Due to the increasing trend of OAuth abuse in phishing and most users' lack of understanding between Device Code and OAuth App Consent phishing, I just added them to the PhishU Framework. Now with a quick, two-step process red teams and internal orgs can leverage the templates to train users for this very real-world attack.

Check out the blog for details at https://phishu.net/blogs/blog-microsoft-entra-device-code-phishing-phishu-framework.html if interested!

I built a set of Claude Code subagents designed for pentesters and red teamers doing authorized engagements.

What it does: You install 6 agent files into Claude Code, and it automatically routes to the right specialist based on what you're working on. Paste Nmap output and it prioritizes attack vectors with

follow-up commands. Ask about an AD attack and it gives you the methodology AND the detection perspective. Ask it to write a report finding and it formats it to PTES standards with CVSS scoring.

The agents cover:

- Engagement planning with MITRE ATT&CK mapping

- Recon/scan output analysis (Nmap, Nessus, BloodHound, etc.)

- Exploitation methodology with defensive perspective built in

- Detection rule generation (Sigma, Splunk SPL, Elastic KQL)

- DISA STIG compliance analysis with keep-open justifications

- Professional pentest report writing

Every technique references ATT&CK IDs, and the exploit guide agent is required to explain what the attack looks like from the blue team side — so it's useful for purple team work too.

Repo has example outputs so you can see the quality before installing: https://github.com/0xSteph/pentest-ai/tree/main/examples

Open to feedback. If you think an agent is missing or the methodology is off somewhere, PRs are welcome.

Write up of a vulnerability chain from a recent SaaS pen test. Two medium-severity findings (file upload bypass and stored XSS) chained together for full admin account creation.

The target had CSP restricting script sources to self, CORS locked down, and CSRF tokens on forms. All functioning correctly. The chain bypassed everything by staying same-origin the entire way.

The file upload had no server-side validation (client-side accept=".pdf" only), so we uploaded a JS payload. It got served back from the app's own download endpoint on the same origin. The stored XSS in the admin inbox messaging system loaded it via an <img onerror> handler that fetched the payload and eval'd it. The payload created a backdoor admin account using the admin's session cookie.

CSP didn't block it because the script was hosted same-origin via the upload. CORS irrelevant since nothing crossed an origin boundary. CSRF tokens didn't matter because same-origin JS can read the DOM and grab them anyway.

Full write up with attack steps, code, and screenshots: https://kurtisebear.com/2026/03/28/chaining-file-upload-xss-admin-compromise/

Also built a Docker lab that reproduces the exact chain with the security controls in place. PHP app, both vulns baked in, admin + user accounts seeded. Clone and docker-compose up: https://github.com/echosecure/vuln-chain-lab