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We found a cluster of 1,001 IPs across 306 networks and 64 countries, tied to eight shared staging servers and a single TLS and HTTP fingerprint that appears nowhere else, plus smaller botnets that fall into clean separate islands.

I built an independent benchmark with 20 real CVEs across 15 CWE categories, 5 models (3 OpenAI, 2 Poolside Laguna), three prompt conditions: full advisory, behavioral description only, and location only (file and function, no description of the flaw).

I have three findings worth sharing:

• No model reliably fixes real vulnerabilities. The best solve rate (gpt-5.5) is 50% overall and 60% under the most favorable condition. The failure modes (e.g, wrong-search drift, budget exhaustion mid-implementation, plausible-but-incomplete patches that pass every visible test) are structured and repeatable across models and tasks.
• Token cost varies 4x for equivalent outcomes. The Laguna models consume 3–4x more tokens than OpenAI models of the same capability tier, with no improvement in solve rate.
• The locate condition is the benchmark's sharpest instrument. Give a model only a file and function (no description of the flaw). Every model drops. The differences between models are within noise at this scale, but it's the condition that most closely resembles what a security researcher actually does: reading code cold and recognizing independently that something is wrong.

Benchmark code and evaluation traces are open sourced.

This is a really bad one that flew under the radar. One character auth bypass in vLLM, LiteLLM, MCP servers, OpenAI shims, and a lot more.

A history of credentials at rest

I've been hard at work on a NEW phishing technique I'm excited to share. I'm calling it "Vaultjacking" and the impact is honestly a bit sobering.

In my blog I demonstrate how a single AiTM landing page can spoof your Google passkey/password manager PIN and use that to access ALL of a victim's third-party credentials (yes, including passkeys). A simple phish on one site can lead to a total compromise of all Chrome-saved credentials.

After FIOD seized 800+ servers and arrested two operators on May 18, the ELLIO research team reports that scanning from the network's ASN ranges has continued largely uninterrupted - and that while roughly a third of the recently-active ranges (including the legacy Stark blocks 94.131.105.0/24 and 92.118.232.0/24) have since been withdrawn from global routing, the surviving ranges under AS209847 (WorkTitans / THE.Hosting) are still announced and still scanning, at the network's normal daily rate.

The sibling ASNs (AS213999 and the Moscow-based AS33993) remain routed and idle.

The recent activity skews toward database and ICS/SCADA discovery = MongoDB, Redis, PostgreSQL, Oracle, LDAP, plus DNP3 and EtherNet/IP - alongside known-exploit probes like CVE-2017-17215 and WinRM.