I work at IPinfo, which runs a weekly scan of the IPv4 Internet. Short version of what we found:

• October 6–7 scan, five days before the attack: 2,528 addresses serving a Danfoss StoreView dashboard in 73 countries and territories. France had 1,331 (53%).
• 85% of the French ones ran software with known flaws, including 527 end-of-life AK-SM 800 units. Only 195 had every fix. Elsewhere it was 84%, so France had more of them online, not worse patching.
• 1,019 of the French addresses were already open on March 30.
• October 14 scan: 316 still online in France (−76%, against a normal 3–7% weekly loss). Fully patched units dropped too (195 → 54), which points to disconnection rather than patching.

Method: the newer UI is matched on page title, the older AK-SM 800 on its web server plus the Flash loader page, and firmware generation comes from the build date the dashboard exposes. Counts are addresses on the ports we scan, so they’re a floor. How the attackers got in is still unknown, and exposure isn’t proof of the entry point.

I continued researching sandbox bypasses discovered in Twig by project Glasswing. This time, I focused on CVE-2026-46633, which still had no public exploits. This writeup documents my development of payloads for the CVE-2026-46633 and the corresponding SSTImap modules.

I put up a free public CertStream endpoint for anyone monitoring phishing or lookalike domains

wss://api.certstream.dev/

No API key or signup needed, just connect over WebSocket

Python example: https://certstream.dev/free-certstream-api.html

Open source: https://github.com/reloading01/certstream-server-rust

Author here :)

TLDR: on Oct 2, 333 exits (~10% of Tor exits) started redirecting port 22 to 12 interception servers running a paramiko-based MITM that stole passwords and tried to drop Ebury on the target.