Proton Mail confirmed and paid for an email-spoofing bug, then left it unfixed for 16 months

Unlike traditional approaches, console named-pipe injection does not use VirtualAllocEx and WriteProcessMemory. Instead, it takes advantage of read and write operations through a named pipe, along with the way console programs store interactive commands in memory.

GET-only egress to full code execution: chaining a URL mirror and a screenshot service

A technical audit evaluating the security defaults of 15 official Helm charts used for AI serving, vector databases, and Model Context Protocol (MCP) agents (including KubeRay, vLLM, LiteLLM, Qdrant, Weaviate, and Flux159 MCP).

Key findings from static manifest analysis and live single-pod lateral movement probes on a test cluster:

• Plaintext Secret Handling: LiteLLM database migration Job embeds raw database passwords in container environment variables (F-13).
• Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution: KubeRay defaults accept unauthenticated job submissions via HTTP, running commands inside a container with passwordless sudo access.
• Over-privileged Agent Access: Flux159 Kubernetes MCP server mounts a ClusterRole with cluster-wide Secret read and pod exec permissions, exposed without an authentication token over HTTP.
• Static Scanners vs CRDs: Standard static analysis tools (Checkov, Trivy, Kubescape) failed to inspect pods nested inside Custom Resource Definitions like Ray clusters.

The paper documents reproducible test commands, network capture logs, and remediation Helm snippets. Scrubbed raw probe logs and results tables are available on GitHub: https://github.com/Sorami-Consulting-AU/ai-kubernetes-helm-chart-security

We scanned 7,040 randomly sampled U.S. local-business directory listings and graded the response headers against a published rubric. Of the 4,688 live sites, 49.7% met none of seven header criteria, and 8 sites (0.17%) passed a strict header-only script-CSP rule. Rubric, parser rules, code and de-identified data are all on the page.

A short write-up of some research I did recently.

(1) An exposed IOCTL lets unprivileged users disable the x86 MONITOR & MWAIT instructions used by Hyper-V and other kernel components--triggering a HYPERVISOR_ERROR bugcheck.

(2) Reaching the IOCTL requires exploiting a TOCTOU bug arguably caused by poor documentation of the SeLocateProcessImageName function.

(3) Reimplementation of the driver's security through obscurity IOCTL encryption scheme: SHA-256 KDF-derived XOR keystream & CRC16 Checksum.

See full write-up, and Github for PoC.