Domain join accounts are frequently exposed during build processes, and even when following Microsoft’s current guidance they inherit over-privileged ACLs (ownership, read-all, account restrictions) that enable LAPS disclosure, RBCD and other high-impact abuses.

Hardening requires layering controls such as disallowing low privileged users to create machine accounts and ensure that Domain Admins own joined computer objects. In addition, add deny ACEs for LAPS (ms-Mcs-AdmPwd) and RBCD (msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity) while scoping create/delete rights to specific OUs.

Even with those mitigations, reset-password rights can be weaponised via replication lag plus AD CS to recover the pre-reset machine secret.

Dig into this post to see the lab walkthroughs, detection pointers and scripts that back these claims.