GATOR - GCP Attack Toolkit For Offensive Research, A Tool Designed To Aid In Research And Exploiting Google Cloud Environments

GATOR - GCP Attack Toolkit for Offensive Research, a tool designed to aid in research and exploiting Google Cloud Environments. It offers a comprehensive range of modules tailored to support users in various attack stages, spanning from Reconnaissance to Impact.

Modules

Installation

Python 3.11 or newer should be installed. You can verify your Python version with the following command:

python --version

Manual Installation via setup.py

git clone https://github.com/anrbn/GATOR.git
cd GATOR
python setup.py install

Automated Installation via pip

pip install gator-red

Documentation

Have a look at the GATOR Documentation for an explained guide on using GATOR and it's module!

Issues

Reporting an Issue

If you encounter any problems with this tool, I encourage you to let me know. Here are the steps to report an issue:

1. Check Existing Issues: Before reporting a new issue, please check the existing issues in this repository. Your issue might have already been reported and possibly even resolved.

2. Create a New Issue: If your problem hasn't been reported, please create a new issue in the GitHub repository. Click the Issues tab and then click New Issue.

3. Describe the Issue: When creating a new issue, please provide as much information as possible. Include a clear and descriptive title, explain the problem in detail, and provide steps to reproduce the issue if possible. Including the version of the tool you're using and your operating system can also be helpful.

4. Submit the Issue: After you've filled out all the necessary information, click Submit new issue.

Your feedback is important, and will help improve the tool. I appreciate your contribution!

Resolving an Issue

I'll be reviewing reported issues on a regular basis and try to reproduce the issue based on your description and will communicate with you for further information if necessary. Once I understand the issue, I'll work on a fix.

Please note that resolving an issue may take some time depending on its complexity. I appreciate your patience and understanding.

Contributing

I warmly welcome and appreciate contributions from the community! If you're interested in contributing on any existing or new modules, feel free to submit a pull request (PR) with any new/existing modules or features you'd like to add.

Once you've submitted a PR, I'll review it as soon as I can. I might request some changes or improvements before merging your PR. Your contributions play a crucial role in making the tool better, and I'm excited to see what you'll bring to the project!

Thank you for considering contributing to the project.

Questions and Issues

If you have any questions regarding the tool or any of its modules, please check out the documentation first. I've tried to provide clear, comprehensive information related to all of its modules. If however your query is not yet solved or you have a different question altogether please don't hesitate to reach out to me via Twitter or LinkedIn. I'm always happy to help and provide support. :)

ZeusCloud - Open Source Cloud Security

ZeusCloud is an open source cloud security platform.

Discover, prioritize, and remediate your risks in the cloud.

• Build an asset inventory of your AWS accounts.
• Discover attack paths based on public exposure, IAM, vulnerabilities, and more.
• Prioritize findings with graphical context.
• Remediate findings with step by step instructions.
• Customize security and compliance controls to fit your needs.
• Meet compliance standards PCI DSS, CIS, SOC 2, and more!

Quick Start

1. Clone repo: git clone --recurse-submodules git@github.com:Zeus-Labs/ZeusCloud.git
2. Run: cd ZeusCloud && make quick-deploy
3. Visit http://localhost:80

Check out our Get Started guide for more details.

A cloud-hosted version is available on special request - email founders@zeuscloud.io to get access!

Sandbox

Play around with our sandbox environment to see how ZeusCloud identifies, prioritizes, and remediates risks in the cloud!

Features

• Discover Attack Paths - Discover toxic risk combinations an attacker can use to penetrate your environment.
• Graphical Context - Understand context behind security findings with graphical visualizations.
• Access Explorer - Visualize who has access to what with an IAM visualization engine.
• Identify Misconfigurations - Discover the highest risk-of-exploit misconfigurations in your environments.
• Configurability - Configure which security rules are active, which alerts should be muted, and more.
• Security as Code - Modify rules or write your own with our extensible security as code approach.
• Remediation - Follow step by step guides to remediate security findings.
• Compliance - Ensure your cloud posture is compliant with PCI DSS, CIS benchmarks and more!

Why ZeusCloud?

Cloud usage continues to grow. Companies are shifting more of their workloads from on-prem to the cloud and both adding and expanding new and existing workloads in the cloud. Cloud providers keep increasing their offerings and their complexity. Companies are having trouble keeping track of their security risks as their cloud environment scales and grows more complex. Several high profile attacks have occurred in recent times. Capital One had an S3 bucket breached, Amazon had an unprotected Prime Video server breached, Microsoft had an Azure DevOps server breached, Puma was the victim of ransomware, etc.

We had to take action.

• We noticed traditional cloud security tools are opaque, confusing, time consuming to set up, and expensive as you scale your cloud environment
• Cybersecurity vendors don't provide much actionable information to security, engineering, and devops teams by inundating them with non-contextual alerts
• ZeusCloud is easy to set up, transparent, and configurable, so you can prioritize the most important risks
• Best of all, you can use ZeusCloud for free!

Future Roadmap

• Integrations with vulnerability scanners
• Integrations with secret scanners
• Shift-left: Remediate risks earlier in the SDLC with context from your deployments
• Support for Azure and GCP environments

Contributing

We love contributions of all sizes. What would be most helpful first:

• Please give us feedback in our Slack.
• Open a PR (see our instructions below on developing ZeusCloud locally)
• Submit a feature request or bug report through Github Issues.

Development

Run containers in development mode:

cd frontend && yarn && cd -
docker-compose down && docker-compose -f docker-compose.dev.yaml --env-file .env.dev up --build

Reset neo4j and/or postgres data with the following:

rm -rf .compose/neo4j
rm -rf .compose/postgres

To develop on frontend, make the the code changes and save.

To develop on backend, run

docker-compose -f docker-compose.dev.yaml --env-file .env.dev up --no-deps --build backend

To access the UI, go to: http://localhost:80.

Security

Please do not run ZeusCloud exposed to the public internet. Use the latest versions of ZeusCloud to get all security related patches. Report any security vulnerabilities to founders@zeuscloud.io.

Open-source vs. cloud-hosted

This repo is freely available under the Apache 2.0 license.

We're working on a cloud-hosted solution which handles deployment and infra management. Contact us at founders@zeuscloud.io for more information!

Special thanks to the amazing Cartography project, which ZeusCloud uses for its asset inventory. Credit to PostHog and Airbyte for inspiration around public-facing materials - like this README!

nuvola - Tool To Dump And Perform Automatic And Manual Security Analysis On Aws Environments Configurations And Services

nuvola (with the lowercase n) is a tool to dump and perform automatic and manual security analysis on AWS environments configurations and services using predefined, extensible and custom rules created using a simple Yaml syntax.

The general idea behind this project is to create an abstracted digital twin of a cloud platform. For a more concrete example: nuvola reflects the BloodHound traits used for Active Directory analysis but on cloud environments (at the moment only AWS).

The usage of a graph database also increases the possibility of finding different and innovative attack paths and can be used as an offline, centralised and lightweight digital twin.

Quick Start

Requirements

• docker-compose installed
• an AWS account configured to be used with awscli with full access to the cloud resources, better if in ReadOnly mode (the policy arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/ReadOnlyAccess is fine)

Setup

1. Clone the repository

git clone --depth=1 https://github.com/primait/nuvola.git; cd nuvola

2. Create and edit, if required, the .env file to set your DB username/password/URL

cp .env_example .env;

3. Start the Neo4j docker instance

make start

4. Build the tool

make build

Usage

1. Firstly you need to dump all the supported AWS services configurations and load the data into the Neo4j database:

./nuvola dump -profile default_RO -outputdir ~/DumpDumpFolder -format zip

2. To import a previously executed dump operation into the Neo4j database:

./nuvola assess -import ~/DumpDumpFolder/nuvola-default_RO_20220901.zip

3. To only perform static assessments on the data loaded into the Neo4j database using the predefined ruleset:

./nuvola assess

4. Or use Neo4j Browser to manually explore the digital twin.

About nuvola

To get started with nuvola and its database schema, check out the nuvola Wiki.

No data is sent or shared with Prima Assicurazioni.

How to contribute

• reporting bugs and issues
• reporting new improvements
• reviewing issues and pull requests
• fixing bugs and issues
• creating new rules
• improving the overall quality

Presentations

• RomHack 2022
  • Slides
  • Demos

License

nuvola uses graph theory to reveal possible attack paths and security misconfigurations on cloud environments.

This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.

This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public License for more details.

You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along with this repository and program. If not, see http://www.gnu.org/licenses/.

When Efforts to Contain a Data Breach Backfire

Earlier this month, the administrator of the cybercrime forum Breached received a cease-and-desist letter from a cybersecurity firm. The missive alleged that an auction on the site for data stolen from 10 million customers of Mexico’s second-largest bank was fake news and harming the bank’s reputation. The administrator responded to this empty threat by purchasing the stolen banking data and leaking it on the forum for everyone to download.

On August 3, 2022, someone using the alias “Holistic-K1ller” posted on Breached a thread selling data allegedly stolen from Grupo Financiero Banorte, Mexico’s second-biggest financial institution by total loans. Holistic-K1ller said the database included the full names, addresses, phone numbers, Mexican tax IDs (RFC), email addresses and balances on more than 10 million citizens.

There was no reason to believe Holistic-K1ller had fabricated their breach claim. This identity has been highly active on Breached and its predecessor RaidForums for more than two years, mostly selling databases from hacked Mexican entities. Last month, they sold customer information on 36 million customers of the Mexican phone company Telcel; in March, they sold 33,000 images of Mexican IDs — with the front picture and a selfie of each citizen. That same month, they also sold data on 1.4 million customers of Mexican lending platform Yotepresto.

But this history was either overlooked or ignored by Group-IB, the Singapore-based cybersecurity firm apparently hired by Banorte to help respond to the data breach.

“The Group-IB team has discovered a resource containing a fraudulent post offering to buy Grupo Financiero Banorte’s leaked databases,” reads a letter the Breach administrator said they received from Group-IB. “We ask you to remove this post containing Banorte data. Thank you for your cooperation and prompt attention to this urgent matter.”

The administrator of Breached is “Pompompurin,” the same individual who alerted this author in November 2021 to a glaring security hole in a U.S. Justice Department website that was used to spoof security alerts from the FBI. In a post to Breached on Aug. 8, Pompompurin said they bought the Banorte database from Holistic-K1ller’s sales thread because Group-IB was sending emails complaining about it.

“They also attempted to submit DMCA’s against the website,” Pompompurin wrote, referring to legal takedown requests under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. “Make sure to tell Banorte that now they need to worry about the data being leaked instead of just being sold.”

Group-IB CEO Dmitriy Volkov said the company has seen some success in the past asking hackers to remove or take down certain information, but that making such requests is not a typical response for the security firm.

“It is not a common practice to send takedown notifications to such forums demanding that such content be removed,” Volkov said. “But these abuse letters are legally binding, which helps build a foundation for further steps taken by law enforcement agencies. Actions contrary to international rules in the regulated space of the Internet only lead to more severe crimes, which — as we know from the case of Raidforums — are successfully investigated and stopped by law enforcement.”

Banorte did not respond to requests for comment. But in a brief written statement picked up on Twitter, Banorte said there was no breach involving their infrastructure, and the data being sold is old.

“There has been no violation of our platforms and technological infrastructure,” Banorte said. “The set of information referred to is inaccurate and outdated, and does not put our users and customers at risk.”

That statement may be 100 percent true. Still, it is difficult to think of a better example of how not to do breach response. Banorte shrugging off this incident as a nothingburger is baffling: While it is almost certainly true that the bank balance information in the Banorte leak is now out of date, the rest of the information (tax IDs, phone numbers, email addresses) is harder to change.

“Is there one person from our community that think sending cease and desist letter to a hackers forum operator is a good idea?,” asked Ohad Zaidenberg, founder of CTI League, a volunteer emergency response community that emerged in 2020 to help fight COVID-19 related scams. “Who does it? Instead of helping, they pushed the organization from the hill.”

Kurt Seifried, director of IT for the CloudSecurityAlliance, was similarly perplexed by the response to the Banorte breach.

“If the data wasn’t real….did the bank think a cease and desist would result in the listing being removed?” Seifried wondered on Twitter. “I mean, isn’t selling breach data a worse crime usually than slander or libel? What was their thought process?”

A more typical response when a large bank suspects a breach is to approach the seller privately through an intermediary to ascertain if the information is valid and what it might cost to take it off the market. While it may seem odd to expect cybercriminals to make good on their claims to sell stolen data to only one party, removing sold stolen items from inventory is a fairly basic function of virtually all cybercriminal markets today (apart from perhaps sites that traffic in stolen identity data).

At a minimum, negotiating or simply engaging with a data seller can buy the victim organization additional time and clues with which to investigate the claim and ideally notify affected parties of a breach before the stolen data winds up online.

It is true that a large number of hacked databases put up for sale on the cybercrime underground are sold only after a small subset of in-the-know thieves have harvested all of the low-hanging fruit in the data — e.g., access to cryptocurrency accounts or user credentials that are recycled across multiple websites. And it’s certainly not unheard of for cybercriminals to go back on their word and re-sell or leak information that they have sold previously.

But companies in the throes of responding to a data security incident do themselves and customers no favors when they underestimate their adversaries, or try to intimidate cybercrooks with legal threats. Such responses generally accomplish nothing, except unnecessarily upping the stakes for everyone involved while displaying a dangerous naiveté about how the cybercrime underground works.

Update, Aug. 17, 10:32 a.m.: Thanks to a typo by this author, a request for comment sent to Group-IB was not delivered in advance of this story. The copy above has been updated to include a comment from Group-IB’s CEO.

TerraformGoat - "Vulnerable By Design" Multi Cloud Deployment Tool

TerraformGoat is selefra research lab's "Vulnerable by Design" multi cloud deployment tool.

Currently supported cloud vendors include Alibaba Cloud, Tencent Cloud, Huawei Cloud, Amazon Web Services, Google Cloud Platform, Microsoft Azure.

Scenarios

Install

TerraformGoat is deployed using Docker images and therefore requires Docker Engine environment support, Docker Engine installation can be found in https://docs.docker.com/engine/install/

Depending on the cloud service provider you are using, choose the corresponding installation command.

Alibaba Cloud

docker pull registry.cn-beijing.aliyuncs.com/huoxian_pub/terraformgoat_aliyun:0.0.4
docker run -itd --name terraformgoat_aliyun_0.0.4 registry.cn-beijing.aliyuncs.com/huoxian_pub/terraformgoat_aliyun:0.0.4
docker exec -it terraformgoat_aliyun_0.0.4 /bin/bash

Tencent Cloud

docker pull registry.cn-beijing.aliyuncs.com/huoxian_pub/terraformgoat_tencentcloud:0.0.4
docker run -itd --name terraformgoat_tencentcloud_0.0.4 registry.cn-beijing.aliyuncs.com/huoxian_pub/terraformgoat_tencentcloud:0.0.4
docker exec -it terraformgoat_tencentcloud_0.0.4 /bin/bash

Huawei Cloud

docker pull registry.cn-beijing.aliyuncs.com/huoxian_pub/terraformgoat_huaweicloud:0.0.4
docker run -itd --name terraformgoat_huaweicloud_0.0.4 registry.cn-beijing.aliyuncs.com/huoxian_pub/terraformgoat_huaweicloud:0.0.4
docker exec -it terraformgoat_huaweicloud_0.0.4 /bin/bash

Amazon Web Services

docker pull registry.cn-beijing.aliyuncs.com/huoxian_pub/terraformgoat_aws:0.0.4
docker run -itd --name terraformgoat_aws_0.0.4 registry.cn-beijing.aliyuncs.com/huoxian_pub/terraformgoat_aws:0.0.4
docker exec -it terraformgoat_aws_0.0.4 /bin/bash

Google Cloud Platform

docker pull registry.cn-beijing.aliyuncs.com/huoxian_pub/terraformgoat_gcp:0.0.4
docker run -itd --name terraformgoat_gcp_0.0.4 registry.cn-beijing.aliyuncs.com/huoxian_pub/terraformgoat_gcp:0.0.4
docker exec -it terraformgoat_gcp_0.0.4 /bin/bash

Microsoft Azure

docker pull registry.cn-beijing.aliyuncs.com/huoxian_pub/terraformgoat_azure:0.0.4
docker run -itd --name terraformgoat_azure_0.0.4 registry.cn-beijing.aliyuncs.com/huoxian_pub/terraformgoat_azure:0.0.4
docker exec -it terraformgoat_azure_0.0.4 /bin/bash

Demo

After entering the container, cd to the corresponding scenario directory and you can start deploying the scenario.

Here is a demonstration of the Alibaba Cloud Bucket Object Traversal scenario build.

docker pull registry.cn-beijing.aliyuncs.com/huoxian_pub/terraformgoat_aliyun:0.0.4
docker run -itd --name terraformgoat_aliyun_0.0.4 registry.cn-beijing.aliyuncs.com/huoxian_pub/terraformgoat_aliyun:0.0.4
docker exec -it terraformgoat_aliyun_0.0.4 /bin/bash

cd /TerraformGoat/aliyun/oss/bucket_object_traversal/
aliyun configure
terraform init
terraform apply

The program prompts Enter a value:, type yes and enter, use curl to access the bucket, you can see the object traversed.

To avoid the cloud service from continuing to incur charges, remember to destroy the scenario in time after using it.

terraform destroy



Uninstall

If you are in a container, first execute the exit command to exit the container, and then execute the following command under the host.

docker stop $(docker ps -a -q -f "name=terraformgoat*")
docker rm $(docker ps -a -q -f "name=terraformgoat*")
docker rmi $(docker images -a -q -f "reference=registry.cn-beijing.aliyuncs.com/huoxian_pub/terraformgoat*")

Notice

1. The README of each vulnerable environment is executed within the TerraformGoat container environment, so the TerraformGoat container environment needs to be deployed first.
2. Due to the horizontal risk of intranet horizontal on the cloud in some scenarios, it is strongly recommended that users use their own test accounts to configure the scenarios, avoid using the cloud account of the production environment, and install TerraformGoat using Dockerfile to isolate the user's local cloud vendor token and the test account token.
3. TerraformGoat is used for educational purposes only, It is not allowed to use it for illegal and criminal purposes, any consequences arising from TerraformGoat are the responsibility of the person using it, and not the selefra organization.

Contributing

Contributions are welcomed and greatly appreciated. Further reading — CONTRIBUTING.md for details on contribution workflow.

License

TerraformGoat is under the Apache 2.0 license. See the LICENSE file for details.