It used to be the case that only businesses used virtual private networks (VPNs) to connect securely to the internet and keep their private data safe. But these days, with the rapid growth of online threats and privacy concerns, even casual internet users should seriously consider using a VPN. Nearly 30% of people now use VPNs for personal reasons, and that number is only growing as more people learn about how VPNs offer an effective way to safeguard online privacy, enhance security, and protect against various cyber threats.
If you are not familiar with this technology, a VPN essentially allows you to send and receive data across a public network as if it were a private network that encrypts, or scrambles, your information so others cannot read it. Let’s take a look at the top 3 reasons why a VPN could come in handy for you.
Now that you know why having a personal VPN is so useful, here are a few tips to help you choose the right product for you:
The post Why You Need a Personal VPN appeared first on McAfee Blog.
Subdomain takeover is a common vulnerability that allows an attacker to gain control over a subdomain of a target domain and redirect users intended for an organization's domain to a website that performs malicious activities, such as phishing campaigns, stealing user cookies, etc. It occurs when an attacker gains control over a subdomain of a target domain. Typically, this happens when the subdomain has a CNAME in the DNS, but no host is providing content for it. Subhunter takes a given list of Subdomains" title="Subdomains">subdomains and scans them to check this vulnerability.
Download from releases
Build from source:
$ git clone https://github.com/Nemesis0U/Subhunter.git
$ go build subhunter.go
Usage of subhunter:
-l string
File including a list of hosts to scan
-o string
File to save results
-t int
Number of threads for scanning (default 50)
-timeout int
Timeout in seconds (default 20)
./Subhunter -l subdomains.txt -o test.txt
____ _ _ _
/ ___| _ _ | |__ | |__ _ _ _ __ | |_ ___ _ __
\___ \ | | | | | '_ \ | '_ \ | | | | | '_ \ | __| / _ \ | '__|
___) | | |_| | | |_) | | | | | | |_| | | | | | | |_ | __/ | |
|____/ \__,_| |_.__/ |_| |_| \__,_| |_| |_| \__| \___| |_|
A fast subdomain takeover tool
Created by Nemesis
Loaded 88 fingerprints for current scan
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
[+] Nothing found at www.ubereats.com: Not Vulnerable
[+] Nothing found at testauth.ubereats.com: Not Vulnerable
[+] Nothing found at apple-maps-app-clip.ubereats.com: Not Vulnerable
[+] Nothing found at about.ubereats.com: Not Vulnerable
[+] Nothing found at beta.ubereats.com: Not Vulnerable
[+] Nothing found at ewp.ubereats.com: Not Vulnerable
[+] Nothi ng found at edgetest.ubereats.com: Not Vulnerable
[+] Nothing found at guest.ubereats.com: Not Vulnerable
[+] Google Cloud: Possible takeover found at testauth.ubereats.com: Vulnerable
[+] Nothing found at info.ubereats.com: Not Vulnerable
[+] Nothing found at learn.ubereats.com: Not Vulnerable
[+] Nothing found at merchants.ubereats.com: Not Vulnerable
[+] Nothing found at guest-beta.ubereats.com: Not Vulnerable
[+] Nothing found at merchant-help.ubereats.com: Not Vulnerable
[+] Nothing found at merchants-beta.ubereats.com: Not Vulnerable
[+] Nothing found at merchants-staging.ubereats.com: Not Vulnerable
[+] Nothing found at messages.ubereats.com: Not Vulnerable
[+] Nothing found at order.ubereats.com: Not Vulnerable
[+] Nothing found at restaurants.ubereats.com: Not Vulnerable
[+] Nothing found at payments.ubereats.com: Not Vulnerable
[+] Nothing found at static.ubereats.com: Not Vulnerable
Subhunter exiting...
Results written to test.txt
From impersonating police officers in Pennsylvania to employees of the City of San Antonio, scammers have been impersonating officials nationwide in order to scam people. A nurse in New York even lost her life savings to a spoofing scam. Phone spoofing is a technique used by callers to disguise their true identity and phone number when making calls. By altering the caller ID information displayed on the recipient’s phone, spoofers can make it appear as though the call is coming from a different number, often one that looks more trustworthy or familiar to the recipient. This deceptive practice is commonly employed by telemarketers, scammers, and individuals seeking to engage in fraudulent activities, making it more difficult for recipients to identify and block unwanted or suspicious calls.
Most spoofing is done using a VoIP (Voice over Internet Protocol) service or IP phone that uses VoIP to transmit calls over the internet. VoIP users can usually choose their preferred number or name to be displayed on the caller ID when they set up their account. Some providers even offer spoofing services that work like a prepaid calling card. Customers pay for a PIN code to use when calling their provider, allowing them to select both the destination‘s number they want to call, as well as the number they want to appear on the recipient’s caller ID.
Scammers often use spoofing to try to trick people into handing over money, personal information, or both. They may pretend to be calling from a bank, a charity, or even a contest, offering a phony prize. These “vishing” attacks (or “voice phishing”), are quite common, and often target older people who are not as aware of this threat.
For instance, one common scam appears to come from the IRS. The caller tries to scare the receiver into thinking that they owe money for back taxes, or need to send over sensitive financial information right away. Another common scam is fake tech support, where the caller claims to be from a recognizable company, like Microsoft, claiming there is a problem with your computer and they need remote access to fix it.
There are also “SMiShing” attacks, or phishing via text message, in which you may receive a message that appears to come from a reputable person or company, encouraging you to click on a link. But once you do, it can download malware onto your device, sign you up for a premium service, or even steal your credentials for your online accounts.
The convenience of sending digital voice signals over the internet has led to an explosion of spam and robocalls over the past few years. Between January 2019 and September 2023, Americans lodged 2.04 million complaints about unwanted phone calls where people or robots falsely posed as government representatives, legitimate business entities, or people affiliated with them.
Since robocalls use a computerized autodialer to deliver pre-recorded messages, marketers and scammers can place many more calls than a live person ever could, often employing tricks such as making the call appear to come from the recipient’s own area code. This increases the chance that the recipient will answer the call, thinking it is from a local friend or business.
And because many of these calls are from scammers or shady marketing groups, just registering your number on the FTC’s official “National Do Not Call Registry” does little help. That’s because only real companies that follow the law respect the registry.
To really cut back on these calls, the first thing you should do is check to see if your phone carrier has a service or app that helps identify and filter out spam calls.
For instance, both AT&T and Verizon have apps that provide spam screening or fraud warnings, although they may cost you extra each month. T-Mobile warns customers if a call is likely a scam when it appears on your phone screen, and you can sign up for a scam-blocking service for free.
There are also third-party apps such as RoboKiller that you can download to help you screen calls, but you should be aware that you will be sharing private data with them.
Enhance your smartphone security effortlessly with McAfee+ which has 24/7 identity monitoring and alerts, advanced privacy features, and AI-powered security for real-time protection against viruses, hackers, and risky links.
The post How to Stop Phone Spoofing appeared first on McAfee Blog.
Last week, the United States joined the U.K. and Australia in sanctioning and charging a Russian man named Dmitry Yuryevich Khoroshev as the leader of the infamous LockBit ransomware group. LockBit’s leader “LockBitSupp” claims the feds named the wrong guy, saying the charges don’t explain how they connected him to Khoroshev. This post examines the activities of Khoroshev’s many alter egos on the cybercrime forums, and tracks the career of a gifted malware author who has written and sold malicious code for the past 14 years.
Dmitry Yuryevich Khoroshev. Image: treasury.gov.
On May 7, the U.S. Department of Justice indicted Khoroshev on 26 criminal counts, including extortion, wire fraud, and conspiracy. The government alleges Khoroshev created, sold and used the LockBit ransomware strain to personally extort more than $100 million from hundreds of victim organizations, and that LockBit as a group extorted roughly half a billion dollars over four years.
Federal investigators say Khoroshev ran LockBit as a “ransomware-as-a-service” operation, wherein he kept 20 percent of any ransom amount paid by a victim organization infected with his code, with the remaining 80 percent of the payment going to LockBit affiliates responsible for spreading the malware.
Financial sanctions levied against Khoroshev by the U.S. Department of the Treasury listed his known email and street address (in Voronezh, in southwest Russia), passport number, and even his tax ID number (hello, Russian tax authorities). The Treasury filing says Khoroshev used the emails sitedev5@yandex.ru, and khoroshev1@icloud.com.
According to DomainTools.com, the address sitedev5@yandex.ru was used to register at least six domains, including a Russian business registered in Khoroshev’s name called tkaner.com, which is a blog about clothing and fabrics.
A search at the breach-tracking service Constella Intelligence on the phone number in Tkaner’s registration records — 7.9521020220 — brings up multiple official Russian government documents listing the number’s owner as Dmitri Yurievich Khoroshev.
Another domain registered to that phone number was stairwell[.]ru, which at one point advertised the sale of wooden staircases. Constella finds that the email addresses webmaster@stairwell.ru and admin@stairwell.ru used the password 225948.
DomainTools reports that stairwell.ru for several years included the registrant’s name as “Dmitrij Ju Horoshev,” and the email address pin@darktower.su. According to Constella, this email address was used in 2010 to register an account for a Dmitry Yurievich Khoroshev from Voronezh, Russia at the hosting provider firstvds.ru.
Image: Shutterstock.
Cyber intelligence firm Intel 471 finds that pin@darktower.ru was used by a Russian-speaking member called Pin on the English-language cybercrime forum Opensc. Pin was active on Opensc around March 2012, and authored 13 posts that mostly concerned data encryption issues, or how to fix bugs in code.
Other posts concerned custom code Pin claimed to have written that would bypass memory protections on Windows XP and Windows 7 systems, and inject malware into memory space normally allocated to trusted applications on a Windows machine.
Pin also was active at that same time on the Russian-language security forum Antichat, where they told fellow forum members to contact them at the ICQ instant messenger number 669316.
A search on the ICQ number 669316 at Intel 471 shows that in April 2011, a user by the name NeroWolfe joined the Russian cybercrime forum Zloy using the email address d.horoshev@gmail.com, and from an Internet address in Voronezh, RU.
Constella finds the same password tied to webmaster@stairwell.ru (225948) was used by the email address 3k@xakep.ru, which Intel 471 says was registered to more than a dozen NeroWolfe accounts across just as many Russian cybercrime forums between 2011 and 2015.
NeroWolfe’s introductory post to the forum Verified in Oct. 2011 said he was a system administrator and C++ coder.
“Installing SpyEYE, ZeuS, any DDoS and spam admin panels,” NeroWolfe wrote. This user said they specialize in developing malware, creating computer worms, and crafting new ways to hijack Web browsers.
“I can provide my portfolio on request,” NeroWolfe wrote. “P.S. I don’t modify someone else’s code or work with someone else’s frameworks.”
In April 2013, NeroWolfe wrote in a private message to another Verified forum user that he was selling a malware “loader” program that could bypass all of the security protections on Windows XP and Windows 7.
“The access to the network is slightly restricted,” NeroWolfe said of the loader, which he was selling for $5,000. “You won’t manage to bind a port. However, it’s quite possible to send data. The code is written in C.”
In an October 2013 discussion on the cybercrime forum Exploit, NeroWolfe weighed in on the karmic ramifications of ransomware. At the time, ransomware-as-a-service didn’t exist yet, and many members of Exploit were still making good money from “lockers,” relatively crude programs that locked the user out of their system until they agreed to make a small payment (usually a few hundred dollars via prepaid Green Dot cards).
Lockers, which presaged the coming ransomware scourge, were generally viewed by the Russian-speaking cybercrime forums as harmless moneymaking opportunities, because they usually didn’t seek to harm the host computer or endanger files on the system. Also, there were still plenty of locker programs that aspiring cybercriminals could either buy or rent to make a steady income.
NeroWolfe reminded forum denizens that they were just as vulnerable to ransomware attacks as their would-be victims, and that what goes around comes around.
“Guys, do you have a conscience?,” NeroWolfe wrote. “Okay, lockers, network gopstop aka business in Russian. The last thing was always squeezed out of the suckers. But encoders, no one is protected from them, including the local audience.”
If Khoroshev was ever worried that someone outside of Russia might be able to connect his early hacker handles to his real life persona, that’s not clear from reviewing his history online. In fact, the same email address tied to so many of NeroWolfe’s accounts on the forums — 3k@xakep.ru — was used in 2011 to create an account for a Dmitry Yurevich Khoroshev on the Russian social media network Vkontakte.
NeroWolfe seems to have abandoned all of his forum accounts sometime in 2016. In November 2016, an exploit[.]ru member filed an official complaint against NeroWolfe, saying NeroWolfe had been paid $2,000 to produce custom code but never finished the project and vanished.
It’s unclear what happened to NeroWolfe or to Khoroshev during this time. Maybe he got arrested, or some close associates did. Perhaps he just decided it was time to lay low and hit the reset on his operational security efforts, given his past failures in this regard. It’s also possible NeroWolfe landed a real job somewhere for a few years, fathered a child, and/or had to put his cybercrime career on hold.
Or perhaps Khoroshev saw the coming ransomware industry for the endless pot of gold that it was about to become, and then dedicated himself to working on custom ransomware code. That’s what the government believes.
The indictment against Khoroshev says he used the hacker nickname Putinkrab, and Intel 471 says this corresponds to a username that was first registered across three major Russian cybercrime forums in early 2019.
KrebsOnSecurity could find no obvious connections between Putinkrab and any of Khoroshev’s older identities. However, if Putinkrab was Khoroshev, he would have learned from his past mistakes and started fresh with a new identity (which he did). But also, it is likely the government hasn’t shared all of the intelligence it has collected against him (more on that in a bit).
Putinkrab’s first posts on the Russian cybercrime forums XSS, Exploit and UFOLabs saw this user selling ransomware source code written in C.
A machine-translated ad for ransomware source code from Putinkrab on the Russian language cybercrime forum UFOlabs in 2019. Image: Ke-la.com.
In April 2019, Putkinkrab offered an affiliate program that would run on top of his custom-made ransomware code.
“I want to work for a share of the ransoms: 20/80,” Putinkrab wrote on Exploit. “20 percent is my percentage for the work, you get 80% of the ransoms. The percentage can be reduced up to 10/90 if the volumes are good. But now, temporarily, until the service is fully automated, we are working using a different algorithm.”
Throughout the summer of 2019, Putinkrab posted multiple updates to Exploit about new features being added to his ransomware strain, as well as novel evasion techniques to avoid detection by security tools. He also told forum members he was looking for investors for a new ransomware project based on his code.
In response to an Exploit member who complained that the security industry was making it harder to profit from ransomware, Putinkrab said that was because so many cybercriminals were relying on crappy ransomware code.
“The vast majority of top antiviruses have acquired behavioral analysis, which blocks 95% of crypto-lockers at their root,” Putinkrab wrote. “Cryptolockers made a lot of noise in the press, but lazy system administrators don’t make backups after that. The vast majority of cryptolockers are written by people who have little understanding of cryptography. Therefore, decryptors appear on the Internet, and with them the hope that files can be decrypted without paying a ransom. They just sit and wait. Contact with the owner of the key is lost over time.”
Putinkrab said he had every confidence his ransomware code was a game-changer, and a huge money machine.
“The game is just gaining momentum,” Putinkrab wrote. “Weak players lose and are eliminated.”
The rest of his response was structured like a poem:
“In this world, the strongest survive.
Our life is just a struggle.
The winner will be the smartest,
Who has his head on his shoulders.”
Putinkrab’s final post came on August 23, 2019. The Justice Department says the LockBit ransomware affiliate program was officially launched five months later. From there on out, the government says, Khoroshev adopted the persona of LockBitSupp. In his introductory post on Exploit, LockBit’s mastermind said the ransomware strain had been in development since September 2019.
The original LockBit malware was written in C (a language that NeroWolfe excelled at). Here’s the original description of LockBit, from its maker:
“The software is written in C and Assembler; encryption is performed through the I/O Completion Port; there is a port scanning local networks and an option to find all DFS, SMB, WebDAV network shares, an admin panel in Tor, automatic test decryption; a decryption tool is provided; there is a chat with Push notifications, a Jabber bot that forwards correspondence and an option to terminate services/processes in line which prevent the ransomware from opening files at a certain moment. The ransomware sets file permissions and removes blocking attributes, deletes shadow copies, clears logs and mounts hidden partitions; there is an option to drag-and-drop files/folders and a console/hidden mode. The ransomware encrypts files in parts in various places: the larger the file size, the more parts there are. The algorithms used are AES + RSA.
You are the one who determines the ransom amount after communicating with the victim. The ransom paid in any currency that suits you will be transferred to your wallets. The Jabber bot serves as an admin panel and is used for banning, providing decryption tools, chatting – Jabber is used for absolutely everything.”
Does the above timeline prove that NeroWolfe/Khoroshev is LockBitSupp? No. However, it does indicate Khoroshev was for many years deeply invested in countless schemes involving botnets, stolen data, and malware he wrote that others used to great effect. NeroWolfe’s many private messages from fellow forum members confirm this.
NeroWolfe’s specialty was creating custom code that employed novel stealth and evasion techniques, and he was always quick to volunteer his services on the forums whenever anyone was looking help on a malware project that called for a strong C or C++ programmer.
Someone with those qualifications — as well as demonstrated mastery of data encryption and decryption techniques — would have been in great demand by the ransomware-as-a-service industry that took off at around the same time NeroWolfe vanished from the forums.
Someone like that who is near or at the top of their game vis-a-vis their peers does not simply walk away from that level of influence, community status, and potential income stream unless forced to do so by circumstances beyond their immediate control.
It’s important to note that Putinkrab didn’t just materialize out of thin air in 2019 — suddenly endowed with knowledge about how to write advanced, stealthy ransomware strains. That knowledge clearly came from someone who’d already had years of experience building and deploying ransomware strains against real-life victim organizations.
Thus, whoever Putinkrab was before they adopted that moniker, it’s a safe bet they were involved in the development and use of earlier, highly successful ransomware strains. One strong possible candidate is Cerber ransomware, the most popular and effective affiliate program operating between early 2016 and mid-2017. Cerber thrived because it emerged as an early mover in the market for ransomware-as-a-service offerings.
In February 2024, the FBI seized LockBit’s cybercrime infrastructure on the dark web, following an apparently lengthy infiltration of the group’s operations. The United States has already indicted and sanctioned at least five other alleged LockBit ringleaders or affiliates, so presumably the feds have been able to draw additional resources from those investigations.
Also, it seems likely that the three national intelligence agencies involved in bringing these charges are not showing all of their cards. For example, the Treasury documents on Khoroshev mention a single cryptocurrency address, and yet experts interviewed for this story say there are no obvious clues connecting this address to Khoroshev or Putinkrab.
But given that LockBitSupp has been actively involved in Lockbit ransomware attacks against organizations for four years now, the government almost certainly has an extensive list of the LockBit leader’s various cryptocurrency addresses — and probably even his bank accounts in Russia. And no doubt the money trail from some of those transactions was traceable to its ultimate beneficiary (or close enough).
Not long after Khoroshev was charged as the leader of LockBit, a number of open-source intelligence accounts on Telegram began extending the information released by the Treasury Department. Within hours, these sleuths had unearthed more than a dozen credit card accounts used by Khoroshev over the past decade, as well as his various bank account numbers in Russia.
The point is, this post is based on data that’s available to and verifiable by KrebsOnSecurity. Woodward & Bernstein’s source in the Watergate investigation — Deep Throat — famously told the two reporters to “follow the money.” This is always excellent advice. But these days, that can be a lot easier said than done — especially with people who a) do not wish to be found, and b) don’t exactly file annual reports.
LOLSpoof is a an interactive shell program that automatically spoof the command line arguments of the spawned process. Just call your incriminate-looking command line LOLBin (e.g. powershell -w hidden -enc ZwBlAHQALQBwAHIAbwBjAGUA....
) and LOLSpoof will ensure that the process creation telemetry appears legitimate and clear.
Process command line is a very monitored telemetry, being thoroughly inspected by AV/EDRs, SOC analysts or threat hunters.
lolbin.exe " " * sizeof(real arguments)
Although this simple technique helps to bypass command line detection, it may introduce other suspicious telemetry: 1. Creation of suspended process 2. The new process has trailing spaces (but it's really easy to make it a repeated character or even random data instead) 3. Write to the spawned process with WriteProcessMemory
Built with Nim 1.6.12 (compiling with Nim 2.X yields errors!)
nimble install winim
Programs that clear or change the previous printed console messages (such as timeout.exe 10
) breaks the program. when such commands are employed, you'll need to restart the console. Don't know how to fix that, open to suggestions.
Fitness trackers worn on the wrist, glucose monitors that test blood sugar without a prick, and connected toothbrushes that let you know when you’ve missed a spot—welcome to internet-connected healthcare. It’s a new realm of care with breakthroughs big and small. Some you’ll find in your home, some you’ll find inside your doctor’s office, yet all of them are connected. Which means they all need to be protected. After all, they’re not tracking any old data. They’re tracking our health data, one of the most precious things we own.
Internet-connected healthcare, also known as connected medicine, is a broad topic. On the consumer side, it covers everything from smart watches that track health data to wireless blood pressure monitors that you can use at home. On the practitioner side, it accounts for technologies ranging from electronic patient records, network-enabled diagnostic devices, remote patient monitoring in the form of wearable devices, apps for therapy, and even small cameras that can be swallowed in the form of a pill to get a view of a patient’s digestive system.
Additionally, it also includes telemedicine visits, where you can get a medical issue diagnosed and treated remotely via your smartphone or computer by way of a video conference or a healthcare provider’s portal—which you can read about more in one of my blogs. In all, big digital changes are taking place in healthcare—a transformation that’s rapidly taking shape to the tune of a global market expected to top USD 534.3 billion by 2025.
Advances in digital healthcare have come more slowly compared to other aspects of our lives, such as consumer devices like phones and tablets. Security is a top reason why. Not only must a healthcare device go through a rigorous design and approval process to ensure it’s safe, sound, and effective, but it’s also held to similar rigorous degrees of regulation when it comes to medical data privacy. For example, in the U.S., we have the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), which sets privacy and security standards for certain health information.
Taken together, this requires additional development time for any connected medical device or solution, in addition to the time it takes to develop one with the proper efficacy. Healthcare device manufacturers cannot simply move as quickly as, say, a smartphone manufacturer can. And rightfully so.
However, for this blog, we’ll focus on the home and personal side of the equation, with devices like fitness trackers, glucose monitors, smartwatches, and wearable devices in general—connected healthcare devices that more and more of us are purchasing on our own. To be clear, while these devices may not always be categorized as healthcare devices in the strictest (and regulatory) sense, they are gathering your health data, which you should absolutely protect. Here are some straightforward steps you can take:
1) First up, protect your phone
Many medical IoT devices use a smartphone as an interface, and as a means of gathering, storing, and sharing health data. So whether you’re an Android owner or iOS owner, get security software installed on your phone so you can protect all the things it accesses and controls. Additionally, installing it will protect you and your phone in general as well.
2) Set strong, unique passwords for your medical IoT devices
Some IoT devices have found themselves open to attack because they come with a default username and password—which are often published on the internet. When you purchase any IoT device, set a fresh password using a strong method of password creation. And keep those passwords safe. Instead of keeping them in a notebook or on sticky notes, consider using a password manager.
3) Use two-factor authentication
You’ve probably come across two-factor authentication while banking, shopping, or logging into any other number of accounts. Using a combination of your username, password, and a security code sent to another device you own (typically a mobile phone) makes it tougher for hackers to crack your device. If your IoT device supports two-factor authentication, use it for extra security.
4) Update your devices regularly
This is vital. Make sure you have the latest updates so that you get the latest functionality from your device. Equally important is that updates often contain security upgrades. If you can set your device to receive automatic updates, do so.
5) Secure your internet router
Your medical IoT device will invariably use your home Wi-Fi network to connect to the internet, just like your other devices. All the data that travels on there is personal and private, and that goes double for any health data that passes along it. Make sure you use a strong and unique password. Also, change the name of your router so it doesn’t give away your address or identity. One more step is to check that your router is using an encryption method, like WPA2, which will keep your signal secure. You may also want to consider investing in an advanced internet router that has built-in protection, which can secure and monitor any device that connects to your network.
6) Use a VPN and a comprehensive security solution
Similar to the above, another way you can further protect the health data you send over the internet is to use a virtual private network, or VPN. A VPN uses an encrypted connection to send and receive data, which shields it from prying eyes. A hacker attempting to eavesdrop on your session will effectively see a mishmash of garbage data, which helps keep your health data secure.
7) When purchasing, do your research
Read up on reviews and comments about the devices you’re interested in, along with news articles about their manufacturers. See what their track record is on security, such as if they’ve exposed data or otherwise left their users open to attack.
Bottom line, when we speak of connected healthcare, we’re ultimately speaking about one of the most personal things you own: your health data. That’s what’s being collected. And that’s what’s being transmitted by your home network. Take these extra measures to protect your devices, data, and yourself as you enjoy the benefits of the connected care you bring into your life and home.
The post How to Protect Your Internet-Connected Healthcare Devices appeared first on McAfee Blog.
Presented at CODE BLUE 2023, this project titled Enhanced Vulnerability Hunting in WDM Drivers with Symbolic Execution and Taint Analysis introduces IOCTLance, a tool that enhances its capacity to detect various vulnerability types in Windows Driver Model (WDM) drivers. In a comprehensive evaluation involving 104 known vulnerable WDM drivers and 328 unknow n ones, IOCTLance successfully unveiled 117 previously unidentified vulnerabilities within 26 distinct drivers. As a result, 41 CVEs were reported, encompassing 25 cases of denial of service, 5 instances of insufficient access control, and 11 examples of elevation of privilege.
docker build .
dpkg --add-architecture i386
apt-get update
apt-get install git build-essential python3 python3-pip python3-dev htop vim sudo \
openjdk-8-jdk zlib1g:i386 libtinfo5:i386 libstdc++6:i386 libgcc1:i386 \
libc6:i386 libssl-dev nasm binutils-multiarch qtdeclarative5-dev libpixman-1-dev \
libglib2.0-dev debian-archive-keyring debootstrap libtool libreadline-dev cmake \
libffi-dev libxslt1-dev libxml2-dev
pip install angr==9.2.18 ipython==8.5.0 ipdb==0.13.9
# python3 analysis/ioctlance.py -h
usage: ioctlance.py [-h] [-i IOCTLCODE] [-T TOTAL_TIMEOUT] [-t TIMEOUT] [-l LENGTH] [-b BOUND]
[-g GLOBAL_VAR] [-a ADDRESS] [-e EXCLUDE] [-o] [-r] [-c] [-d]
path
positional arguments:
path dir (including subdirectory) or file path to the driver(s) to analyze
optional arguments:
-h, --help show this help message and exit
-i IOCTLCODE, --ioctlcode IOCTLCODE
analyze specified IoControlCode (e.g. 22201c)
-T TOTAL_TIMEOUT, --total_timeout TOTAL_TIMEOUT
total timeout for the whole symbolic execution (default 1200, 0 to unlimited)
-t TIMEOUT, --timeout TIMEOUT
timeout for analyze each IoControlCode (default 40, 0 to unlimited)
-l LENGTH, --length LENGTH
the limit of number of instructions for technique L engthLimiter (default 0, 0
to unlimited)
-b BOUND, --bound BOUND
the bound for technique LoopSeer (default 0, 0 to unlimited)
-g GLOBAL_VAR, --global_var GLOBAL_VAR
symbolize how many bytes in .data section (default 0 hex)
-a ADDRESS, --address ADDRESS
address of ioctl handler to directly start hunting with blank state (e.g.
140005c20)
-e EXCLUDE, --exclude EXCLUDE
exclude function address split with , (e.g. 140005c20,140006c20)
-o, --overwrite overwrite x.sys.json if x.sys has been analyzed (default False)
-r, --recursion do not kill state if detecting recursion (default False)
-c, --complete get complete base state (default False)
-d, --debug print debug info while analyzing (default False)
# python3 evaluation/statistics.py -h
usage: statistics.py [-h] [-w] path
positional arguments:
path target dir or file path
optional arguments:
-h, --help show this help message and exit
-w, --wdm copy the wdm drivers into <path>/wdm