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Enhancing IIoT Security Using Digital Twins in Industry

The AI research centre at Torrens University Australia has helped produce a review of 110 studies on digital twins and IIoT security.

What were the main takeaways? They have found that DTs are shifting away from passive monitoring to being a part of the defence architecture.

One of the biggest weak points they found was in legacy sensors with low bandwidth. In these situations, there is a lag before the digital twin reflects a real-world change, and that lag is where attacks tend to slip in.

Would be interested to hear your thoughts! Has anyone here dealt with that sync-gap problem on older hardware?

submitted by /u/TorrensUni
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AXON Body camera 3 of 4 hardware reverse cracking output video!

Recently, I saw someone selling a well-known second-hand market in China. Except for some functions that need to be connected to networking, the 4th generation is used normally. However, because AXON is not in the Chinese market, most of them purchase the activated version from eBay and then reverse. Will such a problem lead to the body camera video of some American enterprises and some unpublished videos of the police will be leaked. Then he sells these body3 and 4th generations at prices ranging from 1,000 dollars and about 1,500 US dollars respectively, and gives a unique software to read and delete it. The question is whether it is feasible or not, but it is not fake to see the real shot.

submitted by /u/Thomas980130
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ExporTheft: 11 "AI Chat Exporter" Chrome extensions upload full chat content on PDF export, while the store listing says "No uploads to external servers"

Family of 11 same-codebase extensions (ChatGPT/Claude/Gemini/etc), ~5.5k users on the main one. Sold as local-only: the store listing says "No uploads to external servers," "Everything processed locally," "No tracking or telemetry."

Observed in the tested version:

  • PDF export POSTs the full conversation to the developer's Cloud Run backend. A local renderer is bundled but only runs as a fallback.
  • Markdown/Text/JSON exports beacon title + source URL to /api/usage. The title is derived from your first message, so it can contain chat content.
  • Every request carries an X-Client-ID in chrome.storage.sync, so it follows you across machines.

Detection + full writeup: https://malext.io/reports/ExporTheft/

submitted by /u/Huge-Skirt-6990
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CET-Compliant Callstack Spoofing via Thread Pool & Enum Callback Trampolining (Rust PoC)

I wrote this after spending an unreasonable amount of time making CET-compliant callstack spoofing work end-to-end on hardware with Intel CET enabled.

The technique combines three primitives: thread pool execution for a clean stack base, enum callback trampolining for a real signed mid-stack frame, and indirect syscalls.

The actual contribution is the CET compliance mechanism: a jmp-based context switch combined with direct shadow stack pointer reconciliation via RDSSPQ/INCSSPQ, without touching unwind metadata. Different approach from BYOUD.

Implemented in Rust with inline assembly.

submitted by /u/_MrTiz
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Closing the Timing Gap: Defensive Temporal Observability

Lately I’ve been thinking about time.

Uptime, pulse checks, execution time, response time. We’ve always treated these as health metrics. They tell us whether a system is alive, responsive, and performing as expected. But what if they’re also security metrics?

That idea isn’t entirely new. At the network layer, covert timing channels, beaconing detection, and behavioral baselining have shown us for decades that the intervals between events matter. Attackers have long understood that rhythm carries information. More recently, researchers have demonstrated timing side-channel attacks against LLMs, using cache latency to infer private prompts and token cadence to fingerprint model outputs.

What I find interesting is the imbalance. Most of the research asks, β€œHow can timing be exploited?” Very little asks, β€œHow can timing help us defend?”

A 2026 systematic survey of LLM-agent security identifies temporal anomaly detection infrastructure as an open research gap, noting that current agent deployment frameworks don’t even support the behavioral baselines such an approach would require. Even then, the discussion largely focuses on session-level behavior. The rhythm within a single execution, the space between observable events, remains largely unexplored.

Maybe time isn’t just metadata, maybe it’s another dimension of observability that we’ve been overlooking.

Time tells you duration and speed. But read carefully, it also reveals location, choke points, and absences, the things that didn’t happen when they should have.

I’ve started exploring this in my own observability work, measuring behavioral changes & entropy across inter-arrival intervals and treating rhythm as signal rather than noise to smooth away.

Curious to know who else is working on the defensive side of temporal behavior, especially for agentic systems or any thoughts or opinions on this topic.

Reference: β€œA Systematic Survey of Security Threats and Defenses in LLM-Based AI Agents: A Layered Attack Surface Framework,” arXiv:2604.23338 (2026). https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.23338

submitted by /u/Standard-964
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Can AI-generated adversaries break TTP-based attribution? (arXiv 2026)

Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) has traditionally attributed attacks through Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs).

In this paper we evaluate whether that assumption still holds when AI agents are explicitly configured to emulate known threat groups.

We configured AI agents to reproduce the behavior of APT28, APT29, APT41, APT44 and Lazarus inside enterprise and military cyber ranges.

Our results suggest that sufficiently capable AI agents can reproduce TTP patterns closely enough to make attribution based solely on behavioral evidence significantly more difficult.

We'd be interested in feedback from practitioners working on CTI, attribution or adversary emulation.

submitted by /u/Obvious-Language4462
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Towards CSI: What's the best harness? (arXiv 2026)

We studied a question that receives surprisingly little attention:

Does the agent harness matter as much as the underlying LLM?

We benchmarked five different cybersecurity scaffolds while keeping the model fixed (alias2-mini) across all 33 CyBench challenges.

Key findings:

  • No single scaffold performs best across every challenge.
  • Combining heterogeneous scaffolds consistently improves coverage.
  • A shared blackboard architecture solves 19/33 challenges (57.6%), outperforming every individual harness while reducing execution time.

Paper: https://arxiv.org/pdf/2605.28334

Happy to answer technical questions or discuss the benchmarking methodology.

submitted by /u/Obvious-Language4462
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