Acronis Threat Research Unit (TRU) has identified an ongoing campaign delivering a previously undocumented custom backdoor against Afghan telecom providers and South Asian critical infrastructure organizations. The backdoor, tracked as PATCHCORD, is a compiled C/C++ implant delivered through sector-specific lures, including fake VPN installers impersonating Afghan Telecom (AFTEL) and telecom management tools.

The research is published here - https://www.acronis.com/en/tru/posts/patchcord-new-malware-cluster-targets-afghan-telecom-and-south-asian-critical-infrastructure/

Twistlock founders Ben Bernstein, Dima Stopel and John Morello are shutting down their newest startup Minimus. They raised 51 million in seed funding from YL Ventures and Mayfield and had around 60 employees a few months ago. The pitch was stripped down container images that cut out most CVEs before they ever shipped but commercial traction never caught up to the technical story. Customers get a 60 day window before the registry goes fully offline on October 22 and remaining cash is going back to investors. Founder pedigree and funding clearly do not guarantee product market fit. Anyone else surprised this one did not make it?

The Hunt.io research team found an open directory staging the full toolkit behind an intrusion into a Philippine nuclear research agency and a naval contractor. The ownCloud path is the interesting part technically.

CVE-2023-49105 lets you forge pre-signed WebDAV URLs when the signing secret is empty, which is the default state on a fresh install. Five custom Python scripts on the server implement this: the signing routine passes an empty bytes literal as the PBKDF2 salt, sets OC-Credential to the account being impersonated, and issues GET requests against /remote.php/dav/files/<account>/<path>, receiving files as that user with no credentials. Four scripts target one account each, the fifth adds PROPFIND enumeration with Depth: 1 to walk folders that were not pre-enumerated.

The naval contractor was hit separately via CVE-2024-28000 (LiteSpeed Cache) using a custom Go reimplementation of MT19937 with PHP mt_rand() parity, verified against 11 known seed/output pairs, plus an XML-RPC brute force with rockyou.txt. Both produced unauthorized access independently.

We also found a separate, possibly unrelated EtherHiding compromise on the same WordPress site. A HuntSQL query on the smart contract address returned 174 unique IPs hosting likely compromised pages with the same NoChain loader strings.

Full writeup with IOCs, the signing routine, and MITRE mapping: https://hunt.io/blog/chinese-speaking-operator-philippine-nuclear-naval-contractor

So happy to finally release AWSHound with Daniel Heinsen. Its been a labor of love for the last 6 months and I can't wait to hear how the community uses it!

If you haven't heard AWSHound is a free, self-hosted tool that turns AWS accounts and Organizations into real attack path graphs using BloodHound CE. It evaluates IAM policies, boundaries, SCPs, RCPs, and resource policies offline. Showing you what an attacker can actually compromise in your AWS organization.

As per WABT's SECURITY.txt, #2831 issue exists

For context:

WABT is a Binary Toolkit for WebAssembly developed by WebAssembly.org (W3C)

wasm2c is a tool inside of it, which is used by many projects like FireFox (via RLBox) to compile wasm down to a sandboxed c library, the assumption is the built C code preserves all WebAssembly's sandbox security features.

This PoC demonstrates escaping that sandbox.