Chalk up a new record for vulns. The number of Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) found and disclosed so far in 2026 surpassed 100,000 on Friday - more than double 2025’s total - and the reason can be summed up in two letters: AI. “It’s kind of wild,” Josh Bressers, VulnCheck’s director of coordinated vulnerability disclosure, told The Register. “The thing that almost scares the bejesus out of me is while 100K sounds like a lot, in a couple years we're going to say, remember when it was only 100K?” As of the time of our interview, about 4 pm UTC on Friday, VulnCheck counted 100,222 CVEs, he said. Microsoft alone added 1,094 security flaws to the total count on Tuesday, following 1,474 vulnerabilities the month before. “There's no denying the fact that vulnerability hunting with AI is driving a majority of what we're seeing.” All the major CVE Numbering Authorities (CNAs) - these are the organizations authorized by the CVE program to assign unique identifiers to security vulnerabilities - like VulnCheck, Microsoft, Oracle, GitHub, and other large enterprise IT vendors “are just screaming into the atmosphere right now,” Bressers said. “It’s AI.” Meanwhile, the percentage of these bugs that are exploited in the wild remains relatively consistent. About 1.4 percent (1,363) of the CVEs published this year have been added to VulnCheck’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog. “But obviously, as the number of CVEs grows, [1 percent] of 1,000 is a lot different than [1 percent] of 100,000,” Bressers said. Plus, as other security researchers have documented, the window between the public release of a security patch and attackers developing working exploits – often by reverse engineering the patch while end users are still applying the fix – is rapidly shrinking. This is also thanks to AI. From CVE to KEV From January to June, 88 percent of the exploitation observed by CrowdStrike using public proof-of-concept (PoC) code occurred within 48 hours of the code's release. The security firm said China-linked groups such as Vault Panda and Genesis Panda moved even faster, launching attacks within 24 hours of disclosure. Similarly, VulnCheck found the median time from CVE publication to exploitation falling from 120 days in 2025 to 80 days during the first half of 2026. This window has closed even further during the second half of the year, which also seems to coincide with the AI-induced vulnpocalypse. “It’s often just hours,” Bressers said, noting 14 make-me-root vulnerabilities that VulnCheck disclosed on Friday in Copeland refrigeration controllers. Two are under active exploitation. These are the devices that Iranian hackers abused to spoil food and spark fires in supermarkets across Europe. “We published those CVEs, and literally minutes later, we were seeing hits on our honey pots,” Bressers said about the Copeland device vulnerabilities. “We’ve hit a point where with anything that looks interesting, someone is taking that information and seeing what they can do with it. Is it AI driven? Probably. It'd be hard to say it's not, because we've seen it really ramp up recently.” This influx of software bugs requires a sea change in how the entire industry approaches vulnerability disclosure and patching. “We don't have a security problem anymore,” Bressers said. “We have a data problem now. Instead of obsessing over vulnerabilities, we need to start looking at things like heat maps for infrastructure, and figure out the vulnerabilities that actually affect you. The CISA BOD helps with that.” What to prioritize in a patchpocalypse The US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) in June issued a cybersecurity directive that replaces flat-deadline vulnerability management policies. Instead of prioritizing patching based solely on CVSS severity scores, the directive instructs organizations to prioritize based on specific risk criteria, including whether the asset is internet-exposed, under active exploitation, and whether an attacker can automate the exploit. “It's telling people to figure out the vulnerabilities that actually affect you, and then put those at the top of the list, instead of just saying we're going to fix all the criticals,” Bressers said. AI-generated vulnerability disclosures also create huge headaches for open source software developers and maintainers, which Bressers describes as a security problem “super close to my heart.” “You've got individual developers that are drowning in vulnerability reports,” he said. “You have foundations being crushed by AI agents scraping their data or downloading their packages, millions of times a day, and it's straining the seams absolutely everywhere you look. The one thing I can say with certainty is: The way we currently do things has to change, and it's going to have to change fairly soon.” Different open source projects have taken different approaches to solving this issue. The Eclipse Foundation, which houses the Open VSX Registry, in April launched a “managed tier” for enterprise customers and other organizations running Open VSX at scale. Instead of using the free, open source version, the managed version guarantees a 99.95 percent uptime SLA backed by service credits. Its customers include AWS, IBM, Google, Cursor, and Windsurf. This paid option means commercial users who rely on the registry help fund its ongoing maintenance - and their own platforms’ security and performance. Meanwhile, curl’s maintainer, Daniel Stenberg, citing an “avalanche of vulnerability reports," updated its bug reporting rules last month. As of October 26, all low- and medium-severity reports go directly into the public GitHub repository, with only the high- and critical-flaws receiving private handling. Stenberg already shuttered curl's bug bounty program this year as AI-generated submissions piled work onto its security team. “A lot more needs to happen, and I think it is going to be a challenge to enact some of this change,” Bressers said. “When a package registry drastically changes something, people start freaking out, and the world is going to end, and people on LinkedIn are complaining - a lot of people are hesitant. No one wants to be the first to jump into the alligator-filled pool. That's one of our challenges.”®
Quantum Systems says its drones are flying again with Germany's military after a cyberattack prompted a precautionary grounding. The company says it spotted the attack at the end of October and reported it to the relevant authorities, but disclosed few details about the intrusion. "The threat was contained thanks to the swift response of our IT and security teams in close and transparent collaboration with the authorities," it said on Thursday. "Through the quick measures taken and the characteristics of the incident, there is no risk in operating Quantum Systems' unmanned systems for the end users and the operators." It added that other players in the European defense industry, and those who support Ukraine's military efforts, have faced "persistent cyberattacks for years." The Bundeswehr grounded its Quantum Systems drones after malware was detected in an update to QBase, the company's QBase ground-control software, Der Spiegel reported, citing unnamed sources. QBase lets operators plan missions, monitor flights, and process data from the ground. The malicious update reportedly reached servers belonging to the German military and other customers, but did not directly infect the drones. "The fleet is operating normally around the globe – including Germany and the Bundeswehr," Quantum Systems told Reuters. "The Bundeswehr was the only customer to ground their systems as a precaution." A spokesperson for Germany's defense ministry declined to comment on the attack or the reported details. The Register asked Quantum Systems for further details. Founded in 2015, Quantum Systems has been providing drones to the Ukrainian war effort for years. Last month, Chancellor Friedrich Merz announced funding for "several tens of thousands" of the company's interceptor drones as part of Germany's winter aid package. The new drones will be built in Ukraine and support interceptor systems already in use on the front lines. Quantum Systems announced a $1.2 billion Series D funding round in July, valuing the company at around $8 billion. ®
Britain's privacy watchdog has put healthcare bosses on notice after receiving more than 300 reports of staff snooping through medical records this year, demanding that executives personally confirm they're doing enough to keep prying eyes out of patient files. The Information Commissioner's Office (ICO) said on Thursday that it had written to more than 200 senior health leaders across the UK, warning that employees accessing records without good reason put patient privacy and public trust at risk. The ICO received and assessed more than 300 reports of medical record snooping between January and mid-October 2026. Staff were caught looking up people they knew, poking around patient files out of sheer curiosity, and sharing private information with people who had no business seeing it. The figure covers reports submitted by healthcare organizations rather than confirmed breaches, and excludes cases still awaiting assessment. ICO chief executive Paul Arnold wants health bosses to personally assure him that their organizations have safeguards in place to stop staff having a nose through records they aren't supposed to see. "Accessing someone's health records without a legitimate reason isn't harmless curiosity. It can cause enormous distress to patients and jeopardize the vital trust people place in our health service," Arnold said. In a three-page letter to chief executives, Arnold makes clear that simply trusting staff to behave themselves won't cut it. He wants to know who can access patient records, whether anyone is checking what they're looking at, and what happens when somebody gets caught snooping. Health bosses are also expected to investigate suspected breaches without dragging their feet, work out whether patients need to be told, and take action against staff caught accessing records they shouldn't. Executives have until November 27 to respond. Those who haven't reviewed their safeguards in the past six months, or aren't happy with what they find, have been given another three months to put their house in order. The problem isn't necessarily that healthcare workers are hacking into systems, as many already have legitimate access to patient records as part of their jobs. The trouble starts when they use that access to look up someone they're not treating, whether it's a neighbor, an ex-partner, or somebody whose name has appeared in the news. This isn't the first time health authorities have tried to stamp out the problem. In July, NHS England warned employees that accessing records without a legitimate reason could cost them their jobs or even land them in prison. That crackdown followed incidents involving staff accessing the medical records of victims of high-profile crimes, including the Nottingham attacks. NHS England also published guidance encouraging organizations to use access controls and audit systems to catch employees poking around where they shouldn't. Some newer electronic patient record systems can even flag suspicious access in real time, although the NHS acknowledged that monitoring capabilities vary depending on the technology organizations have installed. The scale of the problem has been troubling regulators for years. In July, the UK government told Parliament that 1,445 cases of inappropriate access had been reported to the ICO between 2019 and 2025. And the consequences can go beyond getting the sack. The ICO has prosecuted 16 healthcare workers for snooping through patient records over the past decade, with unauthorized access to personal information potentially amounting to a criminal offense under the Data Protection Act 2018. Arnold warned that the regulator could also take enforcement action against healthcare organizations whose protections aren't up to scratch. "I've written to chief executives across the UK asking them to personally assure me that their safeguards work in practice. Where they don't, we expect organizations to put that right," he said. With hundreds of reports already landing on the watchdog's desk this year, healthcare bosses now have a fortnight to explain how they're keeping staff out of records they have no business reading. ®
UK police forces must do more to prevent the wrongful arrests of people subjected to retrospective facial recognition (RFR) searches, according to a Criminal Justice Inspectorate that holds deep concerns about the way in which the technology is used. According to a report from His Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services (HMICFRS), there is a large gap in understanding among police forces and the National Crime Agency about how RFR should be used in responsible policing. The inspectorate blamed "fragmented and underdeveloped" frameworks for governance and legislation. It pointed to a lack of bespoke legislation to provide a uniform approach to police facial recognition use – and said existing laws have not kept pace with the technology. HMICFRS also said the rules governing each force's use of RFR are mismatched, and called for a statutory code to be included in the forthcoming Police Reform Bill to set nationwide standards. Illustrating the breadth of misunderstanding across forces, the report noted that despite the message being routinely communicated by National Police Chiefs' Council (NPCC) reps, individual investigators "often" thought RFR results constituted evidence rather than intelligence. In many cases, they are unaware that RFR results require further enquiries before enforcement action can be taken. "We found that some investigators didn't always carry out enough corroborative enquiries before acting on potential matches," the report stated. "In a small number of cases, officers relied too heavily on RFR results, which led to inappropriate investigative action. "Although some forces had strengthened their processes after such incidents, practice remained inconsistent." Later in the report, the inspectorate described the findings as "deeply concerning." Some of the excuses police staff offered included acute demands on response teams leading to reduced opportunities to carry out further enquiries before acting on RFR matches. In one force, managers were known to encourage officers to "progress investigations quickly" after getting a match on the RFR system. However, the inspectorate clarified that just because an arrest is made, it does not necessarily mean it is wrongful, as investigators may need to rule out subjects from their inquiries. The onus for taking action should also be placed on the police forces themselves, given that some lack formal procedures regarding how RFR enquiries should be carried out, the report noted. The best forces had centralized facial recognition teams, which generally provided better governance and consistent processes. Officials fear long-term misuse of RFR, and other forms of facial recognition, will erode public trust in the technology, which it insists remains generally high. Surveys carried out in 2025 by the likes of the Ada Lovelace Institute and Alan Turing Institute, as well as the King's College London Policy Institute, showed a generally favorable view of facial recognition use in UK policing, with support ranging from 91 percent and 53 percent respectively. Home Office figures released on Thursday to complement the report show similar positivity toward the technology among police officers, with only 4 percent reporting a negative experience. The Register's comments section often paints a vastly different picture of public perception of facial recognition. Kathryn Stone, his majesty's inspector at HMICFRS, said facial recognition has transformed policing, allowing officers to compare images in seconds, allowing them to solve crimes more quickly, but echoed the report's main concerns. "Police forces must be able to show that appropriate safeguards are in place, risks relating to bias and data retention are effectively managed, and decisions are still subject to human judgment," she said. "A clearer statutory framework, stronger national standards and improved governance and oversight arrangements are essential to maintaining public confidence." As well as legislative and governance-related concerns, HMICFRS also noted in its report that officers' training around the use of RFR remains inconsistent, and if improvements were made, this would lead to more effective and lawful use of RFR across the UK. Another major issue was police forces' failure to meet their image retention obligations. Forces were found too often to retain custody images taken of suspects on the Police National Database, against which many RFR queries are made. Police guidance sets out the scenarios in which custody images can and cannot be retained, and the inspectorate found that forces have failed to delete images that should have been wiped. The Police Reform Bill includes a provision to group custody images with the likes of DNA and fingerprints, bringing about more robust measures to ensure they are retained or deleted in line with legal requirements. A Home Office review previously found in 2017 that introducing such a statutory framework was untenable. It concluded that police could not automate the deletion of these images, and doing so manually would be too time-consuming. Jasleen Chaggar, senior legal and policy officer at Big Brother Watch, said UK police cannot be allowed to continue to use RFR when it risks wrongfully arresting individuals. "The revelations that officers are treating facial recognition as bona fide evidence rather than a probability score is alarming," she said. "This approach significantly increases the risk that more innocent people will have officers knock on their door to arrest them for crimes committed in towns they've never visited, as we've seen before. "Worse still, police aren't even logging their use of retrospective facial recognition, meaning people could wrongfully become suspects in criminal investigations without any record of why they've been accused." Chaggar called on the government to "urgently step in" and help the UK's police forces to sort out the new frameworks needed for effective RFR use. ®
The next version of the C++ programming language may be delayed at the last minute due to a dispute over a security-enhancing Contracts feature. Contracts have deeply split C++ technical maintainers. One group backs the C++ creator Bjarne Stroustrup, who is against the technology in its present form in grounds it was hastily implemented. But others are eager to see Contracts implemented, even arguing the tech's detractors are poisoning the C++ development process itself. The disagreement boiled over just before a vote to ratify the new version of the language. In October, the Draft International Standard (DIS) of C++26 failed its ISO ballot — the next-to-last stage in the International Organization for Standardization’s approval process during which a standard's technical details are formally ratified by a set of national standards bodies. The ballot saw 13 votes cast in favor, 9 against, and 12 abstentions, failing to meet the ISO requirement of having no more than 25 percent negative votes. Contracts was the major sticking point for those voting nay. Contracts dispute Contracts allow developers to add preconditions and postconditions to code, as well as assertions that check whether specified conditions hold. Such checks can help catch programming errors that might otherwise lead to undefined behavior. Design by Contract has long been a feature of languages like Ada and Eiffel. Developers have proposed adding Contracts to C++ for at least a decade, after when they were abruptly yanked from C++20 owing to concerns over dangerous defaults. But Stroustrup roasted the revised proposal (P2900) that made it into C++26. “The P2900 contracts and extensions aim to change the nature of C++ and are an existential threat to C++, adding complexity and bloat,” Stroustrup and his colleagues wrote in a paper last August. They noted that the implementation is messy, outdated, not sufficiently tested, and could be more effectively implemented as a library. Not everyone agrees. Andreas Fertig, a member of the C++ standardization committee, feels that the criticisms have already been vetted and that vetoing the proposal this late in the C++ release process is damaging to C++ itself. “The topic has been worked on for years and has received a majority vote multiple times in its current form. By voting ‘no,’ an established system, one based primarily on trust and respectful collaboration, has been shaken,” Fertig wrote in a blog post. The elephant in the room is, of course, the ongoing criticism of how easy it is for developers to accidentally create security holes in C++, leading more than a few projects to adopt Rust. Adding controls might, as Stroustrup notes, hamper C++’s chief attribute of being a blazing-fast language. Sore losers Fertig accused Stroustrup and Co. of being sore losers. “Every ISO standard is simply a set of compromises. Everyone loses sometimes, and everyone wins sometimes,” he wrote. But in this case, “the losing parties refused to accept their loss. The question that primarily determines how to move forward is whether the group can rebuild trust." Unlike Fertig, Harry Bott, CEO of the C++ Alliance – which maintains the open source EDG C++ compiler front end – does not see the Contracts discussion as disruptive to C++ itself. “The draft being sent back isn’t a failure of the process—it’s the process working as intended,” he wrote to The Register by email. “That doesn’t mean the process can’t improve. The goal should be to learn from this and strengthen the process so C++ can continue to evolve in a way developers can rely on.” Where to now? With the ballot failing at this late point of the standardization process – a rarity in C++ history – the language risks missing its expected shipping date of this year. That outcome may force everyone to refer to the new version as “C++27” rather than C++26. (That’s only the informal name; the official name of this eighth version of the language, should it be released next year, would be “ISO/IEC 14882:2027.”) ISO C++ working group WG21 is meeting next week in Búzios, Brazil, for the confronto final. According to a blog post from Thibault Ricord-Marchal, a software engineering consultant at the Paris-based Margo consultancy, the group faces a number of choices. They can carve Contracts out of the spec so the rest of C++26 can ship. That will be messy work, though. The undo button has to be smashed on a lot of library hardening already done using Contracts. Another option is moving Contracts into a separate technical specification, where work can continue to refine the technology. Or they could do a minor revision, vote again and hope the balmy Brazilian weather chills everyone out.®
OpenAI has launched two new security products, one for penetration testing and another for defense, and warned organizations that their businesses are only safe if they use tools like these. “We're now at a point where companies will be secure only to the extent of the frontier model that they use to defend themselves and how well they utilize that,” OpenAI President Greg Brockman said during a Thursday keynote address. The co-founder of the company that broke security did admit that security “fundamentals are important, and not to be discounted.” However, “you need to really reorient your security practice around what these models can do,” Brockman said, with zero irony, and presumably talking about using AI models for defense - not for hacking other organizations. “Also very important is product.” This product, of course, should come from OpenAI, and, to that end, the company rolled out Daybreak Red Team and Daybreak Defense Factory, which are both part of OpenAI’s Daybreak security platform. Red Team, which is available in early access, uses OpenAI models to test companies’ web applications for vulnerabilities. Nancy Wang, who leads cyber-applied AI, described it as “superhuman pen-test at the scale of automated continuous scanning,” with a fleet of agents using source code and app context to investigate and test attack paths. It also helps security teams validate reported vulnerabilities - from code scanners, bug bounty programs, and disclosure reports - and then test the patches for these flaws. The second product, Daybreak Defense Factory, automates the “defensive loop” by “finding, validating, and fixing vulnerabilities at scale.” This one also uses agents built on OpenAI’s latest cyber models - currently, that’s GPT-6 Cyber. The agents scan organizations’ codebases, hunting for vulnerabilities and developing patches. Engineers review and approve the proposed fixes before they go into production. “This way engineers get a merge-ready pull request with the patch and a test that shows that it works,” Wang said. Meanwhile, as OpenAI execs touted the new security products, a coalition of nonprofits filed a lawsuit in San Francisco Superior Court asking a judge to stop OpenAI, Anthropic, Google, Meta, and SpaceX's AI businesses from developing or deploying AI systems more capable than their most advanced existing models. The lawsuit, filed by Irreplaceable Education Fund, Public Citizen, Heat Initiative, and The Alliance for Secure AI, cites incidents involving OpenAI agents accessing Hugging Face, gaining unauthorized access to an Australian government portal containing Medicare statistics, and other AI-related cybersecurity incidents. “Defendants tell us that the AI technology they are developing poses catastrophic risks to the public, including by enabling AI-driven cyberattacks and bioweapons,” the court documents allege, adding that the AI companies “are not wrong.” ®
Lego-owned marketplace BrickLink has been offline for almost a week after identifying "unusual activity on the platform," leaving fans unable to buy and sell spare bricks and minifigures. The company initially described the outage as "necessary work" and said the site would return on November 9. That deadline has come and gone. Visiting BrickLink's domain automatically serves the platform's maintenance page, which was last updated on November 11. "We took BrickLink offline after identifying unusual activity on the platform," the website states. "Our immediate priority was to secure the site, protect our members and ensure the integrity of BrickLink. "Before bringing the site back online, we need to fully understand what has happened. That means containing the issue, investigating how it happened and checking for related issues. "This work is still ongoing and we appreciate your patience while we work to get things back online as soon as possible." The references to security, containment, and investigation suggest something beyond routine maintenance, although BrickLink has not confirmed whether it suffered a cyberattack. The Register asked Lego for more information, but it did not immediately respond. Some adult fans of Lego (AFOL) have criticized the lack of information since the outage began on Friday, November 6. "Imagine how much better this would have been received if they were transparent from day one instead of pretending they have control over something they clearly don't," said one disgruntled Legohead via Reddit. "They don't even need to say what went wrong," said another. "Just an email acknowledging the issue would be appropriate. The entire site is down, and has been for days. That warrants more than a splash page." BrickLink was launched by Dan Jezek in June 2000 as an independent marketplace for enthusiasts to buy and sell Lego sets and individual pieces, including discontinued parts and rare minifigures. The Lego Group acquired BrickLink and Sohobricks from investment outfit NXMH in 2019 for an undisclosed sum. NXMH had bought BrickLink in 2013 and also owned Sohobricks, a South Korean manufacturer of unofficial but Lego-compatible bricks. Lego shuttered Sohobricks in 2020. At the time of Lego's acquisition, BrickLink had more than 10,000 storefronts on its marketplace selling Lego sets, parts, and minifigures. The AFOL community was initially concerned about Big Brick's intention with the acquisition, fearing that it would lead to high prices closer to those on Lego's own Pick a Brick parts-ordering service. For now, buyers and sellers would probably settle for a marketplace that's actually online. ® Updated to add on November 13: Lego said on Friday that BrickLink is back online after acknowledging the "confusion and uncertainty" the downtime caused among Lego fans. A statement made via the BrickLink website confirmed that "some" usernames and IP addresses were accessed, as were "a very small number" of email addresses. "We have already emailed members whose BrickLink usernames or emails were accessed with further information," it said. "Based on our investigation, passwords and payment information were not accessed. You do not need to take any action at this time. We have addressed the issue identified through our investigation and will continue to monitor the platform closely." The site is back online, although its Studio Forum remains down, and the company said it will provide more information on this front "over the coming days." BrickLink will also waive sellers' fees for November and December as a token of appreciation for putting up with the downtime and disruption.
eMudhra's private key exposure has been a security disaster, but it also means that you can block those annoying ads on smart TVs if you’re so inclined. Luckily for those with some know-how and a hatred of smart TV ads, Czech software developer Daniel Vrátil has done the work for you and published his project on GitHub for anyone who wants to take a stab at it - and do the legwork to add support for their own ad-riddled television. Vrátil said he’d been blocking ads on his Samsung smart TV using a Pi-hole (DNS-based ad-blocking software that can run on a Raspberry Pi, for those unfamiliar), but right around the time the eMudhra certificate leak mess unfolded, he had messed something up while tinkering with his home lab and the ads were back. First, here's a bit of background on the eMudhra mess. The company, based in India, operated a publicly trusted HTTPS certificate authority and says it has issued more than 60 million digital certificates. As we learned last month, eMudhra wasn't doing its best to keep its cryptographic keys safe: Eight intermediate CA private keys were found to be absurdly weak, with one being the number four and the others consisting of two- or three-digit numbers that could be guessed with little effort. eMudhra has since left the CA racket, saying that it wasn’t a big deal to it since issuing certs was a small part of its business. The company has blamed a bad software script put in place to generate keys that its hardware couldn’t handle as the root of the issue. What all that means, in a practical sense, is that anyone could forge an eMudhra certificate to spoof a website and do something malicious. It also means that security researchers who were able to get their hands on devices that still trust eMudhra certificates could have a field day learning how their communications work, which is exactly what Vrátil took advantage of. eMudhra private keys were added to the open source mitmproxy service - a fully interactive HTTPS proxy that can be used for good or bad - shortly after they were exposed. Pair that with a 2022 Samsung smart TV that still trusts the compromised eMudhra certificates, and you have a way to inspect its HTTPS traffic and redirect selected requests to a server of your choosing. By Vrátil’s account, swapping out annoying ads for pictures of his family on his TV’s main screen was a pretty simple task. “Luckily for me, Samsung did not yet release an update for my TV that would revoke the certificate,” Vrátil explained in his writeup. “This allowed me to route all traffic from the TV through mitmproxy and get a list of all the domains and endpoints that my TV talks to, but also see the structure of the requests and response payloads.” The advertising traffic flow was pretty basic, it turns out: Activity on the TV is relayed to an ad server, which serves up ads on the home screen based on a JSON response. By generating a certificate for Samsung's advertising domains using a compromised eMudhra signing key, and configuring his router to direct requests for those domains to a server on his home network, Vrátil was able to replace ads with family photos served from his NAS. He also added code that tosses other requests to those advertising domains, including tracking data, into a black hole rather than forwarding them to Samsung's servers. As mentioned above, it’s on GitHub for those who want to trick their TV, if it still supports eMudhra certificates, but you’ll have to do the legwork to dissect how your device is getting ads and tweak the code to work. “It's not exactly a one-click setup,” Vrátil told The Register in an email. He’s invited people to try it out, but no one has bothered to submit a pull request to add support for their own device to his public repo. It’s also worth noting that this is only going to work as long as vulnerable devices keep trusting eMudhra certificates, which hopefully means you need to act fast. That said, smart TVs that are out of support may never receive such an update, leaving them exposed to the certificate weakness even if their owners block the ads. “The compromised eMudhra certificates open up a lot of opportunities for understanding and spoofing network requests from embedded devices, especially those that no longer receive security updates,” Vrátil told us. “And while replacing ads on a TV's home screen with pictures of my family is fun, there are also countless much more sinister applications of this vulnerability.” As for Vrátil, he’s still trying to figure out how to block the firmware update that may eventually render his method obsolete, even though that, as he points out, is a security risk in and of itself. “I want to run the traffic through a proxy that would validate the connection against an up-to-date trust store to at least mitigate anyone intercepting traffic from my TV, or spoofing responses, like I do with my little project here, but it won't protect me from other potential security risks, so there's a trade-off,” he explained. We suppose at this point you can take your pick of abuse. You can use a vulnerability to block ads and some tracking while leaving your TV exposed to potential interception, or let the manufacturer serve up ads and collect data about your viewing habits. There are safer ways to block ads than relying on a TV to keep trusting a compromised CA. ®
Microsoft has warned customers still clinging to Exchange Server 2016 and 2019 to consider the software "permanently vulnerable" as November's security fixes arrive for Subscription Edition (SE) alone. The warning appears in the release documentation for November's Exchange Server SE security update. Looking for Exchange 2016 and 2019 information? Tough. Microsoft stated: "Exchange Server 2016 and 2019 are no longer tested for vulnerabilities and there are no updates released. If you are using those versions of Exchange, you should consider them permanently vulnerable [Microsoft's emphasis] and should upgrade your organization immediately." You have been warned. Support for Exchange Server 2016 and 2019 ended on October 14, 2025, but the company announced an Extended Security Updates (ESU) program in July 2025. The plan was that this program would end on April 14, 2026, by which time customers would surely have made the jump to a later or online version, right? The company said: "This period will not be extended past April 2026 (you do not need to ask)." And... of course it was. As April 2026 rolled around, and it became clear that some customers were still stubbornly sticking with the old versions, Microsoft did the equivalent of heaving an exasperated sigh and offered another six months of paid security updates. Those final weeks also brought a separate treat: a Windows Server update breaking Exchange Server. This time it was serious. Microsoft released the final Exchange Server 2016 and 2019 security updates on October 13. No more patches, no more vulnerability testing, and apparently no more reprieves. According to Microsoft's Security Update Guide, the November update fixed nine vulnerabilities in Exchange Server SE, including a critical remote code execution flaw, CVE-2026-118207. Microsoft isn't testing earlier versions of Exchange for the vulnerabilities. ®
Hackers have used a dodgy third-party ScreenConnect extension to push malware onto at least 288 machines across 48 organizations, prompting ConnectWise to disable a handful of plugins in hundreds of customer environments. Security outfit Huntress first raised the alarm in a Reddit post on Wednesday, warning of an active campaign targeting cloud-hosted ScreenConnect instances. At the time, its security operations center was tracking six compromised managed service providers (MSPs) and more than 286 affected endpoints, with the numbers still climbing. ConnectWise acquired popular remote supporttool ScreenConnect in February, 2015. Huntress spotted the attacks at around 1747 UTC, when someone began using ScreenConnect's remote command feature to install rogue clients on machines managed by multiple IT service providers. All 288 endpoints were hit within 90 minutes, with roughly a third compromised in the first ten minutes. Huntress suspects more MSPs may have been compromised, as the attackers appeared to be numbering their victims sequentially, with the numbers suggesting earlier attacks that it hadn't detected. The attackers deployed a 16-file malware toolkit dubbed SCKit, which installs a separate ScreenConnect client to maintain remote access even if the legitimate connection is shut down. It also contains code designed to spread the infection to IT technicians and potentially other customers under their control. Huntress has since traced the activity to a possible authentication weakness in RMM+, a third-party extension that lets other management tools issue commands through ScreenConnect without technicians using its console. Versions 1.0.31 and 1.0.32 of the extension contain a flaw that means installations without a configured access key will accept a blank one. Because RMM+ operates independently of ScreenConnect's normal user accounts and authentication controls, an attacker could potentially execute commands without defeating MFA. Huntress said the findings matched what its investigators saw during the attacks, with commands reaching machines across several ScreenConnect installations despite no corresponding login activity. The researchers also confirmed that the attacks affected ScreenConnect versions 26.6.6.9747 and 26.7.6.9783, meaning administrators running the latest releases weren't necessarily safe. ConnectWise has acknowledged that third-party extensions may have been involved but has stopped short of confirming how the attackers initially gained access. In a security advisory, the company said it was investigating unauthorized access to certain partner environments and had identified approximately 400 installations containing at least one extension from the RMM+ family. It has disabled five extensions, including RMM+, RMM Plus, and Labtech Plus, wherever it can do so remotely, and urged customers running their own ScreenConnect servers to follow suit. ConnectWise stressed that the 400 environments were identified because they had the extensions installed, not because they were necessarily compromised. The company said: "At this time, we have found no evidence of a compromise of ConnectWise infrastructure or a vulnerability in ScreenConnect itself." There's another nasty trick buried in SCKit. According to Huntress, the malware is designed to turn an infected computer into a trap for the technician sent to investigate it. If the technician connects through ScreenConnect, the toolkit attempts to transfer malware back to their workstation, steal authentication cookies, and use their access to infect other machines. That could give attackers a route from one compromised customer into others managed by the same IT provider. However, Huntress says it has yet to see that part of the attack succeed. "We have not observed that method to spread work successfully. The console-takeover attempt failed in every recovered host log we have checked so far," the researchers wrote. Huntress also suspects that some of the malware's C# code was generated using an LLM, pointing to unusually detailed comments explaining what the code is supposed to do. Apparently, even malware authors appreciate a little help with their homework. Both Huntress and ConnectWise are urging administrators not to investigate suspected infections by remotely connecting through ScreenConnect, since doing so could put the technician's own machine at risk. Administrators are being advised to use other security tools to investigate affected machines, look for rogue ScreenConnect clients, and check what commands have been run. Any malware left behind will also need to be removed before the machines are brought back online. Huntress warned on Reddit that some machines were becoming reinfected within minutes of being taken out of isolation because the malware had not been properly removed. Simply disabling the vulnerable extensions won't necessarily undo the damage, either. As ConnectWise warns, "Disabling extensions and resetting credentials alone may not remove unauthorized software, persistence mechanisms, or access already established on endpoints." And with the attackers already able to install their own remote access software, kicking them out could prove considerably harder than closing the door they came through. ®
European tech buyers are increasingly choosing cybersecurity vendors from their own continent in a bid to reduce their reliance on American technology. Digital sovereignty isn't only prompting enterprise customers to question their clouds of choice, it is also reshaping other parts of the industry too, and the shift is marked. According to sales figures compiled by Context, distributor sales in EMEA of cybersecurity products from EU-headquartered vendors jumped 35 percent in the two years to calendar Q3 2026. Total cybersecurity sales grew up 10 percent over the same period, and sales by US-run companies went up just 8 percent. That growth is from a relatively small base, though EU vendors gained nearly three percentage points to reach 15 percent of tracked sales by value. There is still a long way to go as US-headquartered vendors accounted for 62 percent. The trend coincides with a loss of trust in the Trump administration among customers outside of America, after it cosied up to autocratic rulers while criticizing and punishing allies with tariffs and more. Context stopped short of assigning blame. It said organizations are reviewing their reliance on third-party tech in light of EU compliance regimes: the NIS2 Directive and Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA). NIS2, transposed into national law in October 2024, requires organizations in the bloc to raise their common level of security in the face of digital threats and risks to critical infrastructure. DORA, introduced in January last year, is designed to strengthen cyber security in the financial sector. "Digital sovereignty is becoming a buying decision. As customers and resellers get clearer about what it means in practice, they're asking who holds the encryption keys, who can access sensitive logs and where that data is stored," said Context veep of research Joe Turner. "We're seeing a measurable shift in the EMEA channel. EU vendors gained nearly three points of sales share in two years. An organization can keep its existing identity platform and still choose a European supplier to manage its security logs. That's the kind of decision that gives European vendors an opening." The stats indicate that EU-HQd vendors comprised 92 percent of tracked sales in security awareness training, 82 percent in vulnerability management, and 52 percent for SIEM and log management. US-headquartered companies held into 74 percent of identity and access management sales and 54 percent of cloud security sales. The Reg has asked Context for UK-specific figures to see whether British customers are also voting with their wallets for European alternatives. That certainly isn’t the case for tech purchases in the British public sector, despite Prime Minister Andy Burnham’s professed desire to buy British. Data released yesterday by the Institute for Public Policy Research showed just £1 in every £6 spent by government with the biggest technology suppliers goes to Brit businesses. Still, Burnham only came to power in July so there is time yet for him to put his money where his mouth is. Sovereign AI is another area of concern for enterprise customers. Analyst Omdia said last month that despite the marketing adjective meaning "local assets," almost a third AI providers disclose no proof of sovereignty, and some "expect enterprise to pay for audits to verify their claims." Omdia also found that 80 percent of contracts say network resilience is "out of providers control or responsibility," and "US-headquartered AI providers offer better service transparency and contract terms than a majority of local sovereign AI providers, with providers in India a notable exception." Sovereign services in Omdia's classification include data residency, operational autonomy, jurisdictional sovereignty, and technological autonomy. "Local hosting is not sovereignty. Serious providers must demonstrate their credibility through transparent operations, fair contracts and proof of competence. That includes the network, because data in transit must be sovereign too," said Camille Mendler, research director for telco B2B at Omdia. Someone should tell Microsoft and Anthropic. ®
Welcome, once again, to PWNED, where all the victims are self-owned. This week, we welcome you to a London hotel where you could check out its admin credentials for a booking website just by walking past the front desk. Our story comes courtesy of Neycho Tepavicharov, co-founder of Flashcloud, a Delaware-based web hosting company. He was staying at a hotel in London when he noticed a shocking breach of basic security protocols by management, who were a little too hospitable with their credentials. As he was passing through the lobby, Tepavicharov noticed that the door behind the front desk was open and, inside that back room, there was a whiteboard. On the whiteboard, written in plain English, were the hotel’s Booking.com administrative username and password. Anyone near the desk could clearly see the login information, and if they didn’t have time to write it down, they could have snapped a picture for later use. As Tepavicharov explains, there’s plenty of mischief you could perform with these credentials. “With that login, someone could change or cancel reservations, see guests’ names and contact details, or message guests pretending to be the hotel,” he said. “Fake 'please confirm your payment' messages sent from compromised hotel accounts are a well-known scam.” An attacker could potentially exploit that access to disrupt hotel operations or target guests with convincing scams. Whether the exposed credentials alone would have been enough to access the account would depend on its security settings. Tepavicharov decided to play the role of good samaritan and warn the hotel’s manager that the business was endangering itself by showing everyone its password. “I asked to speak with the manager and showed him what I’d seen. He was mortified and very grateful,” Tepavicharov said. “Nobody on staff had thought of it as a risk. It was just the easiest way for the whole team to share one login.” After Tepavicharov talked to the manager, not only did the hotel change its ways, but it also moved its website to his hosting service, Flashcloud. Tepavicharov notes that there are plenty of takeaways from this incident. Most important: give each user dedicated credentials with their own separate login, and use multi-factor authentication. “The lesson is an old one, but it keeps happening,” he said. “Shared logins end up written somewhere convenient. Give each staff member their own login, turn on two-factor authentication, and keep passwords in a password manager, not on the wall.” ®
Former certification authority eMudhra has claimed a buggy Python script is the main reason it issued laughably insecure digital certificates. The company posted its account of the matter on Bugzilla where a user with the handle “Naveen Kumar ML” wrote “During a single key‑generation ceremony on 30 April 2025, sixteen subordinate (issuing) CA key pairs in eMudhra’s ‘B’ and ‘C’ series were generated correctly on a hardware security module and then processed through an approved wrap/unwrap round‑trip using a custom python key‑handling script.” eMudhra aimed to create eight ECDSA P-384 private keys which should have been 48 bytes long. But the script contained what Kumar described as “a bug/defect in the import code [which] resulted in a read‑back from the unwrapped object that truncated the private value, so the certified public keys correspond to private scalars below the expected range and are recoverable from public information.” The truncation is the key problem here, because it appears that eMudhra ignored 47 of the 48 bytes, producing its infamously insecure single-byte keys such as the number four. Whatever the nature of the bug, Kumar asserts it was “a custom script run only on an isolated ceremony host and was not a function of the emCA software.” eMudhra needed that script because “global supply chain constraints” meant it couldn’t acquire the hardware security modules (HSMs), devices that generate and store cryptographic keys, that it wanted to use when creating a set of certificates for use in the USA. It therefore used HSMs made by a company called Utimaco to generate keys and planned to transfer the keys it produced to a different set of HSMs from a company called Crypto4A. Kumar explained that eMudhra decided on that move, which is unusual, because changes to policy about provenance of certificates meant it had to generate new certs by the end of May. The plan went sour when the company didn’t notice the errors in its script and didn’t test the keys it created. The rest is history: a Mozilla team member noticed that the company’s keys were woefully weak and pointed out that attackers could therefore issue fraudulent certificates that allowed them to impersonate servers, observe traffic, or even modify data in transit. Browser-makers quickly tweaked their software so it would not recognize certs from eMudhra. The Indian business then quit the SSL/TLS certification business, which it said was never a major source of revenue but had suddenly become a severe source of embarrassment. Kumar’s new post lists three steps eMudhra will take to wind up its certification business, one of which will see the company “Put in place improvements motivated by findings of [an] independent review to strengthen our general PKI operations.” Sounds like a plan. ®
Shipping behemoth A.P. Moller-Maersk says it is investigating "an IT security incident" involving the potential theft of data from a legacy system. In a statement issued on Wednesday, the Denmark-based shipping, cargo, and logistics giant confirmed it immediately launched an investigation into the attack and the affected system was secured. "Our findings so far strongly suggest no sensitive data has been disclosed," the company said. "The incident is isolated to a local system, and we have found no indication that there has been any impact on other Maersk systems or customer and partner systems that connect to Maersk through integrations such as APIs and EDI." Maersk described the legacy local system as one "from a previous acquisition," and said it does not expect the attack to have an effect on operations. Customers were reassured that they can continue to use Maersk platforms to manage their shipments as usual, and to expect updates from the company as and when they're available. "Cybersecurity remains a constant, ongoing priority for Maersk," it added. "We have rigorous processes in place to identify and prevent incidents and minimize customer impact. "As always, please treat any unexpected communications claiming to relate to this matter with caution and verify them through your usual Maersk contact. "Thank you for your patience as we continue to investigate the incident." Fortunately for those who immediately feel uneasy after hearing "Maersk" and "IT security" mentioned in the same breath, the wording of the shipping giant's disclosure suggests this intrusion won't be as calamitous as the NotPetya disaster in 2017. Mimicking the Petya ransomware strain, NotPetya was an infamous destructive wiper malware strain that wormed its way across the global economy. Western intelligence agencies attributed the malware to Russia's Sandworm group, an outfit believed to be part of the country's military intelligence service (GRU). Maersk said at the time that it expected the attack to result in a circa $300 million bill, owing to remediation and rebuild costs. Offering a sense of scale, Jim Hagemann Snabe, then chair of Maersk, told World Economic Forum delegates in 2018 that the company's rebuild encompassed 4,000 new servers, 45,000 new PCs, and 2,500 applications – which he said had been completed over just ten days. In 2020, as exclusively revealed by The Register, Maersk went on to lay off around 150 staffers from its command and control center in Maidenhead, England. The staffers who lost their jobs had played key roles in the recovery. ®
In 2019, OpenAI decided not to publicly release a new model because its research uncovered “concerns about malicious applications of the technology.” And on Tuesday, the company announced it has built a kill switch for the models deployed in its research labs, months after some of them displayed disturbing behavior. “As our models get more powerful and the associated safety and security risks become bigger, it becomes more and more critical that we can detect potential issues, and quickly stop models in their tracks when needed,” OpenAI explains in a Tuesday post. The company named the kill switch “Control Room” and described it as “a central system to track model workloads across our research infrastructure and stop them quickly when safety or security concerns arise.” The facility can apparently stop models from producing any output 35 seconds after a decision to pull the plug – and can go faster. “The 35-second lag comes from a caching layer for inference authorization, to support the required volume of traffic. We are working to drive this number down to zero so that we can end jobs instantly,” the company promises. A rookie mistake in critical infrastructure design is to build both production and resilience tools on shared resources that could be taken offline by a single incident. OpenAI seems conscious of that risk, because it says the tool “has been built to keep working even when other systems fail, and to stop model output if Control Room itself goes down.” OpenAI hasn’t explained why it took so long to build a kill switch or why it decided now is the moment when it needs one. The Register fancies recent examples of agents exceeding their brief in worrying ways – like attacking Hugging Face, causing trouble at the Wikimedia Foundation, or going a little too deep when researching Australian healthcare data – may have influenced the timing of this development. “Control Room is already deployed across our research infrastructure, where the need is greatest,” the company’s announcement states. “Our external model-serving stack is already much more centralized by nature, with a well-developed operational capability to quickly take down model deployments if needed.” OpenAI says it plans to “strengthen and expand the system over the coming months, alongside our investments in monitoring for misaligned behavior and security breaches.” That’s a variant of Big Tech’s usual “We’re sorry and we promise to do better in future” proclamation that follows the latest SNAFU. Yet back in 2019, OpenAI pulled the pin before matters ever reached that state. ®
It’s another doozy of a Patch Tuesday, with Microsoft fixing 1,094 bugs in its products, including one that attackers exploited before Redmond released a patch. Jake Knott, head of threat intelligence at exposure management firm watchTowr, succinctly said in an email to The Register: “Maybe we should just go home.” “Most security teams haven’t quite recovered from the last month of bumper-to-bumper critical vulnerabilities, emergency patches, and ‘2shell’-branded everything, and we’re yet again at another Patch Tuesday,” Knott told us. Starting with the zero-day: It’s an Outlook spoofing vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2026-124194, and it only garnered a 6.5 out of 10 CVSS rating. But as Dustin Childs, head of threat awareness at TrendAI’s Zero Day Initiative, warns, don’t let the score or the name lull you into thinking it’s OK to put off patching this one. “It’s labeled spoofing, but the impact is bigger than the name suggests,” Childs said in his monthly Patch Tuesday review. “An attacker sends a specially crafted message file and convinces a user to open it,” he wrote. “Outlook then connects to an attacker-controlled network location without showing the usual external-content warning, which discloses the user’s NTLMv2 hash. The attacker can use that hash to authenticate as the user.” Microsoft marked CVE-2026-124194 as exploited, but per usual didn’t say when the attacks started, who is battering this bug, and what they are doing with the access post exploitation. These details will likely start trickling out soon. Plus, now that there’s a public fix, other miscreants are undoubtedly already scanning for vulnerable versions and reverse engineering the patch for their own attack purposes. So prioritize this fix, and keep an eye on your inbox for any suspicious files. Back-to-back months of 1K+ CVEs Despite the second month of more than 1,000 CVEs (October had 1,474), CVE-2026-124194 is the only one under active exploitation, and none of the 1,094 are listed as publicly known. Childs says this shouldn’t give organizations “false comfort.” “Logging back-to-back months above 1,000 CVEs proves automated bug-hunting has permanently reset patch volume,” he told The Register. “With AI making patch-diffing and exploit generation near-instant, the threat window opens the minute these updates drop.” For defenders, this means two things, Childs added. “What defenders need to know and do right now is abandon broad triage and take immediate defensive action: patch Exchange and Domain Controllers (LDAP/Kerberos) first to stop zero-click compromise, ring-fence exposed network services like DNS and DHCP to prevent wormable spread, and verify manual administrative fixes on your cloud services,” he said. Zero-click threats There are two zero-click threats in this month’s batch of fixes: CVE-2026-116928 and CVE-2026-119958. Both are critical, carrying 9.8 CVSS ratings, in part because they don’t require any user interaction to exploit. CVE-2026-116928 is an out-of-bounds write in Microsoft Windows Search Component that could lead to remote code execution. An unauthenticated attacker could abuse this search feature in Exchange “by sending an email containing a specially crafted attachment,” Redmond warned. “Exchange automatically processes the attachment for indexing, so the recipient does not need to open the email or attachment. Successful exploitation could allow the attacker to execute code with the permissions of the affected processing service.” CVE-2026-119958 is an out-of-bounds write vulnerability in Windows' implementation of the Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) that could allow unauthenticated attackers to execute code remotely without user interaction. This one can be exploited by sending specially crafted LDAP requests to vulnerable systems, potentially compromising domain controllers. Childs also counts 30 CVEs that pose a “wormable risk,” requiring zero authentication and zero user interaction over a network. All of those are listed in his blog, so prioritize fixing those as well. And…Xbox remote code execution And finally, for funsies, a critical flaw in the Windows Xbox Live Networking Service, CVE-2026-112967, that could allow remote code execution also made this month's roundup. It's a heap-overflow vulnerability with a 9.8 CVSS rating that doesn't require authentication or user interaction to exploit. So don't take a gaming break between testing November's updates. Or, if you do, at least make sure vulnerable Windows systems running the Xbox Live Networking Service are on your patching list, too. ®
If you didn't have any privacy concerns about slapping a Ring doorbell on your front door or putting Ring cameras inside, you'll love Amazon's newest offerings, which move around homes and businesses to capture views stationary cameras might miss. The house of Bezos announced the launch of Ring Robotics on Tuesday along with its first two products: a drone designed for indoor home security, and a wheeled robot with a telescoping camera mast for automated after-hours business patrols. Both are designed to proactively patrol spaces as well as respond to alerts from connected alarm systems and Ring-connected devices. According to Ring founder Jamie Siminoff, this is something customers actually want, as those stationary cameras just can’t quite see everywhere. “It’s not just a new category of security; it’s the beginning of a future where proactive, autonomous protection is something every home and every business can have,” Siminoff said. The consumer-focused Ring Drone Cam launches from its own charging dock that Amazon says keeps the thing “out of sight” when not in use, and when in flight is able to patrol a home by flying around pre-programmed routes to take in the sights with its 148-degree FOV, 2K camera that includes LED illumination for night patrols. Amazon says it can also respond to alerts from cameras, sensors, and alarm systems. The Ring Rover Cam, designed with businesses in mind, is sort of like a security Roomba that sports a camera on a telescoping mast that Amazon says can be programmed to certain heights to let it see over counters, shelves, and other workplace obstacles. The Rover can also perform 360-degree scans and includes a siren, lights, and two-way audio so you can yell at intruders who aren't dissuaded by its presence. The Rover streams and records video in up to 4K while moving or patrolling and is designed to make regular patrols of businesses during off hours. It can also detect people and respond to alerts from connected Ring devices. Of course, given that this is Ring we're talking about, these flying and free-wheeling cameras use Amazon's cloud for some processing, likely inviting privacy concerns about what footage and mapping data the company can access and retain. The Amazon-owned security tech firm has faced a number of privacy complaints over the years, some of which have resulted in multimillion-dollar settlements. Ring agreed to pay $5.8 million in a 2023 settlement with the FTC over allegations that employees and contractors improperly accessed customers' private videos and that the company failed to adequately protect accounts against unauthorized access – just imagine the privacy concerns raised by flying robots. More recently, the company took heat for partnering with surveillance outfit Flock Safety, a relationship which it has since canceled. Amazon/Ring also invited criticism for a Super Bowl ad earlier this year promoting a new feature called Search Party, which would remotely activate Ring cameras to search for lost pets, suggesting that Amazon had the ability, in theory, to use Ring cameras like a dystopian neighborhood surveillance network. Another Ring feature, Familiar Faces, which uses AI-powered facial recognition to identify people captured by compatible cameras, prompted a proposed class-action lawsuit filed in June. The complaint alleges that the feature collected biometric information from visitors and passersby without their consent. If we can’t have iRobot, we’ll do it with Ring Amazon abandoned its efforts to buy Roomba robot-vacuum maker iRobot in 2024, blaming regulatory scrutiny for the move. The FTC, under then-chair Lina Khan, examined the deal's potential effects on competition and consumer privacy, including concerns about the information Roombas collect while mapping customers' homes. European regulators, meanwhile, raised concerns that Amazon could use its marketplace to disadvantage rival robot vacuum makers. With this Ring move, Amazon is once again putting robots capable of mapping interior spaces into customers' hands, reviving some of the privacy questions raised during its failed iRobot acquisition. As Amazon explains in Tuesday’s press release, both new Ring robots are powered by AI Pilot, “a custom-built system that uses the devices’ cameras, specialized vision models, on-device sensors, and cloud processing to see, think, and navigate autonomously.” To help the Ring robots understand where they're operating, the devices generate floor plans of interior spaces, according to Amazon. “Carry Ring Drone through your space or let Ring Rover autonomously explore, and it turns what it sees into a floor plan,” the company explains of the setup process. AI Pilot takes the reins in identifying the types of rooms it sees and suggests key patrol areas it should focus on, which users can add to in the Ring app. Amazon claims that videos captured by these new flying and free-wheeling cameras will be protected by an encryption scheme it calls Throw Away the Key Encryption (TAKE). The system temporarily allows Ring's cloud services to access recordings for enabled features before the relevant encryption keys are deleted. Ring announced the scheme in August, presenting it as a way to limit access to customer recordings without sacrificing cloud-powered features. “With TAKE, your Ring videos are protected with unique, rotating encryption keys,” Amazon explained. “A copy of the keys is temporarily held inside a secure enclave within the cloud; think of it as a sealed vault that can only provide Ring access to the key under strict, limited conditions.” The keys, Amazon claims, are later deleted so that only users and those they allow access to can see videos, with Ring only retaining them “to power the intelligent features that you have active on your account.” “We take privacy concerns seriously, and we believe privacy and customer control are fundamental to building products people trust,” a Ring spokesperson told The Register when asked about prior privacy concerns. “That is why customers decide where these devices go and when.” We asked about floor plan security, but didn’t get an answer about that. As for when those devices will be available, the Rover Cam will start shipping on December 16 at a price of about $1,000, but the Drone Cam might not ever actually make it to homes. Amazon’s announcement mentions a release date of January 27, 2027, but that’s subject to the FCC giving its blessing. “Ring Drone Cam has not been authorized as required by the rules of the FCC,” Amazon’s release states. “This device is not, and may not be, offered for sale or lease, or sold or leased, until authorization is obtained.” Amazon told us that the Drone Cam would still start shipping in January, luckily giving everyone a few months to figure out how to deal with this new, more mobile, invasion of privacy. ®
Security company Barracuda warns that attackers are exploiting a pre-authentication authorization bypass bug and a command-injection vulnerability in its popular Email Security Gateway (ESG) products that, when chained, could allow the crims to run commands with root privileges. “We have identified exploitation activity affecting a small number of organizations,” the security vendor said in a late Monday night update to its earlier security advisory. Barracuda declined to answer The Register’s questions, including one about how many organizations have been hit by attackers. A company spokesperson told us that it “worked directly” with the affected businesses “to quickly address the issue. Barracuda acted promptly to remediate the vulnerabilities, releasing patches for affected products.” The vendor disclosed and fixed the vulnerabilities, CVE-2026-116606 and CVE-2026-111560, last week. CVE-2026-116606 is a 9.3 CVSS-rated, pre-authentication authorization bypass flaw in ESG. While authentication is not required to exploit this vulnerability, the attacker must have access to the administrative user interface. As Purplecop Security founder Tausif Ahmed said on Tuesday: “If your Email Security Gateway's admin UI is open to the internet, that's the first thing I'd close today.” CVE-2026-111560 is an 8.6-rated command-injection flaw that affects multiple Barracuda products: its ESG, load balancer (ADC), message archiver (BMA), web application firewall (WAF), WAF control center (WCC), and web security gateway (WSG). “If exploited in combination, these vulnerabilities could allow an attacker to bypass authorization controls and obtain root access to the device,” Barracuda warned on November 2. At the time, the vendor did not report any active exploitation of either. We don’t yet know who is responsible for the attacks, or whether the intruders gained root access – but if they did, they could steal data, install backdoors, and take full control of affected systems. These types of edge-device exploits have been used by Chinese-government spies, and in 2023 the FBI blamed PRC-linked attackers for a series of attacks that targeted Barracuda ESGs to deploy custom malware and maintain access to high-value networks. According to Mandiant, 27 percent of identified affected organizations were government entities. So if you haven’t already: patch now. ®
President Donald Trump has nominated Palantir security chief Michael LoSapio to lead CISA, putting an executive from the controversial government supplier in line to run America's civilian cyber defense agency. The nomination, announced on Monday, could end CISA's nearly two-year wait for a Senate-confirmed director following Jen Easterly's departure in January 2025. LoSapio has served as Palantir's CISO since September 2024, having previously led the company's infrastructure and network security team. He first joined the data analytics outfit in 2013, later spent a spell at database company SingleStore, and returned to Palantir in 2017. If confirmed, LoSapio would move from securing Palantir's systems to leading the federal government's main civilian cyber defense agency. CISA protects federal civilian networks and works with critical infrastructure operators, including power, water, and telecommunications providers. It's a substantial job, particularly given the state of the agency he would inherit. CISA has shed more than 1,000 staff, roughly a third of its workforce, since Trump returned to the White House, according to reports. It's now trying to plug the gaps, although acting director Nick Andersen said in September that around 250 would-be recruits were still waiting for security clearance before they could get to work. Andersen has been running CISA since February. With fewer people to go around, CISA is also rethinking where to spend its time. A strategy published last month emphasizes infrastructure whose failure would do the most damage, raising questions about what gets less attention as the agency operates with fewer staff. LoSapio would be the second person Trump has put forward for the role. His previous pick, Sean Plankey, withdrew in April after spending more than a year awaiting confirmation, with his nomination becoming caught up in a dispute involving Republican Senator Rick Scott over Coast Guard contracting. The nomination arrives late in the congressional calendar. If the Senate does not confirm LoSapio before the current Congress ends, Trump would have to nominate him again for consideration by the incoming Democratic-controlled Senate. Palantir, co-founded by billionaire Peter Thiel, has become a major supplier of technology to US government agencies, including the Department of Homeland Security and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). Its work with immigration authorities has attracted criticism from civil liberties groups and Democratic lawmakers concerned about surveillance and the handling of sensitive personal information. The controversy isn't confined to the US either. In the UK, WhatsApp messages obtained by campaign group Foxglove this week indicate that Palantir privately lobbied a health minister to consider extending its software into GP patient records, despite that data being expressly excluded from its £330 million NHS England contract for the Federated Data Platform. That revelation follows news that NHS England wants greater oversight of Palantir's claims about the benefits of its software, amid questions over the evidence supporting its performance figures. Those controversies could make LoSapio's confirmation hearings particularly interesting, especially as Democrats prepare to scrutinize Palantir's government business more closely. It's unclear whether LoSapio plans to leave Palantir or what would happen to any financial interests he holds in the company if confirmed. Those are questions likely to come up during a confirmation process that CISA, having spent nearly two years without a permanent boss while losing a third of its workforce, could probably do without dragging on any longer. ®
Fireworks AI has disclosed another cyberattack in October and a wider customer data exposure involving billing records, datasets, and incomplete model weights. The company, which lets customers train and run AI models, said a third-party cloud provider hosting its research and development machines was compromised on October 23. Attackers used that access the following day to reach Fireworks development systems and run an unauthorized workload. Fireworks suspects links to financially motivated criminals involved in LLMJacking – selling unauthorized access to AI models through illicit gateways. Fireworks grouped the affected data into three categories: Resource metadata: Resource identifiers, display names, descriptions, creation times, and more Billing information: Billing and shipping addresses, invoice and payment histories, account balances, and credit usages. Payment card numbers are not saved and therefore unaffected Model weights and datasets: For certain customers, a subset of incomplete model weights and datasets were accessed, Fireworks said Lin Qiao, Fireworks co-founder and CEO, said the apparent motive was not stealing model weights in response to concerns raised by Cantina Security CEO Hari Mulackal. "From what we see attackers are not after weights," said Qiao. "Most downloads were partial and stopped." Render founder and CEO Anurag Goel shared a notification from Notion warning that some chats with its AI assistant may have been exposed through the Fireworks incident. "Following an investigation by the Notion security team, we have determined that your workspace, Render, was among the