Ukrainian ransomware crook Artem Stryzhak has been sentenced to 70 months in the slammer by a New York federal court for his role as an affiliate of the Nefilim and Hive ransomware gangs. Prosecutors believe the cybercriminal began working with Nefilim in or around June 2021, while living in Barcelona, Spain. The Nefilim ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) operation was known for targeting wealthy companies, with its operators encouraging affiliates to pursue businesses capable of paying substantial ransom demands. One of Nefilim's most high-profile attacks was on Australian logistics giant Toll Group in 2020, encrypting its files roughly three months after it suffered a separate Mailto ransomware attack. Court documents [PDF] state that Stryzhak agreed with alleged Nefilim boss Volodymyr Tymoshchuk, who remains at large, to pay the ransomware crew a 20 percent cut of the ransom proceeds he collected. Tymoshchuk told Stryzhak that his preference was for attacks to target companies based in the US, Canada, and Australia that turn over more than $100 million annually. This guidance was soon tweaked to encourage targeting companies in the same regions with more than $200 million in annual revenue. Prosecutors claim that around the time Stryzhak joined forces with Nefilim, he also signed up to the Hive ransomware operation as "one of its earliest affiliates," and used its platform to attack approximately seven victims. Hive's operators claimed they targeted circa 1,500 victims worldwide between June 2021 and January 2023. According to separate court documents [PDF], Hive's victims included a law firm and an Ohio hospital, which paid approximately $1.7 million in Bitcoin after the gang initially demanded $2 million during the COVID-19 pandemic. Before its infrastructure was seized in an international law enforcement operation in January 2023, Hive was known for attacking healthcare facilities during the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as being one of the ransomware groups that battered Costa Rica in 2022. Brett Leatherman, assistant director at the FBI’s cyber branch, described Stryzhak as a “prolific cybercriminal” who played a role in groups that were responsible for more than $100 million in victim damages. “Today’s sentence reflects the seriousness of Stryzhak’s crimes and demonstrates the FBI’s global reach and extensive network of international partners,” he said. “Multiple field offices contributed to this investigation, and our work does not end here. We will continue to leverage every tool at our disposal to track down Stryzhak’s co-conspirators and hold them accountable, including Volodymyr Viktorovych Tymoshchuk.” Stryzhak was arrested by Spanish police in June 2024 before being extradited to the US in April 2025. In announcing Stryzhak's sentencing, the Justice Department took the opportunity to remind the public that rewards totaling up to $11 million are available for qualifying information about alleged Nefilim operator Volodymyr Tymoshchuk and other key ransomware suspects. ®

Cisco has open sourced a behavior detection engine that watches AI agents, to help security teams prevent rogue agents from going off the rails like they did with the Hugging Face hack – or worse. It’s called Project Quarry, and it aims to provide a “shared language” for evaluating agent behavior, along the lines of what Snort, which Cisco also maintains, did for detecting malicious network traffic and what YARA did for rule-based malware identification. Most detection tools rely on specific interactions with an AI model or agent. Did it attempt prompt injection? Or did the agent call an attack tool? “But what is missing is the entire context under which something may occur,” Amy Chang, head of AI threat and security research at Cisco, said in an exclusive interview with The Register. She likened this to credit card fraud detection. Without context, individual transactions such as a small test charge or a single purchase in a location far away from a card-holder's usual location may not raise any flags. “And then you try again,” making another fraudulent purchase, “and that went through, too. So now I’m gonna buy the PS5,” Chang said. “Those are the things that Quarry addresses by taking into consideration the entire agent session,” she explained. “One tool call may seem in-scope until you realize that that next step is taking that information and sending it to an attacker-controlled inbox or server.” Even data theft is a sequence and not a single agentic action. Agentic AI security firm Invariant Labs demonstrated this with a proof-of-concept attack against GitHub's MCP server that hijacked a user's agent via a malicious GitHub Issue, and coerced it into leaking data from private repositories. Simply reading a configuration file, or sending a request to an external endpoint may be legitimate agentic actions. However, combining the two can lead to data exfiltration – and shows “why action relationships matter,” wrote Chang and fellow Cisco researchers Adam Swanda, Ravikumar Balakrishnan, and Konstantin Berlin in a blog post about Quarry shared with The Register ahead of publication “A policy can produce a finding when the trace shows a sensitive file read followed within a defined window by an external send,” they wrote. “The risk comes from the relationship between the two actions, so the finding should preserve evidence from both." Quarry covers single- and multi-turn large language model conversations, agents, tool use, Model Context Protocol (MCP) interactions, and multimodal inputs. In addition to the open source code itself, the project’s GitHub repository includes installation instructions, supported Python versions, plugins for Claude Code, Codex and other MCP-compatible agents, configuration examples, rule-writing guidance, and a rule starter pack. For instance, with the rule pack, “If a base-64 encoded malware is somewhere in the tool call, that would result in a block,” Chang said. The rule format looks similar to a YARA or Snort rule, with a header that details the traffic to examine, content to match, and metadata for tracking the rule. Here’s a Quarry rule that flags an agent that reads a credentials file: While the Cisco Ai researchers have not run Quarry against data describing the OpenAI-Hugging Face incident, they suggest that if the intrusion had been read as a complete, step-by-step record of a single session, there were several points where the AI agents’ steps would have given a Quarry rule something to act on and flag for humans. For example, Quarry would probably have flagged internet access from a sandbox. “The rule can flag specific tool calls that reach an external server asset that wasn’t in the task’s allow list,” Chang said. “Another one would be credentials found and used somewhere else.” According to OpenAI’s technical report about the Hugging Face intrusion, this is exactly what happened on July 10, when an agent validated 14 exposed Hugging Face tokens with write access and shared them. “The rule would flag that there was a credential in the tool result that then called an outside service, which is likely not within the parameters of what you would want to do in this case,” Chang said. “We don't want you to go and search for credentials that may have been leaked or inadvertently exposed and then utilize them to conduct a task.” The Cisco team is quick to say that rules along are not a substitute for chain-of-thought monitors, or other forms of human oversight – but they do help record a pattern that other teams can then “review, test, and apply to their own agents,” they wrote. Herein also lies the benefit of open source, and a collective approach to defending against adversarial use of AI, Chang said. “Do we have all the answers? No,” Chang said. “We all see slices of the problem, and it’s important for us to share what we see.”®

UK domain registrar 123 Reg (no relation – Ed) says it was the victim of an “AI-driven cyberattack” that exposed customer data. Customers began receiving their notification emails this week, informing them that their contact information, "related customer relationship data," company VAT numbers, and "product information from an application programming interface (API)" were compromised. A company spokesperson elaborated, saying this means that names, phone numbers, countries, language and currency preferences, account creation dates, the products on the account, and marketing preferences were affected. 123 Reg described the September 18 intrusion as "the first known AI-driven cyberattack against our company," and told The Register that early signs point toward a China-nexus attacker. "Our investigation identified IP addresses that we assessed to be the core attacker infrastructure, which were hosted in China and Singapore, indicating a strong Chinese nexus," the spokesperson said.  "Our investigation further identified AI cyberattack 'skills' hosted on Chinese infrastructure, including copies of skills open sourced by Anthropic and several other AI exploitation frameworks and scripts." They went on to say that many of the artefacts left behind led 123 Reg to suspect that a Chinese state-sponsored group, known for abusing Claude Code in attacks against at least 30 organizations, could be behind the break-in. There is also a suspicion that the same group that hit a number of South Korea’s financial institutions using open-source Chinese AI tool ARTEX, was behind the attack on 123 Reg too. "The TA's mirror of 'anthropic_skills,' and the account naming conventions found on the Chinese servers are consistent with preparation of this class of AI-augmented operation," the spokesperson told us.  "In addition, on October 7, 2026, CrowdStrike published CSA-261162, describing an unknown, likely Chinese-speaking actor that targeted several South Korean financial organizations starting in late September 2026, which is the same period during which we were attacked. "That actor used ARTEX, an open-source Chinese-developed agentic penetration-testing tool released in July 2026, which was also observed to be used in the attack that targeted us." The GoDaddy-owned registrar reported the attack to law enforcement agencies, brought in outside cybersecurity support, and notified the FTC, as well as the data protection authorities in the UK and EU. The company spokesperson added that it worked with Singapore-based ISPs to shut down the attacker's servers in the region, which helped disrupt the attack, in addition to "other actions by us and industry partners." 123 Reg's email to customers stated the attacker's activity "was limited to reading" customer data, although the spokesperson told us "it's possible they created copies of the information," and that this is what prompted the notification. The registrar urged customers to stay alert to the potential misuse of their data, and to treat communications appearing to come from the company with caution. "If you receive a message or call and aren't sure it's from 123 Reg, go directly to our website and log in," the email said. "We will never contact you to request your password, payment details, or verification codes by email, text, or phone. "We also strongly recommend turning on two-step verification (2SV), which helps keep your account protected even if someone tricks you into sharing your password. You can find instructions for setting up 2SV in your 123 Reg account. "We apologize for any inconvenience this may have caused." ®

An autonomous AI agent discovered four vulnerabilities in the decades-old, widely used EPICS (Experimental Physics and Industrial Control System) open source software toolkit, including a critical flaw that could allow remote attackers to execute code on systems used to control particle accelerators and fusion experiments. The bugs include a critical, 9.8-rated under CVSS v3.1 integer overflow vulnerability (CVE-2026-114595), leading to an attacker-controlled out-of-bounds heap write and potentially remote code execution; an 8.2-rated, high-severity, improper message-length validation flaw (CVE-2026-114596), causing an out-of-bounds memory write and controller-process crash; a 7.5-rated, high-severity insufficient bounds checking bug (CVE-2026-114597) that allows out-of-bounds memory reads and process crashes; and a 7.5-rated, high-severity type confusion flaw (CVE-2026-114598) that can lead to denial of service and could expose adjacent memory contents. All four affect EPICS Base, which is used to operate some of the world's largest scientific research projects and facilities, and organizations should update to version 7.0.11, which includes the fixes. “Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities could allow an attacker to cause a denial-of-service condition, corrupt memory, disclose sensitive information, or potentially execute arbitrary code,” the US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) warned in a Tuesday advisory. An AI agent called Cipher independently found all four previously unknown security holes - investigating and testing the unfamiliar EPICS system, and validating the four exploits - in three hours and 49 minutes, Causal Security co-founder Shubham Raj told The Register. “The initial investigation required no human intervention, followed by one instruction authorizing deeper exploitability testing in a secure environment,” Raj said. Earlier this year, Causal Security’s Cipher, which Raj described as “a fully autonomous super hacker that can reason across the technology stack,” found multiple critical attack paths in power-grid systems used across North America and Europe, prompting an October 8 security advisory from CISA. EPICS, originally developed by Los Alamos National Laboratory and Argonne National Laboratory, is used to build and remotely control distributed Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems, connecting operators to physical devices. It’s used in around 90 major scientific, university, and industrial projects and facilities globally including Argonne National Laboratory's Advanced Photon Source and ITER's fusion reactor control system. All four of these flaws illustrate how AI agents are really good at finding vulnerabilities in industrial and operational technologies - systems and equipment that used to be able to rely on obscurity to protect them from hackers - and add to defenders' concerns that it's only a matter of time until an autonomous cyberattack shuts down critical services, like power grids or water systems. These are the types of digital intrusions that can cause physical harm. Raj points to CVE-2026-114595, the critical integer-overflow vulnerability, as an example. “It allows attacker-controlled network data to cause an out-of-bounds heap memory write, with potential for remote code execution,” he told us. “EPICS controllers sit between operators and physical equipment, handling measurements, commands, and control functions,” he continued. “Operationally: Imagine a particle accelerator in the middle of an expensive experiment. An attacker could potentially crash a controller, interrupt critical measurements or control functions, and force operators to halt the experiment. That could mean lost experimental work, significant downtime, and expensive recovery.” Plus, if an attacker was able to develop an RCE exploit, this could allow them to “take control of the affected process, manipulate readings, interfere with control functions, or disrupt the equipment connected to it,” Raj said. The prerequisite for exploiting these vulns in a real scientific facility is being able to reach the vulnerable EPICS services on a facility's control network. But this could occur if the networks weren’t sufficiently segmented, or another system had access to the vulnerable EPICS network. “Once an attacker is able to find a network, which is either misconfigured or they are able to reach, it’s pretty easy to carry out the attacks,” Raj said, adding that exploitation wouldn’t require deep OT knowledge, or understanding of how particle accelerators or fusion reactors work. “Someone with conventional exploitation skills could investigate them, and increasingly capable AI systems could help develop exploits without requiring specialized OT expertise.” Manipulating specific physical processes does require additional knowledge, he added. “But an attacker doesn't need to understand the physics of a particle accelerator to disrupt the software controlling it. Crashing critical processes or interrupting monitoring and control can already have serious operational consequences. What's changing is that attackers may no longer need years of specialized expertise just to discover these weaknesses.” ®

The University of New Mexico is canceling classes across the medicine, nursing, and pharmacy faculties for a second day amid continued efforts to recover from a "cybersecurity event." The attack targeted the Health Sciences Center on Monday, the Uni revealed, forcing it to shut down systems, cancel appointments and clinics at UNM Health hospitals, and divert ambulances to healthcare facilities in nearby Albuquerque and Santa Fe. Hospital appointments and clinics return to normal today, although nonessential UNM Health Sciences Center staff are being asked to remain at home. "The University of New Mexico Health Sciences Center (HSC), which includes the UNM Health clinical delivery system, experienced a cybersecurity event Monday, Oct. 26, 2026," the university said in a statement on Monday evening. "HSC information technology security teams immediately took steps to contain the event and protect the network. They also notified state and federal law enforcement and engaged external partners to assist with the investigation. "Leadership activated an Emergency Operations Center to coordinate the response and provide guidance to HSC employees, students, and UNM Health system frontline providers." The university announced the attack at 1430 local time, immediately cancelling all remaining clinics and classes, dismissing everyone other than critical and clinical staff, and urging patients not to attend HSC facilities. It has not commented on the nature of the cyberattack, although that hasn’t stopped researchers from speculating about ransomware’s involvement. Rumors were fuelled by the newly assembled BYOD ransomware group claiming responsibility for the attack on Monday afternoon. It's important to note that just because a purported ransomware group took credit for the attack, it does not mean they actually were responsible, nor does it mean they deployed a ransomware/locker payload as part of the attack. However, the group's take on the digital raid is that it compromised 36,000 machines, "both [Active Directory] forests," two Oracle databases, the personal data belonging to every student and employee, as well as internal emails and data from other systems. As Reg readers know, a cybercriminal's word is never one to be trusted. Yet BYOD's claims about breaching Trump Mobile's customer database appear to have held up It was a bold debut, even for a ransomware crew: BYOD’s first named victim was the US president's smartphone biz, with data allegedly leaked for all 3,615 customers. A rival group, EndZone, claimed a similar breach a week earlier, and some experts suggested the two could be one and the same. In May, the Trump Mobile was found leaking thousands of people's data via a poorly secured website. The Trump Organization did not respond to our requests for more information in either of these cases. A UNM spokesperson declined to answer our additional questions, directing us back to its public statement. ®

The US government's cybersecurity watchdog has confirmed attackers are exploiting both critical PHP2Shell vulnerabilities, giving federal agencies three days to patch the bugs that have wreaked havoc across the web over the past week. CISA added CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619 to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog on Monday, setting an October 29 deadline for federal civilian agencies to address the flaws. The move marks a shift from last week, when the agency warned of the danger posed by PHP2Shell but said it had not yet observed successful exploitation in the wild. Both bugs are rated 9.2 on the CVSS scale and can be exploited without authentication to run code on vulnerable PHP servers. That's bad news given how much of the web still relies on PHP, and just how many sites could be left exposed. Patches landed on October 21, but attackers had already beaten the maintainers to it. AWS spotted attempts to exploit the flaws as early as October 17, four days before the bugs were publicly disclosed. CISA's confirmation comes amid growing evidence that attackers are doing more than simply knocking on the door. On October 24, Perplexity security researcher Adel Karimi recorded 35 successful shell executions across three honeypots running PHP 8.4.26 under Apache mod_php. The attacks came from two IP addresses and used memory exhaustion and disclosure to achieve remote code execution. The attackers then tried to contact external servers using PHP, curl, and wget, although no additional malware was successfully downloaded. Karimi's findings were consistent with exploitation of CVE-2026-109618, but he found no evidence that the second PHP2Shell flaw was involved. He also warned that the honeypots used a favorable single-worker configuration, so the results don't necessarily reflect how reliably the exploit works against production servers. Still, attackers appear to be giving it a good go. Delft University's Threat Intelligence Lab has tracked more than 50,000 PHP2Shell exploitation requests from over 600 IP addresses across 70 countries. Of those, 171 addresses went beyond probing for vulnerable servers and started sending exploit code or malware droppers. CISA's confirmation also comes after some of the earlier reports of successful PHP2Shell attacks turned out to be rather premature. Sophos walked back its initial assessment after determining that the activity it observed amounted to scanning and failed attempts, while Palo Alto Networks withdrew claims linking the vulnerabilities to an intrusion at a European government agency. CISA has not disclosed which organizations have been compromised or provided details of the attacks behind its decision to add the flaws to KEV. The listing confirms that the agency considers both vulnerabilities actively exploited, but it does not confirm how many production systems have been successfully breached. For federal agencies, the clock is now ticking. CISA is also urging organizations outside the federal government to prioritize the fixes, although the deadline does not apply to them. Admins should update to PHP 8.5.12, 8.4.27, 8.3.36, or 8.2.35, depending on their release branch. Those running older, unsupported versions face the added headache of upgrading or obtaining vendor-supported fixes, while systems that cannot be secured should be taken offline until the risk is addressed. And with CISA now officially acknowledging exploitation, anyone still waiting for more proof before patching may be waiting a little too long. ®

Microsoft has released another out-of-band update for Windows, but this one isn't an emergency fix for the latest breakages. This time, it's all about certificates. The non-security out-of-band release applies to supported OSes ranging from Windows 11 and Windows Server 2025, to Windows 10. It's all about updating the current certificate trust list (CTL) of devices that cannot access Microsoft's certificate-update service, or where automatic CTL updates are disabled. It also contains everything in the October 13 update, including the ongoing VPN issues and the change that could break on-premises Exchange Servers. There might also be oddities with Smart App Control, audio, and Remote Desktop connections for non-admin users, all of which are known issues in the October 13 update. These problems are not resolved in this patch, so be aware of this when installing it. It is also worth remembering that many devices will not need this version since the current certificate list updates usually come down through the update service. However, if that service isn't available or being used, it might be a good idea to get this out-of-band fix (while keeping the known issues in mind), since problems can occur when verifying certificates used by applications or websites. The OOB update came after Microsoft laid out its response to the compromised eMudhra certificate keys. The Indian certification authority's private keys were compromised earlier this month, requiring a massive cleanup effort. According to Microsoft, "they could potentially be used to create certificates or sign content that appeared to come from a trusted CA [certificate authority]." Like many other organizations, Microsoft moved swiftly to block the affected certificate authorities. It did so by updating its Windows Disallowed Certificate Trust List to block the affected certificates. There was also a separate CRLSet release for Edge and WebView2. According to the Windows behemoth, "On October 26, Microsoft released an out-of-band Windows update that removes seven certificates associated with the affected hierarchies: six eMudhra G3 roots and an AAA Certificate Services cross-sign, from the Windows trust list." Microsoft's out-of-band patches are usually released after the company breaks a product and needs to issue an emergency fix. This time, the revision is due to Somebody Else's Problem and a need to get a CTL update out to devices that are disconnected from CTL updates. ®

The cyberattack on Alternative for Germany (AfD), the country’s most prominent far-right political party, exposed hundreds of thousands of confidential emails and attachments, as well as more than 345,000 unique email addresses. Have I Been Pwned confirmed the scale of the breach for the first time today, after AfD officially disclosed the September attack on its hosting provider last week. AfD said in its statement that “only a few email accounts were illegally copied,” but admitted a large amount of the data was taken from them, resulting in an extensive data breach. The emails were added to what the party described as “an activist website,” which summarised the email chains into searchable topics and has led to the publication of various revelations, such as a party co-leader’s opinions on colleagues’ “deeply problematic” racial discourse. Per a report from investigative journalist Lilith Wittmann, citing conversations with the cybercriminals responsible for the hack-and-leak job and party sources, the attack was first spotted on September 9 and started with a compromise of a poorly protected WordPress site. The same report claimed the criminals gained persistent access to the servers operated by the hosting provider, identified as AfD-owned Alternita Dienstleistungs GmbH, and exfiltrated more than a terabyte of data. No official sources have verified the hackers’ claims about how the attack unfolded. The Register contacted Alternita Dienstleistungs for its take. AfD said the owners of the affected email accounts have been notified, and that it reported the attack to security authorities. “We are deeply concerned by what has happened,” the party said in an October 20 statement. “Such a digital attack is illegal and a criminal offense. Furthermore, it is an attack on the German party system and thus on democracy. “We are extremely worried that, apparently, the content of the stolen documents was analyzed using a very rudimentary AI. This analysis focused on keywords, not the context. The alleged scandals published so far do not stand up to scrutiny – a fact that, thankfully, is being confirmed by a growing number of commentators on social media.” Among the AI-generated summaries compiled by the “activist site” are chains supposedly expressing views related to Holocaust denial, racist and antisemitic rants, the 9/11 disaster, forged documents, and more. Der Spiegel sifted through the raw files and reported that party leader Alice Weidel seemingly knew about illegal donations related to the 2017 federal elections weeks before she previously said she did. The AfD's position is that the AI summaries of the emails are not to be trusted, but it has not specifically commented on the veracity of the raw email files available for download via torrent. It did not immediately respond to our request for input, but has told reporters previously that it will not comment on whether the emails, or the stories that have been written based on them, are to be trusted. ®

Japanese ISP GMO Internet has warned customers the cloudy desktop service it offers as an ideal foreign exchange trading environment was compromised by an attacker, and that it had been slow to improve the service's security. GMO runs a service called Onamae.com Desktop Cloud and last week admitted “a third party had installed malicious programs in the server environments of some customers.” That’s never welcome news but is an especially poor outcome because the servers host cloudy Windows desktops that GMO recommends customers use to host foreign exchange trading applications. In later updates the company revealed that some customers reported “unauthorized operations were performed on their trading accounts” and advised that third parties had probably seen users’ passwords for trading services. The next day, the company advised users to immediately change passwords for their trading accounts, and to do so using a device that they don’t use for trading. The company has since admitted that its Onamae.com Desktop Cloud service’s “systems had security vulnerabilities, that its environment was accessed without authorization, and that customer information was taken outside the Company.” “Some customers have also reported transactions in their trading accounts that they do not recognize.” Those transactions have GMO sufficiently worried that it contacted major trading services, asked them to forcibly terminate all active sessions, monitor for unauthorized transactions, and to block trade requests coming from the Onamae.com Desktop Cloud. Not paying, or complaining GMO said it has “received a demand for money from a person believed to be the attacker. We have also been told that, if we refuse, the attacker will take actions such as publishing information about the Company and our customers.” The attacker wants $50 million. The company won’t pay because it feels “complying would not guarantee that the obtained information is deleted or that its misuse is prevented.” Investigations into the incident continue, with GMO warning that 26,739 VDI servers may have been hit by the attack, and that users’ personal devices may be at risk. The company is offering all users a ¥5,000 ($32) condolence payment and promised to make good on any trading losses caused by the attack. This incident may have quite a blast radius, as GMO has warned that some trading apps may keep sessions alive even after passwords change. “Check your securities or FX company's guidance or your account page, and either disconnect all active sessions or ask the company's support desk to disconnect them,” GMO advised. That ¥5,000 isn’t going to get anywhere near paying for the work customers will do to sort this out. GMO CEO Masatoshi Kumagai acknowledged that in a blog post in which he described the payment as “a token of our initial sincerity towards our customers who have experienced inconvenience and worry.” “We will dedicate the full resources of our group to providing a free alternative environment for six months, fundamentally overhauling our system infrastructure, and conducting a thorough investigation into the cause and preventing recurrence with the help of external experts,” he added. But he also admitted that GMO knew the service’s security could be improved. “Our in-house white-hat hackers had previously pointed out areas for improvement to the team,” he wrote. “The team took these points to heart and was working on countermeasures.” “However, while we proceeded cautiously, considering the impact on service availability and prioritizing other issues, our response lacked sufficient depth and speed, allowing the attackers to exploit the vulnerability. I deeply regret that, despite having professionals on staff, we failed to fully translate their expertise into effective defenses as an organization.” The CEO also said GMO can’t secure itself without government help. “I've been involved in this world for 31 years, since the dawn of the internet industry,” he wrote. “The cyberspace that I built with my colleagues, believing it would bring smiles to people's faces, is now on the verge of being completely destroyed by malicious actors.” “The ease with which open weight AI models can be combined and spread into countless attack tools has transformed cyberattacks, which once required advanced skills, into an era where anyone can easily carry them out,” he added, before claiming that GMO Group’s cybersecurity operation “has confirmed that the source of an unauthorized access attack targeting approximately 20 Japanese companies was the misuse of ‘ARTEX,’ an autonomous AI penetration testing tool originally intended for defense.” Kumagai thinks public/private partnerships are needed to improve infosec across Japan. “Yesterday, we submitted a proposal to the government to ‘apply proactive cyber defense,’” he wrote. “We are by no means trying to shift the blame for our company's actions onto the government and beg for a bailout,” he wrote, but argued that unless Japan implements national-level defenses, more such incidents are unavoidable. ®

A new Miasma-family npm worm, originally believed to be just a test with no victims, secretly armed 42 real GitHub repositories from 11 owners, hijacking accounts as early as July and using a stealthy payload built to stay hidden from GitHub and automated scanners, according to JFrog researchers. Threat hunters at SafeDep, an open source supply chain security firm, first spotted the “testmetest” npm campaign last week, identifying 18 packages linked to the same operator between October 19 and October 25, including releases containing credential-stealing malware. As with earlier npm worms, the malware is self-replicating, steals credentials, and installs a wiper that deletes the home directory when the victim revokes the stolen GitHub token, the security researchers noted. The new npm worm shares code with June’s Miasma Phantom Gyp worm, and adds Mini Shai-Hulud’s token-revocation wiper. As of October 22, however, SafeDep had found no compromised third-party packages or victims. “All observed activity belongs to the operator’s own test accounts,” the team wrote. As with most happy-ending security stories, that proved too good to be true. In a Monday report, supply chain security company JFrog said its analysis proved otherwise, and found the testmetest campaign operator “had already armed real repositories belonging to established developers and organizations.” This isn’t just about timing, either, according to JFrog researchers Guy Korolevski and Yair Benamou. “The payload blobs were large enough to evade the GitHub search and API paths normally used to find this kind of compromise,” they wrote. How the attacks worked The attackers planted execution hooks for AI coding assistants and development tools, including Claude, Gemini, Cursor, and VS Code, alongside polymorphic wrappers measuring 12.9 to 13.7 MB that decode a hidden CI-publisher payload. Separately, the npm worm steals credentials, modifies repositories and CI configurations, and spreads through npm packages. The malware also uses a compiled native add-on to decrypt and launch a separate payload. Before executing, the loader checks for CI runners, containers, sandboxes, debuggers, and other signs of automated analysis, exiting silently when it detects them to reduce the likelihood of detection by security scanners. The researchers also found a second build that skips the encrypted file. “It forks, detaches and runs a hard-coded command that pulls a loader from a repository on the operator's own GitHub account,” they wrote. That account – CementBeetleSteeple – hosted 17 campaign repositories in total. JFrog connected this account to a shellpanel scanner, previously documented by Socket in a large-scale campaign that abused GitHub Actions in compromised repositories to exploit CVE-2026-41940 and steal server credentials. CVE-2026-41940 is an authentication bypass affecting cPanel and WHM. CISA added it to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog in April, and cPanel has since published patched versions. “C2 infrastructure were previously reported by Socket; our findings connect them to the testmetest GitHub victim cluster through artifacts and workflows on the same hijacked owners,” the JFrog researchers wrote. They added that while they found 42 armed GitHub repositories and attempted internet-wide exploitation, they did not confirm any downstream cPanel compromises.®

Open-weight models from China have become very popular, but they've also raised some security suspicions. Cohere, a Canada-based biz that offers AI models to enterprises, says that when it was testing Alibaba's Qwen3.8-Flash-Next in its evaluation sandbox, the model attempted to send data to China. "Asked to write a defensive detection rule, Qwen3.8-Flash-Next ignored instructions and inventoried the machine it was running on and then tried to upload a probe file to an Alibaba Cloud storage bucket in Beijing," the biz said in a blog post on Monday. Cohere was running the model through CTI-REALM, Microsoft's security analyst benchmark, and gave Qwen the task of writing a detection rule to look for malicious file downloading and execution by watching for invocations of curl processing bash scripts to the /tmp directory that were accompanied by bash execution. The model's "reasoning" output invented a prior conversation and asserted that no tools were used, output that a guardrail system reading chain-of-thought would accept. Nonetheless, the model issued a curl command to an Alibaba Cloud (aliyuncs.com) server. "The model listed everything in /tmp, checked which transfer tools were installed, read the machine's DNS settings, then tried to upload a test string to an Alibaba Cloud storage bucket in Beijing and checked whether it worked," Cohere said. "Our sandbox had no route out, so the request died at the container wall." The Cohere team wonders aloud whether that behavior was intended, but has no answer. "The first issue is that it made a network call at all," Ivan Zhang, co-founder of Cohere, told The Register via email. "The model was asked to write a detection rule, which doesn't require external communication, and its reasoning trace said it wouldn't use tools. The destination raises additional questions because the attempted upload was to an Alibaba Cloud storage endpoint that wasn't part of the task. We don't know why it appeared, and we don't know the root cause." Alibaba, the maker of the model, did not respond to a request to address Cohere's concerns. Asked whether Cohere ran similar tests against US-made open-weight models, Zhang said, "We evaluate a broad range of models using the same framework our customers use in production: agents with access to real tools operating inside controlled environments. "The key point isn't a comparison between providers. What made this noteworthy was that the model took actions unrelated to the task and those actions weren't reflected in its reasoning trace. The behavior appeared in fewer than one in 100,000 calls, which is exactly why large-scale testing and monitoring matter." There have been other unsubstantiated claims made about similar behavior from open-weight models, and such reports have suggested that "hallucination" - errors made by these models - may be the cause. Cohere has doubts that this behavior simply reflects memorized training data. "Every public sighting so far has involved fetching a file, while the one we caught was an attempted upload to a different bucket, this time in Beijing," the biz said. Cohere described efforts to reproduce the suspect behavior and found that using a technique called prefilling – feeding the model its own reasoning output alongside the opening characters of the bash command so the model would complete the command – they could get it to reference watchlisted hosts up to 23 percent of the time. This still doesn't clarify intent, and Cohere allows that there's a case to be made that the behavior is just bad training data sanitization – logs from development that got swept into the model's training data set. At the same time, the company argues that isolating a suspect model so it can't exfiltrate data doesn't entirely fix everything because these models can still write vulnerable code – accidentally or as a result of model poisoning. Cohere points to research from other organizations that suggests Chinese AI models can produce vulnerable code. The biz, for example, cites a report from Booz Allen (which does a lot of business with the US defense industry) that found "three of four Chinese coding models wrote more vulnerable code for a government customer, with Qwen3-Coder roughly 130 percent worse." "From the outside, it's very difficult to determine the root cause with confidence. We don't have evidence that would allow us to conclude this was deliberate, and we're not making that claim," said Zhang. "For security teams, though, intent doesn't fundamentally change the response. Whether it's a training artifact, a mistake, or something else, the controls are largely the same: restrict unnecessary egress, monitor tool use, and don't treat a reasoning trace as a security boundary. "We strongly support open-weight models and release many of our own. The lesson here is really about trust. Sovereign AI is about more than where a model runs. It's about understanding how it was built, how it was tested, and having confidence in how it behaves inside your environment." ®

LiteLLM has traced last week’s supply chain attack to a master key it accidentally committed to a public GitHub repository in May. The cloud and AI model secret-stealing part of the incident began when someone uploaded a poisoned version (1.107.0) of the popular open source AI gateway to PyPI and its container registries last Wednesday. This compromised version contained an infostealer and a remote access trojan capable of executing arbitrary code on infected machines. While the trojanized package was available on PyPI for less than two hours before being quarantined, it received about 49,000 downloads during that time, according to Wiz. On Friday, LiteLLM detailed the attack chain behind the compromised release and traced it back to May 27, when a configuration file containing a master key was committed to the public LiteLLM-Labs/lite-harness repository. The key belonged to an open source tool used internally by LiteLLM to orchestrate AI agents. The project's developers quickly spotted the error and removed the exposed commit, but failed to revoke the master key. “On October 10th, the threat actor used this key to gain access to our LiteLLM Agent Platform and extracted this GitHub CLI OAuth token,” according to Friday’s postmortem. “From this point onwards, the threat actor had owner-level access to all repositories in our GitHub.” This is especially serious because GitHub CLI tokens are “post-2fa,” meaning that they don’t trigger GitHub's sudo mode authentication flows typically required to perform high-impact repository actions. The token allowed the attacker to author malicious commits into branches on other internal repos - including workflows designed to steal any tokens and secrets configured to be available during the continuous integration development process. And this allowed them to steal other GitHub CLI OAuth tokens linked to two engineers with maintainer privileges. Plus, they acquired tokens for several other internal systems, we’re told. “Reviewing the actor's activity on these other systems shows attempts to identify and exfiltrate additional keys and tokens, with a primary focus on upstream inference API tokens,” LiteLLM noted. Having now stolen several privileged identities, the miscreant could make changes to GitHub repositories without raising any suspicion because the actions and approvals all appeared to come from legitimate, credentialed engineers. In response, LiteLLM’s developers are revoking every token associated with every internal system and vendor platform. “This incident has provided a strong illustration of the risks associated with failing to rotate a potentially exposed key,” they wrote. The infostealers hidden inside the compromised package were designed to hoover up a ton of sensitive information, including browser credentials and cookies from Chrome, Firefox, Edge, and Safari, along with AWS credentials, Google Cloud Platform service account keys and application default credentials, and Microsoft Azure tokens. It also swiped API keys for OpenAI, Anthropic, Cohere, and other LLM providers. So if you installed and ran version 1.107.0, assume any credentials accessible to the affected system may have been stolen. Investigate affected systems, change passwords, and rotate exposed keys. A quick prayer to the patron saint of supply chains wouldn't hurt, either. ®

To address a vulnerability in Google's Brotli compression technology that could allow attackers to corrupt process memory, Microsoft is urging .NET users to update "as soon as possible" after releasing an out-of-band (OOB) security update. It released new versions for .NET 8, 9, 10, and .NET 11 to patch against the Brotli bug, following similar updates from Node.js, Python, and other projects. Senior program manager Rahul Bhandari said in the October 25 release that the buffer overflow vulnerability in Brotli, tracked as CVE-2026-111497 and rated 8.1 under CVSS v3.1 in Microsoft's advisory, could allow an unauthenticated attacker to read or corrupt process memory, potentially resulting in information disclosure, denial of service, or elevation of privilege. Microsoft’s own advisory for the vulnerability, which some are referring to as Broccoli2Shell or Node2Shell, confirms that while experts have cobbled working exploits together, there is nothing to suggest that criminals are using them in successful attacks. However, its exploitability assessment reads: “Exploitation More Likely.” Broccoli2Shell was first disclosed on October 21 by the Node.js team, which released fixes for ten vulnerabilities, the most serious of which was CVE-2026-111497. Node.js credited Khai Tran and Sylvie Mayer of OpenAI’s Codex Security with the discovery, but failed to mention why it was only recognized as a security flaw and disclosed properly in October, despite the underlying bug having been fixed in Brotli's source code in February. OpenAI filled in the gap with a Xeet: “This root cause issue was actually fixed in the Brotli source code in February, but it wasn’t known at the time that it gave rise to a security vulnerability, and there was no more recent release of Brotli. “Since Brotli is built into other software, any software which includes this library needs to take the update too, followed by the users of that software.” Attackers can exploit vulnerable systems by providing them with malicious Brotli-compressed data via a specially crafted request. The vulnerability went slightly under the radar due to the disclosure timing closely aligning with that of PHP2Shell, although fixing the critical flaw should be a priority due to the range of technologies that are affected. In addition to .NET, Node.js, and Python, Bun, Envoy, and Istio have all released patches, and JFrog has worked up an exploit affecting FFmpeg using a specially crafted JPEG XL image, extending the exploit path beyond HTTP. It said that FFmpeg reaches Brotli through libjxl, which it uses to decompress metadata stored in brob boxes within the image format. The same researchers said the vulnerability affects Apache Arrow too, with attackers able to cause a denial of service. Merav Bar, threat researcher at Wiz, added that cloud users are exposed extensively, noting that 91 percent of cloud environments rely on components vulnerable to the Brotli flaw and that 82 percent of cloud environments have publicly exposed Node.js instances. She said: “Cloud environments are particularly exposed due to the widespread use of Brotli-enabled components across containerized applications, Kubernetes clusters, API gateways, reverse proxies, serverless workloads, and cloud-hosted web services.” “Successful exploitation could enable attackers to compromise application workloads, access sensitive information, disrupt service availability, or execute malicious code within affected containers or runtime environments,” Bar added. In an advisory published through its Patch the Planet initiative, OpenAI recommended blocking untrusted Brotli-compressed data where practical until patches can be applied. It also advised maintainers to rebuild affected deployments and restart services to ensure the fixes take effect. ®

A UK-based developer and pentester has claimed a $2,000 Bitcoin prize for demonstrating the exploitability of the PHP2Shell vulnerabilities that melted the internet last week. Jaydip Modhwadia, 26, otherwise known as “Killa,” claimed the prize set by James Pavur, who launched the "Steal My Bitcoin" site on October 24. Pavur launched the CTF (capture the flag) challenge to prove that the PHP2Shell exploit was not as easy as those in the cybersecurity community claimed it to be, promising to award $2,000 in Bitcoin to anyone who could achieve Remote Code Execution (RCE) on his website. "My Bitcoin was stolen after 19.28 hours," the website now says, after Modhwadia claimed the prize, although the real time taken is thought to be less than three hours. Soon after Pavur launched the CTF on Saturday, prospective flag-catchers complained that the website he set up, which served only static HTML, was not built in a way that allowed the PHP2Shell exploit to achieve RCE. The web page was running a vulnerable version of PHP, but the exploit path required a vulnerable website to serve a PHP file for flag-catchers to use as a hook – something that Pavur seemingly updated at around 1300 UTC on October 25. Modhwadia achieved RCE on the website, exposing a PHP endpoint, at 1547 UTC. After an error from Pavur placing the wrong wallet key on the server, the CTF creator sent Modhwadia his award, which the community upped to $2,000 from Pavur’s initial $500. The pentester published a write-up of his method, a single-file Python script he says requires 20 HTTP requests "at most" to fully execute. Speaking to The Register, Modhwadia also confirmed that he got the flag in "around three or so hours in total." He said he followed the news about the competition, "but didn't attempt it until it gained significant notice." If he had attempted it before Pavur introduced the endpoint, he may have struggled. For hours, bug bounty hunters were trying to access the website to attempt the challenge, as news of the CTF had exploded across tech circles. "The fact that it took 19 hours was because after it went popular, the entire site became basically unusable for anyone at all," Modhwadia added. The challenge saw a huge number of attempts, despite Pavur's decision to introduce a prohibitive 1MB request limit on Nginx. Alon Gal, co-founder and CTO at Hudson Rock, commended Modhwadia's work, but added that his success achieved in just a few hours should not be taken to mean that the same attack could be automated at scale. He said: "Does this mean autonomous AI agents can now compromise arbitrary PHP servers at scale? No. This was a sophisticated, target-specific exploit. "But it does demonstrate that PHP2Shell can be weaponized against a live target, even with meaningful technical constraints." Modhwadia's proof of concept is not the first to prove PHP2Shell is exploitable, but it falls under the more advanced category. Early signs suggested that Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) on a vulnerable server would prove a significant barrier to real-world exploitation, and the pentester’s solution bypasses it, along with the others that were disclosed recently. Spencer McIntyre, director of exploit development at VulnCheck, told The Register last week that attackers are finding new ways to exploit PHP2Shell, and "are clearly spending time (and tokens) on this bug." Initially, experts said exploit code was being found online hours, or even days, before the vulnerabilities were disclosed publicly, which led to millions of exploit attempts, although it was too early to determine the efficacy of these on real-world systems. Scores of websites were taken down for maintenance last week as organizations raced to protect themselves from the attacks, which may or may not have proved successful. Modhwadia said he donated a portion of the prize he received to the Lupus Foundation to raise awareness about the condition, from which he also suffers. ®

Anthropic has filed for an IPO that could rank among Wall Street's biggest ever, revealing an $80.7 billion half-year loss, a startlingly complex governance structure, and warnings that its AI models could blackmail humans, resist shutdown, or create "existential risks" to society. The Claude maker filed its S-1 registration statement with the US Securities and Exchange Commission on Monday as it prepares to list on Nasdaq under the ticker ANT. The company has not yet disclosed its proposed share price or how many shares it plans to sell. Of the filing's 614 pages, 94 are devoted to risk factors. But it's Anthropic's financial figures that are likely to raise eyebrows first. The Claude maker reported $16.3 billion in revenue for the first six months of 2026, up from $1.2 billion a year earlier. It also posted a whopping $80.7 billion net loss, although $72.4 billion of that was an accounting adjustment tied to the company's soaring valuation, not money it actually spent. Anthropic's operating loss was considerably smaller at $693 million, down from $2.1 billion a year earlier. By its own adjusted accounting, the company made a $1.6 billion operating profit in the first half of 2026, for a margin of around 10 percent. Whether it can keep making money on those terms is another matter. Training and running Claude requires an eye-watering amount of computing power, and Anthropic will need much more to keep pace with its rivals. A $1.6 billion adjusted profit won't count for much if the infrastructure bills keep growing faster than the business. Susannah Streeter, chief investment strategist at Wealth Club, told The Register that Anthropic's IPO could leave ordinary investors paying a premium for growth that has yet to translate into sustained profits. "A huge pool of private capital has allowed AI businesses to scale up and command extraordinary valuations long before they reach the stock market," she said, adding that investors buying in at the IPO will face a price with "a hefty dose of future success baked in." The financial risks are fairly conventional by Silicon Valley standards, but the warnings about what Claude might get up to are perhaps less so. Anthropic claims that models, including its own, have exhibited unexpected or self-preserving behavior, including attempts to resist shutdown, conceal information, and produce outputs resembling blackmail. It also warns that sufficiently advanced AI systems could pose “catastrophic or existential risks to society” if deployed without adequate safeguards. That's not to say Claude is currently blackmailing customers. Anthropic has observed some of this behavior in testing, but it also identifies more immediate security concerns as it gives its models access to external tools, code repositories, and corporate systems. Anthropic warns that attackers could hide malicious instructions in websites, documents, or API responses that its AI agents can access. If an agent follows those instructions, it could use a customer's permissions to steal data, tamper with code, or make unauthorized transactions. Even testing whether the models will behave themselves is proving tricky. Anthropic reckons some models behave differently when they detect or suspect they're being evaluated, making it harder to predict what they will do outside the testing environment. Keeping its models on a short leash could also cost Anthropic business. The company acknowledges that holding back more capable systems could give competitors an advantage, something it has already risked by restricting access to its Mythos model through Project Glasswing because of its ability to uncover security vulnerabilities. The founders aren't promising to put shareholders first, either. In a letter accompanying the filing, Dario and Daniela Amodei and their fellow co-founders tell prospective investors "not to think of your purchase in purely transactional terms." Anthropic may pass up lucrative business if it considers the risks too great, and investors won't have much say if they disagree. Under the proposed structure, governance structure includes five different classes of stock. By comparison, Google has three. The seven co-founders will retain 50.1 percent of the voting power on shareholder matters, while a separate Long-Term Benefit Trust will get to appoint a majority of the board. In other words, Wall Street is being invited to bankroll Anthropic's AI ambitions, but not necessarily to call the shots. Anthropic wants Wall Street's money to build ever more powerful AI, but is warning investors that it might turn down profits to keep that AI under control. Judging by those 94 pages of risk factors, keeping it under control is far from guaranteed.®

If you run PHP anywhere in your environment, patch to PHP 8.5.12, 8.4.27, 8.3.36 or 8.2.35 now. Two critical flaws disclosed last week, CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619 (nicknamed "PHP2Shell"), let an unauthenticated attacker run code on a server with nothing more than a crafted web request. Both carry a CVSS v4.0 score of 9.2, every earlier release is affected, and exploitation in the wild has been reported. The patch is the easy part. The hard part is finding every copy of PHP you own, because PHP rarely shows up where you expect it. This post covers what the flaws are, how far exploitation has gone, and how to get to full coverage fast. What happened Details leaked before the planned embargo, so the PHP security team moved fast and shipped fixes within about a day of announcing them. The two vulnerabilities Both bugs live in PHP core, not in any framework or plugin, so they reach anything that runs PHP to serve web requests. Affected server setups include PHP-FPM, mod_php, php-cgi, FrankenPHP and LiteSpeed. PHP rates mod_php as the highest risk. No login is needed: the attacker only has to reach a PHP endpoint over HTTP. Fixed versions: 8.5.12, 8.4.27, 8.3.36 and 8.2.35. Every earlier release is affected. PHP has also published minimal source backports for 7.4, 8.0 and 8.1, but there are no official releases for those branches. Treat a backport as a stopgap and plan the upgrade. Is it being exploited? Yes, though reliable public exploits are still scarce. watchTowr reports exploitation in its honeypot network as of October 21, and Tenable relays Cloudflare's CTO saying Cloudflare is seeing early attacks. Other telemetry, such as Patchstack's, shows mostly probing so far. Neither CVE is in CISA's KEV catalog yet, and no public indicators of compromise have been released. How hard the bug is to weaponize depends on the platform. VulnCheck reproduced both flaws and found: Code execution works on ARM64, and on x86 systems where address space layout randomization (ASLR) is turned off. Dozens of public proof-of-concepts exist, but very few work and none bypass ASLR on x86-64. Red Hat likewise rates RCE as hard in practice on default PHP-FPM deployments. Don't read that as permission to wait. Exploits mature quickly once a patch diff is public, and fake PoC repositories for headline CVEs often carry malware, so treat any you find with caution. Tanium's research on exploitability is in Why PHP2Shell is real(opens in a new tab). Most at risk: internet-facing PHP applications, especially those running mod_php or on ARM64 hosts. It's also worth retro-hunting recent web server and PHP-FPM logs for unexplained worker crashes and unusual multipart requests. Why finding PHP is harder than it looks No one has a complete list of PHP-based applications, and anything custom-built won't be on any list. PHP hides in several places at once: OS packages on Linux (php, php-fpm, php8.x), which package managers and most inventory tools see. Homebrew and similar on macOS, outside the system's own package list. Bundled copies on Windows. PHP on Windows usually arrives as a zip extracted to a folder or inside a stack like XAMPP, WampServer, Laragon or a vendor product. It often never registers as an installed application at all. Applications that ship their own PHP, where the fix depends on the application vendor rather than the OS. Containers, where the version is baked into the image tag. PHP is often more widespread than teams expect, and it doesn’t only run on servers. Developer tools, local web stacks and bundled applications put it on workstations too, often without registering as an installed application. The reliable answer is to look at the binaries themselves. In testing, PHP builds from version 5 through 8 all embed their version string (X-Powered-By: PHP/x.y.z), so you can read the exact version straight from the file without running it. How Tanium helps Tanium itself is not affected. Tanium does not use PHP, so there is no impact to Tanium software or Tanium Cloud services. Tanium Guardian content for PHP2Shell is available now in Tanium Cloud. The dashboard shows where PHP is installed and running so you can prioritize patching, with a single fleet-wide count of endpoints with vulnerable PHP across Linux, Windows and macOS. It combines: The existing Installed Applications and Homebrew Applications sensors, which find PHP installed through package managers on macOS and Linux. A Windows PHP Installations sensor that finds PHP where Installed Applications can't see it, including IIS, XAMPP, WampServer, Laragon, package managers and manually extracted copies, and reports version, install type, install path and owning user. The version is read from the binary's file metadata without executing it. A pre-built Saved Question that lists running PHP processes so you can prioritize systems that may be serving traffic. A pre-built Saved Question that identifies PHP containers, matching running containers against php, FrankenPHP and about 25 common PHP-based images such as WordPress, Drupal, Joomla, Nextcloud and Magento. Requires Tanium Cloud Workloads. Tanium Comply finds PHP on disk. For customers licensed for Comply, the dashboard includes PHP2Shell findings by endpoint, full finding details and a 7-day trend, with a pivot to the Comply findings page filtered to the two CVEs. The finding details report shows the specific on-disk locations where PHP was found, which catches copies that package and registry inventories miss. Vulnerability Library definitions for Windows, Linux and macOS are live now — sync the TVL and run an assessment to pick them up. On-premises customers can import the Guardian content manually today. Steps and downloads are in Guardian content for on-premises customers(opens in a new tab) on the Tanium Help Center. Know what's exposed to the internet. More than 13 million internet-facing assets run PHP versions that may be affected, according to Censys Internet Intelligence. Tanium External Attack Surface Management (EASM) discovers the internet-facing assets tied to your organization and identifies the PHP services, versions and web properties among them, with these CVEs surfaced through its coverage of exploitable and weaponized vulnerabilities. Tanium Attack Path Mapping then shows which of those exposed assets share an exposure point with a cloud instance, role or privileged identity: the places where one exploited PHP server becomes a route deeper into your environment. Already using Tanium SBOM? Inventorying PHP versions there is a sound early step. It shows which applications carry a vulnerable PHP and need a vendor update. What to do now Work through these in order; the first three matter most today. Find every PHP install, including Windows copies that never registered as applications. Record the exact version of each. Rank by exposure. Internet-facing servers, mod_php setups and ARM64 hosts come first. Patch to 8.5.12, 8.4.27, 8.3.36 or 8.2.35 through your OS vendor, a php.net build or your application vendor. Restart PHP-FPM and web server workers so the new binary is loaded. If you can't patch yet, isolate internet-facing PHP apps where you can, as CERT-EU advises, and put WAF or IDS rules in front of them (Cloudflare and VulnCheck have both shipped rules for the known vectors). Apply the partial setting with care. session.upload_progress.enabled=0 blocks one demonstrated path for CVE-2026-109619 only and does nothing for CVE-2026-109618. It must be set in php.ini, an FPM pool or server config, followed by a worker restart; ini_set() and .user.ini won't apply it. Hunt. Review recent web server and PHP-FPM logs for worker crashes and malformed multipart uploads. Plan off end-of-life PHP. Anything on 8.1 or older has no official fixed release. Where fixed packages stand (as of Oct 21, 16:30 UTC) Distro packages are still rolling out, so check your vendor before assuming a fix is available. The Remi repository won't ship updates today, so PHP advises switching to distro packages or building from source if you depend on it. Read more here. Supplied by Tanium

We've spent the past several decades using duct tape, string, and chewing gum to chain the world's computers together into this thing we call the internet, so there's really no good reason to be surprised that most of it is full of software containing vulnerabilities that are practically just as old. You can listen to the latest episode of The Kettle right here on this page, as well as on Spotify, Apple Music, or YouTube. Those platforms also let you subscribe to Kettle, so you are always notified when the latest episode goes live. The world is still reeling from the PHP2Shell revelations that hit the news cycle this week, and on The Kettle there's no better topic for host Brandon Vigliarolo, cybersecurity editor Jessica Lyons, and FOSS reporter Liam Proven to tease apart. Join us to discuss what exactly is going on, how AI was key to finding another issue no human likely ever would have discovered on their own, and why exposing more bad code in the backbone of the world's computers might be just what we need to rethink the whole thing for the better. A lightly edited transcript follows: Brandon (00:01) Hi everyone, and welcome to the latest episode of The Register's Kettle podcast. I'm your host, Reg reporter Brandon Vigliarolo. And hey, there's only one thing we could focus on for this week's episode, given all the hubbub around it, and that's the PHP apocalypse. It turns out most of the internet is running software that could allow remote code execution on host systems via a pair, or as of today apparently three, vulnerabilities that have come to collectively be known as PHP2Shell. So that's not great. With me to talk about this is our security editor Jessica Lyons and open source reporter Liam Proven, who has a few things to say about PHP itself and why it's probably not surprising we're finding ourselves in this mess. Thanks to you both for coming on. Liam Proven (00:43) Absolute pleasure. Jessica Lyons (00:43) Nice to be here. Brandon (00:44) So Jess, let's start with the basics. What is this? How big of a problem is it? And where do we stand on getting things fixed? Jessica Lyons (00:51) Great. The short answer is it's a very big problem. So we have these two related memory safety vulnerabilities, and they are in the PHP core. Collectively they're called PHP2Shell, and they affect every version that's been released in the last decade affected by one or both of these, going back to about version 5.4. So the general consensus is this is about 70 percent of all of the websites on the internet are running this code. So it basically affects everyone at this point. What happened here is that this dates actually back to August. An independent researcher first spotted this, and then we can talk a little bit more later about who found more of the exploits and what the (PHP) Foundation did with that. But so he found this vulnerability. There was a coordinated disclosure process with the PHP Foundation, and then that broke a little bit starting over the weekend, and then onto Monday, there were some leaks. There was a video posted that purported to show this exploit. And so we get this emergency warning from the PHP Foundation late Monday saying, "Hey, we are going to be releasing these emergency patches, so everybody get ready so you can implement them as soon as possible. It's very serious." So by Wednesday, they did release these, and there's this mass attempt to patch before any of the attackers get a hold of this and are able to attack websites with it. And one of the issues too is that some websites are running really, really old versions and so they aren't able to patch. So they're just sitting there, these legacy servers are still vulnerable. Brandon (02:52) So there's no direct update path for those old versions, right? It's basically shut this down and reinstall it kind of thing. Jessica Lyons (02:59) Exactly. So basically they're both these memory corruption vulnerabilities and by exploiting them, an attacker can kind of shape the memory that PHP trusts. And then they can use that to hijack what happens next. And that can mean remote code execution. They can take over the websites, they can steal data. And so people are visiting these websites they trust and they don't realize that the underlying code is stealing their data or delivering malware to their computer. And again, this is potentially 70 percent of the internet. So it's a big deal. Brandon (03:36) Quite a few sites were offline. I know even some big services. I stopped playing because I had a baby, but I used to play Final Fantasy XIV pretty religiously. And I know that the entire login server was offline a couple days ago Jessica Lyons (03:50) Right. Brandon (03:50) They were like, "You've got to fix this. Sorry, no one can play the game. If you're not logged in right now, you're not getting logged in for the foreseeable future." It's just insane how much of the internet was affected by this. Now It's under exploit, is that correct? But maybe not successfully exploited yet? Jessica Lyons (04:11) Right. So after the patches were released on Wednesday, later Wednesday, AWS came out and said, "We've seen exploitation attempts at least four days before the patches were released." So that kind of caused another frenzy that, "My God, it's under attack, the whole internet is on fire." There haven't been any successful attacks to date. There's been a ton of attempts. There's a lot of POCs; some work, some don't. But as of Friday, according to the Foundation and according to all of the security experts that I've spoken to, we haven't seen any evidence of successful exploitation. I don't think that means we're in the clear. I think it just means it's taking a while for people – and honestly AIs – to develop successful attacks, but that's where we are right now. Brandon (05:06) Because it's a complicated attack chain, correct? Jessica Lyons (05:10) Right. Yes. Brandon (05:11) So basically, right. This is not working yet, but especially with some of these older websites that are running older versions of PHP that are going to have to take a more thorough approach to getting this fixed and possibly going down for some time, this could be one of those problems that remains serious for a while. And let's not forget, 70 percent of the websites on the internet, that's almost three-quarters of the entire internet. I don't know how many hundreds of thousands or millions of sites that is, but some of those are probably never going to get patched. Jessica Lyons (05:41) Right. Exactly. Brandon (05:43) Just the way it goes. Right. This is going to be the sort of thing that we end up hearing about months or years from now. Jessica Lyons (05:49) I would say years. Brandon (05:53) I'm sure there'll be some bank somewhere that eventually ends up getting – we'll hear about some breach disclosure letter from the state of Maine in four or five years. Jessica Lyons (06:02) And local governments, federal and state governments, I think these are the ones that we're going to be hearing about quite a while from now. Brandon (06:09) Because that's one of the things I was thinking about even for me in my tiny little town in northern Michigan. I wonder if my township or the county is going to be all over it to update their PHP server. Does their IT guy, who probably is a retired dude who lives in the area, even know this is a problem? It really is one of those things that is a big deal, but if you're not kind of following the news on this, it could probably go completely unnoticed. And for many websites, I'm sure it will. Jessica Lyons (06:37) Right. Exactly. Brandon (06:37) So, it's pretty crazy. Liam, you're working on a story, I think, as we are recording this, about some of the history of PHP and how it really probably wasn't very well designed or intended to become so ubiquitous on the internet. What's going on there? Liam Proven (06:53) I've seen one angle on this, which is people saying, "This is 1990s code and it has 1990s problems," which is one way to look at it. But I'm a 1980s internet guy; that's when I started exploring it. My primary email address is older than the web, and it still works. My gods, it gets a lot of spam, but it still works. I've watched the rise and rise of PHP since the first releases. Now, I have no personal interest in web development. I can program, but I don't because I'm really bad at it and nobody needs to have my code inflicted upon them. The guy that wrote PHP in the first place, Rasmus Lerdorf, is my age. I've never met him; I'm sure he's a nice guy. But he said in a very early interview about it, "I really don't like programming. I built this tool to program less so that I could just reuse code." And that was about 1993. He built a little tool that allowed him to put macros in HTML for his own website, and it's just grown. In a later interview, he said something along the lines of, "I don't know anything about writing programming languages. I'm just improvising this as I go and people seem to like it." It originally stood for "Personal Home Page," I think, and later was given a recursive acronym of "PHP: Hypertext Preprocessor." This is a programming language that you mix in with the HTML of a website. It predates the modern model of building websites where a database contains the text and a content management system of some kind assembles on the fly the pages that each person sees. This is an older model where you're running programs that are part of the markup language, which was not a good idea, but that was how he did it. There was a lovely blog post. I've got an old friend who's an extremely skilled and talented programmer who has built a career on PHP, and he said to me, "Look, those criticisms that you've mentioned are of the really early versions and it's changed now." And if he hears this, he's going to be cross with me. But my favorite summary was from a blog called Eev.ee way back when that called PHP "a fractal of bad design." Whatever level you look at it, it was done badly. If you look at the whole plan of "let's just intermingle program code in with the markup language," not a good idea. If you look at the details of how it was implemented, not a good idea. If you look down at low-level details of how the functions return values, not a good idea: inconsistent syntax, inconsistent functions, functions that do really weird things, by default no stack traces, not great error reporting. Now, I'm sure a lot of this has been papered over now, but really there is one reason PHP is still around and still so big: Zuck. Facebook was built in PHP. And Facebook makes lots and lots of money and it's been throwing money at making PHP faster and more reliable and more scalable for decades. Brandon (11:03) Have they been big contributors to it? Liam (11:06) Yeah. They even built a compiler for it, which I suspect is still in use. Now, how much of Facebook today is in PHP? I don't know, possibly none, but for a long time basically the world's biggest and busiest public-facing website that wasn't owned by Google – only because Google have failed to ever make a successful social network – was built on PHP. And it's big, it's complicated. Like Linux itself, nobody fully understands how the whole thing works anymore and hasn't probably for decades. And now people have got bots that they can throw against it and ask them to analyze it. I think this is probably just the first, and I think there's going to be many more. A friend of mine who's a senior developer had a look at the patch, and he's not a C guy, but he said – I'm quoting from comments on Mastodon – that the patch to the current version is 13,000 lines of C. That's a doozy of a patch. Brandon (12:17) That's huge. Liam Proven (12:20) A bunch of people have been working like crazy for quite some time. Some people who've looked at this say it looks handwritten to me. Others have said, "No, I think this is bot-generated." I think the truth is probably a bit of both: some from one, some from the other. Brandon (12:32) Bit of both. I mean, you can't pump out thirteen thousand lines that quickly and have it tested. God, I hope they tested it. Liam Proven (12:41) Right. But that's just for the current version, and this hole affects every published version. So if they do manage to fix this one, how long till the next one comes along? Because I think there's going to be – Brandon (12:56) Especially with the speed at which vulnerabilities are being discovered now. I feel like every time I turn around, I've written one Patch Tuesday article in the past few months, and that one broke the previous two records. And I think since then every month has included more patches, and a lot of those are probably – Jessica Lyons (13:14) October at this point is the record: over a thousand for Microsoft alone. So, yep. Brandon (13:21) That's insane. Like you said, it is a fractal of bad design all the way down, and is going to probably have more vulnerabilities discovered. Jessica Lyons (13:32) Right. Brandon (13:32) Seventy percent of all websites on the internet are using this. What can we do? Are we stuck? Liam Proven (13:35) Well, there's a reason for that, and it's one that doesn't get talked about an awful lot: Facebook aren't the only people that use it extensively, because WordPress is also built on PHP, and it's far from alone. Another senior Linux techie friend of mine gave me a free shell account on the machine that he runs for a few friends years ago, and I thought of resurrecting my old 1990s hand-coded HTML webpage for fun. So I found it on the Internet Archive and found a tool to scrape it and turn it back into HTML again. I looked at some CMSes and asked him if there was any CMS on the machine. He went, "No." And I went, "Well, would you install one?" He went, "No." "Well, why not?" He said, "Well, all the big ones are implemented in PHP, and I won't let that near any server I run." "Well, that's a bit dramatic, isn't it?" And he goes, "No, that's pragmatic. I run a bunch of public-facing servers on my own, and this is how I keep them secure. No containers, no Docker, no PHP, nothing built in any of these technologies." And I went, "Wow, what about..." So I went looking for non-PHP CMSes. There are a lot of CMSes out there. I got a commission about a decade ago to write a comparative assessment of the CMS market versus a company's proprietary Windows product. I went and did a survey and came back and said, "I've found 1,300 so far." And they said, "OK, we can give you five thousand words instead of a thousand words." And I said, "You realize I'm going to have to go and look at 1,300 pieces of software here. Even if I only write three or four words about each one, 'Mostly harmless,' I'm still going to have to look at over a thousand bits of software. It will take me a year." And they went, "Well, how can how can we do it quicker?" And I said, "You can't. I cannot do this survey you want. Give me a full-time job and I'll get it back to you in a couple of years' time." I found a few CMSes that weren't built in PHP. Most of those were built in Ruby instead. And he went, "Yeah, I'm not keen on having that on my server either." So it's not even a case of people that have PHP deployments needing to update. They don't know. They built it on something else which was built on something that was built in PHP. Jessica Lyons (16:15) I was just going to say, Liam, you said, "How long until the next one happens?" And we found out today from the PHP Foundation that there is a third one. They won't be pushing an emergency release for this. They said it'll be published with the next regular release cycle. The Foundation told me that this one, quote, "requires a very unlikely combination of configuration and specific PHP application code, which we do not expect to occur in practical use." So, there's already another one. Liam Proven (16:45) So weeks then. Brandon (16:47) Yeah. Jessica Lyons (16:48) I mean, and even with this, it's hard to exploit. You can mitigate it with a configuration setting. But that was part of the thing we've heard with these other two. And then we did have researchers yesterday who developed this new exploit; this was Vulncheck. And that shows how even ASLR can be bypassed to attack these vulnerabilities on x86 machines. So saying it can be fixed with a configuration setting isn't always a guarantee. Brandon (17:25) That brings me kind of to the elephant in the room of this whole story: AI. because of course it all comes back to AI nowadays. OpenAI and two other security firms reported this. I think Jess, one of your stories or one of the ones Lindsay wrote said that they all used AI to find this, right? Jessica Lyons (17:49) Right. So the companies: Calif, they are a newer startup doing AI pen testing and they're part of OpenAI's partner program, so they used OpenAI models working with OpenAI to find this. And then independently, Wiz, which is owned by Google, also did. So this happened back in August, and then they have been all working with the PHP Foundation on the patch since that point. They have all said these are vulnerabilities that probably wouldn't have been found by humans alone. By all accounts, they've existed for decades and wouldn't have just been found by human researchers. Brandon (18:34) Right. So either these are things that have never been discovered and would have never been exploited theoretically – the exploit path is complex, they're not obvious vulnerabilities, so they needed an AI to find them – or perhaps this is the kind of thing that was known about but was privately held in the hands of some bug hunting company that sells exploits to governments. Who knows? Maybe that's the case. I remember talking to a guy one time at Black Hat who basically said his company's in the business of finding really sensitive vulnerabilities and then selling them to the highest bidder. So there are companies like that that exist. So there's probably plenty of vulnerabilities in software that are not well known that governments and high-level functions are aware of. But in this case, this probably wasn't the case. This is an incredibly difficult-to-find vulnerability. I've seen a lot of chatter online in the past few days about how the internet's on fire and the AI bug-pocalypse has arrived. It seems like we're having another case of people getting all freaked out because this is the end of time, history is over, and AI is going to kill us all. It just seems to me like this is another example of: well, maybe not. This has been getting hammered by potentially bad actors or pen testers, and no one's managed, as far as we know, to successfully use this yet. Is this as serious as it seems, or is this another case of a serious vulnerability that is so complicated and convoluted that it's not really going to be that big of a deal? Liam Proven (20:25) I want to note parenthetically that you described OpenAI as a security company, and if I had been drinking coffee, that would have been very bad for my keyboard. Brandon (20:32) Okay, whoops. Let me take that back. Jessica Lyons (20:31) Ha ha ha. Liam Proven (20:36) Calif is interesting because I just wrote about them. They found a hole in OpenBSD, and there aren't many of those. And only about a week ago, they found a hole which they dubbed "Big Fish" in OpenBSD, and it was just days before OpenBSD 8 shipped. It looks like that had been there for 37 years, which is a neat trick because OpenBSD was founded 30 years ago. So this is in – going to pronounce this carefully – Berkeley Software Distribution Unix in the eighties. But there are doubtless more, and I'm an arch AI skeptic. Some people will claim that this will be the sort of problem that you can solve with AI by getting it to rewrite your stack. Well yes, but then you'll replace it with a new stack that nobody ever understood any of. But there are ways to design, host, and run websites, forums, and chat channels without using any of this stuff. And it could be a net positive if holes like this keep getting found that people will be forced to go back to – sounds crazy, but – static websites serving pre-written code off a disk. One of my favourite websites – recently I discovered there's a whole chain of them, and I hope you won't mind me swearing; maybe you have to beep me. But there's a marvellous website called "This Is a Motherfucking Website and It's Perfect." And recently somebody rewrote it and the new one looks almost identical: "This Is a Modern Motherfucking Website and It's Perfect." He's written it with more CSS or something, but apparently there's a whole chain of these things and they are extremely low on programming code. They contain interactive elements that you can do with just HTML, and you don't need a whole web framework behind it. And the same AI companies are busily scraping the whole web multiple times a day to feed their training engines. Maybe we just have to suck it up, scrape some of these big websites, and redo them as simpler tech with fewer interpreted languages. We are all collectively victims of the sunk cost fallacy. We've got millions of websites. We spent billions and trillions of dollars building all this. We can't just throw it all away. Well, maybe you have to. Brandon (23:27) Sunk cost was something that kept coming to my mind as I was writing up the script for this episode and just thinking about this. It seems like a whole big case of, "Well, all the websites in the world are now on PHP, so I guess we're stuck." Liam Proven (23:42) We have a script? Brandon (23:46) Well, not a formal script, just notes. Liam Proven (23:48) Haha. Well I didn't get the memo. Jessica Lyons (23:50) I think that's part of the problem though: it illustrates this larger issue with AI in general. AI bug hunting and exploit detection kind of illustrates this bigger problem about the internet, especially these legacy systems that underpin government services and critical infrastructure. It is literally held together by duct tape and string. So it's a massive problem. Again, it takes some work to actually make anything of these vulnerabilities and chain them together. AI is getting better at that. So whether or not this ends up being the end of the world for the internet as we know it, it does illustrate a real problem. Brandon (24:42) Like Liam said, maybe this is the sort of catalyst that the wider internet community needs to realize that these systems – this duct tape and string – simply won't keep working forever. We need to maybe modernize all the underlying infrastructure and make it simpler and less kludged together with all these different things over the years. PHP is poor design all the way down, right? It's like: well, maybe we need to tear it out and start over. Even if these vulnerabilities are impractical to exploit and hard to find, the fact that they're being discovered does illustrate that most of our code is a mess. Liam Proven (25:28) I am reminded , the other day I was talking in the comments about A/UX, Apple's original Unix for the Mac, and Apple paid another company to develop A/UX because the US military had a tick box on the form that said to buy systems, they have to be able to run POSIX. The US Army at one point hosted its website on Classic Mac OS. And it wasn't exactly security by obscurity. They said virtually all web server attacks in the mid-1990s were based on getting a remote shell, and Classic macOS didn't have a shell at all, anywhere. There was no way to get a remote shell because you couldn't get a shell if you were sitting in front of it. So they said, "They try and inject bits of x86 code: well, it's not an x86. They try and get a shell: it hasn't got one. They try and get it to run scripts: it doesn't run scripts." They said, "We just sit there and watch people throwing themselves at it. All the best attacks, and none of it works because the operating system's kind of too primitive to do any of that stuff." I don't believe many customers actually ever used A/UX, but it got Apple some lucrative deals. Maybe we're going to see a new trend of super primitive, super basic websites. There'll be a new difficulty in trying to scale the things because Kubernetes expects a lot of this to be dynamically generated by microservices. But bring it on; I'd love to see that. Brandon (27:09) That's a Kubernetes problem, right? Liam Proven (27:12) Yeah. Brandon (27:14) I feel like I would love a simpler internet. It would be amazing if I could just wake up in the morning, go to a news site, and just get the headlines. So often, I feel like – and I think The Register is good at having a relatively simple design, but – so often I feel like the news aggregators that I go to... I look for ones that are as minimal as possible. I look for websites that are simple. I don't need all this in-your-face stuff; it's not necessary. I think we probably are all pretty sick of it in a lot of ways. Jessica Lyons (27:49) But do we really think this is going to happen though? Brandon (27:52) No. Jessica Lyons (27:53) I feel extremely pessimistic about this. I think it's much more profitable to just keep marketing solutions to the problem as opposed to a safe coding overhaul. Brandon (28:04) Unfortunately. Liam Proven (28:06) Geopolitics might yet get in the way. I wrote a piece about OpenEuler, one of the big Chinese enterprise server Linuxes, and one of only two companies actually showing off an OS at the Open Source Summit. The other was also Chinese: OpenKylin, which is more desktop focused. China makes its own chips, China makes its own operating systems, and it's got its own programming languages. They're all open source, taken from European and American developed software by and large, but they could still invade Taiwan and cut off much of the world's chip supply. And suddenly it won't just be that memory is way more expensive than it used to be; it will be that you can't get more memory anymore and you have to keep using 10-year-old chips. And people will be potentially forced to find ways to keep getting more out of the same hardware until we can build new chip fabs, which will take a lot of time and a lot of money. And then quite possibly they'll get blown away in a climate-change-induced hurricane and then we'll have to start again. So, I hope they're going to start building them in the north of Norway and places like that. But yeah we've got bigger problems coming down the pipe and it's all a giant snowball of superficially unrelated things: AI attacks on overcomplicated stacks on one side, and the other kind of attack which involves whistling noises and large explosions on the other side, which cuts off the hardware market. It's hard to plan for this, but nobody's even trying yet. Brandon (29:52) Who would have thought a talk about a PHP vulnerability would have turned into geopolitical chaos and the endof modern technology as we know it? Break out the sundial, people. Liam Proven (30:07) Excuse me, I've just got to go and wind the web server. Hang on. Brandon (30:11) All right, guys. Thanks for coming on. I think this was a really valuable discussion and it shows just how interconnected all these issues in tech are right now. I mean, it is interesting how we're kind of hurtling toward something in a lot of ways. AI will surely be a part of it, as will expensive chips and lots and lots of vulnerabilities being found every day. Hopefully we'll still be here to cover it as that continues to happen. Jessica Lyons (30:40) If AI doesn't kill us. Brandon (30:41) Right. If AI doesn't kill us all. Well, if it doesn't, we'll be here on the Kettle to talk about it. And we hope that you, from whatever bunker you're hiding in, will join us on future episodes. Liam Proven (30:53) Yeah, we'll be publishing a telephone number so you can phone into future Kettle episodes. Brandon (30:59) All right, folks, we'll talk soon. ®

UK Biobank (UKB) says its platform is now "secure" and that academics will soon regain access, months after a major data leak of volunteer health data. The charity, which runs the eponymous research project and describes itself as the custodian of the world's most comprehensive biomedical dataset, said it is waiting for approval from health data controllers and central government before it relaunches the platform. UK Biobank's Research Analysis Platform (UKB-RAP) has locked out all medical researchers trying to access its dataset since the April attack, which led to all 500,000 volunteers’ data being listed for sale on Chinese ecommerce website Alibaba. More than 20,000 researchers use the dataset provided by the cloud-based platform. They upload research projects and run experiments informed by the genomic data UKB collected from 40-to-69-year-olds between 2006 and 2010. The org makes around 30 petabytes worth of the stuff available to researchers, who investigate conditions including cancer, dementia, Parkinson’s disease, and COVID-19 immunity. Professor Sir Rory Collins, CEO at UKB, said on Friday that the organization has "completed the work to ensure that the UKB-RAP is secure," and that the progress was checked by an independent cybersecurity company, whose report recommends reopening the platform. The charity will begin a phased re-introduction of researchers to its platform after it receives the necessary approvals, although boffins will not be able to download any results files at first. The platform will pilot a "manual output checking system," where human reviewers will inspect files researchers wish to download before allowing them to do so, ahead of an automated process expected to roll out next year. According to the guide UKB compiled for researchers outlining the changes to the platform, researchers will also be restricted from building public apps and sharing tools with external colleagues until that manual checking system is fully up and running. Researchers were also warned that they will not be able to refresh or dispense data, only work with pre-existing data. They were also told to expect automatic logout out after 15 minutes of inactivity, with 2FA required upon re-authentication. Other technical changes include no longer being able to SSH into jobs, interactive tools being run via "isolated browsing" which restricts data transfer between web apps and the user's local system, and some restrictions on CLI use. UKB is working toward a day when the researchers using its platform store no data on their own computers, working only with that which is uploaded to the repos it hosts. However, in uploading this data to online repos, de-identified data is accidentally included in the code. UKB says it runs daily automated scans of these repos to catch errors, and provides training to researchers to help prevent these occurrences. Collins said that since the attack, most researchers have confirmed the deletion of de-identified data from their projects, but others have not and won't be admitted back to the UKB-RAP until they do. "Despite our repeated reminders, we are still detecting a small number of code repositories that include de-identified participant data," he said. "As these constitute a serious breach of the Material Transfer Agreement, sanctions are being applied against the researchers who are responsible." The charity also said researchers caught exposing participant data in their code will be forced to move their analyses to UKB-RAP, delete any downloaded data, and undergo additional training before being allowed back on the platform. It had initially told researchers to expect a relaunch of the platform by September 2026, although an update penned last month confirmed that it needed to wait for an independent assessment to be completed, despite already making the required security improvements. ®

The UK government is throwing £130 million at AI-powered cyber defenses, including plans to deploy autonomous AI agents across critical infrastructure to hunt down security flaws before attackers get there first. The money is part of a wider £600 million-plus AI spending spree announced by the Treasury ahead of this week's Budget, with ministers also promising to tackle biological threats, bankroll British AI firms, and reduce the country's dependence on foreign technology. Of the cyber funding, £60 million will go towards a new National Cyber Shield that uses agentic AI to bolster Britain's defenses. That includes a £25 million challenge fund for UK cybersecurity firms and plans for a regulatory sandbox to test autonomous security tools across critical infrastructure, government and industry. Another £70 million will establish the National Exposure and Real-Time Vulnerability (NERV) Centre, using AI to sniff out vulnerabilities across Britain's infrastructure and wider economy. The announcement comes just days after the PHP2Shell security scare, which saw dozens of government websites taken offline after critical flaws were discovered in the widely used scripting language. Britain's National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) worked with OpenAI to coordinate disclosure of the PHP flaws and give affected vendors time to prepare fixes, after AI-assisted researchers uncovered the vulnerabilities. Whitehall has already been experimenting with AI-powered vulnerability hunting. AI minister Kanishka Narayan said last week that the technology had uncovered 500 previously unknown security flaws across significant parts of the public sector. It remains unclear how much freedom the new AI defenders will have to act without human intervention, or when they'll be deployed. Ciaran Martin, former head of the NCSC, welcomed the investment, pointing to the week's events as evidence that Britain needs to get its cyber defenses in order. "We need to padlock our systems, and harness AI for defense," he said. The Treasury is also handing another £120 million to the AI Security Institute (AISI), which tests advanced AI systems for dangerous capabilities and researches ways to keep them under control. Cybersecurity isn't the only threat keeping ministers busy. Another £165 million will fund a National AI Biosecurity Initiative, including £100 million for what the government claims will be the world's first dedicated AI Biosecurity Lab. The independent, non-profit lab will use frontier AI models to detect biological threats and accelerate the development of vaccines and treatments. OpenAI is contributing £100 million in compute and model credits, while Anthropic is offering up to £100 million in model credits, model access and technical support. Google DeepMind and British biotech firm Basecamp Research are also involved, while the remaining £65 million will go towards biosurveillance and medical countermeasures against dangerous pathogens. There's something for the homegrown AI industry, too. The government is adding £60 million to its Sovereign AI Fund to invest in British companies developing technologies including robotics and autonomous systems, plus another £60 million for AI research and development procurement. A further £18 million will fund an Advanced Chip Design Academy, intended to help Britain develop more of its own semiconductor expertise rather than relying quite so heavily on technology designed overseas. The package also includes £30 million for local AI partnerships, £15 million for an AI challenge prize initially focused on healthcare, and £23 million for research into AI's impact on jobs and the economy. Manchester will get a new NCSC AI Cyber Security Centre of Excellence to train government specialists. Additionally, ministers are setting aside £10 million a year to study how AI will reshape employment and industry, including the jobs it might make redundant. The government clearly has high hopes for AI. Whether the technology can live up to them without creating a fresh set of problems is another matter.®

Internet governance bodies are likely to accelerate work to prepare the domain name system (DNS) so it can remain secure once quantum computers can challenge conventional encryption. John Crain, ICANN’s chief technology officer, last week told The Register that he is aware of efforts within the organization, and at other internet governance bodies, to consider what happens once commercially available quantum computers become capable of easily deciphering encrypted information. Those machines theoretically pose a risk to DNSSEC, the Domain Name System Security Extensions that adapt PKI to the job of verifying the veracity of DNS records. The CTO said he’s aware of predictions that such computers could come online “at the turn of the decade” and that he has therefore changed his view of when the DNS needs to be made quantum safe. “If you asked me years ago, I would have said we probably need to be ready in ten years,” Crain said. “Now, maybe it's less than that. I don't know if it's three years or five, but it's probably not ten”. One way to quantum-proof DNSSEC is to use larger keys that even a quantum computer will struggle to crack. Doing so, however, runs into message size limits in the DNS. “If we go for larger key sizes, that means larger zones, larger packets, larger responses,” Crain said. It can also mean traffic being carried by multiple TCP packets, instead of the single UDP messages DNS prefers. Crain said ICANN, the IETF, and other internet governance bodies are aware of this challenge and have begun preliminary work to address it. “Being prepared to go from UDP to TCP is going to take a few years,” he told The Register at ICANN’s annual meeting in Bali last week. “We're probably a few years away from being able to deploy in a predictable manner.” The internet community has, however, seen that the problem is becoming more acute. “We're going to ramp up the speed of development,” Crain said. Internet registry reform nears At ICANN’s Bali conference, The Register also met Jia-Rong Low, in his capacity as chair of the Number Resource Organization, the peak body for the world’s five regional internet registries (RIRs), AFRINIC, APNIC, ARIN, LACNIC, and RIPE NCC. The topic of that conversation was Internet Coordination Policy 2 (ICP-2), the document that governs RIRs. In its current form, ICP-2 describes the formation of a new RIR but no other part of its operations. After strife at AFRINIC raised the possibility of the African registry failing, the NRO decided to update ICP-2 so it covered the entire lifecycle of an RIR, from formation through to possible derecognition. Work on ICP-2 has moved through several rounds of public consultation. It has reached the status of a recommended draft. Low told The Register work on the document has proven “very challenging” to develop entirely with remote work. Last week’s ICANN meeting, he said, offered a venue for in-person collaboration that he hopes will result in work accelerating. The revised document defines four stages in the life of an RIR: recognition, audit, emergency continuity operations, and derecognition. The last three are additions to ICP-2 and give ICANN a major role as an independent overseer of RIRs. Low is hopeful a final document will be ready for review by the end of 2026, and ready for implementation not long afterwards. Scammers target trustworthy-sounding domains like .bank or .pharmacy Phisherfolk and other scammy scum strive to register authoritative-sounding domains as part of their efforts to trick victims. ICANN defines some global top level domains (GTLDs) as “Category 1” strings, because they pertain to regulated sectors – such as .bank, .doctor, and .university – or are felt to need special safeguards because like .sucks they create the potential for bullying. In a session at the ICANN meeting, Siôn Lloyd, ICANN’s principal security, stability and resiliency scientist, said the organization has investigated whether certain top level domains attract more abuse. He found that Category 1 GTLDs are more likely to be targeted by DNS abusers and therefore have a 45 percent higher chance of abuse than other domains. Happily, Category 1 domains are also less likely to have high abuse volumes. ICANN is currently working on a policy (PDP1) that will require domain registrars to take extra action against owners of domains that facilitate abuse, and another (PDP2) that will regulate automated domain registration. More GTLDs, more often? The Register heard plenty of chat at the meeting about ICANN’s new round of applications for GTLDs, which seems to be progressing well. Across various panels and sessions, we also heard references to ICANN’s past statements that new GTLD application rounds should be more frequent and take place at a predictable cadence, along with some suggestions that this round of applications is the template for future rounds. ®