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DVRTC: intentionally vulnerable VoIP/WebRTC lab with SIP enumeration, RTP bleed, TURN abuse, and credential cracking exercises

Author here. DVRTC is our attempt to fill a gap that's been there for a while: web app security has DVWA and friends, but there's been nothing equivalent for VoIP and WebRTC attack techniques.

The first scenario (pbx1) deploys a full stack β€” Kamailio as the SIP proxy, Asterisk as the back-end PBX, rtpengine for media, coturn for TURN/STUN β€” with each component configured to exhibit specific vulnerable behaviors:

  • Kamailio returns distinguishable responses for valid vs. invalid extensions (enumeration), logs User-Agent headers to MySQL without sanitisation (SQLi), and has a special handler that triggers digest auth leaks for extension 2000
  • rtpengine is using default configuration, that enables RTP bleed (leaking media from other sessions) and RTP injection
  • coturn uses hardcoded credentials and a permissive relay policy for the TURN abuse exercise
  • Asterisk has extension 1000 with a weak password (1500) for online cracking

7 exercises with step-by-step instructions. There's also a live instance at pbx1.dvrtc.net if you want to try it without standing up your own.

Happy to answer questions.

submitted by /u/EnableSecurity
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