Login
This project will allow you run a portable access point on a Raspberry Pi making use of Docker containers.
Further reference and explanations:
https://fwhibbit.es/en/automatic-access-point-with-docker-and-raspberry-pi-zero-w
Tested on Raspberry Pi Zero W.
You can customize the network password and other configurations on files at confs/hostapd_confs/. You can also add your own hostapd configuration files here.
Add --rm for volatile containers.
FreshRSS docker run --name autowlan_open --cap-add=NET_ADMIN --network=host autowlan
docker run --name autowlan_wep --cap-add=NET_ADMIN --network=host -v $(pwd)/confs/hostapd_confs/wep.conf:/etc/hostapd/hostapd.conf autowlan
docker run --name autowlan_wpa2 --cap-add=NET_ADMIN --network=host -v $(pwd)/confs/hostapd_confs/wpa2.conf:/etc/hostapd/hostapd.conf autowlan
docker stop autowlan_{open|wep|wpa2}
docker-compose -f <fichero_yml> up
docker-compose -f <fichero_yml> up -d
docker-compose -f <fichero_yml> down
docker-compose -f <fichero_yml> logs
Introducing Tiny File Manager [WH1Z-Edition], the compact and efficient solution for managing your files and folders with enhanced privacy and security features. Gone are the days of relying on external resources β I've stripped down the code to its core, making it truly lightweight and perfect for deployment in environments without internet access or outbound connections.
Designed for simplicity and speed, Tiny File Manager [WH1Z-Edition] retains all the essential functionalities you need for storing, uploading, editing, and managing your files directly from your web browser. With a single-file PHP setup, you can effortlessly drop it into any folder on your server and start organizing your files immediately.
What sets Tiny File Manager [WH1Z-Edition] apart is its focus on privacy and security. By removing the reliance on external domains for CSS and JS resources, your data stays localized and protected from potential vulnerabilities or leaks. This makes it an ideal choice for scenarios where data integrity and confidentiality are paramount, including RED TEAMING exercises or restricted server environments.
Download ZIP with latest version from master branch.
Simply transfer the "tinyfilemanager-wh1z.php" file to your web hosting space β it's as easy as that! Feel free to rename the file to whatever suits your needs best.
The default credentials are as follows: admin/WH1Z@1337 and user/WH1Z123.
:warning: Caution: Before use, it is imperative to establish your own username and password within the $auth_users variable. Passwords are encrypted using password_hash().
βΉοΈ You can generate a new password hash accordingly: Login as Admin -> Click Admin -> Help -> Generate new password hash
:warning: Caution: Use the built-in password generator for your privacy and security. π
To enable/disable authentication set $use_auth to true or false.
zip, tar)150+ languages and a selection of 35+ themesPDF/DOC/XLS/PPT/etc. Files up to 25 MB can be previewed using the Google Drive viewerdatatable js for efficient file filteringΒ
MR.Handler is a specialized tool designed for responding to security incidents on Linux systems. It connects to target systems via SSH to execute a range of diagnostic commands, gathering crucial information such as network configurations, system logs, user accounts, and running processes. At the end of its operation, the tool compiles all the gathered data into a comprehensive HTML report. This report details both the specifics of the incident response process and the current state of the system, enabling security analysts to more effectively assess and respond to incidents.
$ pip3 install colorama
$ pip3 install paramiko
$ git clone https://github.com/emrekybs/BlueFish.git
$ cd MrHandler
$ chmod +x MrHandler.py
$ python3 MrHandler.py
Trawler is a PowerShell script designed to help Incident Responders discover potential indicators of compromise on Windows hosts, primarily focused on persistence mechanisms including Scheduled Tasks, Services, Registry Modifications, Startup Items, Binary Modifications and more.
Currently, trawler can detect most of the persistence techniques specifically called out by MITRE and Atomic Red Team with more detections being added on a regular basis.
Just download and run trawler.ps1 from an Administrative PowerShell/cmd prompt - any detections will be displayed in the console as well as written to a CSV ('detections.csv') in the current working directory. The generated CSV will contain Detection Name, Source, Risk, Metadata and the relevant MITRE Technique.
Or use this one-liner from an Administrative PowerShell terminal:
iex ((New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadString('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/joeavanzato/Trawler/main/trawler.ps1'))
Certain detections have allow-lists built-in to help remove noise from default Windows configurations (10/2016/2019/2022) - expected Scheduled Tasks, Services, etc. Of course, it is always possible for attackers to hijack these directly and masquerade with great detail as a default OS process - take care to use multiple forms of analysis and detection when dealing with skillful adversaries.
If you have examples or ideas for additional detections, please feel free to submit an Issue or PR with relevant technical details/references - the code-base is a little messy right now and will be cleaned up over time.
Additionally, if you identify obvious false positives, please let me know by opening an issue or PR on GitHub! The obvious culprits for this will be non-standard COMs, Services or Tasks.
-scanoptions : Tab-through possible detections and select a sub-set using comma-delimited terms (eg. .\trawler.ps1 -scanoptions Services,Processes)
-hide : Suppress Detection output to console
-snapshot : Capture a "persistence snapshot" of the current system, defaulting to "$PSScriptRoot\snapshot.csv"
-snapshotpath : Define a custom file-path for saving snapshot output to.
-outpath : Define a custom file-path for saving detection output to (defaults to "$PSScriptRoot\detections.csv")
-loadsnapshot : Define the path for an existing snapshot file to load as an allow-list reference
-drivetarget : Define the variable for a mounted target drive (eg. .\trawler.ps1 -targetdrive "D:") - using this alone leads to an 'assumed homedrive' variable of C: for analysis purposes
PersistenceSniper is an awesome tool - I've used it heavily in the past - but there are a few key points that differentiate these utilities
Overall, these tools are extremely similar but approach the problem from slightly different angles - PersistenceSniper provides all information back to the analyst for review while Trawler tries to limit what is returned to only results that are likely to be potential adversary persistence mechanisms. As such, there is a possibility for false-negatives with trawler if an adversary completely mimics an allow-listed item.
Trawler supports loading an allow-list from a 'snapshot' - to do this requires two steps.
That's it - all relevant detections will then draw from the snapshot file as an allow-list to reduce noise and identify any potential changes to the base image that may have occurred.
(Allow-listing is implemented for most of the checks but not all - still being actively implemented)
Often during an investigation, analysts may end up mounting a new drive that represents an imaged Windows device - Trawler now partially supports scanning these mounted drives through the use of the '-drivetarget' parameter.
At runtime, Trawler will re-target temporary script-level variables for use in checking file-based artifacts and also will attempt to load relevant Registry Hives (HKLM\SOFTWARE, HKLM\SYSTEM, NTUSER.DATs, USRCLASS.DATs) underneath HKLM/HKU and prefixed by 'ANALYSIS_'. Trawler will also attempt to unload these temporarily loaded hives upon script completion.
As an example, if you have an image mounted at a location such as 'F:\Test' which contains the NTFS file system ('F:\Test\Windows', 'F:\Test\User', etc) then you can invoke trawler like below;
.\trawler.ps1 -drivetarget "F:\Test"Please note that since trawler attempts to load the registry hive files from the drive in question, mapping a UNC path to a live remote device will NOT work as those files will not be accessible due to system locks. I am working on an approach which will handle live remote devices, stay tuned.
Most other checks will function fine because they are based entirely on reading registry hives or file-based artifacts (or can be converted to do so, such as directly reading Task XML as opposed to using built-in command-lets.)
Any limitations in checks when doing drive-retargeting will be discussed more fully in the GitHub Wiki.
Β
TODO
Please be aware that some of these are (of course) more detected than others - for example, we are not detecting all possible registry modifications but rather inspecting certain keys for obvious changes and using the generic MITRE technique "Modify Registry" where no other technique is applicable. For other items such as COM hijacking, we are inspecting all entries in the relevant registry section, checking against 'known-good' patterns and bubbling up unknown or mismatched values, resulting in a much more complete detection surface for that particular technique.
This tool would not exist without the amazing InfoSec community - the most notable references I used are provided below.
chaos is an 'origin' IP scanner developed by RST in collaboration with ChatGPT. It is a niche utility with an intended audience of mostly penetration testers and bug hunters.
An origin-IP is a term-of-art expression describing the final public IP destination for websites that are publicly served via 3rd parties. If you'd like to understand more about why anyone might be interested in Origin-IPs, please check out our blog post.
chaos was rapidly prototyped from idea to functional proof-of-concept in less than 24 hours using our principles of DevOps with ChatGPT.
usage: chaos.py [-h] -f FQDN -i IP [-a AGENT] [-C] [-D] [-j JITTER] [-o OUTPUT] [-p PORTS] [-P] [-r] [-s SLEEP] [-t TIMEOUT] [-T] [-v] [-x]
_..._
.-'` `'-.
__|___________|__
\ /
`._ CHAOS _.'
`-------`
/ \\
/ \\
/ \\
/ \\
/ \\
/ \\
/ \\
/ \\
/ \\
/_____________________\\
CHAtgpt Origin-ip Scanner
_______ _______ _______ _______ _______
|\\ /|\\ /|\\ /|\\ /|\\/|
| +---+ | +---+ | +---+ | +---+ | +---+ |
| |H | | |U | | |M | | |A | | |N | |
| |U | | |S | | |A | | |N | | |C | |
| |M | | |E | | |N | | |D | | |O | |
| |A | | |R | | |C | | | | | |L | |
| +---+ | +---+ | +---+ | +---+ | +---+ |
|/_____|\\_____|\\_____|\\_____|\\_____\\
Origin IP Scanner developed with ChatGPT
cha*os (n): complete disorder and confusion
(ver: 0.9.4)
cd path/to/chaospip3 install -U pip setuptools virtualenvvirtualenv envsource env/bin/activate(env) pip3 install -U -r ./requirements.txt(env) ./chaos.py -h-h, --help show this help message and exit
-f FQDN, --fqdn FQDN Path to FQDN file (one FQDN per line)
-i IP, --ip IP IP address(es) for HTTP requests (Comma-separated IPs, IP networks, and/or files with IP/network per line)
-a AGENT, --agent AGENT
User-Agent header value for requests
-C, --csv Append CSV output to OUTPUT_FILE.csv
-D, --dns Perform fwd/rev DNS lookups on FQDN/IP values prior to request; no impact to testing queue
-j JITTER, --jitter JITTER
Add a 0-N second randomized delay to the sleep value
-o OUTPUT, --output OUTPUT
Append console output to FILE
-p PORTS, --ports PORTS
Comma-separated list of TCP ports to use (default: "80,443")
-P, --no-prep Do not pre-scan each IP/port w ith `GET /` using `Host: {IP:Port}` header to eliminate unresponsive hosts
-r, --randomize Randomize(ish) the order IPs/ports are tested
-s SLEEP, --sleep SLEEP
Add N seconds before thread completes
-t TIMEOUT, --timeout TIMEOUT
Wait N seconds for an unresponsive host
-T, --test Test-mode; don't send requests
-v, --verbose Enable verbose output
-x, --singlethread Single threaded execution; for 1-2 core systems; default threads=(cores-1) if cores>2
Launch python HTTP server
% python3 -u -m http.server 8001
Serving HTTP on :: port 8001 (http://[::]:8001/) ...
Launch ncat as HTTP on a port detected as SSL; use a loop because --keep-open can hang
% while true; do ncat -lvp 8443 -c 'printf "HTTP/1.0 204 Plaintext OK\n\n<html></html>\n"'; done
Ncat: Version 7.94 ( https://nmap.org/ncat )
Ncat: Listening on [::]:8443
Ncat: Listening on 0.0.0.0:8443
Also launch ncat as SSL on a port that will default to HTTP detection
% while true; do ncat --ssl -lvp 8444 -c 'printf "HTTP/1.0 202 OK\n\n<html></html>\n"'; done
Ncat: Version 7.94 ( https://nmap.org/ncat )
Ncat: Generating a temporary 2048-bit RSA key. Use --ssl-key and --ssl-cert to use a permanent one.
Ncat: SHA-1 fingerprint: 0208 1991 FA0D 65F0 608A 9DAB A793 78CB A6EC 27B8
Ncat: Listening on [::]:8444
Ncat: Listening on 0.0.0.0:8444
Prepare an FQDN file:
% cat ../test_localhost_fqdn.txt
www.example.com
localhost.example.com
localhost.local
localhost
notreally.arealdomain
Prepare an IP file / list:
% cat ../test_localhost_ips.txt
127.0.0.1
127.0.0.0/29
not_an_ip_addr
-6.a
=4.2
::1
Run the scan
% ./chaos.py -f ../test_localhost_fqdn.txt -i ../test_localhost_ips.txt,::1/126 -p 8001,8443,8444 -x -s0.2 -t1
2023-06-21 12:48:33 [WARN] Ignoring invalid FQDN value: localhost.local
2023-06-21 12:48:33 [WARN] Ignoring invalid FQDN value: localhost
2023-06-21 12:48:33 [WARN] Ignoring invalid FQDN value: notreally.arealdomain
2023-06-21 12:48:33 [WARN] Error: invalid IP address or CIDR block =4.2
2023-06-21 12:48:33 [WARN] Error: invalid IP address or CIDR block -6.a
2023-06-21 12:48:33 [WARN] Error: invalid IP address or CIDR block not_an_ip_addr
2023-06-21 12:48:33 [INFO] * ---- <META> ---- *
2023-06-21 12:48:33 [INFO] * Version: 0.9.4
2023-06-21 12:48:33 [INFO] * FQDN file: ../test_localhost_fqdn.txt
2023-06-21 12:48:33 [INFO] * FQDNs loaded: ['www.example.com', 'localhost.example.com']
2023-06-21 12:48:33 [INFO] * IP input value(s): ../test_localhost_ips.txt,::1/126
2023-06-21 12:48:33 [INFO] * Addresses pars ed from IP inputs: 12
2023-06-21 12:48:33 [INFO] * Port(s): 8001,8443,8444
2023-06-21 12:48:33 [INFO] * Thread(s): 1
2023-06-21 12:48:33 [INFO] * Sleep value: 0.2
2023-06-21 12:48:33 [INFO] * Timeout: 1.0
2023-06-21 12:48:33 [INFO] * User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/98.0.4758.80 Safari/537.36 ch4*0s/0.9.4
2023-06-21 12:48:33 [INFO] * ---- </META> ---- *
2023-06-21 12:48:33 [INFO] 36 unique address/port addresses for testing
Prep Tests: 100%|βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ&# 9608;ββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ| 36/36 [00:29<00:00, 1.20it/s]
2023-06-21 12:49:03 [INFO] 9 IP/ports verified, reducing test dataset from 72 entries
2023-06-21 12:49:03 [INFO] 18 pending tests remain after pre-testing
2023-06-21 12:49:03 [INFO] Queuing 18 threads
++RCVD++ (200 OK) www.example.com @ :::8001
++RCVD++ (204 Plaintext OK) www.example.com @ :::8443
++RCVD++ (202 OK) www.example.com @ :::8444
++RCVD++ (200 OK) www.example.com @ ::1:8001
++RCVD++ (204 Plaintext OK) www.example.com @ ::1:8443
++RCVD++ (202 OK) www.example.com @ ::1:8444
++RCVD++ (200 OK) www.example.com @ 127.0.0.1:8001
++RCVD++ (204 Plaintext OK) www.example.com @ 127.0.0.1:8443
++RCVD++ (202 OK) www.example.com @ 127.0.0.1:8444
++RCVD++ (200 OK) localhost.example.com @ :::8001
++RCVD++ (204 Plaintext OK) localhost.example.com @ :::8443
++RCVD+ + (202 OK) localhost.example.com @ :::8444
++RCVD++ (200 OK) localhost.example.com @ ::1:8001
++RCVD++ (204 Plaintext OK) localhost.example.com @ ::1:8443
++RCVD++ (202 OK) localhost.example.com @ ::1:8444
++RCVD++ (200 OK) localhost.example.com @ 127.0.0.1:8001
++RCVD++ (204 Plaintext OK) localhost.example.com @ 127.0.0.1:8443
++RCVD++ (202 OK) localhost.example.com @ 127.0.0.1:8444
Origin Scan: 100%|βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ` 08;βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ| 18/18 [00:06<00:00, 2.76it/s]
2023-06-21 12:49:09 [RSLT] Results from 5 FQDNs:
::1
::1:8444 => (202 / OK)
::1:8443 => (204 / Plaintext OK)
::1:8001 => (200 / OK)
127.0.0.1
127.0.0.1:8001 => (200 / OK)
127.0.0.1:8443 => (204 / Plaintext OK)
127.0.0.1:8444 => (202 / OK)
::
:::8001 => (200 / OK)
:::8443 => (204 / Plaintext OK)
:::8444 => (202 / OK)
www.example.com
:::8001 => (200 / OK)
:::8443 => (204 / Plaintext OK)
:::8444 => (202 / OK)
::1:8001 => (200 / OK)
::1:8443 => (204 / Plaintext OK)
::1:8444 => (202 / OK)
127.0.0.1:8001 => (200 / OK)
127.0.0.1:8443 => (204 / Plaintext OK)
127.0.0.1:8444 => (202 / OK)
localhost.example.com
:::8001 => (200 / OK)
:::8443 => (204 / Plaintext OK)
:::8444 => (202 / OK)
::1:8001 => (200 / OK)
::1:8443 => (204 / Plaintext OK)
::1:8444 => (202 / OK)
127.0.0.1:8001 => (200 / OK)
127.0.0.1:8443 => (204 / Plaintext OK)
127.0.0.1:8444 => (202 / OK)
rst@r57 chaos %
-T runs in test mode (do everything except send requests)
-v verbose option provides additional output
MAAD-AF is an open-source cloud attack tool developed for testing security of Microsoft 365 & Azure AD environments through adversary emulation. MAAD-AF provides security practitioners easy to use attack modules to exploit configurations across different M365/AzureAD cloud-based tools & services.
MAAD-AF is designed to make cloud security testing simple, fast and effective. Through its virtually no-setup requirement and easy to use interactive attack modules, security teams can test their security controls, detection and response capabilities easily and swiftly.
(cd /MAAD-AF)
(./MAAD_Attack.ps1)
Tip: A 'Global Admin' privilege account is recommended to leverage full capabilities of modules in MAAD-AF
