A blue-team writeup on detecting a compromised MikroTik from its own config. Seven techniques, each with the collection command, the artifact it leaves behind, and a triage step. Feedback welcome.

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OpenBao engineers at ControlPlane have chained 4 vulnerabilities to show how under certain conditions, an OpenBao or Vault server can be completely compromised from an unauthenticated position. This is only the second RCE ever found in the Vault codebase.

The exploit is highly plausible in real-world environments, requiring only an unauthenticated entry path and a defined Raft snapshot policy to trigger a complete server compromise.

If you are impacted, upgrade as soon as possible to OpenBao 2.6.3 or 2.7.0

While OpenBao is fully patched, HashiCorp Vault remains exposed as of writing. Unfortunately, IBM's unwillingness to coordinate a mutual disclosure policy means Vault users currently lack an official mitigation

This is an article about the internals of Win32k (Windows's GUI subsystem) and their callouts, with the purpose of shedding light on a very undocumented and crucial subsystem in Windows :)

I work at Glow, and our Glow Labs research team just published this.

Developers asked their coding agents to share screenshots of their work for code review. Some agents decided on their own to create a brand-new public repo, usually under the developer's personal account, and put the screenshots there.

The team found 13k+ images across 300+ organizations, including a frontier AI lab and a Fortune 500 travel company. They show billing records, a financial firm's treasury console, and features weeks or months from release.

Since these repos weren't in the companies' own GitHub orgs, security teams never saw them.

Affected orgs have been notified. The writeup covers why the agents did this and where to look: https://glow.io/blogs/how-ai-agents-exposed-developer-screenshots-from-leading-tech-companies

Proton Mail confirmed and paid for an email-spoofing bug, then left it unfixed for 16 months