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vm2's own repo lists its next sandbox escapes: a deferred nesting fix, a "monitoring" entry in ATTACKS.md, and species shims for Promise and Array but not typed arrays

Author here. I had written up six vm2 CVEs one at a time, then read all six in a row. Read that way they stop looking like separate bugs.

Short version: vm2's bridge is a hand-written wrap list, so it is always one language feature behind. Every fix is one of three moves: add an entry, delete the feature (WebAssembly JSTag), or lie to V8 about a property it reads in C++ (the species shims). None of them makes the bridge see more.

The part I think is new: the open items are checked in. The 3.11.1 commit message describes the nesting fix and declines it. docs/ATTACKS.md marks one category "monitoring." resetPromiseSpecies is from 2023, the Array one is from 2026, and the typed arrays do the same lookup with no shim. The piece ends with a prediction for the next advisory.

The README tells you to use isolated-vm or a separate process. The CVE records say "patched in 3.x." Scanners only read the second one.

submitted by /u/TakesThisSeriously
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New Kimsuki (APT-43) active infrastructure and campaign discovered

Stormshield's Cyber Threat Intelligence team has uncovered the Trigram campaign, targeting the AI, blockchain, and logistics sectors across Europe and the United States.

  • The Bait: Threat actors impersonate 50 companies using fake job offers, invitations, and package tracking notifications to deliver an infostealer to victims.
  • Behind the Scenes: A dedicated platform enables the attackers to track the entire operation end-to-end, from the initial click to credential theft.

By correlating this data with research from Proofpoint, SafeDep and Genians, Stormshield attributes this campaign with high confidence to North Korea, as a continuation of the UNK_DeadDrop cluster and the Kimsuky group (APT-43).

submitted by /u/StormshieldArgos
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NvRoot (CVE-2026-47591) where in neocloud multi-tenant GPU environments, rent = root. Essentially it's a dirty page cache LPE using GPUs as catalyzer

From unprivileged user to root. Most dangerous for those renting multi-tenanted GPU from a neocloud.

Fixed versions: NvRoot in 610.57.04 / 595.91.07 / 580.178.04

no sysctl or seccomp workaround.

Disclaimer: I work at Stealthium, alongside the team that found these. Happy to answer questions on exposure

submitted by /u/ChrisAtStealthium
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2.4% of AFRINIC’s IPv4 addresses answer from outside Africa, and about 81% of those sit in one company’s four blocks

I work at IPinfo and this one started with a simple question: if a registry says an address is African, is it actually in Africa?

This started as work for a paper by our research team (WHEREIS, IMC 2026). We tested it with ping times. Light in fiber only travels so far in a millisecond, so a fast reply puts a hard limit on how far away an address can be.

Most registries pass, but AFRINIC is the exception: 2.4% of the addresses we could measure answer from outside Africa. And about 81% of those are in just four blocks, held by one company.

What surprised me most while writing this is that the registries’ own files still list 98.6% of them as African. So anything that blocks or allows traffic by registry country gets these wrong.

The numbers are a minimum, and anycast is left out.

submitted by /u/seremot
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Cracking Server 2022 NTLMv1-SSP Hashes with Rainbow Tables

A while back, I had released a blog showing that NTLMv1 downgrade attacks still work on Windows Server 2022! While it isn't a default setting, it's still a misconfiguration to potentially look for.

If a DC’s LmCompatibilityLevel is set to 0-2, you can coerce authentication, strip Extended Session Security (ESS), and obtain an NTLMv1-SSP hash that’s crackable with a rainbow table. :)

Blog: https://hunio.org/security/ntlmv1-ssp-cracking/

submitted by /u/elohhs
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Electron, we have a problem

Many Electron apps auto-update without verifying signatures. Many also still trust the compromised eMudhra certificates. Together, that lets an attacker on your network install malware on your machine.

I've compiled a list of notable Electron apps, installed them in a lab, and test which still trust the eMudhra certs, compared to whether they verify update signatures.

You can find the full table of apps on my post.

submitted by /u/pascalschaerli
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