Hackers linked to Russia’s military intelligence units are using known flaws in older Internet routers to mass harvest authentication tokens from Microsoft Office users, security experts warned today. The spying campaign allowed state-backed Russian hackers to quietly siphon authentication tokens from users on more than 18,000 networks without deploying any malicious software or code.
Microsoft said in a blog post today it identified more than 200 organizations and 5,000 consumer devices that were caught up in a stealthy but remarkably simple spying network built by a Russia-backed threat actor known as “Forest Blizzard.”
How targeted DNS requests were redirected at the router. Image: Black Lotus Labs.
Also known as APT28 and Fancy Bear, Forest Blizzard is attributed to the military intelligence units within Russia’s General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU). APT 28 famously compromised the Hillary Clinton campaign, the Democratic National Committee, and the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee in 2016 in an attempt to interfere with the U.S. presidential election.
Researchers at Black Lotus Labs, a security division of the Internet backbone provider Lumen, found that at the peak of its activity in December 2025, Forest Blizzard’s surveillance dragnet ensnared more than 18,000 Internet routers that were mostly unsupported, end-of-life routers, or else far behind on security updates. A new report from Lumen says the hackers primarily targeted government agencies—including ministries of foreign affairs, law enforcement, and third-party email providers.
Black Lotus Security Engineer Ryan English said the GRU hackers did not need to install malware on the targeted routers, which were mainly older Mikrotik and TP-Link devices marketed to the Small Office/Home Office (SOHO) market. Instead, they used known vulnerabilities to modify the Domain Name System (DNS) settings of the routers to include DNS servers controlled by the hackers.
As the U.K.’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) notes in a new advisory detailing how Russian cyber actors have been compromising routers, DNS is what allows individuals to reach websites by typing familiar addresses, instead of associated IP addresses. In a DNS hijacking attack, bad actors interfere with this process to covertly send users to malicious websites designed to steal login details or other sensitive information.
English said the routers attacked by Forest Blizzard were reconfigured to use DNS servers that pointed to a handful of virtual private servers controlled by the attackers. Importantly, the attackers could then propagate their malicious DNS settings to all users on the local network, and from that point forward intercept any OAuth authentication tokens transmitted by those users.
DNS hijacking through router compromise. Image: Microsoft.
Because those tokens are typically transmitted only after the user has successfully logged in and gone through multi-factor authentication, the attackers could gain direct access to victim accounts without ever having to phish each user’s credentials and/or one-time codes.
“Everyone is looking for some sophisticated malware to drop something on your mobile devices or something,” English said. “These guys didn’t use malware. They did this in an old-school, graybeard way that isn’t really sexy but it gets the job done.”
Microsoft refers to the Forest Blizzard activity as using DNS hijacking “to support post-compromise adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) attacks on Transport Layer Security (TLS) connections against Microsoft Outlook on the web domains.” The software giant said while targeting SOHO devices isn’t a new tactic, this is the first time Microsoft has seen Forest Blizzard using “DNS hijacking at scale to support AiTM of TLS connections after exploiting edge devices.”
Black Lotus Labs engineer Danny Adamitis said it will be interesting to see how Forest Blizzard reacts to today’s flurry of attention to their espionage operation, noting that the group immediately switched up its tactics in response to a similar NCSC report (PDF) in August 2025. At the time, Forest Blizzard was using malware to control a far more targeted and smaller group of compromised routers. But Adamitis said the day after the NCSC report, the group quickly ditched the malware approach in favor of mass-altering the DNS settings on thousands of vulnerable routers.
“Before the last NCSC report came out they used this capability in very limited instances,” Adamitis told KrebsOnSecurity. “After the report was released they implemented the capability in a more systemic fashion and used it to target everything that was vulnerable.”
TP-Link was among the router makers facing a complete ban in the United States. But on March 23, the U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) took a much broader approach, announcing it would no longer certify consumer-grade Internet routers that are produced outside of the United States.
The FCC warned that foreign-made routers had become an untenable national security threat, and that poorly-secured routers present “a severe cybersecurity risk that could be leveraged to immediately and severely disrupt U.S. critical infrastructure and directly harm U.S. persons.”
Experts have countered that few new consumer-grade routers would be available for purchase under this new FCC policy (besides maybe Musk’s Starlink satellite Internet routers, which are produced in Texas). The FCC says router makers can apply for a special “conditional approval” from the Department of War or Department of Homeland Security, and that the new policy does not affect any previously-purchased consumer-grade routers.
Nonprofits run out of US Border Patrol stations are also selling other “operation”-themed coins that include a phrase popularized by the Proud Boys, potentially in violation of government rules.
An elusive hacker who went by the handle “UNKN” and ran the early Russian ransomware groups GandCrab and REvil now has a name and a face. Authorities in Germany say 31-year-old Russian Daniil Maksimovich Shchukin headed both cybercrime gangs and helped carry out at least 130 acts of computer sabotage and extortion against victims across the country between 2019 and 2021.
Shchukin was named as UNKN (a.k.a. UNKNOWN) in an advisory published by the German Federal Criminal Police (the “Bundeskriminalamt” or BKA for short). The BKA said Shchukin and another Russian — 43-year-old Anatoly Sergeevitsch Kravchuk — extorted nearly $2 million euros across two dozen cyberattacks that caused more than 35 million euros in total economic damage.
Daniil Maksimovich SHCHUKIN, a.k.a. UNKN, and Anatoly Sergeevitsch Karvchuk, alleged leaders of the GandCrab and REvil ransomware groups.
Germany’s BKA said Shchukin acted as the head of one of the largest worldwide operating ransomware groups GandCrab and REvil, which pioneered the practice of double extortion — charging victims once for a key needed to unlock hacked systems, and a separate payment in exchange for a promise not to publish stolen data.
Shchukin’s name appeared in a Feb. 2023 filing (PDF) from the U.S. Justice Department seeking the seizure of various cryptocurrency accounts associated with proceeds from the REvil ransomware gang’s activities. The government said the digital wallet tied to Shchukin contained more than $317,000 in ill-gotten cryptocurrency.
The GandCrab ransomware affiliate program first surfaced in January 2018, and paid enterprising hackers huge shares of the profits just for hacking into user accounts at major corporations. The GandCrab team would then try to expand that access, often siphoning vast amounts of sensitive and internal documents in the process. The malware’s curators shipped five major revisions to the GandCrab code, each corresponding with sneaky new features and bug fixes aimed at thwarting the efforts of computer security firms to stymie the spread of the malware.
On May 31, 2019, the GandCrab team announced the group was shutting down after extorting more than $2 billion from victims. “We are a living proof that you can do evil and get off scot-free,” GandCrab’s farewell address famously quipped. “We have proved that one can make a lifetime of money in one year. We have proved that you can become number one by general admission, not in your own conceit.”
The REvil ransomware affiliate program materialized around the same as GandCrab’s demise, fronted by a user named UNKNOWN who announced on a Russian cybercrime forum that he’d deposited $1 million in the forum’s escrow to show he meant business. By this time, many cybersecurity experts had concluded REvil was little more than a reorganization of GandCrab.
UNKNOWN also gave an interview to Dmitry Smilyanets, a former malicious hacker hired by Recorded Future, wherein UNKNOWN described a rags-to-riches tale unencumbered by ethics and morals.
“As a child, I scrounged through the trash heaps and smoked cigarette butts,” UNKNOWN told Recorded Future. “I walked 10 km one way to the school. I wore the same clothes for six months. In my youth, in a communal apartment, I didn’t eat for two or even three days. Now I am a millionaire.”
As described in The Ransomware Hunting Team by Renee Dudley and Daniel Golden, UNKNOWN and REvil reinvested significant earnings into improving their success and mirroring practices of legitimate businesses. The authors wrote:
“Just as a real-world manufacturer might hire other companies to handle logistics or web design, ransomware developers increasingly outsourced tasks beyond their purview, focusing instead on improving the quality of their ransomware. The higher quality ransomware—which, in many cases, the Hunting Team could not break—resulted in more and higher pay-outs from victims. The monumental payments enabled gangs to reinvest in their enterprises. They hired more specialists, and their success accelerated.”
“Criminals raced to join the booming ransomware economy. Underworld ancillary service providers sprouted or pivoted from other criminal work to meet developers’ demand for customized support. Partnering with gangs like GandCrab, ‘cryptor’ providers ensured ransomware could not be detected by standard anti-malware scanners. ‘Initial access brokerages’ specialized in stealing credentials and finding vulnerabilities in target networks, selling that access to ransomware operators and affiliates. Bitcoin “tumblers” offered discounts to gangs that used them as a preferred vendor for laundering ransom payments. Some contractors were open to working with any gang, while others entered exclusive partnerships.”
REvil would evolve into a feared “big-game-hunting” machine capable of extracting hefty extortion payments from victims, largely going after organizations with more than $100 million in annual revenues and fat new cyber insurance policies that were known to pay out.
Over the July 4, 2021 weekend in the United States, REvil hacked into and extorted Kaseya, a company that handled IT operations for more than 1,500 businesses, nonprofits and government agencies. The FBI would later announce they’d infiltrated the ransomware group’s servers prior to the Kaseya hack but couldn’t tip their hand at the time. REvil never recovered from that core compromise, or from the FBI’s release of a free decryption key for REvil victims who couldn’t or didn’t pay.
Shchukin is from Krasnodar, Russia and is thought to reside there, the BKA said.
“Based on the investigations so far, it is assumed that the wanted person is abroad, presumably in Russia,” the BKA advised. “Travel behaviour cannot be ruled out.”
There is little that connects Shchukin to UNKNOWN’s various accounts on the Russian crime forums. But a review of the Russian crime forums indexed by the cyber intelligence firm Intel 471 shows there is plenty connecting Shchukin to a hacker identity called “Ger0in” who operated large botnets and sold “installs” — allowing other cybercriminals to rapidly deploy malware of their choice to thousands of PCs in one go. However, Ger0in was only active between 2010 and 2011, well before UNKNOWN’s appearance as the REvil front man.
A review of the mugshots released by the BKA at the image comparison site Pimeyes found a match on this birthday celebration from 2023, which features a young man named Daniel wearing the same fancy watch as in the BKA photos.
Images from Daniil Shchukin’s birthday party celebration in Krasnodar in 2023.
Update, April 6, 12:06 p.m. ET: A reader forwarded this English-dubbed audio recording from a ccc.de (37C3) conference talk in Germany from 2023 that previously outed Shchukin as the REvil leader (Shchuckin is mentioned at around 24:25).
When Syrian government accounts were hijacked in March, the breach looked chaotic. But it revealed something more troubling: a state struggling with the most basic layer of cybersecurity.
Plus: The FBI says a recent hack of its wiretap tools poses a national security risk, attackers stole Cisco source code as part of an ongoing supply chain hacking spree, and more.
Major AI labs are investigating a security incident that impacted Mercor, a leading data vendor. The incident could have exposed key data about how they train AI models.
A tax system breach in Oklahoma is putting highly sensitive personal information at risk. And unfortunately, this is exactly the kind of situation scammers love to exploit.
Hackers reportedly accessed W-2 and 1099 files through Oklahoma’s online tax portal, according to state officials, exposing the kind of information that can open the door to tax fraud, identity theft, and highly targeted phishing attempts.
Before the follow-up scams start rolling in, this is the kind of moment where layered protection matters. McAfee+ Advanced includes identity monitoring and data cleansup that can help alert you if your personal information starts circulating where it shouldn’t, and Scam Detector can flag suspicious messages if scammers try to use this breach as a hook.
What Happened in Oklahoma
According to a statement by the Oklahoma Tax Commission and reported by KOCO News 5, a local ABC affiliate, suspicious activity inside the state’s Oklahoma Taxpayer Access Point system was identified in December 2025. The agency says impacted individuals have been notified directly by mail, and complimentary credit monitoring and fraud assistance are being offered.
When W-2s, 1099s, Social Security numbers, and tax-related records are exposed, scammers can use that information to:
File fraudulent tax returns
Try to open new accounts
Build phishing emails or texts that feel unusually real
Either way, the goal is the same: use real information to make the next scam more believable.
Red Flags of a Scam After a Breach Like This
The breach itself is real. But what often follows is a second wave of scams pretending to help.
Watch For:
Emails or texts about your “tax account” that create urgency
Messages asking you to verify personal information
Fake alerts about refunds, filings, or suspicious activity
Links telling you to log in and “secure” your account
That’s where people can get hit twice: once by the breach, and again by the scam that follows it.
What To Do If You’re Impacted
First, don’t panic. Then:
Take advantage of any free credit monitoring or fraud assistance being offered
Monitor your bank accounts, tax records, and credit reports closely
Consider placing a fraud alert or credit freeze if needed
Be extra careful with any message referencing taxes, refunds, or account access
Go directly to official sites instead of clicking links in emails or texts
And that, my friends, is scam number one in this week’s This Week in Scams.
Let’s get into what else is on our radar.
The FBI Impersonation Scam Showing Up Across the U.S.
Scammers pretending to be federal agents are making the rounds across the country, and this one is built to make people panic fast.
Field offices, including Chicago and Houston, are warning the public about fraudsters posing as FBI agents in calls, texts, and emails. In some cases, the scammers claim you’re connected to an investigation. In others, they say you’re a victim of fraud and need to act immediately to protect yourself.
Sometimes they do not stop there. They may also pretend to be bank employees working alongside the FBI, all to make the story feel more convincing and get access to your money or personal information.
The FBI has shared images of these suspects pretending to be agents. If you are contacted by these officials, report it to the FBI.
Why This Scam Works
This scam plays on the same pressure tactics we’ve seen over and over again: authority, urgency, and confusion.
If someone claims to be a federal agent, many people freeze up and assume they need to cooperate immediately. That’s exactly what scammers are counting on.
The FBI has been clear about this: federal law enforcement will not ask you for money or sensitive personal information over the phone, by text, or by email.
The Red Flags in This Message
Unsolicited outreach from someone claiming to be federal law enforcement
Pressure to act immediately
Requests for money, gift cards, prepaid cards, or personal information
Instructions to keep the conversation secret
Stories involving a bank “working with” the FBI
If it feels dramatic, high-pressure, and just a little off, trust that instinct.
What To Do if You Get One Of These Messages
Do not respond
Do not send money or share personal information
Contact the agency directly using publicly listed contact information
Save the message for your records
Report it to the FBI: 1-800-CALL-FBI (225-5324), or online at tips.fbi.gov.
This is also exactly the kind of message McAfee’s Scam Detector is built to flag before you get pulled in.
How McAfee Helps You Stay Ahead of Scams and Breaches
McAfee+ Advancedgives you multiple layers working together so you are not left figuring it out after the damage is done:
Identity Monitoring alerts you if your personal info shows up where it should not, so you can act fast
Personal Data Cleanup helps remove your information from data broker sites, making you harder to target in the first place
Scam Detector flags suspicious texts, emails, links, and even deepfake videos before you engage
Safe Browsing helps block risky sites if you do click
Secure VPN keeps your data private, especially on public Wi-Fi
This kind of layered protection is critical in cases like ghost student scams, where the first sign of fraud often comes after financial damage has already happened.
Safety tips to carry into next week
Be extra cautious after any real breach makes headlines
Do not trust unsolicited messages just because they reference real institutions
Never send money to someone claiming to be law enforcement
Go directly to official websites instead of clicking links
Use tools that flag suspicious messages in real time so you do not have to guess
The reality is, scams are getting better at looking official.
You should not have to be an expert to spot them. That’s why McAfee is here to help. We’re Safer Together.
We’ll be back next week with more scams making headlines.
In this episode, we discuss Iran’s threats to target US tech firms, gear up for the midterm elections, and get a scene report from the Polymarket pop-up bar in DC.
As strikes continue on Iran’s nuclear facilities, the real danger isn’t the explosion, but what happens if critical safety systems fail—and how that risk could spread across the Gulf.
This category recognizes work that doesn’t just perform, it matters: campaigns that raise awareness, inspire action, and make a real-world impact.
That’s exactly what “Keep It Real” set out to do.
Because behind every scam statistic is a person who thought they were making the right call. And too often, what follows isn’t just financial loss. It’s embarrassment, silence, and stigma.
We wanted to change that.
The campaign launched alongside McAfee Scam Detector to address a growing reality: scams powered by AI are becoming harder to recognize and easier to fall for.
“Keep It Real” paired real survivor stories with AI-driven protection to show how scams actually happen and how people can stop them in the moment.
The goal was simple:
Normalize the experience
Remove shame around being scammed
Help more people recognize scams faster
Because when people feel safe talking about scams, they’re more likely to spot them and stop them.
What Are the Shorty Awards?
The Shorty Awards honor the best work in social media, digital campaigns, and online storytelling across brands, creators, and organizations.
Now in their 18th year, the awards recognize campaigns that combine creativity, impact, and real-world relevance. Finalists are selected alongside leading global brands and judged on both industry evaluation and public voting.
How McAfee’s Scam Detector Fits In
McAfee’s Scam Detector is designed to help people identify scams across everyday digital moments.
It uses AI to fight AI by flagging suspicious:
Text messages and emails
QR codes and links
Social media messages
AI-generated and deepfake content
By combining automatic detection with clear guidance, Scam Detector helps people better understand what they’re seeing and decide what to trust.
Real Stories Behind the Campaign
A core part of “Keep It Real” was giving space to people who experienced scams to share what happened, in their own words.
These stories helped show that scams can happen to anyone and played a key role in breaking the stigma around being targeted.
This recognition reflects the work across McAfee teams who built and brought this campaign to life, including product, engineering, research, creative, and communications.
It also reflects the individuals who chose to share their real scam stories to help others recognize scams, stay safer, and end the shame and stigma around being scammed.
Support the Campaign
The Shorty Awards include a public voting component.
A WIRED analysis of DHS records identified dozens of specialized federal agents who used force against US civilians during the largest known deployment of its kind in US history.
As DarkSword spreads, Apple tells WIRED it will enable iOS 18-specific fixes for millions of iPhone owners who remain on that iOS version rather than force them to update to iOS 26.
McAfee’s mobile research team has uncovered a large-scale Android malware campaign we’re tracking as Operation NoVoice.
The campaign was distributed through more than 50 apps previously available on Google Play, disguised as everyday tools like cleaners, games, and photo utilities. Together, the apps were downloaded more than 2.3 million times, though it’s unclear how many devices may have been impacted.
If the attack succeeds, the malware can gain deep control of a device, allowing attackers to inject malicious code into apps as they are opened and access sensitive data.
However, the most serious impact depends on the device.
On older or unpatched Android devices, the malware can install a highly persistent form of infection that may survive a standard factory reset. Newer Android devices with up-to-date security protections are not vulnerable to the root exploit observed in this campaign, though they may still be exposed to other types of malicious activity from these apps.
In other words, on vulnerable devices, the malware can behave like a kind of digital “zombie,” continuing to operate in the background even after a reset.
Operation NoVoice is what security experts call a rootkit malware attack.
A rootkit is a type of malware designed to gain deep, privileged control of a device while hiding its presence from the user and the operating system’s normal security tools.
Breaking the term down:
“Root” refers to the highest level of access on a system (administrator-level control).
“Kit” refers to a collection of tools used by an attacker to maintain that control.
Put simply, a rootkit allows attackers to operate underneath the normal apps and security protections on a phone, giving them powerful control while staying difficult to detect.
In the case of Operation NoVoice, the attack unfolds in several steps.
1) A normal-looking app starts the attack
The campaign began with apps that appeared harmless on the Google Play Store. These apps advertised themselves as tools like phone cleaners, puzzle games, or gallery utilities.
When a user downloaded and opened one of these apps, it appeared to work normally. There are no obvious signs to the user that anything is wrong.
2) The malware quietly checks the device
Behind the scenes, the app contacts a remote server controlled by the attackers.
The server collects information about the device, things like its hardware, operating system version, and security patch level. Based on that information, the attackers send back custom exploit code designed for that specific device.
3) The attack gains deep system access
If the exploit succeeds, the malware gains root-level access to the device.
At that point, the attackers can install additional malicious components and modify parts of the Android operating system itself.
4) Every app on the phone can be affected
Once the rootkit is installed, it modifies a core Android system library that every app relies on.
This allows attacker-controlled code to run inside any app the user opens.
That means the attackers could potentially access data from messaging apps, financial apps, or social media apps without the user noticing.
5) The malware can remain even after a reset
Operation NoVoice also includes persistence mechanisms designed to keep the malware active.
In some cases, the infection could survive a standard factory reset, because the malicious components modify parts of the system software that resets typically do not replace.
Fully removing the infection may require reinstalling the device’s firmware, something most users cannot easily do themselves.
*To be clear, these apps have been removed from Google Play and are no longer available for download.
Why The Name “Operation NoVoice”
The name Operation NoVoice comes from a hidden component inside the malware itself.
Researchers discovered a resource labeled “novioce” embedded in one of the attack’s later stages. The file contains a silent audio track that plays at zero volume.
This may seem strange, but it serves a purpose.
By continuously playing silent audio in the background, the malware can keep a foreground service running without drawing attention. This allows the malicious code to remain active while appearing harmless to the operating system.
The researchers believe the name “novioce” is likely a misspelling of “no voice,” referring to the silent audio trick used to keep the malware running.
How To Stay Safe from Malware Disguised as Apps
Operation NoVoice highlights an important reality: even apps that appear legitimate can sometimes hide malicious behavior.
Fortunately, there are several steps users can take to reduce their risk.
Be cautious with unfamiliar apps
Even if an app appears on the Google Play Store, it’s still important to review:
the developer’s name
the number of downloads
recent user reviews (check for negative reviews)
Apps with very few reviews, vague descriptions, or suspicious developer accounts can sometimes be part of malware campaigns. And exercise even greater caution with apps promoted through advertisements or that create a a sense of urgency.
Keep your phone updated
Many attacks rely on exploiting known vulnerabilities in older versions of Android.
Installing system updates and security patches helps reduce the chance that these exploits will work.
Remove apps you don’t recognize
If you notice apps on your device that you don’t remember installing, review them carefully and remove anything suspicious.
Keeping your phone’s app list clean reduces the potential attack surface.
Use mobile security protection
Mobile security software can help detect suspicious behavior and block known malware.
What Operation NoVoice Tells Us About the Future of Mobile Threats
Operation NoVoice highlights how mobile malware is evolving. Instead of obvious malicious apps, attackers are increasingly hiding their operations inside ordinary-looking tools distributed through legitimate app stores.
What makes this campaign particularly concerning isn’t just the number of downloads or the technical complexity. It’s the way the malware combines several advanced techniques, device-specific exploits, modular plugins, and deep system persistence, into a single attack chain.
That approach allows attackers to quietly turn an everyday app download into long-term control of a device.
That’s why keeping devices updated, reviewing apps carefully, and using mobile security protection are becoming increasingly important. As Operation NoVoice shows, today’s malware isn’t just trying to get onto devices; it’s trying to stay there.
McAfee’s mobile research team identified and investigated an Android rootkit campaign tracked as Operation Novoice. The malware described in this blog relies on vulnerabilities Android made patches available for in 2016 – 2021. All Android devices with a security patch level of 2021-05-01 or higher are not susceptible to the exploits that we were able to obtain from the command-and-control server. However patched devices that downloaded these apps could have been exposed to unknown potential payloads outside of what we discovered. The attack begins with apps that were previously available on Google Play that appear to be simple tools such as cleaners, games, or gallery utilities. When a user downloaded and opened one of these apps, it appeared to behave as advertised, giving no obvious signs of malicious activity.
In the background, however, the app contacts a remote server, profiles the device, and downloads root exploits tailored to that device’s specific hardware and software. If the exploits succeed, the malware gains full control of the device. From that moment onward, every app that the user opens are injected with attacker‑controlled code.
This allows the operators to access any app data and exfiltrate it to their servers. One of the targeted apps is WhatsApp. We recovered a payload designed to execute when WhatsApp launches, gather all necessary data to clone the session, and send it to the attacker’s infrastructure.
On older, unsupported devices (Android 7 and lower) that no longer receive Android security updates as of September 2021, this rootkit is highly persistent; a standard factory reset will not remove it, and only reflashing the device with a clean firmware will fully restore the device.
In total, we identified more than 50 of these malicious apps on Google Play, with at least 2.3 million downloads.
McAfee identified the malicious apps, conducted the technical analysis, and reported its findings to Google through responsible disclosure channels. Following McAfee’s report, Google removed the identified apps from Google Play and banned the associated developer accounts. McAfee is a member of the App Defense Alliance, which supports collaboration across the mobile ecosystem to improve user protection. McAfee Mobile Security detects this malware as a High-Risk Threat. For more information, and to get fully protected, visit McAfee Mobile Security.
Background And Key Findings
Android malware has been moving toward modular frameworks that update themselves remotely and adapt to each device. Campaigns like Triada and Keenadu have shown that replacing system libraries gives attackers persistence to survive factory resets. BADBOX has shown that backdoors pre-installed through the supply chain can reach millions of devices. Recent research has confirmed links between several of these families, suggesting shared tooling rather than isolated efforts.
NoVoice fits both trends but does not rely on supply chain access. It reaches devices through Google Play and achieves the same level of persistence through exploitation. McAfee’s investigation revealed the following key findings:
All carrier apps were distributed through Google Play. No sideloading required, no user interaction beyond opening the app.
C2 infrastructure remains active at the time of publication.
The C2 server profiles each device and delivers root exploits matched to its hardware and software version.
The rootkit overwrites a core system library, causing every app on the device to run attacker code at launch.
The infection survives factory reset and can only be removed by reflashing the firmware.
The chain is fully plugin-based. Operators can push any payload to any app on the device at runtime.
The only task we recovered clones WhatsApp sessions, but the framework is designed to accept any objective.
Naming
The name comes from R.raw.novioce, a silent audio resource embedded in one of the later-stage payloads. It plays at zero volume to keep a foreground service alive, abusing Android’s media playback exemption. We believe it is a deliberate misspelling of “no voice.”
Distribution Method
All carrier apps were distributed through Google Play and request no unusual permissions. Their manifests include the same SDKs any legitimate app would (Firebase, Google Analytics, Facebook SDK, AndroidX). The malicious components are registered under tampered com.facebook.utils, blending in with the real Facebook SDK classes the apps already include.
Figure 1: One of the carrier apps on Google Play
The initial payload is embedded in the app’s asset directory as a polyglot image. This means the file displays and renders a normal image, but a deeper inspection reveals that the encrypted malicious payload is appended after the PNG IEND marker. Since that marker signals to image viewers that the image data ends there, the appended payload remains hidden during normal viewing.
Geographical Prevalence
The geographical prevalence map shows the highest infection rates in Nigeria, Ethiopia, Algeria, India, and Kenya, regions where budget devices and older Android versions that no longer receive security updates are common.
Figure 2: Affected users around the world
Malware Analysis
The following breakdown walks through each stage of the chain in order, from the moment a user opens the app to the moment stolen data leaves the device. No single file contains the full chain. Each stage decrypts and loads the next, most are delivered from the server at runtime.
Figure 3. The NoVoice rootkit payloads
Stage 1: The Delivery
The moment the app opens, code injected into the legitimate Facebook SDK initialization path runs automatically. No user interaction is needed. It first checks whether the device has already been processed and, in most samples, whether it is running Android 12L or below. A subset of the carrier apps skips the version check entirely. If either check fails, it stops and logs a message disguised as a Facebook SDK error: “FacebookSdk: Failed in initStore.”
If the device was already processed, the code cleans up files assumed to be left behind by previous runs, including paths that do not belong to any standard Android component. None of these are visible to the user.
If the checks pass, the app reads a polyglot image from its own assets’ directory, extracts the encrypted payload (enc.apk) hidden after the image data, decrypts it to produce h.apk, and loads it into memory. It then deletes all intermediate files, temporary directories.
Figure 4: Normal looking image with malicious payloadFigure 5: The malicious payload begins after the IEND marker, starting with the magic value CAFEBABE
Stage 2: The Gatekeeper
The decrypted payload (h.apk) loads a native library (libkwc.so) that controls the rest of this stage. It first verifies it is running inside the intended carrier app by checking the package name and signing certificate against hardcoded values. It also checks whether the app is running in a debug environment.
libkwc.so contains two encrypted embedded payloads. The first (sec.jar) is a gate designed to detect analysis environments. It runs 15 checks, including emulator detection, root indicators, debuggers, VPN and proxy connections, Xposed hooks, and GPS geofencing. If any check fails, the chain stops silently. The geofence compares the device’s location against bounding boxes for Beijing and Shenzhen hardcoded in the native library and excludes devices confirmed to be inside them. If the app does not have location permission, it cannot determine the device’s position and defaults to letting the chain continue. Two brands get special treatment: on Gionee devices, all checks except the geofence are skipped; on Meizu devices, the chain follows a separate code path entirely. Gionee devices have a documented history of shipping with pre-installed malware through supply chain compromise.
Only if all checks in sec.jar pass does libkwc.so decrypt and load the second payload (hex.jar), which begins contacting the C2 server. If the gate fails, it deletes the working directory and stops.
Figure 6: 15 validation checks before proceeding to the next stage
Stage 3: The Plugin
Once the gate passes, hex.jar sets up a plugin framework built on an internal codebase the authors refer to as “kuwo” in their package names. It checks in with a C2 server every 60 seconds. Updates are delivered the same way as the initial payload: as image files with encrypted data hidden after the image content. The server returns download URLs in a response field named warningIcon, disguising plugin downloads as icon fetches. A log-deletion routine runs alongside the framework to remove forensic traces from the device.
The first plugin delivered (rt) acts as an orchestrator. It manages sub-plugins and handles C2 communication. It checks in with the server, sending over 30 device identifiers including hardware model, kernel version, installed packages, and whether the device has already been rooted. The campaign’s name comes from this plugin: it embeds a silent audio resource named R.raw. novioce.
The checkin tells the server two things: who this device is and whether it has already been rooted. If it has not, rt_plugin downloads security.jar, moving the chain into root exploitation.
Figure 7: MediaPlayer initialized to load the embedded NoVoice audio
Stage 4: The Exploit
security.jar first checks whether the device is already rooted. If it has been, it stops. For unrooted devices, it sends the device’s chipset, kernel version, security patch date, and other identifiers to the C2. The server responds with a list of exploit binaries matched to that specific device.
Before running any exploit, the rootkit installer (CsKaitno.d) is decrypted from an embedded resource and written to disk. The rootkit is already in place before any exploit runs.
The exploits are downloaded one at a time from the C2’s CDN, each encrypted and verified before execution. We recovered 22 exploits in total. Our deep analysis of one revealed a three-stage kernel attack: an IPv6 use-after-free for kernel read, a Mali GPU driver vulnerability for kernel read/write, and finally credential patching and SELinux disablement.
The expected end result is the same across all exploits: a root shell with SELinux disabled. From that shell, the exploit loads CsKaitno.d. This is where exploitation ends and persistence begins.
Figure 8: SELinux enforcement disabled as part of the exploit chain
Stage 5: The Rootkit
CsKaitno.d carries four encrypted payloads: library hooks for ARM32 and ARM64 (asbymol and bdlomsd), a bytecode patcher (jkpatch), and a persistence daemon (watch_dog). It first removes files associated with possible competing rootkits, then decrypts and writes its own payloads to disk.
The installer backs up the original libandroid_runtime.so and replaces it with a hook binary matched to the device’s architecture. It also replaces libmedia_jni.so. The replacements are not copies of the original libraries. They are wrappers that intercept the system’s own functions. When any hooked function runs, it redirects to attacker code.
Figure 9: Rootkit copying and preparing modified system libraries before remounting the filesystem as writable
After replacing the libraries, jkpatch modifies pre-compiled framework bytecode on disk. This is a second layer of persistence: even if someone restores the original library, the framework’s own compiled code still contains the injected redirections
Stage 6: The Watchdog
To survive reboots, the installer replaces the system crash handler with a rootkit launcher, installs recovery scripts, and stores a fallback copy of the exploitation stage on the system partition. If any component is removed, the rootkit can reinstall itself.
It then deploys a watchdog daemon (watch_dog) that checks the installation every 60 seconds. If anything is missing, it reinstalls it. If that fails repeatedly, it forces a reboot, bringing the device back up with the rootkit intact.
After cleaning up all staging files, the installer marks the device as compromised. On the next boot, the system’s process launcher (zygote) loads the replaced library, and every app it starts inherits the attacker’s code.
Figure 10: Watchdog payload decrypted, written to disk, permissioned, and launched with a 60‑second restart interval
Stage 7: The Injection
On the next boot, every app on the device loads the replaced system library. The injected code decides what to do based on which app it is running inside. Two payloads activate depending on the app. The malware authors named them BufferA and BufferB in their own code. Both are embedded as fragments inside the replaced libandroid_runtime.so from Stage 5, assembled in memory at runtime, and deleted from disk immediately after loading, leaving no files behind. BufferA runs inside the system’s package installer and can silently install or uninstall apps. BufferB runs inside any app with internet access.
BufferB is the campaign’s primary post-exploitation tool. It operates two independent C2 channels with separate encryption keys and beacon intervals. Both channels send device fingerprints to the C2 and receive task instructions in return.
If all primary domains fail and three or more days pass without contact, a fallback routine activates between 1 and 4 AM, reaching out to api[.]googlserves[.]com for a fresh domain list. Because BufferB runs inside any app with internet access, it can be active in dozens of apps simultaneously on a single device.
Figure 11: Injection logic selecting BufferA for the package installer and BufferB for all other apps
Stage 8: The Theft
The only task payload we recovered is PtfLibc, delivered to BufferB from Alibaba Cloud OSS. Its target is WhatsApp.
PtfLibc copies WhatsApp’s encryption database, extracts the device’s Signal protocol identity keys and registration ID, and pulls the most recent signed prekey. It also reads 12 keys from WhatsApp’s local storage, including the phone number, push name, country code, and Google Drive backup account. For the client keypair, it tries multiple decryption methods depending on how the device stores the key.
It sends the stolen data to api[.]googlserves[.]com through multiple layers of encryption and deletes the temporary database copy when done.
With these keys and session data, an attacker can clone the victim’s WhatsApp session onto another device.
Figure 12: Code accessing and copying WhatsApp’s encrypted Signal protocol databases for exfiltration
Infrastructure
The campaign spreads its C2 communication across multiple domains, each serving a different function.
fcm[.]androidlogs[.]com handles initial device enrollment. Once the plugin framework activates, stat[.]upload-logs[.]com takes over as the primary C2 for plugin delivery, device checkin, exploit distribution, and result reporting. config[.]updatesdk[.]com serves as its fallback. Exploit binaries are hosted separately on download[.]androidlogs[.]com, with an S3-accelerated endpoint (logserves[.]s3-accelerate[.]amazonaws[.]com) as the primary CDN. This endpoint returned 403 errors during our analysis.
Task payloads for BufferB are hosted on Alibaba Cloud OSS (prod-log-oss-01[.]oss-ap-southeast-1[.]aliyuncs[.]com). PtfLibc beacons to api[.]googlserves[.]com, a domain designed to look like Google service traffic at a glance.
The domain separation is deliberate. Taking down one domain does not affect the others. The C2 can update BufferB’s domain lists at runtime, and a fallback routine fetches fresh domains from hardcoded backup endpoints if all configured domains go silent for three or more days.
Recommendations
Because the rootkit writes to the system partition, a factory reset does not remove it. A reset wipes user data but leaves system files intact. Compromised devices require a full firmware reflash to return to a clean state. Blocking the C2 domains and beacon patterns listed in this report at the network level can disrupt the chain at multiple stages.
Attribution
Several indicators link NoVoice to the Android.Triada family. The property (os.config.ppgl.status)NoVoice sets to mark a device as compromised is a known indicator of compromise for Android.Triada.231, a variant that uses the same property to track installation state. Both NoVoice and Triada.231 persist by replacing libandroid_runtime.so and hooking system functions so that every app runs attacker code at launch. Whether NoVoice is a direct evolution of Triada.231, a fork of its codebase, or a separate group reusing proven techniques, the shared approach suggests access to a common toolchain.
Conclusion
What makes NoVoice dangerous is not any single technique. It is the engineering effort behind the full chain: a self-healing pipeline that goes from a Play Store install to code execution inside every app on the device, survives factory reset, and monitors its own installation. The operators built a delivery system, an infrastructure.
We recovered one task. The framework is designed to accept any number of them, for any app, at any time. The C2 infrastructure remains active. We do not know what other objectives have been deployed before, during, or after our analysis. The WhatsApp session theft we observed may be the least of it.
The rootkit’s persistence model, overwriting a system library inherited by every process, patching pre-compiled framework bytecode, and monitoring its own installation with a watchdog, makes remediation difficult.
This research underscores McAfee’s ongoing role in identifying advanced mobile threats and working with platform partners to protect users before large‑scale harm occurs.
A text that looks like it came straight from a courthouse is making the rounds across the U.S. And yes, I got it too.
First things first, that’s a scam. And to be clear: DON’T SCAN THAT QR CODE.
It’s the same playbook as last year’s toll road scams, just dressed up with a little more authority and a lot more pressure.
Before doing anything, our team ran it through McAfee’s Scam Detector. It immediately flagged the message as suspicious, and that’s exactly the kind of moment this tool is built for. When something feels just real enough to second guess, it gives you a clear signal before you click, scan, or spiral.
A screenshot showing Scam Detector in action.
How the scam works
The text claims you’ve missed a payment, violated a law, or have some kind of outstanding “case.” It then pushes you to scan a QR code or click a link to resolve it quickly.
From there, one of two things usually happens:
You’re taken to a fake payment page designed to steal your money, or
You’re prompted to download something that gives scammers access to your device or data
Either way, the goal is the same: get you to act fast before you have time to question it.
Here’s the scam text I got in California. You’ll notice it looks exactly like the others across the country.
The red flags in this message
Urgent, threatening language about fines, penalties, or legal action
Vague accusations with no real details about what you supposedly did
Official-looking formatting like case numbers, clerk signatures, and judge names
Copy-paste consistency across states: McAfee employees in New York and California received nearly identical messages with the same names
There are reports of this scam popping up nationwide, but the rule is simple: law enforcement does not text you to demand payment or resolve legal issues.
What to do if you scanned the QR code
First, don’t panic. Then:
Do not pay anything or enter personal information
Do not delete apps you were told to install (this can make it harder to detect what happened)
Run a device scan using a trusted security tool like McAfee’s free antivirus
Keep an eye on your financial accounts and logins for unusual activity
And that, my friends, is scam number one in this week’s This Week in Scams (new format, we’re experimenting a little).
Let’s get into what else is on our radar.
What to Know About an Alleged Crunchyroll Breach
Anime streaming platform Crunchyroll is investigating claims of a data breach involving customer support ticket data, potentially impacting millions of users.
According to TechCrunch, access appears to involve a third-party vendor system, a reminder that even strong security setups still rely on people and partners, which can introduce risk in everyday moments.
Even if you’ve never entered your credit card into a support form, these tickets can still include:
Email addresses
Usernames
Screenshots or account details
Conversations that reveal habits, subscriptions, or personal context
That’s more than enough for scammers to build highly believable follow-ups.
Why this matters right now
When breaches like this surface, scammers don’t wait. They use the moment to send emails and messages that feel timely, relevant, and legitimate.
For example, scammers might send messages pretending to be Crunchyroll and suggesting you “click this link to secure your account” after the breach. In reality, that “security check” exposes your information.
This is where tools like Scam Detector come back into play, flagging suspicious links and messages even when they reference real companies or real events.
What to do if you have a Crunchyroll account
Change your password, especially if you’ve reused it elsewhere
Turn on two-factor authentication
Be cautious of emails referencing the breach or asking you to “secure your account”
Avoid clicking links and go directly to the official site instead
How McAfee Helps You Stay Ahead of Scams and Breaches
McAfee+ Advanced gives you multiple layers working together so you’re not left figuring it out in the moment:
Scam Detector flags suspicious texts, emails, links, and even deepfake videos before you engage
Safe Browsing helps block risky sites if you do click or scan
Device Security helps detect and remove malicious apps or downloads
Identity Monitoring alerts you if your personal info shows up where it shouldn’t, so you can act fast
Personal Data Cleanup helps remove your information from data broker sites, making you a harder target in the first place
Secure VPN keeps your data private, especially on public Wi-Fi
Plus our instant QR code scam checks will flag suspicious QR codes before you scan them.
Safety tips to carry into next week
Slow down when a message creates urgency. That’s the hook
Don’t scan QR codes or click links from unexpected texts
Go directly to official websites instead of using links sent to you
Use tools that flag scams in real time so you don’t have to guess
The reality is, these scams are designed to look normal. You shouldn’t have to be an expert to spot them. That’s why McAfee’s here to help.
We’ll be back next week with more scams making headlines.
A financially motivated data theft and extortion group is attempting to inject itself into the Iran war, unleashing a worm that spreads through poorly secured cloud services and wipes data on infected systems that use Iran’s time zone or have Farsi set as the default language.
Experts say the wiper campaign against Iran materialized this past weekend and came from a relatively new cybercrime group known as TeamPCP. In December 2025, the group began compromising corporate cloud environments using a self-propagating worm that went after exposed Docker APIs, Kubernetes clusters, Redis servers, and the React2Shell vulnerability. TeamPCP then attempted to move laterally through victim networks, siphoning authentication credentials and extorting victims over Telegram.
A snippet of the malicious CanisterWorm that seeks out and destroys data on systems that match Iran’s timezone or have Farsi as the default language. Image: Aikido.dev.
In a profile of TeamPCP published in January, the security firm Flare said the group weaponizes exposed control planes rather than exploiting endpoints, predominantly targeting cloud infrastructure over end-user devices, with Azure (61%) and AWS (36%) accounting for 97% of compromised servers.
“TeamPCP’s strength does not come from novel exploits or original malware, but from the large-scale automation and integration of well-known attack techniques,” Flare’s Assaf Moragwrote. “The group industrializes existing vulnerabilities, misconfigurations, and recycled tooling into a cloud-native exploitation platform that turns exposed infrastructure into a self-propagating criminal ecosystem.”
On March 19, TeamPCP executed a supply chain attack against the vulnerability scanner Trivy from Aqua Security, injecting credential-stealing malware into official releases on GitHub actions. Aqua Security said it has since removed the harmful files, but the security firm Wiz notes the attackers were able to publish malicious versions that snarfed SSH keys, cloud credentials, Kubernetes tokens and cryptocurrency wallets from users.
Over the weekend, the same technical infrastructure TeamPCP used in the Trivy attack was leveraged to deploy a new malicious payload which executes a wiper attack if the user’s timezone and locale are determined to correspond to Iran, said Charlie Eriksen, a security researcher at Aikido. In a blog post published on Sunday, Eriksen said if the wiper component detects that the victim is in Iran and has access to a Kubernetes cluster, it will destroy data on every node in that cluster.
“If it doesn’t it will just wipe the local machine,” Eriksen told KrebsOnSecurity.
Image: Aikido.dev.
Aikido refers to TeamPCP’s infrastructure as “CanisterWorm” because the group orchestrates their campaigns using an Internet Computer Protocol (ICP) canister — a system of tamperproof, blockchain-based “smart contracts” that combine both code and data. ICP canisters can serve Web content directly to visitors, and their distributed architecture makes them resistant to takedown attempts. These canisters will remain reachable so long as their operators continue to pay virtual currency fees to keep them online.
Eriksen said the people behind TeamPCP are bragging about their exploits in a group on Telegram and claim to have used the worm to steal vast amounts of sensitive data from major companies, including a large multinational pharmaceutical firm.
“When they compromised Aqua a second time, they took a lot of GitHub accounts and started spamming these with junk messages,” Eriksen said. “It was almost like they were just showing off how much access they had. Clearly, they have an entire stash of these credentials, and what we’ve seen so far is probably a small sample of what they have.”
Security experts say the spammed GitHub messages could be a way for TeamPCP to ensure that any code packages tainted with their malware will remain prominent in GitHub searches. In a newsletter published today titled GitHub is Starting to Have a Real Malware Problem, Risky Business reporter Catalin Cimpanu writes that attackers often are seen pushing meaningless commits to their repos or using online services that sell GitHub stars and “likes” to keep malicious packages at the top of the GitHub search page.
This weekend’s outbreak is the second major supply chain attack involving Trivy in as many months. At the end of February, Trivy was hit as part of an automated threat called HackerBot-Claw, which mass exploited misconfigured workflows in GitHub Actions to steal authentication tokens.
Eriksen said it appears TeamPCP used access gained in the first attack on Aqua Security to perpetrate this weekend’s mischief. But he said there is no reliable way to tell whether TeamPCP’s wiper actually succeeded in trashing any data from victim systems, and that the malicious payload was only active for a short time over the weekend.
“They’ve been taking [the malicious code] up and down, rapidly changing it adding new features,” Eriksen said, noting that when the malicious canister wasn’t serving up malware downloads it was pointing visitors to a Rick Roll video on YouTube.
“It’s a little all over the place, and there’s a chance this whole Iran thing is just their way of getting attention,” Eriksen said. “I feel like these people are really playing this Chaotic Evil role here.”
Cimpanu observed that supply chain attacks have increased in frequency of late as threat actors begin to grasp just how efficient they can be, and his post documents an alarming number of these incidents since 2024.
“While security firms appear to be doing a good job spotting this, we’re also gonna need GitHub’s security team to step up,” Cimpanu wrote. “Unfortunately, on a platform designed to copy (fork) a project and create new versions of it (clones), spotting malicious additions to clones of legitimate repos might be quite the engineering problem to fix.”
Update, 2:40 p.m. ET: Wiz is reporting that TeamPCP also pushed credential stealing malware to the KICS vulnerability scanner from Checkmarx, and that the scanner’s GitHub Action was compromised between 12:58 and 16:50 UTC today (March 23rd).
Today marks the start of Spring in the Northern Hemisphere, and with warmer weather setting in summer trips are vacation planning are starting to take shape.
But before you respond to that message about your hotel booking or payment confirmation, it’s worth asking: is it actually legit?
This week in scams, we’re breaking down a travel phishing scheme making the rounds through realistic booking messages, as well as new McAfee research on betting scams and AI-driven malware.
Scammers Who Know Your Exact Travel Reservation Details
A new phishing campaign targeting travelers is exploiting hotel booking platforms like Booking.com, and it’s convincing enough to fool even cautious users.
According to reporting from ITBrew and Cybernews, attackers are running a multi-stage scam:
How The Booking Scam Works
Scam Stage
How It Works
What You’ll Notice
How to Protect Yourself
Where McAfee Helps
Stage 1: Hotel account gets compromised
Attackers phish or hack hotel staff to access booking platforms and guest reservation data.
You won’t see this part — it happens behind the scenes.
Use strong, unique passwords and enable multi-factor authentication on your own accounts to reduce risk of similar breaches.
Identity Monitoring can alert you if your personal information appears in suspicious places or data leaks.
Stage 2: You receive a realistic message
Scammers use stolen booking data to send messages via WhatsApp, email, or even booking platforms.
The message includes your real name, hotel, and travel dates, making it feel legitimate.
Be cautious of unexpected outreach, even if the details are correct. Don’t assume accuracy means authenticity.
Scam detection tools can help flag suspicious messages and identify potential phishing attempts.
Stage 3: Urgency is introduced
The message claims there’s an issue with your reservation and pushes you to act quickly.
Phrases like “confirm within 12 hours” or “risk cancellation” create pressure.
Pause before acting. Legitimate companies rarely require urgent payment changes without prior notice.
Scam detection can help identify high-risk messages designed to pressure you into quick decisions.
Stage 4: You’re sent to a fake payment page
A link leads to a convincing lookalike site designed to steal your payment details.
The page looks real but may have subtle URL differences or unusual formatting.
Always navigate directly to the official website or app instead of clicking links in messages.
Safe Browsing tools can help block risky or known malicious websites before you enter sensitive information.
March Madness Brackets, Bets, and Bad Actors
March Madness brings brackets, bets, and a flood of bad actors.
New McAfee research found that 1 in 3 Americans (32%) say they’ve experienced a betting or gambling scam, and nearly a quarter (24%) say they’ve lost money to one. On average, victims reported losing $547.
That’s not surprising when you look at the environment around the tournament. More than half of Americans are watching, more than half are participating in some form of betting, and 82% say they’ve seen betting promotions in the past year.
Some of the most common setups this season include:
“Guaranteed win” or “can’t lose” betting tips that require payment upfront
Fake sportsbook promotions offering bonus bets or free credits
Messages claiming you have winnings, but need to pay a fee to unlock them
Impersonation scams posing as sportsbook support or betting platforms
Invitations to private “VIP betting groups” on WhatsApp or Telegram
The takeaway: If a betting offer promises guaranteed results, demands the use of bizarre apps and sites, asks for money upfront, or pushes you to act quickly, it’s not an edge. It’s a scam.
“AI-Written” Malware Is Hiding in Everyday Downloads
Not all scams start with a message. Some start with a search.
443 malicious ZIP files disguised as legitimate software
1,700+ file names used to make those downloads look credible
48 variants of a malicious DLL file used to infect devices
These weren’t hosted on obscure corners of the internet either. The files were distributed through platforms people recognize, including Discord, SourceForge, and file-sharing sites.
Here’s how the attack typically works:
You search for a tool.
You download what looks like the right file.
It opens normally at first.
Then, behind the scenes, malware loads quietly and begins pulling in additional code. In some cases, victims are shown fake error messages while the real infection happens in the background.
From there, attackers can:
Turn your device into a cryptocurrency mining machine
Install additional malware like infostealers or remote access tools
Slow down your system while running hidden processes
What makes this campaign stand out is that some of the code appears to have been generated with help from AI tools.
That doesn’t mean AI is running the attack on its own. But it does suggest attackers are using AI to:
Generate code faster
Create more variations of malware
Scale campaigns more efficiently
In other words, the barrier to building malware is getting lower.
The takeaway: If a download is unofficial, hard to find, or feels like a shortcut, it’s worth slowing down. The file may look right, but that doesn’t mean it’s safe.
How McAfee+ Advanced Works in These Scam Moments
Whether it’s a message about your booking, a betting offer that looks legitimate, or a download that appears to be exactly what you were searching for, these scams all rely on the same thing: they blend into everyday moments.
That’s where having backup like McAfee+ Advanced comes in. It includes:
McAfee’s Scam Detector, which helps flag suspicious links in texts and messages like the ones used in these booking and betting scams, so you can spot something risky before you engage
Web protection and real-time device security, helping protect against risky links, malicious sites, and evolving threats if you do click, including fake betting platforms or malware hidden in downloads
Personal Data Cleanup, which helps remove your information from sites that sell it, making it harder for scammers to access the personal details that make messages and scams feel legitimate
Secure VPN, which helps keep your personal info safe and private anywhere you use public Wi-Fi, like hotels, airports, and cafés while traveling
Identity Monitoring and alerts, with 24/7 scans of the dark web to help ensure your personal and financial information isn’t being exposed or reused
Credit and transaction monitoring, so you can get alerts about suspicious financial activity if your information is ever compromised
Identity restoration support and up to $2 million in identity theft coverage, giving you access to US-based experts and added peace of mind if something does go wrong
Stay skeptical, verify before you click, and we’ll see you next week with more.
The U.S. Justice Department joined authorities in Canada and Germany in dismantling the online infrastructure behind four highly disruptive botnets that compromised more than three million Internet of Things (IoT) devices, such as routers and web cameras. The feds say the four botnets — named Aisuru, Kimwolf, JackSkid and Mossad — are responsible for a series of recent record-smashing distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks capable of knocking nearly any target offline.
Image: Shutterstock, @Elzicon.
The Justice Department said the Department of Defense Office of Inspector General’s (DoDIG) Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS) executed seizure warrants targeting multiple U.S.-registered domains, virtual servers, and other infrastructure involved in DDoS attacks against Internet addresses owned by the DoD.
The government alleges the unnamed people in control of the four botnets used their crime machines to launch hundreds of thousands of DDoS attacks, often demanding extortion payments from victims. Some victims reported tens of thousands of dollars in losses and remediation expenses.
The oldest of the botnets — Aisuru — issued more than 200,000 attacks commands, while JackSkid hurled at least 90,000 attacks. Kimwolf issued more than 25,000 attack commands, the government said, while Mossad was blamed for roughy 1,000 digital sieges.
The DOJ said the law enforcement action was designed to prevent further infection to victim devices and to limit or eliminate the ability of the botnets to launch future attacks. The case is being investigated by the DCIS with help from the FBI’s field office in Anchorage, Alaska, and the DOJ’s statement credits nearly two dozen technology companies with assisting in the operation.
“By working closely with DCIS and our international law enforcement partners, we collectively identified and disrupted criminal infrastructure used to carry out large-scale DDoS attacks,” said Special Agent in Charge Rebecca Day of the FBI Anchorage Field Office.
Aisuru emerged in late 2024, and by mid-2025 it was launching record-breaking DDoS attacks as it rapidly infected new IoT devices. In October 2025, Aisuru was used to seed Kimwolf, an Aisuru variant which introduced a novel spreading mechanism that allowed the botnet to infect devices hidden behind the protection of the user’s internal network.
On January 2, 2026, the security firm Synthientpublicly disclosed the vulnerability Kimwolf was using to propagate so quickly. That disclosure helped curtail Kimwolf’s spread somewhat, but since then several other IoT botnets have emerged that effectively copy Kimwolf’s spreading methods while competing for the same pool of vulnerable devices. According to the DOJ, the JackSkid botnet also sought out systems on internal networks just like Kimwolf.
The DOJ said its disruption of the four botnets coincided with “law enforcement actions” conducted in Canada and Germany targeting individuals who allegedly operated those botnets, although no further details were available on the suspected operators.
In late February, KrebsOnSecurity identified a 22-year-old Canadian man as a core operator of the Kimwolf botnet. Multiple sources familiar with the investigation told KrebsOnSecurity the other prime suspect is a 15-year-old living in Germany.
McAfee Labs has uncovered a widespread malware campaign hiding inside fake downloads for things like game mods, AI tools, drivers, and trading utilities.
What makes this campaign especially notable is that some parts of it appear to have been built with help from large language models (LLMs). McAfee researchers found signs that certain scripts likely used AI-generated code, which may have helped the attackers create and scale the campaign faster.
That does not mean AI created the whole operation on its own. But it does suggest AI may be helping cybercriminals lower the effort needed to build malware and launch attacks.
Attackers created many different fake downloads to reach more victims
48 malicious DLL variants
The campaign used multiple versions of the malware, not just one file
1,700+ file names observed
The same threat was repackaged under many different names to look convincing
17 distinct kill chains
Researchers found multiple attack flows, but they followed a similar overall pattern
Hosted on familiar platforms
The malware was distributed through services users may recognize, including Discord and SourceForge
AI-assisted code suspected
Some scripts contained explanatory comments and patterns that strongly suggest LLM assistance
Cryptomining and additional malware observed
Infected devices could be used to mine cryptocurrency or receive more malicious payloads
What Is “AI-Written Malware”?
In this case, “AI-written malware” does not meanan AI system independently invented and launched the attack.
Instead, McAfee Labs found evidence that the attackers very likely used AI tools to help generate some of the code used in the campaign, especially in certain PowerShell scripts.
Put simply:
Term
Plain-English meaning
Large language model (LLM)
An AI system that can generate text and code based on prompts
AI-assisted malware
Malware where attackers appear to have used AI tools to help write or structure parts of the code
Vibe coding
A style of coding where someone describes what they want and an AI does much of the writing
This matters because it can make malware development faster, easier, and more scalable for attackers.
Figure 1: Attack Vector
How The Fake Download Attack Works
The attack begins when someone searches for software online and downloads what looks like the tool they wanted.
That tool might appear to be a game mod, AI voice changer, emulator, trading utility, VPN, or driver. But behind the scenes, the ZIP archive includes malicious components that start the infection.
Step
What happens
1. A user downloads a fake file
The ZIP archive is disguised as something useful or desirable, such as a mod menu, AI tool, or driver
2. The file appears normal at first
In some cases, the package includes a legitimate executable so it feels more convincing
3. A malicious DLL is loaded
A hidden malicious file, often WinUpdateHelper.dll, starts the real attack
4. The user is distracted
The malware may display a fake “missing dependency” message and redirect the user to install unrelated software
5. A PowerShell script is pulled from a remote server
While the user is distracted, the malware contacts a command-and-control server and runs additional code
6. More malware is installed
Depending on the sample, the device may receive coin miners, infostealers, or remote access tools
7. The infected device is abused for profit
In many cases, attackers use the victim’s system resources to mine cryptocurrency in the background
What Kinds of Files Were Used as Bait
McAfee found that the attackers cast a very wide net. The malicious ZIP files impersonated many types of software, including:
Bait category
Examples
Gaming tools
game mods, cheats, executors, Roblox-related tools
AI-themed tools
AI image generators, AI voice changers, AI-branded downloads
System utilities
graphics drivers, USB drivers, emulators, VPNs
Trading or finance tools
stock-market utilities and related downloads
Fake security or malware tools
fake stealers, decryptors, and other risky-looking utilities
That broad range is part of what made the campaign effective. It was designed to catch people already looking for shortcuts, unofficial tools, or hard-to-find software.
Why McAfee Researchers Believe AI Was Used
One of the strongest clues came from the comments inside some of the attack scripts.
McAfee researchers found explanatory comments that looked more like AI-generated instructions than the kind of shorthand attackers usually leave for themselves. In one example, a comment referred to downloading a file from “your GitHub URL,” which suggests the code may have come from a generated template and was not fully cleaned up before use.
These details do not prove every part of the campaign was AI-made. But they do support McAfee’s assessment that certain components were likely generated with help from large language models.
What Happens on an Infected Device
In many cases, the malware was used to turn victims’ computers into quiet crypto-mining machines.
McAfee observed mining activity involving several cryptocurrencies, including:
Ravencoin
Zephyr
Monero
Bitcoin Gold
Ergo
Clore
Some samples also downloaded additional payloads such as SalatStealer or Mesh Agent.
For victims, that can mean:
Possible effect
What it may look like
Slower performance
apps lag, games stutter, system feels unusually sluggish
High CPU or GPU usage
fans run constantly, laptop gets hot, battery drains faster
if an infostealer or remote access tool is installed
McAfee was also able to trace several Bitcoin wallets tied to the campaign. At the time of the report, those wallets held about $4,536 in Bitcoin, while total funds received were approximately $11,497.70. Researchers note the real total could be higher because some of the currencies involved are harder to trace.
Who Was Targeted Most
This campaign was observed most heavily in:
United States
United Kingdom
India
Brazil
France
Canada
Australia
That does not mean users elsewhere were unaffected. These were simply the countries where researchers saw the highest prevalence.
Figure 2: Geographical Prevalence
Red Flags To Watch For
Even though the campaign used advanced techniques, the warning signs for users were often familiar.
Red flag
Why it matters
You found the file through a random link
Unofficial forums, Discord links, and file-hosting pages are common malware delivery paths
The download is a ZIP for something sketchy or unofficial
Cheats, cracks, mod tools, and unofficial utilities carry higher risk
You get a “missing dependency” message
Attackers may use this to push a second download while the real infection happens in the background
The file name looks right, but the source feels wrong
Familiar names can be faked easily
Your PC suddenly slows down or overheats
Hidden cryptominers often abuse system resources
You notice new, unrelated software installed
The campaign sometimes used unwanted software installs as a distraction
How To Stay Safe From Malware Hidden in Fake Downloads
This campaign is a reminder that not every convincing file is a safe one. A few habits can reduce your risk significantly.
Safety step
Why it helps
Download software only from official sources
This lowers the chance of accidentally installing a trojanized file
Avoid cheats, cracks, and unofficial mods
These categories are common bait for malware campaigns
Be skeptical of dependency prompts
Unexpected requests to install helper files or missing components can be part of the attack
Keep your security software updated
Current protection can help detect known threats and suspicious behavior
Pay attention to system performance
A suddenly hot, loud, or slow PC may be a sign something is running in the background
Review what you download before opening it
Even a familiar file name does not guarantee a file is legitimate
McAfee helps protect against malware threats like these with multiple layers of security, including malware detection and safer browsing protections designed to help stop risky downloads before they can do damage.
What To Do If You Think You Opened One of These Files
If you think you downloaded and ran a suspicious file like one described in this campaign:
Action
Why it matters
Disconnect from the internet
This can help interrupt communication with attacker-controlled servers
Run a full security scan
A trusted scan can help identify malicious files and behavior
Delete suspicious downloads
Remove the file and avoid reopening it
Check for unfamiliar software or startup items
The infection may have installed additional components
Change important passwords from a clean device
This is especially important if data-stealing malware may have been involved
Monitor accounts for unusual activity
Keep an eye on email, banking, and other sensitive accounts
If your computer continues acting strangely after a scan, it may be worth getting professional help.
What This Means for the Future of Malware
This campaign highlights how cybercrime is evolving.
The core risk is not just fake downloads. It is the fact that attackers are using AI tools to help generate code, create variations, and speed up parts of the malware development process.
That can make campaigns like this easier to scale and harder to ignore.
For everyday users, the takeaway is simple: if a file seems unofficial, rushed, or too good to be true, pause before opening it. A fake download may look like a shortcut, but it can quietly turn your device into a target.
Frequently Asked Questions
FAQs
Q: What is AI-written malware?
A: AI-written malware generally refers to malicious code, or parts of a malware campaign, that appear to have been created with help from AI coding tools or large language models.
Q: Did AI create this entire malware campaign?
A: McAfee Labs did not say that. The research suggests that certain components, especially some scripts, were likely generated with help from large language models.
Q: What was this malware disguised as?
A: The malicious files impersonated game mods, AI tools, drivers, trading utilities, VPNs, emulators, and other software downloads.
Q: What can happen if you open one of these fake files?
A: Depending on the sample, the malware may install coin miners, steal data, establish persistence, or download additional malicious tools.
Q: Can malware really use my computer to mine cryptocurrency?
A: Yes. McAfee observed samples in this campaign that used victims’ CPU and GPU resources to mine cryptocurrency in the background.
Q: What is the safest way to avoid this kind of malware?
A: Download software only from official or trusted sources, avoid unofficial tools and cheats, be cautious of fake dependency prompts, and keep your security protection up to date.
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