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Residents across the United States are being inundated with text messages purporting to come from toll road operators like E-ZPass, warning that recipients face fines if a delinquent toll fee remains unpaid. Researchers say the surge in SMS spam coincides with new features added to a popular commercial phishing kit sold in China that makes it simple to set up convincing lures spoofing toll road operators in multiple U.S. states.
Last week, the Massachusetts Department of Transportation (MassDOT) warned residents to be on the lookout for a new SMS phishing or “smishing” scam targeting users of EZDriveMA, MassDOT’s all electronic tolling program. Those who fall for the scam are asked to provide payment card data, and eventually will be asked to supply a one-time password sent via SMS or a mobile authentication app.
Reports of similar SMS phishing attacks against customers of other U.S. state-run toll facilities surfaced around the same time as the MassDOT alert. People in Florida reported receiving SMS phishing that spoofed Sunpass, Florida’s prepaid toll program.
This phishing module for spoofing MassDOT’s EZDrive toll system was offered on Jan. 10, 2025 by a China-based SMS phishing service called “Lighthouse.”
In Texas, residents said they received text messages about unpaid tolls with the North Texas Toll Authority. Similar reports came from readers in California, Colorado, Connecticut, Minnesota, and Washington. This is by no means a comprehensive list.
A new module from the Lighthouse SMS phishing kit released Jan. 14 targets customers of the North Texas Toll Authority (NTTA).
In each case, the emergence of these SMS phishing attacks coincided with the release of new phishing kit capabilities that closely mimic these toll operator websites as they appear on mobile devices. Notably, none of the phishing pages will even load unless the website detects that the visitor is coming from a mobile device.
Ford Merrill works in security research at SecAlliance, a CSIS Security Group company. Merrill said the volume of SMS phishing attacks spoofing toll road operators skyrocketed after the New Year, when at least one Chinese cybercriminal group known for selling sophisticated SMS phishing kits began offering new phishing pages designed to spoof toll operators in various U.S. states.
According to Merrill, multiple China-based cybercriminals are selling distinct SMS-based phishing kits that each have hundreds or thousands of customers. The ultimate goal of these kits, he said, is to phish enough information from victims that their payment cards can be added to mobile wallets and used to buy goods at physical stores, online, or to launder money through shell companies.
A component of the Chinese SMS phishing kit Lighthouse made to target customers of The Toll Roads, which refers to several state routes through Orange County, Calif.
Merrill said the different purveyors of these SMS phishing tools traditionally have impersonated shipping companies, customs authorities, and even governments with tax refund lures and visa or immigration renewal scams targeting people who may be living abroad or new to a country.
“What we’re seeing with these tolls scams is just a continuation of the Chinese smishing groups rotating from package redelivery schemes to toll road scams,” Merrill said. “Every one of us by now is sick and tired of receiving these package smishing attacks, so now it’s a new twist on an existing scam.”
In October 2023, KrebsOnSecurity wrote about a massive uptick in SMS phishing scams targeting U.S. Postal Service customers. That story revealed the surge was tied to innovations introduced by “Chenlun,” a mainland China-based proprietor of a popular phishing kit and service. At the time, Chenlun had just introduced new phishing pages made to impersonate postal services in the United States and at least a dozen other countries.
SMS phishing kits are hardly new, but Merrill said Chinese smishing groups recently have introduced innovations in deliverability, by more seamlessly integrating their spam messages with Apple’s iMessage technology, and with RCS, the equivalent “rich text” messaging capability built into Android devices.
“While traditional smishing kits relied heavily on SMS for delivery, nowadays the actors make heavy use of iMessage and RCS because telecom operators can’t filter them and they likely have a higher success rate with these delivery channels,” he said.
It remains unclear how the phishers have selected their targets, or from where their data may be sourced. A notice from MassDOT cautions that “the targeted phone numbers seem to be chosen at random and are not uniquely associated with an account or usage of toll roads.”
Indeed, one reader shared on Mastodon yesterday that they’d received one of these SMS phishing attacks spoofing a local toll operator, when they didn’t even own a vehicle.
Targeted or not, these phishing websites are dangerous because they are operated dynamically in real-time by criminals. If you receive one of these messages, just ignore it or delete it, but please do not visit the phishing site. The FBI asks that before you bin the missives, consider filing a complaint with the agency’s Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3), including the phone number where the text originated, and the website listed within the text.
Three men in the United Kingdom have pleaded guilty to operating otp[.]agency, a once popular online service that helped attackers intercept the one-time passcodes (OTPs) that many websites require as a second authentication factor in addition to passwords.
Launched in November 2019, OTP Agency was a service for intercepting one-time passcodes needed to log in to various websites. Scammers who had already stolen someone’s bank account credentials could enter the target’s phone number and name, and the service would initiate an automated phone call to the target that warned them about unauthorized activity on their account.
The call would prompt the target to enter a one-time passcode that was sent to the user via SMS when the thieves attempted to log in. Any codes shared by the target were then relayed to the scammer’s user panel at the OTP Agency website.
A statement published Aug. 30 by the U.K.’s National Crime Agency (NCA) said three men pleaded guilty to running OTP Agency: Callum Picari, 22, from Hornchurch, Essex; Vijayasidhurshan Vijayanathan, 21, from Aylesbury, Buckinghamshire; and Aza Siddeeque, 19, from Milton Keynes, Buckinghamshire.
KrebsOnSecurity profiled OTP Agency in a February 2021 story about arrests tied to another phishing-related service based in the U.K. Someone claiming to represent OTP Agency then posted several comments on the piece, wherein they claimed the story was libelous and that they were a legitimate anti-fraud service. However, the service’s Telegram channel clearly showed its proprietors had built OTP Agency with one purpose in mind: To help their customers take over online accounts.
Within hours of that publication, OTP Agency shuttered its website and announced it was closing up shop and purging its user database. The NCA said the February 2021 story prompted a panicked message exchange between Picari and Vijayanathan:
Picari said: bro we are in big trouble… U will get me bagged… Bro delete the chat
Vijayanathan: Are you sure
Picari: So much evidence in there
Vijayanathan: Are you 100% sure
Picari: It’s so incriminating…Take a look and search ‘fraud’…Just think of all the evidence…that we cba to find…in the OTP chat…they will find
Vijayanathan: Exactly so if we just shut EVERYTHING down
Picari: They went to our first ever msg…We look incriminating…if we shut down…I say delete the chat…Our chat is Fraud 100%
Vijayanathan : Everyone with a brain will tell you stop it here and move on
Picari: Just because we close it doesn’t mean we didn’t do it…But deleting our chat…Will f*^k their investigations…There’s nothing fraudulent on the site
Despite deleting its Telegram channel, OTP Agency evidently found it difficult to walk away from its customers (and/or the money). Instead of shutting down as Vijayanathan wisely advised, just a few days later OTP Agency was communicating with customers on a new Telegram channel, offering a new login page and assuring existing customers that their usernames, passwords and balances would remain the same.
OTP Agency, immediately after their initial shutdown, telling customers their existing logins will still work.
But that revival would be short-lived. The NCA said the site was taken offline less than a month later when the trio were arrested. NCA investigators said more than 12,500 people were targeted by OTP Agency users during the 18 months the service was active.
Picari was the owner, developer and main beneficiary of the service, and his personal information and ownership of OTP Agency was revealed in February 2020 in a “dox” posted to the now-defunct English-language cybercrime forum Raidforums. The NCA said it began investigating the service in June 2020.
The OTP Agency operators who pleaded guilty to running the service; Aza Siddeeque, Callum Picari, and Vijayasidhurshan Vijayanathan.
OTP Agency might be gone, but several other similar OTP interception services are still in operation and accepting new customers, including a long-running service KrebsOnSecurity profiled in September 2021 called SMSRanger. More on SMSRanger in an upcoming post.
Text messages, emails and phone calls warning recipients about potential fraud are some of the most common scam lures. If someone (or something) calls saying they’re from your bank, or asks you to provide any personal or financial information, do not respond. Just hang up, full stop.
If the call has you worried about the security and integrity of your account, check the account status online, or call your financial institution — ideally using a phone number that came from the bank’s Web site or from the back of your payment card.
Further reading: When in Doubt, Hang Up, Look Up, and Call Back
PoC for an SMS-based shell. Send commands and receive responses over SMS from mobile broadband capable computers.
This tool came as an insipiration during a research on eSIM security implications led by Markus Vervier, presented at Offensivecon 2023
This is not a complete C2 but rather a simple Proof of Concept for executing commands remotely over SMS.
For the shell to work you need to devices capable of sending SMS. The victim's computer should be equiped with WWAN module with either a physical SIM or eSIM deployed.
On the operator's end, two tools are provided:
Of course, you could in theory use any online SMS provider on the operator's end via their API.
On the victim simply execute the client-agent.exe binary. If the agent is compiled as a Console Application you should see some verbose messages. If it's compiled as a Windows Application (best for real engagements), there will be no GUI.
The operator must specify the victim's phone number as a parameter:
FreshRSS server-console.exe +306912345678
Whereas if you use the python script you must additionally specify the MiFi details:
python3 server-console.py --mifi-ip 192.168.0.1 --mifi-username admin --mifi-password 12345678 --number +306912345678 -v
A demo as presented by Markus at Offensive is shown below. On the left is the operator's VM with a MiFi attached, whereas on the right window is client agent.
The United Parcel Service (UPS) says fraudsters have been harvesting phone numbers and other information from its online shipment tracking tool in Canada to send highly targeted SMS phishing (a.k.a. “smishing”) messages that spoofed UPS and other top brands. The missives addressed recipients by name, included details about recent orders, and warned that those orders wouldn’t be shipped unless the customer paid an added delivery fee.
In a snail mail letter sent this month to Canadian customers, UPS Canada Ltd. said it is aware that some package recipients have received fraudulent text messages demanding payment before a package can be delivered, and that it has been working with partners in its delivery chain to try to understand how the fraud was occurring.
The recent letter from UPS about SMS phishers harvesting shipment details and phone numbers from its website.
“During that review, UPS discovered a method by which a person who searched for a particular package or misused a package look-up tool could obtain more information about the delivery, potentially including a recipient’s phone number,” the letter reads. “Because this information could be misused by third parties, including potentially in a smishing scheme, UPS has taken steps to limit access to that information.”
The written notice goes on to say UPS believes the data exposure “affected packages for a small group of shippers and some of their customers from February 1, 2022 to April 24, 2023.”
As early as April 2022, KrebsOnSecurity began receiving tips from Canadian readers who were puzzling over why they’d just received one of these SMS phishing messages that referenced information from a recent order they’d legitimately placed at an online retailer.
In March, 2023, a reader named Dylan from British Columbia wrote in to say he’d received one of these shipping fee scam messages not long after placing an order to buy gobs of building blocks directly from Lego.com. The message included his full name, phone number, and postal code, and urged him to click a link to mydeliveryfee-ups[.]info and pay a $1.55 delivery fee that was supposedly required to deliver his Legos.
“From searching the text of this phishing message, I can see that a lot of people have experienced this scam, which is more convincing because of the information the phishing text contains,” Dylan wrote. “It seems likely to me that UPS is leaking information somehow about upcoming deliveries.”
Josh is a reader who works for a company that ships products to Canada, and in early January 2023 he inquired whether there was any information about a breach at UPS Canada.
“We’ve seen many of our customers targeted with a fraudulent UPS text message scheme after placing an order,” Josh said. “A link is provided (often only after the customer responds to the text) which takes you to a captcha page, followed by a fraudulent payment collection page.”
Pivoting on the domain in the smishing message sent to Dylan shows the phishing domain shared an Internet host in Russia [91.215.85-166] with nearly two dozen other smishing related domains, including upsdelivery[.]info, legodelivery[.]info, adidascanadaltd[.]com, crocscanadafee[.]info, refw0234apple[.]info, vista-printcanada[.]info and telus-ca[.]info.
The inclusion of big-name brands in the domains of these UPS smishing campaigns suggests the perpetrators had the ability to focus their lookups on UPS customers who had recently ordered items from specific companies.
Attempts to visit these domains with a web browser failed, but loading them in a mobile device (or in my case, emulating a mobile device using a virtual machine and Developer Tools in Firefox) revealed the first stage of this smishing attack. As Josh mentioned, what first popped up was a CAPTCHA; after the visitor solved the CAPTCHA, they were taken through several more pages that requested the user’s full name, date of birth, credit card number, address, email and phone number.
A smishing website targeting Canadians who recently purchased from Adidas online. The site would only load in a mobile browser.
In April 2022, KrebsOnSecurity heard from Alex, the CEO of a technology company in Canada who asked to leave his last name out of this story. Alex reached out when he began receiving the smishing messages almost immediately after ordering two sets of Airpods directly from Apple’s website.
What puzzled Alex most was that he’d instructed Apple to send the Airpods as a gift to two different people, and less than 24 hours later the phone number he uses for his Apple account received two of the phishing messages, both of which contained salutations that included the names of the people for whom he’d bought Airpods.
“I’d put the recipient as different people on my team, but because it was my phone number on both orders I was the one getting the texts,” Alex explained. “That same day, I got text messages referring to me as two different people, neither of whom were me.”
Alex said he believes UPS Canada either doesn’t fully understand what happened yet, or it is being coy about what it knows. He said the wording of UPS’s response misleadingly suggests the smishing attacks were somehow the result of hackers randomly looking up package information via the company’s tracking website.
Alex said it’s likely that whoever is responsible figured out how to query the UPS Canada website for only pending orders from specific brands, perhaps by exploiting some type of application programming interface (API) that UPS Canada makes or made available to its biggest retail partners.
“It wasn’t like I put the order through [on Apple.ca] and some days or weeks later I got a targeted smishing attack,” he said. “It was more or less the same day. And it was as if [the phishers] were being notified the order existed.”
The letter to UPS Canada customers does not mention whether any other customers in North America were affected, and it remains unclear whether any UPS customers outside of Canada may have been targeted.
In a statement provided to KrebsOnSecurity, Sandy Springs, Ga. based UPS [NYSE:UPS] said the company has been working with partners in the delivery chain to understand how that fraud was being perpetrated, as well as with law enforcement and third-party experts to identify the cause of this scheme and to put a stop to it.
“Law enforcement has indicated that there has been an increase in smishing impacting a number of shippers and many different industries,” reads an email from Brian Hughes, director of financial and strategy communications at UPS.
“Out of an abundance of caution, UPS is sending privacy incident notification letters to individuals in Canada whose information may have been impacted,” Hughes said. “We encourage our customers and general consumers to learn about the ways they can stay protected against attempts like this by visiting the UPS Fight Fraud website.”
These are a collection of security and monitoring scripts you can use to monitor your Linux installation for security-related events or for an investigation. Each script works on its own and is independent of other scripts. The scripts can be set up to either print out their results, send them to you via mail, or using AlertR as notification channel.
The scripts are located in the directory scripts/. Each script contains a short summary in the header of the file with a description of what it is supposed to do, (if needed) dependencies that have to be installed and (if available) references to where the idea for this script stems from.
Each script has a configuration file in the scripts/config/ directory to configure it. If the configuration file was not found during the execution of the script, the script will fall back to default settings and print out the results. Hence, it is not necessary to provide a configuration file.
The scripts/lib/ directory contains code that is shared between different scripts.
Scripts using a monitor_ prefix hold a state and are only useful for monitoring purposes. A single usage of them for an investigation will only result in showing the current state the Linux system and not changes that might be relevant for the system's security. If you want to establish the current state of your system as benign for these scripts, you can provide the --init argument.
Take a look at the header of the script you want to execute. It contains a short description what this script is supposed to do and what requirements are needed (if any needed at all). If requirements are needed, install them before running the script.
The shared configuration file scripts/config/config.py contains settings that are used by all scripts. Furthermore, each script can be configured by using the corresponding configuration file in the scripts/config/ directory. If no configuration file was found, a default setting is used and the results are printed out.
Finally, you can run all configured scripts by executing start_search.py (which is located in the main directory) or by executing each script manually. A Python3 interpreter is needed to run the scripts.
If you want to use the scripts to monitor your Linux system constantly, you have to perform the following steps:
Set up a notification channel that is supported by the scripts (currently printing out, mail, or AlertR).
Configure the scripts that you want to run using the configuration files in the scripts/config/ directory.
Execute start_search.py with the --init argument to initialize the scripts with the monitor_ prefix and let them establish a state of your system. However, this assumes that your system is currently uncompromised. If you are unsure of this, you should verify its current state.
Set up a cron job as root user that executes start_search.py (e.g., 0 * * * * root /opt/LSMS/start_search.py to start the search hourly).
| Name | Script |
|---|---|
| Monitoring cron files | monitor_cron.py |
| Monitoring /etc/hosts file | monitor_hosts_file.py |
| Monitoring /etc/ld.so.preload file | monitor_ld_preload.py |
| Monitoring /etc/passwd file | monitor_passwd.py |
| Monitoring modules | monitor_modules.py |
| Monitoring SSH authorized_keys files | monitor_ssh_authorized_keys.py |
| Monitoring systemd unit files | monitor_systemd_units.py |
| Search executables in /dev/shm | search_dev_shm.py |
| Search fileless programs (memfd_create) | search_memfd_create.py |
| Search hidden ELF files | search_hidden_exe.py |
| Search immutable files | search_immutable_files.py |
| Search kernel thread impersonations | search_non_kthreads.py |
| Search processes that were started by a now disconnected SSH session | search_ssh_leftover_processes.py |
| Search running deleted programs | search_deleted_exe.py |
| Test script to check if alerting works | test_alert.py |
| Verify integrity of installed .deb packages | verify_deb_packages.py |
