RtlInitUnicodeString ReactOS
CaplockString simonc
CopyMemoryEx ReactOS
SecureStringCopy Apple (c) 1999
StringCompare Apple (c) 1999
StringConcat Apple (c) 1999
StringCopy Apple (c) 1999
StringFindSubstring Apple (c) 1999
StringLength Apple (c) 1999
StringLocateChar Apple (c) 1999
StringRemoveSubstring smelly__vx
StringTerminateStringAtChar smelly__vx
StringToken Apple (c) 1999
ZeroMemoryEx ReactOS
ConvertCharacterStringToIntegerUsingNtdll smelly__vx
MemoryFindMemory KamilCuk

UAC Bypass

Function Name Original Author
UacBypassFodHelperMethod winscripting.blog

Rad98 Hooking Engine

Function Name Original Author
InitHardwareBreakpointEngine rad98
ShutdownHardwareBreakpointEngine rad98
ExceptionHandlerCallbackRoutine rad98
SetHardwareBreakpoint rad98
InsertDescriptorEntry rad98
RemoveDescriptorEntry rad98
SnapshotInsertHardwareBreakpointHookIntoTargetThread rad98

Generic Shellcode

Function Name Original Author
GenericShellcodeHelloWorldMessageBoxA SafeBreach Labs
GenericShellcodeHelloWorldMessageBoxAEbFbLoop SafeBreach Labs
GenericShellcodeOpenCalcExitThread MsfVenom


yaraQA - YARA Rule Analyzer To Improve Rule Quality And Performance

By: Zion3R


YARA rule Analyzer to improve rule quality and performance

Why?

YARA rules can be syntactically correct but still dysfunctional. yaraQA tries to find and report these issues to the author or maintainer of a YARA rule set.

The issues yaraQA tries to detect are e.g.:

  • rules that are syntactically correct but never match due to errors in the condition (e.g. rule with one string and 2 of them in the condition)
  • rules that use string and modifier combinations that are probably wrong (e.g. $ = "\\Debug\\" fullword)
  • performance issues caused by short atoms, repeating characters or loops (e.g. $ = "AA"; can be excluded from the analysis using --ignore-performance)

I'm going to extend the test set over time. Each minor version will include new features or new tests.


Install requirements

pip install -r requirements.txt

Usage

directory (YARA rules folders, separated by space) -o outfile Output file that lists the issues (JSON, default: 'yaraQA-issues.json') -b baseline Use a issues baseline (issues found and reviewed before) to filter issues -l level Minium level to show (1=informational, 2=warning, 3=critical) --ignore-performance Suppress performance-related rule issues --debug Debug output" dir="auto">
usage: yaraQA.py [-h] [-f yara files [yara files ...]] [-d yara files [yara files ...]] [-o outfile] [-b baseline] [-l level]
[--ignore-performance] [--debug]

YARA RULE ANALYZER

optional arguments:
-h, --help show this help message and exit
-f yara files [yara files ...]
Path to input files (one or more YARA rules, separated by space)
-d yara files [yara files ...]
Path to input directory (YARA rules folders, separated by space)
-o outfile Output file that lists the issues (JSON, default: 'yaraQA-issues.json')
-b baseline Use a issues baseline (issues found and reviewed before) to filter issues
-l level Minium level to show (1=informational, 2=warning, 3=critical)
--ignore-performance Suppress performance-related rule issues
--debug Debug output

Try it out

python3 yaraQA.py -d ./test/

Suppress all performance issues and only show detection / logic issues.

python3 yaraQA.py -d ./test/ --ignore-performance

Suppress all issues of informational character

python3 yaraQA.py -d ./test/ -level 2

Use a baseline to only see new issues (not the ones that you've already reviewed). The baseline file is an old JSON output of a reviewed state.

python3 yaraQA.py -d ./test/ -b yaraQA-reviewed-issues.json

Example Rules with Issues

Example rules with issues can be found in the ./test folder.

Output

yaraQA writes the detected issues to a file named yaraQA-issues.json by default.

This listing shows an example of the output generated by yaraQA in JSON format:

binary 0 in front or a space after the string). Every additional byte helps." }, { "rule": "Demo_Rule_3_Fullword_FilePath_Section", "id": "SM3", "issue": "The rule uses a string with the modifier 'fullword' but it starts and ends with two backslashes and thus the modifier could lead to a dysfunctional rule.", "element": { "name": "$s1", "value": "\\\\ZombieBoy\\\\", "type": "text", "modifiers": [ "ascii", "fullword" ] }, "level": "warning", "type": "logic", "recommendation": "Remove the 'fullword' modifier" }, { "rule": "Demo_Rule_4_Condition_Never_Matches", "id": "CE1", "issue": "The rule uses a condition that will never match", "element": { "condition_segment": "2 of", "num_of_strings": 1 }, "level": "error", "type": "logic", "recommendation": "Fix the condition" }, { "rule": "Demo_Rule_5_Condition_Short_String_At_Pos", "id": "PA1", "issue": "This rule looks for a short string at a particular position. A short string represents a short atom and could be rewritten to an expression using uint(x) at position.", "element": { "condition_segment": "$mz at 0", "string": "$mz", "value": "MZ" }, "level": "warning", "type": "performance", "recommendation": "" }, { "rule": "Demo_Rule_5_Condition_Short_String_At_Pos", "id": "PA2", "issue": "The rule contains a string that turns out to be a very short atom, which could cause a reduced performance of the complete rule set or increased memory usage.", "element": { "name": "$mz", "value": "MZ", "type": "text", "modifiers": [ "ascii" ] }, "level": "warning", "type": "performance", "recommendation": "Try to avoid using such short atoms, by e.g. adding a few more bytes to the beginning or the end (e.g. add a binary 0 in front or a space after the string). Every additional byte helps." }, { "rule": "Demo_Rule_6_Condition_Short_Byte_At_Pos", "id": "PA1", "issue": "This rule looks for a short string at a particular position. A short string represents a short atom and could be rewritten to an expression using uint(x) at position.", "element": { "condition_segment": "$mz at 0", "string": "$mz", "value": "{ 4d 5a }" }, "level": "warning", "type": "performance", "recommendation": "" }, { "rule": "Demo_Rule_6_Condition_Short_Byte_At_Pos", "id": "PA2", "issue": "The rule contains a string that turns out to be a very short atom, which could cause a reduced performance of the complete rule set or increased memory usage.", "element": { "name": "$mz", "value": "{ 4d 5a }", "type": "byte" }, "level": "warning", "type": "performance", "recommendation": "Try to avoid using such short atoms, by e.g. adding a few more bytes to the beginning or the end (e.g. add a binary 0 in front or a space after the string). Every additional byte helps." }, { "rule": "Demo_Rule_6_Condition_Short_Byte_At_Pos", "id": "SM3", "issue": "The rule uses a string with the modifier 'fullword' but it starts and ends with two backslashes and thus the modifier could lead to a dysfunctional rule.", "element": { "name": "$s1", "value": "\\\\Section\\\\in\\\\Path\\\\", "type": "text", "modifiers": [ "ascii", "fullword" ] }, "level": "warning", "type": "logic", "recommendation": "Remove the 'fullword' modifier" } ]" dir="auto">
[
{
"rule": "Demo_Rule_1_Fullword_PDB",
"id": "SM1",
"issue": "The rule uses a PDB string with the modifier 'wide'. PDB strings are always included as ASCII strings. The 'wide' keyword is unneeded.",
"element": {
"name": "$s1",
"value": "\\\\i386\\\\mimidrv.pdb",
"type": "text",
"modifiers": [
"ascii",
"wide",
"fullword"
]
},
"level": "info",
"type": "logic",
"recommendation": "Remove the 'wide' modifier"
},
{
"rule": "Demo_Rule_1_Fullword_PDB",
"id": "SM2",
"issue": "The rule uses a PDB string with the modifier 'fullword' but it starts with two backslashes and thus the modifier could lead to a dysfunctional rule.",
"element": {
"name": " $s1",
"value": "\\\\i386\\\\mimidrv.pdb",
"type": "text",
"modifiers": [
"ascii",
"wide",
"fullword"
]
},
"level": "warning",
"type": "logic",
"recommendation": "Remove the 'fullword' modifier"
},
{
"rule": "Demo_Rule_2_Short_Atom",
"id": "PA2",
"issue": "The rule contains a string that turns out to be a very short atom, which could cause a reduced performance of the complete rule set or increased memory usage.",
"element": {
"name": "$s1",
"value": "{ 01 02 03 }",
"type": "byte"
},
"level": "warning",
"type": "performance",
"recommendation": "Try to avoid using such short atoms, by e.g. adding a few more bytes to the beginning or the end (e.g. add a binary 0 in front or a space after the string). Every additional byte helps."
},
{
"rule": "Demo_Rule_3_Fullword_FilePath_Section",
"id": "SM3",
"issue": "The rule uses a string with the modifier 'fullword' but it starts and ends with two backslashes and thus the modifier could lead to a dysfunctional rule.",
"element": {
"name": "$s1",
"value": "\\\\ZombieBoy\\\\",
"type": "text",
"modifiers": [
"ascii",
"fullword"
]
},
"level": "warning",
"type": "logic",
"recommendation": "Remove the 'fullword' modifier"
},
{
"rule": "Demo_Rule_4_Condition_Never_Matches",
"id": "CE1",
"issue": "The rule uses a condition that will never match",
"element": {
"condition_segment": "2 of",
"num_of_strings": 1
},
"level": "error",
"type": "logic",
"recommendation": "Fix the condition"
},
{
"rule": "Demo_Rule_5_Condition_Short_String_At_Pos",
"id": "PA1",
"issue": "This rule looks for a short string at a particular position. A short string represents a short atom and could be rewritten to an expression using uint(x) at position.",
"element": {
"condition_segment": "$mz at 0",
"string": "$mz",
"value": "MZ"
},
"level": "warning",
"type": "performance",
"recommendation": ""
},
{
"rule": "Demo_Rule_5_Condition_Short_String_At_Pos",
"id": "PA2",
"issue": "The rule contains a string that turns out to be a very short atom, which could cause a reduced performance of the complete rule set or increased memory usage.",< br/> "element": {
"name": "$mz",
"value": "MZ",
"type": "text",
"modifiers": [
"ascii"
]
},
"level": "warning",
"type": "performance",
"recommendation": "Try to avoid using such short atoms, by e.g. adding a few more bytes to the beginning or the end (e.g. add a binary 0 in front or a space after the string). Every additional byte helps."
},
{
"rule": "Demo_Rule_6_Condition_Short_Byte_At_Pos",
"id": "PA1",
"issue": "This rule looks for a short string at a particular position. A short string represents a short atom and could be rewritten to an expression using uint(x) at position.",
"element": {
"condition_segment": "$mz at 0",
"string": "$mz",
"value": "{ 4d 5a }"
},
"level": "warning",
"type": "performance",
"recommendation": ""
},
{
"rule": "Demo_Rule_6_Condition_Short_Byte_At_Pos",
"id": "PA2",
"issue": "The rule contains a string that turns out to be a very short atom, which could cause a reduced performance of the complete rule set or increased memory usage.",
"element": {
"name": "$mz",
"value": "{ 4d 5a }",
"type": "byte"
},
"level": "warning",
"type": "performance",
"recommendation": "Try to avoid using such short atoms, by e.g. adding a few more bytes to the beginning or the end (e.g. add a binary 0 in front or a space after the string). Every additional byte helps."
},
{
"rule": "Demo_Rule_6_Condition_Short_Byte_At_Pos",
"id": "SM3",
"issue": "The rule uses a string with the modifier 'fullword' but it starts and ends with two backsla shes and thus the modifier could lead to a dysfunctional rule.",
"element": {
"name": "$s1",
"value": "\\\\Section\\\\in\\\\Path\\\\",
"type": "text",
"modifiers": [
"ascii",
"fullword"
]
},
"level": "warning",
"type": "logic",
"recommendation": "Remove the 'fullword' modifier"
}
]

Screenshots



Handle-Ripper - Windows Handle Hijacker

By: Zion3R

  • Handle hijacking is a technique used in Windows operating systems to gain access to resources and resources of a system without permission. It is a type of privilege escalation attack in which a malicious user takes control of an object handle, which is an identifier that is used to reference a system object, such as a file, a directory, a process, or an event. This allows the malicious user to gain access to resources that should be inaccessible to them.

  • Handle hijacking is a serious threat to system security as it allows a malicious user to access resources and data that should otherwise be protected. It can also be used to inject code into a vulnerable system, allowing the attacker to gain access to information and resources.

  • Handle hijacking techniques are becoming increasingly prevalent as hackers develop more sophisticated methods of exploiting vulnerabilities in Windows systems. As such, it is important that system administrators understand the risks associated with handle hijacking and take proactive measures to protect their systems.


DETAILS

  • To perform a handle hijacking attack, an attacker must first identify a handle that is being used by a legitimate process and that they want to access. This can be done using various techniques, such as scanning the handle table of a process, monitoring handle creation events, or using a tool that can enumerate handles on the system ,Once the attacker has identified the handle they want to access, they can use the DuplicateHandle function to create a copy of the handle with their own process. This function takes the following parameters:

    • hSourceProcessHandle: A handle to the process that contains the source handle.
    • hSourceHandle: A handle to the object to duplicate.
    • hTargetProcessHandle: A handle to the process that is to receive the duplicated handle.
    • lpTargetHandle: A pointer to a variable that receives the handle value.
    • dwDesiredAccess: The access rights for the duplicated handle.
    • bInheritHandle: A value that specifies whether the handle is inheritable.
    • dwOptions: Additional options for the handle duplication.
  • The DuplicateHandle function will create a new handle with the specified access rights and options, and return it in the lpTargetHandle parameter. The attacker can then use this handle to access the resource that it represents, allowing them to perform actions on the resource that they would not normally be able to do.



Bypass-Sandbox-Evasion - Bypass Malware Sandbox Evasion Ram Check

By: Zion3R


Sandboxes are commonly used to analyze malware. They provide a temporary, isolated, and secure environment in which to observe whether a suspicious file exhibits any malicious behavior. However, malware developers have also developed methods to evade sandboxes and analysis environments. One such method is to perform checks to determine whether the machine the malware is being executed on is being operated by a real user. One such check is the RAM size. If the RAM size is unrealistically small (e.g., 1GB), it may indicate that the machine is a sandbox. If the malware detects a sandbox, it will not execute its true malicious behavior and may appear to be a benign file

Details

  • The GetPhysicallyInstalledSystemMemory API retrieves the amount of RAM that is physically installed on the computer from the SMBIOS firmware tables. It takes a PULONGLONG parameter and returns TRUE if the function succeeds, setting the TotalMemoryInKilobytes to a nonzero value. If the function fails, it returns FALSE.

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  • The amount of physical memory retrieved by the GetPhysicallyInstalledSystemMemory function must be equal to or greater than the amount reported by the GlobalMemoryStatusEx function; if it is less, the SMBIOS data is malformed and the function fails with ERROR_INVALID_DATA, Malformed SMBIOS data may indicate a problem with the user's computer .

  • The register rcx holds the parameter TotalMemoryInKilobytes. To overwrite the jump address of GetPhysicallyInstalledSystemMemory, I use the following opcodes: mov qword ptr ss:[rcx],4193B840. This moves the value 4193B840 (or 1.1 TB) to rcx. Then, the ret instruction is used to pop the return address off the stack and jump to it, Therefore, whenever GetPhysicallyInstalledSystemMemory is called, it will set rcx to the custom value."



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