Following up on the Careless Whisper research from University of Vienna / SBA Research (published late 2024, proof-of-concept public as of December 2025):
Protocol-level vulnerability:
Both Signal and WhatsApp use the Signal Protocol for E2EE, which is cryptographically sound. Both platforms, however, emit unencrypted delivery receiptsβprotocol-level acknowledgements of message delivery.
The research demonstrates a side-channel where RTT characteristics of delivery receipts leak recipient behavioural patterns. This is not a cryptographic issue. This is an information-leakage issue where an auxiliary channel (delivery receipt timing) reveals what the primary channel (encrypted messages) is supposed to conceal: who's communicating, when, and from where.
Attack surface:
Platform architectures:
Signal's architecture mitigates this better but doesn't eliminate it. WhatsApp's architecture provides less protection.
Current mitigation status:
Why this matters for protocol design:
This is a good case study in why you can't evaluate messaging security through encryption alone. You need to think about: