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Infoblox customer and staff data exposed in Sharepoint breach

Networking and security firm Infoblox is investigating a third-party breach that allowed crims to access sensitive customer and staff data. "Infoblox is investigating a security event involving unauthorized access to certain company information through a compromised third-party data migration vendor,” a company spokesperson confirmed to The Register. According to sources, the compromised third-party data migration vendor had trusted access to Infoblox's SharePoint system, and the intruders used this vendor’s accounts and access to exfiltrate data directly from Microsoft SharePoint. This data included configuration information related to some customer's NIOS (Network Identity Operating System) deployments. These are saved snapshots of customers’ network data, such as DNS, DHCP configurations, Grid databases, and reporting logs, that can be used to fully recover the appliance or grid in case of a system failure or faulty upgrade. The intruders also stole employee data during the break-in. According to an email CEO Scott Harrell sent to employees, which The Register has seen, compromised employee details include financial information such as direct deposit details, contact info, dates of birth, and Social Security numbers for employees and dependents. Upon discovering the breach, Infoblox “immediately activated” its incident response procedures, and took steps to contain the incident, including hiring outside cybersecurity experts, the spokesperson said. “We have sent notifications about this security event and are providing support and guidance as appropriate,” the Infoblox spokesperson told us. “Based on our investigation to date, we have no indication that any Infoblox products, cloud services, software updates or build-and-release processes were involved. Our priority is to fully investigate and resolve this issue." Affected staff received a $100 "spot bonus" to buy password management services, and were warned to be "especially alert for phishing, vishing, fraud, or other suspicious communications." Infoblox also gave employees and their dependents free credit monitoring and identity protection for two years. Infoblox declined to answer our more detailed questions about the compromise, including the type of data exposed, and how many employees and customers might be affected. The Register will update this story as we learn more about the breach.®

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Attackers are using AI agents to automate cybercrime at 'industrial scale,' FBI and AWS warn

Attackers are using open source AI penetration testing framework ARTEX to automate their attacks on banks, governments, energy and healthcare providers, and other critical sectors around the globe, according to security alerts from the FBI and Amazon Threat Intelligence. Between October 3 and November 5, Amazon’s MadPot honeypot threat sensors detected two ARTEX campaigns: one that allowed thieves to steal AI credentials at “industrial scale” to gain free access to models, and a second that generated deepfake videos to trick live selfie checks. In the first one, miscreants used AI agents to steal API keys, and then feed these keys into the ARTEX framework’s model gateway to power more agents searching for more AI model access keys. “Agents validated identities through each provider’s token and identity services, enumerated storage, assessed permission scope, and went after managed AI model services, secrets and parameter stores, and application identities,” AWS Chief Information Security Officer CJ Moses wrote in a blog post on Friday. Targets included LLM gateways and proxy platforms such as One API, New API, Veloera, Sub2API, and LiteLLM, and AI application builders Dify, FastGPT, Langflow, RAGFlow, Open WebUI, LobeChat, and Ollama. This campaign also used cloud credentials to gain stolen access to the models. In a second campaign, attackers used ARTEX to create real-time deepfake videos to trick identity verification (KYC) checks at two cryptocurrency exchanges, and forged ID photos to pass document checks. “The agents reverse-engineered one vendor’s liveness protocol in detail, documenting the face-detection event stream it sends, how it tracks face position during the check, and the coordinate system it uses to tell the user where to move,” Moses wrote. The agents did manage to complete the full movement sequence with the face positioned within 7 pixels of the target, but this feat was not enough, as the vendor’s server-side verdict rejected the deepfake in every attempt. In a separate session, agents built a real-time deepfake video pipeline on a single consumer-grade GPU using an open-source face animation model. This video achieved 11.5 frames per second, which Moses said is “close to what a live video check expects.” Meanwhile, agents also worked on the ID document checks, building synthetic camera metadata whose image dimensions matched the real values inside the JPEG file, and preserving the original camera compression tables that are usually replaced by re-saving an edited image. While the end goal was stealing cryptocurrency, the campaign illustrates how ARTEX runs several sessions simultaneously, with multiple agents working toward the same result. “One searched for ways to cash out, one worked on clearing account balances, one set up the deepfake video pipeline, and one carried out the verification bypass,” Moses wrote. None of the attack techniques are new, but both of these campaigns show how AI agents can boost the speed and persistence of the attacker. “The agents succeeded where basic security hygiene was missing, including default or hardcoded credentials, keys left in code and public artifacts, unauthenticated interfaces and inference endpoints, and unpatched software,” Moses added. “Getting those fundamentals right remains the most effective defense.” The FBI weighs in The FBI also hammered this message in a separate Friday alert noting “ARTEX significantly reduces the time required to chain attack techniques, with some intrusions progressing from initial targeting to privileged access in under three hours.” The federal cops cited the August attacks against South Korean financial institutions that stole personal data belonging to about 67,000 people. The FBI also highlighted a September ARTEX campaign that targetedd ConnectWise Cloud Backup customers in a supply chain attack that ultimately compromised more than 2,250 downstream Microsoft tenants. After these security breaches became public, the original ARTEX developer removed the GitHub repository in October. However, forked and localized variations plus a commercial version remain, and as of November 4 internet scanning service Censys identified 1,465 hosts running an exposed ARTEX console. And the total number of deploymentsis “likely significantly higher when including systems behind firewalls or in private networks,” according to the FBI. The feds urged all organizations – especially those operating internet-exposed applications, self-service portals, cloud infrastructure, and partner or supplier systems – to implement a series of mitigation measures outlined in its Flash alert. These include reducing external attack surfaces by restricting sensitive services to trusted networks, private connectivity, or dedicated administrative paths, and moving enterprise applications behind zero-trust access policies and permissions. ®

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‘123456’ has been the world’s most popular password for 7 out of the last 8 years

It’s been eight years since NordPass released the first edition of its most common passwords of the year list, and the world has learned nothing about password security in the meantime. NordPass’ eighth edition of its most common passwords list, as culled from data breaches, was released Monday, and it looks suspiciously like the previous ones in the worst possible way. “Once again, ‘123456’ is the most commonly used password in the world,” NordPass said in the report. “That makes it seven out of eight years this password has stood at the top of the leaderboard.” Even when 123456 wasn’t number one, it was still near the top of the heap, as the top three passwords in the list remain unchanged in the eight years NordPass has published its list: 123456, admin, and 12345678. It’s not like the rest of the most common passwords are showing any variety either. According to NordPass, the only real shuffling among the 10 most popular passwords was the entry of the worryingly short 1234 into the top ten and the migration of the ever-popular password “password” down slightly in the top 10 from 6th to 7th place. “We still have a lot of work to do to spread awareness about password safety,” NordPass concluded of that data – and there’s no more pressing time than the present. AI adoption has made password cracking an easier exercise than ever, with more credentials being sucked up in more data breaches at a faster pace. AI has also made cracking hashed passwords a snap too. In other words, if you’re reusing a password that’s been exposed in a breach, even if it’s just a hash that was exposed, you’re more likely than ever before to have another account compromised. The best advice NordPass gives is to move away from passwords toward biometric authentication or passkeys and you're insane not to enable MFA. But for the places you still have to use passwords, there are a few things to avoid – like the 200 passwords in NordPass’ list, for example. Beyond that, NordPass also recommends steering clear of pop cultural trends. “Fandoms make for terrible passwords,” NordPass notes. There are several reasons for that – namely the fact that they follow trends, meaning that “minecraft” password in the early 2000s was a simple one to add to a password stuffing dictionary, just like “skibiditoilet” in recent years. The one thing that connects all those pop-culture passwords is that “they all could be cracked in seconds,” NordPass said. We’re sure our readers are conscientious about their online habits, carefully protecting their accounts with the proper security measures and ensuring each and every password is unique, long, complicated, and random. Unfortunately for you smarties reading El Reg, the person down the hall whose security you’re responsible for may not be so disciplined, so be sure you’re enforcing good practices – Nord knows the average user just isn’t doing it despite years of begging and reminders. ®

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NoisyTCP bug gives Linux servers a remote crash problem 11 years in the making

The researcher who sounded the alarm over Dirty Frag earlier this year has uncovered another Linux kernel flaw, and this one lets attackers crash entire servers remotely without so much as a password. The vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2026-99288 and dubbed NoisyTCP, was discovered by security researcher Hyunwoo Kim, who says it affects almost all Linux distributions. The flaw dates back to October 2015 and went unnoticed until this year, when Kim found and patched it. Attackers don't need to log in or get their hands on any credentials to cause trouble. They can simply knock the server over, although there's no evidence yet that the flaw can be used to steal data or hijack a machine. The bug is buried in Linux's TCP networking code. Two parts of the kernel can trip over each other while processing incoming traffic, leaving one trying to use memory that's already been freed. When that happens, Linux can panic and take the whole machine down with it. Kim says there's no need for any special server configuration either. Services such as Nginx, Apache, and SSH can be vulnerable straight out of the box. An attacker needs access to an open TCP port on a system that processes incoming network traffic across multiple receive queues or CPUs. Perhaps more concerning for administrators running containerized workloads, the damage isn't necessarily limited to the application being attacked. Because the flaw sits in the Linux kernel, crashing a web server inside a container can take down the underlying host and anything else running on it. Kim found that the attack was particularly effective against virtual machines. During testing, he managed to crash Nginx, Apache, and SSH servers running on QEMU/KVM virtual machines in between five seconds and two minutes. Physical hardware put up more of a fight. Even after tailoring his exploit to the target machine, Kim needed roughly 14 hours to crash a bare-metal server running Nginx. Kim has a knack for finding holes in Linux. Back in May, he uncovered Dirty Frag, a kernel bug that allowed local users to gain root privileges. That one caused headaches for administrators when a working exploit went public before patches were ready. His latest discovery, NoisyTCP, has another potentially nasty trick up its sleeve. Kim identified a second exploitation path involving a use-after-free condition, although pulling it off is considerably more difficult than simply crashing a server. In his advisory, Kim says he has developed a limited exploit targeting virtual machines in a lab environment but has yet to demonstrate a general-purpose remote code execution attack. For the moment, the confirmed impact is remote denial of service. A fix was committed to the upstream Linux kernel on November 3, but administrators will need to check whether their distribution has shipped an updated kernel. Red Hat has rated the vulnerability Important, assigning it a CVSS score of 7.5. For those unable to patch immediately, Kim suggests two temporary workarounds: disabling TCP SYN cookies or restricting incoming packet processing to a single receive queue. Neither is particularly appealing. Disabling SYN cookies reduces protection against SYN flood attacks, while limiting packet processing can hurt network performance. The former also needs to be applied separately to containers using their own network namespaces. Kim published the details on November 15, once the disclosure embargo was lifted. The bug had been hiding in plain sight since 2015, leaving Linux servers vulnerable to remote crashes for 11 years. Not bad for a flaw that doesn't even require a login. ®

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Ubuntu gets AI-generated security fixes for those feeling brave

Canonical is offering Ubuntu Pro users an opt-in channel for AI-generated security patches, deploying bots to help tackle the growing pile of vulnerabilities other bots are uncovering. Canonical's VP for "Excellence Engineering," Pierre Guillemin, gave the second keynote at the recent Ubuntu Summit, introducing the Edge archive, an optional repository of security fixes generated by the company's Surge framework. As the announcement describes it: "We built Surge, a multi-agent orchestration framework for CVE remediation and backporting, and have reached a high level of confidence in its capabilities. We will not automatically upload Surge-generated fixes to our stable releases, but from today they are available to Ubuntu Pro users in the new Edge archive." Edge offers patches before extended testing and qualification are complete, allowing users to assess them themselves. Canonical says updates delivered through the normal security channels will remain human-validated. Ubuntu Summit now runs twice a year. Last week's Ubuntu Summit 26.10 followed a rather unfortunately timed server outage for the company. At the previous such event in June, the company announced a move into agentic AI, but this new one is bolder still. Guillemin noted that "October 2026 saw almost as many CVEs as all of 2025." Surge is a "multi-agent orchestration framework" to remediate vulnerabilities in Ubuntu's userspace. In other words, not the kernel, but even so, it is ambitious. The idea is to use a group of different LLMs to triage new vulnerabilities, find existing fixes, use multiple competing models to backport them to the versions in Ubuntu, and run automatic testing on them. Then a different group of "judging models" will evaluate the fixes and look for consensus. When candidates are chosen, they pass through normal Ubuntu package testing. If there are edge cases, low confidence scores, deadlocks, or other problems, then the process will be escalated to the staff of Canonical's security team. It's an attempt, as Guillemin put it, "to use AI to fight AI" – cooperating groups of LLMs patching their way through the ever-increasing flow of security holes. Even so, this is a remarkably courageous tactic (at the risk of using a famous British euphemism). It's an opt-in feature of Ubuntu Pro, Canonical's security and support subscription – although as we reported in 2022, Pro also has a free tier, so security researchers and the community can try Edge out, study it, and report their findings. We do sympathize with companies struggling against a rising tide of bot-powered security hole discovery. In theory, corporate funding can pay for faster fixes than a volunteer community can offer, but even for commercial vendors these are testing times. As we reported when Debian turned 30, surveys suggest that Ubuntu is about a third of the world Linux user base. Some of those users will be intrepid enough to try this, and that will end up being informative for the whole FOSS world. Those with long memories will remember the last time Canonical used the same edgy nomenclature. Back in July 2013, it launched a crowdfunding campaign for an Ubuntu smartphone. The campaign didn't raise enough money. ®

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Crook turns free trials into phishing factory, as LearnWorlds sends 13,000 fake YouTube copyright notices

LearnWorlds, a software and learning course platform, says an attacker sent 13,000 phishing emails to customers over seven days by using automated tools to open free trial accounts. The company insists its systems were not breached. Panos Siozos, Co-founder and CEO at LearnWorlds, said the miscreant created around 570 free trial accounts on the platform between November 7-14, which they used to issue fake copyright infringement notices to customers. "We have found no evidence of unauthorized access to existing customer schools or personal data held for our customers and their end users," he told The Register. According to Siozos, the attacker bypassed the platform's per-customer limit on trial subscriptions and exploited its welcome email feature to send the phishing emails. "In each trial they added their own list of target addresses and rewrote the standard welcome email as a fake copyright notice," he said. "Adding those users triggered the welcome email from our sending address." The first email was sent on November 7, after which the company detected the suspicious signups and blocked the first sender on November 9, although the attacker returned to send a second wave of emails within 40 minutes. LearnWorlds removed all the trial accounts by November 10 and one paid account, which was used to launch more emails, on November 14. "In total, around 13,000 emails were sent to addresses on external recipient lists supplied by the sender," said Siozos. "The trial accounts sent 9,853 between November 7-9, and the paid account sent 3,723 on November 14. "We can’t tell how many people clicked, because the link was disguised to hide clicks. The recipient addresses were the sender’s own list." The CEO confirmed that LearnWorlds has since enhanced its bot checks and is placing holds on new accounts if their emails trigger fraud flags. "We have also examined the novel patterns the attackers used to create more advanced scoring mechanisms. We have reported the phishing website so it can be taken down. Further measures are currently being examined. "Anyone who signed in on the fake page should change their Google password and review their account’s recent security activity." The company's confirmation follows suspicions of foul play aired by users on social media. User reports included copies of the emails they received, which demanded urgent responses to fake copyright infringement claims related to YouTube content. Among the more prominent recipients of the copyright infringement email notices was Marcus Hutchins, of WannaCry fame, who claimed he received an email from the company’s official mail server. The email, a copy of which Hutchins posted to X, referenced general intellectual property and copyright infringements but failed to specify any specific issues. The email prompted the recipient to click a YouTube link to see the “supporting documentation submitted by LearnWorks.” The link predictably turned out to be a YouTube redirect link, taking recipients to a separate website that presents them with a real Google OAuth page. If the user completed the authorization flow, it would have handed attackers control of the target’s Google and YouTube accounts. “The site is designed to look like an official YouTube webpage that enables users to review copyright claims against their channel,” Hutchins wrote. “It contains both the YouTube and Google branding, as well as a very similar theme to the official YouTube one.” According to Hutchins' screenshots, and those posted by others, the attacker was actively tweaking the email style and format, although the underlying lure and authentication mechanisms remained the same. Hutchins didn't specify exactly how the phishing page steals access to targets’ Google accounts, although his description aligns with the steps often seen in OAuth consent phishing attacks. These involve malicious websites serving victims genuine OAuth pages, into which unwitting victims enter their credentials and pass the relevant MFA tests. Typical scenarios see permission pages appear immediately after, and if the user accepts, the malicious website is handed OAuth access tokens to the victim’s account, effectively the keys to control it. LearnWorlds, based in Cyprus, claims to have two million active monthly learners on its platform accessing 900,000 courses and more than 14,000 business customers. Since launching in 2014, it claims to have generated more than $1 billion in revenue. The business focuses on white-label courses - training programs developed by one business and sold to another, assuming the buyer will change the branding and present the course materials as their own. ®

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US allies deepen deal to guard AI supply chains against 'hostile actors' (cough, China, cough)

Nine countries including the UK have signed a US declaration pledging to secure supply chains for AI tech, as pressure grows for tighter export controls following the high-profile resignation of Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang. The US is firming up its Pax Silica initiative on AI and supply chain security. Under the San Francisco declaration, signed on November 15, the coalition says it is entering a new phase that turns shared principles into a working partnership with shared responsibilities. Pax Silica was announced in December last year, ostensibly for the participants to work together on vital parts of the global technology supply chain, including frontier foundation models, compute and semiconductors, advanced manufacturing, minerals refining and processing, and energy. But the list of participants was notable for not including one country – China – leading many to suspect that Pax Silica is yet another effort by Washington to squeeze out its main rival in the global technology and economic stakes. Hong-Kong based South China Morning Post refers to it as Trump's "campaign to China-proof AI and chip supply chains." The latest declaration states that "the security of our peoples cannot be separated from the security of our economies and those of our closest partners," and sets out what must be protected, as well as committing to "protect it together." It asserts that protection should cover key foundational technologies essential to economic security, listing "software, materials, knowledge, components and inputs…essential to AI supply chains." This includes anything that "theft, illicit transfer, or acquisition by hostile actors would confer a meaningful military or intelligence advantage, or undue economic leverage over the participants, or whose unauthorized transfer or misuse could pose significant risks to the economic and national security of the participants." Also listed is the protection of critical infrastructure such as ports, terminals, transport, communications, and logistics networks, and the ICT and energy infrastructure these depend upon. The declaration was jointly released by the US administration, and the governments of Australia, India, Israel, Japan, South Korea, Qatar, Singapore, United Arab Emirates, and the United Kingdom. "The know-how to design a chip, the machine that makes it, and the port that ships it can all be in different countries," the US under-secretary of state for economic affairs Jacob Helberg told the Financial Times. "What makes the San Francisco Declaration historic is that Pax Silica partners have agreed to treat the security of those technologies and the infrastructure behind them as a shared responsibility." This move comes amid reports that both Republican and Democrat lawmakers want to push through further measures to prevent China from accessing advanced chips for AI processing. It follows the recent news that Jensen Huang, the now former CEO of top GPU maker Nvidia, admitted to an affair with a woman suspected by the US of being a spy for Beijing. She worked for a Singapore-based company called Megaspeed that bought Nvidia hardware and was also suspected of making it available to Chinese users. US, Singaporean, and Malaysian police investigations are still probing whether chips were diverted or accessed remotely by Chinese firms. American efforts to control Chinese access to its technology started under the first Trump administration, and continued under President Joe Biden’s leadership. A report out last week claimed US export controls are not stopping AI labs in China from using restricted Nvidia chips, and many of their cutting-edge models were trained using Blackwell GPUs. It is understood that President Trump is to meet with China's premier Xi Jinping this week for bilateral talks on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) summit in Shenzhen. ®

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Has AI’s ‘Black October’ changed the way you secure your code?

October ’26 might be remembered as a seminal moment for software developers and application security teams. AI agents are investigating unfamiliar systems, testing ways to get in and adjusting their next move when an attempt fails. Anyone with a credit card can use that capability to come after your application. Coding agents and their tool integrations have introduced new entry points and surface areas that can be exploited. Pillar’s OpenCode disclosure in October showed how a malicious Model Context Protocol (MCP) server could execute commands on a developer’s Windows or WSL machine during authentication. A server-supplied URL reached a shell without tricking the model. In the same month, the discovery of the two PHP2Shell vulnerabilities, remote code execution bugs in the PHP runtime uncovered with the help of OpenAI’s models, brought new urgency to securing longstanding code across much of the internet. Microsoft revealed that an agent moved from searching GitHub for exposed credentials to stealing Azure Key Vault data in five minutes. When its cloud API requests failed, the agent corrected the API versions and tried again until they succeeded. A report by Anthropic described individual operators using agent frameworks for multi-victim campaigns that previously required specialist teams. Agents carried out reconnaissance, exploitation and data theft across targets in parallel, making sophisticated operations accessible with less hands-on work. In a recent analysis, Tomasz Tunguz estimated the model cost of a 100-million-token attack workload using GLM-5.3, a low-cost model: 100 million tokens × $0.902 per million = $90.20. That is roughly 98% to 99% below the $5,000 to $10,000 frontier-model estimate cited by Bank for International Settlements (BIS) for a comparable cyber attack. Tunguz’s figure covers model usage only, not the full cost of an attack. Even still, it shows how trivially cheap it is now for attackers to go after any codebase, with the spend falling from thousands of dollars to under $100. These new agentic attacks should make every team take another look at the code they’ve been running for years. Engineering and security teams need to find and fix weaknesses in their own applications before an attacker with an army of AI agents gets there first. Security has to become every developer’s responsibility Traditional AppSec checks such as rule-based static analysis, dependency scanning and secret detection are no longer enough on their own. Developers, engineering leaders, and security teams also need defensive AI agents that trace attack paths, uncover missing safeguards and business-logic vulnerabilities, and help fix them. Developers’ responsibility doesn’t stop at the code they’re writing now. An application already in production without known vulnerabilities might still get exploited by an AI agent looking for ways to skip a permission check or business rule. The gap only shows up when a request is traced through the codebase and checked against what users should be allowed to do. A new approach to securing your code CodeRabbit Secure uses semantic analysis to understand your codebase and reason about it the way a security engineer would, tracing requests and checking whether permissions and business rules are enforced. Agents investigate potential attack paths and verify findings independent of the developer or agent that wrote the code, while CodeRabbit Agent generates reviewable fixes. Three main use cases that improve your code security: this works across the SDLC: reviewing each commit in a new PR and flag its security risks; finding vulnerabilities across the repo with a Deep Scan; rechecking code with incremental scans and validating findings at runtime. Find vulnerabilities already in committed code Deep Scan examines the repository, including older paths outside the latest PR. Agents map entry points, access controls, and sensitive operations, then investigate across functions and files. Linked repositories, when configured, supply context from shared services and libraries. A separate agent challenges each suspected vulnerability, checking reachability, exploitation conditions, and safeguards that could disprove it. I tried CodeRabbit Secure Deep Scan against ast-grep and was impressed by its precision. Proving vulnerabilities before flagging them makes every finding far more actionable. Herrington Darkholme, creator of ast-grep Review incoming changes before merge PR security reviews assess each incoming change, including agent-generated code, for vulnerabilities that are reachable and exploitable in the existing application. CodeRabbit’s Security Architecture Review examines how architecture-level changes affect permissions, sensitive data flows, and trust boundaries. The Security Blast Radius map connects changed components to their dependencies and the code that relies on them, helping reviewers trace the potential security impact beyond the PR diff. On GitHub, administrators can enable CodeRabbit Security check and require it through branch protection or a ruleset. It blocks merges when PR security comments at or above the configured severity threshold remain unresolved. Recheck code as it evolves and validate findings at runtime Each Deep Scan builds an attack surface map of the repository, showing which security-relevant entry points have been verified, which have gone stale as the code changed, and which have never been examined. Delta scans then check changed files and areas of the map that are out of date or unverified, so teams know how much of the codebase has been security-reviewed and when it was last reviewed. Individual findings can also be rechecked to determine whether a fix addressed them. For eligible Deep Scan findings on GitHub Cloud with CodeRabbit Cloud, runtime verification generates a reproduction guide and can run it in an isolated environment to confirm whether the vulnerable path is reached. Results are “reproduced”, “not reproduced” or “inconclusive” for the tested revision and environment, however a failure to reproduce may not mean the finding is fixed. Carry the investigation through to a fix Developers can ask CodeRabbit Agent to implement a fix and open a PR, then inspect the finding, proposed fix, and supporting evidence. Teams can also configure severity thresholds to create Jira or Linear tickets automatically and track remediation in their existing workflow. Connecting the vulnerability finding, its supporting evidence, and a proposed fix helps engineering and security teams act while the context is still fresh and carry the change through review, testing and release. Teams can use CodeRabbit Agent to act on that context or easily hand it off to your preferred coding agent with a shareable markdown file. What a million-dollar initiative surfaced CodeRabbit recently committed up to $1 million in free Deep Scans to help organizations find and fix hidden vulnerabilities. In Deep Scans created over a 10-day period in early November, CodeRabbit Secure recorded about 53,000 High or Critical findings across some 2,000 organizations. More than 10,000 findings have already been fixed, including 1,049 rated High or Critical. Some of the security fixes implemented by CodeRabbit included preventing: embedded JavaScript in a repository document’s metadata from running arbitrary code. email subject lines from being interpreted as executable templates and running JavaScript with an API server’s privileges. unauthenticated transfer requests from injecting SQL and triggering unauthorized database operations. As agents produce more code and attackers become more capable, investigation using semantic analysis needs to become a regular part of how software is built and maintained, alongside existing security checks. Find vulnerabilities in your code before an attacker does As attackers use AI agents to investigate unfamiliar systems and adapt their next move, engineering and security teams need the same capacity to investigate their code and carry findings through to tested fixes. Start with a repository your organization cares most about and run a Deep Scan with CodeRabbit Secure. Supplied by CodeRabbit

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Google: AI agent turned a security patch into a working exploit with no human help

A suspected Russian-speaking operator used an AI agent to turn security patches into working exploits with no human in the loop – a first such occurrence, according to the Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) – before ultimately stealing data from victim organizations. Google documented this attack in its fourth-quarter 2026 AI threat tracker, and said it marks a significant advance in how attackers use LLMs for fully autonomous vulnerability discovery and exploitation compared to Q3. In this case, the threat hunters found an exposed staging server hosting a multi-agent vulnerability research and weaponization framework that integrates with multiple frontier and local models. The framework, called exploit_agent, used Russian-language tooling, and was configured to conduct continuous differential analysis of “popular web application software,” according to the report. This includes comparing code before and after security updates, identifying potential vulnerabilities, developing exploits, and then automatically executing them without any human involvement. The server also contained data stolen from victim organizations, and “multiple” post-compromise scripts that allowed attackers to perform nefarious activities including internal reconnaissance, brute-forcing, installing webshells, and removing other attackers’ webshells. “Victim telemetry on the server suggests the operator was specifically interested in targeting French websites associated with the media and entertainment industries, as well as the education sector,” according to the report. The report also documents other instances of attackers moving beyond manual LLM prompting during cyberattacks and instead deploying autonomous, multi-agent offensive security frameworks to carry out multi-stage intrusions. These include both financially motivated cybercriminals and cyber-espionage groups. In addition to the recent attacks involving the open source penetration-testing tool ARTEX, attackers have also used other AI-powered offensive frameworks, including CAIRN, CyberStrikeAI, HexStrike AI, and PentAGI. In another instance, GTIG observed attackers using PentAGI alongside proxy services to target the aerospace sector. “We have observed several threat actors separately experimenting with use of these frameworks and harnesses, including financially motivated, as well as suspected espionage threat actors with a PRC nexus,” the Googlers wrote. “Given the low barrier to entry, ease of integrating new exploits, and massive scaling potential, we believe it is highly likely that threat actors will continue to use these frameworks in campaigns targeting organizations globally.” ®

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Big Tech takes a beating as online safety experts accuse companies of doing bare minimum

Technology companies are doing just enough to show a degree of compliance with the UK's Online Safety Act, but are failing to meet the needs of the individuals and young victims the legislation exists to protect, experts say. A panel of online safety pros assembled before Parliament's Communications and Digital Committee on Tuesday, taking aim at the likes of Google, Microsoft, Meta, and ByteDance for failing to act on important matters. Clare McGlynn, professor of law at Durham University and expert on violence against women and girls (VAWG), was especially critical of major search engine providers for their inconsistent downranking of harmful content search terms. "Rape porn," for example, is correctly downranked and no user sees any relevant links until the tenth page of results, although adjacent terms such as "unwilling porn" can be found as early as the third page, McGlynn said. "I just think if someone spent a little more time thinking 'I really want to minimize the risk of this material appearing,' I would take a systematic approach," she told the committee. "I would downrank 'unwilling' and 'unwanted,' and I would downrank 'asleep porn' as well… because it just means that it's easily findable. "So, they don't rank some of them, but just not systematically or wholly consistently." McGlynn went on to say that during her own research, "force porn" was rightly downranked heavily, although terms as similar as "forced porn" were not. "If you were trying to think of the words that would be similar to say rape, and rape porn is extreme porn and it's not supposed to be on those platforms anymore, you would think of words like unwilling and unwanted," she added. "And we know your algorithm would." Google inevitably took much of McGlynn's flak due to its dominance of the search engine market, although the professor said the same issues can be observed on Bing, too. Alexandra Whiston-Dew, partner at law firm Miscon de Raya, argued that search engines have such an important role in regulating the OSA, noting the limited resources at Ofcom's disposal. She said that more needs to be done from the tech side to ensure different parties in the chain of publication are detected early and downranked or blocked accordingly. There are publications, for example, that actively advertise themselves as websites that host illegal content, and these appear to be missing from the search engines' crosshairs. "So, they are spotlighting the fact that they are publishing illegal content, and this is going under the radar not only from the search engines but also the other platforms and the businesses in the chain of publication," said Whiston-Dew. "Also Ofcom needs to really pull all of their resources together and attack that receptacle of illegal content." Similarly, McGlynn raised the issue of porn sites continuing to host extreme porn, as they are legally allowed to do, to make it available to less regulated territories. With the harmful content still on the site, all it takes is a VPN connection to access it, and bypass the age assurance mechanisms in the process. Success of user reports trails away As well as a piecemeal approach to downranking extreme content, experts said that tech platforms initially showed a strong appetite in quickly handling content-takedown requests, although this appears to have waned substantially. Citing data from domestic violence and VAWG charity Refuge [PDF], Janaya Walker, interim director at the End Violence Against Women Coalition (EVAW), said that before November 2025, the success rate for these kinds of reports made using Refuge’s Trusted Flagger team stood at 53.7 percent. Over the past 12 months, however, this dropped to just 18.2 percent. Further, since November 2025, zero percent of reports made to Meta have been successful, according to Refuge’s figures. The charity’s Trusted Flagger team works closely with social media platforms to report content that victims may have reported to it. The idea is that if the report comes from an authority like Refuge, it is acted upon more quickly. Walker said there was real concern about how platforms behave and whether they comply with existing regulation, and about what that means for specialist services supporting survivors in limbo, particularly without an online commission to advocate for victims' and survivors' interests. Meta did not immediately respond to questions about its takedown rate, but according to its Community Standards Enforcement Report, it removed 27.8 million posts related to adult nudity and sexual activity between April and June 2026. The report does not include a category devoted to VAWG-related reports, so take the data with the appropriate level of scrutiny. Neither Google, Microsoft, nor TikTok responded to requests for comment. The findings from Refuge and the discussion in Parliament this week reflect the wider concern about the efficacy of the OSA, and how online safety experts are frustrated with how little impact it has had, more than a year after the new duties came into force. England's Children's Commissioner, Dame Rachel de Souza, told the same committee in September that the OSA "has made absolutely no difference" to children's access to harmful content online, as evidenced by the accounts of young people themselves. Amid discussions from the panel of experts this week regarding the need for a civil redress scheme, McGlynn pointed to British Columbia's system as an example of how other countries are going further to protect people from online harms. She said: "...an individual still does not have the right to demand an image be taken down. And that is where I think we just lack that capacity to say to an individual, 'this is what you need to do, and you can bring this legal action, for example, against X, against the perpetrator, you can get the material deleted.' "In British Columbia in Canada, they have a swift online civil redress system where you can make these claims, and you can get instant orders to get this material taken down, and you can even get compensation for some of the harm suffered. "So other countries are doing more, if you like, to give the individuals that right as well as all the other measures at the platform level." ®

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