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PolyDrop - A BYOSI (Bring-Your-Own-Script-Interpreter) Rapid Payload Deployment Toolkit

By: Unknown


BYOSI

- Bring-Your-Own-Script-Interpreter

- Leveraging the abuse of trusted applications, one is able to deliver a compatible script interpreter for a Windows, Mac, or Linux system as well as malicious source code in the form of the specific script interpreter of choice. Once both the malicious source code and the trusted script interpeter are safely written to the target system, one could simply execute said source code via the trusted script interpreter.

PolyDrop

- Leverages thirteen scripting languages to perform the above attack.


The following langues are wholly ignored by AV vendors including MS-Defender: - tcl - php - crystal - julia - golang - dart - dlang - vlang - nodejs - bun - python - fsharp - deno

All of these languages were allowed to completely execute, and establish a reverse shell by MS-Defender. We assume the list is even longer, given that languages such as PHP are considered "dead" languages.

- Currently undetectable by most mainstream Endpoint-Detection & Response vendors.

The total number of vendors that are unable to scan or process just PHP file types is 14, and they are listed below:

  • Alibaba
  • Avast-Mobile
  • BitDefenderFalx
  • Cylance
  • DeepInstinct
  • Elastic
  • McAfee Scanner
  • Palo Alto Networks
  • SecureAge
  • SentinelOne (Static ML)
  • Symantec Mobile Insight
  • Trapmine
  • Trustlook
  • Webroot

And the total number of vendors that are unable to accurately identify malicious PHP scripts is 54, and they are listed below:

  • Acronis (Static ML)
  • AhnLab-V3
  • ALYac
  • Antiy-AVL
  • Arcabit
  • Avira (no cloud)
  • Baidu
  • BitDefender
  • BitDefenderTheta
  • ClamAV
  • CMC
  • CrowdStrike Falcon
  • Cybereason
  • Cynet
  • DrWeb
  • Emsisoft
  • eScan
  • ESET-NOD32
  • Fortinet
  • GData
  • Gridinsoft (no cloud)
  • Jiangmin
  • K7AntiVirus
  • K7GW
  • Kaspersky
  • Lionic
  • Malwarebytes
  • MAX
  • MaxSecure
  • NANO-Antivirus
  • Panda
  • QuickHeal
  • Sangfor Engine Zero
  • Skyhigh (SWG)
  • Sophos
  • SUPERAntiSpyware
  • Symantec
  • TACHYON
  • TEHTRIS
  • Tencent
  • Trellix (ENS)
  • Trellix (HX)
  • TrendMicro
  • TrendMicro-HouseCall
  • Varist
  • VBA32
  • VIPRE
  • VirIT
  • ViRobot
  • WithSecure
  • Xcitium
  • Yandex
  • Zillya
  • ZoneAlarm by Check Point
  • Zoner

With this in mind, and the absolute shortcomings on identifying PHP based malware we came up with the theory that the 13 identified languages are also an oversight by these vendors, including CrowdStrike, Sentinel1, Palo Alto, Fortinet, etc. We have been able to identify that at the very least Defender considers these obviously malicious payloads as plaintext.

Disclaimer

We as the maintainers, are in no way responsible for the misuse or abuse of this product. This was published for legitimate penetration testing/red teaming purposes, and for educational value. Know the applicable laws in your country of residence before using this script, and do not break the law whilst using this. Thank you and have a nice day.

EDIT

In case you are seeing all of the default declarations, and wondering wtf guys. There is a reason; this was built to be more moduler for later versions. For now, enjoy the tool and feel free to post issues. They'll be addressed as quickly as possible.



Sttr - Cross-Platform, Cli App To Perform Various Operations On String

By: Unknown


sttr is command line software that allows you to quickly run various transformation operations on the string.


// With input prompt
sttr

// Direct input
sttr md5 "Hello World"

// File input
sttr md5 file.text
sttr base64-encode image.jpg

// Reading from different processor like cat, curl, printf etc..
echo "Hello World" | sttr md5
cat file.txt | sttr md5

// Writing output to a file
sttr yaml-json file.yaml > file-output.json

:movie_camera: Demo

:battery: Installation

Quick install

You can run the below curl to install it somewhere in your PATH for easy use. Ideally it will be installed at ./bin folder

curl -sfL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/abhimanyu003/sttr/main/install.sh | sh

Webi

MacOS / Linux

curl -sS https://webi.sh/sttr | sh

Windows

curl.exe https://webi.ms/sttr | powershell

See here

Homebrew

If you are on macOS and using Homebrew, you can install sttr with the following:

brew tap abhimanyu003/sttr
brew install sttr

Snap

sudo snap install sttr

Arch Linux

yay -S sttr-bin

Scoop

scoop bucket add sttr https://github.com/abhimanyu003/scoop-bucket.git
scoop install sttr

Go

go install github.com/abhimanyu003/sttr@latest

Manually

Download the pre-compiled binaries from the Release! page and copy them to the desired location.

:books: Guide

  • After installation simply run sttr command.
// For interactive menu
sttr
// Provide your input
// Press two enter to open operation menu
// Press `/` to filter various operations.
// Can also press UP-Down arrows select various operations.
  • Working with help.
sttr -h

// Example
sttr zeropad -h
sttr md5 -h
  • Working with files input.
sttr {command-name} {filename}

sttr base64-encode image.jpg
sttr md5 file.txt
sttr md-html Readme.md
  • Writing output to file.
sttr yaml-json file.yaml > file-output.json
  • Taking input from other command.
curl https: //jsonplaceholder.typicode.com/users | sttr json-yaml
  • Chaining the different processor.
sttr md5 hello | sttr base64-encode

echo "Hello World" | sttr base64-encode | sttr md5

:boom: Supported Operations

Encode/Decode

  • [x] ascii85-encode - Encode your text to ascii85
  • [x] ascii85-decode - Decode your ascii85 text
  • [x] base32-decode - Decode your base32 text
  • [x] base32-encode - Encode your text to base32
  • [x] base64-decode - Decode your base64 text
  • [x] base64-encode - Encode your text to base64
  • [x] base85-encode - Encode your text to base85
  • [x] base85-decode - Decode your base85 text
  • [x] base64url-decode - Decode your base64 url
  • [x] base64url-encode - Encode your text to url
  • [x] html-decode - Unescape your HTML
  • [x] html-encode - Escape your HTML
  • [x] rot13-encode - Encode your text to ROT13
  • [x] url-decode - Decode URL entities
  • [x] url-encode - Encode URL entities

Hash

  • [x] bcrypt - Get the Bcrypt hash of your text
  • [x] md5 - Get the MD5 checksum of your text
  • [x] sha1 - Get the SHA1 checksum of your text
  • [x] sha256 - Get the SHA256 checksum of your text
  • [x] sha512 - Get the SHA512 checksum of your text

String

  • [x] camel - Transform your text to CamelCase
  • [x] kebab - Transform your text to kebab-case
  • [x] lower - Transform your text to lower case
  • [x] reverse - Reverse Text ( txeT esreveR )
  • [x] slug - Transform your text to slug-case
  • [x] snake - Transform your text to snake_case
  • [x] title - Transform your text to Title Case
  • [x] upper - Transform your text to UPPER CASE

Lines

  • [x] count-lines - Count the number of lines in your text
  • [x] reverse-lines - Reverse lines
  • [x] shuffle-lines - Shuffle lines randomly
  • [x] sort-lines - Sort lines alphabetically
  • [x] unique-lines - Get unique lines from list

Spaces

  • [x] remove-spaces - Remove all spaces + new lines
  • [x] remove-newlines - Remove all new lines

Count

  • [x] count-chars - Find the length of your text (including spaces)
  • [x] count-lines - Count the number of lines in your text
  • [x] count-words - Count the number of words in your text

RGB/Hex

  • [x] hex-rgb - Convert a #hex-color code to RGB
  • [x] hex-encode - Encode your text Hex
  • [x] hex-decode - Convert Hexadecimal to String

JSON

  • [x] json - Format your text as JSON
  • [x] json-escape - JSON Escape
  • [x] json-unescape - JSON Unescape
  • [x] json-yaml - Convert JSON to YAML text
  • [x] json-msgpack - Convert JSON to MSGPACK
  • [x] msgpack-json - Convert MSGPACK to JSON

YAML

  • [x] yaml-json - Convert YAML to JSON text

Markdown

  • [x] markdown-html - Convert Markdown to HTML

Extract

  • [x] extract-emails - Extract emails from given text
  • [x] extract-ip - Extract IPv4 and IPv6 from your text
  • [x] extract-urls - Extract URls your text ( we don't do ping check )

Other

  • [x] escape-quotes - escape single and double quotes from your text
  • [x] completion - generate the autocompletion script for the specified shell
  • [x] interactive - Use sttr in interactive mode
  • [x] version - Print the version of sttr
  • [x] zeropad - Pad a number with zeros
  • [x] and adding more....

Featured On

These are the few locations where sttr was highlighted, many thanks to all of you. Please feel free to add any blogs/videos you may have made that discuss sttr to the list.



ROPDump - A Command-Line Tool Designed To Analyze Binary Executables For Potential Return-Oriented Programming (ROP) Gadgets, Buffer Overflow Vulnerabilities, And Memory Leaks

By: Zion3R


ROPDump is a tool for analyzing binary executables to identify potential Return-Oriented Programming (ROP) gadgets, as well as detecting potential buffer overflow and memory leak vulnerabilities.


Features

  • Identifies potential ROP gadgets in binary executables.
  • Detects potential buffer overflow vulnerabilities by analyzing vulnerable functions.
  • Generates exploit templates to make the exploit process faster
  • Identifies potential memory leak vulnerabilities by analyzing memory allocation functions.
  • Can print function names and addresses for further analysis.
  • Supports searching for specific instruction patterns.

Usage

  • <binary>: Path to the binary file for analysis.
  • -s, --search SEARCH: Optional. Search for specific instruction patterns.
  • -f, --functions: Optional. Print function names and addresses.

Examples

  • Analyze a binary without searching for specific instructions:

python3 ropdump.py /path/to/binary

  • Analyze a binary and search for specific instructions:

python3 ropdump.py /path/to/binary -s "pop eax"

  • Analyze a binary and print function names and addresses:

python3 ropdump.py /path/to/binary -f



JAW - A Graph-based Security Analysis Framework For Client-side JavaScript

By: Zion3R

An open-source, prototype implementation of property graphs for JavaScript based on the esprima parser, and the EsTree SpiderMonkey Spec. JAW can be used for analyzing the client-side of web applications and JavaScript-based programs.

This project is licensed under GNU AFFERO GENERAL PUBLIC LICENSE V3.0. See here for more information.

JAW has a Github pages website available at https://soheilkhodayari.github.io/JAW/.

Release Notes:


Overview of JAW

The architecture of the JAW is shown below.

Test Inputs

JAW can be used in two distinct ways:

  1. Arbitrary JavaScript Analysis: Utilize JAW for modeling and analyzing any JavaScript program by specifying the program's file system path.

  2. Web Application Analysis: Analyze a web application by providing a single seed URL.

Data Collection

  • JAW features several JavaScript-enabled web crawlers for collecting web resources at scale.

HPG Construction

  • Use the collected web resources to create a Hybrid Program Graph (HPG), which will be imported into a Neo4j database.

  • Optionally, supply the HPG construction module with a mapping of semantic types to custom JavaScript language tokens, facilitating the categorization of JavaScript functions based on their purpose (e.g., HTTP request functions).

Analysis and Outputs

  • Query the constructed Neo4j graph database for various analyses. JAW offers utility traversals for data flow analysis, control flow analysis, reachability analysis, and pattern matching. These traversals can be used to develop custom security analyses.

  • JAW also includes built-in traversals for detecting client-side CSRF, DOM Clobbering and request hijacking vulnerabilities.

  • The outputs will be stored in the same folder as that of input.

Setup

The installation script relies on the following prerequisites: - Latest version of npm package manager (node js) - Any stable version of python 3.x - Python pip package manager

Afterwards, install the necessary dependencies via:

$ ./install.sh

For detailed installation instructions, please see here.

Quick Start

Running the Pipeline

You can run an instance of the pipeline in a background screen via:

$ python3 -m run_pipeline --conf=config.yaml

The CLI provides the following options:

$ python3 -m run_pipeline -h

usage: run_pipeline.py [-h] [--conf FILE] [--site SITE] [--list LIST] [--from FROM] [--to TO]

This script runs the tool pipeline.

optional arguments:
-h, --help show this help message and exit
--conf FILE, -C FILE pipeline configuration file. (default: config.yaml)
--site SITE, -S SITE website to test; overrides config file (default: None)
--list LIST, -L LIST site list to test; overrides config file (default: None)
--from FROM, -F FROM the first entry to consider when a site list is provided; overrides config file (default: -1)
--to TO, -T TO the last entry to consider when a site list is provided; overrides config file (default: -1)

Input Config: JAW expects a .yaml config file as input. See config.yaml for an example.

Hint. The config file specifies different passes (e.g., crawling, static analysis, etc) which can be enabled or disabled for each vulnerability class. This allows running the tool building blocks individually, or in a different order (e.g., crawl all webapps first, then conduct security analysis).

Quick Example

For running a quick example demonstrating how to build a property graph and run Cypher queries over it, do:

$ python3 -m analyses.example.example_analysis --input=$(pwd)/data/test_program/test.js

Crawling and Data Collection

This module collects the data (i.e., JavaScript code and state values of web pages) needed for testing. If you want to test a specific JavaScipt file that you already have on your file system, you can skip this step.

JAW has crawlers based on Selenium (JAW-v1), Puppeteer (JAW-v2, v3) and Playwright (JAW-v3). For most up-to-date features, it is recommended to use the Puppeteer- or Playwright-based versions.

Playwright CLI with Foxhound

This web crawler employs foxhound, an instrumented version of Firefox, to perform dynamic taint tracking as it navigates through webpages. To start the crawler, do:

$ cd crawler
$ node crawler-taint.js --seedurl=https://google.com --maxurls=100 --headless=true --foxhoundpath=<optional-foxhound-executable-path>

The foxhoundpath is by default set to the following directory: crawler/foxhound/firefox which contains a binary named firefox.

Note: you need a build of foxhound to use this version. An ubuntu build is included in the JAW-v3 release.

Puppeteer CLI

To start the crawler, do:

$ cd crawler
$ node crawler.js --seedurl=https://google.com --maxurls=100 --browser=chrome --headless=true

See here for more information.

Selenium CLI

To start the crawler, do:

$ cd crawler/hpg_crawler
$ vim docker-compose.yaml # set the websites you want to crawl here and save
$ docker-compose build
$ docker-compose up -d

Please refer to the documentation of the hpg_crawler here for more information.

Graph Construction

HPG Construction CLI

To generate an HPG for a given (set of) JavaScript file(s), do:

$ node engine/cli.js  --lang=js --graphid=graph1 --input=/in/file1.js --input=/in/file2.js --output=$(pwd)/data/out/ --mode=csv

optional arguments:
--lang: language of the input program
--graphid: an identifier for the generated HPG
--input: path of the input program(s)
--output: path of the output HPG, must be i
--mode: determines the output format (csv or graphML)

HPG Import CLI

To import an HPG inside a neo4j graph database (docker instance), do:

$ python3 -m hpg_neo4j.hpg_import --rpath=<path-to-the-folder-of-the-csv-files> --id=<xyz> --nodes=<nodes.csv> --edges=<rels.csv>
$ python3 -m hpg_neo4j.hpg_import -h

usage: hpg_import.py [-h] [--rpath P] [--id I] [--nodes N] [--edges E]

This script imports a CSV of a property graph into a neo4j docker database.

optional arguments:
-h, --help show this help message and exit
--rpath P relative path to the folder containing the graph CSV files inside the `data` directory
--id I an identifier for the graph or docker container
--nodes N the name of the nodes csv file (default: nodes.csv)
--edges E the name of the relations csv file (default: rels.csv)

HPG Construction and Import CLI (v1)

In order to create a hybrid property graph for the output of the hpg_crawler and import it inside a local neo4j instance, you can also do:

$ python3 -m engine.api <path> --js=<program.js> --import=<bool> --hybrid=<bool> --reqs=<requests.out> --evts=<events.out> --cookies=<cookies.pkl> --html=<html_snapshot.html>

Specification of Parameters:

  • <path>: absolute path to the folder containing the program files for analysis (must be under the engine/outputs folder).
  • --js=<program.js>: name of the JavaScript program for analysis (default: js_program.js).
  • --import=<bool>: whether the constructed property graph should be imported to an active neo4j database (default: true).
  • --hybrid=bool: whether the hybrid mode is enabled (default: false). This implies that the tester wants to enrich the property graph by inputing files for any of the HTML snapshot, fired events, HTTP requests and cookies, as collected by the JAW crawler.
  • --reqs=<requests.out>: for hybrid mode only, name of the file containing the sequence of obsevered network requests, pass the string false to exclude (default: request_logs_short.out).
  • --evts=<events.out>: for hybrid mode only, name of the file containing the sequence of fired events, pass the string false to exclude (default: events.out).
  • --cookies=<cookies.pkl>: for hybrid mode only, name of the file containing the cookies, pass the string false to exclude (default: cookies.pkl).
  • --html=<html_snapshot.html>: for hybrid mode only, name of the file containing the DOM tree snapshot, pass the string false to exclude (default: html_rendered.html).

For more information, you can use the help CLI provided with the graph construction API:

$ python3 -m engine.api -h

Security Analysis

The constructed HPG can then be queried using Cypher or the NeoModel ORM.

Running Custom Graph traversals

You should place and run your queries in analyses/<ANALYSIS_NAME>.

Option 1: Using the NeoModel ORM (Deprecated)

You can use the NeoModel ORM to query the HPG. To write a query:

  • (1) Check out the HPG data model and syntax tree.
  • (2) Check out the ORM model for HPGs
  • (3) See the example query file provided; example_query_orm.py in the analyses/example folder.
$ python3 -m analyses.example.example_query_orm  

For more information, please see here.

Option 2: Using Cypher Queries

You can use Cypher to write custom queries. For this:

  • (1) Check out the HPG data model and syntax tree.
  • (2) See the example query file provided; example_query_cypher.py in the analyses/example folder.
$ python3 -m analyses.example.example_query_cypher

For more information, please see here.

Vulnerability Detection

This section describes how to configure and use JAW for vulnerability detection, and how to interpret the output. JAW contains, among others, self-contained queries for detecting client-side CSRF and DOM Clobbering

Step 1. enable the analysis component for the vulnerability class in the input config.yaml file:

request_hijacking:
enabled: true
# [...]
#
domclobbering:
enabled: false
# [...]

cs_csrf:
enabled: false
# [...]

Step 2. Run an instance of the pipeline with:

$ python3 -m run_pipeline --conf=config.yaml

Hint. You can run multiple instances of the pipeline under different screens:

$ screen -dmS s1 bash -c 'python3 -m run_pipeline --conf=conf1.yaml; exec sh'
$ screen -dmS s2 bash -c 'python3 -m run_pipeline --conf=conf2.yaml; exec sh'
$ # [...]

To generate parallel configuration files automatically, you may use the generate_config.py script.

How to Interpret the Output of the Analysis?

The outputs will be stored in a file called sink.flows.out in the same folder as that of the input. For Client-side CSRF, for example, for each HTTP request detected, JAW outputs an entry marking the set of semantic types (a.k.a, semantic tags or labels) associated with the elements constructing the request (i.e., the program slices). For example, an HTTP request marked with the semantic type ['WIN.LOC'] is forgeable through the window.location injection point. However, a request marked with ['NON-REACH'] is not forgeable.

An example output entry is shown below:

[*] Tags: ['WIN.LOC']
[*] NodeId: {'TopExpression': '86', 'CallExpression': '87', 'Argument': '94'}
[*] Location: 29
[*] Function: ajax
[*] Template: ajaxloc + "/bearer1234/"
[*] Top Expression: $.ajax({ xhrFields: { withCredentials: "true" }, url: ajaxloc + "/bearer1234/" })

1:['WIN.LOC'] variable=ajaxloc
0 (loc:6)- var ajaxloc = window.location.href

This entry shows that on line 29, there is a $.ajax call expression, and this call expression triggers an ajax request with the url template value of ajaxloc + "/bearer1234/, where the parameter ajaxloc is a program slice reading its value at line 6 from window.location.href, thus forgeable through ['WIN.LOC'].

Test Web Application

In order to streamline the testing process for JAW and ensure that your setup is accurate, we provide a simple node.js web application which you can test JAW with.

First, install the dependencies via:

$ cd tests/test-webapp
$ npm install

Then, run the application in a new screen:

$ screen -dmS jawwebapp bash -c 'PORT=6789 npm run devstart; exec sh'

Detailed Documentation.

For more information, visit our wiki page here. Below is a table of contents for quick access.

The Web Crawler of JAW

Data Model of Hybrid Property Graphs (HPGs)

Graph Construction

Graph Traversals

Contribution and Code Of Conduct

Pull requests are always welcomed. This project is intended to be a safe, welcoming space, and contributors are expected to adhere to the contributor code of conduct.

Academic Publication

If you use the JAW for academic research, we encourage you to cite the following paper:

@inproceedings{JAW,
title = {JAW: Studying Client-side CSRF with Hybrid Property Graphs and Declarative Traversals},
author= {Soheil Khodayari and Giancarlo Pellegrino},
booktitle = {30th {USENIX} Security Symposium ({USENIX} Security 21)},
year = {2021},
address = {Vancouver, B.C.},
publisher = {{USENIX} Association},
}

Acknowledgements

JAW has come a long way and we want to give our contributors a well-deserved shoutout here!

@tmbrbr, @c01gide, @jndre, and Sepehr Mirzaei.



BestEdrOfTheMarket - Little AV/EDR Bypassing Lab For Training And Learning Purposes

By: Zion3R


Little AV/EDR Evasion Lab for training & learning purposes. (๏—๏ธ under construction..)โ€‹

 ____            _     _____ ____  ____     ___   __   _____ _
| __ ) ___ ___| |_ | ____| _ \| _ \ / _ \ / _| |_ _| |__ ___
| _ \ / _ \/ __| __| | _| | | | | |_) | | | | | |_ | | | '_ \ / _ \
| |_) | __/\__ \ |_ | |___| |_| | _ < | |_| | _| | | | | | | __/
|____/_\___||___/\__| |_____|____/|_| \_\ \___/|_| |_| |_| |_|\___|
| \/ | __ _ _ __| | _____| |_
| |\/| |/ _` | '__| |/ / _ \ __|
| | | | (_| | | | < __/ |_ Yazidou - github.com/Xacone
|_| |_|\__,_|_| |_|\_\___|\__|


BestEDROfTheMarket is a naive user-mode EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response) project, designed to serve as a testing ground for understanding and bypassing EDR's user-mode detection methods that are frequently used by these security solutions.
These techniques are mainly based on a dynamic analysis of the target process state (memory, API calls, etc.),

Feel free to check this short article I wrote that describe the interception and analysis methods implemented by the EDR.


Defensive Techniques

In progress:


Usage

        Usage: BestEdrOfTheMarket.exe [args]

/help Shows this help message and quit
/v Verbosity
/iat IAT hooking
/stack Threads call stack monitoring
/nt Inline Nt-level hooking
/k32 Inline Kernel32/Kernelbase hooking
/ssn SSN crushing
BestEdrOfTheMarket.exe /stack /v /k32
BestEdrOfTheMarket.exe /stack /nt
BestEdrOfTheMarket.exe /iat


Bropper - An Automatic Blind ROP Exploitation Tool

By: Zion3R


An automatic Blind ROP exploitation python tool

Abstract

BROP (Blind ROP) was a technique found by Andrew Bittau from Stanford in 2014.

Most servers like nginx, Apache, MySQL, forks then communicates with the client. This means canary and addresses stay the same even if there is ASLR and PIE. So we can use some educated brute force to leak information and subsequently craft a working exploit.


Flow of exploitation

  1. Find buffer overflow offset
  2. Find canary
  3. Find saved registers (RBP / RIP)
  4. Find stop gadgets
  5. Find brop gadgets
  6. Find a Write function (write / dprintf / puts / ...)
  7. Leak the binary

Examples of Results

There is 3 customs vulnerable examples provided in this repository. You can run it directly or build the Dockerfile

BROPPER will then dump the binary :

It's then possible to extract all ROP gadgets from the dumped binary using ROPgadget for example :

$ ROPgadget --binary dump
Gadgets information
============================================================
0x0000000000001177 : adc al, 0 ; add byte ptr [rax], al ; jmp 0x1020
0x0000000000001157 : adc al, byte ptr [rax] ; add byte ptr [rax], al ; jmp 0x1020
0x0000000000001137 : adc byte ptr [rax], al ; add byte ptr [rax], al ; jmp 0x1020
...
...
...
0x0000000000001192 : xor ch, byte ptr [rdi] ; add byte ptr [rax], al ; push 0x16 ; jmp 0x1020
0x000000000000182e : xor eax, 0x891 ; mov rdi, rax ; call rcx
0x0000000000001861 : xor eax, 0xffffff22 ; mov rdi, rax ; call rcx

Unique gadgets found: 235

Script usage

To use this script:

python3 -m pip install -r requirements.txt
python3 bropper.py -t 127.0.0.1 -p 1337 --wait "Password :" --expected Bad --expected-stop Welcome -o dump
$ python3 bropper.py -h
usage: bropper.py [-h] -t TARGET -p PORT --expected-stop EXPECTED_STOP --expected EXPECTED --wait WAIT -o OUTPUT [--offset OFFSET] [--canary CANARY] [--no-canary] [--rbp RBP] [--rip RIP] [--stop STOP]
[--brop BROP] [--plt PLT] [--strcmp STRCMP] [--elf ELF]

Description message

options:
-h, --help show this help message and exit
-t TARGET, --target TARGET
target url
-p PORT, --port PORT target port
--expected-stop EXPECTED_STOP
Expected response for the stop gadget
--expected EXPECTED Expected normal response
--wait WAIT String to wait before sending payload
-o OUTPUT, --output OUTPUT
File to write dumped remote binary
--offset OFFSET set a offset value
--canary CANARY set a canary valu e
--no-canary Use this argument if there is no stack canary protection
--rbp RBP set rbp address
--rip RIP set rip address
--stop STOP set stop gadget address
--brop BROP set brop gadget address
--plt PLT set plt address
--strcmp STRCMP set strcmp entry value
--elf ELF set elf address

Contributing

Pull requests are welcome. Feel free to open an issue if you want to add other features.



AtomLdr - A DLL Loader With Advanced Evasive Features

By: Zion3R


A DLL Loader With Advanced Evasive Features

Features:

  • CRT library independent.
  • The final DLL file, can run the payload by loading the DLL (executing its entry point), or by executing the exported "Atom" function via the command line.
  • DLL unhooking from \KnwonDlls\ directory, with no RWX sections.
  • The encrypted payload is saved in the resource section and retrieved via custom code.
  • AES256-CBC Payload encryption using custom no table/data-dependent branches using ctaes; this is one of the best custom AES implementations I've encountered.
  • Aes Key & Iv Encryption.
  • Indirect syscalls, utilizing HellHall with ROP gadgets (for the unhooking part).
  • Payload injection using APC calls - alertable thread.
  • Payload execution using APC - alertable thread.
  • Api hashing using two different implementations of the CRC32 string hashing algorithm.
  • The total Size is 17kb + payload size (multiple of 16).

How Does The Unhooking Part Work

AtomLdr's unhooking method looks like the following

the program Unhooking from the \KnwonDlls\ directory is not a new method to bypass user-land hooks. However, this loader tries to avoid allocating RWX memory when doing so. This was obligatory to do in KnownDllUnhook for example, where RWX permissions were needed to replace the text section of the hooked modules, and at the same time allow execution of functions within these text sections.

This was changed in this loader, where it suspends the running threads, in an attempt to block any function from being called from within the targetted text sections, thus eliminating the need of having them marked as RWX sections before unhooking, making RW permissions a possible choice.

This approach, however, created another problem; when unhooking, NtProtectVirtualMemory syscall and others were using the syscall instruction inside of ntdll.dll module, as an indirect-syscall approach. Still, as mentioned above, the unhooked modules will be marked as RW sections, making it impossible to perform indirect syscalls, because the syscall instruction that we were jumping to, can't be executed now, so we had to jump to another executable place, this is where win32u.dll was used.

win32u.dll contains some syscalls that are GUI-related functions, making it suitable to jump to instead of ntdll.dll. win32u.dll is loaded (statically), but not included in the unhooking routine, which is done to insure that win32u.dll can still execute the syscall instruction we are jumping to.

The suspended threads after that are resumed.

It is worth mentioning that this approach may not be that efficient, and can be unstable, that is due to the thread suspension trick used. However, it has been tested with multiple processes with positive results, in the meantime, if you encountered any problems, feel free to open an issue.


Usage

  • PayloadBuilder is compiled and executed with the specified payload, it will output a PayloadConfig.pc file, that contains the encrypted payload, and its encrypted key and iv.
  • The generated PayloadConfig.pc file will then replace this in the AtomLdr project.
  • Compile the AtomLdr project as x64 Release.
  • To enable debug mode, uncomment this here.

Demo (1)

  • Executing AtomLdr.dll using rundll32.exe, running Havoc payload, and capturing a screenshot

  • AtomLdr.dll's Import Address Table


Demo - Debug Mode(2)

  • Running PayloadBuilder.exe, to encrypt demon[111].bin - a Havoc payload file


  • Running AtomLdr.dll using rundll32.exe


  • Havoc capturing a screenshot, after payload execution


Based on



EntropyReducer - Reduce Entropy And Obfuscate Youre Payload With Serialized Linked Lists

By: Zion3R


EntropyReducer: Reduce The Entropy Of Youre Payload And Obfuscate It With Serialized Linked Lists


How Does It Work

EntropyReducer algorithm is determined by BUFF_SIZE and NULL_BYTES values. The following is how would EntropyReducer organize your payload if BUFF_SIZE was set to 4, and NULL_BYTES to 2.


Obfuscation Algorithm

  • EntropyReducer first checks if the input raw payload is of a size that's multiple of BUFF_SIZE, if not, it pads it to be as so.
  • It then takes every BUFF_SIZE chunk from the payload, and makes a linked list node for it, using the InitializePayloadList function, initializing the payload as a linked list.
  • The created node will have an empty buffer of size NULL_BYTES, that will be used to lower the entropy
  • At this point, although EntropyReducer completed its task by lowering the entropy of the payload, it doesn't stop here. It then continues to randomize the order of each node in the linked list, breaking down the raw payload's order. This step is done via a Merge Sort Algorithm that is implemented through the MergeSort function.
  • The sorted linked list is in random order because the value in which the linked list is sorted is the XOR value of the first three bytes of the raw payload, this value determines its position in the re-organized linked list, this step can be shown here
  • Since saving a linked list to a file is impossible due to the fact that it's linked together by pointers. We are forced to serialize it.
  • Serialization of the generated linked list is done via the Obfuscate function here.
  • After that, the serialized data is ready to be written to the output file.

Deobfuscation Algorithm

  • Since the last step in the Obfuscation Algorithm was serializing the linked list, the first thing that must be done here is to deserialize the obfuscated payload, generating a linked list from it, this step is done here in the Deobfuscate function.
  • Next step is to sort the linked list using the node's Id, which is done using the same Merge Sort Algorithm used before.
  • Now, the linked list is in the right order to re-construct the payload's bytes as they should. So we simply strip the payload's original bytes from each node, as done here.
  • Last step is to free the allocated nodes, which is done here.

Usage

  • EntropyReducer simply read the raw payload file from the command line, and writes the obfuscated version to the same file's name prefixed with ".ER".
  • The size of the final obfuscated payload varies depending on the values of both BUFF_SIZE and NULL_BYTES. However, it can be determined using the following equation
FinalSize = ((OriginalSize + BUFF_SIZE - OriginalSize % BUFF_SIZE ) / BUFF_SIZE) * (BUFF_SIZE + NULL_BYTES + sizeof(INT))
  • The PoC project in this repo is used to execute the ".ER" file generated as an example of deserializing and deobfuscating it.

Include In Your Projects

All you have to do is add EntropyReducer.c and EntropyReducer.h files to your project, and call the Deobfuscate function. You can check PoC/main.c for reference.


Output Example

In this example, BUFF_SIZE was set to 3, and NULL_BYTES to 1.

  • The raw payload, first payload chunk (FC 48 83)

  • The same payload chunk, but at a different offset


Profit

  • The same file, AES encrypted, scores entropy of 7.110.

  • Nearly the same result with the RC4 algorithm as well; 7.210

  • Using EntropyReducer however, scoring entropy even lower that that of the original raw payload; 4.093


The Merge Sort Algorithm Is Taken From c-linked-list.



RustChain - Hide Memory Artifacts Using ROP And Hardware Breakpoints

By: Zion3R


This tool is a simple PoC of how to hide memory artifacts using a ROP chain in combination with hardware breakpoints. The ROP chain will change the main module memory page's protections to N/A while sleeping (i.e. when the function Sleep is called). For more detailed information about this memory scanning evasion technique check out the original project Gargoyle. x64 only.

The idea is to set up a hardware breakpoint in kernel32!Sleep and a new top-level filter to handle the exception. When Sleep is called, the exception filter function set before is triggered, allowing us to call the ROP chain without the need of using classic function hooks. This way, we avoid leaving weird and unusual private memory regions in the process related to well known dlls.

The ROP chain simply calls VirtualProtect() to set the current memory page to N/A, then calls SleepEx and finally restores the RX memory protection.


The overview of the process is as follows:

  • We use SetUnhandledExceptionFilter to set a new exception filter function.
  • SetThreadContext is used in order to set a hardware breakpoint on kernel32!Sleep.
  • We call Sleep, triggering the hardware breakpoint and driving the execution flow towards our exception filter function.
  • The ROP chain is called from the exception filter function, allowing to change the current memory page protection to N/A. Then SleepEx is called. Finally, the ROP chain restores the RX memory protection and the normal execution continues.

This process repeats indefinitely.

As it can be seen in the image, the main module's memory protection is changed to N/A while sleeping, which avoids memory scans looking for pages with execution permission.

Compilation

Since we are using LITCRYPT plugin to obfuscate string literals, it is required to set up the environment variable LITCRYPT_ENCRYPT_KEY before compiling the code:

C:\Users\User\Desktop\RustChain> set LITCRYPT_ENCRYPT_KEY="yoursupersecretkey"

After that, simply compile the code and run the tool:

C:\Users\User\Desktop\RustChain> cargo build
C:\Users\User\Desktop\RustChain\target\debug> rustchain.exe

Limitations

This tool is just a PoC and some extra features should be implemented in order to be fully functional. The main purpose of the project was to learn how to implement a ROP chain and integrate it within Rust. Because of that, this tool will only work if you use it as it is, and failures are expected if you try to use it in other ways (for example, compiling it to a dll and trying to reflectively load and execute it).

Credits



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