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NvRoot (CVE-2026-47591) where in neocloud multi-tenant GPU environments, rent = root. Essentially it's a dirty page cache LPE using GPUs as catalyzer

From unprivileged user to root. Most dangerous for those renting multi-tenanted GPU from a neocloud.

Fixed versions: NvRoot in 610.57.04 / 595.91.07 / 580.178.04

no sysctl or seccomp workaround.

Disclaimer: I work at Stealthium, alongside the team that found these. Happy to answer questions on exposure

submitted by /u/ChrisAtStealthium
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2.4% of AFRINIC’s IPv4 addresses answer from outside Africa, and about 81% of those sit in one company’s four blocks

I work at IPinfo and this one started with a simple question: if a registry says an address is African, is it actually in Africa?

This started as work for a paper by our research team (WHEREIS, IMC 2026). We tested it with ping times. Light in fiber only travels so far in a millisecond, so a fast reply puts a hard limit on how far away an address can be.

Most registries pass, but AFRINIC is the exception: 2.4% of the addresses we could measure answer from outside Africa. And about 81% of those are in just four blocks, held by one company.

What surprised me most while writing this is that the registries’ own files still list 98.6% of them as African. So anything that blocks or allows traffic by registry country gets these wrong.

The numbers are a minimum, and anycast is left out.

submitted by /u/seremot
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Cracking Server 2022 NTLMv1-SSP Hashes with Rainbow Tables

A while back, I had released a blog showing that NTLMv1 downgrade attacks still work on Windows Server 2022! While it isn't a default setting, it's still a misconfiguration to potentially look for.

If a DC’s LmCompatibilityLevel is set to 0-2, you can coerce authentication, strip Extended Session Security (ESS), and obtain an NTLMv1-SSP hash that’s crackable with a rainbow table. :)

Blog: https://hunio.org/security/ntlmv1-ssp-cracking/

submitted by /u/elohhs
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Electron, we have a problem

Many Electron apps auto-update without verifying signatures. Many also still trust the compromised eMudhra certificates. Together, that lets an attacker on your network install malware on your machine.

I've compiled a list of notable Electron apps, installed them in a lab, and test which still trust the eMudhra certs, compared to whether they verify update signatures.

You can find the full table of apps on my post.

submitted by /u/pascalschaerli
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IP snowshoeing under US .gov email via a whitelisted AmazonSES typo in SPF

UPDATE: Livingston County, MI, has removed amzonses[.]com from its SPF record. It had been there since at least November 2023, and when we checked, it authorized 32,066 IPs to send email as milivcounty[.]gov Since our research on US government domains went public, several government organizations have made changes to their DNS. The City of Waynesboro, TN has fixed the typo in its MX record, and the private company’s homepage served under woosterar[.]gov has been taken down. The Alabama Legislature looks to have a fix in progress too.

I run a small email security consultancy and this is our research.

A typo of AmazonSES in US government DNS whitelisted 32,066 IPs to pass DMARC p=quarantine as milivcounty[.]gov, with the IP set rotating every 3-8 days.

Attackers are snowshoeing the IPs, and once they get listed by Abusix and Spamhaus, they rotate the SPF include chain.

Other AmazonSES typos in gov SPF are amasonses[.]com under pikevilleky[.]gov and amazones[.]com under townofkirkwood[.]gov.

There are also 40 other US Gov domains with dangling & abused NS (domain takeover), MX (mail interception), and DMARC (telemetry hijack) records.

Our team has registered 17 of these typos and expired domains, including one that had been in use for 20 years and only expired in August.

DNS vulnerabilities have been around for decades, but many US government orgs decided to skip the security guardrails when they had the chance, and now those old gaps are being exploited by the same technologies they missed.

submitted by /u/PlasmaJam
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Certificate authority list: every CA's incident record since 2017

CAs found 17% of their own incidents in 2026 so far, down from 29% last year and 59% in 2022. Researchers, root programs, and other outsiders found the rest.

That's from a dataset we built of every TLS incident in Mozilla's CA program since 2017 (1,581 as of November 7). 2026 is already the busiest year, with 338. Only 11 incidents in the whole set are critical, and eMudhra's computable keys are the only one where a CA lost control of its own keys.

https://www.certkit.io/ca-report

submitted by /u/certkit
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Behavioral LOLBins detection engine with sequential correlation, PE masquerading checks, and Sysmon integration

I built a behavioral detection engine focused on Living-off-the-Land binaries on Windows and wanted to share it with the community for feedback.

Problem it tries to solve

Traditional signature/hash-based detection struggles with LOLBins because they are legitimate, signed Microsoft binaries. Attackers also rename them, obfuscate command lines, and chain multiple utilities across time. Single-event rules often miss the broader operational context.

What the tool does

  • Collects process telemetry (prefers Sysmon Event ID 1, falls back to psutil)
  • Single-event behavioral rules for common LOLBins (certutil, bitsadmin, mshta, regsvr32, rundll32, powershell, wmic, etc.)
  • Sequential multi-stage correlation (download β†’ execute, LOLBin β†’ encoded PowerShell, process cascades)
  • Binary masquerading detection via PE OriginalFileName
  • PPID spoofing anomaly checks
  • Command-line obfuscation heuristics (carets, backticks, Base64 blocks, environment variable slicing)
  • False-positive suppression + de-duplication
  • Timeline reconstruction (Β±5–10 min window) + process lineage
  • Local web dashboard for triage
  • Automated Markdown incident reports + webhook support (Slack/Discord/SIEM)

Architecture highlights

  • Modular pipeline: collector β†’ correlation state machine β†’ detection engine β†’ timeline reconstructor β†’ dispatcher
  • Rules can be written in YAML (declarative) or pure Python
  • Built-in threat emulation test harness (11 scenarios currently)

Current limitations

  • psutil mode has polling latency (can miss very short-lived processes)
  • Still user-mode only (no kernel/ETW consumer yet)
  • Needs more real-world tuning of suppression rules

GitHub: https://github.com/nimesh895/Behavioral-Living-off-the-Land-LOLBins-Detection-System

Would love feedback on:

  • Rule coverage / false positive rates you’ve seen with similar approaches
  • Missing high-value sequential chains
  • Whether the dashboard and timeline reconstruction are useful in practice
  • Any other LOLBins or techniques I should prioritize

Happy to answer technical questions or discuss design decisions.

submitted by /u/nimesh404
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