In enterprise environments, identity effectively became the control plane once network perimeters broke down (e.g. zero trust, et cetera).

I’m seeing a similar pattern emerging on the public internet via age verification and safety regulation, but with identity moving closer to the access layer itself.

Not just: “Are you over 18?”

But: identity assertions are becoming part of how access is granted at the OS/device/app store level.

From a security perspective, this seems to introduce some new attack surfaces:

• high-value identity tokens at the OS/device level
• new trust boundaries between apps, OS, and third-party verifiers
• incentives to target device compromise or token reuse rather than account-level bypass
• potential centralisation of identity providers as enforcement points

Questions I’m trying to think through:

• Does this effectively make identity providers the new perimeter/control plane?
• How would you model this system (closer to DRM, identity federation, or something else?)
• What are the likely failure modes if this layer becomes centralised?
• Are decentralised / on-device credentials actually viable from a security standpoint, or do they just shift the attack surface?

Curious how people here would threat model this or where the obvious breakpoints are.

NTLM-Relaying has been proclaimed dead a number of times, signing requirements for SMB and LDAP make it nearly impossible to use captured NTLM authentications anymore. However, it is still possible to relay to many webservers that do not enforce Extended Protection for Authentication (not just ADCS / ESC8).

A missing authentication check in TP-Link’s Archer NX series allows unprivileged attackers to upload firmware. The update lands as the company defends a Texas lawsuit alleging deceptive security claims.

Analysis of the LiteLLM incident: stolen CI tokens → malicious PyPI releases → credential exfiltration from runtime environments.

With focus on trust boundaries in CI/CD and secret exposure.